STANCETAKING AS IDENTITY WORK:

THE CASE OF MIXED AMERICAN/ISRAELI COUPLES

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Stancetaking as identity work: The case of mixed American/Israeli couples
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation identifies and contributes to filling several gaps in research on stance, with an eye toward the role of stancetaking as a means of identity construction. The case in focus is one at a cultural border, with data coming from relatively unstructured interviews I conducted with mixed American/Israeli couples. The twelve interviews yielded over 9,000 stancetaking clauses, which are the focus of three related analyses.

The first analysis presents two types of evidence showing that stancetakers can achieve intersubjectivity beyond the level of the turn-by-turn: first, examples of explicitly intertextual stancetaking drawing on the relationship between stancetakers, and second, patterns in stancetaking within a community that provide support for the idea of a “stance repertoire” within that community. The second analysis is a statistical examination of Israelis’ and Americans’ uses of epistemic stance marking as they differ by stance topic; I argue that this second study provides quantitative support for previous qualitative studies of epistemic stance, and shows that Israelis and Americans pattern similarly in their use of epistemic marking. The third analysis uses four case studies of Israeli speakers to examine the relationship between the way a stance is produced at the discourse level and at the phonetic level, with a particular focus on vowel quality. Regression analyses find that each of the stance-related discourse factors of topic, epistemic stance type, evaluation, and
alignment significantly affect the production of at least some vowels for at least some speakers, with some of the variation attributable to a change in the influence of the speakers’ L1 (Hebrew) phonology on their L2 production. This analysis demonstrates not only that stance-related variables are useful for understanding sound variation in general, but also that sound variation can help us understand the enterprise of stancetaking more thoroughly.

Taken together, these findings show that speakers construct their identities in part through the kinds of stances they take and the ways that they take them. They also demonstrate several directions for further research on stancetaking, particularly in operationalizing relationships between local identity moves and higher-level identity categories (for example, nationality) that speakers orient to.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

*Stance* has become an increasingly popular theoretic concept in linguistics and linguistic anthropology. The term has been used to describe the subjective evaluation of stance objects and the intersubjective negotiation of viewpoints between conversation participants. It has been used as a shorthand for *epistemic stance*, which itself addresses both evidence given for assertions and a speaker’s claims to authority to make those assertions. It has been analyzed as a grammatical phenomenon and as an interpersonal phenomenon. Some researchers have characterized stancetaking as one of the many linguistic resources that speakers use to display and help construct their identities in interaction.

The goal of this dissertation is to draw attention to some new ways to approach the study of stance by presenting qualitative and quantitative analyses that show how stancetaking is associated with speakers’ construction of their identities both on a local level and more broadly. These analyses address stance primarily as an interpersonal phenomenon, focusing on the ways that speakers present themselves through stancetaking in conversation. More specifically, this dissertation identifies and contributes to filling three gaps in the stance literature:

1. The achievement of intersubjectivity in stancetaking beyond the turn-by-turn.
2. Quantitative examination of topic- and nationality-based patterns in epistemic stance, and
3. Phonetic correlates of stancetaking, including those related to the prominence of foreign accent.

All three of the analyses that address these gaps show that speakers construct their identities in part through the kinds of stances they take and the ways that they take them. These analyses demonstrate the importance of stancetaking for understanding sociolinguistic variation by describing how speakers vary their stancetaking both on the discourse level and on the phonetic level—and by examining the relationships between the two. These analyses show that stancetaking plays an important role in conditioning variation, and argue that it is crucial to include stance among other predictors of intraspeaker variation, including speech event, interlocutor, and topic.

In the remainder of this Introduction, I first provide an overview of previous research on stance (1.1), then introduce the study of sociophonetic variation (1.2), which is the focus on the analysis in Chapter 6. I highlight some key theories relating language use to speaker identity, showing how I believe an analysis of stancetaking can contribute to our understanding of identity construction (1.3). Finally, I situate the study in the literature on Jewish languages and on language use by Israelis and American Jews (1.4). The chapter closes with a section (1.5) providing an overview of the dissertation.

1.1 A theoretical introduction to stance

Recent treatments of stance provide frameworks and illustrative analyses to demonstrate that stance is fundamental in the construction and presentation of the
emerging self within a conversation. In view of the research on language and identity showing that identities are constructed in interaction, this understanding of stance also has implications for larger, more enduring conceptions of identity.

The term “stance” has been used in much of the literature examining the evolving self in discourse, for example both in Goffman’s (1981 [1979]) presentation of footing and in Ochs’ (1992) discussion of indirect indexicality. Recently, however, the concept of stance has become more widely addressed in linguistics and linguistic anthropology, as witnessed by the large number of publications in the area, including two recent edited volumes (Englebretson 2007; Jaffe 2009). The recent focus on stance as an object of study and as a vehicle for the display and construction of the self in discourse draws on frameworks such as Goffman’s and Ochs’, as well as on positioning theory (Davies and Harré 1990; van Langenhove and Harré 1999) and the turn-by-turn analysis promoted by Conversation Analysis (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974).

As I discuss in Chapters 4 and 5, stancetaking has been shown to be both subjective, indicating the stancetaker’s perspective, and intersubjective, constructed in concert with other stancetakers. The intersubjective nature of stancetaking has been the focus of work by Kärkkäinen (2003, 2006), who argues that stance emerges in interaction, rather than being “primarily situated in the minds of individual speakers” (2006: 700). This view of stancetaking finds support in research on dialogicality, a term that emerged from literary theory (Bakhtin 1981 [1975]; Kristeva 1980 [1967]) and has been adopted by researchers of language use (Du Bois 2007; Kärkkäinen 2003, 2006; Lempert 2009) to describe the ways that
speakers inevitably engage with and draw on others’ previous utterances. As I argue in Chapter 4, to fully understand the intersubjective nature of stancetaking we must move beyond dialogicality within an interaction and also consider intertextual stancetaking, analyzing the use of constructed dialogue and constructed stance in stancetaking.

In contrast to some earlier studies, which consider stance as an overarching term without making distinctions with regard to the form or function of different types of stances, more recent studies have attempted to distinguish among types of stances. Some have focused only on one type of stance, mainly epistemic stance. *Epistemic stance* has been used to describe the linguistic encoding of many different aspects of a speaker’s relationship to her stance, including information source, reliability, speaker commitment, and so forth. Previous work has also stressed that the use of epistemic marking can relate to interpersonal motivations rather than only epistemological ones. In this study, I contribute to this latter understanding of stance, engaging with work by researchers including Fox (2001), Kamio (1997), Kärkkäinen (2003), Mushin (2001), Pomerantz (1984), and Raymond and Heritage (2006) that focuses on epistemic stance marking as it relates to issues of rights to information and responsibility for information.

While some writers have focused on one type of stance, others have theorized the interrelationships among different types of stances. Agha (2007) and Lempert (2009) point out an important distinction in stance type: that between evaluation, assessment, and evidentiality on the one hand and “orientations toward other (typically co-present) interactants” (Lempert 2009: 225) on the other hand.
Kockelman (2004) makes a slightly different distinction: that between “the stances we take toward states of affairs [and]...the stances we take toward our own and others’ stances” (143). Schiffrin (2006) develops a useful model for understanding stance through the positioning of the self in relation to the “‘real’ world of referential meaning” (210). Similarly, Du Bois has developed a framework that highlights the relationships among current speaker, prior speaker, and stance object.

In the most complete formulation of his approach to stance, Du Bois (2007) argues for the use of a “stance triangle” (Figure 1.1) as a tool for attending to “the structured interrelations among the acts and entities which comprise stance [and thus allow] participants, and analysts, to draw inferences by triangulating from the explicit components of stance to the implicit” (165). He maintains that we simultaneously accomplish three component acts in a single act of stancetaking: evaluation, “the process whereby a stancetaker orients to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality or value” (143); positioning, through which the stancetaker indicates her affective stance (e.g. “I’m glad”) and epistemic stance, or claim to variable degrees of certainty or knowledge; and finally alignment, “the act of calibrating the relationship between two stances, and by implication between two stancetakers” (144). Thus Du Bois explains stancetaking, using the first-person point of view of the stancetaker: “I evaluate something, and thereby position myself, and thereby align with [respect to] you” (163). This formulation emphasizes three crucial entities in stancetaking: the present stancetaker.
(Subject₁); a prior stancetaker (Subject₂), with whom Subject₁ aligns; and a stance object to which both stancetakers are oriented.

**Figure 1.1: The stance triangle (reproduced from Du Bois 2007: 163)**

Du Bois’ model has the advantage of addressing several categories of stance (epistemic, affective, propositional, interactional) and it begins to provide a framework to understand the relations among them. Du Bois’ model of stance can be seen to incorporate all conceptions of stance that have been put forward, while distinguishing between different elements of stancetaking and at the same time painting a larger picture. The stance triangle forces an analyst to move from a focus on just epistemic stance or just interactional stance to a wider view of the complex
act of stancetaking, with both its propositional and interactional functions. While the stance triangle itself does not operationalize the relationship between individual stances and more enduring aspects of identity, it does provide a useful starting point to examine this interaction and can be productively paired with theories, including that of Bucholtz and Hall (2005), discussed below in Section 1.3, that do operationalize this relationship.

This dissertation contributes to filling three gaps in the body of research on stance. The first gap, addressed in Chapter 4, is created by a strong focus in the stance literature on local intersubjectivity. As I show in that chapter, while there are good reasons for this focus, it is necessary to move beyond such a narrow focus, since intersubjectivity is certainly created beyond immediate, turn-by-turn contexts. I demonstrate this through an analysis of intertextual stancetaking, which shows that speakers invoke others’ stances at great temporal distances in their own stancetaking, and through an analysis of a community’s stance repertoire, a set of stances that speakers who have possibly never met each other are able to draw on.

The second gap, which is the topic of Chapter 5, is in the area of epistemic stance. While there have been many studies of both the evidential and the interpersonal functions of epistemic stance marking, there has not been any systematic, quantitative study of the type of patterns that emerge on a larger scale within a particular population with particular interpersonal concerns. Chapter 5 seeks to address this lacuna, identifying topic- and nationality-based patterns across thousands of stances from two dozen speakers and bridging epistemic and interactional stancetaking. Finally, Chapter 6 builds on a small number of studies
relating sound variation to stance-related discourse variables, and demonstrates not only that stance-related variables are useful for understanding sound variation in general, but also that sound variation can potentially help us understand the enterprise of stancetaking more thoroughly. Thus this study identifies three related directions for future research in the study of stancetaking.

1.2 Phonetic and phonological variation

Chapter 6 presents a sociophonetic analysis of four speakers’ stancetaking. Sociophonetics is distinguished from investigations of phonological variation by seeking to move beyond the usually binary phonological categories historically investigated in studies of sociolinguistic variation, such as r-full/r-less (Feagin 1979; Labov 1966), -ing/-in’ variation (Campbell-Kibler 2007; Labov 1966; Trudgill 1974), shifted or unshifted vowels (Eckert 1989; Feagin 1986), and released vs. unreleased /t/ (Benor 2001, 2004b; Bucholtz 1996).¹ These influential studies have revealed much about language variation and change and formed the basis of many areas of sociolinguistic inquiry. However, recent studies have shown that sound variation is frequently not binary, and that even subtle phonetic variation can be used to distinguish social groups or situations. In the case of language contact, a fine-grained phonetic analysis is particularly useful in revealing subtle changes in “accent,” which may be used as an interactional strategy by participants who have access to the phonologies of multiple languages.

¹ Binary categories have been used historically in the study of sociolinguistic variation (a) because they tend to be relatively easy to determine auditorily, and (b) because they lend themselves to VARBRUL analysis.
This dissertation begins to answer a call (by, e.g., Hay and Drager 2007; Podesva 2006) to apply the theories of the broader field of research in language and social meaning to the study of the detailed production of sound in language. Chapter 6 marries a sociophonetic approach to variation in vowel production with the theoretical grounding provided by stance analysis.

1.3 Language and identity

This work is not only a study of stance and sociophonetic variation; it is also a study of how speakers use language to display and construct their identities. There have been many sociolinguistic studies of identity construction among ethnic minorities and immigrant groups in the United States. There has been comparatively less sociolinguistic research on couples whose members, coming from different ethnic or national backgrounds, must construct joint and individual identities in relation to each partner’s background and other available identities (the few such studies in a European context include Anderson 1999, 2002; Piller 2002). The couples whose talk is analyzed in this dissertation are binational couples in which one partner is a Jewish American and the other partner is a Jewish Israeli. Such couples have two different national cultures within their families, though they also have access to discourses about an imagined Jewish community that transcends national boundaries (on imagined communities, see Anderson 1983 and Chapter 2 of this dissertation). This coexistence of “same” and “different” made Israeli/Jewish American romantic partnerships seem a promising setting for the investigation of identity construction. This work examines how members of these binational couples
position themselves as similar and different through stancetaking, and it considers how the use of local positioning strategies interacts with higher-level (less situationally specific) identity categories that the speakers orient to.

Following a social constructionist approach, I understand identity as something individuals construct rather than something individuals “have.” Someone who belongs to a given ethnic group, gender, or profession—for example—must choose to what extent to adopt and display elements of the perceived identity of that group and other groups, whether in terms of appearance, social or ritual activities, or language use. Identity is negotiated in “relationship with larger social constructs” (Mendoza-Denton 2002: 475) at every level: “macro-level demographic categories; . . . local, ethnographically specific cultural positions; and . . . temporary and interactionally specific stances and participant roles” (Bucholtz & Hall 2005: 592). That is to say, identity is not static but is constructed in an ongoing way, not only varying from year to year but also emergent in interaction from moment to moment and situation to situation. The present study addresses several ways that speakers construct their identities through stancetaking in individual interactions, and considers how identity construction on a local level relates to broader identity categories. The following sections identify some important themes in the literature on language and identity, and their relation to this project.

1.3.1 Language displays and helps construct identity

Sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists have studied how interactants construct and understand identity categories and have demonstrated that linguistic
variables correlate indirectly, rather than directly, with social categories. A linguistic form, whether lexical, syntactic, phonological, or any other form, does not have a direct relationship to a social category. Instead, language provides rich symbolic resources, including those listed just above, that index “stances, social acts, social activities, and other social constructs” (Ochs 1992: 337), which in turn are associated with the interpretations social actors make on the basis of these social constructs. For example, tag questions in English are associated “with stances such as hesitancy, and social acts such as confirmation checks,” which in turn may be associated with, or index, a female social role (Ochs 1992: 340–342). One goal of the present study has been to identify stances and phonetic variants that index locally relevant identity categories.

Bucholtz and Hall (2004, 2005) draw on Ochs’ work on indexicality, as well as Irvine and Gal’s work (2000) on language ideology, in further refining a theory of the construction and interpretation of identity. Building on prior work in anthropology and linguistics, they develop a framework for investigating identity in connection with language use. One aspect of their framework is the “positionality principle,” which states that “identities encompass (a) macro-level demographic categories; (b) local, ethnographically specific cultural positions; and (c) temporary and interactionally specific stances and participant roles” (Bucholtz and Hall 2005: 592). Through choices made in language use, speakers index all of these categories, individually and in combination. Both Ochs (1992) and Bucholtz and Hall (2004, 2005) recognize that linguistic construction of identity may be carried out explicitly (for example, in the naming of self or others) or implicitly (through adoption of
linguistic forms indexing a desired identity, or avoidance of linguistic forms indexing a rejected identity). And, certainly, linguistic construction of identity is multilayered: “identity does not emerge at a single analytic level—whether vowel quality, turn shape, code choice, or ideological structure—but operates at multiple levels simultaneously” (Bucholtz & Hall 2005: 586).

In the present study, I explore two “analytic levels” at which identity operates in the speech of binational couples. I argue that discursive elements of stancetaking index identity more explicitly, while sound variation in stancetaking does so more implicitly. In both cases, however, I argue that speakers are making identity moves on a local level, vis-à-vis their partners, as well as vis-à-vis me (the interviewer), that may be part of a larger enterprise of identity construction.

1.3.2 Identity categories addressed in the present study

In the following chapters, I consider several identity categories that emerge as relevant in the analyses. Perhaps the most obvious, and most “macro-level” category, is national identity. I argue that speakers index their national identity (Israeli or American) through their epistemic marking of stances about the culture of each national group, by marking stances in ways that are predictable within their national group (Chapter 5). Evidence that speakers orient to their national identity as important comes from the fact that nearly all the speakers seemed to accept the premise of the interview (as described in Chapter 2): that Israelis and Americans are different in some way, whether in large-scale cultural practices, ways of communicating, or taken-for-granted elements of daily living such as TV and radio
shows, or food practices. A second macro-level category that I show speakers engage with is level of religious observance. This is a focus of two examples in Chapter 4, both from a single couple, but many members of couples I interviewed took stances positioning themselves explicitly or implicitly as more or less observant than their partner or than Americans or Israelis in general. This is clearly a relevant identity category for many of these couples, and one that is indexed through stancetaking.

In addition to these two “macro-level” identity categories, I note several other identity categories. The first, which I would categorize as a “local, ethnographically specific” position, is engagement in the local Jewish and Israeli community. The analysis in the second part of Chapter 4 shows that speakers index their level of engagement through the kind of stances they take about Israeli and American cultural norms. That this is a relevant category for the speakers is reflected in the fact that most of the couples, whether or not they describe themselves as involved in the Jewish community, knew what I meant when I asked whether they were involved: After an initial response directly answering my question, most interview participants elaborated on their (non)attendance or (non)membership at a synagogue, Jewish community center, or other marker of Jewish community affiliation—though some couples challenged the premise that these sorts of institutional affiliations are equivalent to involvement in the local Jewish community.

The third and final level in Bucholtz and Hall’s positionality principle is “temporary and interactionally specific stances and participant roles.” I argue that
several temporary stances and roles are established both explicitly and implicitly in the speech analyzed in this study. In Chapter 5 I show how speakers overtly index their relative epistemic authority through patterned uses of epistemic marking. In Chapter 6 I show that epistemic authority is one of several local stances indexed through subtle variation in speakers’ production of vowels; other elements of stancetaking that are predictive of such phonetic variation are evaluation and alignment.

1.4. Previous sociolinguistic studies of Israelis and American Jews

1.4.1 Jewish languages, Jewish English, and Jewish linguistic repertoires

Part of the identity construction that speakers in this study engage in is related to their Jewish identity. Thus, in addition to being a study of the linguistic variation associated with stancetaking, and the role of stancetaking in identity construction, this work is also a study of Jewish language use, which joins it to a different research tradition than those already discussed. For millennia, whenever and wherever Jews have formed distinct communities, they have developed their own ways of speaking, differing to some extent from the speech of the communities around them. In more extreme cases, this separation led to a way of speaking that was classified as a separate language; approximately two dozen lects have been identified as Jewish languages, including such languages as Yiddish, Judeo-Spanish, Judeo-Arabic, and many others. These languages differ from their neighboring so-called co-territorial languages in orthography, lexicon, phonology, morphosyntax,
and/or semantics (cf. Fishman 1981: 5).\textsuperscript{2} During the twentieth century, linguistic research on the approximately two dozen historically identified Jewish languages focused primarily on documenting lexical, phonological, morphosyntactic, and semantic features of the languages and analyzing their differences from their neighboring co-territorial languages.\textsuperscript{3} While there has been some debate as to whether Jewish English deserves designation as a Jewish language, much of the early linguistic discussion of Jews' use of English analyzed their speech and writing from the framework developed for other Jewish languages; that is, primarily identifying structural characteristics that distinguish Jewish English from standard English (see, e.g., Fishman 1981; Gold 1985; Rabin 1981; Steinmetz 1981; Wexler 1981). In most of these cases, the variety that is discussed is a variety of English heavily influenced by Yiddish and used mainly or exclusively by Orthodox Jews. In these studies, descriptions of the linguistic practices of English-speaking Jews are typically described in generalizations, rather than based on specific examples or a corpus of linguistic data.

Over the past few decades, emerging sociolinguistic and anthropological theories have been applied to wider use of English by Jews, including discourse strategies and pragmatics, as well as sociolinguistic variation in code choice, phonology and lexis. For example, Tannen (1981) analyzes examples of New York Jewish speech as a sample case of the culturally relative “rules” of conversational

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{2} See \url{www.jewish-languages.org} for an overview of languages and research.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} For example, Yiddish is distinguished from German, its closest relative and a main co-territorial language (of Yiddish I, which is spoken in Germanic lands; see Weinreich 2008 [1973]), by being written in Hebrew characters and also through lexical, phonological, and other differences. Judeo-Arabic similarly differs from co-territorial Muslim and Christian varieties of Arabic.
\end{itemize}
style, while Schiffrin (1984) demonstrates, based on a series of interactions she observed, that for at least some American Jews, arguing with each other is viewed positively, as a sign of friendship and intimacy, rather than as something to be avoided.


A more recent development in the study of Jewish English, and the language use by Jewish speakers of other languages, is the concept of a “Jewish linguistic repertoire” (Benor 2009, 2010, 2011), or a “Jewish linguistic spectrum” (Hary 2009). Rather than focusing on a fixed set of differences between two reified languages or dialects, this approach emphasizes the agentiveness with which
members of Jewish communities can choose among a set of linguistic resources to index their Jewishness in particular ways. Rather than asking questions such as “Is X a Jewish language, and how does it differ from co-territorial languages?,” this newer approach asks questions such as “What linguistic resources are available to members of a certain Jewish community, and how are these resources selectively employed to index varying degrees of identification with the Jewish community and the larger communities?” This newer approach resonates well with the larger body of research on language and identity, taking into account such concepts as interspeaker variation, indirect indexicality, agentiveness in identity construction, and the availability of style shifting. This approach also motivates the present study, in which I argue that stances are part of the repertoire of any community, and that a particular set of stances are part of the repertoire of the communities that these twelve couples belong to. Though stances are not normally associated with a particular Jewish language, I argue that they nonetheless index alignment with Jewishly-relevant identity categories.

1.4.2 Sociolinguistic research on Hebrew and English spoken by Israelis

Sociolinguistic research on Hebrew and on language use in Israel is much more abundant than research on Jewish English, with substantial bodies of work in the areas of bilingualism and language policy (e.g. Ben-Rafael 1994; Fishman and Fishman 1978; Maschler 1991; Spolsky and Shohamy 1999) as well as in discourse analysis and pragmatics. Here I briefly review some findings relevant to the present study.
One feature of Israeli discourse that has been much remarked on is the preference for directness, identified in speech among friends and co-workers (Blum-Kulka 1982) and in families (Blum-Kulka 1997), and reified by Katriel in her 1986 book *Talking straight: Dugri speech in Israeli sabra culture*. Drawing on this body of research, Chiarini (2010) analyzes a corpus of English e-mails written by Israeli Jews and Arabs and finds that Israeli Jews tend to use a direct (largely unmitigated) style of politeness even in English. However, Katriel (2004) argues that the emphasis on direct speech has declined in recent years among Israelis; Maschler (2001) finds support for this claim in the rise of the increasingly popular Hebrew discourse markers *ke’ilu* and *kaze* (both closely analogous to the English discourse marker *like*), used frequently as hedges, which would have been dispreferred when “straight talk” was the rule of the day. The findings in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, with regard to patterns of epistemic stance style, may provide further evidence for minimized difference in the use of directness between Israelis and American Jews.

There is relatively little research on sound variation in Hebrew to draw on for the present study. One exception is Levon (2009, 2010), who examines a range of linguistic practices, including lexical and prosodic variation, to show how lesbian and gay Israelis perform their sexual and national identities.

### 1.4.3 Summary

The present study engages both with discourse analytic studies of language use by Israelis and Jewish Americans and with the new tradition of research on
Jewish linguistic repertoires. Many researchers of Jewish languages would not categorize the speech of participants in this study as a Jewish language. The classification of Hebrew as a Jewish language is problematic because, for most of its active history, Hebrew has been the language of a nation (both ancient and modern Israel) rather than a minority variety of a dominant language, like other Jewish languages (cf. Ornan 1985 “Hebrew is not a Jewish language”). And the Americans and Israelis who I spoke with in the course of this study do not speak a variety of English that is markedly different from surrounding varieties, which is one way that Jewish languages have traditionally been defined. However, as I show in different ways in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the couples in this study have varying degrees of access to several Jewish repertoires, as reflected in their stancetaking. This project thus not only builds on prior research on language and identity, showing ways that stancetaking can bridge different “levels” of identity, both local and higher-level, but it also contributes to linguistic research on the Jewish and national identities of both American- and Israeli-born Jews, while helping to bridge the gap between Jewish languages research and current sociolinguistic theory.

1.5 Outline of chapters

Chapter 2 describes the research population that is the focus of this study, discussing relevant social and political factors, and introducing the twelve couples who form the group of research subjects. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the research methods employed in data collection. Chapters 4–6 constitute the analytical heart of the dissertation: Chapter 4 provides two related arguments for
considering intersubjectivity in stancetaking beyond the local turn-by-turn level, Chapter 5 presents the results of a statistical analysis of stancetaking practices in this research population, and Chapter 6 investigates how the speakers’ vowel production is correlated with stance-related variables. Chapter 7, the conclusion, outlines the significance of this study and proposes some future directions for further research.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH POPULATION

This chapter provides background information about the general population from which my participants were drawn (2.1 and 2.2), addresses the complex concept of “community” (2.3), and introduces the reader to the twelve couples I interviewed for the study (2.4).

2.1 Israelis in America

Research has found that Israelis migrate to North America with varying goals. Some seek permanent residence, following the American dream (Nahshon 1976), while others migrate for educational or professional reasons and plan to return to Israel, especially if they have families (Gold 2001). Even if plans to return rarely materialize, they play an important role in individuals’ self-conception (Cohen and Gold 1997). Israeli immigrants seem to have an ambivalent status in the U.S. On the one hand, generally high levels of education, familiarity with Western norms, and, in many cases, a Caucasian appearance give the immigrants certain advantages in adapting to American life. On the other hand, economic success and personal satisfaction seem to relate to ethnicity (European vs. Middle Eastern or North African), age, gender, and destination, with the size and strength of Israeli support networks varying by city (Gold 1994, 2001).

All Israelis who leave Israel for any substantial length of time at least potentially face the stigma of yerida. Yerida (literally ‘descent’) is viewed in opposition to aliya (literally ‘ascent,’ colloquially ‘immigration to Israel’), as
explained by Gold (2002): “In contrast to the Hebrew term aliyah that refers to Jews’ move from the diaspora to the higher place of Israel, yeridah describes the stigmatized downward path of Israelis who descend from the Promised Land into the diaspora. Emigrants are the yordim” (5). In the 1970s, when Israel saw its first substantial waves of yerida, yordim were called “moral lepers” by then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, reflecting common sentiment in Israel (see, e.g., Gold 2002; Nahshon 1976). I learned in my interviews that the view of yordim is not much better today. In the following excerpt, Liora, a young Israeli woman I interviewed, voices a sentiment she attributes to her family members when they learned she was planning to live abroad. “They” in Line 1 refers to her family members who immigrated to Israel.

Excerpt 2.14

1 Liora You know they wanted to settle down somewhere, ok you’re Jewish your place should be here.
2 Rebecca Mm-hm,
3 Liora And now you’re going to be an immigrant again, I mean we did, we went through all this trouble, to build our country,
4 So you would be safe and you go you know our families are going to be living there,
5 Rebecca Right.
6 Right.
7 Liora And you go and you know ruin.
8 @@@ Ruin our efforts.
9 What the hell’s wrong with you.

In part as a result of Israelis’ complex ideologies about yerida, “Israeli emigrants confront [a] paradox of membership and belonging as individuals and within the

4 Transcription conventions appear in Appendix A.
communities they create in places of settlement” (Gold 2002: 6). Several of the Israelis I interviewed expressed gratitude for the local Israeli community and close ties with the local Jewish community, while simultaneously expressing a desire to return to Israel at some point in their lives.

2.2 The Washington area Jewish and Israeli communities

The Israelis who form the basis of this study with their American partners live in Washington, DC and its suburbs. While this destination of Israeli emigrants has not received as much attention as the communities in, say, New York (Ben Ami 1992; Ritterband 1986; Shokeid 1988, 2002) or Los Angeles (Sabar 2000), there are several pockets of Israelis living especially in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs of DC. One community that has received a fair amount of attention is that in Rockville, Maryland. Though the exact size of the community is unknown, the community is so well-recognized that newspapers from the Baltimore Sun to the Israeli daily Haaretz have profiled it. The area features Israeli restaurants, kosher grocery stores that stock Israeli food, and plenty of Israeli cultural activities (films, dances, lectures). An apartment complex located near the Rockville Jewish Community Center is even known informally as “The Kibbutz” (named after the famous farming cooperatives throughout Israel), and newly arrived Israeli families regularly seek—and are recruited—to fill empty apartments in the Kibbutz or nearby. A recent article in the Baltimore Sun quoted an Israeli man as saying that when he moved to Maryland from Israel, he was told by Israelis already in the area not to consider any zip codes other than 20852, the zip code that contains the Kibbutz (Marech 2008).
The Washington area also has a large, vibrant Jewish community, with Jewish Community Centers, Jewish schools, and of course synagogues scattered in many locations throughout the region. I had initially hoped to focus my research on mixed Israeli/American couples living in Rockville, due to its prominence as a destination for Israelis in the area. However, in my recruiting efforts, I found it difficult to reach enough couples living in Rockville. Ultimately, among the twelve couples interviewed for this research, three were living in Rockville at the time, three additional couples were living in suburbs near Rockville, and the other six couples lived in other parts of DC, Maryland, or Northern Virginia. As I conducted my interviews, however, I learned that living in Rockville is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for being engaged in a local Jewish and Israeli community; two of the three couples living in Rockville did not seem to have their relationships and activities centered in the Rockville community much at all, three of the couples living near Rockville were more involved, and some of the couples living in Northern Virginia had their own group of Israelis who socialized together.

