Combating Nuclear Trafficking in the Former Soviet Union & Eastern Europe: U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance and the Illicit Nuclear Trade, 1997-2009

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By

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The illicit trafficking of fissile and radioactive materials emerged as a prominent threat following the collapse of the USSR. In the aftermath of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, the issue has received renewed attention due to the increasing concern that terrorists could acquire the necessary materials to develop an improvised nuclear device (IND) or radiological dispersal device (RDD, also known as a dirty bomb). This study first addresses the challenges to working with nuclear trafficking data and conducts a comparative analysis of trends in open vs. restricted-access databases of nuclear smuggling incidents. The study then turns to its main focus: utilizing open-source data to examine the relationship between U.S. funding for threat reduction and border security programs and nuclear smuggling in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe. In doing so, it seeks to answer two key questions: First, is U.S. funding appropriately targeted to address known smuggling routes? Second, how has U.S. assistance impacted the number of nuclear trafficking incidents in the FSU and Eastern Europe? In the process of answering these questions, the study also identifies and describes a probable Eastern smuggling route through Siberia to South and East Asia.
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I. Introduction

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the risk of unsecured nuclear and radiological materials being sold on the black market became a major concern for Russia and the West. With the collapse of the economy and the breakdown of security at nuclear facilities throughout the former Soviet Union (FSU), impoverished nuclear scientists and military officers had both incentive and opportunity to divert nuclear materials for personal gain. Beginning in the early 1990s, nuclear and radioactive materials reportedly originating from former Soviet facilities, including uranium and plutonium as well as other radiological sources, began appearing in smuggling incidents in Europe and the FSU. Since 1991, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recorded over 1500 confirmed incidents in its Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), including over 300 attempts to illegally sell or transport nuclear or radioactive substances. ¹ While the majority of these incidents involve low-threat materials, the ITDB has recorded over a dozen incidents involving weapons-grade uranium or plutonium,² and reports indicate an even higher number involving high-risk radioactive material that could be used to create a radiological dispersal device (RDD, also known as a dirty bomb).

Black market nuclear smuggling is a critical potential acquisition pathway for aspiring nuclear states or terrorist groups. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, scholars and policymakers were primarily concerned with “loose” nuclear weapons and

² For a full list of confirmed and credible incidents involving weapons-usable material, see the Appendix.
material that could be used to accelerate the nuclear ambitions of states such as North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. For example, Graham Allison argued in 1996 that:

The defining danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons is not Iran’s purchase of civilian nuclear reactors that may assist Iranian nuclear ambitions a decade hence; it is the threat that today, or tomorrow, Iran will purchase nuclear weapons or fissile material from some fragment of the current Russian nuclear system.  

At that time, the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining nuclear capabilities was considered, but generally only as an afterthought. Over the past decade, however, the prospect of nuclear terrorism has become the more prominent concern. This shift was primarily driven by two factors: 1) New indications of terrorist interest in nuclear and radiological weapons (particularly from al Qaeda and affiliated groups), and 2) Growing evidence that aspiring nuclear states prefer to build full nuclear programs by acquiring dual-use capabilities. While trafficking in nuclear materials could potentially provide immediate access to fissionable material, relying on this mechanism would leave a country wholly reliant on smuggling rings for access to nuclear materials. The A.Q. Khan network, a sophisticated scheme for illicitly transferring dual-use nuclear technology, clearly demonstrated that nations seeking nuclear weapons prefer to develop self-sustaining nuclear programs rather than depend on criminal elements for access to weapons usable nuclear material. In contrast, terrorist organizations have been deemed less likely to require independent, scalable nuclear programs and more likely to seek quick access to nuclear or radioactive materials via the black market.

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Indeed, the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials has received renewed consideration in the aftermath of September 11, and in particular in the latter half of the decade. The importance of this concern was clearly demonstrated in 2007, when approximately 300 participants from 60 countries came together for a major international conference on nuclear trafficking. The issue rose to even greater prominence under the Obama Administration, taking center stage during President Obama’s high-profile April 2009 speech in Prague. During this address, President Obama highlighted the threat of nuclear trafficking as a key motivating factor for his initiative to secure all nuclear materials in four years. In accordance with this effort, the leaders of 47 nations gathered in Washington, D.C. for the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, at which nuclear trafficking was an important topic of discussion.

Though recent years have seen a renewed focus on nuclear security issues, the United States has overseen an extensive financial and technical assistance effort since the early 1990s to help secure nuclear materials at their source and detect illicit materials in transit. These initiatives include, for example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (also known as Nunn-Lugar), the Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, and a variety of programs under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy. Through such endeavors, the U.S. government works closely

with partners around the world to prevent and respond to nuclear trafficking incidents. Combined, the United States devotes over a billion dollars to these efforts each year, with over 80% of this amount dedicated to enhancing nuclear site security and interdicting nuclear smuggling.\(^7\) In total, the U.S. has spent over $18 trillion on nuclear security initiatives since 1991.\(^8\)

This study will utilize open-source data to examine the relationship between U.S. funding for threat reduction/border security programs and illicit nuclear trafficking incidents in the FSU and Eastern Europe. In doing so, this study will endeavor to answer two key questions: First, how reliable is the available data on nuclear trafficking incidents, particularly the data contained in open databases? Second, what correlations can be drawn between U.S. nonproliferation assistance and nuclear trafficking incidents?

The answers to these questions will constitute a unique contribution to the existing literature on nuclear trafficking and nonproliferation programs. In publications such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ dossier on *Nuclear Black Markets*, analysts have previously compared trafficking trends between two restricted-access databases, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) and the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO), a proprietary

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\(^7\) Matthew Bunn, *Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years*, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, April 2010, 85.

database maintained by researchers at the University of Salzburg. However, the academic literature has yet to compare these datasets to trends contained in the Newly Independent States (NIS) Nuclear Trafficking Database maintained by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), a fully open database available on the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) website. Furthermore, while previous research has addressed trends in nuclear trafficking incidents and the details of U.S. funding for nuclear security programs, no analysis has yet been conducted that ties these two datasets together to identify correlations or causal relationships. Current government and non-governmental assessment metrics for these assistance programs are limited to calculating completion percentages or adherence to a set standard for “meeting key requirements.” While such measurements are useful performance metrics, they fall short of considering such programs’ impact on nuclear trafficking—the core phenomenon they are intended to halt. This study endeavors to address this critical gap by directly examining the link between U.S. assistance programs and known nuclear trafficking incidents. It does not purport to produce the definitive work on this subject; rather, this study aims to undertake an initial analysis while setting the stage for further research on these complex questions.

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II. Definitions

The following key terms will be used throughout this study:

- **Discrete incident**: A specific seizure or theft of nuclear or radioactive material. Such individual incidents are thus distinguished from bulk statistics that reference a collection of incidents taking place over months or years.

- **Nuclear materials**: Materials usable in the nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear weapons, including plutonium (Pu), uranium (U), and thorium (Th). This incorporates natural and depleted uranium as well as plutonium radiation sources used in commercial devices, such as smoke detectors. As such, not all materials in this category are weapons-usable or even toxic; for example, neither natural nor depleted uranium poses a weapons or public health risk.

- **Nuclear trafficking / nuclear smuggling**: In the context of this study, these terms will be used as a catch-all to refer to the illicit movement and sale of both fissionable nuclear materials and other radioactive materials, including radioisotopes commonly used in industrial and commercial applications.

