METHODS TO THEIR MADNESS:
UNDERSTANDING THE BEHAVIOR OF ROGUE REGIMES

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ABSTRACT

Despite the urgency of rogue states for U.S. policy, scholars have not developed an understanding regarding their definition and emergence. My dissertation seeks to resuscitate rogue states as a subject of inquiry for both the policy community and political science.

It makes the case for roguery as a concept within International Relations (IR) by identifying the puzzle it poses, that is, why do countries of a marginal military and economic stature so vigorously resist what IR scholars have termed state socialization? I delineate and expand upon the particular practices inherent to anti-socialization, or aversion, documenting how their perpetuation among marginal actors is both out of sync with globally conceived notions of appropriateness and seemingly unnecessary among the ever-adapting community of surviving autocracies.

Upon establishing a population of cases based on these criterion and situating rogue states within the wider conventional wisdom on authoritarian survival, I develop a path-dependent conceptual framework to account for roguery’s onset and perpetuation. My explanation focuses primarily on the worldviews of political entrepreneurs during state-building, distinguishing “progressive worldviews”—in which a state comes to over time envision for itself a place within the international community—from “reactive” ones—which, resulting from a belief that the world outside has left the state beggared relative to its neighbors and vulnerable to outside attack, facilitates a siege mentality, necessitating
what I call differentiation—a belief that survival entails internalizing and routinizing practices that further distinguish, rather than connect, the state to the outside world. The success or failure of the entrepreneurial establishment in identifying an ideationally receptive coercer— namely the military-security establishment—willing to form a coalition based upon said establishment’s vision, neutralize those who would oppose it, and ultimately commit itself to the practices deemed to further differentiation, marks a critical juncture at which states do or do not become rogue. The entrenchment of roguery, moreover, corresponds to the accrual of benefits among this coalition over time, various domestic and international survival strategies learned along the way, and a number of structural intervening factors such as geo-strategic orientation.

I test this theory through five detailed case studies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number of people whom I would like to thank in helping me see this project through. My undergraduate advisor at Brandeis University, Steven Burg, supervised my BA honors thesis and helped me develop the initial puzzles and ideas that would eventually form the foundations of this dissertation. He also gave me the encouragement and faith in myself to take my studies to the next level. Andrew Bennett proved an invaluable mentor to me during my graduate studies at Georgetown. His enthusiastic support for this project as others—including myself—were beginning to doubt its tenability, is something I will never forget. Andy’s insights into both the purpose behind and practice of qualitative research, unique ability to speak to a range of issues within the study of international politics, and unwavering patience allowed me to breathe our countless early conversations in his office into life, while consistently rethinking and improving upon my ideas and approaches throughout the course of research and writing; I hope I have done him proud. Stephen J. King helped me understand the complex and fascinating universe of authoritarian regimes, which—in addition to his expansive knowledge of the Arab world—contributed immensely to the framing of my theory and applicable cases. Charles Kupchan’s work on state socialization and the nexus between domestic coalitions and policymaking made him an excellent third committee member. I am particularly grateful for his willingness to come on board despite our not having worked together before. I would also like to thank Steven David of Johns Hopkins University. Although Professor David was ultimately unable to serve on my committee, his willingness to discuss and consider the links between my thinking on rogue states and
his own prior work on “omnibalancing” made the prospect of taking on a relatively underexplored question in the field far less overwhelming.

In a project such as this—whose conceptual thrust I was compelled to apply to a wide range of cases, whether in passing or through in-depth process-tracing—I was fortunate to have engaged with a number of country and area specialists generous enough to share their insights and time with me. These included, inter alia, David Steinberg (Burma), Victor Cha and Hilary Izatt (North Korea), Dylan Craig (South Africa), Dana Moss (Libya), and Steven Burg (Yugoslavia). I am particularly grateful to Jooeun Kim, James Person, and Jason Pack for pointing me toward helpful sources and stronger analytic points of departure within my sections on North Korea and Libya, which proved by far the most complicated cases to understand, research, and write about.

I am also thankful for the support and encouragement provided by my colleagues in the Department of Government at Georgetown, particularly Peter Henne, Zachary Ritter, Yonatan Morse, Sarah Yerkes, Elizabeth Mercurio, Alex Berg, Kimberly Hill, and Julia Lau. Mr. Jeffrey Popovich of Georgetown’s Lauinger Library was exceptionally helpful in facilitating my research, and the senior and administrative staff of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies—particularly Dr. Michael Hudson, Dr. Judith Tucker, Jenna Beveridge, and Kelli Harris—as well as the Department of Government—especially Dr. Marc Howard and Tatiana Mollazadeh—deserve my gratitude for working with me to secure funding for my studies.

I am incredibly lucky to have been brought up in a family that values knowledge and believes in the pursuit of one’s passions and interests. The unwavering support of my parents in particular—Beth and Edward Julie—provided a sense of comfort and peace
of mind that helped me trudge through even the bleakest periods of graduate student life; they have made everything possible for me. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my girlfriend and soul-mate, Miriam Ganem-Rosen, whose love, kindness, and unparalleled sense of humor made the last two years immeasurably more enjoyable and memorable than they would otherwise have been. She helped me in more ways than she probably realizes, serving as an excellent editor and provider of countless food for thought, reminding me to celebrate and enjoy the good times and not get too fixated on the not-as-good ones.

Cory S. Julie

Washington, D.C.
May 2013
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

ADDRESSING THE ROGUE STATES ISSUE—WHY NOW?

The U.S. and other governments appear increasingly confronted by the realization that many of the gravest threats to their national security come not, as they once did, from the possibility of large conventional clashes among the armed forces of the great powers, but from a relatively exclusive group of weaker state actors behaving in consistent disregard of global norms. These states often balk at the great powers, at times brazenly challenging their interests through brutality, provocation, and sabotage. Recent and recurrent international events—inter alia, the Libyan and Syrian regimes’ relentless military crackdowns against their own populations in the face of persistent global condemnation and multifaceted pressure for reform, North Korea’s unprovoked assaults on both military and civilian targets in South Korea with nearly 30,000 U.S. troops stationed nearby, and continued Iranian intransigence in complying with international demands regarding its nuclear program—seem to ceaselessly fuel such perceptions. Western officials and analysts have to this point identified and characterized “rogue states” chiefly by their pursuit of ill-advised policies at home—namely repressive autocratic ruling structures and gross violations of citizens’ human rights—and abroad—sponsoring international terrorist and criminal entities, aiming to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and behaving aggressively toward neighbors, some of whom are friends and allies of the U.S. Washington has also noted rogue states as a point of long-term concern for its current strategic planning.¹

¹ The 2002 National Security Strategy, for example, contended that “new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. . .the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment more dangerous.” For more, see
Despite the urgency of this issue for our foreign and defense policy, scholars have not developed a strategic understanding regarding the emergence of rogue states, as well as insights into their perpetuation and the sustainability of their behavior. While analysts have addressed certain behavioral symptoms often attributed to rogue states in isolation from one another (i.e. a study on state sponsorship of terrorism here, an analysis of WMD proliferation there), they have not grappled with configurations of these behaviors among non-great power states, and their implications for those states’ posturing, as an important and conceptually distinctive category in contemporary international politics. This in my view presents a significant analytic gap. Indeed, the limited flaunting of international norms might well make strategic sense for a weaker state. Nuclear weapons, for example, can be far less expensive as a deterrent than maintaining large conventional forces, and the sale of nuclear technology abroad can generate revenue for an economically underperforming regime. Yet when committed in tandem with other international sins such as aiding terrorist organizations, these states run further risk of retaliation and retribution, rendering their posturing harder to explain through traditional political science paradigms like realism. So why do certain marginal states deny themselves the fruits of generally complying with the international order, condemning themselves to years or even decades of low levels of trade and economic growth, and isolating themselves socially and politically from the wider regional and world systems in which they reside? Instead of being addressed along these lines, I submit the rogue states concept has fallen victim to an undisciplined application by pundits, polemicians,


2 North Korea, for example, which had a higher GDP per capital than South Korea in 1948, now has nearly 1/17th the figure of its Seoul
and other Western policy and media wonks to virtually any country opposed to Washington’s bidding. Confronted by such controversial buzz terms as “The Axis of Evil,” it is not difficult to see why scholars remain unconvinced of the worthiness of rogue states as a distinct analytical category, and tend to shy away from the question outright. Yet the truth is undeniable: there are countries who fit the latter description, and many of these occupy an increasingly important place in the threat assessments and foreign policy agendas of today’s regional and great powers. Now is the time to develop an understanding of them as a group within their own right, and assess the commonalities undergirding their bizarre position in the modern world.

The goal of this project is to resuscitate rogue states as a subject of serious inquiry for both the U.S. policy community and political science. In the process, I address a set of key questions. First and foremost, what is a rogue state and how does its presence affect both the understanding and practice of contemporary international politics? Second and most importantly, what drives these countries to “go rogue” in the first place, why do they stay that way, and under what conditions—if any—and to what extent, can and might they change behavior? Lastly and more tangentially, what role do the policies and behaviors of the U.S. itself, and its allies, play in these processes, and how can their potentially negative influences be attenuated? This project develops a theoretical framework in an attempt to address these questions.

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3 See, for example, “Bush’s Axis of Evil Comes back to Haunt the United States.” The Washington Post, 10 October 2006
THE STATE OF THE ART–ROGUE STATES IN POLICY ANALYSIS

Mainstream IR scholarship has remained generally on the sidelines of the rogue states issue, leaving policy analysts to assume the bulk of the work to date. A number of well-thought policy-oriented studies emerged throughout the 1990s and early 2000s as the rogue states concept gained traction in U.S. national security discourse. Michael Klare, for example, described “a new class of regional Third World powers”–developing nations with sizeable militaries and apparent designs to dominate their weaker neighbors–surfacing throughout the 1980s to replace the fading Soviet Union as the Pentagon’s new key point of global concern. While U.S. planners did not deem any one of these countries on its own a threat on par with the Russia of yesterday, the fear of a revisionist network of rogue actors, particularly regimes with documented aspirations for sophisticated WMD arsenals, grew increasingly acute.

Robert Litwak took a more hardheaded view, tracing Washington’s rogue states doctrine to the State Department’s 1979 publication of a list of state sponsors of terrorism. Countries included in it–initially Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria–were subject, under the Export Administration Act signed into law later that year, to various sanctions on the export or sale of arms-related material, provision of “dual-use” technologies, and various forms of economic assistance. Cuba was added to the list in

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5 Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996, 16-26
6 Despite the official expiration of this act in 1994, then President Clinton exercised his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to issue Executive Order 12924, which continued export control regulations then in effect. Since that time, U.S. presidents have extended these regulations on an annual basis. The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is currently responsible for enforcing and administering the anti-boycott laws under the Export Administration Act. Note the following BIS definition: “The Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, has been in lapse since August 21, 2001. In the absence of an Export Administration Act, the U.S. dual-use export control system continues to be dependent on the
Concern with terrorism as an instrument of state policy among these new adversaries heightened tremendously throughout the late 80s and 90s, particularly as citizens and assets of the U.S. itself became targets of attacks in which rogues and their proxies were actively involved, or at the very least, knowingly complicit. The 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, or “Lockerbie Bombing,” for example, which resulted in the loss of 189 American lives, was ordered by Libyan premier Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and executed by his intelligence apparatus. Shortly after that time, U.S. President Ronald Reagan branded Libya—along with Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua—“outlaw governments” engaged in international terrorism against the American nation. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) assassins who carried out bombing attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, as well as U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole in Aden in 2000, received critical support and safe haven from the government of Sudan. And Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qa’ida mastermind who oversaw the 9/11 attacks, operated with impunity from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan from 1996 until the beginning of U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom five years later. WMD soon became a second key

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President's invocation of emergency powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. As demonstrated by recent events, having a modern, coherent, and effective system of dual-use export controls – to prevent terrorists, rogue states, and proliferators of weapons of mass destruction from accessing sensitive U.S.-origin goods and technology -- is now more important than ever. The Administration supports legislation to create a streamlined and strengthened export control system that effectively promotes both U.S. national security and U.S. economic interests.” Available at [http://www.bis.doc.gov/eaa.html](http://www.bis.doc.gov/eaa.html).

7 The present list consists of Cuba, Syria, Iran, and Sudan. Note that Syria is the only originally designated country remaining on the list. South Yemen was dropped in 1990 after its merger with the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), Libya in 2006 due to its renunciation of terrorism (in conjunction with Tripoli’s relinquishment of its WMD program), and Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion of 2003 (Baghdad originally facilitated its removal in 1982 to make itself eligible for U.S. military technology transfers in support of its war effort against Iran, and was then renamed following its 1990 invasion of Kuwait). While North Korea was removed in 2008 for meeting all nuclear inspection procedures then required of it, U.S. officials have on more than one occasion indicated their intent to continue monitoring Pyongyang’s potential involvement in terrorist activity, and possibly rename it a state sponsor.

8 EIJ merged with Al-Qaeda in 2001 to spawn the organization currently known as Al-Qaeda

9 Bin Laden had actually been based in Sudan during the five years prior to his move to Afghanistan
distinguishing feature of this new breed of adversary, and after Ba’thi Iraq—a country presumed to be armed with WMD—invaded neighboring Kuwait in 1990, Washington expressed deeper concern over regional aggression as well, again particularly vis-à-vis potential targets that constituted U.S. allies or strategic assets.  

Despite their identification of rogue behavior as a timely and important strategic policy issue, these studies neglected to contribute any satisfying explanations as to why it had both come about in the first place and continued to puzzle policymakers even in the midst of America’s “unipolar moment.” Aside from some useful prescriptions on a case-by-case basis, these analyses were also hard-pressed to deliver a set of contingent and pointed strategies that could be applied broadly to various types of rogue states in question. Perhaps such shortfalls in analysis mirrored reluctance on the part of the U.S. government itself to pinpoint the precise nature of the problem. Indeed, at no point during this time did Washington (or the analytic community, for that matter) devise any definitive list of rogue states, despite the scattered appearance of the term in official strategy documents and policy statements. To compound matters, roguery bore no standing in international law, facilitating greater confusion and inflexibility not only among officials in Washington, but also mutually concerned international organizations.

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12 Lake’s 1994 Foreign Affairs article, for example, characterizes Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Cuba as “backlash states,” while other writers hinted at the inclusion of states such as Syria, Afghanistan, Burma, Sudan, and Yugoslavia. See, for example, Philip Bowring, “Rogue States’ Are Overrated,” International Herald Tribune (6 June 2000). Available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/06/opinion/06iht-edbow.t.html. The State Department’s list of state sponsors of terror, moreover, was of course independent from these other writings.
and individual states. U.S. allies began to either question the American attention to rogue regimes or challenge it outright.\textsuperscript{13}

Some analysts were quick to note the apparent inconsistencies. Litwak, for example, aptly characterized the Clinton administration’s rogue states policy as a “one-size-fits-all” approach that demonized a complex set of post-Cold War cases engaged in various troubling behaviors all under a single rogue umbrella. Litwak supported these claims with case-studies of U.S. engagement with Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, in addition to thoughtful policy options of: 1) “rollback;” (overt regime-change) 2) “comprehensive containment;” (a combinatorial approach of politico-economic isolation and military deterrence) and 3) “conditional containment” (mixed strategies that integrate an engagement component into an overall containment approach).\textsuperscript{14} Regardless, the policy community was still trying to account for a phenomenon on which there was no real consensus to begin with. Much of the insights and commentary that were to follow, to no large surprise, fell short due mainly to one of the following two errors: 1) ascribing rogue behavior nearly exclusively to the personalistic proclivities of individual state leaders (e.g. Kim Jong-Il of North Korea, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, etc.);\textsuperscript{15} or 2) identifying target states’ problematic actions and subsequently proposing policy tools the U.S. and international community could deploy to address them. The actual foundations of rogue behavior itself, however, continued to find little systematic consideration in this literature. Instead, the consensus in policy analysis gravitated between “these regimes are


\textsuperscript{14} Litwak, “Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy.”

\textsuperscript{15} Raymond Tanter, for example, characterized rogues as “subject to the politics of personality . . . the policies of rulers are more a reflection of the whims of charismatic individuals than the outcome of bargaining among multiple centers of power”
irrational and erratic” and “how can we deal with these (irrational and erratic) regimes?”  

ACADEMIC WISDOM ON ROGUE STATES?

A cursory overview of the extant literatures within international relations (IR) and comparative politics (CP) points to a similar inability within academic political science to account for rogue behavior.

Predominant system-level IR paradigms such as Balance of Power (BOP) rest on the logic of states attempting to maintain security in an anarchic world by countering the power of other states and/or developing their own domestic power capabilities, namely conventional military assets. BOP also assumes that secondary states will act to develop meaningful power capabilities relative to rival, stronger powers. Rogues’ apparent willingness to remain isolated in the face of more powerful declared adversaries—often such great powers as the United States, in addition to smaller, regional powers—as well as develop capabilities that are both unconventional and ultimately deleterious to their interstate positioning, circumnavigate or defy classical realist BOP logic.

The literature on threat and in particular, balance of threat (BOT), represents important modifications of BOP reasoning. In his Origins of Alliances, Walt emphasizes how states view the intentions of other states as the key to understanding their security posturing. According to BOT, a state tends to balance not only on the basis of the

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17 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979

capabilities of its counterparts, but also on how it perceives their intentions. Yet Walt’s almost exclusive emphasis on threats both external and material presents a rather incomplete picture of how certain states—particularly smaller autocracies—conceive of their own security. Indeed, authoritarian regimes often face extremely pressing threats inside their borders; rival ethnic factions, disaffected elites, insurgencies, and radical opposition movements will likely constitute just as urgent concerns to an autocracy—especially a young one—than many external challenges. In addition, it is arguably the confluence of internal and external threats, rather than just one or the other, which determines a state’s national security priorities.

Indeed, most of the conventional system-level IR wisdom cannot fully encapsulate how the majority of weaker and/or smaller states perceive threats and make decisions. Current IR work that has incorporated internal justifications for foreign policy-making tends, like much of the literature within international security in general, to favor treating cases of great power or imperial political-strategic interaction. While crucial, this focus can neglect the interesting effects of interaction between systemic and domestic variables among a wider universe of relevant cases. Newer work on foreign policymaking in the developing world has helped fill some of these conceptual gaps. Steven David’s concept of “omnibalancing” in particular sheds light on the multiple centers of power against which smaller authoritarian regimes must balance when making foreign policy decisions. It assumes that third world states feature “weak and illegitimate” leaders operating in highly threatening domestic political scenarios. In

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response, they are prone to ally with “secondary” external rivals to insulate themselves from the more salient domestic threats to their rule. Self-protection of the regime may hence come at the expense of the state’s maximal interstate interests, as classically conceived.22

Omnibalancing’s keener attentiveness to the nexus between domestic and foreign affairs among third world states can shed only partial light on the puzzle of roguery. For one thing, if rogues assessed their utmost existential threats to indeed be internal, omnibalancing might expect them to make a strategic decision—as did Anwar al-Sadat when he steered Egypt away from Moscow and toward Washington after the 1973 Yom Kippur War—to reorient their alignment position and bandwagon wholeheartedly in favor of another great power. Rogues seem rarely willing to undertake such fundamental shifts, and when they do appear to heed omnibalancing’s prescription of addressing internal threats by appeasing external actors, these may represent little more than tactical survival gambits as opposed to strategic reorientations. Some rogues, moreover, have proven content to carry out their policies without the sustained support of any singular outside power. Finally, omnibalancing views states as situated in a particular moment as they reconsider their alignment positions, and are thereby poised to undergo a major change in posture. Though critical in and of itself, this focus tends to overlook how the state arrived at that position in the first place, or if and why it would not have been able to reconsider its position given alternate conditions. By expanding omnibalancing’s scope to include both origins and outcomes, the analyst might employ the tools of comparative

22 Ibid., 236
historical analysis to similarly trace why a rogue was unable to make fundamental changes at moments when it seemed a likely possibility.\textsuperscript{23}

Other IR literature that has more closely attended to the interaction between domestic and system-level variables is similarly hard-pressed to account for rogue behavior, given a primary emphasis on war–particularly great power war–as the dependent variable of interest. This is particularly striking in the study of revolutions. In \textit{Revolution and War}, for example, Walt argues that the outbreak of revolutions increases prospects for war, as domestic challenges within the revolutionary state project heightened threat perceptions and induce security competition between itself and concerned external actors.\textsuperscript{24} While this should well be the case between great powers either themselves undergoing or viewing revolutions within the territories of neighbors or potential adversaries, smaller revolutionary states, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, are less equipped to so regularly rely on war as a tool, and may engage in numerous problematic security behaviors beyond it.\textsuperscript{25} Indeed, scholarship on the contemporary third world indicates that statesmen of developing nations view conventional interstate warfare as an increasingly unattractive and relatively unrealistic option. Many such states, in fact, are forced to contend with trying historical legacies that precluded them early on from developing war-making apparatuses essential to the type of power projection and dynamics explored by much of the extant IR scholarship.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{25} Throughout its existence, the USSR was involved in nearly 240 militarized interstate disputes, compared to 117 for the Islamic Republic of Iran
\end{itemize}
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security scholars tend to focus on the responses to revolution of larger states with sizable extant military capabilities at the revolutionary moment itself. Such an approach makes sense in the context of great powers, which may view revolutionary developments in their peers as existential to their own security, and respond accordingly. To smaller states, such considerations may be either outright unfeasible or a luxury they cannot afford.

It is also worth mentioning that the debate within political science over what constitutes a “real” revolution remains unsettled. Hence, looking at rogue states—which are often but not always associated with revolutionary “movements,” “personalities,” or “tendencies,” but do not regularly engage in war–can add to the understanding of how such outlooks might shape other types of political-strategic conduct. It can also provide more nuanced insights into why and under what conditions rogues actually might wage conventional wars. Seeing if and how such concerns do or do not play out in the context of smaller states that undergo some sort of deep political change from an ancien régime—call it revolution or not—constitutes an important compliment to our understanding of these issues.

Relevant work in comparative politics (CP) also falls short in accounting for rogue behavior. While much of the recent scholarship on coalitions and regime type— authoritarianism in particular—can explain how certain regimes emerge, survive, and potentially buckle, relatively little of it accounts for how elites conceive of, and form policies toward, the world around them, and how state behavior and structure might

27 Walt’s own study covers primarily the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions. France and Russia were imperial and great power states with sizable extant conventional war-making apparatuses. In her classic study examining the relationship between military power and revolutionary outcomes, moreover, Skocpol focuses on revolutionary France, Bolshevik Russia, and Maoist China, all great power states. See Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1994

consequently interface with and reflect these tendencies. As far as it is concerned with international interaction, comparative analysis tends to emphasize a predominantly “outside-in” approach; this is to say that it accounts for what types of structural issues influence ruling coalitions to form, organize and, need be, reorient power at home.\(^{29}\) It is also notable that CP tends to favor treating “soft” external influences—e.g. the availability of aid, fluctuations in trade regimes and patterns, and diplomatic ties—while largely eschewing security issues and threats. Such approaches, like omnibalancing, are useful in accounting primarily for moments of large-scale path-breaking change, particularly spells of regime genesis and demise.\(^{30}\) However, the stickiness of rogue behavior—in addition to rogues’ proclivities to undertake tactical rather than strategic policy shifts—begs for additional probing to capture behavior throughout the regime’s *lifetime*.

Other comparative political studies focus on typologizing regimes to forecast *survival* trends and explain why certain political formats facilitate greater stability than others.\(^{31}\) Power in these analyses is emphasized to the extent that it is gathered and wielded to maintain and expand a regime’s rule at home, but not how it is used to consider influence or relations abroad. In other words, survival is trumped at the expense


\(^{30}\) Linz and Stepan (1978), for example, combine macro-structural and elite-centered explanations to demonstrate how democracies may break down in the face of crises, giving way to highly autocratic formats; O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) fuse similar considerations to explain how cracks form in authoritarian regimes and under what circumstances they give way to democratic transitions.

\(^{31}\) Geddes (1999) drew distinctions between the sustainability of various authoritarian regime types in the modern world. Military regimes, she found, break down the most readily (8.5 years average); Personalist regimes maintain their grip on power as long as possible by limiting regime access to a select inner circle (15 years average); Single-party regimes benefit from strong corporatizing party institutions and survive typically for periods of 24 years or longer.
of behavior. Authors such as Geddes (1999) and Hadenius and Teorell (2007) discuss such neat autocratic types as “one-party,” “military,” and “personalist,” explaining away regime durability as a reflection of the primary institutional actor(s) in charge of the state apparatus. Some of this institutional literature can account in part for the historical dynamics underlying rogue behavior. Nevertheless, the tendency toward universal generalization stemming from its broad theorizing as well as statistical and game-theoretic analyses overlooks the nuanced and often overlapping configurations of ideas and institutions to which rogues seem to adhere for survival.