2.3 Use of the term “community”

So far I have used the terms “Jewish community,” “Israeli community,” and “Rockville community” without explaining what I mean by community. The idea of “community” and how it is relevant to language use has been approached in many ways in linguistics, and I believe several conceptions of community are helpful for understanding language use by the couples interviewed for this project.

*Speech community* is the oldest term in linguistics for describing a collective of people whose language use is under analysis, and according to some definitions of
the term, all of the couples in this study are members of a shared speech community. The term has been variously used to describe simply any “group of people who interact by means of speech” (Bloomfield 1933: 42), a group of people whose communication is in some way distinct from other groups due to “regular and frequent interaction by means of a shared body of verbal signs” (Gumperz 2001 [1968]: 43), or, somewhat differently, a group of people who participate in “a relative homogeneity in norms of interpretation,” even if their speech production is heterogeneous (Labov 1980: 369). These three definitions alone (and they are not the only ones) demonstrate the wide range of ways the term speech community has been used (see Patrick 2002 for a more thorough overview). I see little utility in using a term that is understood in so many different ways. Based on these definitions, we don’t know what a priori assumptions an analyst is making by using the term: direct interaction among group members, uniformity and distinctness of communication style, or uniformity and distinctness of interpretive norms? I made none of these assumptions when beginning this study, and after having analyzed their speech and stancetaking, I would not feel comfortable applying any one of these definitions to the entire group of couples I interviewed.

One term that seems more useful to me is imagined community, which comes from the political scientist Benedict Anderson (1983). Anderson explains that a nation is an imagined community “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1983: 6). Members of the couples in this study belong, at least potentially, to several imagined
communities, and not only national ones: Israelis, Americans, the worldwide Jewish community, the local Jewish community, a community of Israelis married to Americans, perhaps even a larger imagined community of binational couples more broadly, and others. It is important to remember that, even though members of these communities may never meet each other, someone who identifies as part of an imagined community views herself or himself as having something fundamental in common with other members of the community. Viewpoints and ideologies may be among the things that members of an imagined community conceive of themselves as sharing, and these viewpoints and ideologies are developed and expressed through stancetaking.

This idea of shared viewpoints and ideologies is further developed in Strauss’s (2004) idea of an opinion community and Du Bois’ (2007) description of a community of discourse. Strauss defines an opinion community as:

any social group, of any size, in which opinions are discussed (or...in which assumptions are shared). It can be a face-to-face group like a family, social clique, or local community, or a far-flung one in which various media—electronic chat rooms, newspapers, music, movies, and television—mediate the discussion. Opinion communities are formed by prior discussion of a topic, and familiarity with this prior discussion is part of the expected competence of members of that community. (Strauss 2004: 170)
Though Du Bois doesn’t define his *community of discourse*, his claim that “a stancetaker’s words derive from, and further engage with, the words of those who have spoken before—whether immediately within the current exchange of stance utterances, or more remotely along the horizons of language and prior text as projected by the community of discourse” (Du Bois 2007: 140) gives a similar impression to that of Strauss’s opinion community.

An opinion community or community of discourse may overlap to varying extents with multiple imagined communities, speech communities, and communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991). It is important to note that this study is not a community of practice study. Though each couple constitutes a miniature community of practice, and several of the couples participate in larger communities of practice with each other, not all of the couples participate in shared endeavors. As I argue in Chapter 4, we would certainly expect stances to be part of the repertoire of a community of practice. However, this study shows that speakers need not participate in a shared community of practice to have a shared stance repertoire.

2.4 Couples in the study

Twelve couples participated in this study: six in which the Israeli partner was a woman and the American partner was a man, and six in which the Israeli partner was a man and the American partner was a woman. The couples’ pseudonyms and approximate length of relationship at the time of the interview are listed in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Study participants (all names are pseudonyms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Israeli woman/American man</th>
<th>Length of relationship at time of interview (approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Einat and Josh</td>
<td>21 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galit and Kevin</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liat and David</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liora and Clark</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violette and Zebulun</td>
<td>7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yael and John</td>
<td>14 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American woman/Israeli man</th>
<th>Length of relationship at time of interview (approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amy and Barak</td>
<td>15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claire and Arad</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emily and Yair</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenna and Yossi</td>
<td>8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy and Misha</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel and Tomer</td>
<td>13 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the time of their respective interviews, most of the couples were married; Lucy and Misha and Emily and Yair were engaged. All the couples in the first part of Table 2.1 (Israeli woman/American man) were parents, except Galit and Kevin, who were expecting their first child. Interestingly, Amy and Barak were the only couple in the second part of Table 2.1 (American woman/Israeli man) who were parents at the time of their interview.\(^5\)

Six of the couples (Einat and Josh, Yael and John, Amy and Barak, Claire and Arad, Emily and Yair, Lucy and Misha) lived in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, four (Galit and Kevin, Liora and Clark, Violette and Zebulun, Jenna and Yossi) lived in the Virginia suburbs, and two (Liat and David, Rachel and Tomer) lived within the

\(^5\) That is, Amy and Barak were the only couple who had children together. Yair and Emily were both parents of grown children from their previous marriages.
city limits of DC. Among the Maryland couples, Amy and Barak are friends with Yael and John, and several of the Maryland couples report involvement with the same synagogues and community institutions. Among the Virginia couples, Jenna and Yossi know both Violette and Zebulun (Violette is Yossi's sister) and Galit and Kevin. Among the American partners in the couples, only Josh, John, Amy, and Rachel had lived in Israel, and only Amy and Rachel claimed to speak Hebrew confidently.

Religious self-identification is important but somewhat complex to report, as many interviewees told me about both their past and present religious identification, and in many cases these were both quite different for two members of a couple. Most of the American participants grew up in moderately religious homes, with families that belonged to non-Orthodox synagogues and did not strictly observe Jewish law. Some of the Israeli participants (Arad, Einat, and to a lesser extent Tomer) had, at least at some point in their life, been more strictly observant, and many of the Israeli participants reported preferring a more traditional synagogue services than their partners.

At the time of their respective interviews, none of the couples was strictly religious. Most attended synagogue only for holidays or the occasional Shabbat (Sabbath), if at all. Yair and Emily, and Arad, are the exceptions to this rule: all reported attending synagogue services regularly. None of the participants strictly observed the regulations surrounding Shabbat. Several couples reported keeping kosher at home (Arad and Claire, Einat and Josh, Galit and Kevin), though for the last two of these couples keeping kosher is described more as a cultural than as a religious practice. In each of the couples that keeps kosher at home, the practice was
initiated by the Israeli partner and the American partner reports “going along” with
the Israeli partner’s wishes on that front.

In sum, among the twelve couples there is some amount of variation in family
status, religious practices and identification, and the American partner’s experience
with Israel.
CHAPTER 3: METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

This chapter describes the methods of data collection used to form the corpus of interviews on which this dissertation is based. I begin, in Section 3.1, by situating myself with regard to the community under study. While I do not claim that this is an ethnographic study, Section 3.1 shows that I am not a complete outsider to the community, and that the ways that participants in the study seemed to view me may have shaped their talk on the interview topics. Section 3.2 describes the recruitment methods used, then Section 3.3 discusses my choice to use interviews as the data source for this study, identifying some of the benefits of an interview methodology, and describing the particular methodology I used in my data collection. Section 3.4 sums up the methods of data collection.

3.1 The researcher

My engagement in the Washington-area Jewish community has been ongoing for several years. As soon as I moved to DC in 2005, I became part of the Jewish community by virtue of my participation in Jewish religious and social activities in the area. Through these types of activities I met not only American Jews but also Israelis, in part through a Hebrew conversation group for Israelis and fluent Hebrew speakers. In Rockville, I have attended religious services geared toward Israelis, Israeli Independence Day celebrations, and Israeli dance classes. In early 2007 I began conducting research interviews with Israeli/American couples and have been thinking about identity construction and stancetaking by these couples ever since.
All of these activities have given me a degree of familiarity with Jewish life in the Washington area and with the local Israeli community. I have experience with Israeli culture more broadly by virtue of having spent three recent summers in Israel on educational programs, twice enrolled in intensive Hebrew language programs and once on an archaeological dig. These experiences in Israel, combined with reading Hebrew newspapers online and listening to Israeli music while in the U.S., add another layer to my familiarity with Israeli culture and lifestyles.

I believe that many of the participants in my study view me as an insider to some extent, though I may not live in their neighborhoods or have children who go to the same schools as theirs. Since my first contact with all participants was by e-mail, they knew my full name before meeting me. My middle name, Rubin, is a common Jewish surname both in the U.S. and in Israel. My last name, Damari, is shared by one of Israel’s most famous singers, the late Shoshana Damari. At some point before the interview began, or early in the interview, I mentioned to all participants that I have spent time in Israel, including two summers in language programs. In addition to the fact that several participants asked if I or my husband was related to Shoshana Damari, I also gain confidence that participants saw me as an insider because many of them used Hebrew words or phrases in interviews without translation or explanation, referred to such Israeli cultural institutions as Galatz and Galgalatz (popular radio stations) and Lalsha (a popular women’s magazine), or made unflattering comments about other Jews or Israelis they knew, which I suspect they would avoid with outsiders (cf. Schiffrin 1984: 314: “after receiving such confirmation [that the interviewer was Jewish, as was the
interviewee], one woman said that she could then speak freely”).

3.2 Recruitment

I recruited participants through three primary methods.

Listservs. Between 2007 and 2010 I sent out several e-mails to a listserv I participate in that is geared toward Israelis living in the Washington, DC area. E-mails indicated that I was interested in meeting couples consisting of one Israeli and one American. In the e-mails I explained that I was doing research on communication and identity in binational couples. I also sent an e-mail to a local synagogue listserv that I participate in. Of the twelve couples included in the final study, nine were recruited through listservs.

Flyers. I put up flyers (with similar wording to the e-mails) in the Jewish Community Center in Rockville as well as at kosher grocery stores in the area. One of the couples included in the final study contacted me after seeing a flyer.

Word of mouth. Many couples I recruited mentioned having friends who might be interested in participating in the study. I encouraged each of these couples to tell their friends about the study and to forward my recruiting e-mail widely; however, of the couples included in the study, only one was recruited by a previous participant. Additionally, one couple was referred to me by a mutual friend.

3.3 Interviews

When I received an e-mail response to one of my recruitment efforts, I would invite the respondent to schedule an informal interview between me and the
respondent and his or her partner. Interviewing couples together was meant to increase the conversational feel of the interviews, and in most cases this appeared to be successful, with partners building on each other’s comments and interacting directly with other at some points in the interview.

Nearly all interviews were conducted at the participants’ homes. Interview lengths ranged from 30 minutes to two hours, with most falling in the range of 50–70 minutes. I recorded all interviews using digital recorders. Early interviews (2007–2008) used a table-top omnidirectional microphone, while later interviews (2009–2010) used unidirectional lavalier microphones.

In each case, I opened the interview with a question inviting the participants to compare American and Israeli cultures. The remainder of the interview loosely followed a questionnaire (Appendix B) designed to give me a sense of the participants’ cultural and religious backgrounds, social circles, and family practices. I prioritized the questions so that, if a couple spent a long time answering some questions, I could choose which other questions were important to ask and which could be skipped. I wanted to give each couple considerable leeway in topic choice and time devoted to each topic. Unless a couple seemed to wrap up a topic or run out of things to say, I generally avoided asking a new question to change the topic.

As the majority of recent stance studies have been based on naturalistic data (from corpora of self-recordings, written documents, and other sources), some explanation is in order regarding the choice of interview data. I made this choice for two reasons.
First, while naturalistic data may provide a more accurate indication of
talk, I chose to conduct interviews in order to elicit
stances from a targeted population on targeted topics. When researchers use a
corpus of self-recordings or personal letters, for example, they have little control
over either the research population (except in a broad sense) or the topics (unless
the corpus is quite large). Thus Naomi Quinn, an anthropologist who researches
shared schemas, writes that, in her opinion, “interviews must always be the
methodological strategy of choice for collection of discourse on a topic...[that]
either arises frequently and regularly in all everyday talk (as do address terms, for
example), nor appears predictably in a well-defined setting (like legal discourse, for
example)” (Quinn 2005: 40). Indeed, in my interviews I asked each couple explicitly
for their observations of similarities and differences in their cultural backgrounds,
yielding an abundance of stances on relevant topics. While not mimicking “everyday
conversation,” this approach has the advantage of revealing how members of
binational couples present themselves to someone they don’t know well through
stancetaking, which is at least one type of articulation of how they see themselves
and their relationship.

Second, even if the goals of the study lent themselves to naturalistic data, it is
notoriously difficult to get large amounts of naturally-occurring data from couples.
Piller (2002) encountered this problem when asking bilingual couples for self-
recordings. Many couples in her study cited time constraints or uncooperative
spouses as a reason for not providing recordings, and even the recordings she did
receive were frequently a blend of private and public talk, with many conversations
addressed partially to the researcher. I encountered a related set of problems in my research. In an attempt to circumvent the constraints of interview data, I asked each of the couples I interviewed to provide recordings of interactions they had with each other and with family members, providing suggestions for recording occasions, but ultimately leaving the details up to the participants and assuring them final discretion over which recordings were used in the research. Nonetheless, only three of the twelve couples I interviewed agreed to provide self-recordings. Among those three, one held onto my loaned digital recorders for several months without making any recordings, despite frequent reminders. The other two couples made several short recordings, mostly of interactions with their children. In recordings from one of the couples, one can hear occasional complaints from the husband about being recorded. Ultimately, weighing my options, I decided to use only the interview data in order to have comparable data from a larger number of couples.

It is worth asking how representative the interview data are of couples’ usual communication. I attempt to partly address this question in Chapter 4, where I present a detailed qualitative analysis of one couple’s divergent stancetaking. There, I point to the way “prior stances” are presented (using the time adverbial always and the simple present tense) as an indication that, while I may have prompted the couple to talk about cultural differences during the interview, they had done so many times before, taking the same or similar stances even when not primed by an interviewer.

In setting up and conducting the interviews, I endeavored to make them as non-interview-like as possible: I met with the partners together to open the
possibility that they would converse with each other in addition to with me, and I kept my questions to a minimum except as required to keep the conversation moving. In several interviews, twenty or thirty minutes of talk passed between my substantive questions. This indicates to me that, at least in those interviews, I was fairly successful in collecting “interviews that resembled as closely as possible the spontaneous discourse about [the relevant topics] that might occur in all the likely places” (Quinn 2005: 41). Talk between interviewees without directly addressing the interviewer echoes Schiffrin’s (1984) findings in group interviews with Jewish Philadelphians. Like Schiffrin, my role in the interview was as “someone who wanted to gather information” (Schiffrin 1984: 314), but also as a fellow Jewish person, who has spent summers living and studying in Israel and has opinions about matters of concern to Israelis and Jewish Americans. The relevance of my identity as a Jewish person, and not just as a visiting sociolinguist, was ratified by the participants, as described in Section 3.1 above.

Thus, even though interviews are likely to elicit different kinds of talk than we would find in everyday conversation, the nature of these interviews and the participants’ apparent perception of me as an insider leads me to believe that the stances speakers take in these interviews are to some extent reflective of the stances that they take outside of the interviews.

3.4 Summary

This study relies on data from interviews with twelve binational American/Israeli couples to investigate stancetaking by individuals and couples at a
cultural border, and the role of their stancetaking in their identity construction. In the following chapters, through qualitative and quantitative analysis of discursive and phonetic patterns of stancetaking, I show how speakers deploy elements of Jewish and Israeli linguistic repertoires, thus positioning themselves in particular ways in relation to their partners and the larger communities to which they belong. I begin in Chapter 4 by identifying evidence of intersubjectivity created by present speakers in interaction with previous speakers, harking back to the positioning and alignment vectors in Du Bois’ (2007) stance triangle.
CHAPTER 4: INTERSUBJECTIVE STANCETAKING
BEYOND THE TURN-BY-TURN

4.1 Overview

Much of the research on intersubjectivity in stancetaking focuses on its achievement and marking in turn-by-turn exchanges in individual interactions. After noticing that many of the participants in my interviews also engaged in their stancetaking with utterances and stances outside the present interaction, I undertook to answer three questions about intertextual stancetaking: (1) What linguistic resources do speakers use in taking stances intertextually? (2) Can stances be intertextual without being marked as such? and (3) Are there stances that are identifiable as part of a “stance repertoire”? In addressing these three questions, this chapter argues that intersubjectivity can be achieved in stancetaking, whether explicitly marked or not, intertextually across interactions.

After Sections 4.2 and 4.3, which situate this chapter in the context of previous research on dialogicality, intersubjectivity, and intertextuality and outline the motivations for the chapter, Section 4.4 presents qualitative analyses of cases in which the stancetaker responds to prior stances in the ongoing relationship between interlocutors. I show that the speakers use constructed dialogue, constructed stance, verb tense, and time adverbials to take divergent stances in the present by engaging intersubjectively with past stances. In Section 4.5 I take a wider view, describing commonalities in stances across my interviews to argue that circulating stances or components of a “stance repertoire” can be identified on the basis of three types of evidence: commonality of stances across speakers, taking into...
account community affiliation; lexico-syntactic resonance; and parallels in argumentation. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter by arguing that both of these types of stancetaking—intertextual stancetaking by members of a couple and stancetaking drawing on a stance repertoire—contribute to the linguistic construction of speakers’ identities as related to particular communities and demographic categories.

4.2 Background: Intersubjective stance

Intersubjectivity has been addressed in research on language in interaction in various ways. Schiffrin (1990: 138) describes a view of communication in which “the goal of communication is the achievement of intersubjectivity (i.e., audience recognition of actors’ intentions),” and thus “intersubjectivity pervades the entire communication process because its achievement rests on shared procedures for constructing and inferring meaning” (all emphasis original). This is a useful explanation of intersubjectivity, which emphasizes the pervasive nature of intersubjectivity in communication. In this view, intersubjectivity is more or less unidirectional: an audience must recognize the intentions of an actor. Some recent discussions of intersubjectivity in the context of stancetaking (and related concepts) have also tended to address intersubjectivity in the context of a unidirectional speaker-hearer relationship. Nuyts (2001) defines an intersubjective utterance as one that includes an “indication that the evidence [for an evaluation] is known to (or accessible by) a larger group of people who share the same conclusions based on it” (393) giving as an example the phrase “it is known that...” (387). Scheibman (2007)
also argues that intersubjectivity is something that a speaker makes explicit for a hearer: “speakers...create intersubjective ties both by generalizing experience and attitude and by ratifying others’ points of view while mutually adhering to societal discourses” (118).

A different line of research on stance treats intersubjectivity and dialogicality as multi-directional, drawing attention to conversation participants’ turn-by-turn negotiation of stance. Kärkkäinen (2003, 2006), building on Du Bois (2000, 2002, 2007), argues that, in much of the research, “stance” has become “a (near) synonym for subjectivity,” with the emphasis solely on the speaker’s perspective (Kärkkäinen 2006: 702). In Kärkkäinen’s presentation of stancetaking, on the other hand, stances are not “primarily situated in the minds of individual speakers” and shared unidirectionally with an audience, but only come into existence through “dialogic interaction between interlocutors” (Kärkkäinen 2006: 700)—a dialogicality that “leads naturally to a concern with intersubjectivity” (Du Bois 2007: 140, emphasis original). Kärkkäinen’s focus on dialogicality emphasizes “stance taking as a sequential activity, rather than an individual action” (Ibid: 712), reflecting a more mutual view of intersubjectivity.

My goal in this chapter is to extend Kärkkäinen’s argument even further. My claim is that stancetaking can be interactive and intersubjective without being entirely sequential, and without necessarily containing an explicit indication (Nuyts 2001; cf. Agha 2007, Lempert 2009) of its intersubjectivity. Before presenting the data, I situate the chapter in the body of previous research on the related concepts of dialogicality and intertextuality.
4.2.1 Dialogicality and Intertextuality

In the most complete formulation of his approach to stance, Du Bois (2007) argues for the use of a “stance triangle” as a tool for attending to “the structured interrelations among the acts and entities which comprise stance [and thus allow] participants, and analysts, to draw inferences by triangulating from the explicit components of stance to the implicit” (165). He maintains that speakers simultaneously accomplish three component acts in a single act of stancetaking: evaluation, “the process whereby a stancetaker orients to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality or value” (143); positioning, through which the stancetaker indicates her affective stance (e.g. “I’m glad”) and epistemic stance, or claim to variable degrees of certainty or knowledge; and finally alignment, “the act of calibrating the relationship between two stances, and by implication between two stancetakers” (144). Thus Du Bois explains stancetaking, using the first-person point of view of the stancetaker: “I evaluate something, and thereby position myself, and thereby align with [respect to] you” (163). This formulation emphasizes three crucial entities in stancetaking: the present stancetaker (Subject₁); a prior stancetaker (Subject₂), with whom Subject₁ aligns; and a stance object to which both stancetakers are oriented.

The stance triangle has the advantage of addressing several categories of stance (epistemic, affective, propositional, interactional) and it begins to provide a framework to understand the relations among them. While the triangle itself does not operationalize the relationship between individual stances and more enduring
aspects of identity, it does provide a useful starting point to examine this interaction and can be productively paired with theories focusing on larger-scale social processes. Du Bois (2007) argues that the stance triangle captures the complex nature of stancetaking: In addition to its function of enabling participants and analysts to pick out “missing pieces” of the stance act based on the parts that are made explicit, it also incorporates the perspectives of several preexisting theoretical frameworks that are relevant to stance. Among these, Du Bois draws his readers’ attention to dialogicality and intersubjectivity; here I focus both on dialogicality and on a related concept, intertextuality. The terms dialogicality and intertextuality have a complex history beginning in the field of literary theory, where they originated (Bakhtin 1981 [1975]; Kristeva 1980 [1967]). Here, however, I will focus on how the terms have been used in the fields of linguistics and linguistic anthropology—and in particular with regard to stance.

Du Bois explains that dialogicality “makes its presence felt to the extent that a stancetaker’s words derive from, and further engage with, the words of those who have spoken before—whether immediately within the current exchange of stance utterances, or more remotely along the horizons of language and prior text as projected by the community of discourse” (2007: 138). Kärkkäinen uses a narrower definition of dialogicality. She describes speech as “inherently dialogic...[that is,] talk is always directed to a particular recipient or recipients within the sequential context of the turn-by-turn unfolding talk” (2006: 706). This pairing of “dialogic” with “sequential context” and “turn-by-turn” underscores Kärkkäinen’s (and in fact Du Bois’) analytical focus on dialogicality in sequential turns.
However, dialogicality need not be limited to a single interaction. Stancetakers may engage in dialogicality at a greater temporal distance, as indicated in Du Bois’ explanation quoted above. Indeed, Lempert (2009) has pointed out the difficulty that can arise for corpus-based studies of stance when “the dialogicality of stance is not manifest in transcripts of stance-taking” because the stance object or stance-responded-to is drawn from outside the “here-and-now event of stancetaking” (227). Lempert’s own study (2009) of U.S. presidential candidate John Kerry’s stancetaking during a 2004 debate reveals that when Kerry took stances positioning himself as a person of “conviction,” he was indirectly addressing unnamed, presumably non-present critics who had attributed to him the opposite of conviction, “flip-flopping.” This demonstrates that a stance can be taken effectively even when it engages dialogically with a stance (that Kerry is a flip-flopper) taken days or weeks earlier. Trester (2009) provides another example of alignment created primarily with a non-present speaker; her study identifies “ways that constructed dialogue may be used to display and evaluate voices towards which the speaker adopts a negatively-evaluative stance” (149). In Niemelä’s (forthcoming) data, stories are told to achieve alignment primarily with the present interlocutor but also with participants in the storyworld. All three of these studies begin to open the field of stance research to the use of a wider lens, exploring dialogicality beyond the realm of the turn-by-turn.

Like dialogicality, intertextuality describes the engagement of a current speaker with a prior spoken or written text, the difference being that the prior text is generally understood to exist at some temporal distance from the current
interaction. Studies have illustrated the role of intertextuality in constructing local identities (Hamilton 1996) and family roles and identities (Gordon 2007, 2009; Tannen 2007) and in managing family conflict (Tannen 2006)—all relevant to the present analysis. In a study of the discourse of one family during the week of the 2000 U.S. Presidential elections, Gordon (2007) shows how family members’ repetition of a story about the four-year-old son’s school elections serves to create alignment among all the family members and reinforce their family identity as Democrats and as supporters of the Democratic presidential candidate, Al Gore. This alignment is accomplished through the use of constructed dialogue reviving the four-year-old’s humorous misconceptions about elections and the presidential candidates. Tannen (2006) analyzes arguments that took place in three families, showing how claims made in these arguments were intertextually brought into later conversations, where they were resolved or defused. The use of intertextuality through constructed dialogue can thus demonstrate and (re)create solidarity with another speaker (Gordon 2007; Tannen 2006), evaluate another speaker’s utterance (Trester 2009), and, as I argue below, underscore the salience of a stance taken over time or indicate a stance’s place in the repertoire of a community.

In Section 4.4, I argue that each member of a married couple creates and performs identities in interaction with a stranger (the interviewer) by intertextually presenting the interaction of their own current stance with a prior stance taken by their partner. I use Du Bois’ stance triangle to analyze the interaction of stances over time and thus consider how “temporary and interactionally specific stances” (Bucholtz and Hall 2005: 592) reflect and contribute to more enduring identities.
through a process of stance accretion. In Section 4.5, I show examples of dialogic stancetaking that are not explicitly marked as such, yet reflect alignments among speakers by positioning the speakers in particular ways in relation to the communities of practice and imagined communities the speakers belong to. While these two types of dialogicality are markedly different from that found in turn-by-turn negotiations of stance, speakers still engage with each other’s stances in order to construct and perform their identities.

4.3 Motivations

Whereas linguistic research on intersubjective stancetaking has typically focused on the local, turn-by-turn negotiation of stances, as described above, I noticed repeatedly in my interviews that participants not only oriented to local utterances in their stancetaking, but also engaged with utterances and stances outside the realm of the immediate conversation in various ways. This recognition led me to ask three questions, which I present here as my research questions:

1. What linguistic resources do speakers use in taking stances intertextually? How do they mark the stances they are aligning with?

2. Can stances be intertextual (that is, engage with stances taken outside the immediate interaction) without being marked as such?

3. Are there stances that are common enough across speakers to be called “circulating stances” or a “stance repertoire”? Are there any internal indications that stances are part of a stance repertoire?
The following two sections attempt to answer these questions.

4.4 Intertextual stancetaking

In this section I address intertextually disaligning stances taken by a single couple who, during our interview, constructed contrasting identities. In what follows, I examine several instances of stancetaking in the interview and show how these stances contribute to the construction of these divergent identities. The examples analyzed below demonstrate that conversational participants may take a stance by attributing an accreted stance to someone else through the use of constructed dialogue, adverbials, and contrastive verb tense. Analysis of these stances complements and expands the previous research on stance by demonstrating how a more longitudinal dimension can be introduced even with a single interaction as data source.

The couple whose stances are the focus of this section chose the pseudonyms Arad and Claire. Claire is a native of the Washington, DC area; Arad was born in Israel and lived there until moving to the U.S. roughly three and a half years before our interview. At the time of the interview, both Claire and Arad were in their mid-thirties; they met approximately three years before our interview and were married a year and a half later. The couple’s respective religious backgrounds are also relevant to the discussion, since religion is another difference between them. Claire grew up in a moderately religious Jewish home. Her family belonged to a synagogue and celebrated Jewish holidays, but did not strictly adhere to traditional Jewish law
and customs. Arad, on the other hand, grew up in a strictly religious Jewish family. He took on a secular lifestyle in his mid-twenties but in the interview expressed conflicting views about the role of religion in his life. Claire has never lived in Israel and has traveled there for short visits only after meeting Arad. She doesn’t speak Hebrew and can only understand a few words, which was mentioned as a point of difficulty as Arad’s parents do not speak English.

In our interview, Claire and Arad did engage in the type of turn-by-turn stancetaking and alignments that have been the focus of much of the stance literature. However, here I focus on a different strategy they use, which has not been discussed as much in prior research: taking a stance by attributing a contrasting stance to someone else. Each of the stances I present below highlights a difference between the two partners being interviewed, who indeed emphasized their differences more than any other couple I interviewed.