- **Open database**: A database that is fully accessible by the general public. The only open database of nuclear and radiological trafficking data is the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database maintained by CNS.

- **Orphan sources**: Radioactive materials without any identifiable owner or responsible party. Many such orphan sources are believed to have been abandoned in military and industrial facilities following the USSR’s collapse. When relying on media reports, a particular source’s status as “orphan” is
subject to interpretation. This study used a conservative interpretation, only
categorizing materials as orphan when they were clearly abandoned, not
simply discovered outside the immediate possession of their owner.

- **Other materials**: Materials that, while neither nuclear nor radioactive, are
sold or offered for sale as part of a scam or hoax. Two common examples are
osmium-187 and so-called “red mercury.”

- **Other radioactive materials**: Non-fissionable radioisotopes that pose a
potential public health risk through passive contamination or incorporation
into an RDD. Prominent examples include cesium-137, cobalt-60,
americium-241, and strontium-90.

- **Radioactively contaminated materials**: Non-radioisotopes that emit
radiation due to proximity or exposure to ionizing radiation. Such materials
are most often radioactive scrap metal, but other examples include
radioactively contaminated food, tools, and objects.

- **Restricted-access database**: A database that is not fully available to the
general public due to classification or proprietary ownership. The IAEA
ITDB and the University of Salzburg’s DSTO both fall into this category, as
do the databases maintained by Interpol, the WCO, and the US National Labs.
As noted above, however, broad trends and statistics may still be available for
restricted-access databases, as they are for the ITDB and DSTO.

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12 Kenley Butler and Akaki Dvali, “Nuclear Trafficking Hoaxes: A Short History of Scams Involving Red
Mercury and Osmium-187,” CNS, April 2004, [http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_42a.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_42a.html).
III. Scope

This study will examine nuclear trafficking in the FSU/Eastern Europe and U.S. assistance measures designed to secure nuclear materials and halt smugglers trafficking in radioactive substances. The analysis will focus on the years 1997-2009, and will include incidents involving materials originating in or trafficked through any former Soviet republic.

The type of nuclear smuggling examined in this study is distinct from the black market networks that facilitated the proliferation of nuclear dual-use technologies to countries like Pakistan, North Korea, Libya, and Iran. These networks, while also a vital component of proliferation, are largely characterized by different materials, actors, and goals. Rather than trafficking in radioactive materials, the Khan network—for example—primarily focused on importing (and later exporting) the technologies necessary to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium to produce weapons usable material. As such, this operation involved networks of front companies and middlemen through which Khan purchased dual-use materials from legitimate businesses in Europe and Asia.\(^\text{13}\) In contrast, nuclear trafficking is traditionally believed to involve insiders with access to nuclear material and criminal middlemen responsible for the movement and sale of the stolen material.\(^\text{14}\) The goals and long-term implications of these two activities are similarly disparate: as noted earlier, obtaining weapons usable material through nuclear trafficking is a potential “quick fix” for aspiring nuclear countries that

\(^{13}\) Fitzpatrick 2007, 23-31.

nonetheless leaves them dependent on smugglers. In contrast, trading in dual-use technology allows a country or organization to build a self-sufficient nuclear program, but entails a complex development process that takes years to produce usable material.

Based on this distinction, this study will not consider U.S.-funded programs that primarily or exclusively aim to halt dual-use trafficking, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or NNSA’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP). Rather, it will focus on threat reduction and border security programs, which are designed to secure nuclear materials at their source and to enhance radiation detection capabilities, thereby ensuring that smuggled materials are identified and seized at key transit points, such as border crossings, ports, and airports.

Dataset Development

The dataset of nuclear trafficking incidents used in this research was compiled from incident reports contained in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database. It includes incidents that took place between October 1996 and December 2009, to allow for analysis of the years 1997-2009 based on both calendar year and fiscal year. In accordance with the scope as described above, the following types of incidents were excluded from the dataset:

• Incidents involving nuclear dual-use technologies or parts.
• Incidents involving material that neither originated in nor was trafficked through the FSU or Eastern Europe.

15 The dataset is available in read-only form online at http://bit.ly/TraffickingDataset. To obtain a full version of the dataset in Microsoft Excel format, contact the author at: sw368 at georgetown dot edu.
• Incidents that could not be assigned to a specific year.
• Entries with bulk statistics for a given time period. Given that these statistics were not available for each country or jurisdiction, including such figures would drastically skew the results.
• Incidents where legally transported materials were mistakenly seized.
• Unconfirmed reports regarding the theft, loss, or sale of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{16}

Each incident included in the dataset was assigned to a specific country. Thefts were assigned to the country where the theft took place (i.e. the country of origin), while seizures were assigned to the country where the material was seized. For incidents that took place in Russia, the oblast or city was recorded as well to facilitate a more detailed analysis of nuclear smuggling routes.

IV. The Reliability of Nuclear Trafficking Data

Analysts researching nuclear trafficking face significant obstacles to obtaining accurate data on stolen and/or smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These issues, which are discussed in depth below, guarantee that any compilation of trafficking incidents will include uncertain information. Furthermore, reports of discrete incidents likely comprise a small percentage of actual incidents, while the total number of known thefts and intercepted materials likely represents only a fraction of all nuclear smuggling operations. This section will first examine these data challenges before considering their

\textsuperscript{16} On multiple occasions, reports have surfaced claiming that nuclear weapons had been sold by or stolen from former Soviet states. None of these reports has been confirmed, and the implicated governments have flatly denied all such reports. These incidents were therefore excluded to avoid skewing the data on cases involving nuclear materials.
impact on the trends shown across nuclear trafficking databases. In doing so, this study aims to determine the extent to which the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database can serve as a robust foundation for research into the relationship between nuclear smuggling and U.S. assistance programs.

**Nuclear Trafficking Data Challenges**

Though widely acknowledged among researchers in the field, the limitations of nuclear trafficking data are rarely discussed in any prominent or in-depth manner in nuclear trafficking literature. One notable exception is William C. Potter and Elena Sokova’s 2002 article on “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?”, which provides a discussion and examples of the limited reliability of nuclear trafficking data due to underreporting, over-reporting, concealment and intentional distortion of information, and conflicting information. This section builds on their work to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the challenges of working with nuclear trafficking data and the implications for research in this field.

**Database Availability**

Numerous national, international, and non-governmental entities have developed databases of nuclear trafficking incidents. These databases are primarily maintained by government or international organizations, such as the IAEA, INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization (WCO), or the U.S. national laboratories. Access to these

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18 Fitzpatrick 2007, 120.
databases is restricted to official government personnel due to the confidential nature of the reports they contain. Two additional databases are based out of academic institutions or think tanks and rely primarily on open sources: the DSTO and the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Databases. Although an academic institution maintains the DSTO, the database is considered proprietary based on the sensitive nature of some of its contents. As such, access is restricted to the researchers who maintain it and a small number of collaborators.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the only database openly available to the general research community is the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, which is substantially smaller than other databases. For example, the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database contains 333 incidents between 1997 and 2005,\textsuperscript{20} compared to over 600 in the ITDB and over 1000 in the DSTO.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{Data Quality}

Regardless of the number of incidents they contain, all nuclear trafficking databases suffer from data quality and data reliability issues. Underreporting is a common occurrence, even for databases based on restricted government reporting, like the ITDB. As Potter and Sokova note, information sharing between governments—and with international organizations like the IAEA—remains limited with regard to nuclear smuggling incidents; often, very few details about the specifics of smuggling cases are

\textsuperscript{19} Author’s correspondence with Lyudmila Zaitseva, Division of Physics and Biophysics at the University of Salzburg, 11 November 2010.