In light of the conventional policy and academic wisdoms I have outlined hitherto, it is time to go back to the drawing board. Indeed, by repeatedly failing to tie assessments into a more thorough comparative framework explaining which strategies toward rogue regimes work when and, far more importantly, why, practitioners and analysts remain locked into prescribing “cures” without fully diagnosing their “patients.” This invites not only continued confusion among ourselves as well as our friends and allies, but also the risk of further downward spiraling of relations and mutual misunderstandings between the U.S. and its rogue adversaries, which appear at already unsettling and potentially untenable levels. And from an analytical standpoint, this status quo presents hurdles to the generalizability of current prescriptions that have facilitated

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33 Giliomee and Simkins (1999), for example, discuss how dominant-party regimes emerge out of relatively chaotic backgrounds—inter alia, revolution, decolonization, and national liberation struggles—and justify policies on a self-proclaimed basis to represent the “new nation.”
any successes, thereby limiting the scope of predictability for future generations of scholars and strategists.  

As I will clarify throughout this dissertation, roguery is not the consequence of whimsical behaviors on the part of uncultivating statesmen. It is rather the result of a self-reproducing path-dependent process, set in over time, and taking hold among certain autocracies with a relatively marginal international status. A rogue, just like any other country or institution, seeks survival above all else. Yet unlike most other marginal states, the endurance of its leadership, along with the coalition of domestic constituent support bases on which it depends—particularly the defense, intelligence, and security services—becomes linked quite inextricably to remaining committed to behaviors considered deviant by the majority of the international community. This is not a result of erraticism; rather, such behaviors symbolize a calculated response to the regimes’ internal and external threat matrices.

Path-dependence characterizes processes in which “history matters.” For the cases under exploration in this thesis, I argue that the realities of history—including the difficult adjustment to postcolonial life—geography—including regional penetration by outsiders and their intraregional “lackeys” perceived with great trepidation or skepticism—and political power—specifically how it should be attained and maintained, and to what ends—interface with a particular ruling structure—a political entrepreneurial class

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34 This relates to Van Evera’s (1997) discussion of “applicability” as a key component of strong theory building: “How common are antecedent conditions that activate [a theory’s] operation? The more prevalent the causes and conditions of the theory, the greater its explanatory power. The prevalence of these causes and conditions in the past govern its power to explain history. Their current and future prevalence govern its power to explain present and future events.” See Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 18-19


espousing a rejectionist worldview hitching its wagons to a pervasive military-security complex—to produce an equilibrium both powerful yet bizarre to the average observer.

While mechanisms of creation might have more to do with the international context in which a would-be rogue comes of age (i.e. the historical forces cited above), the shift to roguery crystallizes as mechanisms of reproduction take on a life of their own. Particularly after it has begun to regularly justify norm-violating conduct for the sacred sake of regime survival, national defense against existential adversarial forces, or saving the nation from a corrupted ancien régime, the harder it gets to reverse course. Indeed, ruling coalitions may stake their very legitimacy on such claims, while benefitting materially from them in the long run. The more time passes, the more these behaviors are perceived by the regime and its pillars as the only way to both shield the state from the specter of iterated external conflict—which is amplified and instrumentalized advantageously through regime propaganda—and insure the ruling circle’s continued stranglehold over resources and privileges, the more there appears no viable alternative to the regime and its associated ruling style. As such, the stakes in roguery grow higher, for if affairs go awry and the potential for regime collapse grows more real, there exists no alternative ruling format to which the regime can stably transition. Rogues develop various survival strategies as coping mechanisms so as to permit extended flexibility in both their domestic conduct and interstate relations.

Conversely, the passage of time is the bane of outside powers attempting to engage rogue regimes and bring them “in from the cold,” not only because it is harder to coerce and compel them as their behavior becomes more entrenched, but also because the

prospect of cleaning up the mess following a collapse grows more nightmarish, grim, and pricey as time goes on. The lock-in effect of roguery, as it were, makes it a difficult process for both rogues themselves as well as concerned external actors to meaningfully challenge.

The purpose of this dissertation is three-fold: 1) to flesh out the latter conceptual process more thoroughly by developing a theory of rogue behavior; 2) to deploy that theory toward an examination of critical cases from the relevant population of states; and 3) to draw general conceptual lessons regarding the cessation of roguery, as well as glean policy implications and offer recommendations. This approach assumes a broad comparative perspective. In contrast to the literature to date, my population includes countries that might have gone rogue but did not, pre-rogue time periods in states that later went rogue, and post-rogue periods in states that eventually modified or relinquished their deviant behavior. We must begin, necessarily, by establishing definitional criterion for identifying and analyzing rogue states, as well as uncovering and distinguishing between different types. Indeed, perhaps we have not yet succeeded at mastering the policy toolkit vis-à-vis rogues not because we have the wrong answers, but because we need to start with stronger questions and concepts.

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38 See, for example, Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements.” *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall 2011), pp. 84-119. In the North Korean case, it is also worth noting that South Koreans themselves have become increasingly wary of reunification as its projected price tag rises while the economic gap between north and south only continues to grow. See, for example, Soogil Young, Chang-Jae Lee, and Hyoungsoo Zang, “Preparing for the Economic Integration of Two Koreas: Policy Challenges to South Korea.” In Marcus Noland (editor), *Economic Integration of the Koran Peninsula*. Special Report 10. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998.
CHAPTER 2: ROGUE STATES–DEFINITIONS AND PUZZLES

ROGUE STATES—WHAT ARE THEY AND WHAT IS PUZZLING ABOUT THEM?

While this study’s ultimate purpose is to meaningfully question and conceptualize the existence of rogue regimes, political science has no unanimously accepted or sufficiently rigorous definition to speak of. Hence, we begin necessarily by establishing objectively what a rogue state is. The purpose of this chapter is to define the phenomenon of roguery and make a case for the puzzle it poses to contemporary international politics.

Perhaps the most widely cited definition to date comes from the contributors to Rotberg et al.’s 2007 compendium, aptly entitled Worst of the Worst. Similar to the view of U.S. strategists and policy analysts cited in the previous chapter, the contributors posit “internal repression” and “external aggression” as the defining characteristics of rogue behavior. The only “true rogues,” according to them, were those countries that exhibited very high levels of both—Belarus, North Korea, and Syria.39 While this repressive inside–aggressive outside conceptualization is a good start to studying the problem more systematically, it is far too general and applies to too many potential cases, many of which are not even germane to the roguery conversation. While the modern People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russian Federation, for instance, display both of these characteristics, observers would not identify them as rogue, nor should they be puzzled by Beijing and Moscow’s behaviors given the confluence of those states’ vast power resources and ambitious national security goals and agendas. As such, Rotberg et al.’s

conceptualization misses the deeper and more intriguing aspect of the puzzle; that is, why might countries without those types of power potential behave in such provocative ways?

This in mind, we can adjust the definition of a rogue state and reformulate its puzzle. This study defines a rogue state as a relatively marginal autocracy averse to socialization within its immediate regional environs as well as the wider international community. The deployment of norm violating—particularly vis-à-vis security, and to a lesser extent, economic—behaviors is the primary manifestation of this aversion. In order to work from these assumptions, we need to address three corollary questions: 1) What does it mean to be a marginal state? 2) What is socialization and what is puzzling about aversion to it in current world politics? and most importantly, 3) How can we identify aversion to socialization when we see it?

Marginality refers to the state’s relatively minor status in global security and monetary affairs. Candidates for roguery are non-OECD countries that fall outside the list of world’s large economies, and individually in possession of no more than 1% of global GDP. 40 While some rogues are also deviant or reclusive economic players within their own regions, others command a fairly sizeable regional economic presence, due typically to earnings accrued from natural resources and other strategic rents. The latter, often as a result of the greater largesse at their disposal, might be able to more forcefully pursue revisionist foreign policy objectives than the former; I will elaborate upon this further in Chapter 3.

Rogue candidates also possess relatively meager power projection and conventional war-making capacities, and play no serious role in the formulation of global

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military strategy.\textsuperscript{41} While these countries have sporadically proven able to in some ways \textit{complicate} the military designs of the great powers, they are unable to altogether \textit{thwart} them. By this logic, and supported by accepted academic measurements of international power and military capability, rogue states cannot constitute second-tier “revisionist powers,”\textsuperscript{42} and certainly not “great”\textsuperscript{43} nor “major powers.”\textsuperscript{44} The composite capabilities of their armed forces, moreover, is consistently well below those of the world’s top ten national militaries.\textsuperscript{45} While some known rogues, such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan, boast standing armies with active-duty personnel volumes approaching or on par with those of some great powers, these are unable to match such \textit{quantitative} endowments in manpower with any meaningful \textit{qualitative} comparative advantage in technology, training, and innovation. In contrast to the “trigger-happy” posture often ascribed them by Western observers, rogues rarely–albeit with certain notable exceptions–allow interstate disputes to escalate into all-out wars. Indeed, full-fledged combat against either a great power or military coalition comprised of different great power elements and contributions are neither desirable nor tolerable.\textsuperscript{46} Even if the most bellicose and

\textsuperscript{41} For more on grand strategy, see, for example: Robert J. Art, \textit{A Grand Strategy for America}. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003; and Barry Posen, \textit{The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars}. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984


\textsuperscript{43} See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, \textit{The Tragedy of Great Power Politics}. New York: Norton, 2001


warmongering rogue rhetoric matched actual intentions, practically all rogue candidates lack the sheer volumes of conventional armaments and indigenous production capacities necessary to sustain protracted wars. All things considered, these are states lacking the potential to constitute true “game changers” in international political life.

Next, if rogues are defined by their aversion to socialization, we need a clearer picture of what socialization is. Conceived mainly by IR scholars of the constructivist tradition, state socialization refers to the process by which nations internalize norms originating outside their own borders. Here, I define norms as collective expectations for the proper conduct of actors within a given identity, articulated—either formally or informally—as rules of behavior with some level of general applicability. In the case of rogue states, I am interested in why a certain group of countries flout and violate norms—particularly vis-à-vis interstate security and economic behavior—widely valued by the majority of the international community, and espoused more forcefully by powerful members asserting a right to speak on its behalf.

Analysts of socialization have disagreed over whether the process occurs solely at behest of the great powers imposing it, or represents a conscious decision by weaker states to assume new and evolving roles of their own accord. Earlier writings supported an “outside-in” approach. Ikenberry and Kupchan, for instance, demonstrated how during periods of global systemic change, a nascent hegemon would combine material

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power with the articulation of new normative principles to bring less powerful states into its sphere of influence. More recent studies, like that of Checkel et al., have by contrast taken a more “inside-out” perspective, arguing that socialization entails an active process whereby states seek to internalize newly encountered norms that are both mutually definable within and acceptable to the international communities they inhabit. Once set into motion, this process leads them to assume new and entrenched identities within those communities, with the potential for further evolution. The consensus—in which I situate the contentions of this thesis—points to a confluence of the two approaches, seeing socialization as a ubiquitous and enduring feature of international political life. As such, aversion is also a two-pronged concept. It is designed to capture both deliberate behaviors taken by the state independently, as well as some of the friction ensuing from that state’s contact with largely uncontrollable yet defining outside forces. While aversion contains both active and passive elements, the regime may actually come to benefit from external developments occurring in reaction to their behaviors. Sanctions are a case in point, and I will explore this issue further in Chapter 3. Before we explore the contents of aversion, however, it is important to understand why its presence among marginal actors is puzzling and interesting today.

49 Checkel et al., for example, distinguished “Type I” socialization—in which actors engage in conscious “role-playing” in response to knowing what is socially accepted in a given community—from its “Type II” counterpart—in which actors adopt the interests and possibly the very identity of the community in which they are a part. See: G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power.” International Organization Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 283-315; Jeffrey T. Checkel et al. “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework.” International Organization 59 (Fall 2005), pp. 801-826
The current era of international politics is arguably one of unparalleled levels of socialization. We have seen not only increasing scholarly acknowledgement that “norms matter,” but also a far greater consensus among the most powerful state actors—and by extension, norm-setters—as to the types that matter most. This, in turn, has produced a greater sense of which types of behaviors can be regarded as deviant; Deon Geldenhuys has put it well:

Political deviance can be defined as direct and explicit acts that ‘challenge the social order.’ A political deviant is likely to be characterized by someone who is irresponsible, unwilling to ‘play the game’ by the established rules, stigmatized, and dishonoured, and may be labeled a ‘pariah.’ Clearly, these observations may have a bearing on domestic and international politics, too . . . In the context of world politics, behavior would acquire a deviant character when it prompts the disapproval, anger or indignation of the international community at large (typically expressed through multilateral organizations), groups of states, a dominant power, or non-governmental organizations and individuals prominent on the global political stage.51

In international economics, socialization is reflected in the phasing out of full-fledged dirigisme in favor of market-driven innovation and privatization at home, while promoting state integration into the marketplace abroad. Despite important critiques over the inequitable distribution of its benefits,52 globalization has clearly facilitated the decline of barriers to transnational trade across the board, pushed forward the multinationalization of investments, and converged consumption patterns across countries to unprecedented extents.53 With the end of the Cold War, even key components of a formerly rival military-ideological bloc—in particular China and Russia—have largely and irreversibly embraced the praxis of global capitalism.54

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Autarchy in particular—a policy of economic independence from other nations by limiting or foregoing trade with them—is viewed as increasingly passé and counterproductive. By limiting international trade, autarchies fail to capture the distribution of superior products resulting from specialization and the division of labor, as well as economies of scale. Numerous studies on the developing world highlight the futility of autarchic strategies—import substitution industrialization (ISI) in particular—in nurturing development during state building.\textsuperscript{55} Even former great powers that embarked on autarchy-driven expansion ultimately suffered from dissonance between making their economies fit the foreign policy imperatives of leaders to “go forward,” and reining in those imperatives to more closely match actual economic capabilities.\textsuperscript{56} Great power practitioners of autarchy rarely succeeded for long, and the practice would surely constitute an anathema to great power status today. Current data and statistical work, moreover, points to the deleterious effects of continued self-imposed economic isolation on the strategic well-being of smaller states in issue-areas such as public sector performance, external indebtedness, and foreign exchange.\textsuperscript{57}

The international community is also converging increasingly on a series of common political values. Perhaps the most obvious is the bolstered acceptance of

\textsuperscript{55} Prominent examples include: O’Donnell (1973); Hirschman (1979); Kaufman (1979); Collier et al. (1979); and Waterbury (1983). Many of these studies utilize the so-called “bureaucratic authoritarian” development model, applied mainly to Latin American countries throughout the 1960s and 70s. ISI constituted a quick fix in these cases for addressing early economic development problems by ramping up local production and distributing the benefits of high volumes of basic locally manufactured goods. It tottered, however, as these states considered production of higher-order goods, ultimately suffering from inflation with the removal of trade barriers, and popular discontent with consequent reductions in subsidies and other social welfare programs. These dynamics facilitated the contentious and highly autocratic political solution of a ruling alliance between the military and civilian technocrats. Ultimately, many of these systems could not sustain themselves and embarked on a transition toward greater political pluralism.

\textsuperscript{56} See William Carr, Arms, Autarky, and Aggression: A Study of German Foreign Policy, 1933-1939. London: Edward Arnold, 1972; and Snyder, “Myths of Empire,” particularly the chapter on Japan.

democracy as the proper vehicle for governance worldwide, particularly by countries that had previously operated under rival political systems: communism, fascism, and various forms of authoritarianism. Even regimes that have not institutionalized nor transitioned to liberal democracy themselves (including some, for that matter, who are nowhere near it) seem compelled to at least invoke it for legitimacy purposes. Also telling in this regard is the shift of many autocracies since the onset of the “third wave” of democratization in the late 1970s to “hybrid” ruling strategies. These include selective and predominantly cosmetic reforms, such as unfair elections and limited structural adjustment policies, put in place to give autocrats a façade of increased pluralism while tactically appeasing global demands—often those of key suppliers of external aid—for greater liberal praxis. They have permitted for some political space, albeit minimal, for disaffected citizens to “blow off steam.”

Increasing international emphasis on a core of inviolate human rights is also undeniable. By the mid-1990s, states had adopted nearly 25 major international human rights conventions, protocols and other instruments. Observance of human rights obligations—as enshrined by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights—is kept under close international scrutiny by a vast network of monitoring mechanisms. Increasing reverence for human rights has also brought with it somewhat of a relaxation

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60 Geldenhuys, “Deviant Conduct in World Politics,” 32.
61 These include the UN’s Human Rights Commission, the EU and other regional organizations, INGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Freedom House, and the U.S. State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights. See Geldenhuys, “Deviant Conduct in World Politics,” 33.
of the concept of sovereignty. This is perhaps meant to, *inter alia*, counteract the shield behind which the grossest violations of human rights can often take place. The NATO-led operation to oust Qadhafi’s murderous regime in Libya, the international effort—including Arab League sanctions—to isolate Syria, and the U.S.-led gambit to nurture the reformist movement in Burma are but a few recent examples of a rising global intolerance for acts such as torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, confinement of civilian populations, military attacks on civilian targets, and destruction of cultural property.\(^6^2\) In a resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Commission in 1999, all member states claimed a “right” to democracy, lending credence to a cherished Western legal philosophy that the enjoyment of human rights in the context of a pluralistic political order was a global legal entitlement that should be guaranteed to all people.\(^6^3\)

The reader will note that in my definition above, I had attached the absence of democracy—or presence of autocracy—to marginality as a necessary condition for rogue status. While it is indeed our aim to identify rogue states objectively on the basis of a set of defined behaviors, our conceptualization of roguery as a tendency toward anti-socialization entails inherently that this phenomenon is shaped to some extent by not only our identity as Western analysts, but also our connection to a global normative policy agenda defined increasingly by respect for human rights and the rule of law. Honesty is warranted in this matter. Miroslav Nincic, the only scholar to have written a serious


theoretical analysis on rogue—or as he calls it, “renegade”—behavior to date, has raised this point in his work. His elaboration is in my view quite instructive:

Most of the attributes defining renegades are behavioral: regimes are so considered because of what they do. But there is a sense in which they also are so defined by what they are: regimes considered renegade invariably are authoritarian or totalitarian. Not all non-democracies are renegades, but all renegades are non-democracies.

The rejection of democracy is, in a nontautological sense, both a defining feature of renegades and a necessary condition for their emergence. It is a defining attribute since renegades are labeled as such partly because of the perceptions they evoke, whereas democracies are less likely to stimulate apprehension even when they behave in a way that would cause trepidation in the case of non-democracies. For example, we are far more concerned when non-democracies acquire weapons of mass destruction than when democracies do. This is because the formers’ domestic conduct indicates they partake of a different morality, making it harder to trust their intentions. Similarly, we are less worried that a government committed to domestic transparency would engage in military action involving such weapons. One of the defining attributes of a renegade regime, then, is that it is a non-democracy. It is also a necessary condition for deviant international behavior, since every regime exhibiting the behavioral attitudes associated with deviant international behavior has, in fact, been a non-democracy.64

International consensus has also converged on what constitutes permissible and, more importantly, inappropriate means of states’ foreign and security policies. The broad condemnation of state-sponsored terrorism reflects an expanding belief that innocent civilians should not be the victims of radical crusades nor regimes the subjects of unchecked violence, as well as support for structured procedure over vigilantism in resolving political disputes. There is also the oft-cited doomsday scenario fear of what a terrorist organization might do if and when it acquired WMD.65 The UN itself has developed 12 conventions against terrorism since 1963, many of which address these concerns in very explicit language. Following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, for example, UNSC resolution 1189 reemphasized the suppression of international terrorism as a first-order concern to world peace and security. It also charged all member states to refrain from facilitating in any way the organization or

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64 Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 52-3
execution of terrorist operations abroad, and share pertinent intelligence on known or suspected terrorist activities. Following the attacks of 9/11, UNSC resolution 1373—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—enumerated 11 measures to deepen the global counterterrorism regime by preventing funding for terrorist acts and freezing the financial assets of terrorists and their associates. By mid-2002, over 100 states had reported to the UN on actions they had taken to comply with 1373. Many regional groupings have adopted their own anti-terrorism conventions as well, and the U.S. and its G8 counterparts have repeatedly emphasized the need to deny terrorists access to any WMD. There is also widespread opposition to illicit foreign policy instruments other than terrorism. A large set of international agreements dating back to 1912, for example, aims to counter state production, trafficking, and dissemination of narcotics.

Retarding the proliferation of WMD has also become an increasingly seminal item on the international security agenda. UNSC resolution 1504, for example, which

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67 Chapter VII of the UN Charter sets out the Security Council’s powers to maintain peace and security, including sanctions and military force
was adopted unanimously in 2004, established Chapter VII obligations for all member states to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and their delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles. 73 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and EU expressed similar demands. 74 And at the 2003 G8 summit in France, the participants agreed that the proliferation of WMD “poses a growing danger to us all . . . the preeminent threat [along with global terrorism] to international security.” 75 The agreements comprising the nonproliferation regime are many and well documented, 76 and despite double standards suffered by many of these throughout the Cold War—particularly the NPT, which expected developing nations to diligently foreswear nuclear capabilities while the major


74 In December 2003, for example, the European Council adopted a “European Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD,” which highlights counterproliferation as a central concern for EU external action, and WMD proliferation as one of the severest threats to the well being of European peoples, territory, and foreign interests. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-policy/non-proliferation-disarmament-and-export-control/wmd/lang=en


76 Nuclear non-proliferation conventions include: the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT, taking effect in 1970 and extended indefinitely in 1995); Antarctic Treaty (1959, prohibiting nuclear explosion or disposal of radioactive wastes in Antarctica); Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963, prohibiting all test detonations of nuclear weapons except underground); Treaty of Tlateloco (1967, creating a Latin American nuclear free zone), Seabed Treaty (1971, banning the emplacement of WMD or nuclear devices on the ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone); Rorotonga Treaty (1985, formalizing a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific); ASEAN Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1996); Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996, banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, for either military or civilian purposes); and Treaty of Pelindaba (1996, creating an African nuclear weapon-free zone). Conventions against the proliferation of non-nuclear WMD include: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (1972); Missile Technology Control Regime (1987, an informal agreement among the most advanced producers of missile-related equipment to halt the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads); and Chemical Weapons Convention (1993, which required that all chemical weapons be destroyed within ten years). See Geldenhuys, “Deviant Conduct in World Politics,” 24-26
powers maintained an arms race—the substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals worldwide since has breathed new life into the global nonproliferation regime.  

Although perhaps not codified as robustly as the aforementioned norms, there appears an increasingly shared perspective on the types of conventional foreign behaviors—typically in the context of military or intelligence operations—deemed inappropriate in international life. One of these is regional aggression, the use of a state’s military forces to threaten, dominate, or destabilize weaker states in its immediate vicinity. A related behavior, which I call interference, is the use of intelligence assets to actively meddle in the affairs of neighbors and sabotage their public institutions. Such operations can be used to leverage political outcomes favorable to the aggressor as well as dislocate and distort the target’s economy to its advantage. The threats of such behaviors are, of course, heightened with the possession—real or suspected—of WMD. Both regional aggression and interference constitute disregard for the sovereignty and autonomy of other states, concepts that enjoy substantial protection in the international normative corpus. The charters of, inter alia, the UN, OAS, OAU, Pact of the League of Arab States, and Helsinki Accord of 1975 all enshrine the vitality of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The blatant aggression of Ba’thi Iraq toward its neighbor, Kuwait, in the early 1990s sent particular shockwaves in this regard, heightening international opposition to the threat or use of force against others—particularly by the stronger against the weaker—as well as support for the right to settle interstate disputes by peaceful means. Following this episode, the great powers in particular have been continually

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77 Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 49  
78 See, for example, Klare, “Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws,” 16-24.  
less tolerant of the first use of armed force in contravention of the UN Charter,\textsuperscript{80} as well as acts of flagrant interference. The end of Syria’s de facto occupation of Lebanon, dating back to 1976, is a case in point.\textsuperscript{81} Relatedly, violations of international humanitarian norms throughout the conduct of military operations—even if the motivations initially underlying military engagement were “unjust”—are also the subject of increasing international censure. Iraq’s actions during its occupation of Kuwait and those of Yugoslavia in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, involved what many considered war crimes. Prohibitions against such sins are codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, as well as the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977.\textsuperscript{82}

In short, today’s international community operates with certain assumptions—both implicit and explicit—regarding what constitutes proper and improper interstate conduct. While most countries seem willing, and increasingly so, to acknowledge and in many ways live by these assumptions, not all are. To be fair, all states are guilty of flouting and disregarding established norms, at times even the very ones they have themselves formulated and claim to hold dear. The question is: why should we be concerned when states on the peripheries of international power commit these infractions? Well, great powers can often sidestep the pitfalls of defying norms with little to no cost due to both

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{80} The General Assembly equated aggression with acts such as attack, bombardment, blockade, invasion, occupation, and the staging of military operations on neighbor territory. The 1991 U.S.-led international coalition to halt Iraqi aggression in Kuwait is a clear indicator of this support.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Following the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri—in which Syrian agents were implicated—and subsequent “Cedar Revolution” protests in Beirut, the international community—both in the form of individual governments as well as UNSC Resolution 1559—exerted tremendous pressure on Damascus in the court of global public opinion. By April of that year, the last of Syria’s military and intelligence units withdrew from Lebanese soil.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} These oppose acts like torture or inhuman treatment, willful killing, extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity, hostage-taking, subjecting civilians to military attack, as well as environmental warfare. See, for example, the 1976 UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Available at http://www.un-documents.net/enmod.htm.
\end{itemize}
their possession of superior capabilities as well as ownership of the very parameters of membership in international society. And rising second-tier powers attempting to challenge the greats have historically had the means to do so rather effectively by incentivizing loyalty and encouraging bandwagoning behavior among smaller states. Marginal states, however, face significant opportunity costs by acting in open defiance of the great powers, and as opposed to their revisionist counterparts, cannot hope to project the type of influence needed to induce real systemic change. In this context, the very existence of rogue states shows us that socialization is a far more difficult process for some states than others, and makes us wonder whether the vision of a more socialized world—which many assumed would come to replace fully the deep military-ideological polarizations of the Cold War era—will remain only a vision. Scholars have largely overlooked the possibility that the process of socialization could be perceived at times as unappealing or even downright perilous to regime survival, which has, in turn, likely contributed to IR’s general neglect of rogue regimes as a subject of serious academic inquiry. Indeed, in order to truly round out the debate on socialization, it seems only fair that the question of why states become socialized must be extended to why in some cases they do not, and under what circumstances this can change.


Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 93

This statement might be considered contentious in and of itself by some of the more radical contributors to the rogue states conversation. Chomsky (2000) and Blum (2006), for example, have both referred to the U.S. as a rogue actor given Washington’s extensive documented use of controversial foreign policy instruments abroad, among them active and passive sponsorship of chemical arms deployments against civilian populations in, *inter alia*, Iraq during the 1990s and South Vietnam during the 1960s. While there is an element of truth to these arguments, they do not pose compelling puzzles to political scientists. Indeed, political science has found rather consistently that great powers—particularly great powers on the wane—have a tendency to act rather brutally and at times irresponsibly. See, for example, “Theory and International Politics: Kenneth Waltz.” *Conversations with History* series. Berkeley, CA: The Institute of International Studies–UC Berkeley, 10 February 2003; and Snyder, “Myths of Empire.” Hence, this project does not directly take on these claims, but rather focuses on the use of unconventional tactics and strategies by weaker and smaller states in particular to make a case for a puzzle that has not yet been convincingly accounted for.
Notions of anti-socialization are not restricted to academic discourse; their manifestations are observable empirically. I have utilized findings from the Index of Globalization, developed by Swiss economic research institute KOF on the basis of key economic, political, and social indicators,\(^{86}\) to produce the tables below. As they demonstrate, practitioners of aversion—which I have flagged from “most likely” rogue cases North Korea, Burma, Syria, Iraq, and Iran—appear to remain relatively more isolated than their regional counterparts, notably ones of comparable size and material capability, fairly *consistently over time*. Their levels of regional and global integration, in fact, more closely resemble those of less developed countries with significantly inferior resource and human capital potentials. From Table 2.1, for example, we note that North Korea—despite heavy industrial and development capacities that once allowed it to economically outrank even its now gargantuan southern neighbor—presently lags dramatically behind the East Asian regional curve, including even Mongolia, a landlocked country with a population nearly 1/8\(^{\text{th}}\) its own, engaged largely in a traditional economy based on agriculture and herding. Note in Table 2.2 that Burma, the second-largest country in Southeast Asia and among its most resource-rich, trails all its ASEAN counterparts save Laos, a landlocked and infrastructurally dilapidated communist state 1/3 its size and 1/8 its population, 75% of which continues to toil in subsistence farming. And Syria, Iraq, and Iran, top ten states in terms of both size and population within the Middle East and North Africa region, and the latter two OPEC members, sit straddled by Yemen, a near-failed state, and the West Bank, a non-state, increasingly further from

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\(^{86}\) See “KOF Index of Globalization” index data. Available online at [http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/](http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/). Economic indicators include trade as percentage of GDP and levels of foreign direct investment; Social indicators include personal contacts and tourism, levels of electronic communications and information flows, and cultural proximity; Political indicators include levels of diplomatic presence in country and participation in international treaties and organizations.
their counterparts in the *Mashreq* and *Gulf*.\(^{87}\) The comparisons indicate such outcomes need not be considered inevitable; something about these states’ actions or postures favors or results in a relative forgoing of sustained international linkages.

So, what specifically are the behaviors undergirding the process of aversion? I argue that aversion is composed of two subsets of activity: 1) Suppression, which I define as acts of extreme internal repression bearing interstate consequences; and 2) Provocation, the three principle sins of: a) WMD procurement; b) sponsorship of terrorist and other illicit non-state entities; and c) regional destabilization. Let us now elaborate on the contents of these behaviors and make a case for their place within the puzzle.

**Suppression—Repression Extreme and Unbounded**

From the military regimes of 1970s Latin America, to the single-party corporatizers of the modern Arab world, to the dictatorships of Africa and the Caribbean, comparativists have long agreed that repression, which I define as state mobilization of coercive assets to gather intelligence on and neutralize dissenters—either real, potential, or
even imagined—constitutes a basic key ingredient to authoritarian survival.\textsuperscript{88} So what is distinct and interesting about suppression in the context of roguery? The answer is twofold; 1) due to both its extreme nature and singular importance among the regime’s survival instruments, suppression affords its practitioners relatively lesser flexibility in ruling structure over time, and by extension, grimmer prospects for a stable escape from power should and when the need arises; and 2) its implications extend beyond the national political level. Let us further explore these two caveats.

Suppression is indeed repression\textsuperscript{89} in its most extreme, unbridled, and brutish form. Rather than seek to merely defuse dissent, practitioners of suppression aim to systematically crush it. In fact, they hope to prevent any semblance of opposition from emerging at all by strangling civil society and retarding its development to the greatest possible extent.\textsuperscript{90} Since patronage networks and propaganda can accomplish only so much, and the risk of delegating power throughout non-state organizations—a-la corporatism\textsuperscript{91} is determined to be too great, sheer coercion might quickly become a primary, perhaps exclusive, survival tool. As this dynamic self-perpetuates, the regime can “reinvent itself” only by turning to increasingly brutal and egregious behaviors: arbitrary detentions; confinement and arrests of civilians; targeting family members and associates of dissenters; deploying heavy military assets—including artillery and sniper fire—against defenseless civilian targets; mass displacement; destruction of homes and

\textsuperscript{88} Juan J. Linz, \textit{Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes}. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000
\textsuperscript{89} Depending on the availability of data, specific measurements of repression may include figures on paramilitary and internal security forces, defense spending as percentage of GDP, and proportion of internal security to overall military spending.

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other personal and cultural properties; apartheid; acts of severe and dehumanizing torture including rape and forced sodomy; and attempted genocide.

Such comportment, however, is becoming increasingly passé, even within the stubborn context of autocratic politics. Indeed, most authoritarian regimes in this day and age have learned that the ability to deftly balance repression with other survival tools—such as the distribution of patronage and cooptation of key non-state constituencies like labor and religion—can provide them the leverage and maneuverability necessary to survive another day.92 Many have also internalized the hybrid ruling strategies discussed above. Indeed, the flexibility built into hybrid autocracy can help rulers secure an “escape hatch,” that is, a way to exit or cede power in the event his rule is deemed no longer acceptable to the majority of his support base. While the breakdown of authoritarian regimes is inevitably volatile, an escape hatch prevents the violence from escalating to unmanageable proportions, and facilitates a more stable transition of power—at the very least for the time being—to an alternative trusted institution or clique than would otherwise be possible.93 The sheer carnage that wracked Libya during Qadhafi’s demise as well as that occurring presently in Syria, is a result of the lack of such an alternative. It is also a reflection of the reality that practitioners of suppression face few attractive alternatives to the grim status quo they have themselves created, and under the most serious forms of internal pressure—even after they have begun to mitigate conditions

92 See Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown. Geddes’ findings point to strong correlations between the type of authoritarian institutions in place—central to which are the extent and nature of repression—and regime longevity. Sultanistic regimes, for example, which maintain power almost exclusively through severe repression while limiting regime access to only a select inner circle, last for only 15 years on average. Single-party regimes, by contrast, can survive for periods of up to 24 years by successfully leveraging the party apparatus—which maintains links to multiple societal layers—to mediate conflict through a whole spectrum of strategies, only one of which is repression. For more on the relative strength of single-party regimes, see Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007
initially facilitating their international ostracism—will more likely crack rather than bend. The inflexibility that seems inevitably to accompany suppression begs the question of why autocracies should continue to favor it.

The second defining factor of suppression is that it presents spillover effects beyond the national political level. These manifest themselves either “on the ground”—in the form of such developments as refugee outflows, border instability, and stirrings among irredenta in neighboring lands—or “psychologically”—in the form of international outrage and condemnation over human rights violations and atrocities on an unacceptable scale. It is important to note that larger and more powerful autocracies can often build resistance and even immunity to such effects. The example of modern China shows that such regimes are not only willing to escalate their use of severe strong-arm tactics to counterpoise and annihilate challengers, but are in so doing also equipped to retain stability from within while blunting the impact of upsetting reactions from without. Despite its army’s brutal response to the Tiananmen Square student protests of 1989, Beijing overcame the global trauma associated with the incident and reemerged on the world stage reinvigorated by neo-capitalist reforms, while still under the firm grip of the Communist single-party machine. The practice of such repression by marginal actors, however, constitutes a far more dangerous game. One need not look far to see the potential for ill-planned and heinous crackdowns to facilitate such major interstate dilemmas as massive demographic displacements, claims of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and steady erosion of the support of former friends and allies. Such

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94 While the exact total death count is unknown, estimates range from several hundred to a few thousand. See, for example, “Beijing Death Toll at Least 300; Army Tightens Control of City but Angry Resistance Goes On.” The New York Times, 5 June 1989

95 See, for example, Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006
behavior can invite comprehensive multilateral sanctions leading to the slow economic
demise, if not eventual crumbling, of these regimes, as well as military force. It is almost
sure to cause the world to simply view the offending state with a deeper stigma than that
of other surrounding, sometimes equally autocratic, nations.96 As despicable as
repression in any form may be, we should question under what circumstances leaders of
marginal states might allow its consequences to leave home base.

While it is beyond the scope of this project to do so, integrating suppression into
the rogue states conversation can also shed further light on the relationship between
domestic repression and broader international peace and security concerns. Indeed,
should U.S. policymakers regard highly repressive regimes—particularly those with whom
they share neither vital systematic relations nor mutual strategic interests—as more
threatening than their better-behaved counterparts? Existing answers, like those of the
Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) research program, are ill suited to properly address this
question.97 The observation that democracies rarely go to war with one another does not
tell us about which specific subsets of non-democracies pose the most danger to
democracies in arenas other than war, and how they do so. Although the jury is still out
on this question, recent quantitative work indicates that domestic repression anywhere
ought to constitute a concern to governments everywhere.98

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96 Efraim Inbar, “The Emergence of Pariah States in World Politics: The Isolation of Israel.” *The Korean
97 See, for example, Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1993; and Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International
98 Caprioli and Trumbore’s statistical analysis in the Rotberg et al. volume, for example, correlated high levels of
internal repression with deeper proclivities toward initiation of and involvement in militarized interstate disputes
(MIDs), as well as sponsorship of terror organizations and WMD programs. See Mary Caprioli and Peter F.
Trumbore. “Human Rights Rogues: Aggressive, Dangerous, or Both?” in Robert I. Rotberg (editor), *Worst of the
40-67
Table 2.4: Indicators and Implications of Suppression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suppressive Policies</th>
<th>Interstate Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- State-sponsored drives toward genocide and mass killings</td>
<td>- Refugee outflows and IDPs seeking asylum in neighboring states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regular and wide-scale confinement and arbitrary detention of civilians</td>
<td>- Military build-up and security operations near transnational borders → Cross-border tensions and boundary disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Targeting family members and personal associates of dissenters</td>
<td>- Insurgent groups prompted to form and operate against home state from across the border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deploying heavy military assets (artillery, sniper fire) against civilians, including during protests and demonstrations</td>
<td>- Illicit trafficking in narcotics and persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Destruction of homes, other personal and cultural property</td>
<td>- Multilateral condemnations and sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Apartheid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Acts of severe torture, including rape, attempted genocide, confining suspected dissenters in labor camps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Child labor and military conscription of child soldiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROVOCATION—POWER THROUGH “WEAPONS OF THE WEAK”

As discussed above, previous analyses have tended to focus on “aggressiveness” as the linchpin of rogue interstate behavior. But what does aggressiveness really mean, and what about it as a tool of these states’ foreign policies should interest observers? Indeed, speaking of aggression as a form of deviant conduct seems almost antithetical to the accepted realist notion of power as the primary currency in politics among nations. And history certainly does not portray the strategic success of countries through standing idly by. Yet it is key differences in conceptions of power—and how it ought to be acquired, preserved, and exercised—that could facilitate a turn to the peculiar type of “aggression” endemic to rogues.

For most countries, power consists largely of maintaining some type of advantage in military capabilities relative to actual or potential rivals and threats. In the case of...

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smaller states whose resources and objectives render them unlikely to pursue such advantages independently, perceived power gaps and insecurities might be remedied through partnerships with stronger regional and international partners.\(^\text{100}\) While such solutions may comprise sufficient threat reduction strategies for most, they do nothing of the sort for others. The prospect of being socialized into a traditional security relationship in which outside powers—who along with their regional “proxies” are perhaps perceived as a historical adversary to the regime’s very legitimacy and even raison d’être—maintain the upper hand, might be in fact construed as an existential threat in and of itself. Caught between the need to be perceived as independently capable and a lack of conventional means to fully actualize it, the rogue candidate’s quest for power lends itself to deploying “weapons of the weak.” As opposed to traditional power gambits—namely those achieved through conventional military operations—intended to alter or preserve the balance of power, and carried out in coordination with friends and allies, these initiatives can only hope to provoke it, and are undertaken primarily alone, though sometimes jointly with other rogue actors.

Three primary weapons constitute provocation: 1) active sponsorship of terrorist organizations and other subversive foreign policy instruments—used for either power projection or revenue-generating purposes—such as criminal syndicates, illicit trade networks, and narcotics trafficking agents; 2) a determination to acquire WMD and other advanced military technologies to be used as threats to achieve the designs of the regime; and 3) a posture of regional destabilization including the deployment of military, intelligence, or non-state proxy assets, as well as other forms of interference, to

intimidate and meddle in the affairs of neighboring states. Regional destabilization drives are conducive to local discord, and occur in violation of treaties and other interstate regimes to which offenders might be a party. Despite their inherent dangers, though, these drives—as alluded to above—generally fall short of provoking large-scale military combat or all-out war; in other words, they are convenient by allowing offenders to be aggressive without being hostile. In a world marked by increasing normative consensus on what constitutes appropriate security conduct, provocation by marginal actors is certainly interesting.101

Table 2.5: Indicators of Provocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons of Mass Destruction</th>
<th>Sponsorship of Terrorism</th>
<th>Regional Destabilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Nuclear weapons capability; Chemical, biological, and/or radiological weapons capability</td>
<td>-State-sponsored provision of funds, arms and materiel for terrorist organizations</td>
<td>-Interference: Deployment of military and/or intelligence assets within neighboring states to distort political and economic conditions within the target region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Credible reportage on pursuit of nuclear energy activities deemed essential only to weapons-grade material, including uranium enrichment</td>
<td>-State-sponsored provision of safe havens, transit points, and training facilities for terrorist organizations</td>
<td>-Support for rebel and insurgency movements in multiple neighboring states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Transferring and selling nuclear material, dual-use technology, and advanced weapons-systems</td>
<td>-Covert state support for terrorist organizations to further state or specific institutional goals</td>
<td>-Intelligence operations and subversion, to include political assassinations, elections tampering, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISOLATION—THE LONELY EXISTENCE OF A ROGUE STATE?

Commentators on rogue states have often equated them with isolated states, at times ascribing such nomenclatures as “pariah,” “outcast,” and “outlaw” quite interchangeably with rogue. While mine is not a study of isolation exclusively, permit me to say a bit more about the process now so as to avoid blinding analysts to the traits about which they should really be concerned when assessing rogues, as well as the mischaracterization of all isolated states as rogue, or vice versa.

As is often best to do with misunderstood concepts, we might begin with a brief discussion of what isolation is not. Isolation does not include sporadic bouts of alienation or normal temporary ruptures in interstate relations resulting from border demarcation disputes, trade issues, and other commonplace occurrences in day-to-day international politics. It also does not include attempts by one state to quarantine another during periods of armed conflict between them. Smaller countries, which by virtue of their natural endowments or sheer geographic location enjoy an island-like existence with very minimal global presence, are not isolated states. Similarly, states living in obscurity that desire greater interaction with the outside world yet are consistently denied it would not fall into this category. Particularly in earlier international systems, it was not unusual for different political systems to live in virtual seclusion from one another (imperial Rome, for example, had very little interaction with the kingdoms of China and Southeast Asia). Nor is isolation here the “isolationism” or “splendid isolation” practiced by the few

fortunate great powers—such as the 18th century U.S. and late 19th century Great Britain, respectively—who sought to maintain and enjoy their dominance while keeping a healthy distance from the major international issues and conflicts of the day.  

As it is relevant to our conversation, isolation is a two-pronged phenomenon. Defensive, or inside-out, isolation, is a protective strategy designed to insulate a state from perceived harmful external influences. In cases where a regime holds sacred certain values, codes of conduct, religious beliefs, or political ideologies that might be perceived at risk from outside exposure, defensive isolation may constitute an attractive option. Ideally, it is pursued voluntarily and unilaterally by one state over a period of time, during which outside interactions and exchanges—economic, cultural, educational, and intellectual—are significantly curtailed, and withdrawal from normal international relations is accelerated.

Enforced, or outside-in, isolation, is the means by which the great powers or international community at large exert pressure on an offending target state in the form of punitive measure(s), typically sanctions and embargoes. It is a deliberate policy undertaken by two or more states against another, intended to sever or curtail its international interactions against its will. This is an important caveat, as many in the policy and academic communities consider the implications of coercive diplomatic strategies insofar only as they mete out measurable damage on the target’s physical infrastructure. The accepted understanding of sanctions, for example, is the taking of measures to inflict damage on the target state’s economy to induce changes in its political behavior; the prospect of continued material impairment is thought to make the costs of

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103 Deon Geldenhuys, “Isolated States”
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
noncompliance outweigh its benefits.\textsuperscript{106} Such conceptualizations miss a seminal issue, that is the effect of curtailing international interaction on the target’s worldview, as well how the interaction between target and sender shape’s the sender’s views of the target.\textsuperscript{107}

Defensive and enforced isolation should be regarded as ideal types; the reality of the rogue states conversation is that it contains elements of both. Roguery is a bizarre interstate orbit resulting from a mutually reinforcing perception of uniqueness by the regime and deviance by some elements of the world outside, and the taking of measures by both parties—whether purposefully and/or accidentally—to pronounce that difference. In cases where the measure is taken exclusively by either side, these are instances of pure isolation, not roguery, and they are not germane to the study. Such nuances remain largely unclear from the literature on isolation to date, which has focused quite exclusively on the enforced variety. Its contributors assessed the so-called “pariah” states of the Cold War-era: South Africa, Israel, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and to a lesser extent the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Chile. These countries were targeted largely as a result of their flirtations—though in some cases, serious involvement—with nuclear weapons programs, and to a lesser extent “offensive” internal practices of their ruling regimes.\textsuperscript{108}


\textsuperscript{107} Tostensen and Bull’s more recent definition of sanctions is a step in the right direction: “The temporary abrogation of normal state-to-state relations to pressure target states into changing specified policies or modifying behavior in suggested directions. Sanctions subsume an array of measures, ranging from oral condemnation—for example, “shaming”—to military intervention.” See Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, “Review: Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?” \textit{World Politics}, Vol. 54 (April 2002), pp. 373-403, 374

\textsuperscript{108} The “Zionist entity,” for example, which displaced multitudes of Arab inhabitants in creating a Jewish state in Israel, was considered “born in sin,” and the racist policies of South Africa’s apartheid government were deemed similarly reprehensible. See Geldenhuys, “Isolated States;” Efaim Inbar, “The Emergence of Pariah States in World Politics;” Robert E. Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation;” Vale, “South Africa as a Pariah International State;” and Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs & Proliferation”
Purely enforced isolation appears to result typically from three considerations: 1) The target takes a specific foreign policy stance deemed unfavorable or threatening to the interests—foreign and domestic—of a particular outside great power. The story of Taiwan is a case in point, as is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, whose self-declared independence is recognized only by Turkey and viewed by the rest of the international community as an illegal occupation of the sovereign Republic of Cyprus. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany), which as a result of the Federal Republic of Germany’s (West Germany) Hallstein Doctrine was heavily censured throughout the Cold War, is another example; 2) The regime begins engaging in domestic policies—albeit not on a suppressive scale—that cause concern in the capitals of neighboring countries. The restoration of military rule under General Frank Bainimarama in modern day Fiji is a case in point;109 or 3) The target was previously an adversary of one or more great powers as a result of provocative behaviors no longer undertaken. The target remains alienated from the outside in as a result of the great powers’ lingering disdain for its regime, and usually historical animosities as well. This is a relatively rare variant.110

Cases of pure defensive isolation are harder to find, but do exist. They would, in theory, see themselves as truly unique from the world around them, and feel compelled to

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safeguard this uniqueness by sealing themselves hermetically from external institutions and ideals. This exercise would not necessarily require taking any types of offensive measures to thwart interference from abroad, nor suppressive action to quell disturbances at home. To survive under such conditions, the practitioner would require a government authoritarian or semi-authoritarian in praxis, and widely viewed as legitimate—perhaps even revered—by the majority of a relatively politically passive population. Modern Bhutan is an example of this. The country’s majority Vajrayana Buddhist population bears a deep historical reverence for the office of Druk Gyalpo—King of Bhutan—a reverence which has helped the current king, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, uphold the somewhat controversial principle of Gross National Happiness (GNH) initiated by his late father. GNH represents an official belief, grounded in Buddhist philosophy, that economic development alone could not deliver individual fulfillment and well being to the Bhutanese people. In practice, it resulted in major curtailment of Bhutan’s cultural and commercial exchanges abroad, and has contributed to the country’s status as one of the world’s poorest economies and least linked in to modern global telecommunications structures. Its origins lay, to a great extent, in heightened perceptions throughout the late 1980s that Bhutan’s indigenous Ngalop culture was under threat from outside ideas infiltrating the country during successive five-year development plans of the prior two decades, as well as an influx of ethnic Nepali Hindus to the country’s south. Part of the policy included making compulsory traditional Buddhist dress for all citizens, including Hindus.\(^ {111} \) Yet even in Bhutan, it seems that this type of posture is not easy to maintain for long, as ordinary people appear restive for real reform and equality among ethnic

groups. Indeed, it appears the combination of defensive and enforced isolation missing from previous treatments that seems—at least in this author’s view—to facilitate countries’ peculiar drift into the trajectory we know as roguery.

Analysts and policymakers should further take care not to conflate rogue with failed states. As we will discuss further in the following chapter, roguery is a purposive process undertaken by elites in control of an at least relatively institutionalized and functional state apparatus. In failing or collapsing states, by contrast, basic functions of the state are no longer performed . . . As the decisionmaking center of government, the state is paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced. As a symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action. As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign organization. As the authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. As a system of socioeconomic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed; it no longer receives supports from nor exercises control over its people, and it no longer is even the target of its demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the right to rule.

The reader will note that in this definition, state collapse is a two-way phenomenon; the regime has lost legitimacy both in the eyes of its people as well as its own capabilities. While rogue regimes do not necessarily entail total legitimacy at the popular level, and may well face pockets of armed internal resistance, there is far less question as to who is in command of the state’s territory and decisionmaking.

The schema below helps us visualize roguery’s ideal place within this broader conversation. Note that in quadrant IV I have added a category of “challenger state.” While I will expand upon this and assess its implications for rogue survivability in the following chapter, let me offer a basic definition now so the reader can better

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112 “Political Reform in Bhutan” Al-Jazeera International (English), “News Hour” segment. 3 November 2011.
113 Israeli scholars Efraim Inbar and Robert E. Harkavy, who focus on “pariahitude” in the specific context of Israel, have done a decent job of bridging this gap.
comprehend the diagram. Challenger states espouse minimally reactive worldviews, perhaps leading them to offer commiseration and even material support to their rogue brethren. While they take rhetorical and policy postures in limited contradistinction to the normative status quo of their respective regions, their behaviors have not (yet) escalated—or no longer escalate—into full-fledged aversion. Modern-day Venezuela and Belarus are cases in point.