4.4.1 Attributed and accreted stances

In their chapter “Attributing stance in discourses of body shape and weight loss,” Coupland and Coupland address local alignment in stancetaking, then note, “There is an important distinction to be made, however, between the act of endorsing, validating, or sharing another person’s known or witnessed stance and the act of projecting a stance onto someone else—specifying what the other person’s stance is, was, will be, or should be” (2009: 229). In that chapter, the authors analyze two types of cases: In one case, a physician displays empathy by attributing to a patient a stance that the physician believes to be the stance of the
patient. In the other case, women’s magazine feature writers claim authority or insider status by attributing to their readers stances that the readers are likely to take or that the writers wish them to take for the purposes of their articles. The excerpts analyzed below differ from those examples in that, here, the stances are attributed purportedly on the basis of stances the “original” speaker has actually taken in interaction—Coupland and Coupland’s “known or witnessed stance[s]”—rather than on imagined stances.

Nonetheless, even when reporting a stance someone else ostensibly did take, there is an element of novel construction. Tannen (2007 [1989]) coins the term “constructed dialogue,” devoting an entire chapter to the argument that “‘reported speech’ is not reported at all but is creatively constructed by a current speaker in a current situation” (107–108). “Reporting” what someone said or thought in the past inevitably introduces complications. To use the terms of Goffman’s (1981 [1979]) participant roles, a speaker drawing on constructed dialogue is never simply “animating” another “author’s” utterance, but is authoring a new utterance that draws intertextually on a previous speaker’s utterance. The question, then, is not how accurate the reporting of one’s own or someone else’s speech is; it is what purpose the constructed dialogue serves in the present context—a new context, which reshapes the utterance, no matter how faithfully it is rendered. Likewise, when one speaker attributes a stance to another speaker or to herself, that stance may be understood as a “constructed stance,” attributed by a current speaker to serve a purpose in the present interaction. Studies of epistemic stance have focused on the authority-claiming function of reported speech, particularly direct reported
speech (Clift 2006; Holt 1996). I argue that another purpose constructed dialogue can serve is to take a stance by orienting to a constructed stance; in the examples analyzed below these stances are constructed as durable or “accreted” stances.

On the durability of stances, Du Bois argues that “the question of who took which stance is perennially salient, is remembered over time, and counts as negotiable coin in the currency of reported discourse” (2007: 173). Rauniomaa encodes this durability in the term stance accretion, which is explained as follows: “particular stances are likely to be accumulated in the run of a conversation or several conversations. Stances can be seen to accrue, which gives them the potential to become attached to the identities that they help to evoke” (2003: 1). Through this process, stance accretion can be seen to link the second and third levels in Bucholtz and Hall’s (2005) positionality principle, which emphasizes the coexistence of three levels of identity: “(a) macro-level demographic categories; (b) local, ethnographically specific positions; and (c) temporary and interactionally specific stances and participant roles” (592). In their interview with me, both Arad and Claire took stances by aligning themselves with regard to each other’s prior stances, most of which were presented as enduring or accreted stances. I say the stances were presented as accreted stances in order to emphasize that, while the present speaker indicates that the reported or constructed stance is “perennially salient” and “accumulated in the run of...several conversations,” it is of course impossible to know how many times the constructed stance was actually taken and whether, in fact, the interactant whose stance is being constructed would agree with the characterization. However, the points made above with regard to constructed
dialogue apply here as well: The important question is not the accuracy of the constructed words or stance; it is the purpose served by the reconstruction itself. I argue that the speakers here use this reconstruction of stances as one resource for developing the individual and joint identities they present to me in the interview.

In Excerpt 1, Claire describes her stance on religious practice: that it is valuable for personal and interpersonal reasons, but not because of a threat from a higher power. She underlines her rejection of this threat by contrasting her view of religion with Arad's, which he seems to confirm.6

Example 1: Religion

1. Claire: I'm either doing it because,
2. I think it's special and means something...religiously,
3. Or because I think it's special and means something spiritually,
4. Or because I think...it's,
5. It means something to bring a family and friends closer together.
6. Um and those are the three reasons that I enjoy religion.
7. I don't believe that there is a God out there who if I don't y'know do this or that, /is/ gonna...
8. Not bring me into the- gates. I just-
9. Y'know, I just don't believe that. A- and you do, right?
10. Arad: Right.
11. [No, I'm not- I'm not I'm not-
12. Claire: [You always say,
13. I'm a sinner I'm a sinner if I don't-
14. Y'know if I drive on Shabbat I'm a sinner.
15. I don't believe that.

Viewed in the framework of Du Bois' stance triangle, this is a rare stancetaking act in which every part of the stance triangle is made explicit. Claire

6 Though Arad’s initial agreement, “Right,” is followed by apparent negation, the prosodic contour of this turn indicates that “No, I’m not- I’m not I’m not-” is the beginning of a separate utterance.
explicitly positions herself by using the subjective pronoun I, in lines 7, 8, 9, and 15. She explicitly evaluates a stance object, in saying I don’t believe that there is a God out there who if I don’t y’know do this or that, is gonna not bring me into the-gates; it is also clear that that in her statements in lines 9 and 15 refer to this same stance object from lines 7–8. And, finally, she also makes her disalignment with Arad clear, not only by addressing him (as Subject2) in the second person, but also by explicitly referring to a stance she attributes to him. This is supported through a quotation she attributes to Arad in lines 12–14. By introducing this quotation with the time adverbial You always say, Claire claims that this was not a one-time stance from Arad, but rather a plurality of stancetaking acts that have accreted into a more durable identity, with which Claire disaligns in her own stance. Thus Claire uses constructed dialogue, introduced by a time adverbial, to provide a contrast between her present stance and Arad’s accreted stance.

In Excerpt 2, Claire constructs two related dialogues between her and Arad, which underline their different expectations about how they should interact as a couple when they have complaints about each other:

**Example 2: Private interaction**

1. Claire: Um it’s still, I think we’re still not used to it, y’know?

2. Bezalel: Any- complaint he has about me,

3. Claire: He’ll just tell me and I’ll say,

4. Bezalel: Y’know you need to be a little more sensitive.

5. Claire: That not telling me everything you don’t like about me, because...

6. Bezalel: You don’t-

7. Claire: You don’t always want to hear that.

8. Rebecca: Right.

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*Given that the quotation is presented in the first person, it seems to be a direct quotation (but see Tannen 2007 [1989]: 39 on direct quotations).*
9. Claire: So,
10. It’s not something I’m used to.

→ 11. And he’s always saying to me,
→ 12. Tell me everything you don’t like about me I want to change.
→ 13. And I can’t do it! I can’t bring myself,
→ 14. To say something to you that’s, that’s um...
→ 15. That would- that if it, the situation was reversed, that I would be hurt.
16. I can’t do it.

First, in lines 2–4, Claire constructs a dialogue in which Arad tells her a complaint he has about her, to which she responds you need to be a little more sensitive. Then she constructs a dialogue in which Arad asks her to tell me everything you don’t like about me, I want to change, to which Claire replies that she can’t do it (lines 11–15). Here again, Claire takes a stance by constructing an ostensibly recurring dialogue that attributes accreted stance, as demonstrated through the use of he’s always saying to me (line 11). She describes Arad’s stances in lines 2–3 and lines 11–12; her evaluation of his stance and disalignment with him are demonstrated in two different ways: In the first example, Claire’s response to Arad is produced as part of the dialogue (I’ll say, y’know you need to be a little more sensitive), whereas in the second example her reaction is reported without the use of constructed dialogue (lines 13–16). Not only does Claire take a stance rejecting Arad’s method of criticizing her, she also takes a stance rejecting the opportunity to criticize him similarly, when she is invited to. In this example, Arad’s stances and one of Claire’s contrasting stances are reported through constructed dialogue.

In the next excerpt, Claire and Arad work together to co-construct a dialogue in which they each take a stance toward American social norms. Leading up to this excerpt, Arad criticizes Americans for being “extremely nice” but “fake,” identifying
what he sees as an insincere expression of desire for social contact. In this excerpt, he reconstructs, with Claire’s help, a dialogue between the two of them that he claims frequently occurs when other people express an interest in spending time with them. Arad’s disalignment with Claire in this excerpt serves to reinforce his evaluation of American social norms.

**Example 3: Public interaction**

1. Arad: So y’know when me and my wife will go into some social events,  
→ 2. and say oh wow y’know we should get together sometime.  
→ 3. I say, well they’re very nice let’s go to get together with them,  
/we’re-/  
→ 4. so she has to put me on the spot, no they don’t really mean it.  
5. Claire: [@@@  
6. Rebecca: [@@@  
7. Arad: So y’know that’s, that’s what I mean, that’s what I’m talking about.  
8.  
→ 9. Claire: I don’t say they don’t really mean it.  
10. Arad: I don’t know, but it’s-  
11. Rebecca: @@@  
12. Arad: I know, of course she /doesn’t/ think, because she’s she’s part of it.  
13. Y’know she’s she’s returning in the same /thing/  
14. Claire: I know how to play the game.  
15. Arad: She- hah?  
16. Claire: I know how to play the game.  
17. Arad: Yes, so I don’t know how to do it because sometimes I-  
→ 18. And I ask a question, I ask her what should I do, should I call him?  
19. And sometimes I’m applying the Israeli laws\(^8\) to the Americans.

We find constructed dialogue in several places in this excerpt. In lines 2–4 Arad constructs a dialogue with three speakers: In line 2, an acquaintance proposes social plans to Arad and Claire (*we should get together sometime*); in line 3, Arad responds positively to the suggestion (*let’s go to get together with them*); and in line 4, Claire disabuses him of the idea that it was a sincere offer (*they don’t really mean*  

\(^8\) In Hebrew, the same word—*hukim*—is used to mean both ‘laws’ and ‘rules.’
it). Claire responds to the claim Arad makes in this constructed dialogue—that she has confirmed that Americans are insincere—by negating her purported stance using the exact same wording: *I don’t say they don’t really mean it* (line 9). Finally, Arad provides another dialogue, which positions him as bewildered at the American social scene: *I ask her what should I do, should I call him?* (line 18)

We can tell that Arad perceives these dialogues as occurring frequently because of his use of the simple present: *I say, I ask her*, indicating that the reported utterances occur generally, rather than a defined number of times in the past. Arad’s choice of verb tense, like Claire’s use of *always*, contributes to the hearer’s understanding that the differences between the two spouses highlighted in this excerpt are long-standing. By recounting this dialogue, Arad takes an evaluative stance that might be paraphrased as “I think American social norms are inauthentic,” thereby disaligning himself with Claire, who *is part of it* (line 12) and *know[s] how to play the game* (line 16).

Arad and Claire also take stances in response to stances they attribute to their partner without the use of constructed dialogue. Excerpt 4 provides an example of stancetaking through *constructed stance* rather than constructed dialogue or reported speech. In the dialogue before this excerpt, Arad and Claire are discussing Arad’s desire to live a more religious lifestyle and socialize more with religious Jews. He proposes that moving to Potomac, a nearby suburb with a larger Jewish population than where they currently live—though also a more expensive location—would facilitate these changes. Claire draws on Arad’s stance in favor of moving to Potomac, as well as on stances he has taken earlier in the interview, to
introduce her contrasting stance that moving to Potomac may not have the effect
Arad is seeking.

**Example 4: Moving to Potomac**

→ 1. Claire: And you want to um...you’re looking for your place.
→ 2. And so you,
→ 3. You think that if we move to Potomac things are gonna change,
   4. And I think you might-
→ 5. Maybe you need a change from, from within you.
→ 6. I’m just not sure that that’s the solution.
→ 7. Y’know it’s-
→ 8. Y’know yet- we’re gonna be spending...so: much money,
→ 9. To try to change your situation,
→ 10. I don’t know if we’re gonna be happier.

In this excerpt, Claire uses two clauses of epistemic uncertainty, *I’m just not sure that* (line 6) and *I don’t know if* (line 10) to disalign herself with Arad’s stance *that if we move to Potomac things are gonna change* (line 3). In this case, Arad’s stances are not invoked through constructed dialogue. In line 1, Claire relates Arad’s dissatisfaction with their current lifestyle to other stances he has taken in the interview (and, quite possibly, in their previous conversations) about feeling like an outsider in the United States. She then cites his stance that moving to Potomac would solve some of his problems (lines 2–3), before expressing her contrasting stance, that a change in residence might not be the solution he is looking for and that the change instead needs to come from within Arad (lines 5–6 and 10). Though Claire does not indicate it lexically or grammatically in this excerpt, Arad’s stance in favor of moving to Potomac seems to be an accreted stance. Throughout the interview, both Claire and Arad mention Arad’s desire to move to Potomac several times, and it becomes clear that the debate about the expense of moving to Potomac
is an ongoing one. Thus, in this example, Claire does not contrast her stance with Arad's through constructed dialogue, but rather through two constructed stances. This demonstrates a related but different way that a stance can be taken intertextually with a stance attributed to another speaker.

Each of these four examples portrays a different stance. In Excerpt 1, Claire takes an oppositional stance toward religious compulsion, which she contrasts with Arad's positive orientation toward that view. In Excerpt 2, she takes an oppositional stance toward brutal honesty between husbands and wives, again contrasting with Arad's view. In Excerpt 3, Arad takes an oppositional stance toward American social norms, emphasizing the difference between his expectations in social interaction and Claire's. In Excerpt 4, Claire demonstrates her disagreement with Arad by invoking two of his prior stances. At the same time, all four of these stances work together to construct divergent identities for Arad and Claire. On the topics of religion, private interaction, public interaction, and residential choices, their accreted stances demonstrate that they have different beliefs and different expectations. In contrast to Kärkkäinen's (2006) claim that interactants take stances expecting agreement, Arad and Claire clearly expect and provide disagreement in these areas. Each spouse's attribution of the other's prior stances provides a foil for their own stancetaking.

4.4.2 Discussion

These examples from Arad and Claire demonstrate the identity work and relationship work that can be done through intertextual negotiation of stances
between interlocutors who know each other well. While intertextuality has been identified as a resource for building relationships (e.g. Gordon 2007; Tannen 2006), intertextual stancetaking has not been similarly explored. By taking the stances they took in interaction with me, a stranger, Claire and Arad presented themselves and each other as certain types of people on the basis of their past stances. Additionally, the stances taken in this interview play a role in the ongoing construction of the couple’s joint and individual identities; each time Arad or Claire takes a stance on their cultural or religious differences, these differences—these disalignments—are reinforced as a notable aspect of their relationship. Viewed in the context of Bucholtz and Hall’s (2005) positionality principle, the interactions analyzed above demonstrate how particular linguistic strategies (constructed dialogue, constructed stance, verb tense, and adverbials) are used to make temporary stances more powerful and to recruit them in the development of locally specific positions or identities. These locally specific positions are related to demographic categories of nationality and religion to the extent that Arad and Claire invoke these categories explicitly or implicitly in their stancetaking. I argue that each partner’s self-positioning with regard to these demographic categories—Israeli, American, religious, secular—is enacted in part through stance accretion.

A question may be raised as to whether Arad and Claire have really taken these stances so frequently that they can be called accreted stances. Stance accretion is a subjective and intersubjective process whereby a stance comes to be seen as a component of its speaker’s enduring identity. As such, the objective question of how many times a stance was actually taken by a certain speaker is subsidiary to
interactants’ perception that the stance is attached to the stancetaker’s identity, which I argue here is the case with Arad and Claire.

Another question that may be raised is whether Arad and Claire’s disalignment with each other is not “real” disalignment but rather an example of what Schiffrin (1984) calls the sociable role of argument in some Jewish communities. Indeed, culturally bound interactional norms must be taken into consideration in relation to all three elements of the stance triangle: evaluation, alignment, and positioning. In Schiffrin’s data, ostensible disalignment in the form of argument is a turn-by-turn exchange of viewpoints that contributes to the feeling of camaraderie produced by old friends. Schiffrin identifies as a feature of argument “sustained disagreement: Speaker A declares something (A1), Speaker B disagrees with some portion of what A has said (B1), Speaker A disagrees with some portion of what B has said (A2),” and so on (Schiffrin 1984: 316). By contrast, while Arad and Claire do show instances of turn-by-turn disagreement, in many cases they initiate responses to questions with *intertextual references to long-standing disagreements*, rather than disagreeing with locally adjacent statements. This demonstrates a difference from Schiffrin’s model of camaraderie-building through local negotiation.9

An examination of stance concerned with the world of social interaction can fruitfully begin by asking the three-part question of the stance triangle—*who is

---

9 Additionally, Schiffrin’s observations are based on Jews of Eastern European descent and she includes a caveat that Jews from other backgrounds may have very different argumentation and socializing styles. As Arad’s family comes from Yemen, there is no reason to assume that he would engage in argument as sociability in the same way as the Eastern European-descended interviewees in Schiffrin’s data.
taking *what stance* in response to *what other social actor(s)*—but should also ask how stances relate to more durable identity categories. This examination of an interaction between two participants who know each other well reveals a few ways speakers can attribute stances to themselves and to each other through interaction with past stances. Through the linkage of past and present stances, both participants and analysts can make observations about longer-term processes of identity construction.

### 4.5 Stance repertoire

The previous section examined intersubjective stancetaking by members of a single couple. Focusing on individual stancetaking examples, I showed how members of a couple interact with each other’s intertextual stances to establish alignments and disalignments with each other on various stance topics. In this section I take a wider view, considering a larger group of couples to see what their stancetaking has in common. I argue that certain stances are “circulating stances” or part of a community’s “stance repertoire” on the basis of three types of evidence: (1) commonality of stances across speakers, taking into account community affiliation; (2) lexi-co-syntactic resonance; and (3) parallels in argumentation. The idea of a stance repertoire expands on Benor’s (2009, 2010) argument for an ethnolinguistic repertoire, an attempt to avoid the contradiction in sociolinguistic research between descriptions of “reified” ethnolects and the recognition of intra-group and intra-speaker variation as well as out-group use of features typically associated with an in-group.
While Benor’s work on ethnolinguistic repertoire has focused mainly on phonological, morphosyntactic, and lexical variation, my goal here is to discover whether stance can be viewed as part of the repertoire available to Jewish speakers in this community—or to any socially or demographically defined group of speakers in their own community. I hypothesized that, within a community, stances would be drawn from a shared repertoire, in observable patterns in stancetaking.

Stances are not created in a vacuum. As with phonological and other forms of variation, being a member of a given community or communities means having access to a shared repertoire of stances. The idea of stances forming a repertoire for a speech community or community of practice also resonates with work on intersubjective stancetaking, as described in the introduction to this chapter.

Whereas researchers tend to claim that stancetaking is the intersubjective activity of a pair or group of current interlocutors (e.g., Kärkkäinen 2006; Du Bois 2007), I hypothesized that stancetaking may be the intersubjective activity of a community; that is, that the meaning of a stance is determined in part by its place in a community’s repertoire. In this chapter, I focus on stances describing and evaluating differences between “Israeli culture” and “American culture.” By evaluating the typical behavior of a group of people as being a certain way, speakers position themselves as knowledgeable about both national groups, and may be aligning themselves with or against other speakers who have taken stances on related topics.
4.5.1 Circulating stances

In the interviews, I asked what differences couples had noticed between Israelis and Americans, without suggesting any particular differences. Several topics came up frequently across interviews, including stances related to language learning and language barriers, differences in religious beliefs and practices, characteristics of American and Israeli schools and education, and differences in coming-of-age experiences. Two of the topics most frequently brought up as differences between Israelis and Americans were (1) the nature of familial and friendship relationships and (2) politeness norms. Five American and six Israeli participants mentioned differences in relationships, and five Americans and five Israelis mentioned differences in politeness norms; that is, about half of the interviewees addressed each of these two topics.

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show characteristics that interviewees attributed to the two national groups in terms of relationships. Table 4.1 shows descriptions of Israelis’ relationships, while Table 4.2 shows descriptions of Americans’ relationships. In Tables 4.1–4.4, except in the cases that are marked as personal (for example using first-person pronouns), these are all presented as generalizations about Israelis or Americans, not as comments about the speaker or her/his partner.

Table 4.1: Descriptions of Israelis’ relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American speakers</th>
<th>...say these things about Israelis</th>
<th>Israeli speakers</th>
<th>...say these things about Israelis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amy</td>
<td>• “As loyal as they come”</td>
<td>Arad</td>
<td>• “I could call my friends or my family in the middle of the night if I needed something”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Not so open to new friends”</td>
<td></td>
<td>• “30 minutes is far away”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Family-oriented”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.2: Descriptions of Americans’ relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American speakers</th>
<th>...say these things about Americans</th>
<th>Israeli speakers</th>
<th>...say these things about Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>“Not as genuine as Israelis”</td>
<td>Yael</td>
<td>“Don’t get very close to each other”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“No one’s gonna come through that door” [neighbors won’t come visit]</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Independent”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel</td>
<td>“Closed”</td>
<td>Liat</td>
<td>“There is some gap”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“There’s a wall there”</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Everybody’s behind their doors”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“You don’t know whether you reach or you don’t reach”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josh</td>
<td>“Can live across the whole country” [away from family]</td>
<td>Einat</td>
<td>“People are more to themselves”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“There’s that kind of separation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Emphasizing the individual”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“You don’t see your family”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Two hours is not a big deal”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[to live away from your family]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Four hours is close relatively”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[to live to your family]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show, briefly, the kinds of differences that interviewees attributed to the two national groups vis à vis politeness norms.

**Table 4.3: Descriptions of Israeli politeness norms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American speakers</th>
<th>...say these things about <strong>Israelis</strong></th>
<th>Israeli speakers</th>
<th>...say these things about <strong>Israelis</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amy</td>
<td>• “More pushy”</td>
<td>Arad</td>
<td>• “Confronting people”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Aggressive”</td>
<td></td>
<td>• “Don’t say hello if they don’t know you”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Incredibly offensive to Americans”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Not ‘proper’”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>• “Difficult”</td>
<td>Yael</td>
<td>• “They all feel that if there’s somebody who does something good for you, like what’s going on do you want something in return?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Rude”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Aggressive”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Can’t take a compliment”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucy</td>
<td>• “Critical”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Pushy”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claire</td>
<td>• “Honesty is the best policy”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• “Brutal honesty”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel</td>
<td>• “Rarely say they’re sorry but they mean it”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.4: Descriptions of American politeness norms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American speakers</th>
<th>...say these things about <strong>Americans</strong></th>
<th>Israeli speakers</th>
<th>...say these things about <strong>Americans</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claire</td>
<td>• “White lies are more accepted”</td>
<td>Einat</td>
<td>• “Say hello to strangers in the street”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel</td>
<td>• “Always say they’re sorry but they’re not really”</td>
<td>Barak</td>
<td>• “More polite”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “Say excuse me, how are you”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “They don’t really mean it”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “Extremely nice, but so fake”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “They don’t really mean it”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “Offer something just to be polite”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yael</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “View them [Israelis] as rude”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “the façade is very polished”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These four tables show commonalities in how both Israeli and American interviewees describe differences between Israeli and American norms for relationships and for politeness. This is a first indication that these stances—that Israelis are rude and Americans are artificially polite; that Israelis live close to their families and have a warm support network while Americans are independent, individualistic, and live far away from their families—may be common stances in the speakers’ communities. But not all of these speakers belong to the same community in the same way, and it’s worth noting the differences in how these couples describe their communities and friendship networks (friendship networks and community affiliation have been shown to have an impact on linguistic variation in, e.g., Benor 2009, 2010; Milroy 1980).

In order to look at the couples’ stancetaking on these two topics in light of their community affiliation, I grouped the couples based on three social factors: reported friendships with American Jews, reported friendships with Israelis, and reported involvement in the institutional Jewish community (including synagogue membership, Jewish school enrollment, attending activities at the Jewish Community Center and the like). Table 4.5 shows the relationship between community affiliation and stancetaking on the topics of relationships and politeness norms. In the table, Group 1 contains couples who report all three markers of community affiliation: friendships with both Israelis and American Jews and institutional involvement. Group 2 contains couples who report friendships with Israelis and institutional involvement; Group 3 contains couples who report friendships with both Israelis and American Jews, but minimal or no institutional
involvement; Group 4 contains couples who report institutional involvement only; and Group 5 contains couples who report friendships with American Jews only.

**Table 4.5: Community factors in stancetaking (including type of institutional involvement)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Couples who mention both relationship differences and politeness differences</th>
<th>Couples who mention only relationship differences</th>
<th>Couples who mention only politeness differences</th>
<th>Couples who mention neither topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>• Many friends are Israelis • Many friends are American Jews • Involved in Jewish/Israeli institutions</td>
<td>Einat/Josh (synagogue and JCC) Yael/John (synagogue and JCC) Arad/Claire (synagogue) Tomer/Rachel (synagogue) Barak/Amy (JCC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yair/Emily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2</td>
<td>• Many friends are Israelis • Involved in Jewish/Israeli institutions</td>
<td>Liat/David (community activities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3</td>
<td>• Many Israeli friends • Many American Jewish friends • Minimal or no institutional involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Misha/Lucy</td>
<td>Galit/Kevin Yossi/Jenna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 4</td>
<td>• Involved in Jewish institutions</td>
<td>Liora/Clark (synagogue activities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 5</td>
<td>• Many friends are American Jews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Violette/Zebulun</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between these factors and stancetaking on these two topics is striking. Members of five out of six couples in Group 1 (who have several different kinds of connections to the local community) mentioned both relationship and
politeness differences as salient differences between the two cultural groups. Yair and Emily, the one couple who mentioned neither, didn’t talk much about general differences between the cultures, perhaps in part because Yair has been living in the U.S. for 30 years, longer than any of the other participants and seemingly long enough to have gotten used to American social norms. Moving down the table, couples who have fewer connections to the local community are more likely to mention only one type of cultural difference (relationship differences or politeness differences), or neither. The differences in stancetaking on these two topics across the groups, and particular between Group 1 and the other groups, seems to be an indication that having both social and institutional involvement in the local Jewish and Israeli community is associated with increased awareness or reportability of both relationship differences and politeness differences. This association may indicate that these stances are circulating stances within the local community.

We now come to the question of the marking of intertextuality in stancetaking. Though, as Lempert (2009) points out, all discourse is interdiscursive in a trivial sense, we are reminded to ask how an utterance “formulates… its own connection to other events” (Agha 2007: 72–73, cited in Lempert 2009: 227). Having identified stances that are common across interviewees, and especially among those with dense community networks, is there any indication that speakers recognize that these are common stances among Americans and Israelis who are familiar with both cultures? Is there an indication that speakers are engaging in some form of alignment or self-positioning through taking these stances? How can we tell if a stance is taken in interaction with a related stance and therefore with other
stancetakers? Recent studies of dialogic stancetaking emphasize the value of examining “resonance” (Du Bois 2003, 2007; Kärkkäinen 2006), “text-metrical organization” (Lempert 2008, 2009; c.f. Agha 2007), or “lexicosyntactic parallelism of cross-turn stance-taking” (Lempert 2009) as a window into the dialogic relations between speaker turns. Lempert identifies one role of parallelism as follows: “text-metrical structure can help map sentence-sized ‘propositional stance’ (orientations toward propositional content, Du Bois’ ‘evaluation’ vector) into ‘interactional stance’ (orientations toward interactants, Du Bois’ ‘alignment’ vector)” (Lempert 2009: 226). Thus, examining such parallelism may provide a window into intertextual stancetaking; in fact, in my own work (Damari 2010), I have found that speakers use resonance to construct disalignment with their own prior stances in order to mark epistemic and affective changes in stance.

It is perhaps not surprising that there is limited resonance across the stances taken by the speakers I interviewed. No interviewee was privy to topics raised or stances taken in the other interviews, so any explicit alignments made with other interviewees through stancetaking would have been purely speculative (along the lines of “I bet you’re hearing a lot about X”). However, there is some resonance across stances, perhaps providing further evidence that these are shared or circulating stances and not just similar experiences the speakers have had. I focus first on lexical resonance, that is, the common use of particular keywords. Quinn (2005) maintains that the appearance of frequent keywords across speakers is useful to identifying shared cultural schemas. Some keywords used by multiple speakers include “pushy” (by Amy and Lucy) and “aggressive” (by Amy and John)
for Israelis, and “polite” for Americans (by Barak and Tomer). But the most common keyword across interviews, with regard to the two topics under analysis here, was the word “close.” Several speakers used the word “close(r)” metaphorically to describe relationships with Israelis as compared to Americans, as shown in the excerpts in Example 4.

**Example 4: “Closer” (metaphorical)**

4a
Rachel lived in Israel for one year after college. She met her husband, Tomer, while living there; they had been together for about nine years at the time of the interview, the last eight of which have been spent in the U.S. She reports having many Israeli friends.

1. Rachel: Um I have...closer,
2. More emotionally...I think rich relationships with..
3. Israeli friends or children of <@Israelis than I do with@>...
4. My American friends who are great people and as supportive as they can be but just...
5. There is a wall there.

4b
Yael had lived in the U.S. for about twelve years at the time of the interview. She and her husband, John, who lived in Israel for several years, stressed their bicultural identity, their competence as judges of American and Israeli culture, and their selective acceptance and rejection of specific aspects of each culture.