\textsuperscript{20} Based on the dataset developed for this study.

\textsuperscript{21} Approximate values for the ITDB and DSTO based on the charts in Fitzpatrick 2007, 121-2.
known or shared, even for incidents where the perpetrators face prosecution. In a paper presented at the 2007 Edinburgh conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking, Galya Balatsky and William Severe emphasized that “in addition to the information on trafficked materials and the facilities they came from, we need information on perpetrators, their motivation and trafficking behavioural patterns” to enable an adequate analysis of trafficker intent; such details are frequently lacking from smuggling incident reports.

Moreover, governments are often slow to inform the IAEA about trafficking incidents, with most reports trickling in 2-3 years after the actual occurrence—if they are submitted at all. National governments may also have an incentive to over-report incidents to the IAEA in order to appear cooperative or to overstate their success in interdicting smuggled nuclear materials. As an example, Potter and Sokova highlight an alleged Russian seizure of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in 1994, during which 3 smugglers were arrested. Some analysts question whether this incident was exaggerated or invented, based on its lack of corroboration by other sources and the fact that the supposed perpetrators do not appear to have been prosecuted.

These cases of both over-reporting and underreporting highlight the selection bias inherent to nuclear trafficking data. All of the available databases on nuclear smuggling

22 Potter and Sokova 2002, 117.
rely heavily on incidents that have been self-reported, either to the IAEA, the media, or directly from a government official to the database owner. In countries with robust freedom of the press, this effect might be partially mitigated by the possibility that investigative journalists would uncover an incident the government attempted to hide. As a result, the databases based on open-source media reports—though subject to their own limitations, as discussed below—may be less vulnerable to selection bias than the consolidated figures published based on the ITDB, which are entirely dependent on self-reporting.

However, even if governments fully and openly reported all incidents to both the IAEA and the media, the data contained in nuclear trafficking databases would be unlikely to accurately encompass the entirety of nuclear smuggling operations. Although border security and materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) programs have undoubtedly improved governments’ ability to detect the theft and movement of nuclear and radioactive materials, many (if not most) smuggling operations likely circumvent such controls. Furthermore, “there is a high probability…that the sample [of nuclear trafficking cases] we have discerned is unrepresentative of the larger universe of incidents.” Indeed, the totality of known incidents likely skews heavily towards less

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26 Balatsky and Severe 2007, 96.
28 Although the ITDB includes incidents derived from media reports, only incidents confirmed by a participating government partner are included in published statistics.
sophisticated smuggling networks that possess fewer mechanisms for avoiding
detection.31

Questions of data reliability become even more prevalent when drawing primarily
or exclusively on open-source information. Governments may have many motivations
for reporting or not reporting incidents in the open press: while halting an attempt to
smuggle material into the country reflects well on that government’s interdiction
capabilities, other incidents could reflect negatively on the government—for example, the
theft of nuclear material, or the seizure of material whose theft or transit into the country
went undetected. Russia, for instance, has displayed an inconsistent approach to
reporting nuclear incidents; on some occasions it has denied the very possibility that
material could be stolen from Russian facilities, while at other times officials have
acknowledged security shortfalls and the occurrence of numerous thefts or attempted
thefts.32 Unsurprisingly, the information governments report to the IAEA does not
always match the information released to the public.33 The degree of government

(Summer 2008): 434-8. Lee has similarly addressed the distinction between the “visible” and the “shadow”
nuclear trafficking market in previous works, including “Nuclear Smuggling: Patterns and Responses,”
Parameters 33, no. 1 (2003): 95–111 and Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the
32 See, for example, “Ministry Denies Nuclear Material Thefts From Closed Complex,” NIS Nuclear
Never Been Missing From Russian Nuclear Facilities,” NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, 16 March 2005,
http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2005/20050100.htm; “Rosatom Head Assesses Security at Russian Nuclear
Facilities,” NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, 16 September 2004,
http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2004/20040460.htm; “Gosatomnadzor Head on Accounting Anomalies,
Radiation Source Theft,” NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, 10 December 2003,
http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2003/20030830.htm; “Minatom Official Discusses Attempted Thefts of
Fissile Material,” NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, 28 September 2000,
33 Ibid, 117.
transparency in a given country likely has a strong influence on the percentage, types, and accuracy of incidents reported to the media.

Moreover, of the total incidents that governments record, only a small fraction are reported individually in the press or accounted for as individual incidents in trafficking databases. For example, Russia’s Federal Customs Service announced in December 2007 that, between January and November of that year, it intercepted approximately 850 attempts to illicitly traffic materials with elevated levels of ionizing radiation.\textsuperscript{34} The NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, however, records only 14 discrete incidents in Russia during that same time period. While the database may not include every media report published on the subject, a discrepancy of this magnitude is more likely due—at least in part—to selective reporting by journalists. Nuclear trafficking has been a common topic of discussion since the early 1990s, with hundreds of incidents occurring each year; as such, it is reasonable to expect a degree of reporting fatigue within the media.

Many of the incidents that do receive media attention are reported inaccurately or inconsistently. Whether due to honest confusion or deliberate sensationalizing, the press has a tendency to incorrectly report incidents as involving weapons-grade uranium or plutonium rather than less dangerous nuclear material or other radioactive isotopes. This type of exaggeration was most pronounced in the first half of the 1990s, but it continues to occur on a regular basis—especially in initial reports filed before the authorities can

conclusively identify the relevant radioactive materials through testing. For example, a February 2004 seizure of radioactive material on the Ukrainian-Hungarian border was initially reported to involve enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. Subsequent reports, however, revealed that the only nuclear material seized was depleted uranium (which is neither weapons-usable nor dangerous). Beyond confusion as to the type of nuclear or radioactive material seized or stolen, news stories often contain inconsistent details regarding the quantity or value of materials involved, the alleged perpetrators, or even the location of the incident. Depending on which sources they use, different databases may thus record different details pertaining to the same incident. Each database is, therefore, only as accurate as the sources it relies upon; the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, for instance, includes an explicit warning to this effect:

These abstracts are taken from open press sources and unclassified government documents and are presented on an as-reported basis. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies cannot vouch for the accuracy or veracity of these reports, nor can it verify reported facts in the abstracts.

Implications

Based on these factors, the various established databases will have different strengths and weaknesses depending on the sources they use to populate their database. Those that primarily rely on self-submitted, official government reports—like the ITDB and the databases maintained by the WCO and Interpol—are often hampered by delayed notification and are limited to the information provided by their government partners,

35 Potter and Sokova 2002, 117.
37 Potter and Sokova 2002, 118.
who may not be acting from a policy of full disclosure. On the other hand, databases that rely primarily on open-source reports will incorporate new incidents more quickly, but may be limited by the inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and penchant for exaggeration the media traditionally displays when covering nuclear trafficking issues. Ultimately, all nuclear trafficking databases must be assumed to contain questionable and/or inconsistent data. Therefore, any conclusions based on such data—including those drawn in subsequent sections of this study—must be considered tentative.