Table 2.6: Provocation/Isolation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provocation</th>
<th>Isolation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Preliminary Observations about the Rogue Population**

Having established within this chapter the puzzle of rogue behavior, the behavioral and definitional criterion for the constitution of a rogue state, and the difference between rogues and other categories, the table below delimits my universe of cases, as well as some attendant characteristics of interest. Using indicators of aversion to identify this population indeed adds a layer of depth to the extant scholarship on rogue states, and helps us sidestep the oft-cited critiques of selecting cases merely on the basis of U.S. labeling. Before delving deeper into the case population and theorizing more systematically the advent of roguery, there are a couple key characteristics of the cases
we should point out immediately for purposes of both observation and identification of population subtypes.
| Table 2.7: Population of States | Rogue Regime Duration (Years) | Preceding Regimes | Gone Rogue | Actions | Effects of Int'l Pressure on Dynamics of Reproduction or Demise | Nature of Regime | Post-Colonial?
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------|---------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------
| **Libya (Qaddafi Regime), 1969-2011** | 42 | -Italian colony -Qasarli monarchy | 1973 | 1,2,3,4 | 1+2+3→B/C (2003) 1+2+4→a→E (2011) | 1a/b,2 | Y |
| **Syria (Al-Asad Regime), 1970-Present** | 42 | -French Mandate -Military coup-prone "parliamentary republic" -Ba'thist takeover | 1972 | 1,2,3,4 | 1+2→a→A (2012) | a | Y |
| **North Korea (Kim Regime), 1945-Present** | 64 | -Imperial Japan -Soviet occupation -Partition of the Peninsula | 1963 | 1,2,3,4 | 1+2→a→b→A | a | Y |
| **Iran (Revolutionary Regime), 1979-Present** | 33 | -Qajar Dynasty -West-backed Shah dictatorship | 1979 | 1,2,3 | 1+2→a→A | b | N |
| **Pakistan (Post-Zia ul-Haq), 1977-Present** | 35 | -British colonialism -Islamic parl. republic -Military rule | 1998 | 1,2,3 | 0→b→A | b | Y |
| **S. Africa (Apartheid Regime), 1948-1994** | 46 | -Boer anti-British resistance -British Union of S. Africa -Independence but entered WWII for UK -National Party Ascendance | 1961 | 1,2,3 | 0+1+2→c→D | 4,1a | Y |
| **Cuba (Castro Regime), 1959-Present** | 53 | -Spanish colony -U.S.-secured independence with "right to intervene" -Balbista-dominated politics reversed dem. reforms -U.S.-backed dictatorship | 1975 | 2,3 | 0+1+2+3→c→C | 3→1a | Y |
| **Sudan (Military Regime), 1989-Present** | 23 | -Mahdist loss→GB colony -Separate north/south admin -GB/Egypt provide independence -Military/civilian tussels and civil war, 1958-72 -Resumption of Islamist-oriented military rule | 1989 | 3,4 | 1+2→a→A (1996) 0+1+2+3→b→A (Present) | b | Y |
| **Yugoslavia (under Milosevic), 1989-2001** | 12 | -Ottoman rule→Russian support→Independence→federation with Serbia dominance →Nazi occupation→Tito strongman -Early 90s post-Tito unraveling -Ascendance of Milosevic/FDRY | 1992 | 4,1,2 | 0+1+2+4→c→E (2001) | a | Y |
| **Burma (Tatmadaw Regime), 1963-Present** | 49 | -Direct British rule→Indian province→Self-governing colony -Democratic experiment 48-62 | 1988 | 4 | 0+1+2→a/b→B/C (Present) | a | Y |
| **Cambodia (Khmer Rouge), 1975-1979** | 4 | -French protectorate→Japanese dissolution -Pro-Western monarchy -U.S. anti-Vietnam air raids -Politicized politics and ineffective military administration | 1975 | 4 | 0+1+2+4→b→E (1979) | 3 | Y |

Rogue Behavior Key: 1-WMD; 2-Regional Destabilization; 3-Sponsorship of Terrorism; 4-Suppression
International Pressure Applied Key: 0-Exogenous Developments; 1-Shaming; 2-Sanctions; 3-Limited Military Force; 4-External Military Intervention
Rogue Status Key: a-Unrepentant; b-Partially Compliant; c-Compliant
Internal Status Evolution Key: A- Behavioral Retrenchment; B-No Change; C-Self-Moderation; D-Democratic Transition; E-Regime Overhaul
Nature of Regime Key: 1-Garrison Regimes 1a-Secular Garrison State 1b-Islamist Securitocracy 2-Guerilla Rogue: Afghanistan, Cambodia 3-Settler State: South Africa
First, these are all cases in which the regime was clearly propped by a central autocratic institution linked deeply to the state’s coercive machinery. In most, elements of the national security establishment occupied a defining and central, albeit not totally exclusive, role within the regime’s actual decisionmaking structures. Along these lines, I have divided the cases into three broad categories. The majority of them, not to mention the ones that survived the longest, can be described as “garrison regimes,” a term borrowed from the late preeminent political scientist Harold D. Laswell. Writing in 1941, Laswell predicted a rising trend in world politics away from “the dominance of the specialist on bargaining, [i.e.] the businessman, and toward . . . a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society.” Laswell also believed that “the military men who [would come to] dominate [the politics of] a modern technical society will be very different from the officers of history and tradition,” whose primary focus was on “fighting effectiveness” and “battle potential.” While a world teeming with Laswellian garrison states did not exactly come to pass, there appears something substantive to his vision in the context of many of our cases. Neither fully military nor completely civilian, neither truly peaceful nor absolutely intent on waging war, the majority of these regimes seem to thrive on a format in which specialists on violence appear more essential than in others, yet not absolute.

Interestingly, five of these cases—Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Libya and Afghanistan—utilized Islamist doctrine and elements—intellectuals, clerics, and paramilitary and terrorist forces—to shore up their garrison credentials; I have termed them *Islamist securitocracies*. The terminology is important; they are adjectivally

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Islamist due to the role ascribed to religious elements and the use of Islam for legitimacy purposes, yet they are at their heart securitocracies, as the vitality of the regime trumps all other concerns, including religion itself. The remainder of the garrison regimes relied on secular ideals–tinged often with the rhetoric of Marxism, non-alignment, anti-Westernism, and anti-imperialism–and institutions–typically large standing militaries, pervasive domestic security agencies, and defense industries–to survive. I have termed these secular garrison states. I have categorized two of the rogue cases–The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (or IEA, under Mullah Omar’s Taliban) and Democratic Kampuchea (or DK, Cambodia under Khmer Rouge Prime Minister Pol Pot)–as guerilla rogues, states founded by paramilitary movements that have through armed struggle hijacked weak or defunct prior regimes, and converted their organizations into ruling bodies. A final subtype–which can be more accurately regarded as a smaller subset of secular garrison regimes–I have identified is a settler state, regimes founded by non-native settlers who fought for and ultimately usurped control of the land from both indigenous peoples and vested outside powers. While South Africa under apartheid is the only positive case to qualify as such, it remains an integral and fascinating specimen, in both that its roguery began and ended with the Cold War, and because it was the only state within the population to have successfully transitioned to democracy in the absence of external military intervention.

We might further sub-categorize our cases by juxtaposing their respective degrees of institutionalization–i.e. state capacity to disperse political and security responsibilities both adequately and strategically–at home to the extent of regional revisionism–i.e.
propensity to challenge the international status-quo power balance—in policy goals abroad.

Table 2.8: Institutionalization/Revisionism Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Rogue Regime Institution</th>
<th>Level of Rogue Regime Institution</th>
<th>Degree of Regional Revisionism in Foreign Policy Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>II.</td>
<td>III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Democratic Kampuchea</td>
<td>Iran**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>E Afghanistan</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan**</td>
<td>Pakistan**</td>
<td>North Korea**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**: Secular Garrisons
**: Islamic Securitocracies
**: Guerilla Rogues
**: Settler State

** Positive Cases Analyzed

Our categorizations should indeed be regarded flexibly; they are not intended for stringent typological theorizing but rather to add more nuance to broad commonalities and differences across the case population uncovered through process tracing. The identification of negative case counterparts, moreover, is made possible and more manageable by subdividing the population as such. Analysis of these cases can help demonstrate why certain states that could have gone rogue ultimately did not, or why
they may have desisted after initiating the rogue pathway. Given the particular conditions of this inquiry, in which we are assessing opaque regimes to which the public still has relatively constricted access, the addition of negative cases might add further credibility to the theoretical claims, claims which are the subject of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPTUAL LOGIC OF ROGUERY

THEORIZING ROGUERY—INTRODUCTION

A successful theory of rogue states should address three central questions posed at the outset of this study: 1) Why do certain marginal autocratic states embark on a course of gross norm-violating conduct—particularly the aversive behaviors associated with suppression and provocation identified in the previous chapter—to the extent that it estranges them from international society? 2) Why, particularly given the underdevelopment and overall structural disrepair caused by sanctions and other punitive measures often taken by international society in response to these behaviors, do rogues continue to stay the seemingly self-defeating and isolating course of roguery? and 3) What factors might explain the sustainability, shift, or demise of rogue behavior?

While previous volumes have described the behaviors of rogue regimes after identifying them *ad hominem*, I proceed by drawing upon the more systematic conceptualizations offered in the previous chapter to propose a logic undergirding rogue behaviors and survival calculi. To do this, we must first assess critically the state of knowledge on the genus in which the rogue species lay, the authoritarian regime, and derive from this knowledge things we should and perhaps might already know about rogues yet were unaware of, as well as some testable hypotheses.

ROUGES AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON AUTOCRACY

To this point, we have defined rogue states as unique from other autocracies largely on a *behavioral* level, vis-à-vis the nature and extent of their aversive comportment. To move from definition to explanation, though, we must hone in on comparisons between rogues and typical autocracies on a *survival* level. Teasing out
which, if any, unique constellation of strategies from the larger autocratic toolkit rogue states exploit to endure can provide critical foundations for our theory.

The fundamental similarity between rogue regimes and all autocracies is their primary focus on survival and the entrenchment of their domestic position. Despite popular claims of their erratic behavior, the regimes within my population boast an impressively long average lifespan of nearly 33 years. Only in three cases—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (or FDRY, under Serb President Slobodan Milosevic), Democratic Kampuchea, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—did the regime survive for less than 20. It is also noteworthy that the IEA and DK boasted particularly short durations relative to the rest of the population, 5 and 4 years respectively. As the only two guerilla rogues identified, their fates suggest these particular setups may in general be relatively less conducive to sustaining rogue behavior once they have assumed control of the state. In addition, sustained external military intervention was critical in facilitating the removal of all three regimes; absent intervention they would likely have survived far longer. Nevertheless, the general findings place rogue regimes well above the average survival projections of military regimes (8 years) and personalist regimes (19 years) cited by Geddes, and close to that of the single party regime (36 years), generally considered the most stable format within the authoritarianism literature.117

A second corollary similarity between rogue states and the larger autocratic world is that, despite popular perceptions of the singular importance of rogue elites in controlling their territories, their leaders do not and cannot rule alone. Their general longevity cited above would be simply unattainable absent some sort of viable support

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117 See, for example, Brownlee, “Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization;” and Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown”
While individual leaders are certainly important, additionally if not equally so are the coalitions they construct to effectively structure their rule and insulate themselves from harm or regime overhaul. How can what we know about the nature of authoritarian ruling coalitions in general mold our understanding of the inner workings of a rogue? 

The work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. assumes the existence of two fundamental constituent groups within any regime: the selectorate and winning coalition. The selectorate is the subset of the wider population with a say in policy outcomes; the winning coalition is the subset of the selectorate capable of more directly choosing and sustaining a leader in office. In democracies, both the winning coalitions—containing not only those organs bound to the executive and his camp, but also large opposition establishments and civil societies—and selectorates—containing virtually all those citizens eligible to vote—are vast and far-reaching. This is because democratic leaders are most accountable to the people they govern, and influential official institutions—like the army and police—are obliged to remain professional and refrain from involvement in civil political life. Ruling coalitions in autocracies, by contrast, are considerably smaller; their survival hinges more upon continued legitimacy in the eyes of key institutional actors within the coalition rather than the population at large. Indeed, in the absence of a viable electorate, autocratic leaders are more accountable to themselves and their

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118 See Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 24, who echoes this observation in his own look at rogue behavior.
119 See, for example, Jessica L. Weeks, Leaders, Accountability, and Foreign Policy in Non-Democracies. Stanford University: Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (May 2009)
supporters than their wider population of subjects. Within autocracies, moreover, institutions both official—such as the security apparatus—and “civil”—such as professional associations and the business community—operate foremost as instruments or appendages of the ruling regime and, by extension, their own secular interests.\textsuperscript{122} Let me now say a few words about how comparativists have classically conceived of coalitions and power structures within ideal-typic autocracies, and proceed to delineate where rogues can fit in.

The most durable authoritarian model—the single-party state\textsuperscript{123}—survives through corporatism. This rather difficult strategy entails seeking the appeasement of both the elite and popular sectors, without having to exhaust state energies through the pains of either mass ideological mobilization or systematic coercion. The corporatizer rather entrenches itself within and ultimately subsumes the various institutions of a would-be “civil society”—labor and trade organizations, professional syndicates, youth movements, religion, business, etc.—distributing patronage to and mollifying such constituencies who might otherwise be tempted to mobilize politically.\textsuperscript{124} Appeasement is meant to facilitate neutralization and by extension cooptation, resulting in a sort of equilibrium in which these various societal groupings can exist with a certain degree of autonomy, so long as they do not question the fundamental legitimacy of the ruling regime through political activities. In the ideal corporatist model, civil society becomes—in everything but title—a state affair. Within elite society, a strong single-party machine effectively structures the relations and decision-making patterns of ruling coalitions, ultimately determining whether that coalition will endure or fragment. The backbone of the party forces these

\textsuperscript{122} See, for example, Bueno de Mesquita (et. al.), “The Logic of Political Survival;” and Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” \textit{International Organization} 62 (Winter 2008), pp. 35-64

\textsuperscript{123} Geddes (1999) found that single-party regimes last considerably longer than their authoritarian counterparts. See Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown,” 20-25

\textsuperscript{124} Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies}. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968
elites to acknowledge that although compromise may cause them personal setbacks in the near term, they are willing to make that sacrifice if they perceive the party as able to bring them the type of medium and long-term gains that make staying in office worthwhile. ¹²⁵ When maintained and perfected, the combination of elite conflict mediation–i.e. vis-à-vis the winning coalition–and popular appeasement–i.e. vis-à-vis the selectorate–allows these regimes to not only survive, but in many cases thrive. ¹²⁶

Other models of authoritarianism operate according to a more exclusionary coalitional structure than does the latter, in terms of both the selectorate and to an even greater extent the winning coalition. While military regimes rely on some linkages between the senior officers in charge and civilian elites, they tend to value the cohesion of the military establishment and officer corps more than anything else, including staying in office. Consequently, military regimes have often sidestepped ambitious development projects and proven poor corporatizers, unable to entrench their control in a way that affords real longevity. ¹²⁷ They typically fall from power in the face of sustained antigovernment demonstrations, ¹²⁸ and because they usually enjoy some popular support and can maintain unit cohesion even after leaving power, generals are happy to negotiate a withdrawal from government under favorable economic conditions. ¹²⁹

Personalist regimes, or dictatorships, on the other hand, lack both the impressive institutional ethos of a professional military establishment as well as the foresight of a

¹²⁵ See, for example: Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes;” Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” and for a more current perspective, Brownlee, “Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization,” especially chapters 1 and 2
¹²⁶ Recall the latter discussion of post-Tiananmen China. Beijing won MFN status from the U.S. shortly after the crackdown, and acceded to the WTO in 2001.
¹²⁷ Perlmutter, “The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes”
¹²⁸ Jay Ulfelder, “Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes.” Comparative Political Studies, 44 (September 2011), pp. 1123-1151
well-run party machine to undertake robust corporatist projects. Essentially, they represent the vilest and least stable aspects of autocracy; they survive through sheer coercion and the selective distribution of rewards and patronage to cronies, loyalists, and members of the inner circle, who are often connected to the top levels of power through ties of kinship. Because their support base is so narrow and resources they can independently marshal so limited, personalist regimes often rely on foreign patrons to stay afloat, as well as shallow attempts to inspire popular legitimacy through a “cult of personality.”\textsuperscript{130} Reluctant to lose their monopoly on resources and fearful of retribution from the domestic enemies they often accrue, these regimes attempt to cling to power for as long as possible. Dictators appear willing to negotiate their exit only when faced by substantial pressure from foreign lenders, sustained bloody public protest, or outside military intervention. When they fall from power, it happens violently.\textsuperscript{131} Given their constricted maneuverability due to very shallow selectorates and narrow winning coalitions, military regimes and dictatorships prove ultimately untenable setups.

From this broad conceptual survey, we can parse out four general variables essential to authoritarian survival. I term these: 1) institutional ethos; 2) ideational ethos; 3) coercion, and 4) corporatism. I have delineated these variables in Table 3.1 below, and coded “yes” or “no” to indicate their presence or absence for the corresponding regime types. While patronage might be included as a fifth mechanism, I have omitted it because it is an absolute constant in any autocracy. To be authoritarian is to distribute some form of patronage in exchange for political loyalty and/or acquiescence; there is no avoiding that. The question is how sustainably and on what scale the process is carried

\textsuperscript{130} H.E. Chehabi and Juan L. Linz (editors), \textit{Sultanistic Regimes}. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998
\textsuperscript{131} Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown,” 25
out; corporatism captures this dynamic.\textsuperscript{132} At first glance, coercion might seem another constant. As discussed in the previous chapter, repression in one form or another is a mainstay of all autocracies. There is a key difference, however, in a regime’s emphasis on sheer coercion as a \textit{primary} survival tool vs. a last line of defense. While single-party regimes and monarchies are not afraid to deploy coercion, they typically wait to do so until the more preferred strategies of corporatism or patronage distribution fail. Military regimes and to a greater extent dictatorships, are by contrast, highly coercive. Hence, a positive coding for “coercion” indicates regimes that embrace it as a primary tool.

Table 3.1: Ideal-Typic Autocratic Survival Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Institutional Ethos</th>
<th>Ideational Ethos</th>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Corporatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-Party</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist/Dictatorship</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarian</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Institutional ethos” refers to the primacy of a \textit{definable} central organization (or, in some cases, two or three) within a regime’s power base. As alluded to above, single-party regimes survive through the apparatus of a dominant party mediating elite conflict and preventing popular unrest by entrenching corporatist networks throughout society. Armed forces can at times play important, if not seminal, supporting or behind-the-scenes roles in single-party regimes as well.\textsuperscript{133} Despite the obvious institutional centrality of militaries within military regimes, scholars have concluded that only those formats that have gradually redistributed power increasingly away from the military in favor of civilians prove durable. Military officer-premiers who have insulated themselves from

\textsuperscript{132} “Clientelism” refers to a shallower form of patronage
\textsuperscript{133} See, for example, Steven A. Cook, \textit{Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey}. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007
their societies while reorienting their mission foci from national defense toward increased managerialism, politicization, and internal security have been destined to crumble. History has indeed shown that military organizations are more concerned with serving themselves than the state, and consequently more often than not represent a transit point to either democracy or other modes of authoritarianism, rather than an end in and of itself. Hence, we must take military regimes’ deceivingly strong institutional ethos—i.e. on the military—with a grain of salt. Personalist regimes lack a definable institutional ethos altogether; they shun social pluralism and recruit elites based on shallow ties of kinship and clientelism. Paths to career advancement in key organizations like the military and civil service are unpredictable, and appointments to key positions often arbitrary. While they are more concerned with staying in power than their military counterparts, dictators’ lack of a strategic vision for doing so renders coercion the only real institution of choice. While totalitarian regimes—which I discuss further below—rely on many institutions to entrench power, there is no clear-cut institutional power center. Hannah Arendt aptly characterized this phenomenon by analogizing totalitarian regimes to onions; an all-powerful leader sits in the onion’s center, shrouding himself within multiple countervailing layers of bureaucracy that are ignorant of what the other layers are doing. Monarchies have a more unique institutional ethos. While it is not as administratively complex or efficient as a dominant party, the office of a king, *emir*, or sultan is positioned uniquely to control all matters of high policy while exuding a certain regal legitimacy that enables him to stand above the fray of daily political life. At the

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135 Chehabi and Linz, “Sultanistic Regimes,” 25
same time, his two-pronged command of the purse and security apparatus allows the monarch to combine the tools of coercion and patronage distribution in a manner rendering his overthrow by most means arduous if not downright unjustifiable.

“Ideational ethos” refers to the primacy of a certain ideology or doctrine within a regime’s survival strategy. Ideology entails a systematic set of ideas or ideals serving as a regime’s legitimizing blueprint in all matters of policy, particularly foreign and economic. Scholars of authoritarianism have not traditionally placed much stock in the role of ideology. Linz characterized autocracies as polities with “limited but not responsible political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideologies, but distinctive mentalities, without extensive [ideological mass] political mobilization.” For Linz and others, ideology factored mainly into the developmental stage of the authoritarian project; dominant parties used the power of bold claims and ideas regarding the transformation of society and mobilization of a “new nation” to amass followings early on. Yet once faced with the formidable tasks of statebuilding—collecting taxes, agency oversight and staffing, etc.—as well as the omnipresent challenge of popular resistance on primordial or personal grounds, corporatist imperatives largely trumped ideology. To the extent that leaders required ideational appeals, they employed a less systematic “mentality.” In the cases of military and personalistic regimes, coercion and clientelism trumped ideology absolutely. It was only totalitarian regimes that were characterized—both by scholars and the historical record—by a truly unabashed attempt to dominate individuals in all aspects of life through commitment to a sophisticated pervasive official ideology combined with

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state terror. No cases within the rogue population–with the potential exceptions of North Korea until the early-mid 1980s and Democratic Kampuchea from 1975-78–qualify as totalitarian. Yet even these cases are distinct from totalitarianism as conventionally understood; they operate according to far more clearly defined institutional logics than the elusive onion models posited by such classical theorists as Brzezinski and Arendt. It is also notable that they are not great powers; the cases serving as the basis for initial theorizing on totalitarianism were.

A brief note on monarchies is also in order here. Of the fifteen monarchies still in existence, none are considered free, nine are considered “not free,” and the remaining six “partly free.” One, Saudi Arabia, ranks at the very bottom of Freedom House’s list of worst human rights violators, alongside Syria and Burma. They are also remarkably stable–a 2003 study cited 13 monarchies in existence at the time of writing, as compared to 15 in 1972. These statistics could arguably make an initial case for monarchies’ inclusion in the rogue population. Yet despite their seemingly clear proclivity toward internal violence, I omit them from the rogue states conversation outright. No monarchy past the 20th century–with the potential exception of Saudi Arabia–has engaged in the aversive behaviors I’ve associated with roguery, including the commission of mass killings or genocidal campaigns. It is also notable, though not surprising, that within the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia–the only three world regions

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140 North Korea, for example, operates through three clear dominant institutions: The Korean Workers’ Party; The Korean People’s Army; and the Kim family. Nazi Germany, by contrast, boasted at least six different centers of power all attempting to outbid and outmaneuver one another in the hopes of attaining greater closeness to the Führer.
141 “Combined Average Ratings–Independent Countries, 2011” Freedom House
142 Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism”
still containing substantial monarchies—these regimes fall within the upper half of their respective regional globalization scales. These data are consistent with central claims in the theoretical literature cited above regarding the survivability of monarchies. Indeed, the monarch appears the only type of autocrat able to stably master the four mechanisms of autocratic survival.