1. Yael: Americans don’t like to I think eh get very close to each other.
2. I mean that’s the impression I got.
5. Em, like if you in college you can be very best friends but then when you grow up,
6. You have a family,
7. And you don’t get too close,
{19 lines omitted}
27. And it’s not like that in- with Israelis they all like bond,
28. They get together every weekend and they,
29. Y’know play dates with the kids and they,
30. It’s very very close and-

4c

Though Clark has never lived in Israel, several of his close childhood friends were Israeli and he met his wife, Liora, at a wedding in Israel. They had been married about two years at the time of the interview; Liora came to the U.S. for the first time after meeting Clark.

1. Clark: The neighborliness is not existent. (Liora: unfortunately.)
2. Yeah.
3. Which is weird for Liora that’s a cultural thing right there because,
4. I mean I think it’s different in Israel,
5. people tend to be a little closer. (Liora: friendlier.)

Speakers also used the word “close(r)” and, to a lesser extent, “(not) far” to describe literal, geographical differences in familial relationships, as in Example 5.

**Example 5: “Close” and “far” (literal)**

5a

1. Liora: Also because it’s small, usually you live close to your family,
Einat met her husband, Josh, when she first came to the U.S. at age 19. They have been married for 19 years, all but one of which have been spent in the U.S. They frequently visit her large extended family in Israel.

1. Einat: Yeah you live close to your family. {in Israel}

5c
1. Einat: Yeah but in Israel mo- mostly people live ne- not far from their parents.

5d
→ 1. Arad: You guys live in a huge country.
→ 2. It’s a big country.
3. For you guys to go from here to there,
4. If it takes about two hours that’s not a big deal.
5. For me- thirty minutes is a big deal.
6. And if you have a friend /that-/...
7. Claire has a friend that they’re far away from home,
→ 8. Because it’s you know it’s a big country,
9. They live in different states.
10. And,
11. It’s very: normal- that you don’t see them.
12. But in my- my circle of friends {in Israel} I saw them once, once a week!

5e
1. Tomer: The fact that, that...
→ 2. Y’know that in Israel if your grandma live hour and half from you she live far away, (Rachel: right) and you don’t meet as much?
→ 3. And here y’know if it’s uh uh f-four hour is considered close relatively? (Rachel: right)
4. Uh like, a person I spoke today with said “oh now our parents are close, they they only-”
5. I said “how how far?”
6. He said “only three four hours.” (Rachel: right)

In the examples addressing differences in residential patterns and in these examples, we see more than just lexical resonance. In 5a and 5b, Liora and Einat, both Israeli women, use the same phrase about Israelis—“you live close to your
family”—exhibiting both lexical and syntactic resonance. They both also use the generic you, which “tend[s] to universalize experience,” according to Scheibman (2007: 120). Additionally, Liora (5a), Arad (5d), and, indirectly, Tomer (5e) (again, all Israelis) use the same argument: Israelis remain metaphorically closer than Americans to their friends and families because, due to the relative size difference of the two countries, Israelis who remain in-country are geographically closer to their friends and families than Americans tend to be.

Another example of lexico-syntactic resonance combined with similarity of argument comes up in Israelis’ talk about American politeness norms. Both Barak and Arad, two Israeli men, use the set phrase “they don’t really mean it” to describe what they perceive as Americans’ insincere version of politeness.

Example 6: “They don’t really mean it”

6a
Barak met his wife, Amy, when they were both living in Tel Aviv. They lived together for six years in Israel, and at the time of the interview had been living in the DC area for nine years.
1. Barak: So I mean yes,
   2. The Americans are more polite,
   3. They...more polite on the road,
   4. They’re more polite off the road,
   5. They say excuse me,
   6. They they,
   7. Even if they almost touch you they say excuse me,
   8. They open the door for you,
   9. They...do a lot of things that-
   → 10. Y’know they say how are you when...they don't even...know you,
   → 11. Or if it’s just in a hallway in a building that’s...obviously you know
       that you will never see them again but they say hi and and...
   → 12. How are you,
   → 13. And they don’t really mean it,
   14. But that’s...the way they were brought up,

6b
1. Arad: The problem with you guys that you have,
   2. Trying to- you are nice.
   3. You’re extremely nice.
   4. But it’s so fake. (Claire: But it’s not fake.)
   5. It’s fake! (Claire: You’re over- you’re-)
   6. People in Israel if you go in the s- walk on the street,
   7. people won’t say hello if they don’t know you.
   → 8. Here you walk on the mall...
   → 9. People say hello, hi, it’s like they know you, it’s fake!
       {36 lines omitted}
   47. So y’know when me and my wife will go into some social events,
   48. And say oh wow y’know we should get together sometime.
   49. I say, well they’re very nice let’s go to get together with them,
       /we’re-/ 
   → 50. So she has to put me on the spot, no they don’t really mean it.
   51. Claire: [@@@]
   52. Rebecca: [@@@]
   53. Arad: So y’know that’s, that’s what I mean, that’s what I’m talking about.
   54. ...
   → 55. Claire: I don’t say they don’t really mean it.10

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10 Claire’s rejection of the attribution of this utterance to her seems to indicate that “they don’t really mean it” is Arad’s stance rather than hers.
Combining the perception of Americans as being “polite” and “not really meaning it,” a third Israeli man, Tomer, also recognizes possible misunderstanding with Americans; when he offers something to someone,

6c

Tomer: I say uh by the way y’know I’m Israeli I mean it. I I’m not being polite.

4.5.2 Discussion

These three factors—commonality of stances, lexicosyntactic resonance, and parallels in argumentation—provide indications that stances related to differences in American and Israeli relationships and politeness norms are circulating stances, part of the repertoire available to these speakers as part of their community. While this study focuses on a particular, local Jewish community, these stances may be part of the repertoire of a larger community of Israelis and American Jews. In presenting the results of this study at a Jewish Studies conference, I heard from many American and Israeli audience members (who were not from the same area as the speakers) that these stances sounded familiar—even so familiar as to be mundane. In addition, many audience members themselves agreed with the stances in expected ways, particularly the stances about politeness norms.

Expressions of these stereotypes can also be observed in public discourse about differences between Israelis and Americans and the accompanying communication difficulties. A simple web search reveals many English-language websites, from personal blogs to business-advice sites to established magazines and newspapers, reporting on Israelis’ “pushy” and “aggressive” ways. Some
commentators complain and criticize, while others offer advice on bridging the communication gap between Israeli businesspeople and their American associates. Some Israeli commentators, writing in English, provide justification for Israeli “rudeness” either based on the size of the country (e.g., “Israel is a very small country whose population is one big family,” Shapiro 2009, citing Leyden) or by hinting at military and political conditions in the context of personal interactions (e.g., “If there’s one thing that rude Israeli culture has taught me, it’s that it takes assertiveness to survive,” “In defense of Israeli rudeness”). There is less public discourse in English on Americans’ “fake” politeness. However, a Hebrew web search reveals complaints about American politeness norms, from simple disingenuousness to charges of inefficiency; one U.S.-based graduate student who blogs in Hebrew complains about a wishy-washy response from her advisor: “instead of this whole long speech, couldn’t you just say yes, cut the paragraph?” (Saint Dindin 2007).

Web searches for points of view about Israeli family relationships turn up, more than blogs, scholarly and pseudo-scholarly articles emphasizing the stability and closeness of Israeli families and tracing these characteristics to factors including historical and current societal traumas (the Holocaust and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict) that lead Israelis to cling to their families. Other commentary about Israeli relationships comes up in the context of business relationships, for example, “Israelis are a very warm and friendly people. When they invite you to their home or out for dinner - they are not just being polite - they are displaying sincere friendship” (Leyden 2009).
These web findings further support the argument that the stances I have identified in these interviews are part of a stance repertoire that is available to members of a certain “opinion community” (Strauss 2004) or “community of discourse” (Du Bois 2007). They also emphasize that, while we could certainly imagine that a community of practice would have a repertoire of stances available to it, stances can also be a repertoire of an imagined community, a group of people who may never meet and yet have access to shared discourses.

4.6 Conclusions

4.6.1 Implications

There are good reasons why turn-by-turn intersubjectivity in stancetaking has been such a strong focus of the literature on stance. Speakers have many ways of clearly indexing the relatedness of an utterance to another speaker’s immediately prior utterance. These strategies include the use of turn-initial discourse markers such as well (Schiffrin 1987), markers of agreement and disagreement such as I agree and you’re wrong, and resonance as in Du Bois’ (2007: 160) example I don’t know if she’d do it / I don’t know if she would either. In each of these cases, the speaker’s engagement with the previous turn is clearly encoded in the language of the responsive stance. In many of these cases speakers orient themselves to the same stance object, and it is relatively straightforward to interpret a speaker’s alignment or disalignment with the previous speaker.

However, this focus on local, turn-by-turn negotiation of stances neglects an element of stancetaking that has been recognized elsewhere in the sociolinguistic
literature: how individual stances fit into the larger context of social life, outside the immediate interaction. Ochs (1993) defines stance as “a display of a socially recognized point of view or attitude” (288, emphasis added), while Strauss (2004) contributes the concept of an opinion community, which, while it is not presented an approach to stance, is, like Ochs’ definition, relevant to the idea of a stance repertoire. Yet research that contributes more systematic analyses of stance does not typically take into account this wider view of intersubjectivity, despite Du Bois’ description of dialogicality as existing “[both] immediately within the current exchange of stance utterances [and] more remotely along the horizons of language and prior text as projected by the community of discourse” (2007: 138).

This chapter has shown two ways of systematically identifying intersubjectivity beyond the turn-by-turn approach that has been most common in prior systematic approaches to stance. Speakers may take an intertextual stance by making explicit reference to stances that other speakers have taken previously. In response to Research Question 1, linguistic resources that speakers use in taking stances intertextually include constructed dialogue, constructed stance, verb tense, and time adverbials. These resources help to make (dis)alignment explicit even without the speaker (dis)aligning with an immediately prior stance. Answering Research Question 2, I have shown that stances can be intertextual without being explicitly marked as such through constructed dialogue or constructed stance, yet can be recognizable through resonance with stances outside the immediate interaction. In response to Research Question 3, I have argued that stances about differences in Israeli and American politeness norms and relationships are part of a
stance repertoire on the basis of resonance, similarity of argument, and distribution by community affiliation. This shows, not only that stances can be part of the repertoire of a community of practice or imagined community, but also that stances that are part of a community's repertoire can be classified as such through identification of the same sorts of cues (i.e. resonance) that are used to trace intersubjectivity in more conventional contexts (i.e., turn-by-turn negotiation of stance).

These two approaches to intertextual stancetaking have clear implications for identity construction in an interview context, and perhaps beyond it. A research interview may be perceived by an interviewee as an opportunity to position herself as a particular kind of person. I argue that the interviewees whose stances are analyzed here position themselves and construct their identities in a few ways. As argued above (Section 4.4), in their interview Arad and Claire positioned themselves differently from each other—in some cases even in opposition to each other—with regard to their stances on several topics, in particular topics related to perceived differences between Americans and Israelis. Stances they took in the interview not only presented Arad and Claire as certain types of people to me, an outsider, but also contributed to their ongoing identity construction as a couple and in interaction with relevant demographic categories. In Section 4.5 I argued that by taking particular types of stances, speakers align themselves with other stancetakers and groups of stancetakers. Taking particular stances with regard to differences between Israeli and American culture positions speakers not only as knowledgeable
about the cultures and their differences but also as familiar with a community’s
collections for stancetaking on those topics.

4.6.2 Future directions

In Chapter 2 I quoted the anthropologist Naomi Quinn, who wrote that
“interviews must always be the methodological strategy of choice for collection of
discourse on a topic...[that] neither arises frequently and regularly in all everyday
talk (as do address terms, for example), nor appears predictably in a well-defined
setting (like legal discourse, for example)” (Quinn 2005: 40). This approach raises
an important paradox for research on stance repertoires: Capturing circulating
stances on topics that are not likely to be spoken about in predictable contexts
requires conducting interviews in which the interviewer raises the topics, yet basing
discourse analysis on interview data limits the possibility of capturing ratifying or
nonratifying reactions of co-community members, which is a relevant factor for
analyzing stance repertoires. I have tried to minimize this problem by conducting
interviews with couples, rather than with individuals, to open up the possibility of
reactions. Contrast, for example, Liora’s ratification of Clark’s stances in 4c and
Rachel’s ratification of Tomer’s stances in 5e with Claire’s contradiction of Arad’s
stance in 6b. These alignments would not be available in individual interviews.
Surveys would be another method to shed light on the place of individual stances in
a stance repertoire; a wide-distribution survey could ask informants which stances
they would associate most strongly with members of their imagined community.
Ethnographic fieldwork within a community would provide even more evidence about the ways that stances are taken.

This chapter has examined the ways that speakers align themselves with other speakers (present and non-present) primarily through the evaluations they make of cultural differences between Israeli and American norms and, to a lesser extent, through their epistemic positioning of themselves, as in Claire’s Example 4, “Moving to Potomac.” The next chapter focuses more on this latter point, the ways that speakers position themselves through epistemic marking of their stances, though this is also inextricably linked to evaluation and alignment.
CHAPTER 5: PATTERNS IN EPISTEMIC STANCE MARKING

5.1 Overview

Chapter 4 constructed an argument for the existence of intertextual intersubjectivity in stancetaking, as manifest in constructed dialogue and dialogic resonance, among other strategies. This chapter addresses the achievement of intersubjectivity through the marking of epistemic stance. While the previous chapter focused primarily on the alignment implications of intersubjective stancetaking, in the present chapter I turn my focus to the positioning vector in Du Bois’ (2007) stance triangle, which incorporates epistemic stance. I present the results of a quantitative study of epistemic stance marking in the research interviews I conducted with twelve binational, American/Israeli couples. This study addressed three main questions: (1) Do members of binational couples claim and assign authority or responsibility differently (and thus position themselves differently) when talking about different topics? (2) Are there trends in epistemic strategies across speakers? and (3) What do any such trends tell us about speakers’ orientation to their own national culture and their partner’s national culture?

Statistical analysis finds that the Americans and Israelis had similar patterns of stancetaking overall: both groups used mostly epistemically unmarked stances (64% overall) and had similar rates of subjectively (31%) and attributively (5%) marked stances. Additionally, in keeping with claims made in previous, qualitative studies (described in Sections 5.2 through 5.4 below), both groups were most likely to use epistemically unmarked stances to talk about personal topics, while they had
higher-than-average rates of subjectively and attributively marked stances when talking about their partner’s home country and culture and lower-than-average rates when talking about their own country and culture.

Sections 5.2 through 5.5 below outline important developments in previous research on evidentiality and epistemic stance, followed by Section 5.6, which motivates the present study. Section 5.7 outlines the methodology of the study, Section 5.8 the results, and finally Section 5.9 identifies some conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the study.

5.2 Background: Evidentiality and epistemic stance

Since the early 1980s, much has been written about evidentiality and epistemic stance from a linguistic point of view. Here I briefly summarize some of the developments in our understanding of these terms and concepts. Some detailed overviews of the related fields of evidentiality and epistemic stance are provided by Bednarek 2006; Fox 2001; Kärkkäinen 2003; and especially Mushin 2001.

The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic stance is famously tricky, as Kärkkäinen writes, “Where evidentiality fits in with epistemicity and which one is considered the superordinate category varies from one researcher to the next” (Kärkkäinen 2003: 18). Early writings on the topic tend not to focus on the distinction between the two but frequently treat them simply as related concepts. One of the earliest treatments of evidentiality and epistemic stance in linguistics is Givón 1982 (“Evidentiality and epistemic space”), which does not provide definitions for the terms evidentiality and epistemic space, and in fact seems to use
them more or less interchangeably, proposing “a three-segment scale of the epistemic—or evidential—space in human language” (Ibid: 41). Chafe (1986) also minimizes the distinction between evidentiality and epistemicity, but introduces two distinct ways of understanding evidentiality. The “narrow sense”—grammatical marking of kinds of evidence—is most common in languages that indicate source or type of evidence through affixation.\(^{11}\) Chafe’s broad sense, which he adopts for his analysis, and which more closely reflects the approach of this study, includes “a range of epistemological considerations that are linguistically coded in spoken and written English...[and involve] attitudes toward knowledge” (Chafe 1986: 262).

Chafe lists evidential devices in English including “modal auxiliaries, adverbs, and miscellaneous idiomatic phrases” (Ibid: 261), all of which can index degree of reliability, mode of knowing, type of evidence, and comparison to expectations.

Some more recent work does delve into the distinctions between evidentiality and epistemicity. Kärkkäinen regards “evidential distinctions as part of the marking of epistemic modality. This is motivated by my definition of epistemicity, namely as different ways of showing commitment toward what one is saying, or...as different attitudes toward knowledge” (Kärkkäinen 2003: 19).

Similarly, Bednarek (2006: 635) defines epistemological positioning as “the expression of assessments concerning knowledge..[which] often overlaps with \textit{evidentiality}—the linguistic marking of the basis of speaker/writer knowledge.” As noted above, Mushin (2001) provides a thorough overview of the uses and

\(^{11}\) Such languages include Japanese (as analyzed by Aoki 1986; Kamio 1994, 1997; Mushin 2001), Kwakiutl (Boas 1911), Macedonian (Friedman 1986; Lunt 1952; Mushin 2001), Quechua (Floyd 1993), Russian (Jakobson 1957), Tibetan (DeLancey 1986, 1991), and Turkish (Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986), to name just a few.
taxonomies of the terms *evidentiality* and *epistemology* in the study of both English and other languages, and my approach to this topic draws on her treatment of it. She adopts Chafe’s “broad” sense of the term *evidentiality*, and describes *epistemological stance* as follows: “In terms of conceptual structure, one can say that when verbally representing a piece of knowledge, speakers necessarily take a *stand* on how they acquired the information, how they know it. This stand is their *epistemological stance* towards the information” (Ibid: 52, emphasis original). I adopt this definition from Mushin but prefer the label *epistemic stance*, which is more common in the literature. Mushin provides a useful figure, reproduced as Figure 5.1 below, which presents several forms of epistemic stances ordered by their subjectivity—roughly, “the role the speaking subject plays in linguistic production” (Ibid: 1; see section 5.3.2 below for a more detailed discussion of subjectivity). Mushin’s model of epistemological stance types presents an opposition between subjective and objective. At the most “subjective” end of the continuum are representations of information presented as “the product of the conceptualiser’s direct and conscious perceptual experience,” in the most extreme case, “private states, like emotions and sensations” (59), for example “I’m exhausted!” (65). At the most “objective” end of the continuum are stances in which the conceptualizer’s perspective is completely erased, for example a “world truth” such as “Two plus two equals four” (74).
In section 5.7.2 below, I present the simplified model of epistemic stances that I use for my analysis.

I now turn to a more detailed discussion of types and functions of epistemic marking.

5.3 Background: Types of epistemic stances

I have grouped epistemic strategies into three categories or types, based on focuses of previous research on epistemic stance. These categories are roughly analogous to the left end, middle, and right ends of Mushin's continuum.

5.3.1 Attributive stance

One of the most commonly researched types of epistemic marking in English is reported speech, also known as constructed dialogue, along with a related concept, attribution. Use of reported speech has been identified as a means of giving evidence for a stance (Holt 1996), as a means of increasing the authority of a stance (Clift 2006; Du Bois 1986), as a means for a speaker or narrator to create distance...
from a reader or listener (Shuman 1993), as a means for a speaker to “soften” (Strauss 2004) or avoid taking responsibility for (Fox 2001; Holt 1996; Pomerantz 1984) a socially problematic stance, and as a foil for a disaligning stance (Damari 2010). Distancing from an attributed utterance can be emphasized using devices such as exaggerated prosody (Buttny 1997) or oh-prefacing (Trester 2009), frequently in combination with assessment of the reported utterance by the current speaker. In these types of examples, the present speaker seems to be attempting to avoid being held accountable as the “author” (Goffman 1981 [1979]) of the utterance. Similarly, Hunston (2000) writes, “If a piece of language [...] is attributed, it is presented as deriving from someone other than the writer. If a piece of language is averred, the writer him or herself speaks” (178). Yet there is no pure attribution; as Hunston notes, “attributed utterances are embedded within averred ones” (Ibid: 179); that is, a speaker who uses an attributed stance is never simply the “animator” (Goffman 1981 [1979]) of another’s utterance; the present utterance is designed by the present speaker for a purpose in the present interaction (cf. Tannen 2007 [1989] on “constructed dialogue”).

Within the realm of reported speech, distinctions may be made between direct and indirect reported speech, where direct reported speech is said to “blur the distinction between the current speaker’s point of view and that of the original speaker” (Holt 2000: 427) or to “communicate a more authentic piece of information than an indirect quote” (Li 1986: 41). Still, many authors have pointed to the unreliability of direct reported speech (Clark and Gerrig 1990; Lehrer 1989;
Mayes 1990); thus I do not consider direct reported speech as a separate category of attribution.

5.3.2 Subjectively marked stance

A second category of epistemic stances contains those that explicitly invoke the speaker’s perspective, which I call subjectively marked stances. Finegan (1995: 1) describes subjectivity as concerned with “expression of self and the representation of a speaker’s (or, more generally, a locutionary agent’s) perspective or point of view in discourse.” He contrasts this use of the term subjectivity with uses relating to the grammatical subject; with a term that “contrasts with objectivity in suggesting something ‘soft’, unverifiable, even suspicious” (Ibid); and with subjective modes of inquiry. I adopt Finegan’s understanding of subjectivity in the context of this work. Previous work on subjectively marked stances tends to see these types of stances not as a category to themselves, but rather as one end of a continuum, whether subjective-objective (Bednarek 2006; Mushin 2001) or subjective-intersubjective (Kärkkäinen 2003; Nuyts 2001; Scheibman 2007).

In Mushin’s continuum (Figure 5.1 above), “The more that the conceptualiser is represented as part of the construal, the more ‘subjective’ the representation” (Mushin 2001: 80); at the other pole, “The most objective utterances are those in which there is a maximised distinction between the conceptualiser and the object of conceptualisation,” in which the speaker is “offstage” (Ibid: 8). Nuyts (2001) problematizes the subjective-objective dichotomy. He claims that this distinction has never been well defined and that the literature is not clear on how subjectivity is
linguistically expressed. Nuyts offers examples, writing that markers such as “in my view/opinion/mind, if you ask me, to me, etc., can be used to indicate that the speaker is offering information about a state of affairs which is strictly subjective, even in the absence of any other ...qualificational expression in the utterance” (387). Nuyts contrasts these markers with markers of intersubjectivity, such as “it is known that,” in an attempt to move the discussion from a contrast in subjectivity vs. objectivity to a contrast in subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity. Nuyts describes the contrast as follows: “one pole involves the speaker’s indication that (s)he alone knows (or has access to) the evidence and draws conclusions from it; the other pole involves his/her indication that the evidence is known to (or accessible by) a larger group of people who share the same conclusion based on it” (393).

I argued in chapter 4 that all stancetaking is intersubjective, or emergent “from dialogic interaction between interlocutors” (Kärkkäinen 2006: 700), and that “intersubjectivity pervades the entire communication process” (Schiffrin 1990: 138). Based on this understanding of intersubjectivity and an assumption that no utterance is entirely free of speaker subjectivity, when I write about a continuum of subjectivity, I will use the subjective-objective opposition simply as a shorthand for more or less subjectively marked.

5.3.3 Factual (epistemically unmarked) stance

The final category that is commonly addressed in discussions of types of epistemic stance is a stance that is epistemically unmarked, which I call factual stance, following Mushin (2001); this stance type is also called zero-marked (e.g., by
Fox 2001). A factual stance is taken when a speaker provides no evidential marking for an utterance. Factual stances have been variously described as an indication that the information is common knowledge or unchallengeable (Mushin 2001: 74); as a way for a speaker to “disassociate herself from the representation...[denying] that what they are talking about is their own representation of events” (Mushin 2001: 75); or, in contrast, as correlating with “greater claims to authority, responsibility, and entitlement, while overt marking correlates with at least some distancing from, or denial of, such claims” (Fox 2001: 182). The subset of factual stances referred to as generalizations can be used "to evaluate and strengthen stances; and to create intersubjective ties...by generalizing experience” (Scheibman 2007: 118).

In the following section I review prior work analyzing the functions of these three stance types and epistemic marking more broadly.

5.4 Background: Functions of different epistemic stance types

Given some of the definitions of evidentiality and epistemic stance discussed above, perhaps the most obvious function of epistemic marking is to indicate the degree of certainty or reliability a speaker attributes to an utterance. In a paper based primarily on languages with grammatical evidential systems, Givón (1982) argues that, across languages, there are three types of propositions:

• “Propositions which are to be taken for granted, via the force of diverse conventions, as unchallengeable by the hearer and thus requiring no evidentiary justifications by the speaker [later labeled “highest certainty”];
• Propositions that are asserted with relative confidence, are open to challenge by the hearer and thus require—or admit—evidentiary justification [later labeled “medium certainty”]; and, finally,

• Proposition [sic] that are asserted with doubt, as hypotheses, and are thus beneath both challenge and evidentiary substantiation [later labeled “lowest certainty”]” (Givón 1982: 24).

This distinction among types of propositions assumes that evidential marking is associated only or primarily with assertions of medium, or questionable certainty: propositions that may be challenged. According to Givón, propositions that are either hypotheses or “taken for granted” would be unmarked, using what I call factual stance. Du Bois (1986) draws on Givón’s distinction in proposition type, writing, “A statement is sometimes called self-evident if it is considered a basic or foundational tenet of a particular culture—one that is presupposed and, indeed, would ordinarily remain unmarked” (322). In contrast, when entering territory that is less sure, quotation is “a powerful tool for persuasion, to the extent that it shifts hearer’s scrutiny of knowledge, interests, sincerity and fallibility to those who are most able to bear it” (332). On the basis of these two explanations, and perhaps also on the basis of speaker intuition, we would expect any uncertain stances to be supported with reported speech or other evidence. However, in the analysis reported in Section 5.8 below we see this is not straightforwardly the case.

Chafe (1986) divides evidential markers into two broad categories: modes of knowing and comparison of knowledge to expectations. Within each broad category,
he groups markers (including adjectives, adverbs, verbs, quotatives, and modals) into sub-categories by function, e.g., source of evidence (sensory, hearsay, induction, or deduction), degrees of reliability, and so forth. This type of taxonomy supports Givón’s assertion that evidentiality is about certainty of assertion, specifically aligned with source of information. This approach to evidentiality is spelled out in the introduction to the edited volume Chafe’s chapter appears in:

This book is about human awareness that the truth is relative....There are some things people are sure of, either because they have reliable evidence for them, or—probably more often—because they have unquestioning faith that they are true. There are other things people are less sure of, and some things they think are only within the realm of possibility. Languages typically provide a repertoire of devices for conveying these various attitudes toward knowledge. (Chafe and Nichols 1986: vii)

Thus, like Givón, Chafe and Nichols identify the purpose of evidential markers as primarily about encoding source of information and level of certainty.

Pomerantz (1984) likewise supports Givón's claims about the role of evidential marking, but adds an additional dimension. She argues that when people are sure of a statement and there is little negative social consequence for saying it, they assert it “declaratively,” i.e., epistemically unmarked. When speakers are not sure or there is a possible negative social consequence, they provide one of two
forms of evidence: 

“(1) telling *my* experience, i.e., only what I know first hand regarding the state of affairs, and (2) reporting someone else’s version of the state of affairs. With both kinds of evidence, speakers suggest the existence of a particular state of affairs without directly asserting it” (Pomerantz 1984: 609–610, emphasis original). This is an early indication in the literature that social realities such as avoiding disagreement, not only certainty or actual source of evidence, may dictate choices made about epistemic marking.

In any case, the view of epistemic stance as reflecting the relative certainty or reliability of a piece of information isn’t as straightforward as we might think. For example, is there a direct relationship between type of evidence on the one hand and certainty or speaker commitment on the other? Mushin (2001: 17) notes a “lack of a clear boundary” between the two, but points out that this relationship is not fixed: “Degree of speaker commitment is an inference that can be drawn from evidential use, but one cannot claim that speakers use evidentials solely to express their degree of commitment” (24).

Mushin (2001) claims that the primary question addressed by the use of epistemic stance is not speaker commitment or certainty per se, but rather:

the assumption of ‘authority’ over information, where the person who has assumed ‘authority’ is understood as taking responsibility for the validity of the information….For instance, the person who has lesser authority in a speech situation might cite someone who has more authority in order to demonstrate their strong belief in the
information, and perhaps to persuade their interlocutors to adopt the same degree of commitment and belief. In this context, reportive evidentiality would be used to ‘vouch for’ information. In other contexts, speakers might choose to represent information as a report in order to signal their lack of commitment or ambivalence with respect to their epistemological assessment. In these circumstances they shift responsibility for the truth of the information to the reported speaker, essentially washing their own hands of the affair.

(22)

Thus we see that attributive marking of stance does not straightforwardly serve to indicate either a high or a low degree of reliability or speaker commitment. For the purpose of the present analysis, I avoid inferences of speaker commitment in my discussion. Instead, contributing to a growing focus in the research over the last 20 years or so, I focus on the interpersonal question of who is given epistemic authority or responsibility for a stance. Following Fox (2001), my interest is less in the speaker’s relationship to her utterance but primarily in “the speaker’s relationship to the outside world” (169).