**Nuclear Trafficking Trends in Open vs. Restricted-Access Databases**

The challenges associated with nuclear trafficking data would, on the surface, lead one to expect the various databases to contain entirely inconsistent information. There is some evidence to support this expectation; for instance, a 1998 article in *Nucleonics Week* discussed the lack of harmonization between the ITDB and the databases maintained by the WCO and Interpol. Yet, a 2007 analysis of the ITDB and DSTO showed that the two databases generally displayed the same broad trends, despite the probable inconsistencies between the specific data points they contain.

That comparative analysis, however, did not include data from CNS’s NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database. This comparison is particularly critical, as the CNS database is the only compilation of nuclear trafficking incidents openly available to most academic researchers or journalists focusing on the subject. This section will compare

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40 Fitzpatrick 2007, 121-4.
data from the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database to published trends from the ITDB and DSTO in order to determine whether the same trends hold true across open and restricted-access databases. As the previous analysis makes clear, the challenges to working with trafficking data implies that no database may accurately incorporate the entirety of nuclear smuggling incidents. However, consistency across databases allows comparability with existing research and—for broad trends—may indicate an accurate approximation of the visible nuclear trafficking landscape. As such, a reasonable level of consistency is necessary to move forward with further analysis based on the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database. Thus, this study will test the following baseline hypothesis:

**Hypothesis:** Open databases on nuclear trafficking incidents should show the same general trends as restricted-access databases.

To perform this analysis, I utilized the dataset compiled for this project based on data from the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, as described above. In accordance with the scope of this research project, the dataset covers the years 1997-2009; as such, it does not provide an exact match for the years analyzed in prior publications (such as *Nuclear Black Markets*, which covered the period from 1992-2005). However, the existing overlap from 1997-2005 provides sufficient basis for a comparative analysis in three areas: incidents over time, nuclear material type, and smuggling routes.

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41 Although the IAEA has continued to publish yearly reports with summary data from the ITDB, the reporting methodology changed after 2005. From 2006-2010, incidents are now divided based on type (seizure, theft, or orphan/other) rather than by material type. As such, it was not possible to extend the data from *Nuclear Black Markets* to cover the years from 2006-2010.
Incidents Over Time

To develop a chart of nuclear trafficking incidents over time, each incident in the dataset was assigned to a calendar year and a category based on the type of material involved: Nuclear, Nuclear and Other Radioactive, Other Radioactive, Orphan, Radioactively Contaminated, and Other.

All three databases show a similar overall trend between 1997-2002, when the total number of incidents is generally steady with a slight rise in the early 2000s. However, the data indicates a considerable discrepancy between databases beginning in 2003-2004. In 2004, the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database shows a notable drop in incidents (from 53 in 2003 to 31 in 2004), while the number of incidents in the ITDB doubled in the same time period (from approximately 57 in 2002 to approximately 130 in 2004). According to the IAEA, the prominent spike in incidents recorded in 2003-2004

Figure 1: NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database incidents, 1997-2009
Figure 2: DSTO incidents, 1991-2005

Figure 3: ITDB incidents, 1993-2005

Fitzpatrick 2007, 122.
Fitzpatrick 2007, 121.
may be due to improved reporting from IAEA member countries rather than an actual increase in nuclear trafficking activity.\textsuperscript{44} However, the DSTO also indicates a rise in incidents beginning in 2004, though the increase is less extreme (from approximately 100 in 2002 to 160 in 2004) than that shown by the ITDB. Though not included in Figure 2 above, the DSTO continues to show a rise in incidents through 2007, and in fact indicates that “the number of cases recorded between 2001 and 2009 has virtually doubled as compared to the previous decade.”\textsuperscript{45} This discrepancy between the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database and the other two databases could result from the shifting geographic origin of smuggled material; in contrast to the dataset used for this study, the ITDB and DSTO both include data from worldwide incidents rather than just the FSU and Eastern Europe. Alternatively, the drop in incidents could indicate that the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database may not accurately reflect the real-world trend in nuclear smuggling cases after 2003. Rather, this trend may instead result from methodological or personnel changes in the management of the database, such as alterations to project staff, the sources used, or the approach to gathering incident reports.

The number of incidents involving nuclear materials is roughly consistent across databases between 1997 and 2003, with all three finding approximately 10-20 cases per year involving uranium, plutonium, or thorium (a less well-known element that can also serve as nuclear reactor fuel). The seizure of any type of nuclear materials is likely to


draw significant media attention; such incidents would also be high priorities for
governments to report to the IAEA. Thus, it is reasonable that databases would show
greater consistency in the number of reported incidents involving nuclear material than
those involving other types of radioactive material. This finding also supports Potter and
Sokova’s conclusion that the media more often confused nuclear and other radioactive
materials in the early 1990s. If the media continued to regularly report radioactive
materials as nuclear materials, one would expect the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database
and the DSTO to show a significantly higher number of nuclear incidents than the ITDB.

The ITDB has not consistently distinguished orphan radioactive materials
separately from other radioactive sources. The DSTO, however, reports substantially
more orphan cases than the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database; orphan cases also
constitute a much higher percentage of cases in the DSTO. This difference is likely due
to two factors: database size and data interpretation. As discussed in the Database
Availability section, the DSTO is significantly larger than the NIS Nuclear Trafficking
Database, with four or five times the number of incidents—if not more—in any given
year. Furthermore, as noted earlier, it is often unclear whether seized radioactive material
is truly orphaned or simply discovered in the absence of its owner. In categorizing the
material type involved in each incident, using a less conservative definition of
“orphaned” radiation sources could have a considerable impact on the number of cases
identified as such.
Nuclear Material Type

In order to allow a more detailed analysis of the fissionable isotopes involved in smuggling incidents, each case entailing nuclear material was assigned a more specific designation of material type based on isotope and enrichment level.

As Figures 4 and 5 show, the percentages of nuclear material types involved in incidents in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database generally align with the DSTO. Both databases show similar percentages of plutonium in sources (7% in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database vs. 6% in the DSTO); HEU (6% vs. 7%); LEU (27% vs. 29%); and natural uranium, depleted uranium, and thorium (30% vs. 39%). In the absence of an explicit category for incidents that involved uranium of an unknown enrichment level, DSTO incidents of this type were placed into the “unidentified” category.

This segment, which represents 16% of...

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46 DSTO and ITDB data from Fitzpatrick 2007, 123.
47 Author’s correspondence with Lyudmila Zaitseva, Division of Physics and Biophysics at the University of Salzburg, 4 April 2011.
nuclear incidents in the DSTO, constitutes a similar percentage to the combined categories of “unidentified” and uranium (unspecified enrichment level) in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database (3% and 14% respectively, for a total of 17%).