INTEGRATING ROGUES INTO THE AUTOCRACY CONVERSATION

Given these general coalitional survival mechanisms observable across the modern authoritarian universe, how can we characterize rogues? Do they fit into the conventional ideal-typic categories, or is there perhaps something more unique about the configurations of their coalitions’ stakeholders that might help us explain the subtypes identified within the rogue population? The extant literature provides some intriguing and encouraging clues in confronting these questions. Within her study, Geddes observed some autocracies not easily identifiable on an institutional level as either exclusively single party, military nor personalist. In certain cases, a party bureaucracy, military apparatus, or leading elite(s) personalities could, in various combinations, dually comprise a regime’s power base. Geddes further uncovered a more select group of hybrids in which all three autocratic pillars were in tandem driving the regime. Interestingly, these single party/military/personal (SMP) regimes were found to be the most durable in the study, surviving an average length of 38 years. It was immediately

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144 Oceania contains the miniscule archipelago monarchy of Tonga
145 Michael Herb in particular has argued that as a result of both family control over state institutions and a particular type of popular legitimacy monarchs inspire, monarchies are uniquely, perhaps exceptionally, equipped to overcome challenges that would otherwise wrack and potentially undo a different type of autocracy; See Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999
146 Ethiopia from 1974-1991, for example, was coded as a military/personalist hybrid regime; the personal decisionmaking of strongman Head of State Mengistu Haile Mariam as well as the ruling military junta, The Derg, were each paramount within Addis Ababa’s center.
striking to the author that two key rogue cases (Syria, Burma)—as well as two potential negative cases identified prior to consulting the Geddes data (Egypt, Indonesia)—fell under this characterization. The below table provides a sketch of Geddes’ hybrid population, which I have further subcategorized into either positive or negative rogue cases.\textsuperscript{147} Cases highlighted in yellow represent my own coding decisions when they conflicted with those of Geddes; cases highlighted in magenta represent my modifications to what I have assessed as miscodings by Geddes; cases highlighted in blue represent my coding of cases omitted altogether by Geddes in her study.\textsuperscript{148}

Table 3.2: Positive and Negative Cases of Roguery according to the Geddes Criterion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single Party/Military/Personalist (SMP)</th>
<th>Military/Personalist (MP)</th>
<th>Single Party/Personalist (SP)</th>
<th>Single Party/Military (SM)</th>
<th>Personalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria '63-Present</td>
<td>Egypt '52-'70 '70-'81</td>
<td>Pakistan '77-'88 Nigeria '93-'99</td>
<td>Cambodia*</td>
<td>Haiti '95-Pres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma '62-'88 '88-</td>
<td>Indonesia '67-98</td>
<td>Sudan '89-Present</td>
<td>Afghanistan '96-'01</td>
<td>Gabon '60-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea '48-Present</td>
<td>Paraguay '54-'93</td>
<td>Libya '69-'11</td>
<td>Mauritania '80-</td>
<td>North Korea '48-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba '59-Present</td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger '74-'93</td>
<td>Cuba '59-Present</td>
<td>Rhodesia '65-'79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq '79-'03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran '79-Present</td>
<td></td>
<td>Panama '81-'89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia '89-'01</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chile '73-'89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Cambodia ('75-'79) is characterized by Geddes as a single-party regime

The table provides several intriguing, though by no means conclusive, insights into survival trends among the rogue population that appear to confirm and enrich our

\textsuperscript{147} In cases identified by Geddes as formerly hybrid that later underwent democratic transitions, I made judgments as to whether these might have qualified as rogue (or come close) before the transition. If there was no credible case to be made, such as in Bolivia or Bangladesh, I have not included them in the table. I also leave out hybrid cases of genocide occurring as the result of civil war, such as Rwanda and Burundi, as well as foreign-maintained countries like East Germany (GDR).

\textsuperscript{148} These include: South Africa under the apartheid Nasionale Party (1948-1994); The Islamic Republic of Iran (1979-Present); The Federal Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia (1989-2001); and The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001)
initial speculations regarding rogue subtypes. First, 1) **all rogue regimes are indeed hybrid configurations of autocracy; none would qualify remotely as any one of the singular autocratic ideal-types discussed above.** While Geddes has coded some cases within the rogue population as monolithic autocracies, there are strong arguments to be made against each of these coding decisions, particularly for the “most likely” rogue cases, the garrison regimes. While Ba‘thi Iraq was coded as personalist, for example, recent historical scholarship has uncovered the institutional centrality of both army and party to the vast system of rewards distribution and informant networks responsible for propping Saddam’s regime.\(^{149}\) While Libya under Qadhafi was also coded as personalist, country experts have supported almost unanimously the critical role played by the internal security apparatuses attached to the Revolutionary Committees, as well as the military, in entrenching the Colonel’s vision for a *Jamahiriyya* state system by the mid-1970s, the period during which Tripoli turned to roguery.\(^{150}\) Second, no matter their particular configuration, 2) **rogues are typically, with the exception of Cambodia and Afghanistan, hybrids in which the national security establishment—namely senior officers within the military and intelligence services—comprises a key constituency of the selectorate.** Again, to see this requires a more critical eye toward Geddes’ coding of cases; most germane to our inquiry is the listing of North Korea and Cuba as single party/personalist regimes. Indeed, despite the exclusion of the word “military” from both codings, serious watchers of Pyongyang and Havana note the essentialness of coordination between their regimes’ ruling parties and general officers in stabilizing


recent succession-related scenarios, namely the transfer of power following both Kim Jong-Il’s December 2011 death, as well as the protracted infirmity of Fidel Castro.\footnote{Brian Latell, \textit{The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics}. Miami: University of Miami–Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 2003; Suck-Ho Lee, \textit{Party-Military Relations in North Korea}. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1989; Kyung-Ae Park (editor), \textit{New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy}. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010} Based on the latter two considerations, we can justify moving Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba into the SMP category, and Libya into the military/personalist category.

The reader will note that I have included Yugoslavia and Iran in the SMP category as well; since Geddes does not account for these cases, their codings also merit some further clarification. The spawn and survival of the breakaway Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) depended upon a strategic confluence of the three autocratic pillars. The commanding personality of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic was able–largely through inflammatory speeches and raucous pro-Serb demonstrations–to amass a popular following, and tap effectively into radical nationalist sentiments being espoused by prominent Serbian intellectuals at the time. The Socialist Party of Serbia provided a bureaucratic mechanism through which Milosevic could actualize his agenda, and a predominantly Serbian officer corps within the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) assumed increasingly active regime roles, both economically through interstate weapons sales and domestic armament programs, and politically through party activities including recruiting, senior leadership, and even party formation.\footnote{John R. Lampe, \textit{Yugoslavia As History: Twice There Was a Country}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000} Iran is a slightly more complicated case, as its primary political party functioned for only seven short years after the 1979 founding of the Islamic Republic. Prior to its dissolution in 1987, the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) was indeed instrumental as a vehicle for consolidating the power of the pro-Khomeini clergy, outbidding its potential rivals on the national scene, and
neutering popular demands for greater pluralism.\textsuperscript{153} The regime also hinged upon the personalism of Ayatollah Khomeini; his notion of \textit{velayat e-faqih} (The Guardianship of the Jurist) invoked a divinely ordained right to vest state sovereignty directly in the hands of the \textit{faqih}—meaning only Khomeini—and institutions linked to the clergy. Iran’s premier security apparatus—the \textit{Pasdaran}, or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—which was mandated initially to protect the state’s Islamic system, has grown into an increasingly central regime actor, overtaking all key strategic and operational portfolios while accruing vast corporate and business interests extending into the multibillions of dollars.\textsuperscript{154} These developments, in tandem with the capability of the clerical establishment to supplant IRP functions following its exit from public life in the late 80’s, still render Iran an SMP regime even though a nominally single party no longer sits at or near its helm.

Now what of the guerilla rogue states, which appear confined to the single party/personalist (SP) category? Geddes’ original coding of Democratic Kampuchea as a single-party regime may appear at first glance well justified due to the institutional predominance of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK, or Khmer Rouge) within Cambodia from 1975-79. Further probing, however, indicates that personalist agendas within the Khmer Rouge steadily outmatched pure single-party rule after the organization took power. Indeed, the CPK’s project became defined increasingly by its central leadership’s relentless campaign to protect their privileged status through entrenching top-down control and murdering all potential sources of threat. The CPK’s \textit{Tou Samouth}

\textsuperscript{153} This included stamping out popular demands for broadly based elections for a constituent assembly, and instead vetting candidates for the narrowly based Guardian Council
faction–comprised of French-educated elite apparatchiks attached to Prime Minister Saloth Sar (aka Pol Pot), and their followers within the single officially “approved Khmer race”–targeted not only obvious potential adversaries such as non-Khmer peasants and grassroots leaders, but also key elements within party ranks, including proven revolutionaries with “suspect” backgrounds and even senior officials, many of whom were of Khmer origin;\textsuperscript{155} hence my decision to recode Cambodia SP. Note that I have also coded Afghanistan alongside Cambodia in the SP category. While the Taliban was indeed the sole official institution designated to rule Afghanistan at the time, its regime also developed deeply personalist tendencies immediately upon assuming control. Contrary to their claims of Islamic piety, Mullah Mohammed Omar and his senior lieutenants were attentive mainly to the interests of warlords and regional potentates, with whom they benefitted mutually from smuggling operations and the lucrative opium trade, while the majority of the Afghan population remained destitute.\textsuperscript{156}

Given their SP status, the IEA and DK were the only cases qualifying as rogues, according to the Geddes criterion, that lacked a professional and effective national military-security apparatus occupying a central regime role. Might we cursorily establish a link between the short lifespan of these regimes to this relative absence? A brief assessment in the context of the two cases points to the affirmative. Throughout the late 1970s, Pol Pot ordered cross-border raids by the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK) into neighboring Vietnam, sparking retaliatory incursions and eventually occupation by the Vietnamese military. Disaffected senior officers within the RAK itself in fact proved ultimately instrumental in assisting the Vietnamese operation. It appeared,


then, that the failure of CPK leadership to properly integrate and deploy its military instrument resulted in no small part in the regime’s rapid fall from power. In the Afghan case, despite the mass killings sanctioned by Mullah Omar against the Afghan population, (approximately 400,000 deaths) the Taliban did not field a security apparatus sufficient to even control the entirety of Afghanistan’s territory, something nearly unheard of among regimes employing repression on that scale. Further absent from the Taliban’s arsenal was a professional standing military; even its elite unit—the so-called 055 Brigade—consisted of former mujahideen militiamen loyal primarily to Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, not Kabul. It was no wonder that following Al Qaeda’s launch of the 9/11 attacks—which, of course, occurred with the Taliban’s blessing—U.S troops routed Taliban forces from Kabul within a month of the start of Operation Enduring Freedom.

These observations lead to a couple further key hypotheses: 3) A competent and extensive national security complex is indeed seminal to maintaining a durable rogue state, particularly with regards to containing the interstate fall-out that can result from engaging in suppression, and to a greater extent provocation. The IEA and DK demonstrate this lesson with respect to both the practices of regional destabilization and state sponsorship of terrorism, respectively. We can further derive three corollary hypotheses from this observation: 3a) Guerilla rogues are prone to shorter lifespans because they fail to convert the paramilitary organizations used to

158 Throughout its tenure, the Taliban controlled approximately 90% of Afghan territory, with the remaining 10% under the control of the so-called “Northern Alliance,” a Tajik-dominated political-military umbrella organization led by former Afghan Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. See The Military Balance. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996-2001
159 See, for example, Daniel Eisenberg, “Secrets of Brigade 055,” Time Magazine World. 28 October 2001. Accessed online at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,181591,00.html>
overtake the state into an apparatus effectively diffusing both political and security responsibilities. By extension, rogues built on single-party/personalist structures will likely be short-lived; 3b) Given the ability of a civilian party apparatus to both neutralize potentially devastating internal conflicts among the elite and populace and, in tandem with a robust military-security complex, reasonably disperse political and security imperatives, rogue cases boasting SMP regimes will be the most durable; and 3c) Strong personalism and a viable military-security complex juxtaposed to weak civilian institutions render military-personalist regimes prone to a tactical focus on security and personalist imperatives at the expense of strategic statebuilding priorities. While they may be more durable than the single party/personalist setups the likes of DK and the IEA, these regimes are peppered by increasingly significant challenges and setbacks—notably deteriorating security and infrastructural conditions—bound to intensify as a result of persistently short-sighted winning coalitions and increasingly shallow popular support bases. The two primary cases within this category, Pakistan and Sudan, appear to corroborate these hypotheses at first glance. The recent writings of one Pakistan specialist are particularly edifying: [Pakistan] “is the story of how a self-absorbed feudal political class disposed to kick problems down the road, and a powerful army in love with its image and bewitched by its obsession with India thought they could advance Pakistani foreign policy goals without having to pay a steep price for it and were proved wrong.”160

Another interesting observation—and by extension hypothesis—emerges upon integrating South Africa into our population analysis. As the sole single-party/military

regime within the population, white South Africa’s appeared the only leadership under investigation to really eschew a personalist ethos. While its utmost commitment was to the Afrikaner-dominated apartheid state,\textsuperscript{161} it was Pretoria’s two primary institutional, not personal, actors—the Nationalist Party (NP) and defense establishment—which would uphold it. While all of its rogue counterparts retained for their entire duration the leadership of a single individual, family, tribe, or exclusive intra-institutional clique, South Africa experienced leadership turnover five times throughout its rogue tenure. Its turn to roguery was not personal; it resulted from a rising consensus among top NP leadership during the 1960s prime ministership of Hendrik Verwoerd that the optimal way to maintain apartheid, while protecting the country from rising opposition to it by blacks within the newly independent surrounding nations as well as South Africa itself, was to expand the organs of state security\textsuperscript{162} and afford them a more prominent place in national politics.\textsuperscript{163} This was enshrined within the worldview of “total onslaught.” Its exit from roguery was not personal either. When President F.W. de Klerk and the African National Congress (ANC) commenced negotiations in 1990 that would eventually terminate apartheid, a parallel track on national military integration between the South African Defense Force (SADF) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)—the “Spear of the Nation,” the ANC’s military wing—materialized almost immediately.\textsuperscript{164} South Africa was also the only rogue whose eventual re-socialization into the international community materialized alongside an organic democratic transition. Hence, we can hypothesize that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Its other sins included a nuclear weapons program and regional destabilization
\item Specifically the South African Defense Force (SADF), Department of Defense, the South African Police, and intelligence community
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
4) the presence of personalism in rogues corresponds positively with their
determination to stay the rogue course; it is correlated inversely with the willingness
to alter behavior, or especially, abdicate power. In other words, the more
professional and dispassionate the institutions of rogue governance, the more
conducive they are to new possibilities and outside engagement. To students of
autocracy this observation should come as no surprise. Indeed, the more leaders have
invested personally in their leadership, the more they stand to lose in the face of regime
failure, including their own privileges, resources, and even lives. At the same time, the
more leaders infuse their personal designs and dogmas into their tenures, the less room
there stands for alternative centers of power to take root. Particularly when executed in
tandem with other authoritarian measures, personalism adds that element of
“stubbornness” so often associated with roguery.

Assessing these cases in light of the wisdom on authoritarianism as well as the
Geddes framework allows us to tease out important observations overlooked by previous
analyses of roguery, as it relates to both typological work on authoritarianism as well as
the relevant IR literatures. Namely, it appears an institutional savvy combined with the
ability to pick and choose selectively from the authoritarian toolkit that allows rogues to
sidestep chronic and sometimes terminal weaknesses faced by likeminded regimes,
especially by the “purer” variants of autocracy, be they single party, military, or
dictatorship. Here we are reminded of the peculiar and perhaps contradictory reality of
the rogue state identified in the previous chapter; it can at times be both static and fluid,
both stable and volatile. It is precisely these tensions, when considered in light of their
non-great power statuses, which render the aversion practiced by rogues so perplexing to
Western strategists. Table 3.3 below provides a general summary of this assessment; it is a replica of Table 3.1 with the addition of rogue states as a category. As the table displays, rogue states can find ways to be well institutionalized without resorting to the painstaking practice of corporatism, and extremely coercive without constricting their power bases to perilously shallow levels. This is a balancing act seemingly unattainable by most marginal autocracies, except for monarchies, which as discussed, possess key exceptional features.

Table 3.3: Rogues in the Context of Ideal-Typic Autocratic Survival Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Institutional Ethos</th>
<th>Ideational Ethos</th>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Corporatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-Party</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist/Dictatorship</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarian</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogue</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DIFFERENTIATION–THE INITIATION OF THE ROGUE PATHWAY**

We have heretofore defined rogues clearly as practitioners of aversion and placed our population in an empirical and conceptual context arguing for something distinctive about their survivability. Considering also the basic premise that states, like individuals, are purposive actors, we can surmise that rogues are states whose particular survival concerns and national security objectives actually render them prone to aversion. In other words, rogues exist in a reality different from what we may consider “normal” or “socialization-prone” states, whereby behaviors that distinguish, not connect, them from the world outside come to form part and parcel of an overall survival calculus. This

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165 There is wide consensus on this across the main schools of IR thought. See Duncan Snidal and Christian Reus-Smit (editors), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008
process, which I call differentiation, is fundamental to explaining roguery.\footnote{The concept of differentiation is grounded, \textit{inter alia}, in sociological systems theory. See particularly the works of Niklas Luhmann such as: \textit{Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity}. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002; \textit{Social Systems}. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995; and \textit{Ecological Communication}. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989} While aversion represents the particular policy choices of the regime, differentiation captures its conception of self relative to others, its \textit{worldview}. What do we mean by worldview?

Worldviews characterize and influence the way individuals interact with reality, and encompass sets of ideals, principles, and doctrines that explain how society should work, what aspects of the current societal order need to be revised and corrected, and why these imperfections existed in the first place.\footnote{This notion of a worldview and its application to political behavior draws from work in psychology.} Worldviews also offer blueprints for actions, objectives, and goals, specifically \textit{vis-à-vis} the allocation of power and to what ends it should be deployed.\footnote{See Thomas S. Mowle, “Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict.” \textit{Political Psychology}, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2003), pp. 561-592} A state’s worldview can encompass secular ideology, religious beliefs, or the strategic cultural orientations of leading institutional actors such as party apparatchiks or military officers. All states operate according to some worldview, and all worldviews are determined at least in part by how leaders see themselves relative to the world outside.

Not all leaderships, however, weigh external and internal forces equally. We might further distinguish between \textit{progressive} and \textit{reactive} worldviews. Progressive worldviews emphasize the state’s own cultural and historical experiences to define and over time, reformulate and reinvent, a place \textit{within} the international community. Reactive worldviews, on the other hand, are characterized by a sense of historical nihilism; they underscore a notion that the world outside has treated the state unfairly, leaving it underprivileged and vulnerable. Regimes may reinterpret history in light of
these forces and legitimize themselves as combatants on the front line against them; yet in so doing they must also contextualize themselves in opposition to international society. Rogue regimes are initially spawned through such reactive worldviews; they espouse perceptions of threat through a filter of besiegement and encirclement.

Consider the “Serbian nationalism” expressed by Milosevic and his lieutenants. Despite the fact that Serbs suffered the largest casualties in both world wars and deserved special credit for the 1918 creation and 1945 resurrection of Yugoslavia, they argued, non-Serbs had repeatedly “slapped them in the face,” conspiring to create two separate states–Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina–in which Serbs would become persecuted national minorities.169 Such views are not unique among our population; all of the included cases–no matter their size and extent of provocation–share an acute sensitivity and awareness to perceived existential survival challenges, challenges that would come to constitute lifebloods of their domestic and foreign politics. Even in cases where the primary actual source of threat to the regime is internal, leadership will tend to link these to a deleterious external influence. In some cases, they really believe in their own paranoia; in others claims are made primarily for purposes of advantage. Either way, the justifications are present and pervasive. The reader will note that in Table 3.3, I have ascribed rogues a positive value for “ideational ethos.” While their ideational claims may not be as widely uncontested as in a typical monarchy, or systematically articulated and aggressively enforced as in a typical totalitarian state, rogue regimes espouse a reactive worldview as a means to pay homage to and justify the union of personalities and institutions defending their systems.

Examples of these processes among our population are clear. In its founding document proclaiming the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, for instance, the Burma Revolutionary Council carved out explicitly a special place for the “existing defense services. . .[to] be developed to become national armed forces” charged with protecting “the socialist economy” and blocking external influences.\(^\text{170}\) South African political and defense officials ceaselessly cited the “total onslaught” of Soviet-backed Marxism and other malicious outside forces to legitimize the increased activism of the military.\(^\text{171}\) The official North Korean ideology of _juche_, self-reliance, alludes constantly to the exigency of a dominant military-party system so as to never let down the state’s guard against its many enemies. As the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il wrote,

> A state without self-reliant armed forces capable of defending the country from the enemies at home and abroad when imperialism exists cannot, in fact, be called a completely independent sovereign state. . .Imperialism is a constant cause of war, and the main force of aggression and war today is U.S. imperialism. . .Self-reliant defense is a military guarantee for a nation’s political independence and economic self-sufficiency.\(^\text{172}\)

If it was not already obvious to the reader from both glancing at the rogue population and considering the marginal status characteristic we have imposed, all of our cases hail from the developing world. This is certainly no accident, and a basic recounting of the post-independence trajectories of all these cases demonstrates how wider concerns associated with third world statebuilding could nudge embryonic rogues on the path of differentiation. These concerns encompass a messy configuration of internal challenges—populational cleavages along ethno-nationalist lines, weak


institutions, the nature of wealth distribution, and imposition of artificial national boundaries—alongside external ones—tenuous security environments, regional conflict, wariness of neighbors’ intentions, and the fall-out from great or imperial power intervention. The reader will also note from Table 2.7 that nearly every rogue state was at some point the victim of colonialism. While Iran is the singular exception to this rule, Persia experienced consistent and intensive foreign penetrations throughout its existence; the strategic rivalry between the British and Russian Empires for control of Central Asia throughout the initial half of the nineteenth century—the so-called “Great Game”—is a case in point. This must also be taken seriously; the conventional wisdom on the developing world teaches us that the departure of colonialism acts as a significant accelerator to the panoply of threats identified above. In their colonial pasts, the dominion of outside powers provided a framework through which these instabilities could be suppressed and contained; rather than fighting one another, for example, primordial groups could coexist through “cross-cutting” mechanisms like the education system. In a post-colonial world equating political relevance only with the possession of a nation-state, however, the desire to be acknowledged translated into the need—perhaps obsession—to dominate the state outright, a process wrought inescapably by struggle.

Within these scenarios, emerging leaders, or political entrepreneurs, contextualize such challenges—and even more importantly, challengers—as pivotal reference points in defining the complex environs they inherit, and identifying the threats with which they must contend in garnering legitimacy and security within them. The

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nascent entrepreneurial worldview undergoes a Darwinian process of diffusion throughout the aspiring body elite, serving as a metric by which the most committed individuals can outbid and purge potential adversaries, while capturing more adherents to a selectorate that is loyal to the reactive beliefs. Successful diffusion and the continued assurance of outbidding require a symbiotic interdependence among entrepreneur and a coalition that contains an ideationally receptive coercer. As outbidding continues, each party becomes further enmeshed in a relationship in which its material and institutional security depends almost unconditionally upon the other. Coalitions are charged to address not only how power should be wielded and distributed at home, but also the state’s posture toward socialization and its potential feedback effects on the coalition’s now established reactive position. Foundational worldviews frame the formulation of coalitional missions, or grand strategies, perpetually bearing in mind and inflating the potential threats—at home, regionally, and throughout the world—to regime survival, and devising as well as justifying the political, economic, and military means to counteract them. The empirical reality of the threats is not what is critical; it is rather the justifications deployed to assess them. The subsequent nature of grand strategies depends on a complex interface between the nascent worldview, on-the-ground institutional imperatives, and the historical context in which the state comes of age.