In a study that operationalizes the speaker’s relationship to his interlocutors, Kamio (1997) argues that a speaker’s use of evidential marking is determined not by the source or reliability of information, but by the speaker’s rights to the information, and thus that evidentiality and politeness are closely related. He formalizes this argument by claiming that speaker and hearer each have a “territory
of information,” and that a speaker’s choice of evidential marking is based on her assessment of where the information is situated with regard to the speaker’s and the hearer’s territories of information. Specifically, speakers will use more marked or “indirect” evidential strategies when the information is in the hearer’s rather than speaker’s territory of information. This seems to be a good representation of how speakers in my sample are using epistemic marking, as I discuss below.

Fox also argues that choice of evidential marking is based on “an understanding of and a shaping for the precise sequential location in which the utterance is produced, where that understanding and shaping are tied to notions of authority, responsibility, and entitlement” (2001: 170). She hypothesizes “that zero-evidential marking represents a claim to greater authority, responsibility, and entitlement than does overt evidential marking” (170). On the other hand, “by doing a message as ‘animator’—which in some circumstances could be indicated by evidential marking—a participant can be seen to distribute responsibility to other...participants and thereby minimize the potentially negative consequences of their actions” (174). Mushin agrees: “while epistemological stance may reflect the actual historical (objective) origin of speakers’ knowledge, it may equally reflect a more subjective construal based on their current recall and on pressures and interests associated with the current speech situation” (Mushin 2001: 53).

In the title of their 1992 book, Hill and Irvine make a point to emphasize the interaction of evidence with responsibility, writing, “the topic of ‘Responsibility and Evidence in Oral Discourse’ [their book title] seems to us especially apt for furthering this new direction of work, since ‘responsibility’ points toward the
agency aspect of meaning while ‘evidence’ points toward the knowledge aspect” (2). Heritage and Raymond (Heritage and Raymond 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006) similarly stress the relevance of what they call a speaker’s “socioepistemic rights” in influencing the ways that speakers take stances.

Other authors have described other interpersonal functions of epistemic marking. Schiffrin (1985) points out that “beliefs, opinion, judgments, and feelings differ from assertions and statements of fact because they are representations of internal, cognitive states that are available for neither observation nor verification” (40). However, Strauss (2004) argues that “‘assertions and statements of fact’ are also presentations of beliefs—the difference is not whether a belief is being presented, but what speakers see as its cultural standing. Thus, to gain the right of incorrigibility it is not enough to utter a belief. It has to be explicitly marked as the speaker’s belief by saying I believe, I think, and so on. No one can doubt that is what you believe, even if they disagree with the assertion” (Strauss 2004: 191, emphasis original). Thus Schiffrin and Strauss seem to agree that subjective marking is a way for a speaker to shield herself from critique. For Strauss, this use of subjective marking is one part of a detailed taxonomy of “cultural standing.” Based on a variety of examples from American English, Strauss argues that “When speakers voice an opinion on a topic about which there has been prior discourse or tacit agreement in their opinion community, they are expected to mark the cultural standing of that opinion...on a continuum that ranges from highly controversial to completely taken for granted in the relevant opinion community” (Strauss 2004: 161). According to Strauss, controversial opinions tend to be softened by a range of devices including
attribution to others; debatable opinions are qualified by one or more of several devices including marking as the speaker’s own beliefs (e.g., *I think* or *to me*); in contrast, common opinions are typically short sentences with no qualification or support, parallel to what I call *factual stances*.

We have seen that evidentials and epistemic markers may be understood as having several functions. For a time, they were understood primarily as indicating the speaker’s assessment of the source of information or the reliability of information. However, it is frequently difficult for a speaker to identify the actual, original source of a piece of information, and the source of a piece of information does not always correlate with its reliability. For this and other reasons, more recent research in this area has focused more on the interpersonal functions of epistemic markers, from information management to face work. One interpersonal function of epistemic markers whose use has been discussed at length by analysts, and which is woven into many treatments of the issue, is answering the question of whether a speaker takes epistemic responsibility for an utterance or attributes that responsibility to someone else—or to no one. This last function is the one I focus on in my approach in this chapter, taking a statistical approach to analyze how speakers orient toward topics with different potential social consequences.

### 5.5 Previous quantitative studies of stance

This chapter is one of a relatively few quantitative studies of stance. Two early and well-known studies of stance use a quantitative methodology: Biber and Finegan (1988, 1989) used a statistical method called *cluster analysis* to identify
speech styles in English, challenging the assumption that texts within a genre constitute a linguistic whole, distinct from others. Applying cluster analysis to large corpora of spoken and written English, Biber and Finegan grouped texts into clusters on the basis of their similar use of certain previously identified stance markers (i.e. on the basis of their similarity of linguistic form), rather than on the basis of their membership in a genre (determined by topic and purpose).

Biber and Finegan’s statistical methodology has been adopted by several subsequent quantitative studies of stance. Watson (1999) modified the model and applied it to a study of evidentiality and affective stance in the writing of an Australian novelist, finding that the novels were divided into two different groups, with very distinct styles of expressing stance. Precht (2003) used cluster analysis to identify differences in stance styles between British and American speakers, drawing on a large corpus that included speakers of both nationalities, in several different speech situations. By grouping texts on the basis of stance markers that frequently occurred together, Precht found significant differences in the stance styles of British and American speakers, with Americans using more markers of affect while British speakers used more evidential markers.

Downing (2001) used distribution patterns and the results of chi-square tests to discuss the evidential and interactional functions of the adverb *surely*, while other studies, including some whose focus is primarily qualitative, identify frequency-based patterns of stance markers, including identifying the most common epistemic stance markers in a corpus, showing the distribution of stance markers by position (e.g., Conrad and Biber 2000; Kärkkäinen 2003; Scheibman 2007). O'Barr
and Atkins (1980) incorporate some quantitative and statistical analysis in a mainly qualitative study of gender patterns in the use of powerless language forms, such as hedges, tag questions, direct quotations, and so forth, finding that these features, traditionally associated with women's language (Lakoff 1975), are “neither characteristic of all women nor limited only to women” (O'Barr and Atkins 1980: 102).

This chapter differs from earlier work by using multilevel logistic regression modeling to identify significant influences of topic and social factors on speaker’s choice of stance type, and significant interactions between factors. Additionally, in contrast to many of the studies mentioned above, I hand-coded each clause individually rather than rely on a computer program to identify patterns in a tagged corpus. Manual coding allowed me to take into consideration the entirety of each clause and adjacent clauses, coding in a way that was informed by the context of the clause and not only by the appearance of predetermined keywords.

5.6 Motivations

This study was motivated by two broad questions. First, is there quantitative support for the claims found in qualitative studies about the functions and uses of different epistemic stance types? Second, how do strategies of epistemic authority relate to self-positioning and identity construction in interactions between members of binational or cross-cultural couples?

In an early treatment of positioning theory, Davies and Harré (1990) argue that identity is not static but is constructed in interaction with others, particularly
through “discursive practices [that] constitute [position] the speakers and hearers in certain ways” (Ibid: 62). Harré and van Langenhove (1999: 17) elaborate on some possible types of positioning: “One can position oneself or be positioned as e.g., powerful or powerless, confident or apologetic, dominant or submissive, definitive or tentative, authorized or unauthorized, and so on.” Bamberg (1997) identifies three different levels of positioning: Level 1 addresses the relative positioning of characters within a story, level 2 addresses the speaker’s positioning with regard to an audience, and level 3 addresses narrators’ positioning with regard to themselves (self-conception of identity). Schiffrin (2006) integrates Bamberg’s levels of positioning with the related concepts of footing and stance, writing, “Whereas positioning deconstructs speaker’s identity projection in relation to what is said, footing deconstructs the speaker’s production format in relation to talk, and stance addresses the epistemic basis of the speaker/content relationship” (208). Du Bois’ (2007) stance triangle organizes the concepts somewhat differently: his conception of positioning, which interacts with alignment and evaluation in each act of stancetaking, encompasses both the types of positions enumerated by van Langenhove and Harré and epistemic positioning. However, regardless of the preferred organization of these related topics, it is clear that epistemic stance is related to—and, I argue, is a means of—positioning.

Thus positioning plays a role in each of the research questions that motivated this study:
1. How do members of binational couples orient epistemically toward statements about their own national culture, their partner’s national culture, cultural comparisons, and other topics? More specifically, do speakers claim and assign authority or responsibility differently (and thus position themselves differently) when talking about different topics?

2. Are there trends in how speakers position themselves via claiming and assigning responsibility for stances, across speakers and within or across national groups?

3. What do any trends in the use of epistemic strategies and epistemic positioning tell us about speakers’ relation to their own culture and adaptation to their partner’s culture?

The following section describes the methods of data analysis that were used to try to answer these questions.

5.7 Data analysis

5.7.1 Coding of stance topic

I coded for topic and stance type every clause that can be characterized as a stance. Following Du Bois (2007), I defined a stance as any clause that states an opinion, makes a claim, evaluates something, positions the speaker, or indicates an alignment with another social actor. Since it can be difficult to determine whether two related, adjacent clauses constitute a single stance or separate stances, I made the decision to uniformly consider each independent clause, along with any of its subordinate clauses, as a single stance, which of course may contribute to a larger
stance-taking endeavor. Utterances such as these accounted for the vast majority of utterances in the interviews, and comprised a corpus of 9,055 stances, taken from the twelve interviews with twenty-four speakers.

I developed the coding scheme for topic based on my research questions, informed by trial coding of a subset of the data. I could not find a grammatical or lexical basis for coding for topic; topic is not reliably equivalent with grammatical subject, for example. Instead, I coded for topic based on the content and context of the clause. Table 5.1 shows the list of topics that were used for initial coding.

**Table 5.1: Coding of Stances for Topic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>The clause is primarily about:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>Speaker’s description of or opinions about the local Israeli or Jewish community (in the DC area), including institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Israel/Israelis</td>
<td>Speaker’s description of or opinions about Israel, Israeli culture or Israeli people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>America/Americans</td>
<td>Speaker’s description of or opinions about America, American culture or Americans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cultural comparison</td>
<td>Speaker’s comparison of Israeli and American culture; doesn’t fit into one of the above categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Other culture</td>
<td>Speaker’s description of or opinions about another culture (generalizations or about specific people); doesn’t fit into one of the above categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Speaker’s description of or opinions about the couple’s religious practices or religious beliefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Couple’s relationship</td>
<td>Speaker’s description of the couple’s relationship or communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>The couple’s (or the speaker’s individual) biographical details, experiences, interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>The speaker’s partner’s individual biographical details, experiences, interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>The couple’s family (parents, children, siblings, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>None of the above</td>
<td>Anything that doesn’t fit into one of the above categories.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the sake of consistency, coding for topic followed a hierarchy. First, if a stance referred specifically to some element of the local community (Israeli, Jewish, or otherwise) or its members, I coded it as “local community.” If a stance did not
refer to the local community but to Israelis or Americans or some aspect of Israeli or American culture broadly, I coded it as “Israel” or “America.” The label “America” covers stances about both Americans generally and American Jews in particular. If a stance addressed the comparison of American and Israeli cultures, I coded it as “culture comparison,” whereas if a stance had to do with a national culture, but didn’t focus specifically on one or two cultures I was focusing on, I coded it as “other culture,” having to do with a culture other than Israeli or American. Stances having to do with the couple themselves were coded as “religion” or “relationship/communication” if appropriate and, if not, as either “self” or “partner.” Stances related to the couple’s family, but not codable as “relationship/communication” or “self” or “partner,” were coded as “family.” Finally, stances fitting none of these criteria were coded as “none of the above.” Adhering to this hierarchy for coding allowed me to be confident that I was coding topics consistently. As mentioned above, the coding of each stance was informed by the entire clause and its context, rather than on the basis of a predetermined set of keywords.

As an illustration of the hierarchy, consider this stance, from my interview with Barak and Amy: “We talk about, um, the honesty factor, how how straight, and law-abiding people might be from different cultures.” This statement could be coded as “culture comparison” or as “relationship/communication,” but since “culture comparison” is higher on the hierarchy outlined above, that is the code that is applied.
Because they were topically related and patterned together statistically, I merged some categories after hand-coding to arrive at this final set of categories, which is the set of codes that was entered into the regression model:

- Local community
- Israel
- America
- Relationship and cultural comparison
- Self and family (includes self, partner, family)
- Other (includes religion, other cultures, none of the above)

5.7.2 Coding of epistemic stance

Next I coded the epistemic marking of each stance. I followed a text-driven methodology, “trying to make as few theoretical assumptions as possible before analyzing the text data, rather than using a previously established theoretical framework to classify the data” (Bednarek 2006). I developed a coding scheme based on a subset of the data collected, with an eye toward my research question of what resources speakers draw on to support their stances. This was also done by hierarchy, using the stance types found in Table 5.2. (Examples of each stance type can be found after Figure 5.2 below.)
Table 5.2: Coding of Stances for Epistemic Stance Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Stance type</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Narrative-personal</td>
<td>A set of at least two sequentially ordered clauses recounting an event relating to the stance topic. The speaker was a participant in or direct observer of the story being recounted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Narrative-other</td>
<td>A set of at least two sequentially ordered clauses recounting an event relating to the stance topic. The speaker was not a participant in or direct observer of the story being recounted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Subjectively marked</td>
<td>The speaker makes explicit reference to his or her personal thoughts, feelings, opinions, or knowledge about the stance topic or object. Includes self-quotation. E.g., “I think...,” “I know...,” “I always say...,” “if you ask me,” “for me...,” “I don’t like...,” and similar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Constructed dialogue</td>
<td>The speaker reports another person's words as support for or as a foil for the speaker's own stance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Constructed stance</td>
<td>The speaker reports another person's views, beliefs, or observations (or a hypothetical belief, e.g. “they would agree”) as support for or as a foil for the speaker's own stance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Authoritative text</td>
<td>The speaker makes reference to a book, TV show, newspaper, law, statistic, etc. as the source of or as evidence for a particular stance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Unmarked</td>
<td>Unmarked for epistemicity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, if a stance reported a narrative (defined as a series of at least two sequentially ordered clauses recounting an event) I coded it as “Narrative.” The narrative category was further distinguished on the basis of speaker involvement in the story. If the speaker was a participant in or direct observer of the story, I coded the clause as “narrative-personal”; if not, as “narrative-other.”

If a stance explicitly referred to the speaker’s thoughts, feelings, opinion, or knowledge (e.g., “I think,” “I always say,” “if you ask me,”), I coded it as “subjectively marked.” If a stance reported the words of someone else, I coded the clause as “constructed dialogue,” whereas if a stance reported the views of someone else, I coded as “constructed stance.” Appeal to a book, law, newspaper, statistic, or similar authority was coded as “authoritative text.” If a stance did not meet any of the above criteria, it was coded as “unmarked.” This category contains stances that seem like
proverbs, stances that make generalizations, and stances that are presented simply as facts, perceived by the stancetaker as requiring no evidential support.

As statistical analysis can be relatively difficult and uninformative when the dependent variable (in this case stance type) has many different levels, I later combined these categories as follows, drawing on the literature described above.

- Own authority (narrative-personal, subjective);
- Other’s authority (narrative-other, constructed dialogue, constructed stance, authoritative text);
- Unmarked.

I thus developed a simplified scale of subjectivity comparable to those found in Mushin (2001) and Bednarek (2006), but better suited to statistical analysis:

**Figure 5.2: Subjectivity and epistemological stance types (adapted)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective (Speaker’s perspective is evoked)</th>
<th>Objective (Speaker’s perspective is effaced)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Own authority (subjective)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Other’s authority (attributive)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Personal narratives</td>
<td>- Others’ narratives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Subjective marking: “I think,” “if you ask me,” etc.</td>
<td>- Constructed dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Constructed stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Authoritative text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unmarked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For ease of discussion, and in keeping with others’ use of the terms, I use the shorthand *subjective* to refer to the “own authority” category and *attributive* to refer to the “other’s authority” category.

It is important to note that, in contrast to some previous studies of epistemic stance, my focus is not on the degree of speaker commitment or the actual source of
information, but rather on who is the bearer of epistemic authority. One reason for this is the way I framed my research questions (see Section 5.6). It is also the case that it is often difficult to determine speaker commitment from many epistemic markers, especially *I think*. (See Kärkkäinen 2003 for an in-depth discussion of the difficulty of inferring degree of speaker commitment from *I think*.)

Following are examples of each stance type from my interviews.

**Subjective stance**

- Tomer: *I always say* that I never knew how religious...are American until I got here,
- Einat: And *I think* usually it comes up when you know like when holidays come around.
- Amy: They’re they’re...like- diametrically different cultures if you ask me.

**Attributive stance**

- Yael: But *from friends that we know* that went back it’s still kind of like that
- Claire: And *you {her husband} see me* as integrated.
- Galit: *He’s like* uh- g- when I go back to Israel, and I want to do this in Israel, and, *{about a friend}*

**Factual stance**

- Barak: Every culture they have the positive and the negative things.
- Josh: Cause a lot of Israelis leave Israel.
- Rachel: The Americans are maybe\(^{12}\) too guarded and too euphemistic in how they use language, and Israelis are just, sometimes too crude.

**5.7.3 Intercoder reliability**

In order to assess the psychological reality of the coding categories, and to ensure that the categories were defined clearly enough to be stable, I provided the

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\(^{12}\) Rachel’s use of “maybe” may indicate a lower degree of commitment, but degree of commitment is not the focus of this analysis.
guidelines in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 (coding categories), along with in-person training on the coding, to an assistant coder with no linguistic training. A non-linguist was chosen to minimize the possibility that the categories made sense only to a linguistically-trained eye. The assistant coder was asked to code two separate subsets of the data according to the guidelines provided: one 250-clause subset was coded for topic and one 250-clause subset was coded for stance type. I also coded these two subsets of data, both of which were distinct from the subset the coding schemes were developed on. An intercoder reliability analysis using Cohen’s Kappa statistic was performed to assess consistency between coders. The intercoder reliability when coding for topic was found to be Kappa = 0.84 (p < 0.001), with a standard error of 0.03. When coding for epistemic stance type, reliability was found to be Kappa = 0.71 (p < 0.001), with a standard error of 0.03. As both of these Kappa values are above the rule-of-thumb threshold of 0.70 (see, e.g., Lombard et al. 2010 and references cited there), the categories were determined to be stable.

5.7.4 Statistical analysis

Once coded, the 9,055 stancetaking clauses were subjected to a mixed-model logistic regression analysis, also known as mixed-effects modeling or multilevel modeling (MLM). MLM has several advantages that are relevant for this study. While standard regression analyses require that individual observations be independent, this assumption is frequently violated in linguistic data, as tokens produced by the same speaker are not independent (see, e.g., Johnson 2009). MLM provides a solution to this problem by enabling the grouping of data points that are related.
Specifically, MLM allows the inclusion of both fixed effects (variables with a small and fixed number of values, e.g., stance type) and random effects (variables with an essentially unbounded number of values, e.g., speaker) (Field 2009; Johnson 2009).

Separate binomial regressions were carried out with subjective and attributive as the target value; in each case factual was selected as the reference value. Regressions were run to determine the effect of nationality (Israeli or American), gender (male or female), and topic (as listed above) on the stance type used. Regressions were also conducted including the interaction of topic with nationality, in order to answer the research questions posed above. I included speaker and couple as random effects in all models to account for the fact that stances taken by a single speaker, or by members of a single couple, are not independent.

5.8 Results and Discussion

Before presenting the results of the regression models, I provide an overview of the distribution of epistemic stance markings.

5.8.1 General trends in distribution of stance type

The overall distribution of the three stance types is shown in Table 5.3 below. Factual (epistemically unmarked) stances are by far the most common. This is unsurprising given, for example, Mushin’s description of factual stance as indicating “that the source of information is unimportant to the establishment of the validity of the information” (2001: 74) and Chafe’s claim that “So far as we can tell
from their language, users of English regard knowledge as factual much of the time, expressing it without any evidential qualification” (1986: 271). The distribution of stance types seems to contradict the argument made by Scheibman (2002) and Kärkkäinen (2003) that “speakers seldom report bare facts, events or actions in an unmediated manner, but consistently convey their points of view, evaluation, opinions, and attitudes while doing so” (Kärkkäinen 2003: 77, citing Scheibman 2002). Speakers do frequently convey their points of view, but at least in this study, in contrast to Kärkkäinen’s suggestion, they do not frequently mark them as such. One possible explanation for this is the role of the speech situation; as Nylund (under review) has argued, speakers frequently “enact factual participant roles in [research] interviews” (1). On the other hand, given the range of subjective markers available, and the frequency with which they are used compared to attributive markers (see, e.g., Kärkkäinen 2003: 37), it is perhaps also not surprising that subjective marking was more common than attributive marking.

Table 5.3: Overall distribution of stance types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subjective</th>
<th>Attributive</th>
<th>Factual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2757</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>5820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>30.45</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>64.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N = 9055

The following graph (Figure 5.3) shows overall trends in use of stance type by topic. We see that, across national groups, speakers are least likely to use subjective marking when talking about Self and Family and most likely to use it
when comparing cultures. Speakers are least likely to use *attributive* marking when comparing cultures or talking about Self and Family and most likely to use it when talking about the local community. Taking into account that these results are for all speakers, it makes sense that neither America nor Israel should be at either the high or low extreme for any stance type, since stancetaking style on these two topics will likely vary by speaker nationality (as seen below). It is interesting to note that, across nationalities, in this data set stances taken about oneself and one’s family were the most likely to be epistemically unmarked. This seems to support the Kamio’s (1997) claim that the use or non-use of evidential marking is dictated largely by the “location” of the information in the speaker’s and hearer’s territories of information and Fox’s (2001: 170) claim that zero-marking “represents a claim to greater authority, responsibility, and entitlement.”

**Figure 5.3: Frequency of stance types by topic**
Tables 5.4–5.6 below show distribution of stance types by speaker. We can see that, while the use of subjective stance averages around 31% across speakers, among speakers it ranges from 14% to 41%. Attributive ranges from 0% to 26%, averaging to 5%, and factual ranges from 52% to 86%, averaging to 64%. (In the column for speaker nationality, “A” stands for American and “I” for Israeli.)

Table 5.4: Distribution of stance types by speaker
(sorted by % subjective stance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Nat.</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Subjective</th>
<th>Attributive</th>
<th>Factual</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>david</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yair</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yossi</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lliora</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kevin</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violette</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>einat</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barak</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clark</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>josh</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yael</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zebulun</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liat</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arad</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emily</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>claire</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>john</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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### Table 5.5: Distribution of stance types by speaker (sorted by % attributive stance)

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Table 5.6: Distribution of stance types by speaker (sorted by % factual stance)

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Having presented some of the overall trends in the data, I now turn to the results of the statistical analysis.

5.8.2 Results of regression analyses

As mentioned above, the statistical test used was a binomial mixed-model logistic regression, which identifies significant correlations between predictors (independent variables) and outcomes (dependent variable).
Taking variables individually to start, topic is found to be a significant predictor of the use of *subjective* stance, $F(5, 8569) = 80.73, p=.000$, while nationality and gender are not significant (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5 and Table 5.7 below). Similarly, topic is found to be a significant predictor of the use of *attributive* stance, $F(5, 6292) = 16.56, p=.000$, while nationality and gender are not significant (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5 and Table 5.8 below).

**Figure 5.4: Frequency of stance types by nationality**

**Figure 5.5: Frequency of stance types by gender**
Before turning to a more detailed discussion of topics, it is worth considering the factors found to be non-significant predictors. While there is no previous quantitative research on the use of epistemic stance marking across genders or across national groups, it is perhaps surprising that men and women, and Israelis and Americans, do not differ significantly in their rates of use of subjective stance (on differences in Israeli vs. American politeness styles see, e.g., Blum-Kulka 1982, 1997; Katriel 1986; on gendered politeness norms and stancetaking patterns see, e.g., Bucholtz 2009; Hannah and Murachver 2007; Kiesling 2001, 2009; Mills 2010). There are a few possible explanations for this finding. One possible explanation for the lack of significant difference across national groups is that each person whose stances are analyzed here has had extensive contact with at least one member of the other national group, and in several cases many members of the other national group. We might see different results if we were to analyze the stancetaking styles of monolingual or “monocultural” Israelis or Americans. Focusing on subjective stance marking, it is possible that the (national or gender) groups differ in the form of their subjective marking of stance (e.g., I think vs. in my experience). That type of distinction is beyond the scope of this chapter, but could be a fruitful topic for further research.

As we can see from Table 5.7 below, all topics are shown to be significant predictors of the use of subjective stance, \( F (7, 8569) = 58.16, p=.000 \). Generalized across all speakers, the topics Self/family, Israel, and Local community (with odds ratios less than 1) disfavor the use of subjective stance, while Compare Cultures and America (with odds ratios more than 1) favor it. In the table, the significant factors
are ordered from highest to lowest odds ratios, that is (as the odds ratio represents the effect size) from the strongest positive correlation to the strongest negative correlation.\textsuperscript{13} (This ordering is used for the remainder of the results section.)

Table 5.7: Effects of topic, nationality, and gender on subjective stance type

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<th>SE(B)</th>
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<td>1.57</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.77**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 Log likelihood=38,120.119, **p<.005, (not significant)

As mentioned above, it is not surprising that Self/family would disfavor the use of subjective stance, since it is the most personal topic, well within the speaker’s territory of information, and a logical topic for the highest degree of authority and entitlement. Similarly, it is not surprising that Compare favors subjective stance because both American and Israeli speakers are treading somewhat on their partners’ territories of information when comparing the couple’s two home cultures. This introduces both of the factors that Pomerantz (1984) notes can lead to the use of subjectively marked stance: The speaker may not be as sure about the reliability of what they are saying and, regardless of speaker certainty, comparing

\textsuperscript{13} The odds ratio is centered at 1. The greater the odds ratio is than 1, the stronger the positive relationship between factors; the smaller the odds ratio is than 1 (with a limit of zero), the stronger the negative relationship between factors.
one’s home culture to one’s partner’s runs the risk of a negative social consequence (the speaker’s partner could be offended by the comparison).

In contrast to the results for subjective stance, the significant results for attributive stance are somewhat more limited, though the model is significant, $F(7, 6290) = 12.02, p=.000$. Only the topics Israel and Self/family are found to be significant predictors of the use of attributive stance. Across all speakers, Israel favors the use of attributive stance, while Self/family disfavors it.

**Table 5.8: Effects of topic, nationality, and gender on attributive stance type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.79</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.59*</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self/family</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.50**</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 Log likelihood=36,512.329, *$p<.05$, **$p<.005$, (not significant)

The same reasoning as above applies to the interpretation of Self/family as disfavoring attributive stance: in each case, by contrast, that topic favors the use of factual stance. It is difficult to interpret the significance of the topic Israel in favoring attributive stance without taking speaker nationality into account, so I now turn to the results from regressions that include interaction effects.

Having seen the trends across all 24 speakers, it may be even more informative to look at the trends when we take speaker nationality into account. Though nationality alone is not a significant predictor of the use of subjective stance,
we might expect that a speaker’s nationality would influence the speaker’s stancetaking with regard to the topics identified here, and that is in fact the case. The interaction of topic and nationality is found to be a significant predictor of subjective stance, $F(5, 8565) = 5.97$, $p=.000$. Israelis are more likely than Americans to use subjective stance when talking about America, and less likely than Americans to use subjective stance when talking about Israel (other topics are not significant; see Table 5.9 and Figure 5.6).

Table 5.9: Effects of the interaction of topic and nationality on subjective stance type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.59**</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*America</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1.57*</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*Israel</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.57*</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*Local</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*Self/family</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*Compare</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 Log likelihood=38,157.752, *p<0.05, **p<.005, (not significant)

It seems reasonable to assume that, for an Israeli speaker, descriptions and evaluations of Israel would fall within the speaker’s own territory of information, while descriptions and evaluations of America would fall within the speaker’s partner’s territory of information, at least when that partner is present, which they were in all my interviews. It also seems likely that an Israeli evaluating aspects of America or American culture runs the risk of eliciting disagreement from their partner, or even offense on the part of their partner. Thus, these findings confirm earlier arguments that a speaker may choose to mark an utterance as her inference or her opinion when the topic of the utterance is outside her territory of information.
(Kamio 1997) or when she wants to avoid criticizing someone (Pomerantz 1984) or avoid a disagreement (Pomerantz 1984; Schiffrin 1985; Strauss 2004). Following Strauss’s (2004) taxonomy of “cultural standing,” these findings seem to indicate that these speakers are more likely to view as potentially debatable stances about their partner’s home country than other topics.