The one disparity between these two databases is the percentage of incidents involving plutonium; such cases represented only 3% of nuclear incidents in the DSTO, compared to 13% of nuclear incidents in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database. None of the plutonium seizures recorded in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database occurred between 2006 and 2009; as such, this disparity is not merely an effect of the different time periods. The discrepancy is most likely the result of exaggerated media reports mistakenly identifying seized radioactive material as plutonium. As discussed earlier, there are numerous instances where initial news stories reported the discovery of smuggled plutonium, only to have later reports reveal that no plutonium was involved. For example, in December 1996 Bulgarian police seized a set of containers that were initially reported to contain “highly radioactive materials, including uranium, plutonium, radium, iridium, and cesium-137.” However, a report four days later revealed that five of the containers were empty, while the remaining eight contained only iridium and

cesium-137, with no evidence that plutonium was or ever had been present. \(^{49}\) Similarly, in a 2003 incident on the Russian-Finnish border, the seizure of radioactive gemstones was reported as a possible plutonium trafficking incident in the Finnish press; a follow-on report disclosed that, while the stones may have contained a small amount of natural uranium, they posed no risk to public health or security. \(^{50}\) As Potter and Sokova noted, follow-on reports of this type typically receive far less media attention than the inflammatory initial story. Taking into account its larger size and broader scope, the DSTO may be in a better position to identify such retractions and corrections.

In contrast to the two databases that rely primarily on open-source information, Figure 6 shows that the ITDB includes only a miniscule percentage of incidents involving unidentified material—as would be expected, given the probability that most governments wait to report an incident to the IAEA until they conclusively identify the type of material involved. Based on the charts above, it appears likely that most open-source cases involving unidentified materials or an unspecified type of uranium are ultimately confirmed to be natural uranium, depleted uranium, or thorium. Furthermore, the ITDB data provides additional evidence that, among the cases involving nuclear materials, media stories over-report plutonium as the trafficked substance. Indeed, the ITDB shows only 2% of cases involving any type of plutonium, compared to 20% of nuclear incidents in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database and 9% of nuclear incidents in


the DSTO. While the previous section of analysis confirmed that the news media has become less inclined to mistake other radioactive isotopes for fissionable materials like uranium or plutonium, this evidence indicates that there remains a significant probability that open-source reports will misidentify other nuclear materials as plutonium.

Discounting the apparent over-reporting of plutonium smuggling cases, the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database is largely consistent with the ITDB and DSTO regarding major cases of HEU and Pu trafficking. Of the cases that fall within the scope of the dataset used in this study, the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database includes all four incidents reported by the IAEA and both of the “additional highly credible cases” contained in the DSTO.51

*Smuggling Routes*

In the years immediately following the fall of the USSR, nuclear trafficking incidents were heavily concentrated in Europe, as traffickers obtained nuclear and radiological materials from the FSU and brought them west in search of buyers. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, European officials in countries like Germany and Norway began to see a marked drop in trafficking cases.52 At the same time, officials in Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia noted a sharp upswing in incidents.53 Writing in 2002, Lyudmila Zaitseva used DSTO data to confirm this shift, arguing that:

51 See the Appendix.


53 See, for example, “The Trade for Materials for WMD,” NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, 1 March 1999, [http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/1999/19990160.htm](http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/1999/19990160.htm); “Turkey Detects Nuclear Material Trafficking,”
This pattern suggests that nuclear trafficking from the former Soviet Union may now be flowing southward and that the reduction in smuggling incidents observed in Europe is indicative, at least in part, of this shift rather than an improvement in the situation overall.54

In order to determine whether the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database demonstrated this same trend, all incidents involving the seizure of smuggled material (including both trafficking in actual nuclear/radioactive materials and scams, but excluding orphan radiation sources) were coded for a smuggling route. Incidents in Europe or in Russian oblasts on or near the border with Europe were designated part of the Western route. Similarly, incidents in the Caucasus, Turkey, Central Asia, or in Russian oblasts on or near the border with those regions were designated part of the Southern route. Incidents in central Russia (such as Moscow) were not included in either category because the smuggling route could not be readily determined.

As Figure 7 shows, the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database confirms the presence of a notable rise in incidents along the Southern route from 1997 to 2003. In fact, this database indicates that the Southern route overtook the Western route in 1998, and generally shows more cases of nuclear smuggling along the Southern route than the Western route during this time period. However, it should be noted that the total number of European incidents in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database between 1997 and 2003 is significantly lower than in the DSTO.55


Between 2003 and 2009, the trend is less conclusive, though incidents along both routes appear to stabilize at the same approximate level. This stabilization could indicate that the Southern route—while still prominent—has lost its favorable edge among smugglers, perhaps due to increased efforts to combat illicit trafficking in the region over the past decade. The reduction in incidents along both routes between 2004 and 2009 reflects the overall drop in incidents recorded by the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database during that time period.

While compiling the dataset of trafficking incidents, a concentration of smuggling incidents in the Russian Far East became apparent, indicating a probable Eastern smuggling route running through Siberia to East Asia.
Though this route appears less heavily transited than the Western or Southern routes, it displays a consistent level of traffic. Despite this trend, the Eastern route has gone largely unnoticed in the academic literature. Several sources have noted that trafficking along the Southern route can include South and Southeast Asia as destinations; however, the route from Siberia to China and East Asia was neither acknowledged nor discussed.\(^\text{56}\)

Based on the incidents recorded in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, the Kamchatka Peninsula is an important eastern location for the movement of radioactive materials, as is the port of Vladivostok. There have also been repeat incidents on Sakhalin Island and in Primorsky Maritime Province, Chita Oblast, and Amur Oblast along the Chinese border. Although many of the incidents along the Eastern route

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involve the transport of radioactively contaminated cargo, there have also been 9 incidents involving nuclear materials (including 4 incidents involving LEU) and 9 incidents involving cesium-137 or strontium-90, both of which are considered “high risk” sources due to their potential use in an RDD. In March 1997, Russian police seized 5.2kg of uranium near Novosibirsk, arresting seven individuals who had been attempting to sell the material for USD 100,000. The material reportedly originated in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, and was destined for buyers in China or Pakistan.\(^ {57}\) As it is highly unlikely the material was pure U-235, as several reports implied,\(^ {58}\) the enrichment level of the seized uranium remains unclear. Nonetheless, the incident demonstrates the potential viability of the Eastern route for transporting nuclear materials through Siberia to South and East Asia.

A relatively large subset (17.5%) of recorded incidents in the Russian Far East are allegedly perpetrated by members of the Russian military or involve material stolen from a military facility. This trend most likely results from the concentration of military personnel and facilities in Eastern Siberia, due to Vladivostok’s status as the base of the Russian Pacific Fleet and the presence of Vilyuchinsk submarine base on Kamchatka Peninsula. For example, in January 2001, three suspects were arrested in Kamchatka Oblast for attempting to sell two “radioisotope monitoring instruments” containing 60g of strontium-90 and yttrium-90. The instruments were stolen from a military base by one of


the suspects, a lieutenant in the Russian military, who intended to sell the devices in China.\textsuperscript{59}

The number of discrete incidents reported along the Eastern route is very low, typically under 5 a year. However, several reports of broad statistics from the Far East branch of the Russian Customs Service indicate that these incidents represent a miniscule fraction of the whole. In 2005, the branch announced that it had intercepted 200 “attempts to illegally ship radioactive items across the border” between 1995 and 2005.\textsuperscript{60} There are also indications that traffic along this route is growing; from this average rate of 20 incidents per year from 1995-2005, the volume of cases rose to 74 illicit trafficking incidents in 2008 and 84 in the first nine months of 2009.\textsuperscript{61} It remains to be seen whether this upward trend will produce a similar upswing in the number of discrete incidents reported with individual details in the local or national Russian media.