Let us briefly consider these contentions in the context of the Syrian case. The 1970 Corrective Revolution engineered by Hafiz al-Asad accommodated the progressively insatiable ambitions of personality—the historically marginalized and impoverished ‘Alawi minority sect from which Asad hailed would now dominate key

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175 For more on the outbidding thesis, see, for example, Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism.” *International Security* Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 49-80
official and business portfolios—the Ba'ath Party—whose commanding performance in the 1954 elections and growing appeal throughout the region cemented its status as a rising star in both domestic and inter-Arab politics—and the Syrian military—whose influence heightened throughout the 1950s with the consolidation of a cohesive ‘Alawi officer corps and its infiltration into Ba’thi cadres.\textsuperscript{176} Syria’s historical background—defined by internal chaos and inter-class resentment following the departure of the French Mandate during the late 1940s, as well as a belief among Syrian intellectuals in a historic homeland of \textit{Bilad al-Sham}, or “Greater Syria,” encompassing the territories of modern-day Lebanon and Palestine, and in Damascus as the epicenter of the Pan-Arab universe—provided fertile and vulnerable entry for these institutions to stake their claims. The reactive nature of the worldview, including an official “state of emergency” justified on the grounds of ever-present confrontation with the sworn Israeli nemesis, reinforced the legitimacy of the new state and its pillars. Hinnebusch’s words capture this confluence of dynamics within Syria’s political development:

The Ba’th state, the product of a nationalist party and an army radicalized by the conflict with Israel, developed, under Asad, into a huge national-security apparatus designed to confront Israel. The consolidation of the state was accompanied by the concentration of power in Asad’s hands . . . it was accepted within the political elite as necessary to confront the gravest threat the country and regime had ever faced, a defeat and occupation brought on by the weakness and recklessness of a factionalized regime.\textsuperscript{177}

Despite the stark relevancy of these observations to our population, is it not the case that all autocracies—and regimes for that matter—depend upon some type of bargain between political entrepreneurs and the central institutions of state power? The key feature of this bargain in the rogue context, it seems, is that it is formed through a filter of


\textsuperscript{177} Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policy of Syria,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (editors), \textit{The Foreign Policies of Middle East States}. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 141-166, 147
fear, anxiety, and even rejection upon the state’s point of contact with international society. This point encompasses not only simple economic considerations, but also its effects on local identity and its attendant regimes, institutions, and values. Etel Solingen’s work on the relationships between coalitional structure and international behavior is helpful in bringing this critical juncture into sharper focus. Solingen argues that in their formative stages, coalitional strategies materialize from a cost-benefit calculation regarding the intensity with which states should pursue interaction with the international community. *Internationalizing coalitions* equate national security with the fruits of socialization. They promote economic and trade openness, encourage foreign investment, and reinforce ties to multilateral institutions, while eschewing the mobilization of resources for potential military conflict “so as to both avoid unproductive, inflation-inducing investments and budgetary drain under the shroud of “national security” and undercut backlash beneficiaries of state rents.” 178 *Backlash coalitions*, by contrast, spawn and reproduce to combat socialization’s ill-perceived effects. They set out to

preserve state entrepreneurship and military-industrial allocations, resist external pressures for economic liberalization and intrusions on sovereignty, and target internationalizing adversaries at home and abroad. Regional insecurity and competition is a natural side-effect at best, and a dominant requirement at worst, of this grand strategy. Regional cooperation threatens backlash coalitions because it scales back military imperatives, erodes statist privileges, and devalues nationalist and confessional myth-making as a political currency. 179

Solingen’s words breathe life into our earlier observations regarding the survivability of rogue coalitions and their dependency on the military-security complex; indeed, if a leader is fully committed to shunning internationalization for the purposes of

179 Ibid., 524
advantage described above, hitching his wagons to the might of this complex appears a calculated necessary decision.\textsuperscript{180}

There is another necessary historical condition common to our population that merits attention here. The beginnings of roguery, and by implication the edification of bonds between political entrepreneurs and coalitioners it entails, are rooted fundamentally in a quest to break from the past. Ours are regimes that express a need to not only establish new principles of legitimacy, but to further insure those principles represent a discontinuity from the tainted ones of regimes prior. Whether it was Qadhafi charting a radical new course for Libya to supplant a defunct, corrupted, and Western-propped Sanusi Monarchy, Kim Il-Sung steering North Korea away from the yoke of Japanese imperialism that had strangled it prior to the Korean War as well as a U.S. poised to take its place in that war’s wake, or Ayatollah Khomeini vying to raise an Islamic Republic from the ashes of the Shah, these states’ futures would have to come both radically and expediently at the expense of their pasts. At its inaugural National Convention in 1975, the Khmer Rouge went so far as to even declare “Year Zero” on Cambodia’s new revolutionary calendar. No rogue, wrote Nincic, “came to power via fully institutionalized means; none could convincingly claim a right to rule rooted in the legitimacy of the \textit{process} that brought them to power. Each established its position by rejecting foundational political principles that applied before its accession to power.”\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{180} We might further note that internationalizing coalitions, according to Solingen, are likely to form in what she calls “zones of stable peace;” they are likely to in turn nurture and sustain such environments, bearing “positive global externalities by minimizing risk . . . and enhancing [their] reputation as credible members of the new global institutional order.” Backlash coalitions, on the other hand, will likely emerge out of more threatening regional circumstances, embracing solutions–be they economic closure, pervasive militarization, or nationalist brinkmanship–that in turn bear negative security externalities. See Solingen, “Mapping Internationalization,” 537

\textsuperscript{181} Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 69
THE MECHANICS OF REPRODUCTION

For the nascent reactionary selectorate, establishing a clean break from the past is not a particularly easy feat, and may require extreme methods to demonstrate the regime’s seriousness to both internal challengers and the outside world. If a coalition of a new ethno-religious or societal ilk, for example, now occupies power—as was the case with Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Africa, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia—campaigns of systematic suppression “may establish a contrast with a predecessor accused of laxness regarding the dominant ethnicity’s interests.”\(^{182}\) In the case of new regimes emerging in the wake of regional conflict and compelled to contrast themselves with a previous administration’s inattentiveness—whether real or imagined—to national security and interstate prestige, the practices of provocation might accomplish the job.\(^{183}\) Official rhetoric is continually deployed to heighten the fear of adversaries and their institutions—often making claims of their designs to obstruct the state’s “purer” and more “benevolent” intentions—while continuing to outbid potential sources of intra-regime rivalry. Consider Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi’s writings against liberal democracy in favor of his own Jamahiriyya state:

Traditional democracy, prevalent in our world today, confers upon members of parliament a sanctity and an immunity it denies ordinary citizens. Parliaments have thus become a means of confiscating and monopolizing the power of the people. Such a state of affairs gives the people the right to struggle, by waging a revolution to destroy these instruments—the so-called representative assemblies which monopolize democracy and sovereignty, and usurp the will of the masses. The masses will rise and proclaim the new principle in a thundering cry: “No, to representation of the people.”\(^{184}\)

The relentless proliferation of such sentiments effectively harden the process of differentiation. “State of emergency” laws and other restrictive security policies are

\(^{182}\) Ibid.
\(^{183}\) Ibid.
quickly justified for purposes of maintaining readiness in the face of an ever-possible assault, whether physical or ideational. The worldview continues to demonize its many enemies, equating them to “paper tigers” or other symbolically fragile entities facing imminent demise. As this thinking reprocesses, rogues’ political economies are increasingly oriented not toward addressing the needs of an often destitute population, but incentivizing the continued allegiance of the military and internal security apparatuses. Stakeholders naturally become further locked further into towing the regime’s line, eschewing the entry of pro-internationalization elements into the coalition and insulating themselves from alternative strategic plans or centers of power. A cycle has now begun in which the line between regime survival and norm-violation becomes increasingly nonexistent.

Burma’s armed forces—or Tatmadaw—enshrined officially in the 1960s as high protector of the state and its socialist economy, for example, have put in place a system whereby senior officers control and abuse the vast majority of state territory, regularly confiscating additional lands to support their own agricultural and manufacturing enterprises and insure profitable concessions in mining and timber logging. Not only have Burma’s generals distorted irrevocably the economy of one of the most resource-rich lands on earth, but have demonstrated a stomach for increasingly unsavory tactics to secure these sources of power. These include, inter alia, displacing Shan tribes along the Thai border for use of their farmland, encouraging the use of forced labor for public works projects, turning a blind eye to trafficking in children and narcotics, sanctioning rape as a control tactic by soldiers, and pursuing security cooperation with North
Korea. And why not? Rogues like Burma can cite a disadvantageous balance of power, to which they have themselves contributed, to continually justify the privileges of their key institutions.

While such assertions might appear novel in framing the reproduction of roguery, they have fairly solid grounding in extant IR wisdom. Robert Putnam’s work, for example, demonstrates how domestic desperation can actually give rogue states a certain credibility within “two-player games,” which may come to preclude outside players from inducing changes in their behavior though negotiations. With the hardening of differentiation and the subsequent growth of what Putnam calls “isolationist” forces within the regime, rogue coalitions are defined by increasingly small numbers of “win-sets” committed to virtually the same overarching policies. Political entrepreneurs have fixed investments in specific policymaking patterns that maintain differentiation, and the terms of international deals offering new political-economic linkages will inherently force them to consider reshaping their coalitions by incorporating internationalist elements at the expense of aversive ones. Internationalizing coalitions might, in turn, legitimately threaten a regime by generating yet another independent power center in the form of a merchant class. Syria today is faced with the potential dangers of this scenario. Hafiz al-Asad’s limited experiments with economic liberalization throughout the 1990s gave rise to an empowered “Sunni bourgeoisie;” it is according to some accounts now this very group that is poised to endanger the regime’s stranglehold on power in the event of its defection, which according to some experts is

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186 Putnam defines win-sets as follows: For a given national-level constituency, the set of all possible international agreements that would be received favorably; larger win-sets make international agreements more likely.
already taking place. As negotiators, then, rogue entrepreneurs seem better served to steer clear of such threatening prospects by making fewer international agreements and driving much harder bargains in those that they do.

In their work on selectorate theory, moreover, Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue that leaders in such highly selective coalition structures as rogues will devote resources to private benefits for supporters to compensate for policy failures. Ceteris paribus, the theory assumes that resources committed to private goods are necessarily spread more thinly as the winning coalition increases, while the value of public goods to its members would not decrease if the coalition grew. Given the omnipresence of salient external threats with which selective backlash rogue coalitions insist only they are suited to contend, as well as the heights of power to which coalition constituents have through such claims grown accustomed, it becomes extremely difficult for leaders to justify drastically augmenting or reorienting their coalitions along these lines. This is particularly so in the face of a populace consistently sidelined and unaware of the true costs of isolation, and an elite establishment willing to fight hard to maintain its privileges. These literatures demonstrate how as roguery becomes more entrenched among the coalition supporting it, it can very well raise the international stakes of compliance to a point of no return.

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187 See, for example, Joshua Landis, “The Shabiha Causes Horror–The Unraveling is Sure to Speed Up.” Syria Comment (9 June 2012). Available online at: <http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=14878>
189 Private goods are those enjoyed by a select few among the coalition’s stakeholders—such as food surpluses and luxury items—as opposed to public goods such as national defense, which are enjoyed by the entire population.
STAYING FLEXIBLE–STRATEGIES OF SURVIVAL AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ROGUERY

The stubborn reproduction of roguery occurs not only as a result of such par-for-the-course effects of international interaction, but also because the regimes have discovered and developed deft survival strategies with which to handle them.

First, they deploy what I call strategic clientelism. Given that both no regime can survive in absolute global isolation, and the exigencies of differentiation render a singular dependence on any one outside power unfavorable, strategic clientelism presents the opportunity to selectively manipulate and/or intersperse foreign relations among two or more patrons so as to avoid a particular overreliance on any one. This strategy permits maneuverability for states who have little of it to begin with, allows them to shift closer toward one patron during times of tension with another, and play patrons off one another should the need arise. Termed by one writer the “ally from hell,” Pakistan, for instance, has mastered the element of manipulation, leveraging its position at the strategic epicenter of the Global War on Terror to continue receiving significant loan and grant assistance from the United States as well as favorable agreements from global financial institutions (whose mutually agreed-on targets they almost always fail to meet, instead seeking quick renegotiation to more liberal terms), while simultaneously harboring terrorist and jihadi groups, maintaining a nuclear program, and exporting nuclear know-how and technology abroad.\(^{191}\) North Korea excelled at—and to a large extent survived by—counterbalancing Russian and Chinese interests in its affairs throughout the “Sino-

Soviet split” of the post-Korean War era; and Sudan’s seamless acceptance of Chinese backers in the development of its petroleum industry—particularly following the West’s reproach of the genocide and subsequent pullout from joint ventures there—points to Khartoum’s adeptness for such flexibility as well.

Our population demonstrates a corresponding fluidity vis-à-vis the espousal of official ideas; we might refer to this as doctrinal flexibility. Despite an often dogged rhetorical insistence on ideological discipline and purity, rogues can ably straddle ideational lines, accommodating tactical reformulations of doctrine without compromising the fundamental bases of regime security. The ability to be somewhat communist, capitalist, neutralist, etc.—or none of them at all—when convenient allows these regimes to further the dynamic of differentiation abroad while cautiously testing the waters of legitimacy at home. During his 1977 Sabha Declaration–Qaddafi’s major policy speech announcing Libya’s transformation from post-monarchy military regime to Jamahiriyya192—the Libyan leader called for an administrative revolution to bring power to the people and a cultural revolution to eradicate foreign “influences” and “political illnesses.”193 At the same time, he urged the burning of effigies and “books containing imperialist, capitalist, reactionary, Jewish or Communist thought.”194

Doctrinal flexibility is also useful for navigating successions, particularly those sensitive ones surrounding the transfer of power from founding leader to heir apparent. Following the death of his father Hafiz in the summer of 2000, for example, Bashar al-Assad permitted a so-called “Damascus Spring,” toying with reforms that would allow

192 Note that Jamahiriyya is not an actual Arabic word; it was coined by Qadhafi as a pluralized variant of the Arabic word for republic, Jumhuriyya, to denote a government of mass popular authority.
greater freedom of expression, freer flows of information, and increased civil society activity in Syria. At the same time these debates were taking place, though, Bashar was in contact with top “old guard” officials—*inter alia*, Vice President Khaddam and General Intelligence Directorate General Sulayman—to define the limits of and eventually crush potential reform, while maintaining the loyalty of the security establishment. After the passing of Kim Il-Sung and ensuing systemic crisis in North Korea, including widespread famine, Kim Jong-Il began shifting public discourse away from *Juche*–the traditional party-centered doctrine of self-reliance–and increasingly toward *sŏngun chŏngch’ŏl*–the politics of “military first.” This elevated the Korean People’s Army to an almost godlike status, “not simply an institution for national security but a forerunner for socioeconomic rebuilding, as well.”* Sŏngun* was a deliberate and calculated response to a potential loyalty vacuum by officers following the succession, while maintaining the image of an invigorated North Korea to the world outside.

Second, but in a similar vein, rogues display a proclivity for *loose commitments within international and regional organizations*. Our cases are not necessarily involved less quantitatively within “global civil society,” but the extent and nature of their involvement is qualitatively inferior to counterparts in the wider international community. This maneuver affords rogues added flexibility regarding which commitments they can take more seriously or causes champion more vigorously during periods of interstate tension or flux. In his quest to offset the effects of sanctions and portray a more pacifistic global image of Libya throughout the 1990s and 2000s, for


197 Ibid., 93
example, Qaddafi largely reoriented the focus of Libya’s foreign relations from the Arab Middle East to Black Africa, and assumed senior roles within the African Union as well as the new UN Human Rights Council.\textsuperscript{198} While Burma joined ASEAN in 1997, its membership appears more about counterbalancing Indian and Chinese interests in Myanmar than improving its human rights record and political practices, issues for which it is still critiqued heavily by the regional grouping.\textsuperscript{199}

A third survival strategy is \textit{brinkmanship}. Rogues will at times ratchet up their aversive behaviors–conducting sudden nuclear tests, intensifying force postures at sea or on the land borders of neighboring states, sanctioning intelligence operatives and terrorist proxies to run interference and carry out assassinations abroad, and backing large-scale domestic massacres and internments of their own populations. While these pursuits rarely force the hands of patrons and adversaries outright, they can extract diplomatic carrots and other concession that fuel day-to-day survival, as well as stall addressing core issues–such as human rights or reform–which could threaten the regime’s grasp on power. North Korea has mastered this practice as a means of continuing to receive outside food aid; Syria’s present campaign of violence against civilians raises the stakes for both whatever semblance there is of an armed opposition as well as outside powers continuing to call for the removal of Bashar al-Asad’s regime.

Another source of strength for rogue states within the current international system appears an increasing presence of what we might call the \textit{international cult of aversion}. While our cases are defined by an opposition to the \textit{overarching} normative fabric of

\textsuperscript{198} See, for example, René Lemarchand, \textit{The Green and the Black: Qadhafi's Policies in Africa}. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988

\textsuperscript{199} Jürgen Haacke, \textit{Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International Implications}. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006
international society, rogue regimes partially thrive within a *sub-society*—or cult—in which they can find support for their endeavors and commiseration with their visions. Such backing comes from fellow rogues, as well as what I introduced in the previous chapter as *challenger states*—relatively likeminded regimes whose behaviors have not (yet) escalated into full-fledged aversion, but assume rhetorical and policy postures favoring an ideational strain alternative to the normative status-quo of their respective regions.

The examples of inter-rogue support networks are clear and many: From the early 1990s until 2002, Slobodan Milosevic had Serbian secret agents utilize shell companies and other sanctions-busting institutions to transfer sophisticated military technologies and dual-use items to the regimes of Mu’amar Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein;\(^\text{200}\) Syria and Iran have enjoyed a strategic partnership since the early 1980s that has supplied Tehran a conduit through which to deploy terrorist proxies in the Arab world, and Damascus access to better military and coercive firepower, some of which has reportedly assisted the current crackdown;\(^\text{201}\) U.S. intelligence reports confirmed that North Korean scientists had assisted Syria in the construction of its Al-Kibar nuclear reactor. Destroyed by the Israeli Air Force in 2007, satellite photos indicate this facility was nearly identical to Pyongyang’s Yongbyon reactor, known to produce weapons-grade plutonium;\(^\text{202}\)

\(^\text{200}\) See, for example, “Guns, Planes, and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine Arms Transfers.” *South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) Report*, United Nations Development Program, August 2007


Reporting also points to North Korean security assistance to the Burmese military, possibly for a nuclear program.203

Examples of challenger states assisting rogues and contributing to the cult of aversion are also fairly straightforward. Venezuela from 2001-2013, under the presidency of the late Hugo Chavez, is a case in point. Since backtracking from much hoped-for democratic reforms in 2001, Chavez pursued a clear “anti-imperialist” agenda, using oil money accounting for nearly 8% of the state’s fixed capital to promote anti-U.S. “social power” projects throughout Latin America. Chavez consistently eschewed cooperation with regional U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and reportedly offered haven and arms to FARC rebels, while turning a blind eye to cronies within the Venezuelan diplomatic corps and business community who funnel support to Hizbollah’s South American wing. Chavez maintained strong ties to Cuba and especially Iran; Caracas and Tehran entered a security arrangement in 2009, and unclassified U.S. Department of Defense reports point to an increased presence of elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) operatives in Venezuela. Chavez also pledged continued gas assistance to Iran as it faces international sanctions, and opened diplomatic doors to other South American states on its behalf; Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad indicated Iran’s potential willingness to assist Venezuela in the construction of a “nuclear village,” perhaps in order to acquire uranium.204

Belarus throughout the 1994-Present period, under President Alexander Lukashenko, is another example of a challenger state contributing to the cult of aversion.

203 Andrew Selth, “Burma and North Korea: Conventional Allies or Nuclear Partners?” Regional Outlook, Griffith Asia Institute, No. 22 (2009)
Characterized by one analyst as a regime that is “not only totally out of step with political developments in the [Eastern European] region but poses a clear threat to its own citizens and to the still-fragile European security system,”205 Belarus is the only post-Soviet state to outright reject dialogue with such pro-reform Western institutions as the Council of Europe and OSCE. Belarusians are subject to increased economic and cultural isolation at the hands of Lukashenko and a cronyist “shadow elite,” and greater repression—particularly surrounding national elections—by an internal security service whose numbers now double those of the armed forces.206 As of 2004, Minsk also became one of the top twenty arms exporters worldwide, supplying weapons to rogues likes Sudan, Syria, and Iran, and lending diplomatic support to Qadhafi’s Libya, Saddam’s Iraq, and Milosevic’s Yugoslavia.207

Rogues seek flexibility through domestic as well as international maneuvering. While, as we have argued above, they share a vested interest in firmly maintaining the overarching configuration of institutions responsible for propping their regimes, expectations for coalition loyalty among even the most disciplined of rogue leaders might not always match realities on the ground. Occasionally purging the centers of internal power, then, permits the regime to refresh itself while walking a tightrope between ossification, on the one hand, and outright change on the other. Most importantly, coalitional adjustments reinforce the regime’s intent to fashion and maintain a union

ever-bound to its increasingly stringent worldview and commanded by an able national security establishment. Timing is important to these moves; rogues are best positioned to justify them in the context of emerging external threats to which they must respond, or new opportunities upon which they can capitalize.

Milosevic, for example, began expelling those elements of the Serbian elite expressing skepticism over the implementation of his “nationalist program” in 1987—the very same year he had taken control of the Yugoslav Communist League and only first emerged as a national presidential contender—in favor of JNA commanders.\(^{208}\) In tandem with these maneuvers, Milosevic ratcheted up portrayals of the international community as an enemy of Serbian aspirations, citing Serbia as a victim of post-WWII “German-Catholic” revanchism, and accusing his critics of allowing foreign powers to dominate government policy and endanger the survival of the Serbian people.\(^{209}\) Political fault-lines hardened between “patriots”—Milosevic’s supporters—and “traitors”—oppositionists such as former Prime Minister Milan Panic, forced to defend themselves from claims of treasonous Western connections.\(^{210}\) Kim Il-Sung killed off vast numbers of political figures from rival camps perceived as stooges of foreign ideations—particularly homegrown socialists, political democrats, and nationalists—as early as the 1945 Liberation. Purges remained an important tool to make scapegoats for heavy losses incurred at the hands of the American nemesis during the early phases of the Korean War.\(^{211}\) They also provided further justification and space to catapult Kim’s own faction of the North Korean Communist Party—consisting of men shaped by their experiences

\(^{209}\) Ibid., 144
\(^{210}\) Ibid., 166
throughout the 1930s and 40s serving under him in Manchuria as anti-Japanese guerillas—into the top echelons of the Korean Workers’ Party and military by the latter 1950s.212

Drives toward flexibility might also entail augmenting, vice constricting, the ranks of a rogue selectorate. The “Separation of Power and Revolution,” for example, the major principle behind Libya’s political transformation, entailed Qadhafi’s disbursal of official powers to both a Revolutionary Sector—including senior regime leadership, former Revolutionary Command Council members still in office, and most importantly the Revolutionary Committees, who were given fairly free reign to serve as lethal enforcers of Qadhafi’s worldview, by then enshrined in his Green Book—and Ruling Sector—those new institutions supposedly embodying Qadhafi’s novel model of “direct democracy” in action: the People’s Congresses and People’s Committees.213 Like the examples cited above, Qadhafi’s reorientation of Libyan politics was intended to address threats and seize opportunities. The 1970 death of Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser—whose mantle of pan-Arab leadership Qaddafi strove to inherit—had a tremendous impact on the Libyan leader. Nasser’s replacement by a staunchly pro-Western counterpart in Anwar Sadat increased Qaddafi’s sense of urgency to actively carve out a new place for Libya in a regional context increasingly awash by foreign interests and ideas, and possibilities of military offensives by neighbors.214 At the same time, bolstering Libya’s pan-Arab credentials could impart a common identity to a population

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historically fragmented among three regional population centers—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan—culturally distinct and geographically distant from one another.\textsuperscript{215}

Purges and augmentations are not one-way paths; rogues will often, in fact, \textit{alternate} seamlessly between them to blunt the impacts of foreign meddling and maintain the flexibility and delicate power balance so critical to their survival. Burma is a case in point. While the regime added a sizeable civilian component to its ruling military structure as a popular (and international) appeasement strategy following the popular protests of 1988, the junta continued to carry out large purges over the next two decades. Senior General Than Swe’s 2004 sacking of the Burmese military intelligence directorate and its leader, General Khin Nyunt, was especially telling. The ministers, ambassadors, and officers associated with this outfit had essentially overseen the SLORC’s foreign relations since 1990. Largely in favor of ending Burma’s isolation, they were involved in discussions with ASEAN regarding a constitutional process that included the democratic opposition, as well as the further liberalization of Burma’s economy, prospects simply too threatening for the junta to bear at the time.\textsuperscript{216}

The political economies of our population are also structured increasingly in such a way that perpetuates the reproduction of roguery. Rewarding and imparting preferential treatment to the security apparatus might stem initially from the regime’s ideational sense of duty to support those institutions deemed uniquely eligible for the sacred mission of national defense. Yet as the coalition further entrenches its dominion and fuels its appetite for material security, remaining the only self-proclaimed “man for


the job” takes on a life of its own, and equates to further transforming the economy into an instrument of political repression, and sabotaging the formation of power centers beyond the selectorate’s purview. The process is of course cyclical: to further justify this privileged status means the coalition must in turn reassert its one-of-a-kind suitability for the task at hand. Downplaying economic performance in the name of loftier ideational goals is the obvious way to pursue this end. Qadhafi, for example, emphasized the fulfillment of basic needs and egalitarianism over the accrual of wealth;\(^\text{217}\) Khomeini argued that the soul of society wastes away upon giving in to material obsessions;\(^\text{218}\) Sudanese Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi contended that only regimes guided by Islam could “put into action economic programs . . . striking the magic balance between development and equity . . . material prosperity and moral values . . . and between other divergent aspects of life;”\(^\text{219}\) North Korea’s Juche ideology overlooked dismal economic achievements on the ground by equating regime performance solely with the attainment of national self-reliance, reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and a sense of popular collectivity;\(^\text{220}\) The Taliban cited an “amoral character of the entire [Western] growth industry;”\(^\text{221}\) Other rogues who did not make a doctrinal commitment to minimizing personal prosperity—Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Syria, and Iraq—still consistently emphasized the importance of nationalist aspirations over income.\(^\text{222}\)

As a result of these tensions, differentiation subsumes not only the space between the regime and the outside world, but also increasingly that between itself and its public.