**Figure 5.6: Frequency of stance types by nationality and topic**

The interaction of topic and nationality is also found to be a significant predictor of attributive stance, $F(11, 6286) = 8.60$, $p=.000$, though only for one topic. Israelis are, unsurprisingly, less likely to use an attributive stance when talking about Israel than are Americans. No other interactions with topic were found to be significant.
Table 5.10: Effects of the interaction of topic and nationality on attributive stance type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.07</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*Israel</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*Self/family</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*America</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*Local</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality*Compare</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 Log likelihood=36,465.787, *p<0.05, **p<.005, (not significant)

This finding also supports previous claims made about the interpersonal functions of attributive stance. Previous research, from Du Bois (1986) to Fox (2001) and Mushin (2001), has argued that attributive stance is a way to divert responsibility for a potentially problematic utterance from the current speaker, either with the goal of invoking a more qualified authority or with the goal of signaling lack of speaker commitment. Assuming once again that a speaker will be more willing to take responsibility for stances about her own culture than her partner’s culture (at least in front of the partner), we see this borne out in the statistics: Israelis are less than half as likely as Americans to attribute a stance about Israel to someone else. To put it slightly differently, following Strauss’s cultural standing taxonomy, these findings indicate that these Americans are more likely than Israelis to view stances about Israel as potentially controversial.

What do the results about subjective and attributive stance tell us about the use of factual stance? Factual stance has been argued to index “greater authority, responsibility, and entitlement than does overt evidential marking” (Fox 2001: 170) or to mark statements that are perceived by the speaker to be “established facts”
(Pomerantz 1984: 609) or “common opinion” (Strauss 2004). This is borne out in the data and statistics. We find that, across national groups, participants in the study were most likely to use factual stance to talk about themselves and their families; Americans were least likely to use factual stance to talk about Israel, while Israelis were least likely to use factual stance to talk about America. This supports the arguments mentioned above: speakers are using factual stance to talk about a topic that they can easily be considered experts on. If the two partners being interviewed disagree about some description or assessment of a family member or some event in their family’s history, which is certainly possible, it is not because one of them is less qualified to talk about it. Thus, even if stances taken about the speaker’s family are not necessarily “established facts” or “common opinion,” speakers seem to deem it safe to talk about them as such, perhaps since the risks are lower than those associated with assessing a partner’s home country.

A final factor to consider is the length of the relationship. Over the course of a relationship, we might expect to see a few changes relevant to this discussion. First, we might expect that members of a couple would converge in their conversational style due to ongoing interaction with their partner, and thus possible influence from their partner. Second, we might expect that years of experience with the partner’s culture and home country would lead a speaker to speak more like a member of that culture, with less concern for speaking as an outsider. However, inspection of the descriptive statistics reveals that the assumption of linearity is violated for the interaction of length of relationship with stance type, both with and without interaction with nationality and topic (see Figures 5.7–5.10 below). This means that
there is no linear relationship between the length of relationship and the frequency of use of any given stance type, a fact likely caused by idiosyncrasies of the interviewees; as there were only 12 couples, most of the data points on the horizontal axis are based on only one speaker. With the linearity assumption violated, including length of relationship as a variable in a larger regression model would be invalid; therefore we cannot conclude that time spent in a relationship with a foreign partner leads to changes in rates of epistemic marking.
Figure 5.7: Americans’ use of subjective stance

Figure 5.8: Americans’ use of attributive stance
Figure 5.9: Israelis’ use of subjective stance

Figure 5.10: Israelis’ use of attributive stance
5.9 Conclusions

Mixed-model logistic regression analyses find topic and the interaction of topic and nationality to be significant predictors of these speakers’ rates of both subjective and attributive stance. Across national groups, speakers were least likely to use either subjective or attributive stance (and thus most likely to use factual, or epistemically unmarked, stance) to talk about Self and Family. Taking speaker nationality into account, Israelis were most likely to use subjective stance to talk about America and least likely to use it to talk about Israel, while Americans’ patterns were the opposite. Israelis were also significantly less likely than Americans to use attributive stance to talk about Israel. Framed in the terms of Research Question 1, speakers do claim and assign authority and responsibility differently when talking about different topics. Speakers of both national groups tended to position themselves as experts on their own culture and as non-experts on their partner’s culture. To answer Research Question 2, there are trends across national groups in how speakers position themselves through claiming and assigning responsibility for stances. Israelis and Americans negotiate information rights in much the same ways. Research Question 3 asked what we can glean about speakers’ relation to their own culture and adaptation to their partner’s culture from these trends. Given especially the lack of linearity between length of relationship and stance type with regard to topic, there is insufficient evidence among these speakers to claim that Americans “adapt” to speak about Israel more like Israelis or that Israelis speak about America more like Americans over time.
5.9.1 Implications

This study has several implications for our understanding of stancetaking in binational couples and for research on epistemic stance.

Previous studies of the interpersonal functions of epistemic stance have been supported by detailed qualitative and typological analysis of the use of epistemic markers in various speech situations and have built useful taxonomies on the basis of this analysis. The present study uses a quantitative methodology to support the qualitative findings of previous studies; the results discussed above support prior studies arguing that epistemic stance type indexes claims to authority and entitlement, response to risk of negative social consequences, and avoidance of disagreement.

In her discussion of marking of cultural standing of opinions, Strauss (2004) includes two caveats that are relevant to this study. One caveat is that we should expect cultural differences in how speakers mark the standing of their opinions, especially “among speech communities that have a high tolerance for conflict and debate (e.g., Israel...)...views that are controversial [could be] treated as if they were simply debatable, and debatable views as the common opinion” (Strauss 2004: 188). This hypothesis is difficult to test; since no previous studies have described rates of use of various epistemic strategies in the way that has been done here, we have no baseline to compare these results to and can only compare the results from the Israelis in this study to those of the Americans. Aside from a difference in the use of attributive stance (Americans are relatively likely to use attributive stance when talking about Israel but Israelis are not especially likely to use attributive stance
when talking about America), the significant results for Israelis and Americans in this study were identical. So there is some difference in the marking of potentially controversial or debatable stances, but perhaps not as much as Strauss would predict.

Strauss also notes that there seem to be genre differences in how speakers mark their opinions, giving the examples of letters to the editor and online bulletin boards, both genres that seem to be correlated with a lack of mitigation even for controversial or debatable opinions that would normally be expressed with some form of mitigation. We might suppose that a research interview would also differ from everyday conversation in how speakers mark their opinions with regard to their cultural standing. However, the use of subjective and attributive marking in these interviews seems to pattern more or less exactly as Strauss would have predicted: both are used most often to talk about the speaker's partner's home country (stances that inherently run an increased risk of being controversial or debatable) and least often to talk about Self and Family (stances that run a minimal risk of being controversial or debatable). This seems to indicate that research interviews, at least the ones I conducted, mirror other speech events and genres in speaker assessment of the need to mark cultural standing.

Further analysis of the implications of this study's findings for understanding the interview speech event is informed by Kamio (1997). In Kamio's formulation, a speaker will be more likely to use evidential marking when the information put

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14 Strauss's analysis draws on data from research interviews along with everyday conversations and newspaper and magazine stories, but does not pursue differences among these genres.
forth is more within the hearer’s than the speaker’s territory of information. His theory seems to take the roles of speaker and hearer as self-explanatory. However, in an interview with one researcher and two interviewees, these roles are not as straightforward. My interview questions and my body language and gaze were designed so that, in each case, an interviewee would speak not only to me but to her partner as well—put differently, so that she would view not only me but her partner as a “ratified” listener, if not directly “addressed” (Goffman 1981 [1979]). The findings reported above seem to indicate that the speakers in these interviews orient both toward their partners and toward me as hearer in Kamio’s sense. I have already discussed the idea that high rates of subjective marking by Americans for topics related to Israel and by Israelis for topics related to America indicate that these speakers are sensitive to where the information is “located” in their vs. their partner’s territory of information. I have also claimed that the very high rates of factual stance for topics related to the speaker and her family indicate, unsurprisingly, speakers’ claims of authority and entitlement to the information. However, understood within Kamio’s framework, speakers would have a much greater claim of entitlement to the information about Self and Family vis à vis me than vis à vis their partner. This could thus be an argument that, in the interviews, speakers’ awareness of territory of information was oriented toward their partners and toward me differently depending on the topic.

On a more fundamental level, it is worth noting that the relatively high rate of epistemic marking in the interviews might be surprising on its face. Relying on intuition, we might suspect that people would feel at ease speaking with their
partners and would feel free to speak their minds, without worrying about offending or negotiating territories of information. However, the analysis reveals that the speakers interviewed here do qualify stances they take about their partners’ cultures, perhaps to avoid offending or avoid disagreement. It is certainly possible that my presence as an interviewer induced speakers to conduct their stancetaking in what Kamio (1997) calls a more “polite” manner than they would had I not been present. This would be an argument for the genre differences Strauss (2004) hypothesizes.

In addition to providing quantitative support for prior research based on qualitative analysis, this study also supplements previous quantitative studies of the interpersonal functions of epistemic stance. Precht (2003) groups sets of stance markers into “moods” by co-occurrence, and uses these moods to illustrate differences between American and British epistemic styles. The present study also identifies cultural patterns in epistemic marking, but focuses in more detail on the relevance of topic to epistemic choices. Kärkkäinen (2003) and Scheibman (2007) present frequencies of particular stancetaking strategies in corpus studies designed to identify grammatical and lexical stancetaking constructions and their general functions in American English. The present study focuses on patterns and frequencies of stancetaking strategies in a specific, interpersonally high-stakes speech event, a research interview in which individuals are asked to characterize differences between their culture and their partner’s culture in front of their partner.
5.9.2 Future Directions

One aim of future qualitative research on epistemic stance and epistemic authority should be to compare speech from the same speakers on the same range of topics across different genres. The analyses above make a strong case for patterns of epistemic marking by American and Israeli speakers on the cultural topics addressed in the interviews. However, the lack of contrasting speech genres makes many of my conclusions about the role of the interview context for epistemic strategies necessarily tentative.

This study has shown that Israeli and American speakers position themselves epistemically in similar ways with regard to their own culture and their partner's culture, as well as with regard to the topic of Self and Family. A promising direction for future work in this area would be to explore cross-linguistic differences in epistemic positioning strategies by bilingual speakers. All of the data for this study were recorded in English and we certainly might expect a more pronounced difference in epistemic style if the Israelis had produced stances in Hebrew. This was not possible for this study since most of the American partners were monolingual English speakers; encouraging Israelis to code-switch or to speak only in Hebrew would have led to a very different kind of interview. Another possible direction for this work would be to combine quantitative analysis of holistically coded clauses, as found in this study, with frequency analyses of individual epistemic markers or evaluative adjectives, for example as found in Fox (2001) or Precht (2003). Combining these types of analyses may provide a more detailed understanding of speakers' choices of epistemic strategies.
This chapter has shown patterns of epistemic stance types as they vary by topic among Israeli and American speakers in my interview sample. The following chapter presents the results of analysis on a different level of production in the interviews, the phonetic level.
CHAPTER 6: PHONETIC VARIATION IN STANCETAKING

6.1 Overview

Chapters 4 and 5 addressed discursive elements in intersubjective stancetaking, including evaluation, alignment, topic, and epistemic stance type. This chapter uses these same discourse variables to highlight the relationship between the way a stance is produced at the discourse level and the way a stance is produced at the phonetic level, a relationship that was hypothesized by Erving Goffman in 1981 and has been supported by a few studies since then. The present analysis was designed to test two specific questions: (1) Does speakers’ vowel production change significantly depending on any aspect of stancetaking? and (2) Does bilingual speakers’ first language (L1) phonology emerge any more strongly depending on the type of stance they are taking? A set of four case studies of Israeli speakers shows the different ways that these stance-related discourse variables affect speakers’ phonetic production of vowels, in particular vowel quality or placement of a given vowel in the speaker’s vowel space. Regression analyses show that all four of the discourse variables tested—topic, epistemic stance type, evaluation, and alignment—significantly affect vowel quality in at least some vowels for at least some speakers. I also present evidence that, at least in some of these cases, the variation in vowel quality may be associated with the relative strength of influence of the speaker’s L1 (Hebrew) phonology. Since each speaker has different patterns in these effects—and different vowel spaces overall—I do not claim that these particular results are generalizable to a larger population. However, the fact that so
many significant relationships were identified between discourse factors and vowel quality, across four different speakers, leads me to argue that similar studies of other speakers would likely also find some influence of discourse factors on phonetic production of vowels, and that this is an interaction that is worth pursuing in further studies.

I begin in Section 6.2 by describing some of the relatively few studies that have examined associations between stance-related discourse variables and phonetic production in the realms of prosody and vowel production. Section 6.3 motivates the present study and presents some hypotheses about the possible influences of Hebrew phonology on English vowel production in bilingual speakers. Section 6.4 describes the process of data analysis, including selection of speakers and tokens, coding of discourse elements, measurement of formants, and statistical analysis. Section 6.5 presents an overview of the results, outlining trends by discourse variable, while Section 6.6 provides more detailed statistical results for each speaker. Section 6.7 outlines some conclusions that can be drawn from the present study.

6.2 Background: Stance and sound variation

Potential and actual relationships between speaker stance and elements of phonetic production have been identified by researchers in several subfields of linguistics, including discourse analysis, identity-based variationist linguistics, and sociophonetics. Decades ago, sociologist Erving Goffman wrote that a change in footing will typically involve either codeswitching or prosodic change, in pitch,
volume, rhythm, stress, or tonal quality (1981 [1979]: 128). Stance, like footing, implies positioning of self and alignment with others, and is a way of organizing discourse; thus it is unsurprising to find phonetic correlates with stancetaking. In fact, Goffman’s hypothesis is borne out in findings in the field of sociophonetics; in their overview of the emerging field of sociophonetics, Hay and Drager (2007) point out that “Recent work has shown that fine details of phonetic implementation are highly instrumental in the organization of discourse structure” (95) and call for work “that combines careful discourse analysis with detailed phonetic analysis [to help understand] the ways in which phonetic variability is harnessed for the communication of interactional information” (95).

As suggested by Goffman, however, much of the research on the sociophonetics of stancetaking focuses on variation in prosody, rather than in vowels. Yaeger-Dror et al (2010) write that “Speaker stance should always be considered as a possible factor in any study of any interpersonal pragmatic and prosodic variation” (142). Indeed, Yaeger-Dror and Hall-Lew (2002) show that an “adversarial” or “informative” stance is a strong predictor of prosodically prominent negatives spoken by American presidents in political debates and news conferences, though Yaeger-Dror et al (2010) demonstrate that, cross-linguistically, negation in stances identified by analysts as “supportive” is more prosodically prominent than negation in stances identified as “informative” or “remedial.” The authors view this latter finding as surprising in light of what they call the “Social Agreement Principle,” the “preference for agreement” in conversation arising from the field of Conversation Analysis (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977). Based on this
principle, according to Yaeger-Dror et al, we would expect conversationalists to phonetically minimize their use of negation when taking a supportive footing, and maximize it when taking a remedial footing; however, the opposite is the case according to Yaeger-Dror et al’s findings. As discussed in Sections 6.5 and 6.6 below, several of the speakers in this study use less prominent, centralized pronunciations of certain vowels when taking disaligning stances, providing support for the role of the Social Agreement Principle in phonetic production. In a different type of a study, Podesva (2011) shows that a medical student uses rising intonation more frequently in professional situations than in social situations, and attributes this pattern to the student’s “patient-oriented stance,” which is part of a “caring doctor persona” (pp. 11–13). As the data for the present study come from a single genre, the research interview, I do not address speakers’ selective access of different elements of their personas, however the study of the medical student provides additional evidence of correlations between stances and details of phonetic production.

Several studies in the field of interactional linguistics also address the role of prosody in stance-like interactions. Ogden (2006) highlights the complexity of alignment between stancetakers, showing that a “second assessment turn” that produces convergent alignment lexically and syntactically may in fact produce divergent alignment given the right prosodic contour. Similarly, Raymond (2010) finds that, even when choosing from the limited set of type-conforming responses to a yes-no interrogative (i.e., ‘yes’ and ‘no’ and their variants), speakers make prosodic choices that add more information to their response. For example, by using either
an abrupt, falling-in-pitch ‘yeah’ or ‘yeah’ with very high pitch, speakers can mount a challenge to the premise of the question they are responding to. Both Ogden’s and Raymond’s studies show ways that prosody can undermine the lexical and syntactic face-value alignment of an utterance. In a study in the same volume as the Raymond study, demonstrating additional ways that prosody can provide information left out of the lexical and syntactic structure of an utterance, Güllich and Lindemann (2010) show how an epilepsy patient uses prosody, among other linguistic resources, to construct the emotion of fear in interactions with her doctor, without explicitly naming the emotion.

In the field of sociolinguistics, there have been some studies of vowel production identifying discourse variables that can be seen as related to stance, including topic. Schilling-Estes (2004) finds that two speakers from different ethnic backgrounds diverge the most in several linguistic features, including their vowel production (specifically diphthongal vs. monophthongal /ay/), when talking about the topic of race relations. Schilling-Estes proposes as a possible explanation the higher degree of salience when the two speakers are talking directly about the subject; “[h]ence, in the sections on race relations, each interlocutor emphasizes his own in-group belonging by highlighting his ethnolinguistic distance from his interlocutor” (177–178). This “ethnolinguistic distance” can also be seen in the terms of the stance triangle: when talking about a certain topic or stance object, the two speakers align themselves differently due to their different stances about the topic, and this is reflected in their vowel production. Changes in topic also figure into the style-shifting of travel agent Sue (in Coupland 1980), whose regional accent,
including vowels, became more or less pronounced depending on factors including topic, though, as Coupland points out, topic is “inadequate” as a correlate of style; in one case, “[i]t is Sue’s attitude towards the subject matter that changes” (1980: 10) and is reflected in her use of linguistic style, including her vowel production.

Attitude toward topic is also important in Woods’ (2001) study of Southerners living in New York. Woods examined four speakers’ production of /ay/ and /ey/, and found that each of the four speakers produced some southern variants of these two vowels, and that the production varied by topic and attitude. However, individual speaker was found to be the strongest predictor of variation, and Woods argues convincingly that different subjects had different strategies for their production of southern and northern variants. Individual variation is also a central outcome of the present study.

The emphasis on attitude toward topic is very much in keeping with Du Bois’ (2007) construction of the stance triangle, with attitude combining elements of Du Bois’ “evaluation” and “positioning.” There have also been studies relating vowel variation to affect, also identified by Du Bois as part of the stance triangle. In a study attempting to pinpoint phonetic correlates of affect, Local and Walker (2008) found a “one-to-many” relationship between phonetic object and affect: for example, they found that phonetic design was not a reliable predictor of the valence (positive or negative) of individual tokens of “wow.” Eckert (2010) argues that the production of two vowels, in particular /o/ and /ay/, has a symbolic relationship with affect among pre-adolescents, with fronted tokens indexing a simple, childlike affect, while backed and raised tokens express a more complex kind of affect, related to “fear,
sadness, annoyance, victimization and so on” (79). In a related finding, Johnson (2006) shows that, among speakers participating in the Northern Cities Shift, positive traits such as cheerfulness, warmth, affectionateness, sympathy, and compassion were correlated with higher degrees of /æ/-fronting. Finally, in a study of an actress’s production of 112 sentences with different emotions (angry, happy, sad, and neutral), Yildirim et al (2004), researchers working at the intersection of emotion and speech science, found significant differences in duration, pitch, and vowel quality, with angry or happy speech characterized by longer utterance duration, higher pitch, wider pitch range, and lower and fronter back vowels.

In sum, researchers in several related fields have recognized the interplay between elements of stancetaking and phonetic variation in speech, providing evidence that the two can fruitfully be studied together. Additionally, for L2 English speakers, acoustic analysis may reveal the relative prominence of the speaker’s nonnative accent, perhaps pointing to utterances that are more strongly connected, for the speaker, to her Israeli and Hebrew-speaking identity.

6.3 Motivations

In light of previous research that has found relationships between discourse elements and prosody, and between discourse elements and vowel production, I was interested to find whether such a relationship would hold for the bilingual speakers whom I had interviewed and whose stancetaking I had analyzed in previous chapters. This interest led to two related research questions.
1. Does speakers’ vowel production change significantly depending on topic or other aspects of stancetaking, such as epistemic stance type, evaluation, or alignment?

2. Since the speakers considered here are bilingual and were interviewed in their second language (L2), does their first language (L1) phonology emerge any more strongly depending on what sort of stance they are taking? That is, if a given speaker has statistically significant differences in the production of some vowel(s) depending on one or more stance factors, do those differences in vowel production reflect an influence of L1 (in this case, Hebrew) phonology? While previous research has addressed the impact on foreign accent prominence of factors such as recent residential patterns (Sancier and Fowler 1997) and read material vs. extemporaneous speech (Munro and Derwing 1994), to the best of my knowledge, no previous research has addressed the impact of discourse factors such as topic, stance type, evaluation, or alignment on influence of L1 phonology when speaking an L2.

A few words are in order about the Hebrew vowel system before I describe the hypotheses I made about influences of Hebrew phonology on English production in bilingual speakers. Hebrew is described as having a five-vowel system [i, e, a, o, u] (see, e.g., Aronson et al 1996; Coffin and Bolozky 2005; Glinert 1989; Most et al 2000; Schwarzwald 1972), which “approaches the ‘ideal’ state” (Schwarzwald 1972:
8); that is, F1 is low (and nearly identical\textsuperscript{15}) in [i] and [u], higher (and nearly identical\textsuperscript{16}) in [e] and [o], and highest in [a], while F2 is highest in [i], lower in [o, a, e], and lowest in [u]. This vowel system is the most common cross-linguistically.

There are inconsistent findings among acoustic studies as to the comparison of Hebrew and English vowels. Schwarzwald (1972) finds that, comparing vowels spoken by Hebrew speakers to their counterparts produced by English speakers, [i] is higher in Hebrew than in English, [e] is backer in Hebrew than in English, [o] is higher in Hebrew than in English, and [u] is higher and backer than in English. These results are echoed by the Hebrew and English vowel productions of a bilingual speaker in Schwarzwald’s study. In contrast, Aronson et al (1996: 291) find that “the Hebrew values for [i, u, e] fall between the values of ‘tense’ and ‘lax’ vowel pairs in English” (Aronson et al 1996: 291), indicating a different result for those vowels.

On the basis of these differences between the Hebrew and English vowel systems, I hypothesized that the following vowels might show increased influence of Hebrew phonology under some circumstances:

\textsuperscript{15} According to the acoustic studies by Most et al 2000 and Schwarzwald 1972.
\textsuperscript{16} According to the acoustic studies by Aronson et al 1996; Most et al 2000; and Schwarzwald 1972.
Table 6.1: Relationships between vowels in Hebrew and American English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English lexical class</th>
<th>IPA symbol(s) (American English)</th>
<th>IPA symbol(s) (Israeli Hebrew)</th>
<th>Comments¹⁷</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAP</td>
<td>Æ</td>
<td>not phonemic</td>
<td>L1 Hebrew speakers frequently pronounce English [æ] either as [a] or, more often, as [ɛ].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUT</td>
<td>ʌ</td>
<td>not phonemic</td>
<td>L1 Hebrew speakers frequently pronounce English [ʌ] as [a].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THOUGHT</td>
<td>ɔ</td>
<td>not phonemic</td>
<td>L1 Hebrew speakers frequently pronounce English [ɔ] either as [a] or, more often, as [o].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIT/FLEECE</td>
<td>ɪ/ɪ</td>
<td>ɪ/ɪ</td>
<td>[ɪ] and [i] are allophonic in Hebrew, but separate phonemes in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRESS/FACE</td>
<td>ɛ/ɛɪ</td>
<td>ɛ/e</td>
<td>[ɛ] and [e] are allophonic in Hebrew, but separate phonemes in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOT</td>
<td>ɑ</td>
<td>ɑ</td>
<td>Although Hebrew has [a] natively, L1 Hebrew speakers frequently produce English words containing [a] but spelled with an orthographic “o” more GOAT-like.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4 Data analysis

6.4.1 Recording

Recordings were made on either an Olympus DS–40 digital voice recorder or an Olympus WS–300M digital voice recorder. As recordings were made at different times, for different initial purposes, Tomer’s recording was made with a lavalier microphone, while Yael’s, Arad’s, and Galit’s recordings were made with an omnidirectional tabletop microphone. Recordings were sampled at 44 kHz.

¹⁷ These comments are based on my impressions of L1 Hebrew speakers; I have not found any research on Hebrew or Israeli accent in English.
6.4.2 Selection of speakers and tokens

I chose four Israeli speakers to analyze on the basis of two criteria: sound quality of interview (excluding interviews with excessive background noise) and length of interview (to allow for collecting sufficient tokens of each vowel across a range of topics, stance types, evaluations, and alignments). The speakers chosen were two men, Arad and Tomer, and two women, Yael and Galit. Descriptions of each speaker's overall vowel space can be found in Section 6.6.

Since there is no previous research to support my hypotheses about specific vowels, I coded all the monophthongs in Table 6.2 below. Tokens were sampled from throughout an interview, rather than focusing on particular segments. Potential tokens were excluded if they were unstressed, if they were shorter than 50 milliseconds (as very short vowels are frequently centralized for articulatory reasons) or if the sound quality at that point in the interview made formant measurement too difficult or unreliable.

Table 6.2: Monophthongs measured

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPA symbol</th>
<th>English lexical set (Wells 1982)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>KIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>FLEECE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ε</td>
<td>DRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>FACE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æ</td>
<td>TRAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>LOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʌ</td>
<td>STRUT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ɔ</td>
<td>THOUGHT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o</td>
<td>GOAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>GOOSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.4.3 Coding of discourse factors

Drawing on the findings of studies such as Coupland (1980) and Schilling-Estes (2004), I hypothesized that topic might be a predictor of vowel variation. Since epistemic stance type is a form of footing a speaker takes toward an utterance, I also expected that Goffman’s (1981 [1979]) prediction about changes in sound production based on footing would also predict changes based on epistemic stance type. The topic and epistemic stance codes used for this analysis are the same codes that were used in Chapter 5:

**Topic**
- Local community
- Israel
- America
- Relationship and cultural comparison
- Self and family
- Other

**Epistemic stance type**
- Own authority (narrative-personal, subjective)
- Other’s authority (narrative-other, constructed dialogue, constructed stance, authoritative text)
- Unmarked
(See Chapter 5, Sections 5.7.1 and 5.7.2, for detailed explanation of coding of topic and stance type.)

Evaluation and alignment are also related to footing, and therefore might also be subject to Goffman’s predictions about variation in their production. Further evidence for possible sound changes based on alignment comes from Ogden (2006), Raymond (2010), and Yaeger-Dror et al (2010), who all show ways that alignment with a prior speaker is established through prosody. In order to discover whether alignment could also be reflected in vowel quality, I coded clauses for evaluation and alignment by taking into account the entire clause and its context (rather than based on the appearance of particular words, phrases, or grammatical constructions). I coded each clause as positive, negative, or neutral evaluation on the basis of the wording of the stance itself, with reference to information obtained in the interview outside of that clause. I included this reference to other parts of the interview because other stances often provided information that made the speaker’s evaluation of the stance object in the target stance clearer than it was within the target stance itself. For example, the clause “I feel like she’s more American than she’s a Jew” isn’t explicitly a negative evaluation, but it’s clear from nearby statements that this is viewed as a negative state of affairs by the speaker (Arad), so the clause was coded as “negative evaluation.”

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18 Some evidence that Arad views being more American than Jewish as a negative thing comes from statements such as the following:
- “But I wanna keep my Jewish uh, tradition”
- “I don’t want to drop my Israeli, uh tradition, but, I am gonna be an American. First! I mean, not before not before uh being Jewish.”
- “So, um, the way that um, American female raised in the- in the- in the average family, it’s more American than uh than Jew. So for example, my wife, she knows
Following are examples of each type of evaluation from each of the interviews that were coded for this analysis.

**Positive evaluation**

- Yael: And I think because of being together we kind of came to y’know middle ground.
- Arad: Cause I’m very proud of Israel,
- Galit: And it was very easy for me to to connect to that, because the Jewish community had such a you know, ovo- you know, welcoming kind of approach to outsiders.
- Tomer: Bu- bu- but I feel that there is something in the, um...Israeli mentality that can put you in advantage if you...eh use it right I mean,

**Negative evaluation**

- Tomer: And y’know in a way working um...in Hebrew school, Jewish school and just I think make me even more alienated with Jewish uh
- Yael: Yeah like I said in Israel everything is negotiable. And sometimes you do need to know where to put the line.
- Arad: The problem with you guys that you have, trying to- you are nice. You’re extremely nice. But it’s so fake.

______________________________
she knows Hebrew, she knows to read Hebrew, but she doesn’t understand what she’s reading. [...] People here knows, know to read, the Bible, whatever, Tanakh, but has nothing- they don’t understand what’s going on.”

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• Galit: And if we go out for a restaurant he orders porks, and he knows that I hate it.

Neutral evaluation

• Tomer: And also we moved here with couple of friends from Haifa that she study with me uh in university,

• Yael: In America there’s a lot or like Americans in general there’s a lot of like really str- a lot of structure, and limits and and routine and and punct-punctuality?...which you know there’s good and bad,

• Galit: It’s just f- I mean I think that the synagogues here have a different um concept than what they have in Israel,

• Arad: Because it’s not really culture because it’s- You’ve been to Israel so you know, It’s very f- very fam- very similar to- to American,

In order to avoid confounding factors, clauses were coded for alignment only with the speaker’s partner, not with me. Alignment was coded as convergent, divergent, or neutral. In contrast to the coding for evaluation, and in order to limit coding of convergent and divergent alignment to those cases that were likely to be oriented to as such by the speaker, alignment was only coded as convergent or divergent in two cases: (a) if the clause immediately followed something the speaker’s partner had said, with which the clause was clearly aligning or disaligning or (b) if it made explicit reference to something the speaker’s partner had said previously.
Following are examples of each type of alignment from each of the interviews that were coded for this analysis.