\textit{Implications}

Despite the many challenges to obtaining accurate data on nuclear trafficking incidents, a comparison of the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database to the ITDB and DSTO reveals that similar trends are apparent across open and restricted-access databases. In particular, the databases show general consensus on the rate of incidents in the late 1990s

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{60} “200 Attempts to Illegally Transfer Radioactive Items Have Been Blocked by Customs Officials in the Russian Far East over the Last Ten Years,” NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, 4 May 2005, \url{http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2005/20050180.htm}.

\textsuperscript{61} “Customs Officials in the Far East Identify 84 Cases of Smuggling of Radioactive Objects in the First 9 Months of the Year,” NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, 26 October 2009, \url{http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2009/20090250.html}.
\end{footnotesize}
and early 2000s, the types of nuclear material involved in smuggling cases, and the shift in smuggling routes from the Western route to the Southern route in the late 1990s.

Two primary discrepancies between databases were revealed: 1) Over-reporting of incidents involving plutonium in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, and 2) Divergent trends in the number of incidents per year beginning in 2004. The first of these discrepancies most likely results from the media’s tendency to sensationalize incidents, especially by reporting the involvement of weapons-usable material. The second discrepancy may be due to the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database’s regional focus, though it could also indicate methodological changes in how the database is maintained. Thus, while the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database displays a sufficient degree of overall consistency with the ITDB and DSTO, it may be difficult to produce conclusive findings based on the trends shown after 2004.

V. The Relationship Between U.S. Assistance and Nuclear Trafficking Incidents

The relationship between U.S. funding for threat reduction and border security programs and nuclear and radiological smuggling is extremely complex. It is characterized by bidirectional chains of cause and effect, with the amount of funding affecting the number, type, and location of trafficking incidents even as smuggling trends impact the size and targeting of U.S. appropriations. These causal loops play out through the actions and reactions of innumerable actors, from Congress and U.S. government officials to partner countries and members of smuggling rings the world over.
This study does not attempt to describe each of these myriad processes; rather, it focuses on examining the data for correlations associated with two specific feedback mechanisms. First, it will evaluate the influence of smuggling incidents on U.S. funding by determining whether U.S. assistance allocations shift in response to changing trends in trafficking routes. Second, it will assess the impact of U.S. assistance on smuggling incidents by examining how the number of trafficking incidents changes following an increase in funding.

**U.S. Funding Prioritization and Nuclear Smuggling Routes**

Since the fall of the USSR, the United States has expended trillions of dollars on initiatives to secure nuclear materials and enhance border security in the FSU. Initially, the U.S. focused on nuclear security measures in Russia, which was deemed to pose the greatest threat of loose nuclear weapons and materials. However, the U.S. quickly began to expand its threat reduction programs to address additional former Soviet states. In doing so, the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy have had to make calculated judgments on how best to allocate funds and focus their efforts. As noted above, nuclear traffickers have shown distinct preferences for specific smuggling routes that have evolved over time. In order for U.S. programs to achieve both effectiveness and efficiency, they should be targeted to focus on the regional areas of greatest concern for nuclear trafficking. Moreover, as these areas of concern shift, U.S. funding should shift accordingly.

*Hypothesis: U.S. threat reduction and border security funding should shift its regional focus over time in response to known trends in nuclear smuggling routes.*
Two of the primary U.S. nonproliferation initiatives—the Department of State’s EXBS program and the DoD CTR program—provide country-by-country funding breakdowns in their Congressional Budget Justifications.\(^{62}\) Data for these programs is available from FY 2000-2009 and FY 1998-2009 respectively, allowing a more detailed examination of funding priorities for specific regions and smuggling routes. As in the previous section, European countries were assigned to the Western route; Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia were designated as the Southern route; and East Asia was considered the Eastern route. Because funding totals for Russia do not break down the specific targeted oblasts, appropriations for Russia could not be associated with a particular route and therefore were excluded from this analysis. As the only appropriations for FY 1998-1999 were designated for projects in Russia, this section focuses only on funding for the period from FY 2000-2009.

*The Shift to the Southern Route*

As discussed in the previous section, the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database, the DSTO, and anecdotal evidence from regional officials all indicate an increase in incidents along the Southern route in the late 1990s and early 2000s; this trend was widely acknowledge by both analysts and government officials to represent a shift from the Western route that dominated nuclear trafficking in the early-mid 1990s. Therefore, U.S. funding to countries along the Southern route should show a similar increase. Given the

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complexity of the federal budget process, it would be reasonable for this funding shift to show a delay of 2-3 years after the identification of the trend.
As expected, U.S. funding to the Southern route shows a notable upward trend beginning in the early 2000s. Though the available funding data did not include the late 1990s, extrapolating the trend shown from 2000-2002 backwards may indicate that funding to the Southern route overcame funding to the Western route for the first time in the early 2000s (Figure 9). Irrespective of this extrapolation, however, Figure 10 clearly shows that while funding increased overall from 2000-2009, it increased at a greater rate for countries along the Southern route than those along the Western route.

It is notable that funding to the Southern route countries made its first major spike in 2002, approximately three years after officials in the region began to note the upswing in incidents. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that any shifts in funding would take place 2-3 years after the shift in route became apparent.

**Eastern Route**

Although the Eastern smuggling route has been largely overlooked in academic literature, it has received increasing attention and funding from U.S. government programs like EXBS. In keeping with the lower number of incidents along the Eastern route, funding levels remain an order of magnitude lower than those for the Southern and Western routes. However, appropriations to East Asia show a strong upward trend, most likely a response to the region’s growing importance for traffickers over the past decade, including as a destination for nuclear and radiological materials originating in the FSU. As the location of multiple major transshipment points, East Asian countries are also prominent partners in the NNSA Megaports program. Although region-specific funding
data is not available for this initiative, the NNSA highlights the program’s installation of radiation detection equipment in countries including China, South Korea, and Thailand—all known destinations for Eastern route nuclear trafficking from Russia.\(^6\)

**Impact of U.S. Funding on Nuclear Trafficking Incidents**

U.S. programs to counter nuclear trafficking primarily divide into two categories: nuclear smuggling interdiction and nuclear materials security. Initiatives that fall within the first category provide radiation detection equipment for use at border crossings, ports, and airports; they often include training for customs and border patrol officials as well. Programs in the second category include efforts to enhance site security and MPC&A at

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facilities housing nuclear and radiological materials. Combined, these initiatives are intended to raise the visibility of ongoing smuggling operations while preventing future trafficking by locking down materials at their sources.

As such, U.S. assistance should have a two-phase impact. In the near term, enhanced border security—particularly through the installation of radiation detectors—should provide a dramatic improvement in the ability to detect hidden nuclear and radioactive material at border crossings, leading to a spike in incidents. In the longer term, U.S. funding should shrink the nuclear smuggling business as material at nuclear sites is secured and nuclear traffickers are captured. These outcomes can reasonably be expected to materialize over a longer time period, as smugglers may possess stocks of nuclear or radioactive material stolen in the early 1990s that they are only now introducing into the market. Thus, the initial increase in incidents should be followed by a more gradual decrease in incidents over the next 5-10 years.

Hypothesis: Increased U.S. assistance to a region should lead to an initial spike in incidents, followed by a gradual decrease over time.