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\(^\text{221}\) M. J. Gohari, *The Taliban: Ascent to Power*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 68
\(^\text{222}\) Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 89
As long as the regime continues to prioritize insuring privileged societal status and superior market access for members of the selectorate, sacrificing popular economic well-being for a substandard national economy tailored to its own interests becomes a price worth paying. Burma, a country relatively disengaged from MIDs and with almost no forward regional military presence,²²³ consistently devotes scarce state resources to purchasing materiel and maintaining one of the largest armies in Southeast Asia. While the poor get poorer, officers of the Tatmadaw have profited handsomely from their monopoly on extralegal activities, and their family members enjoy matriculation in private schools and universities, and access to superior health care and food supplies.²²⁴ Saddam Hussein invested in advanced weaponry and raised the salaries of military personnel, ensuring their preferential access to housing and consumer goods.²²⁵ North Korea’s 1961-1967 Seven Year Plan, which promoted a war economy focused on heavy industry and military production, indulged the security establishment while steadily plummeting the national economy below its southern counterpart.²²⁶ Yugoslavia and South Africa used selective privatization and nationalization programs to reinvest in their internal security apparatuses, giving officers superior salaries and assigning them missions and weapons—including anti-aircraft and heavy artillery—not normally associated with policing.²²⁷

²²⁴ David I. Steinberg, Burma, the State of Myanmar. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001, pp. 73-77
The more these individuals become accustomed to the finer things in life, the more loathe they are to relinquish them by reforming an economy distorted purposefully to their own advantage, and facing punishment perceived as built into any reform scenario. The late Kim Jong-II probably represented this truism best. He personally brought roughly $750,000 worth of Hennessy into North Korea every year, making his country the largest net importer of the high-end cognac. Kim also maintained a vast personal cinema collection, and flew in world-class chefs to sample the finest cuisines while his people were literally starving to death. Afraid to fly, he would travel frequently by armored train around the country to resupply his kitchen’s stock of fresh lobster.228

Rogues’ political economies are also structured to manage and offset the potential domestic political risks of external economic punishment, sanctions in particular. Often touted by the international community as the ideal nonmilitary coercive diplomatic approach, studies have actually shown the beneficial effects sanctions can have for target economies. In particular, they can act as a boon to noncompetitive industries by bolstering comparatively inefficient domestic competitors of imported goods through policies like import substitution industrialization,229 and inspiring rent-seeking behavior among enterprising elites. Import sanctions, especially on relatively inelastic goods like oil, alcohol, and tobacco, typically constrict supply and increase the price for these goods without significantly increasing demand. In most target states, borders are porous and opportunities for smuggling and other types of black market operations abound, enriching

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the managers of these illicit activities, who often are tied to the ruling regime.\textsuperscript{230} Arms embargoes, in this same vein, can both benefit a target’s military-industrial complex by facilitating larger expenditures on military equipment and justifying a bolstered role for the military in governance, as well as encouraging the growth of a local arms industry.\textsuperscript{231}

Examples of such effects among our population are clear. Iran used sanctions to entrench its state-run enterprises while marginalizing counterparts in the Islamic financial and private sectors. Its close relationship with a flourishing underground economy—the so-called “trade mafia”—came to account for some 40% of state economic activity,\textsuperscript{232} and the \textit{mullahs} have reaped the benefits of this arrangement through lucrative off-shore investments in the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{233} Saddam Hussein strategically manipulated the U.N. Oil for Food program, which was intended to ease the suffering of his people at the hands of international sanctions throughout the 1990s, to further reward and entrench his coalition. He granted duty exemptions and favorable contract terms to security officers and trading syndicates allied to fellow Tikriti clansmen, while reselling food and medicines purchased under the program on the black market.\textsuperscript{234} Milosevic also proved to be a master at the sanctions-busting game, establishing a virtual state mafia—including high-ranking security officials—who controlled such illicit activities as currency manipulation and auto theft, and monopolized most import-export activities, including

\textsuperscript{230} Also see Peter Andreas, “Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 49 (June 2005), pp. 335-360
\textsuperscript{231} Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type,” 10
\textsuperscript{233} Jean-Francois Seznec, “Economics of the Middle East” Graduate Seminar. Washington, D.C.: Walsh School of Foreign Service for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University. Spring 2008
Foreign economic pressure can also well have the unintended consequence of reconfiguring and reviving rejectionist internal political discourse that has perhaps even become passé, “increasing social commitment to ideational goals that seem to be assaulted by hostile foreigners and by casting the regime as their protectors.”

**Intervening Variables**

Of course, the variables set out above do not operate in a vacuum. The presence or absence of certain complicating, or intervening, factors—both within the state as well as its backyard—may ease or thwart the reproduction of roguery, as well as the international community’s ability to pursue engagement.

Internally, the presence of **ethno-nationalist grievances** appears particularly effective fodder for groups seeking to justify their dominance over a backlash selectorate. Elites can justify such claims clearly on grounds of having been historically slighted by an ancien régime or at the hands of foreign adversaries. In the case of such rogues as Sudan, Syria, or Yugoslavia, we consistently see these claims facilitate a “rally-around-the-flag effect” amongst the security apparatus, justifying the use of aversive behaviors like mass killings to safeguard “in-group prerogatives and the expense of out-groups.”

Note that nine out of our thirteen regimes justified their positions through ethno-nationalist lenses. Others that did not still deployed intensive identity-related claims: Iran utilized the language of religion to cast its revolutionary regime as a guardian of the Islamic faith; North Korea’s *Juche* combined intense nationalism with Confucian elements.

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236 Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 40

237 Ibid., 35
Second, rogues should by no means be regarded as monolithic in their respective holds on power. The degree to which they do or do not leave some internal space for alternative power centers to take root can influence their longevity. While nine of our cases can be considered totally autocratic, i.e. offering virtually no political space beyond the regime, the ones which possessed more liberal trappings— including limited multiparty systems, elections, and political oppositions— seemed better prepared to stably break the rogue cycle when the international moment arrived. Yugoslavia’s exit from roguery, for instance, was not due entirely to outside military intervention; it occurred in tandem with a democratic transition engineered by student protest movements, particularly Otpor, and an opposition party establishment finally willing to close ranks after years of discord. South Africa’s exit was also the result of a transition engineered by the ANC and its counterparts in civil society, notably the Anglican Church and other anti-apartheid elements, at the height of sanctions. These observations could well have implications for other cases in our population.

While all rogues have in common political economies structured to benefit their selectorates, two additional intra-population variables appear potentially significant to our inquiry. The first is the presence or absence of rentierism. Rentier theory essentially correlates a state’s ability to generate significant income from external rents, natural resources in particular but also strategically vital geographic entities like military bases, with authoritarian sustainability. Regimes can devote these revenues, especially those accrued from petroleum exports, to suppress democratic stirrings by stunting the development of an independent bourgeoisie, funding large repressive apparatuses, and

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exempting rulers from taxing their citizens (i.e. no representation without taxation). 239

In turn, we might expect the presence of rentierism among our cases to act as a boon to roguery, permitting regimes to flex their muscles less deterred by the prospect of international punishment. Interestingly, the three rogues that are OPEC members–Iran, Iraq, and Libya–were also guilty of committing all three acts of provocation (WMD, regional destabilization, and sponsorship of terrorism). As apparent from the table below, moreover, these were also the most militarily active cases within the population, as measured by engagement in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) throughout their rogue tenures. While the remaining similarly culpable cases are not “classic” rentier states, some display strong rentier tendencies in their economic survivals: In Syria, for example, oil export earnings and remittances from laborers abroad, many of whom work in the petroleum sectors of the Gulf states, constitute the most important sources of foreign exchange. 240

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<th>Table 3.4: Involvement in MIDs while Rogue</th>
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Source: Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer, The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001


240 See “Background Note: Syria,” U.S. Department of State. Available online at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm#econ>
A second political-economic factor, though perhaps harder to visualize and define, is what we might call a tolerance for pain. As is apparent from the following tables, there are considerable differences in the extents of economic isolation and stunted growth our regimes are in fact willing to tolerate. Particularly striking are Iran and North Korea, which demonstrated steadily deteriorating figures in both trade flows and GDP growth over time. Under Saddam, Iraq experienced growth rates of -18.31% and -4.43% in 1995 and 2000, respectively; at the height of sanctions in 1990, Yugoslavia and South Africa experienced growth rates of -8% and -.32% respectively. These data also echo the observation that, a-la Putnam and Bueno de Mesquita et al., especially among these types of cases, economic, i.e. regime, “well-being” and socio-political liberalization do not necessarily go hand in hand. Note Burma and Sudan, which boast two of the highest growth rates yet lowest political and social globalization scores among the population. In that same vein, consider the trajectories of Libya and Syria, two of the highest ranking cases in terms of socio-political openness over time—which occurred in tandem with gradual economic improvements—yet presently wracked by instability that has ended the life of the former while now existentially threatening that of the latter. This reinforces the observation that once set into motion, roguery can be a hard course to reverse.
Table 3.5: Actual Economic and Trade Flows (By Index Percentage Points), 1975-2005

![Graph showing economic and trade flows from 1975 to 2005 for various countries like Cambodia, Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia, Syria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and DPRK.]

Source: KOF Globalization Index; Bank of Korea

Table 3.6: GDP Growth Rates (By Percentage), 1990-2010

![Graph showing GDP growth rates from 1990 to 2010 for countries like Cambodia, Myanmar, Sudan, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Iran, and DPRK.]

Source: Economic Research Service/USDA International Macroeconomic Data Set; Bank of Korea
Table 3.7: Political Globalization Scores, 1975-2009

Source: KOF Globalization Index

Table 3.8: Social Globalization Scores, 1975-2005

Source: KOF Globalization Index
**Table 3.9: Summary of Intervening Domestic Factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Ethno-Nationalist Concerns</th>
<th>Total Autocracy</th>
<th>Rentier</th>
<th>Tolerance for Pain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Y–Maintaining supremacy of ethnic Burman center while suppressing peripheral states</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y/N-Timber</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Y–Maintaining supremacy of white Afrikaner elites</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y/N-Diamonds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Y–Maintaining supremacy of Qadhafi tribe while suppressing regional loyalties</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Y–Maintaining supremacy of ‘Alawi tribe while suppressing Islamists &amp; minorities</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Y/N–Maintaining supremacy of Punjabi fiefdoms/officer corps, while deterring India and managing Islamist groups</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Y–Maintaining supremacy of Sunni-Tikriti minority while suppressing Shi'a and Kurds</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Y–Maintaining supremacy of the “Arab” north over the “Christian” south</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Y–Protecting Serbia national aspirations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Y–Maintaining supremacy of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban over Tajiks and other minority groups</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>N/Y–Protecting Pol Pot’s Khmer faction</td>
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Other international factors might further complicate the process of roguery, namely the contributing or preventative role outside powers will play. Most important in this regard is the state’s geo-strategic orientation, specifically its locale, power resources and capabilities, and alliance structures. Rogues situated in areas recognized as strategically important, endowed with sizeable material capabilities, and more embedded within compelling alliance structures are better suited to weather the strains of international pressure than those who are not.241

The international community’s disparate approaches to the recent crackdowns in Libya and Syria—of intervention and muddling through, respectively—accentuate the operability of these variables. Its key borders with Israel, Turkey, and Iraq place Syria at the gateway of the Levant, Central Asia, and Persian Gulf. Its centrality within the wider Arab-Israeli conflict arena, former de facto hegemony in Lebanon, and interference in post-Saddam Iraq make the international community wary of taking any action to

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facilitate further belligerency by Damascus on these foreign policy fronts. Syria boasts a vast and loyal security apparatus with over 325,000 regular and 100,000 paramilitary forces, well capable of neutralizing any armed opposition and preventing it from holding significant swaths of territory. The regime has the diplomatic and strategic support of a key regional player, Iran, as well as China—with whom it conducts significant trade relations—and Russia—who maintains a naval base at the port city of Tartus and resists taking any UN action to condemn Syria. Libya, despite being the fifteenth-largest worldwide oil exporter with the ninth-largest amount of proven reserves, sits in a far less explosive regional security environment. It is wedged between Tunisia and Egypt, two key U.S. allies that have already initiated their own democratic transitions, with increasing irreverence for autocracies as unabashed as Qaddafi’s. Even after renouncing its nascent weapons programs and support for terrorism in 2003, Libya retained relatively few friends globally; only Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez spoke out strongly in Qaddafi’s defense, and few challenger states, like Zimbabwe, were reported to offer him safe haven in the event he stepped down. The GCC and Arab League consequently found little difficulty in giving the NATO intervention their blessings. Libya’s coercive assets, moreover, were ill-suited to deter its impending doom; Qaddafi’s 70,000-strong standing army, whose divisions were subject to periodic reshuffling due to sectarian fissures, lost control of the country’s entire east to rebel forces in a matter of weeks.242 In essence, Libya’s geo-strategic orientation facilitated a window of opportunity in which the

international community could help oversee its stable takedown; Syria’s apparently has not. Implicit within this analysis are other complicating factors, such as the level of priority with which the international community assesses the rogue, as well as how it is regarded by the U.S.

The flow chart on the following page summarizes the variables, conceptual assertions, and path-dependent theoretical model formulated throughout this chapter.
Table 3.10: The Conceptual Logic of Roguery

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<tr>
<th>Marginal Status (Given) +</th>
<th>Non-Democracy (Given) +</th>
<th><em>CRITICAL JUNCTURE</em></th>
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<td>Third World Threats</td>
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<td>Post-Colonial Adjustment</td>
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<td>Contact with International Society</td>
<td>Progressive Worldview</td>
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<td>Reactive Worldview</td>
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<td>Intra-Elite Outbidding</td>
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<td>Entrepreneurial Establishment</td>
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<td><strong>DYNAMICS OF REPRODUCTION</strong></td>
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<td>Int'l Survival Strategies</td>
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<td>• Strategic Clientelism</td>
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<td>• Doctrinal Flexibility</td>
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<td>• Flexible Int'l Org. Commitments</td>
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<td>• Brinkmanship</td>
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<td>• Int'l Cult of Aversion</td>
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<td>Managing Fallout</td>
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<td>Coalition Accrues Benefits</td>
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<td>Blurring of Line b/w Regime Survival and Norm-Violation</td>
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<td><strong>Domestic Survival Strategies</strong></td>
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<td>• Selectorate Purges</td>
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<td>• Balancing Purges &amp; Augmentations</td>
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<td>• Selectorate-Oriented Pol. Economy</td>
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<td>Intervening Domestic Accelerators:</td>
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<td>• Ethno-Nationalist Grievances</td>
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<td>Intervening Int'l Accelerators:</td>
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<td>• Geo-Strategic Orientation</td>
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<td>• Priority for Int'l Community?</td>
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<td>• U.S. Posture</td>
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differentiation

Contact with International Society

Managing Fallout

Coalition Accrues Benefits

Blurring of Line b/w Regime Survival and Norm-Violation

Domestic Survival Strategies

Intervening Domestic Accelerators:
• Ethno-Nationalist Grievances
• Degree of Total Autocracy
• Presence of Rentierism
• Tolerance for Pain

Intervening Int'l Accelerators:
• Geo-Strategic Orientation
• Priority for Int'l Community?
• U.S. Posture
THE ROAD AHEAD—METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH STRATEGY

Having now situated and defined roguery within the context of existing policy and academic literatures, as well as theorized its origins and reproduction, we can test these understandings empirically against elements of our population. Given the fairly limited amount of research on this issue to date, as well as the still relative paucity of reliable quantitative figures on rogue states, to generate a universe of cases and data sufficient for conducting compelling large-N statistical analyses is presently unfeasible. The dissertation could, however, contribute to coding for future statistical work on the topic.243 Case studies, on the other hand, are well suited to address the dissertation’s puzzle by probing causal mechanisms and intervening variables identified hitherto within the population’s threat and decisionmaking calculi. Process tracing, moreover, follows historical patterns within cases to tease out the motivations of political entrepreneurs and their coalitions for taking particular actions at various historical intervals.

In light of these considerations, I elected to conduct case-studies of 5 rogue states—Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, Libya, and North Korea—on the basis of several considerations: 1) They represent the most prevalent two subsets of rogue regimes: Islamic securitocracies, or those states whose selectorates drew upon predominantly Islamist ideals and elements—intellectuals, clerics, paramilitary and terrorist forces, etc.—to establish their credentials; and Secular garrison states, those whose selectorates came to depend—a-la Laswell—on various combinations of specialists of violence—large standing militaries, domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, warlords, defense and armaments industries, etc.—and disseminators of a reactive yet mainly temporal worldview—typically

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243 One possible avenue for future research includes identifying, coding, and analyzing rogue cases from pre-modern eras.
a large party and its associated propagandist elements, a charismatic leader (or leadership), and/or a mix of the two. 2) As per Table 2.8, these cases capture a fairly broad range of attributes along the institutionalization/revisionism matrix. 3) As part of an initial inquiry, or plausibility probe, into roguery as a subject of serious scholarly inquiry, they constitute cases conceivable as “most typical” and commonly associated with the rogue label (Iran, Libya, and North Korea), as well as ones with relatively lower values on the dependent variable who are not (Pakistan, Sudan). Chapter 4 presents my studies of Islamic securitocracies, and Chapter 5 secular garrisons.

As I discussed at the conclusion of Chapter 2, negative cases can further assist our analysis by demonstrating why certain states with similar antecedent conditions and, arguably by extension, the potential to “go rogue,” ultimately veered away at the critical juncture depicted above, or perhaps backtracked slightly later in time.244 To this effect, I assess Indonesia and Algeria as negative cases in Chapter 6. I offer conclusions in Chapter 7.

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244 For more on the merits of case study analysis and process tracing, see George and Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences;” and Pierson, “Big, Slow-Moving, and . . . Invisible”
CHAPTER 4: AVERSION IN THE NAME OF GOD?
ASSESSING ISLAMIST SECURITOCRACIES

INTRODUCTION

A significant subset of rogue regimes relied on Islam as a basis for self-identity and political legitimacy throughout their tenures. Pakistan was proclaimed an Islamic republic in its 1973 constitution and further Islamized following the reforms of Zia ul-Haq throughout the late 1970s and 80s. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Shi’a clergymen replaced the Shahsanshah at the helm of an Islamic Republic in Iran—the first and only of its kind in the modern era.\textsuperscript{245} Through the “September Laws” of 1983, President Muhammad Ja’far al-Numayri instituted Shari’atic Law throughout the Sudan, a campaign vigorously maintained and intensified under the subsequent rogue regime of ‘Omar al-Bashir from 1989 to 1999, and to a certain extent extending to the present day. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban regime instituted a fundamentalist “Islamic Emirate” from its bases in Kabul, and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi frequently appealed to an apocalyptic vision of Islam, which included the establishment of an Islamic Legion to forcibly facilitate ideological unification in the Maghreb.\textsuperscript{246} It is therefore logical to explore how the presence and manipulation of Islam may affect the operation of and incentives to roguery in Muslim-majority cases.

The three rogue cases coded as Islamist securitocracies and under investigation in this chapter–Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan–are well suited to the task. They share underlying

\textsuperscript{245} Along with Afghanistan and Mauritania, these remain the only states worldwide to be designated officially as Islamic republics.

\textsuperscript{246} Their mention notwithstanding here, I refrain from treating Libya and Afghanistan in the present chapter. Despite its frequent appeals to Islamism, the Qadhafi regime’s structure and worldview were overwhelmingly secular, excluding clergy from the selectorate’s senior ranks, and regularly deploying security forces to suppress Islamist movements inside the country. Although the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was widely considered theocratic, its remarkably brief existence under an ethnically homogenous (Pashtu) insurgency movement in the Taliban, renders its treatment as a guerilla rogue more appropriate.
commonalities in the turn to roguery set forth by our theory; that is, the fashioning of a
cornerstone between political entrepreneurs espousing reactive worldviews—in this instance,
of an Islamist orientation—and a pervasive military-security apparatus. Yet significant
distinctions in the domestic distribution of power, geo-strategic and historical
circumstances, and socioeconomic factors further demonstrate how the paths in (and
potentially out of) roguery within this subtype can actually co-vary.

In Iran, political power was vested firmly in the hands of the religious
establishment itself. The revolutionary regime’s foundational doctrine of Guardianship
of the Jurisprudent (Velayat e-Faqih) mandated that the office of Supreme Leader
(Rahbar) oversee the state’s central decisionmaking bodies—including the Council of
Guardians (Shora-ye Maslahat-e Nezam), and Assembly of Experts (Majles-e
Khobregan)—comprised entirely of senior clerics (ayatollahs), and remain responsible for
setting high policy and disseminating the regime’s official guidance on ideological purity.
Although a parallel civilian structure—many of whose officials are indeed popularly
elected through relatively free and fair local and municipal elections—does exist within
the Islamic Republic, its constituents cannot contest the clerical establishment on matters
of national security, and are comprised increasingly of “hardline,” vice “reformist,”
elements with strong ties to the key ayatollahs. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
Islamic Republic’s chief ideologue and founding Rahbar, deployed reactionary
worldviews, expressed in his seminal Islamic Government (Hokumat-i Eslami), and other
treatises, to legitimize such an arrangement from the outset. Particularly prominent in his
thinking was, inter alia, an avowed distaste for secularism and the increasing influence of
the U.S. and other foreign powers in the governments of his predecessors. Although
Khomeini supposedly had not intended initially to export his revolution through force or sabotage, the immediate onset of war with Iraq reinforced Tehran’s perception of a perilous existence within a predominantly Sunni-Arab neighborhood, rife with forces eager to subvert the Shi’a-Persian theocracy in their backyard, and largely allied to a Western world historically uninhibited from meddling directly in Iranian affairs. Differentiation materialized in tandem with Iran’s political entrepreneurs—the ayatollahs—lending increasing powers to critical elements of the state’s coercive establishment. Central to this dynamic were those officers and soldiers who had cut their teeth battling Saddam throughout the 1980-88 war, and while so doing demonstrated an utmost loyalty to the tenets and praxis of Velayat e-Faqih—namely the Basij (shorthand for Basij-e Mostaz’afin, The Mobilization of the Oppressed) paramilitary forces, and most importantly the Pasdaran (shorthand for Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)—and the aversive postures it would come increasingly to embody through Tehran’s successive battles with the outside world. In other words, an Islamist securitocracy in Iran materialized from the clerics’ incorporation of a particular type of ideationally accommodating muscle from the outset, which came progressively to produce a mutually beneficial arrangement that in time rendered aversion logical and hard to break.

The dynamics of roguery in Sudan and Pakistan occurred largely in reverse. It was the ruling military establishments in these two countries who integrated Islamist elements—including clerics, warriors (also referred to as practitioners of jihad, or mujahideen) and even government bureaucrats—as a means to inject legitimacy into
political systems that had, respectively, either failed outright or been perceived as corrupted and vulnerable to threats by senior officers in the post-independence era.

In Sudan, the predictable yet unstable post-independence fluctuation of power between corruptible civilian—and supposedly “democratic”—politicians and incompetent military officers became an increasing source of frustration for senior young-guard elements of the officer corps. The pattern, which recycled roughly from independence in 1956 until Bashir’s 1989 takeover, proceeded generally as follows: Within a month of a new government’s formation, oppositionists would approach junior coalition partners with proposals for sweeter portfolio arrangements; these partners would subsequently organize a vote of no-confidence, leading to the dismantling of the incumbent government and a takeover by the military, only to reorganize the distribution of spoils, call for new elections, and ultimately restart the process. Upon taking power in 1989, Brigadier General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir—who was at the time commanding the 8th Infantry Brigade in its campaigns against the southern secessionist Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)—saw within Hassan ‘Abd Allah Al-Turabi, director of the National Islamic Front (NIF), an opportunity to alter this rotten status-quo while ensuring the military would henceforth be more than just a figurehead, and recast its image honorably in the fight against the southern kuffar, or infidels. Their subsequent alliance would facilitate and lock in the aversive actions identified by observers as hallmarks of Sudanese policy: a brutal military-backed jihad against the non-Arab-Muslim peoples of South Sudan and Darfur; and conversion of the country into a safe haven and launching pad for some of the most notorious terrorist operators of the modern era, including Usama Bin Laden himself.
Although roguery in Pakistan’s case was perhaps not quite as deliberate or unabashed as Sudan’s or Iran’s, its army and military intelligence services—who have since the mid-1970s fluctuated between ruling the country overtly and exerting a powerful behind-the-scenes influence over civilian governments—similarly integrated Islamist elements, at least at the outset, to bolster their domestic credentials as leading national institutions, and certainly the only ones capable of defending the country from the Indian nemesis. For Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who ousted and executed civilian incumbent Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977 and installed himself as president thereafter, Islamization—initially vis-à-vis the introduction of Shari’a law and later the empowerment of the mujahideen—constituted a vital tactic for restoring morality to a nation which had fallen prey to the ills of “socialism,” and a military whose lackadaisical and secular esprit de corps had resulted thrice in national humiliation on the battlefield with India, including the losses of most of Kashmir and Bangladesh. With the concomitant need to address ever-present and expanding external threats, namely the lurking Indian menace, Soviet military intervention and communist-backed administrations in Afghanistan, and more recently, their former U.S. brethren in arms, the Pakistani state turned increasingly toward aversion—finalizing the nuclear program initiated under Bhutto and more problematically, nurturing Islamist terrorist groups, who after “making their bones” as anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan, have remained a formidable yet increasingly uncontrollable force in the country’s complex national security milieu. Over time, exaggeration of the Indian threat, and by extension the security establishment’s tacit legitimation of the use of terrorist organizations as a coping strategy, perpetuates an unstable, yet understandable, cycle in which Pakistan’s generals
and feudal politicians can continue to reap the benefits of power while shelving the long-term consequences of their aversive behaviors.