**Convergent**

- (Kevin: But it was some pretty important years In isr- you know, from what eighteen to twenty-eight and even uh-younger, so)
- Galit: the most important years where you know you kind of establish yourself I did live in Israel.
- (John: It’s a complete Israeli home.)
- Yael: Um, **yeah** I can say so.
- Tomer: But um...yeah that I feel that that y’know that **like Rachel said** there is this American use of of language a little bit or uh uh eh y’know uh like the fact that I c- I I think about it like y’know I'm not sure if it's the right way, but like whitewashing?
- (Claire: He’s more racist than I am.)
- Arad: **I agree**, it’s in it’s in me.

**Divergent**

- (Rachel: But if you look in the Bible it’s a pejorative.)
- Tomer: In the Bible **I'm not sure** if in the Bible it’s pejorative,
• (Claire: No, you’re getting good at manipulating the language.)
• Arad: It’s not the same level as yours.

• (Kevin: And I think we did have one Shabbat or a b-whatever, uh)
• Galit: We’ve had people, **but it wasn’t on Shabbat**, like to do the Shabbat dinner,

• (John: I’m telling her about the *rosh katan, freier syndrome*. The whole country’s
dictated by that.)
• Yael: **No it’s not that**, it’s not only that.

**Neutral**
• Tomer: I always think about Rachel as someone who decided to be Jewish.
• Yael: Americans don’t like to I think get very close to each other.
• Arad: I just hate it. I don’t like it.
• Galit: Um, because I’d never been in one place for so long, and I always had the
instinct to move.

6.4.4 Coding of phonetic environment

Recognizing that phonetic environment can have a strong impact on the
pronunciation of a given segment, which could overlap with the discourse factors
coded above, I coded each vowel for preceding and following segment. The coding
categories used are presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Coding of preceding and following segment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Segments coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labial</td>
<td>/p,b,m,f,v,w/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coronal</td>
<td>/θ,ð,t,d,s,z,l,n/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post alveolar and palatal</td>
<td>/ʃ,ʒ,tʃ,dʒ,j/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velar</td>
<td>/k,g,ŋ/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhotic</td>
<td>/r/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>word boundaries and /h/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4.5 Formant and duration measurement

After coding each interview for the phonetic and discourse factors described above, I manually marked (using the textgrid function of Praat [Boersma 2003]) vowels of the classes listed in Table 6.2 above. Using a Praat script, I collected automatically generated values for the first three formants (F1, F2, and F3) of each vowel at the midpoint, employing Linear Predictive Coding (LPC). Once all the formant measurements were collected, I hand-checked outliers in F1 and F2 for each vowel class and manually corrected any errors based on my own inspection of the spectrograms generated by Praat. Any vowels whose formants were not clearly measurable were excluded at this point. The script also produced measurements of vowel duration.

The number of tokens measured are presented in Table 6.4. Discrepancies in the number of tokens measured across interviews can be explained by a combination of the relative sound quality of each interview (poorer sound quality led to fewer vowel tokens that could be measured) and idiosyncrasies of the speakers. Because of the small number of GOOSE tokens for some speakers and the common practice to conduct separate analyses for GOOSE divided by whether the
preceding segment is ±coronal,\textsuperscript{19} that vowel was not subjected to regression analysis for any speaker. Tomer’s THOUGHT vowel was also excluded from analysis. Other vowels with small Ns were subjected to analyses, though significant results are presented with caveats in the results section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arad</th>
<th>Tomer</th>
<th>Yael</th>
<th>Galit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIT</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEECE</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRESS</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACE</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAP</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOT</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUT</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THOUGHT</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOAT</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOOSE</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{6.4.6 Statistical analysis: Individual vowel measures}

Statistical analyses were conducted separately for each speaker. This was done for several reasons. This is a preliminary study, with no previous research on which to base a hypothesis that speakers would behave similarly. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, tokens were coded for only four speakers. An analysis conducted on the basis of four speakers would not be likely to be generalizable, particularly because, as I show in Section 6.6, these four speakers have very different vowel spaces. Therefore, the goal of this analysis was to identify patterns

\textsuperscript{19} The \textit{Atlas of North American English} (Labov et al. 2006) finds a distinction in the degree of fronting of GOOSE depending on whether it follows a coronal consonant.
produced by individual speakers, taking into account individual vowel spaces, rather than to produce generalizable results.

Separate data files were created for each vowel for each speaker. The set of tokens in each file was subjected to a series of regression analyses, using the variables listed in Table 6.5 below. First, I used univariate analyses to determine which factors (phonetic and discursive) had an individual effect on the formant values or duration of each vowel. Next, the relevant factors were entered into confirmatory multivariate regression models to determine the relative strength of the predictive factors. Separate analyses were carried out for F1, F2, and vowel duration as dependent variable.

### Table 6.5: Independent variables (predictors) used in regression models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Phonetic variables</strong></th>
<th><strong>Values</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preceding segment</td>
<td>labial, coronal, post alveolar/palatal, velar, rhotic, other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following segment</td>
<td>labial, coronal, post alveolar/palatal, velar, rhotic, other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>vowel duration in milliseconds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Discourse variables</strong></th>
<th><strong>Values</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>local community, Israel, America, cultural comparison, self/family, other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance type</td>
<td>attributive, subjective, factual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>positive, negative, neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>convergent, divergent, neutral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6.4.7 Measurement of vowel tokens for selected American partners

In three of the four case studies presented below, the Israeli partner had significant effects of alignment on the production of at least one vowel class. In these
cases, since I suggest that the American partner’s vowel production may be influencing that of the Israeli partner, I also measured vowel tokens for the American partner (at least ten tokens of each vowel that varied by alignment for the Israeli partner). Thus, after I discuss alignment-related effects on the vowel production of Yael, Galit, and Tomer, I also present vowel charts of their partners for reference.

6.5 Summary of results across speakers

This section presents an overview of the results for each of the four discourse factors: topic, epistemic stance type, evaluation, and alignment. The results described here are results that were significant after accounting for the influence of phonetic factors. In Section 6.6, where I present more detailed results for individual speakers, I include statistics showing the influence of phonetic factors where relevant.

Despite the fact that summary results for each discourse factor are presented in a single table, regressions were run separately for each speaker. The tables on the following pages show many idiosyncrasies across speakers. This is to be expected since they have different vowel spaces; thus, they should not be expected to show the same shifting patterns, since the vowels are moving from and going to different places.

The tables below include effects of discourse factors on duration, but the discussion focuses on variation in vowel height (F1) and backness (F2).
6.5.1 Topic

Three of four speakers had a significant influence of topic on the quality or duration of at least one vowel. Topics that had a significant effect were local community, America, Israel, and cultural comparison: that is, every topic other than self/family. The significant results are summarized in Table 6.6 and discussed in more detail below.

Table 6.6: Speakers and vowels with significant effect of topic on vowel quality and duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>DRESS</th>
<th>FACE</th>
<th>LOT</th>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>GOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td></td>
<td>(lower when topic is compare)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomer</td>
<td>lower when topic is America</td>
<td></td>
<td>fronter when topic is compare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galit</td>
<td>higher when topic is Jerusalem</td>
<td>(lower when topic is local) shorter when topic is compare</td>
<td>fronter when topic is compare</td>
<td>fronter when topic is Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table we can see that both front and back vowels had an influence of topic on vowel quality, while variation in duration affects only one vowel for one speaker. Cultural comparison is the topic that is influential across the most speakers and vowels. Galit has the most vowels affected by topics, with four out of the nine vowels tested showing a significant effect, whether Israel (two vowels), cultural comparison

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20 Here and throughout the rest of the chapter, I use the following conventions in results summary tables: Significant results related to vowel quality (height or backness) are in plain font, while results related to vowel duration are in italics. Results presented in gray and in parentheses are based on a small number of tokens (fewer than 4 for the target value or fewer than 30 overall) and should be interpreted with caution.
(two vowels), or local community (one vowel). As hypothesized, we see frequent movement across speakers in the DRESS/FACE pair, and in LOT and THOUGHT. I discuss these patterns in more detail when presenting individual speakers’ results.

6.5.2 Stance type

Three of four speakers had a significant influence of stance type on at least one vowel, as can be seen in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7: Speakers and vowels with significant effect of stance type on vowel quality and duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIT</th>
<th>FACE</th>
<th>TRAP</th>
<th>LOT</th>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>GOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td>fronter</td>
<td>shorter when stance is subjective</td>
<td>higher when stance is subjective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomer</td>
<td>longer when stance is attributive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galit</td>
<td></td>
<td>fronter when stance is attributive</td>
<td>lower when stance is subjective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table we can see that both attributive and subjective stance type can affect both vowel duration and vowel quality in front and back vowels, although there is some variation across speakers. Galit’s vowels are affected by both attributive and subjective stance, while Arad’s are only affected by subjective stance and Tomer’s one relevant vowel is affected by attributive stance. Interestingly, there is no overlap across speakers in which vowels were affected.
6.5.3 Evaluation

As Table 6.8 shows, all four speakers show influence of evaluation on the quality of at least one vowel. Evaluation is notably not a significant predictor of vowel duration for any speaker.

**Table 6.8: Speakers and vowels with significant effect of evaluation on vowel quality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIT</th>
<th>FLEECE</th>
<th>STRUT</th>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td>fronter when evaluation is negative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(lower when evaluation is positive or negative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomer</td>
<td>backer when evaluation is positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>higher when evaluation is positive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yael</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>backer when evaluation is positive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three speakers, Tomer, Galit, and Yael, have effects of positive evaluation on vowel quality, with positive evaluation promoting changes in STRUT for two speakers. Arad has effects of negative evaluation on his vowels; for Arad both positive and negative evaluation promote lower THOUGHT, while negative evaluation promotes fronter KIT. Here we see, as hypothesized, movement in the KIT/FLEECE pair and in STRUT and THOUGHT.

6.5.4 Alignment

Three of four speakers have significant effects of alignment on at least one vowel, as reflected in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9: Speakers and vowels with significant effect of alignment on vowel quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIT</th>
<th>FLEECE</th>
<th>LOT</th>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>GOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tomer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fronter when alignment is divergent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>backer when alignment is divergent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yael</td>
<td>lower when alignment is convergent (or divergent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>higher when alignment is convergent</td>
<td>lower when alignment is convergent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that alignment has effects on both front and back vowels. Yael has the most widespread influence of alignment on vowel production; it affects three of her vowels, including both front and back vowels. The two speakers who have influences on only one vowel each, Tomer and Galit, have their vowels centralized with divergent alignment. This may provide support for Yaeger-Dror et al’s (2010) hypothesis, based on the “Social Agreement Principle,” that divergent stances should be phonetically minimized. I explore this issue in more detail below.

In sum, for each discourse feature, at least three out of four of the speakers analyzed here have some vowels significantly affected in quality or duration. In the next section I explore the results in more depth, presenting results individually for each speaker, with comparative vowel charts and statistical results for each significant result.
6.6 Results and discussion, by speaker

6.6.1 Yael: Effects of alignment and Hebrew phonology on vowel production

**Overall vowel space.** My impression of Yael is that she has a strong Israeli accent, which is reflected in her vowel space. Her high front vowels, KIT and FLEECE, have almost the same value in the F1 dimension, and overlap substantially in the F2 dimension. Her STRUT vowel is, overall, as low as LOT, reflecting what I have claimed is a common adaptation among L1 Hebrew speakers to a non-native phoneme. Though GOOSE is backer than would be expected for the average American English speaker, Yael’s other back vowels are mostly distinct and target-like.  

---

21 Values of F1 and F2 here and throughout the chapter are presented in Hertz.
Table 6.10 summarizes the significant results when Yael's vowels are (individually) subjected to regression analyses with discourse factors as independent variables. Below I focus mainly on her results with regard to alignment, offering possible explanations for the variation in vowel production. I also show the relatively strong role Hebrew phonology plays in Yael’s style-shifting as compared with other speakers.
Table 6.10: Summary of significant effects of discourse factors on Yael’s vowels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIT</th>
<th>STRUT</th>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>GOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>backer when evaluation is positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alignment</strong></td>
<td>lower when alignment is convergent (or divergent)</td>
<td>higher when alignment is convergent</td>
<td>lower when alignment is convergent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most striking results among Yael's vowels have to do with the effects of her alignment in stancetaking on her vowels, which is unsurprising given the nature of her interview. With her husband, John, Yael presents one of the stronger images of a unified couple. In the interview, they present themselves as being in agreement on the pros and cons of American and Israeli culture, and they describe a cultural “middle ground” they have chosen for raising their family, as shown in the following examples.

**Excerpt 1**

John: And I have a problem with both of them. Because, on the one hand I think it’s complete disorder in Israel, and that leads to a lot of chaos, and then on the other hand,

Yael: Everything is rules here.

John: I think I ca- I can't stand all the rules here.
**Excerpt 2**

Yael:  So I think I’m pretty familiar with the American culture and I think because of being together, we kind of came to y’know middle ground. But uh, there are a lot of differences in the culture. And um, y’know good bad or indifferent it’s a different culture.

This high degree of convergent alignment is reflected not only in individual stances from Yael, but quantitatively across her interview. Among the four speakers featured in this chapter, Yael has the highest rate of convergent stancetaking (25% of coded stances) and by far the lowest rate of divergent stancetaking (4% of coded stances; the lowest rate after her comes from Tomer, with 16%). Additionally, in contrast to other speakers, who have higher degrees of divergent alignment on cultural topics, the topic of America is a significant predictor of higher rates of convergent alignment for Yael. Her number of divergent stances overall was so low as to make statistical analysis of effects of her divergent stances on her vowels unreliable, often only one or two instances per vowel. But with high numbers of both neutral and convergent stances, statistical analysis of the differences between those is still possible, and here we find several significant results; Yael has the most widespread influence of alignment on her vowel production among the four speakers analyzed here.

We see the effects of alignment on Yael’s vowel production in both front and back vowels. In the front, Yael’s KIT vowel becomes significantly lower when her
alignment is convergent or divergent with her husband, as we can see in Table 6.11.22

**Table 6.11: Effects of alignment on Yael’s KIT vowel height (F1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>492.76</td>
<td>8.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent alignment</td>
<td>105.24</td>
<td>39.03</td>
<td>.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergent alignment</td>
<td>53.03</td>
<td>16.69</td>
<td>.38**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .225, *p < .01, **p < .005

The following vowel chart presents visually the change in Yael’s production of KIT depending on alignment, showing that KIT becomes significantly more centralized and more distinct from FLEECE with convergent alignment. In each comparative vowel chart in this chapter, I use two colors (either red and blue or orange and green) to show the target value(s) and the reference value(s), respectively, of the vowel in question. In this chart, red shows the placement of KIT with convergent alignment (the target value), while blue shows the placement of KIT with neutral alignment (the reference value). The gray points show the placement of other vowels.

22 The statistical results in this chapter should be interpreted as follows. The constant is presented in every table and is useful for reproducing results, but can be ignored for purposes of interpretation. The “B” value for each factor shows the change (positive or negative, measured in Hz) in either F1 or F2 associated with the indicated value of the factor. For example, in Table 6.11, we see that the value of F1 increases by 105.24 Hz when alignment is divergent, and the value of F1 increases by 53.03 Hz when alignment is convergent. Both indicate a lowering of the vowel in the speaker’s vowel space. The second column, SE(B), presents the standard error of B, indicating the degree to which the B value would be expected to vary across samples, while the third, β, indicates the number of standard deviations the change in B represents. The asterisks show the level of significance each result reaches. Finally, R² is a measure of how much of the variation in the outcome is accounted for by the predictors in the regression model. For example, in Table 11, the R² value of .225 indicates that 22.5% of the overall variation in the height of Yael’s production of KIT is accounted for by the factors in the table.
nearby vowels for reference, including the divergent value of KIT, which is based on too small a token count to be reliable. Each point represents the average position for that vowel; the radiating lines show one standard deviation in both F1 and F2 dimensions for each vowel.

**Figure 6.2**

There are several possible explanations for the difference in Yael’s production of KIT depending on alignment. One is that, when she converges in her stancetaking with her American husband, Yael’s high front vowels become more
distinct and thus more target-like. As we can see from the plot of Yael’s overall vowel means (p. 159), without accounting for any discourse factors Yael's FLEECE and KIT vowels are very close together, almost exactly the same in the F1 dimension, with a small gap in the F2 dimension. This is unsurprising, given that in Hebrew KIT and FLEECE are allophones, and the underlying Hebrew /i/ has been shown to fall between English KIT and FLEECE (Aronson et al. 1996). Yet, when Yael’s stancetaking is convergent with her husband’s, her high front vowels become more distinct (particularly in the F1 dimension where they are, overall, nearly overlapping) and more target-like, perhaps echoing her husband’s native accent in American English.23

Convergent alignment has a different effect on Yael’s back vowels, causing them to become less distinct and thus less target-like. Table 6.12 and Figure 6.3 show that Yael’s GOAT vowel becomes significantly lower when her alignment is convergent, while Figure 6.3 and Table 6.13 show that her THOUGHT vowel becomes significantly higher when her alignment is convergent. (Please note the low N (23) for THOUGHT, which means that these results are not as reliable as the results for KIT and GOAT, with Ns over 50.)

---

23 This might also be the case with her divergent alignment, although it may be risky to read too much into Yael’s patterns of divergent alignment, since it is so unusual in her interview.
Table 6.12: Effects of alignment on Yael’s GOAT vowel height (F1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE(B)</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>656.49</td>
<td>26.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>-500.35</td>
<td>207.78</td>
<td>-.29*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following palatal</td>
<td>-93.40</td>
<td>30.10</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE(B)</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>637.40</td>
<td>26.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>-419.22</td>
<td>204.49</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following palatal</td>
<td>-93.65</td>
<td>29.12</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergent alignment</td>
<td>44.22</td>
<td>20.52</td>
<td>.25*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R^2 = .240 for Step 1, R^2 = .302 for Step 2, *p < .05, **p < .005

Figure 6.3

Yael: GOAT and THOUGHT vowels by alignment
Table 6.13: Effects of alignment on Yael’s THOUGHT vowel height (F1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>694.18</td>
<td>15.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergent alignment</td>
<td>-67.34</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>-.44*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R^2 = .191, *p < .05

As we can see in the tables and figures, THOUGHT and GOAT move toward each other (almost entirely converging in the F1 dimension) when Yael's stancetaking is convergent with her husband's. I had hypothesized that THOUGHT might become more GOAT-like under certain circumstances, reflecting increased influence of Hebrew phonology (since THOUGHT is not phonemic in Hebrew). Yet at first glance it is surprising that Yael’s phonology would become more Hebrew-like, as reflected in the raising of THOUGHT, when her stancetaking is convergent with that of her English-speaking husband. However, an examination of John's vowel chart (Figure 6.4) shows that his THOUGHT vowel is, overall, relatively high and backer than GOAT; thus it is possible that Yael’s THOUGHT vowel is in fact becoming more like John's when it rises with convergent stance.
One final result is worth noting in Yael's vowels. More than any of the other speakers discussed here, Yael's vowels show the possible effects of Hebrew phonology. On the one hand we have seen that her KIT vowel, nearly overlapping with FLEECE in her speech overall, becomes more distinct from FLEECE, and thus more target-like, in convergent stances. On the other hand, we have seen the acoustic convergence of GOAT and THOUGHT in the F1 dimension, perhaps
reflecting the fact that THOUGHT is not phonemic in Hebrew. The effect of Hebrew phonology can also be seen in Yael’s production of STRUT. I had hypothesized that STRUT would be an available site of style-shifting for these speakers. Since it is not phonemic in Hebrew, many L1 Hebrew speakers produce an English STRUT vowel much closer to LOT, which is a more familiar vowel. An examination of Yael’s overall vowel chart (p. 159) shows that overall, Yael’s STRUT vowel is quite low and close to her LOT vowel, much more so than for Arad and Galit.24 When we take evaluation into account, we see that Yael’s STRUT vowel is even closer to LOT when she is evaluating something positively (Table 6.14 and Figure 6.5).

Table 6.14: Effects of evaluation on Yael’s STRUT vowel backness (F2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1370.25</td>
<td>16.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Evaluation</td>
<td>-84.30</td>
<td>28.85</td>
<td>-.37*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .139, \ *p = .005 \]

24 Tomer’s LOT and STRUT are differently arranged, with STRUT low and central, where LOT might be expected, and LOT higher and backer, near THOUGHT.
A possible explanation of this change in STRUT to be more LOT-like has to do with strength of emotion. Perhaps when she is evaluating something positively, Yael’s attention is diverted from maintaining a more target-like accent in English and Hebrew phonology is allowed to have a stronger influence. This explanation accords with folk notions (though not supported with research to the best of my knowledge) that bilingual speakers are more likely to use their first language when they are expressing strong emotions. Though this is only one possible explanation, and admittedly speculative, the fact remains that, for this reason or another, Yael’s
already quite LOT-like STRUT vowel becomes even more LOT-like when she is taking a positively evaluative stance.

In sum, Yael has widespread influence of alignment on her vowels, including centralization of KIT and convergence of THOUGHT and GOAT. We have also seen that these patterns, combined with backing of STRUT, show variation in the degree of influence of Hebrew phonology on Yael’s production of English vowels.

6.6.2 Galit: Effects of topic on vowel production

**Overall vowel space.** Impressionistically, Galit does not have a strong Israeli accent. This could be partly due to the fact that she spent a good portion of her childhood living outside of Israel, primarily in a European country where English is spoken (though not as an official language). This impression about her accent is reflected in the shape of her overall vowel space. In her vowel chart we can see clear separation between the (allophonic in Hebrew) front vowel pairs KIT/FLEECE and DRESS/FACE, compared to Yael and Tomer (who both have somewhat overlapping KIT and FLEECE). We can also see in this vowel chart (Figure 6.6) that Galit’s STRUT vowel is central in her vowel space, while LOT and THOUGHT are close together in the low back region of her vowel space. GOOSE is substantially fronted, which is common in American English.
Table 6.15 summarizes the significant results when Galit’s vowels are subjected to regression analyses with discourse factors as independent variables.

Below I focus mainly on her results with regard to topic, offering possible explanations for the variation in vowel production.
Table 6.15: Summary of significant effects of discourse factors on Galit’s vowels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FLEECE</th>
<th>DRESS</th>
<th>FACE</th>
<th>LOT</th>
<th>STRUT</th>
<th>THought</th>
<th>GOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>higher when topic is Jerusalem</td>
<td>(lower when topic is local) shorter when topic is compare</td>
<td>fronter when topic is compare</td>
<td>fronter when topic is compare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance type</td>
<td></td>
<td>fronter when stance is attributive</td>
<td></td>
<td>lower when stance is subjective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>higher when evaluation is positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>backer when alignment is divergent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the four speakers analyzed here, Galit has the most prevalent influence of topic on her vowel production (four vowels, compared to zero, one, or two for other speakers), with several topics influencing her vowel production, including two topics—Israel and a specific location in Israel (in her case Jerusalem)—that did not produce a significant effect on any other speaker’s vowel production. Aside from its influence on Galit’s vowels, topic has a significant influence on many other discourse variables in Galit’s interview. All of the topics coded are significant predictors of some change in stance type, evaluation, and/or alignment, with a

---

25 Nearly all the Israeli interviewees spoke to some extent about their hometown in Israel, which I coded separately from generalizations about Israel or Israelis. I do not report these results elsewhere because they did not come out as significant except in Galit’s production of DRESS.
particularly frequent influence of topics related to differences in culture: Israel, America, and cultural comparison.

With regard to Galit’s vowel production, it is worth noting first that, impressionistically, Galit does not have a strong Israeli accent. This impression about her accent is reflected in the shape of her overall vowel space (see p. 170). Among other things, in that vowel chart we can see clear separation between the (allophonic in Hebrew) front vowel pairs KIT/FLEECE and DRESS/FACE, compared to Yael and Tomer (who both have somewhat overlapping KIT and FLEECE). Yet, with certain topics, we see convergence in Galit’s FACE and DRESS vowels (Tables 6.16 and 6.17 and Figure 6.7).

**Table 6.16: Effects of topic on Galit’s FACE vowel height (F1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>401.82</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic: Local community</td>
<td>72.51</td>
<td>21.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .173, *p = .001

**Table 6.17: Effects of topic on Galit’s DRESS vowel height (F1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>470.48</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic: Jerusalem</td>
<td>-62.88</td>
<td>23.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .095, *p < .05
When the topic is the local community, Galit’s FACE vowel becomes lower, well within the range of her DRESS tokens in the F1 dimension. On the other hand, when talking about her hometown of Jerusalem, Galit produces higher DRESS tokens, which more closely resemble her FACE vowels in the F1 dimension. This semi-convergence in DRESS and FACE may reflect increased influence of Hebrew phonology, in which the Hebrew phoneme /e/ falls between the values of English DRESS and FACE (Aronson et al 1996).
We also see significant changes in Galit’s back vowels depending on topic.

Both GOAT and THOUGHT become more centralized, moving toward STRUT: GOAT when the topic is Israel, and THOUGHT when the topic is a cultural comparison, as can be seen in Tables 6.18 and 6.19 and Figure 6.8.

**Table 6.18: Effects of topic on Galit’s GOAT vowel backness (F2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1460.95</td>
<td>65.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>-1122.78</td>
<td>510.35</td>
<td>-.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding coronal</td>
<td>137.28</td>
<td>45.75</td>
<td>.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following labial</td>
<td>-151.04</td>
<td>66.14</td>
<td>-.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1438.21</td>
<td>64.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>-1025.44</td>
<td>498.86</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding coronal</td>
<td>129.86</td>
<td>44.66</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following labial</td>
<td>-141.80</td>
<td>64.51</td>
<td>-.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic: Israel</td>
<td>147.52</td>
<td>73.75</td>
<td>.22*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .352 for Step 1, R² = .398 for Step 2, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .005

**Table 6.19: Effects of topic on Galit’s THOUGHT vowel backness (F2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1272.35</td>
<td>19.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic: Cultural comparison</td>
<td>202.85</td>
<td>48.25</td>
<td>.62*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .379, *p < .001
One possible explanation for the centralization of GOAT and THOUGHT is that Galit is using centralized, less extreme vowels to downplay potentially divisive stances phonetically; in her stancetaking, Israel is a significant predictor of higher rates of divergent alignment, while cultural comparison is a significant predictor of lower rates of convergent alignment. This is only one possible explanation, and should not be considered conclusive, since it presumes the impact of a mediated relationship (topic through alignment to vowel production), when one of the direct parts of that
relationship (alignment to vowel production) is not attested in the statistical results. At the same time, however, we find possible support for this explanation in Galit’s FLEECE vowel, which is significantly backer when she is taking a divergent stance, also perhaps showing phonetic mitigation of potentially divisive stancetaking (see Table 6.20 and Figure 6.9). Both of these cases potentially accord with Yaeger-Dror et al’s (2010) interpretation of the Social Agreement Principle, which predicts that utterances “should be prosodically reduced...if they carry new information which might be inferred as disagreeing with—or nonsupportive of—an earlier speaker” (p. 138).