This hypothesis will be evaluated for the entirety of the selected region (the FSU and Eastern Europe), using overall funding levels as recorded in the Interactive Budget Database developed through the Securing the Bomb project at Harvard University. It will specifically focus on funding for nonproliferation programs relating to two goals: 1) Securing nuclear warheads and materials, and 2) Interdicting nuclear smuggling. As

64 Project on Managing the Atom. Interactive Budget Database. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs / Nuclear Threat Initiative. Available online at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/charts/cnm_funding_interactive.asp
discussed above, these programs have the greatest relevance to nuclear trafficking. The Interactive Budget Database incorporates funding data from FY 1991-2011, allowing analysis across the full time period covered by this study (1997-2009).

However, due to the variance in funding levels for different countries within the FSU and Eastern Europe, a region-wide analysis has the potential to mask trends and correlations. Therefore, the hypothesis will also be tested for four individual sub-regions within this area: Europe, Turkey and the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia. The sub-regional analysis will rely on the same funding data from EXBS and CTR used in the previous section, with countries grouped by sub-region rather than by smuggling route. As noted in the previous section, country-specific funding data is not available prior to FY 1998; thus, the sub-regional analysis will cover fiscal years 1998-2009.

**Region-wide Analysis**

The data for U.S. funding and nuclear trafficking incidents across the FSU and Eastern Europe can be divided into two distinct periods: FY 1997-2003 and FY 2004-2009. With the exception of FY 1997, which appears to be an outlier in terms of the number of incidents, the first period shows a fairly direct positive correlation between increased funding and an increase in the number of incidents. Both funding and incidents spike noticeably in FY 2002, when funding for programs related to interdicting nuclear smuggling jumped from $44.1 million to $130.4 million. This correlation is largely consistent with the first part of the hypothesis, confirming that increased funding (particularly for interdiction capabilities) leads to an increase in recorded incidents, most
likely due to the installation of radiation detection equipment. Interestingly, the spike in incidents occurred the same year as the increase in funding, rather than in the subsequent year as implied by the hypothesis.

Beginning in FY 2004, the data shows a distinct negative correlation between funding and incidents, as U.S. funding increases dramatically while the number of incidents drops by a third, from an average of 41 incidents/year to an average of 26 incidents/year. This shift from a positive correlation to a negative correlation could indicate that U.S. threat reduction efforts reached a turning point between 2003 and 2005, with site security and border security initiatives combining to meaningfully disrupt nuclear smuggling networks in the FSU and Eastern Europe. However, the drop in incidents is fairly abrupt, rather than the gradual decrease predicted by the hypothesis. Furthermore, as noted in Section V, the dramatic decrease in incidents recorded in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database beginning in 2004 is inconsistent with the trend
recorded by the ITDB and DSTO—though this discrepancy could be related to the exclusively regional focus of the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether the correlation displayed between FY 2004-2009 accurately reflects the trafficking landscape, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions.

Sub-Regional Analysis

Based on the data displayed in Figure 13, below, the negative correlation between funding and incidents from FY 2004-2009 is less distinct at the sub-regional level than it was for the region overall. All four sub-regions show a clear decrease in incidents in the mid-2000s, indicating that the drop in incidents recorded in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database was relatively evenly distributed across sub-regions. However, the dramatic upward trend in funding displayed in Figure 12 is not as apparent at the sub-regional level; in fact, only the Caucasus/Turkey demonstrates a marked negative correlation between funding and incidents after FY 2003. This discrepancy likely results from data limitations, given that the sub-regional analysis only includes funding figures from EXBS and CTR. If the drop in incidents post-2004 is assumed to be accurate, this inconsistency in funding trends implies that the negative correlation shown at the regional level is most directly linked to increased appropriations for other U.S. threat reduction programs, such as those managed by DOE.

The sub-regional data does provide further confirmation that increased funding produces a near-term increase in nuclear smuggling incidents. Each of the sub-regions examined shows notable, linked spikes in funding and incidents: Russia in FY 2000 and
FY 2006, Europe in FY 2008, the Caucasus/Turkey in FY 2002, and Central Asia in FY 2002. As with the regional data, these linked spikes occur simultaneously, rather than an increase in funding leading to an increase in incidents the following year. The correlation between funding and incidents is not 100% predictive, as the data also includes instances where funding peaks without a corresponding spike in incidents, such as Europe and the Caucasus/Turkey in FY 2006. Nonetheless, the overall prevalence and consistency of this trend presents strong evidence in support of the first part of the hypothesis.
The sub-regional data is weaker with regard to the second part of the hypothesis, which predicts a gradual decrease in incidents after the initial spike. The expected pattern does appear consistent with the figures from Russia, where a funding increase in FY 2000 corresponds to a spike in incidents, followed by a gradual decrease in incidents through FY 2005. A similar pattern is present in Central Asia between FY 2002 and FY 2006. However, the other instances in which incidents spike simultaneously with funding increases—such as Russia in FY 2006, the Caucasus/Turkey in FY 2002, and Europe in FY 2008—all show an abrupt rise in trafficking incidents that just as abruptly drops off a year or two later. Though these cases do show a spike in funding leading to a decrease in incidents in subsequent years, they are inconsistent with the expectation of a gradual decrease in incidents, as put forth in the hypothesis.

VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications

This study examined two interrelated issues in the ongoing effort to understand and combat the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials: First, given the challenges to gathering accurate data on nuclear smuggling incidents, is there sufficient consistency between different databases—particularly between open vs. restricted-access databases—to indicate consensus on the general shape of the illicit nuclear trade? Second, using openly published data on trafficking incidents and U.S. funding for threat reduction initiatives, what conclusions can be drawn regarding the dynamic between U.S. assistance and trafficking trends? The answers to these questions, as explored through
this study, help to address major gaps in the nuclear trafficking literature and provide a solid foundation for future research in this area.

**Nuclear Trafficking Trends**

This study discussed in depth the many obstacles to compiling an accurate dataset of nuclear trafficking incidents, including over-reporting, underreporting, selection bias, and inconsistent and incomplete information. In spite of these challenges, the above analysis demonstrated that the same general trends hold true across open databases like the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database and restricted-access databases like the ITDB and DSTO. The primary discrepancies between databases result from two key factors:

First, the media bias toward over-reporting the seizure of weapons-usable materials causes databases based on open-sources (like the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database and DSTO) to contain artificially low rates of incidents involving natural and depleted uranium. Over-reporting incidents involving plutonium was particularly common in the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database. Therefore, databases that rely in whole or in part on media reports should revise their information gathering methodology to include rigorous follow-up on any incident reported to involve nuclear material (particularly Pu or HEU). Although the media may not always publish follow-on stories to correct the misidentification of low-risk nuclear materials as HEU or Pu, the data indicates that many such reports may be missed in the existing databases. Any report of nuclear material—but especially those involving weapons-usable material—should be flagged for follow-up research in the subsequent weeks and months.
Second, the databases show divergent trends in the overall number of incidents reported beginning in 2003-2004. While the ITDB and DSTO recorded a significant rise in incidents beginning in the mid-2000s, the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database shows a dramatic decrease in incidents during the same time period. This divergence may reflect a rise in incidents outside the FSU and Easter Europe, as the ITDB and DSTO both include global rather than regional data; it could also indicate changes to the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database’s methodology for data population. The final explanation for this discrepancy thus remains unclear, rendering this study unable to draw definitive conclusions regarding nuclear trafficking trends after 2004.

The Relationship Between U.S. Funding and Trafficking Incidents

The relationship between U.S. funding levels and the incidence of nuclear smuggling cases is remarkably complex, involving numerous actors and a myriad of potential causal mechanisms and feedback loops. This study examined two specific theories: First, that U.S. funding should shift to reflect changes in nuclear smuggling routes; and second, that increased U.S. funding should lead to an initial spike in incidents followed by a gradual decrease over time.

Based on country-specific funding data for CTR and EXBS, the U.S. has demonstrated a notable degree of awareness and agility in targeting funds to regions based on shifting trafficking trends and routes. In particular, the U.S. appears to have reprioritized funding in response to reports that traffickers had begun altering their smuggling routes to travel south to Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia rather than west to Europe. As expected, this funding shift was delayed several years after these
reports arose, most likely due to the time needed to confirm the new trend and move re-focused budgets through the appropriations process. U.S. threat reduction program managers must continue to closely monitor trends in nuclear smuggling routes in order to ensure that funds remain appropriately targeted to the areas of greatest concern.

There is also significant evidence that U.S. efforts to increase awareness and interdiction of smuggled materials—especially through the installation of radiation detection equipment at border crossings, ports, and airports—have succeeded in enhancing countries’ abilities to identify nuclear and radioactive materials. At both the regional and sub-regional levels, the data showed a common pattern of funding and incidents spiking in the same year. This finding indicates that funding increases are rapidly translated into new capabilities for partner countries, with rapid deployment of radiation detection equipment resulting in near-term interdiction successes. This outcome was faster than anticipated, as the hypothesis assumed at least a one year delay between a funding increase and a resulting spike in incidents, due to the time needed to transport and install new radiation detectors in the field.

Similarly, following the spike in funding and initial increase in incidents, the rate at which incidents decreased proved faster than expected. Contrary to the hypothesis, the data rarely showed trafficking incidents gradually tapering off after a spike; instead, the number of incidents generally dropped rapidly after one or two years. This finding could indicate that the disruption of smuggling networks—either by securing materials at their source, identifying and arresting traffickers, or erecting sufficient barriers to prompt smugglers to change their route—occurs sooner than anticipated following a funding
spike. Alternately, this rapid drop-off in incidents could indicate implementation problems, such as officials becoming less meticulous in utilizing detection equipment one to two years after its initial installation. In order to ensure that the provided equipment is being used as intended, U.S. border and port security assistance programs should periodically conduct refresher trainings and review implementation procedures with the relevant agencies in partner countries.

The Eastern Smuggling Route

This study identified a probable Eastern smuggling route through Siberia to South and East Asia. The Eastern route appears to be more lightly traveled than the Western or Southern routes, with lower numbers of discrete incidents and fewer cases involving high-risk nuclear or radioactive materials. Based on available data, the U.S. is increasing the level of funding directed toward countries in East Asia; however, assistance to this region remains a degree of magnitude below that provided to countries along the Western and Southern routes. Due to this lower level of scrutiny, there remains the possibility that higher risk materials could be transported “under the radar” via the Eastern route to known transshipment hubs like Malaysia and Singapore. As the U.S. and its partners complete site and border security projects in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, traffickers may increasingly turn to the Eastern route as an avenue for smuggling materials out of the FSU. Therefore, U.S threat reduction programs should continue to allocate additional funds to the Eastern route. Furthermore, policymakers, program officers, and scholars should closely monitor the type and rate of nuclear trafficking
incidents along the Eastern route, in order to proactively identify any shift toward heavier traffic or higher risk materials.

**Areas for Future Research**

As noted in the introduction, this study was intended to set the stage for future research on the relationship between U.S. nonproliferation funding and known incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking. Based on the analysis conducted in this study, the following potential research paths would provide valuable additions to the literature. First, there are multiple ways in which it would be beneficial to repeat this research design with additional data, including: A) Obtaining country-specific funding data for more programs, particularly NNSA programs like Second Line of Defense and Megaports, B) Expanding the trafficking dataset through independent research or by utilizing a larger database like the DSTO or ITDB, C) Extending the timeframe back to 1992, or D) Expanding the scope to incorporate threat reduction programs sponsored by other governments or international organizations. Second, a future study could more closely examine the relationship between trafficking incidents and different categories of assistance, such as distinguishing between funding for border security and site security. Third, though this study primarily aimed to evaluate correlations between funding and trafficking data, additional research could utilize a case study approach to validate the underlying causality behind the identified correlations. Fourth, the datasets utilized in this research could be applied to examine other causal mechanisms in the relationship between U.S. assistance and nuclear trafficking incidents. Finally, this analysis opted to focus on two relatively narrow hypotheses when examining the relationship between
nuclear smuggling and U.S. funding. So long as the limitations of the existing nuclear trafficking databases are taken into account, a similar approach could be used by government analysts for broader program assessment and evaluation purposes.
VII. Appendix: Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Type</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Within Scope? (reason)</th>
<th>Present in Dataset?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>24 May 1993</td>
<td>Vilnius, Lithuania</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>150 g</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>Mar 1994</td>
<td>St. Petersburg, Russia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>2.972 kg</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>10 May 1994</td>
<td>Tengen-Weichs, Germany</td>
<td>Pu</td>
<td>6.2 g</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>13 Jun 1994</td>
<td>Landshut, Germany</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>.795 g</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>25 Jul 1994</td>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
<td>Pu</td>
<td>.24 g</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>8 Aug 1994</td>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
<td>Pu</td>
<td>363.4 g</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>14 Dec 1994</td>
<td>Prague, Czech Republic</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>2.73 kg</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>Jun 1995</td>
<td>Moscow, Russia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>1.7 kg</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>6 Jun 1995</td>
<td>Prague, Czech Republic</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>.415 g</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>8 Jun 1995</td>
<td>Ceske Budejovice, Czech Republic</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>16.9 g</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>29 May 1999</td>
<td>Rousee, Bulgaria</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>10 g</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>Dec 2000</td>
<td>Karlsruhe, Germany</td>
<td>Pu</td>
<td>.001 g</td>
<td>No (location)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>16 Jul 2001</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>.5 g</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>26 Jun 2003</td>
<td>Sadahlo, Georgia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>~170 g</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Mar-Apr 2005</td>
<td>New Jersey, USA</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>3.3 g</td>
<td>No (location)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>24 Jun 2005</td>
<td>Fukui, Japan</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>.0017 g</td>
<td>No (location)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>1 Feb 2006</td>
<td>Tbilisi, Georgia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>79.5 g</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery</td>
<td>30 Mar 2006</td>
<td>Henninsdorf, Germany</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>47.5 g</td>
<td>No (location)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Confirmed Incidents Involving HEU and Pu, ITDB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Type</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Within Scope? (reason)</th>
<th>Present in Dataset?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>6 Oct 1992</td>
<td>Podolsk, Russia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>1.5 kg</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>29 Jul 1993</td>
<td>Andreeva Guba, Russia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>1.8 kg</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>28 Nov 1993</td>
<td>Sevmorpu, Russia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>4.5 kg</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Tomsk, Russia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>145 g</td>
<td>No (date)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>1992-1997</td>
<td>Abkhazia, Georgia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>655 g</td>
<td>No (incident year unknown)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversion</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Chelyabinsk, Russia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>18.5 g</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Elektrostal, Russia</td>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>3.7 kg</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Additional Highly Credible Cases Involving HEU, DSTO


66 Zaitseva 2010, 7.
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