Table 6.20: Effects of alignment on Galit’s FLEECE vowel backness (F2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2442.75</td>
<td>52.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>838.84</td>
<td>410.14</td>
<td>.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2403.91</td>
<td>48.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>1790.52</td>
<td>396.78</td>
<td>.57***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic: Israel</td>
<td>-697.27</td>
<td>145.59</td>
<td>-.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent alignment</td>
<td>-145.72</td>
<td>51.75</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .072 for Step 1, R² = .401 for Step 2, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Though I am not claiming that Galit’s vowel production is influenced by her husband Kevin’s vowel production, I nonetheless present his vowel chart (Figure 6.10) here for reference. Kevin’s FLEECE vowel is, overall, substantially higher and fronter than his KIT. I have not examined variation in his FLEECE vowel by stance type.
In sum, Galit’s vowels are sensitive to topic and alignment, with THOUGHT and GOAT becoming centralized (and less target-like) in utterances on potentially divisive topics, and FLEECE becoming centralized (and less target-like) in disaligning stances. FACE and DRESS converge with the influence of topic, perhaps indicating increased influence of Hebrew phonology.
6.6.3 Arad: Effects of epistemic stance type on vowel production

**Overall vowel space.** My sense when listening to Arad is that he has a relatively strong Israeli accent in English. However, it is likely that this observation comes from some aspect of his speech production other than vowels, as his vowel space appears canonical for a speaker of American English (see Figure 6.11). His high front vowels FLEECE/KIT and mid front vowels FACE/DRESS are mostly distinct, not reflecting their status as allophones in Hebrew. TRAP and STRUT, which are not phonemic in Hebrew, are where we would expect them to be for an English speaker, with TRAP low and front (though overlapping to some extent with DRESS), and STRUT perhaps lower in the vowel space than might be expected, but still substantially higher than LOT. LOT itself is quite low and distinct from Arad’s back vowels, and GOAT and THOUGHT are adjacent but distinct. GOOSE shows quite a bit of fronting, also to be expected in American English (Labov et al. 2006).
Arad has the most prevalent influence of epistemic stance type on vowel production (three vowels compared to none, one, or two for the other speakers), and it is consistently subjective stance that has an impact on his vowels, as seen in Table 6.21.
Table 6.21: Summary of significant effects of discourse factors on Arad's vowels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIT</th>
<th>FACE</th>
<th>TRAP</th>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>GOAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td></td>
<td>(lower when topic is compare)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance type</td>
<td></td>
<td>fronter when stance is subjective</td>
<td>shorter when stance is subjective</td>
<td></td>
<td>higher when stance is subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>fronter when evaluation is negative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(lower when evaluation is positive or negative)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two vowels whose quality is affected by subjective stance, FACE and GOAT, both take more extreme positions, FACE moving forward, away from DRESS and closer to FLEECE (see Figure 6.12 and Table 6.22), and GOAT moving upward, away from THOUGHT and closer to GOOSE (see Figure 6.12 and Table 6.23). The widespread influence of epistemic stance type on Arad's vowels reflects its interaction with other discourse variables. Looking at regressions reporting significant interactions of discourse variables, we find that Arad’s use of subjective stance is promoted by the topics of cultural comparison and America, and negatively influenced by the topic of self/family. Subjective stance use is also promoted by Arad’s use of negative evaluation.
Table 6.22: Effects of stance type on Arad’s FACE vowel backness (F2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1709.41</td>
<td>98.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>2023.46</td>
<td>873.90</td>
<td>.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1665.85</td>
<td>95.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>177.11</td>
<td>72.51</td>
<td>.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective stance</td>
<td>177.11</td>
<td>72.51</td>
<td>.33*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = .106$ for Step 1, $R^2 = .213$ for Step 2, *$p < .05$
Table 6.23: Effects of stance type on Arad’s GOAT vowel height (F1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>525.78</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective stance</td>
<td>-33.72</td>
<td>14.56</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .015, *p < .05

While the relationship between significant effects of topic on stance type and significant effects of stance type on vowels is relatively straightforward, it is less straightforward to explain the nature of the effects of subjective stance on Arad’s vowels. This difficulty has partly to do with the ambiguity of the meaning of subjective stance, as discussed in Chapter 5 (section 5.4 and section 5.7.2). As I explained in section 5.7.2, stances coded as subjectively marked are simply those in which the speaker explicitly claims epistemic responsibility for the stance. The coding system I used is agnostic on degree of speaker commitment. Thus it is difficult to say whether Arad’s use of subjective stance is associated with emphasis, which might be associated with strength of emotion, and which could potentially explain the extremity of Arad’s FACE and GOAT vowels in subjective stances.

However, this central role of subjective stance in Arad’s discourse and its influence on his vowels is nonetheless worth noting.

Arad also has the most widespread influence of evaluation on vowel production, with evaluation significantly predicting changes in two vowels, compared to one for other speakers. This relatively frequent influence of evaluation also accords with variation in Arad’s stance-related variables, as the topics of Israel and local community significantly predict higher rates of positive evaluation, while the topic of cultural comparison significantly predicts lower rates of negative
evaluation. Arad’s KIT vowel becomes more extreme and more FLEECE-like when evaluation is negative (see Table 6.24 and Figure 6.13), while THOUGHT lowers, moving away from GOAT and toward STRUT with both positive and negative evaluation (see Table 6.25 and Figure 6.13).

**Table 6.24: Effects of evaluation on Arad’s KIT vowel backness (F2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1957.23</td>
<td>36.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding labial</td>
<td>-205.83</td>
<td>89.97</td>
<td>-.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding /r/</td>
<td>-256.56</td>
<td>112.35</td>
<td>-.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1909.94</td>
<td>35.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding labial</td>
<td>-240.51</td>
<td>80.97</td>
<td>-.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding /r/</td>
<td>-209.27</td>
<td>101.30</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative evaluation</td>
<td>204.94</td>
<td>68.06</td>
<td>.43***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .230 for Step 1, R² = .409 for Step 2, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p = .005

**Table 6.25: Effects of evaluation on Arad’s THOUGHT vowel height (F1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>508.44</td>
<td>19.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative evaluation</td>
<td>71.39</td>
<td>30.24</td>
<td>.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive evaluation</td>
<td>77.31</td>
<td>34.48</td>
<td>.49*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .329, *p < .05
There are three possible explanations for the raising of KIT with negative evaluation, all of which are related. Arad might be intentionally hyper-articulating these KIT tokens for emphasis; he does not seem to be someone who is afraid of emphasizing his negative assessment. If this is the case, it would run counter to the Social Agreement Principle, as described by Yaeger-Dror et al (2010). It is also possible that for Arad, negative assessment is associated with a Hebrew-speaking identity, leading his KIT to converge with FLEECE, its fellow allophone in Hebrew. Finally, it is possible that emotion associated with negative assessment leads Arad
to draw attention away from the goal of maintaining a target-like pronunciation of KIT as distinct from FLEECE.

Though it is interesting that Arad’s THOUGHT vowel lowers substantially with non-neutral evaluation, it may be risky to read too much into this change, since the analysis is based on an N of 19, which is quite low for regression analysis, and means the results are not very reliable. I thus present these results without further comment.

It is also worth addressing some of Arad’s non-significant results. He is the only one of the four speakers with no significant influence of alignment on vowel production. This result may be in keeping with other characteristics of Arad’s stancetaking. In their interview, Arad and his wife, Claire, had what seemed to me to be the most antagonistic of all the interviews I conducted (as discussed in Damari 2010). This impression is reflected in the statistical results: Of the four speakers, Arad has the highest rate of divergent stances (20.4%) and by far the lowest rate of convergent stances (13.5%). In contrast to the three other speakers featured here, in Arad’s stancetaking, alignment had no significant effect on stance type. Additionally, some topics are associated with changes in alignment: the topics America and cultural comparison are significant predictors of lower rates of convergent alignment for Arad, while the topic of local community is a significant predictor of higher rates of divergent alignment. Given how common it is for Arad to take stances divergent from his wife’s in the interview, particularly with regard to cultural topics, it is not surprising to see that Arad is at the other end of the spectrum from Yael in effects of alignment on vowel production. Whereas Yael has
the highest overall rate of convergent stances and the lowest overall rate of divergent stances, Arad has the lowest overall rate of convergent stances and the highest overall rate of divergent stances, and tends to take stances divergent from his wife's particularly with regard to cultural topics. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising to see that, while Yael's alignment has a significant effect on three of her vowels, Arad's alignment has a significant effect on none of his.

In sum, Arad's vowels show a significant influence of stance type and evaluation, more so than any of the other speakers, with FACE and GOAT taking more extreme positions when Arad is taking a subjective stance, and KIT and THOUGHT being affected by the type of evaluation. On the other hand, Arad is the only speaker who has no significant influence of alignment on vowel production, which is in keeping with my impressions about the nature of his interview and with statistical results of the interactions among his discourse variables.

6.6.4 Tomer: LOT as a site of style-shifting

**Overall vowel space.** Tomer has quite a strong Israeli accent when speaking English. While this impression may be affected by other aspects of his phonetic production, including consonants and prosody, his vowel chart (Figure 6.14) also shows several characteristics of a strong Israeli accent. In his high front vowels, we see substantial overlap between KIT and FLEECE vowels, reflecting the fact that these are allophones in Hebrew. We also see a very low STRUT vowel, near where we would expect to see LOT, reflecting a common adjustment among Hebrew speakers whose L1 does not have a phonemic STRUT vowel. Finally, we see closely
clustered back vowels GOAT, THOUGHT, and LOT, again supporting my hypothesis that THOUGHT, which is not phonemic in Hebrew, and LOT, which typically has orthographic “o,” would merge toward GOAT, which is a more familiar vowel in Hebrew.

**Figure 6.14**

Like Arad, Tomer has relatively few cases of significant influence of discourse factors on vowel production, though as with all the speakers analyzed here, Tomer
has some striking patterns in his vowels, particularly in the style-shifting accomplished by his LOT vowel.

**Table 6.26: Summary of significant effects of discourse factors on Tomer’s vowels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>KIT</th>
<th>FLEECE</th>
<th>DRESS</th>
<th>LOT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lower when topic is America</td>
<td>fronter when topic is compare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>longer when stance is attributive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>backer when evaluation is positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fronter when alignment is divergent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first pattern to notice in Tomer’s vowels is a significant difference in the production of his DRESS vowel based on topic (see Table 6.27 and Figure 6.15). When Tomer is talking about most topics, his DRESS vowels cluster roughly midway between the overall means for FACE and TRAP, as is standard in English. However, when he is talking about America, his DRESS vowels move significantly downward and much closer to TRAP, becoming even more distinct from FACE, perhaps due to increased awareness of his American accent when speaking about America.
Table 6.27: Effects of topic on Tomer’s DRESS vowel height (F1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>584.79</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding velar</td>
<td>-64.29</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>578.19</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preceding velar</td>
<td>-57.69</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic: America</td>
<td>28.29</td>
<td>11.17</td>
<td>.24*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R^2 = .130 for Step 1, R^2 = .185 for Step 2, *p < .05, **p ≤ .001

Figure 6.15

Tomer’s stances on the topic of America tend to have some additional characteristics. The topic of America is a significant predictor of lower rates of
subjective stance, lower rates of positive evaluation, and lower rates of convergent alignment. This combination of factors indicates that for Tomer this topic is a site of style-shifting both on the discourse level and on the phonetic level.

Topic also has an effect on Tomer's LOT vowel, as seen in Figure 6.15 and Table 6.28. As I noted earlier (p. 188), Tomer’s LOT vowel, overall, is back and quite high. When we look at his LOT vowel separately by topic, we see that several topics cluster near his THOUGHT vowel, and one (America) even approaches his GOAT vowel. This reflects a pattern I hypothesized: that both LOT and THOUGHT could become relatively GOAT-like under certain circumstances, reflecting the influence of Hebrew phonology. However, when Tomer is taking a stance comparing Israeli and American culture, his LOT vowel becomes lower and significantly more central in the F2 dimension. Like the topic of America, Tomer’s stances on the topic of cultural comparison also seem to be a site of style-shifting in several ways: The topic of cultural comparison is a significant predictor of lower rates of positive evaluation, higher rates of divergent alignment, and lower rates of convergent alignment.

**Table 6.28: Effects of topic and alignment on Tomer’s LOT vowel backness (F2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE(B)</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1020.83</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic: Cultural comparison</td>
<td>130.83</td>
<td>41.31</td>
<td>.45*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent alignment</td>
<td>147.00</td>
<td>48.61</td>
<td>.43*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .502, *p \leq .005 \]

This interaction with divergent alignment is reflected in the regression results when alignment is tested as a predictor of vowel quality, as seen in Table
6.28 and Figure 6.16. In stances with neutral alignment, LOT nearly converges with THOUGHT, which is also quite close to GOAT, again reflecting the pattern I hypothesized. However, when Tomer is taking a stance with non-neutral alignment, his LOT vowel moves down and forward in his vowel space. Neither of these movements (in the F1 or F2 dimension) is significant for his convergent stances, but the movement in the F2 dimension is significant for his divergent stances, with LOT moving to a much more central point in Tomer's vowel space.

**Figure 6.16**
Though interpretation of the model presented in Table 6.22 is complicated by the fact that the two predictors, cultural comparison and divergent alignment, are themselves statistically related, it is important to note that cultural comparison and divergent stance both emerge as significant predictors of the F2 value of LOT, independently and when entered into a model together. Additionally, the regression model containing both the significant predictors of LOT F2 value, cultural comparison and divergent alignment, has an R square value of .502, meaning that these two variables statistically account for 50.2% of the variation in LOT in the F2 dimension. This R square value is by far the highest of any of the regression models reported in this chapter. This provides further indication that LOT is a notable site of style-shifting for Tomer.

Though I have not claimed that Tomer’s vowel production is influenced by his wife Rachel’s vowel production, it is relevant that Rachel’s production of LOT is squarely low and central in her vowel space (see Figure 6.17), unlike Tomer’s LOT, which is relatively higher and backer.
6.7 Conclusions

This chapter provides strong evidence that discourse factors related to stancetaking can be associated with changes in vowel quality and vowel duration. It also provides preliminary evidence that these changes may reflect changes in the relative strength of influence of a bilingual speaker’s L1 phonology on speech in their L2. The analysis is based on only four speakers, each with distinct patterns in
their vowel production as distinguished by discourse factors, and therefore the specific results presented here are not generalizable to a larger sample. However, the fact that each of these four speakers has several vowels whose production is affected by discourse factors indicates that this is a fruitful direction for future research.

I now return briefly to review the outcomes of some of my specific hypotheses about the influence of Hebrew. I hypothesized that vowels likely to be affected by changes in discourse factors would include TRAP, STRUT, and THOUGHT, which are not phonemic in Hebrew and thus likely subject to variation; the pairs KIT/FLEECE and DRESS/FACE, which are separate phonemes in English but allophonic pairs in Hebrew; and LOT, which I hypothesized would be subject to orthographic influence, leading it to become more GOAT-like.

**Vowels not phonemic in Hebrew.** STRUT and THOUGHT showed significant variation related to stance, as hypothesized, but TRAP did not. We saw changes in Yael’s STRUT vowel, becoming more LOT-like, with positive evaluation. We saw changes for Yael and Arad in THOUGHT, with Yael’s THOUGHT vowel becoming closer to GOAT with convergent alignment and Arad’s closer to GOAT with neutral alignment but moving away from GOAT with convergent and divergent alignment. There were not significant changes in TRAP based on discourse factors. A possible explanation for this is that perhaps, among Israeli L2 speakers of English, TRAP has a degree of salience that leads speakers to make a special effort to achieve a relatively categorical, target-like production. In each of these four speakers’ overall vowel space, the mean value for TRAP appears in the expected area, as a low front
vowel, though for several of the speakers the range of TRAP production overlaps substantially with DRESS.

**Vowels that are allophones in Hebrew.** Several of the speakers had changes in the degree of convergence of KIT/FLEECE and DRESS/FACE, as predicted. For Yael, KIT, which overall is very close to FLEECE, moves away from FLEECE with convergent alignment. On the other hand, for Arad, whose KIT and FLEECE are overall quite distinct, KIT moves closer to FLEECE with negative evaluation. For Galit, whose DRESS and FACE are overall distinct, the two vowels converge with certain topics.

**LOT.** Finally we come to the unique case of LOT, which is phonemic in Hebrew, but was hypothesized to be subject to orthographic influence. LOT turned out to vary significantly by stance for one speaker, Tomer, whose LOT vowel is quite close to GOAT overall, but is subject to style-shifting based on topic and alignment. When the topic is cultural comparison or when Tomer is taking a divergent stance, his LOT vowel becomes more central, diverging from GOAT.

### 6.7.1 Implications

This study has implications both for our understanding of stancetaking and for our understanding of sociophonetic variation.

Understanding the relationships between stance-related discourse variables and phonetic production may enhance our understanding of stancetaking itself. This study shows that phonetic variation is an important dimension of stancetaking—whether that variation is an outcome of stancetaking or whether it contributes to
the act of stancetaking. The coding of discourse variables both for Chapter 5 and for this chapter was done manually, on the basis of discourse alone. If further research shows consistent patterns (within a speech community or more universally) in vowel quality, vowel duration, prosody, or other phonetic measures based on stance-related factors such as evaluation, alignment, or affect, this will shed more light on the nature of stancetaking and perhaps further inform coding of stance-related discourse variables for future studies of stancetaking.

Research on the intersection of stance and phonetic production may shed light on the interplay of speech above and below the level of awareness. A stance is typically taken very consciously and deliberately; it may be an explicit articulation of some aspect(s) of a speaker’s mental state, or an intentional social act in interaction with other interlocutors. On the other hand, while the degree of intentionality with which speakers deploy phonetic variants itself varies by speaker and context (Podesva forthcoming), conversational participants will frequently be less aware of the details of their phonetic production of an utterance than of the stance itself.

Studies like this one can also contribute to the enterprise of explaining the factors behind sociolinguistic variation. To date, studies of intraspeaker variation in vowels and other features have examined predictive factors related to interlocutor, topic, register, and other factors. Very few studies have addressed the impact of the type of discourse variables examined here on sociophonetic variation (but see Benor 2001; Podesva 2006). The present study demonstrates that stance-related variables can play a role in vowel production, and opens the question of whether
these variables can play a role in other aspects of phonetic production.

The present study also demonstrates the value of studying the sociophonetics of nonnative speakers, and the variable influence of L1 phonology on L2 vowel production. Studies examining variation in strength of foreign accent typically focus on more long-term factors, such as length of residence in host country, personal motivation, and nature of production (e.g. read vs. extemporaneous speech). Based on this study, we can see that bilingual speakers’ foreign accents are not static across speech situations or even within a speech situation. The data for this chapter came from a single interaction for each speaker; the only factors that changed across the interview were topics and the speakers’ stances toward those topics, and yet we see strong variation in each speaker’s vowel production. Research on second language phonology should take discourse factors into account, examining the relationship of foreign accent to stancetaking.

Thus, this study has implications for fields engaged in stance analysis (including discourse analysis, linguistic anthropology, and interactional linguistics), for sociophonetics and perhaps the field of phonetics more broadly, and for studies of second language acquisition focusing on the acquisition of sound systems.

6.7.2 Future directions

Future studies should consider variation in vowel production by both native and non-native speakers of the language spoken in the data, and should use data from genres of speech other than the interview, ideally more naturalistic speech situations. Future studies should also consider other methods of coding, perhaps
using automated coding of discourse factors, informed by human observations (as in, e.g., Biber and Finegan 1988, 1989; Precht 2003), to achieve a higher degree of reliability in coding. An additional direction for future research would be integration of qualitative discourse analysis to shed more light on the interpretations of quantitative findings. Many of my interpretations of the reasons or meaning behind the patterns discovered here could be strengthened by conducting in-depth qualitative analysis of the stances that feed into the quantitative analysis.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1 Contributions of the dissertation

The main goal of this project has been to identify and address three gaps in the field of stance research and to show how research that is done in these gaps can contribute to our understanding of identity construction through stancetaking.

The first gap, addressed in Chapter 4, is created by the predominant focus in the stance literature on local intersubjectivity, without taking into account the ways that intersubjectivity can be achieved beyond adjacent turns at talk. In that chapter, I showed two ways that intersubjectivity can be achieved more broadly in stancetaking. The first analysis showed that two interlocutors who know each other well can draw on each other’s past stances as foils for their own present stances, using such linguistic resources as constructed dialogue, constructed stance, verb tense, and adverbials to engage explicitly with past stances. By taking stances in interaction with each other’s past stances, members of that couple presented themselves individually and jointly in particular ways; in addition, each time a member of the couple takes a stance on a topic of ongoing disagreement, that disagreement and each individual's record of stancetaking on those topics are reinforced as a notable aspect of their relationship. Thus temporary stances accrete (Rauniomaa 2003) to become a part of each speaker’s locally specific identity (Bucholtz and Hall 2005).
The second analysis in Chapter 4 provides a different view of intersubjective stancetaking beyond the turn-by-turn. There I showed that stances are part of a community’s linguistic repertoire, deriving evidence from commonality of stances, resonance, and parallels in argumentation. The stance repertoire approach shows that stances can be intertextual without being explicitly marked as such through constructed dialogue or constructed stance, yet can be recognizable through resonance with stances outside the immediate interaction. The identification of resonance across stances that are not adjacent provides evidence that stances that are part of a community’s repertoire can be identified on the basis of the same sorts of cues that are used to trace intersubjectivity in a turn-by-turn exchange.

Chapter 5 addressed a second gap, focusing on the interpersonal functions of epistemic marking. Previous research on the use of epistemic marking relied on close qualitative analysis to demonstrate the interpersonal functions of epistemic markers, from information management to face work. The quantitative analysis presented here confirmed many of the findings of previous work, showing that speakers were more likely to use epistemic marking when the stance they were taking addressed a topic on which they may have been seen to have less authority than their interlocutor (Fox 2001; Mushin 2001); in other words a topic that was outside their “territory of information” (Kamio 1997) relative to an interlocutor. I argued in that chapter that epistemic marking can be used not only for the local management of interpersonal relations (cf. Kärkkäinen 2003), but also to index larger-scale identity categories (e.g. nationality) through implicit claims to epistemic authority.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I showed that stancetaking can have correlates in the realm of sound variation, as each of the bilingual speakers considered in that chapter varied in their production of several vowels depending on the type of stance they were taking. Taking a particular type of stance activates a change in vowel production for these speakers, either intentionally or subconsciously, as part of the construction of the stance or as a result of it. More research is needed on these questions, but this chapter provides statistical evidence that several aspects of stancetaking—topic, epistemic stance type, evaluation, and alignment—are associated with vowel quality for four bilingual speakers.

Taken together, these findings have several implications. One is to provide evidence for the role of stancetaking in identity construction. These three analyses highlight some of the ways that speakers construct their identities through stancetaking, both more explicitly in terms of the assessments they make and how they take responsibility for these assessments, and more implicitly in terms of the phonetic detail of their stance production. Stancetaking plays a role in how speakers present themselves both locally and on a more macro-level, as their stancetaking reflects and constructs elements of their demographic-level identities.

A second implication is to demonstrate the fruitfulness of taking stance into account when looking at sociolinguistic variation. Studies of intraspeaker variation in sociolinguistics have examined variation mainly as it correlates with situational factors such as speech event, formality, and interlocutor. To the extent that these studies consider variation within a speech event, they analyze the ways that variation correlates with changes in topic. This dissertation provides evidence that
stancetaking plays an important role in conditioning variation, both on the discourse level (as seen in Chapter 5) and on the phonetic level (as seen in Chapter 6). This evidence leads me to advocate that various aspects of stancetaking should be taken into account in order to understand patterns of sociolinguistic variation. Taken from another angle, this evidence shows that vowel quality is one of the phonetic resources speakers can use to take a stance, in conjunction with discursive means of stancetaking and perhaps even in the absence of discursively explicit stancetaking strategies (this latter point would require more research). It seems likely that manipulation of vowel quality and other phonetic resources may be socially recognized within particular speech communities as ways of constructing a stance; this hypothesis merits investigation through the use of perception studies.

The analysis presented in Chapter 6 also underscores the importance in variation research of considering speakers individually, for two related reasons. First, as Johnstone (1996) and others have argued, individuals are linguistic agents who deploy linguistic resources in idiosyncratic ways. Even when individuals have many characteristics in common—nationality, socioeconomic status, gender, community membership—they still produce their utterances and participate in linguistic variation in distinct ways, ways that are not entirely predictable from the set of characteristics that describe them (see also Benor 2010; Podesva forthcoming). Each person has a unique set of experiences with the world in general and with language in particular, and a unique set of goals in interaction. All of these factors lead to idiosyncratic ways of using language; this is certainly true of the participants in this study. Chapter 6 contributes a second reason for considering
speakers individually: When examining a phonetic feature such as vowel production, we find that speakers have different starting points (different overall vowel spaces), so that it is uninformative to compare, for example, the production of STRUT by a speaker with a central STRUT vowel overall (Galit) to that of a speaker with a low STRUT vowel overall (Yael). The production of these speakers must be analyzed separately to understand the stylistic moves that are being made.

A related implication of this study is for the “repertoire” approach to research on Jewish language use (Benor 2009), and the idea of an ethnolinguistic repertoire (Benor 2010) more broadly. Previous research taking this approach has focused on elements of a linguistic repertoire including phonological, lexical, morphosyntactic and semantic features. This analysis adds another level, which might be called the discourse level, showing what stances are part of a community’s repertoire, and how these stances are taken. The analysis in Chapter 4 showed that certain stances, including those related to differences in Israeli and American relationships and politeness norms, are part of the repertoire of an opinion community that overlaps with local speech communities and communities of practice (e.g. the Rockville Jewish community or Israeli families living in Maryland who socialize together), as well as imagined communities (e.g. American Jews or Israelis in America). Though stances are not associated with a particular language variety, as are phonological and lexical elements of a repertoire, speakers are nonetheless able to draw on a repertoire of stances, along with other linguistic resources, to index their alignment with these communities and to accomplish other identity-related moves.
7.2 Future Directions

These findings identify several fruitful directions for further research on stancetaking. More research is needed to validate the arguments made here in the areas of intertextual stancetaking and stance repertoire, quantitative patterns in epistemic stance marking, and stance-related phonetic variation.

Future work in all three areas would benefit from two related qualities: (a) more genres of talk (b) from a wider range of speakers. The data providing the basis of analysis for this study benefitted from the relative homogeneity of speakers (all binational Israeli/American couples) and of genre (all interviews were broadly comparable). However, a more diverse set of data will be crucial to further pursuit of the theoretical claims made here, particularly those relating to patterns of epistemic stance use and phonetic variation associated with stancetaking.

I have argued that interviews were the best available method for addressing the research questions posed in this project. But it has been shown that interviews do not necessarily yield the same sort of talk that speakers engage in when in other settings. Genres of talk that would be useful to investigate in further work include spoken and written discourse from everyday conversation and electronic communication among friends and families to public discourse, including blogs, editorials in periodicals, and public speeches. Whereas sound variation obviously could not be captured in written discourse, other elements of intersubjective and epistemic stancetaking might vary from spoken to written discourse; this is a question worth pursuing.
A wider range of speakers would also be useful for further investigation of the points made here. This study has focused on a very specific research population: first, couples, and second, people at the boundary between two national/cultural groups. While this population was chosen intentionally to explore specific questions (the existence of a stance repertoire, claims to epistemic authority, and the influence of L1 phonology on a bilingual speaker speaking an L2), the theoretical claims made here can and should be pursued in a broader population. Any speech community or community of practice potentially has a stance repertoire or repertoires, and epistemic strategies do not only have interpersonal significance in interactions between members of a couple. Similarly, there is no reason to expect that phonetic variation in stancetaking will be limited to bilingual speakers, especially since the results of that investigation did not always clearly correlate with influence of L1 phonology. Analysis of all three of these elements of stancetaking in a broader population would make useful contributions to the larger body of research on sociolinguistic variation.

7.3 Concluding remarks

This project has served to contribute to and challenge our understanding of the ways that people take stances in interaction with other speakers both within and across individual interactions. In asking about the stances that individuals take regarding cultural norms that range from more familiar to more foreign, we can understand how they view themselves and their partners, and how they present those identities to a stranger. And by expanding and refining our understanding of
the ways that speakers take stances, we can also gain additional insight into sociolinguistic variation.
Appendix A: Transcription conventions

. A period indicates falling, final intonation.
, A comma indicates continuing intonation.
? A question mark indicates rising intonation.
... Ellipses indicate silence of more than one second.
- A hyphen indicates a truncated word or false start.
: A colon indicates an elongated sound.
/words/ Slashes enclose uncertain transcription.
words Italics indicate a stressed word or utterance.
words Bold font indicates analytic focus.
@ indicates one burst of laughter.
@word indicates a word spoken while laughing.
<@words@> indicates words spoken while laughing.
words [words] Square brackets indicate simultaneous talk.
{words} Curly brackets identify analyst clarification or explanation.
Appendix B: Interview “script”

Preliminary questions
• Do you guys ever talk about similarities and differences between American and Israeli culture? What similarities or differences have you noticed?
• How did you meet?
• Who is in your social circle? Who are your close friends? (American Jews, Israelis, Non-Jews? People in your neighborhood?)
• Are you friendly with your neighbors?

Background and residential patterns
• To Israeli: Where in Israel are you from? Did your parents grow up in Israel? Does your family still live in Israel? Have you lived in any other countries?
• To American: Where are you from? Have you been to Israel? What was your relationship to Israel before you met your spouse? Have you lived in any other countries?
• Do either of you speak any languages besides Hebrew and English?
• How did you (the Israeli) end up in the U.S.? How long have you lived here? Why did you choose to live where you live?
• What do you do?

Cultural and religious practice
• Do you do anything to celebrate Jewish holidays? What? Does it feel more American or Israeli to you?
• Do you do anything to celebrate Israeli holidays? What?
• What do you—each of you—think of as the relationship between being Israeli and being Jewish? How are they similar and different?
• Did you (the Israeli) think of yourself as Jewish when you lived in Israel? What about now?
• To American: What was your Jewish/religious/cultural upbringing like?

Local community
• Are you involved in the Jewish community here? In what ways?
• Do you feel just as much part of the American Jewish community as American Jews? Why or why not?
• What do you like most about the American Jewish community?
• What do you like least about the American Jewish community?
• Is there a local community of Israelis here? What do you do with them?

Children and family
• How often do you visit Israel? Do your children enjoy it?
• How do your children feel about being partly Israeli?
• Do your children speak Hebrew? Do you have any rules about what languages they should speak when?
• Do you hope your children will live in Israel in the future?
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