In addition to rationales for initiating the rogue pathway, these three cases illuminate the divergent effects that various historical-institutional dynamics may have on roguery’s reproduction in Muslim nations. Sudan stands at one end of this spectrum. With the military firmly in charge by 1999, Bashir cut off the head of the Islamist snake before it became too stifling a constraint on Khartoum–purging Turabi and his NIF stalwarts from the government and security agencies upon which they had previously so vigorously preyed, and expelling the terrorists received as honored guests only several years prior. While the regime’s suppressive campaign in Darfur remains of deep concern to the international community, and Bashir appears reticent to let Sudan head in the direction of the Arab Spring, Khartoum has since scaled back its jihad in the south, cooperated to some extent with South Sudan’s internationally recognized self-determination, and acceded to all twelve global counterterrorist conventions. Due to the Pakistani military’s far more ambiguous and precarious role in national governance, the entrenched nature of Pakistan’s elaborate political spoils system in which both generals and feudal politicians alike bear a vast stake, and other reasons we will further explore below, undertaking a confrontation of a similar nature—or for that matter any measure threatening fundamental political change—will likely continue to be perceived as counter to Islamabad’s interests, however narrowly conceived, for the foreseeable future. At the opposite end of the spectrum stands Iran. Given the clerical establishment’s genuinely revolutionary credentials and immense benefits steadily accrued by selectorate

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247 Iran’s was the only state formed in the context of a truly bottom-up, or “social revolution,” as opposed to an officer/Islamist-backed putsch, as occurred in Sudan, or top-down military coup, as occurred in Pakistan.
constituents who have consolidated their power and holdings through increasing allegiance to the *ayatollahs–inter alia* members of the security apparatus and hardline civilian politicians–combined with an American enemy whose recently antagonistic diplomacy toward Tehran–despite documented attempts by the clerical establishment to reopen high-level negotiations with Washington–has become an increasingly institutionalized feature of U.S. policy,\(^{248}\) fundamental change does not appear on Tehran’s immediate horizon.

Through the lens of our theory of rogue behavior introduced in Chapter 3, the following three sections expand upon the latter insights, and more thoroughly trace the processes behind the making of Islamist securitocracies in Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan.

GUARDIANSHIP OF JURIST AND GUARD–CONTEXTUALIZING THE IRANIAN GARRISON

Evidences of Iranian aversion are straightforward. The Islamic Republic is known to have previously possessed chemical weapons—which it deployed throughout the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88—and although Tehran ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, likely retains a sizeable stockpile. According to the Center for Defense Information, the country also possesses a biological weapons capability. While Iran agreed in 2003 to permit the IAEA to conduct intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities and publicly declare its program, the UN watchdog agency accused Tehran of failing to disclose uranium enrichment operations at Natanz, while the regime announced plans to construct a heavy-water reactor at Arak capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium shortly thereafter. Although Iranian officials have recently been relatively more forthcoming regarding their nuclear aspirations, they prohibited IAEA inspectors from visiting sites, namely Parchin, where the military is believed to be supporting nuclear research. By most accounts, Iran’s nuclear enrichment program continues to advance, recently causing the Israeli government to indicate its willingness to undertake unilateral military action against Tehran absent strong assurances that the U.S. will intervene militarily to prevent acquisition of the bomb. Iran has also sanctioned assassination campaigns against dissidents abroad—particularly members of such expatriate opposition groups as Mojahedin-e Khalq and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran—and is the largest known international exporter of state terrorism—supplying arms, training, and funds to Hizbullah in Lebanon, providing operational support to Hamas and

250 Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 57
the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and offering safe haven to Turkish separatists affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Since Iran represents the only case in this dissertation that did not undergo formal colonial rule, a more thorough analysis of its prerevolutionary history is warranted, which in tandem with a focused look at the regime’s post-1979 trajectory, may help us contextualize the rationale behind this intensive aversion.

Despite dodging the colonial bullet, Iran’s political history and identity were forged overwhelmingly in reaction to external forces. This was especially the case for the nascent political entrepreneurial and military-security elements; the Islamic Republic we know today might in fact be conceived as the clerics’ ultimate response to the dishonorable methods with which their predecessors, first the Qajar rulers followed by the Pahlavi Shahs, stewarded these most important national institutions.

Situated roughly 11,000 miles from Western Europe, external powers arrived at Iran’s doorstep later than its regional counterparts. Yet by the mid-19th century, Persia had become the primary battleground of the so-called “Great Game” between Great Britain and Russia, who in 1907 carved up the territory into separate “spheres of influence”—with Russia controlling the north and Britain the south. Throughout the Qajar dynasty, which lasted from 1794-1925, the Islamic scholarly establishment, or ‘Ulama, aligned itself with the regime in exchange for receiving royal protection and patronage.252 While some scholars, such as Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, did their best to protect Islam from the onset of Western ideation during this era, the clerical establishment faced one humiliation after another as a result of its quiescence. During the 1905-1911

“Constitutional Revolution,” for example, in which the clergy agreed to embrace the regime’s attempts at its integration through the formation of an ‘Ulama-led Council of Guardians,\textsuperscript{253} Muhammed Ali Shah bombarded the assembly and returned the country to absolutist rule shortly thereafter. Throughout the Pahlavi Dynasty, which lasted from the end of Qajar rule to the inception of the Islamic Republic, the ‘Ulama –represented by such senior clerics as Ayatollah Borojurdi–was again largely manipulated to accept the Shahs’ reliance on foreign backing as a \textit{fait accompli}.\textsuperscript{254}

It is important to note that the Iranian clergy did not historically possess grand political ambitions. The loyalty of the \textit{ayatollahs} was primarily to their followers, who in exchange for spiritual guidance as sources of emulation, provided \textit{mujtahids} with most of their income. This system came under threat only toward the end of Qajar rule, in which the demands of foreign political and economic interests on the bureaucracy compelled the Shahs to promote a more radical secularization program, which included edging out the \textit{ayatollahs} in favor of a new secular intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{255} This continued well into the Pahlavi era. Overspending on his seven-year in particular plan forced Muhammad Reza Shah to turn increasingly to international lenders, leading the regime to seize control of the burgeoning petroleum infrastructure–which, since the 1908 discovery of oil in Khuzestan, had been controlled largely by the southern Bakhtiari–and sell off its rights to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, raising the government’s share from a paltry 16 to 20%. The Shah also sought increasing U.S. guidance on foreign policy matters, and gave American firms priority in the allocation of contracts. Previously vital domestic elements of Iran’s

\textsuperscript{253} Also known as \textit{mujtahids}, or practitioners of \textit{ijtihad}, these are scholars qualified to apply the art of interpretation toward the corpus of Islamic law.

\textsuperscript{254} Martin, “Creating an Islamic State,” 19

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 5
socioeconomic fabric, namely the *Bazaari* class, were beginning to languish under these policies, as a sort of “cultural imperialism”—represented by a growing preference among Iran’s upper echelons for Western luxury items, music, and film—ensued, and further alienated the clerics. The Shahs, they believed, had by now adopted a perception of Islam as a barrier to progress, evidenced by a strong-armed manipulation of the education system to secularize control of religious instruction, disregard for the ancient right of sanctuary in shrines, banning of key ceremonies like the ‘Ashura procession, and mandate of Western dress. Foreign interests, as it were, were jeopardizing the historically secure position of one of Iran’s most cherished institutions. The Pahlavis also exploited these new connections to shore up their own personal power, particularly through military-intelligence functions.

Like the clerical establishment, Iran’s pre-revolutionary military was seen as another once glorious institution that had fallen unfortunate victim to external meddling. The Qajars were so preoccupied with counterbalancing British and Russian interests in Iran they did not have time to undertake extensive military reforms, even though the extant tribal levies system should by most accounts have enabled them to stand up an army of 90,000 men. In fact, for the duration of the “Great Game,” external manipulation of tribal interests—Russia vis-à-vis the Turkoman in the north-east and Britain the Bakhtiari in the south-east—meant that the tribes were often better equipped than the army. Within the army, the most important fighting force, the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade, was primarily an imperial instrument designed to enhance

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256 Ibid., 14-15
258 Martin, “Creating an Islamic State,” 2
Russian influence during times of weakness. After Moscow’s withdrawal from Persia following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, it was the British, not Iranians, who reorganized the Brigade, thereby further propagating the continued infiltration of corruptible external influences into military politics. Reza Khan, for example, used his promotion by the British to colonel within the Cossack Brigade to cement his stature following the period of Russian and British withdrawals. Throughout the entire Pahlavi period, moreover, Iran’s military-security structure remained loyal primarily to the legacy of its Shahs and the outsiders who propped them. The absence of overt colonialism, and by extension any significant pro-independence armed struggles or wars of national liberation, also meant that the army largely missed the opportunity to be perceived as an independent and nationalist fighting force, remaining a mere proxy enforcer of the Shah’s unholy alliances. When desertions reduced military ranks to a mere 65,000 by the mid-1940s and threatened to weaken the Shahs’ hold on power, it was to be yet another outsider, the U.S.—now steadily replacing Britain as the key Western interlocutor in regional affairs—to oversee the military’s rebuilding. Washington, as it were, saw in Muhammad Reza Shah the only stable pro-Western element in Iran’s increasingly factionalized politics. By 1943, steady U.S. support for the Shah’s military rebuilding grew the standing force to 80,000.

Following the 1953 CIA and MI6-backed coup to remove Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq and reinstall the deposed Shah, expanding the military-security

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259 Iran’s seclusion from any alliance during WWII, for example, prevented the army from gaining combat experience.
260 With the clerics on the right side of the political spectrum, and the communist Tudeh Party on the extreme left
261 Popular among broad segments of Iranian society, Mussadiq’s nationalization of the Anglo-Persian oil company—with support from the communist-backed National Front—was viewed by the West as a threat to its strategic interests, and by the Shah as a humiliating defeat for his office. For more on this episode, see Stephen
complex became the top priority for America’s Iran strategy. Between 1953 and 1963, Washington provided Tehran with a staggering $500 million in military aid, bringing the now 120,000-strong army to 200,000. Oil revenues, which rose at exponential rates throughout the late 1950’s and early 60’s, subsidized the rising military budget.\textsuperscript{262} U.S. assistance allowed the Shah to centralize and increasingly personalize his grip on power by improving capabilities in intelligence-gathering and surveillance. The fruit of these efforts was Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar (The Organization of Intelligence and National Security, or SAVAK). Trained and supported by the CIA, SAVAK was ruthless in its suppression of oppositionists, including clerics and communist sympathizers. The army was perceived as no less of a foreign stooge; its loyalty to the Shah throughout the protests of the 1960s brought it to fire openly on crowds during a series of demonstrations in spring 1963, killing hundreds of civilians. The Shah’s increasingly blatant personalization of power permitted by these organizations constituted a further humiliation to ordinary subjects; he bestowed pensions, sinecures, and privileged positions to the elite, and a gradual re-siege of all lands lost by his father (who, by the way, had made modest gains in reducing Iran’s foreign dependency) made the royal family exceedingly wealthy. Perhaps the ultimate insult was the Shah’s “2,500 Year Celebration of the Persian Empire at Persepolis,” a five-day celebration in October 1971 that featured extravagant festivities with costs exceeding $20 million, and a guest list of key international dignitaries including U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew. The

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{262} Kinzer, \textit{All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror.} Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2008}
extent to which foreign backing allowed the Shah to perpetuate a national security state, in fact, was unprecedented among even other dictatorships throughout this era.\footnote{See, for example, Homa Katouzian, “The Pahlavi Regime in Iran,” in H.E. Chehabi and Juan L. Linz (editors), \textit{Sultanistic Regimes}. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, pp. 182-205}

The pre-revolutionary period thus provided a fertile context for reactive ideation. While \textit{Islamic Government} was not published until 1970, and later refined for incorporation into Iran’s post-1979 constitution, Khomeini had long spoken out against the injustices of Iran’s foreign handlers.\footnote{In 1964, for example, Khomeini spoke out famously against special legal rights enjoyed by U.S. servicemen in Iran, including trial in their own courts.} The world, Khomeini believed, had become divided into two distinct poles: \textit{Mustakbarin}, the oppressors–states and elites who abuse their power to exploit the weak; and \textit{Mustazafin}, the oppressed–those individuals who as a result of their powerlessness are fated to suffer dishonorable humiliation at the ends of others. The Muslim world, since the last two hundred or so years, had languished among the downtrodden of the \textit{Mustazafin}, a once great civilization now whoring itself to a soulless international system of crafty oppressors. The independence of a truly Islamic Republic, Khomeini believed, could serve as the only true counterforce to a corrupted capitalist West, a morally bankrupt East, and a non-aligned movement that was little more than a sham. It could pursue the only “right path,” the “path of God and belief,” over the “corrupt path of Satan and disbelief.” The demonization of outside powers featured front and center in this doctrine. The Shah’s behaviors were regarded not as mere folly; they were representative of a pandemic to which corrupt rulers and elites in all the surrounding Muslim lands were now susceptible. This sad reality was the result of a conspiracy materializing over the last several centuries by “arrogant powers;” the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, for example, was seen as a plot to divide and weaken
the *Ummah*—or worldwide Muslim community—in order to plunder its wealth. Salvation, as it were, lay in a return to Islam; if an *Ummah* of over one billion Muslims stood united, not only could the West no longer afford to exploit it, but they could change the entire balance of global power.265

Regardless of its potency, the worldview meant little absent the proper mechanisms to enforce it. Indeed, at its outset, the Islamic Revolution was not an entirely Islamic enterprise; it actually featured a smattering of leftist and secular groups joined in mass protest alongside the clerics. Many of these organizations, such as the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, even fielded their own paramilitary organizations. For Ayatollah Khomeini, the union of clerical and security elements provided the unparalleled—and perhaps sole—opportunity to reverse the path of the Shahs while winning this complex post-revolutionary space, and translating the vision of *Velayat-e Faqih* forcibly on the ground.266 And the ranks of the burgeoning Pasdaran constituted the optimal vehicle with which to both seize and transform the Iranian state according to the unprecedentedly independent guidance of the jurist, while reorienting Iranian national security strategy to realistically acknowledge and address the *mustakbarin-mustazafin* schism lurking beyond Iran’s borders.

With its humble origins as a network of local militant groups recruited by Khomeini from Iran’s Shi‘a mosques, and referring to itself collectively as the *Hezbollah*, or “party of God,” the Pasdaran was by no means always destined to succeed in this most ambitious mission. In fact, its heavy-handed repression throughout the post-revolutionary streets and against ethnic minorities and secular politicians made it quite

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unpopular during the revolution’s immediate aftermath. The Iraqi invasion of 1980, however, provided Khomeini the opportunity to recast the institution as a national savior, and more importantly, use the pretense of external threat to shift the security establishment’s purpose from regime stooge to purveyor of an “Islamic way of war” on battlefields both abroad and at home. At the time of the Iraqi invasion, the Iranian military had lost nearly half its regular infantrymen to desertions and purges, and the regime was hard-pressed to convert the Shah’s capabilities into battle-ready assets. Although they entered the war as amateurs with little military training and combat experience, through trial by fire and the fortunate coincidence of Iraqi military mismanagement, the Pasdaran improved its warfighting skills and dramatically increased its ranks. IRGC units rallied to the frontlines alongside Iranian regulars to outmatch Iraq’s forces, while tales of their bravery allowed the IRGC to retrench control within Iran’s heartland through deployment of the Basij. This process bore critical consequences for Iran’s political development by catapulting young IRGC officers—in any normal military context, prematurely—into senior command positions, and allowing them to gradually outmaneuver secular-oriented generals from Iran’s conventional military forces for influence in national politics.

The conduct of the war itself also indicates that Iran’s new power wielders had more in mind than simple victory, something they arguably had achieved as early as 1982, with the liberation of all Iranian territory initially held by Iraqi forces. Despite a number of ceasefires offered by Saddam to restore the status-quo ante, Khomeini and his

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268 Zabih, “The Iranian Military in Revolution and War,” 219
Pasdaran lieutenants perpetuated hostilities and pressed for yet “another divine victory.” IRGC commanders had come to believe their tactics—including “human wave” assaults, which, in military historical hindsight proved incredibly unsound—were actually working, conceptualizing even the most paltry territorial gains as evidence for one final victory and a prerequisite for the ultimate salvation.\textsuperscript{270} It took another six years of war and a series of painful IRGC incursions into Iraqi territory to convince Khomeini that it might finally be time to call it quits. Despite the absence of a clear victor, the prosecution of the Iran-Iraq War provided more fodder for the clerics and budding security establishment to perpetuate an Islamist securitocracy at home. Guard officers returned from war as national heroes, and although they suffered massive on-the-ground devastations in terms of manpower and supplies, the symbolism evoked of the revolution’s survival in the face of a major regional power backed by the Arab world and both superpowers (keep in mind that the U.S. Navy had engaged the Iranians during transport assistance operations late in the war) was undeniable.\textsuperscript{271}

Iran’s post-war development relied on a more muscular cohabitation of clerical and security elements as a matter of course. Khomeini made the Office of Rahbar, or Supreme Leader, commander-in-chief of the military, and carefully deployed clerical commissars—or Supreme Leaders’ Representatives—to oversee Pasdaran operations, and ensure their continued adherence to the tenets of Velayat-e Faqih.\textsuperscript{272} In addition to the clerics’ three formal advisory bodies—the Council of Guardians, Assembly of Experts, and Majma ’-e Tashkhis-e Nezam, or Expediency Council—the ayatollahs set in place

informal institutions with no specific legal status to insure the uncontested supremacy of the selectorate structure. The Association of Friday Prayer Leaders, for example, permitted IRGC commanders to use Jumu‘a—or Friday Prayer ceremonies—to establish their views on key political issues, including foreign policy, while circumventing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other normal bureaucratic channels. More importantly, rather than either permit Iran’s pro-reform elements to develop their own power bases or crush them outright and install a military regime, Khomeini had the clever foresight to groom a separate cadre of loyal elites through the Pasdaran ranks. These individuals have gradually crept their way into top positions within the selectorate as well as the Islamic Republic’s parallel civilian structure. Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei, Iran’s current Rahbar, and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s fourth president, for example, were two of Khomeini’s first representatives to the IRGC. Today’s conservative political elite, moreover, is composed increasingly of second-generation hard-liners shaped by their formative experiences as Pasdaran officers during the Iran-Iraq War. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s current president whose policies and tainted reelection have dealt a serious blow to the reformist agenda initiated by his predecessor, Sayyed Mohammed Khatami, was a former IRGC officer. Interior Minister Mustafa Muhammad Najaris is another Pasdaran veteran who helped stand up Hizbullah in Lebanon, and Ahmad Vahidi, the defense minister, is a former commander of the Niru-ye Qods (Qods Force), the IRGC’s foreign intelligence unit.

273 Ibid., 35
Khomeini’s regime depended early on upon inter-elite outbidding to coopt and discredit opponents—often on accusations of their being foreign sympathizers—whose worldviews ran counter to his own. Mehdi Bazargan, for example, Iran’s first appointed prime minister after the revolution, urged moderation in the wake of the November U.S. embassy hostage crisis, and called openly for an “Islamic Democratic Republic” based on a non-theocratic structure absent the mechanisms responsible for disbursing Khomeini’s worldview, specifically the Assembly of Experts.\(^{275}\) Bazargan resigned shortly thereafter, and was denied a bid for the presidency by the Council of Guardians in 1985, after he had begun critiquing openly the Islamic Republic’s new “cultural revolution” strategy—which amounted to purging the intelligentsia of pro-Western elements—and wrote an open letter of dissent to then Speaker of Parliament Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.\(^{276}\) Abdolhasan Bani-Sadr, Iran’s first elected president who in June 1981 was impeached for allegedly plotting against Chief Justice Muhammad Beheshti and other clerics, publicly remarked in 1979 that exporting the revolution to southern Lebanon should constitute an Iranian priority:

By not paying attention to what is happening there, we will not be helping the advancement of our revolution . . . in order to advance our revolution, it is imperative that we go beyond our frontiers and to confront the enemies wherever they may be . . . if we do not go out of Iran to help the revolution, others will come to our country to plot against us.\(^{277}\)

Potentially subversive elements within the clerical establishment itself were also fair game, leading to the wartime establishment of Dadgah-e Vizheh-ye Rouhaniyat (Special Court for the Clergy), which sanctioned prosecution of dissident ayatollahs espousing interpretations of Islam seen as potentially undermining Velayat-e Faqih.\(^{278}\)


\(^{277}\) *Enghelab-e Islami* (August 1979), cited by Hunter, “Iran and the World,” 41

\(^{278}\) Rakel, “Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran,” 35
The military-security apparatus—the Pasdaran in particular—has over the years remained perhaps the only institutional constant within Iran’s selectorate to continue unabashedly to fly the flag of Velayat-e Faqih, particularly as progressively fewer segments of the body politic and society lose faith in the regime’s seemingly antiquated revolutionary ideals. The Middle East’s geostrategic landscape following the Iran-Iraq War seemed to demand no less of the Guard, which for the last couple decades has been compelled to respond to the U.S. Military’s post-Desert Storm regional prowess with a combination of religious zeal and irregular warfare. The Pasdaran’s enhanced monopoly over Iranian deterrence strategies—namely missile programs, external operations outfits (the elite Qods Force in particular) and naval assets defending the Persian Gulf and energy sources passing through the Straits of Hormuz—is indicative of this trend. The organization’s continued leadership in the practice of state-sponsored terrorism, initiated during the end of the revolution, is of no less importance to the Pasdaran. Its most important client, for example—Lebanon’s Hizbullah—was the brainchild of Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, a hardline cleric who, while serving as Iran’s ambassador to Syria in the late 1980s, oversaw the deployment of Qods Force Units in south Lebanon’s Biqā’ Valley to replace Amal as a more aggressive and revolutionary Iranian surrogate movement. Southern Lebanon provided the Pasdaran an ideal opportunity to pay homage to and further ingratiate themselves within Khomeini’s coalition. Unlike Amal, whose leadership was secular, Hizbullah’s clerical authorities had studied under or alongside some of Iran’s top mujtahids in the sacred Shi’a shrine cities of Najaf and

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Qom, making them more amenable to cast themselves in the mold of *Velayat-e Faqih*.

Lebanon’s historically fractious polity—dominated by a Christian elite with Western and Israeli backing—and marginalized Shi’a population—which according to some accounts constitutes Lebanon’s demographic majority—legitimized solid ground on which Tehran could engage in destabilization and the sponsorship of terrorism in pursuit of regime goals.

The domestic and regional environments in which the Iranian regime operates, both past and present, show no immediate rationales according to which the clerical-military complex would opt to let down its guard: Iran was subject to intense international isolation following the 1979 hostage crisis; the Iraqi invasion received sizeable external support; and Tehran continues to face substantial political, military, and economic pressure as a result of its alleged nuclear program.

After the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the *Pasdaran* announced a revision of its training and organization doctrine to officially accommodate partisan and irregular warfare. Its perceived successes in deterring U.S. gains in Iraq and thwarting the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) routing of *Hizbullah* in the 2006 Lebanon War rendered “Mosaic Defense” a serious component of future IRGC objectives. Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the *Pasdaran*’s senior commanding officer, has stated that reviving the Iran-Iraq War-era fervor—and thereby emphasizing human and spiritual factors over material—constitutes a top organizational priority. This is observable in a number of developments. For one, as mentioned, the current regime appears to be

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280 Ibid., 139
281 Yair Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple,” 106
282 Hunter, “Iran and the World,” 41
283 Ward, “Persian Praetorians”
closing ranks in favor of conservative elements with established ties to the IRGC. Jafari himself was appointed by Rahbar Khameini in September 2007, and is linked closely to Mohsen Rezaee, Expediency Council Secretary and former IRGC commander, as well as Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, current Mayor of Tehran and another former Guard officer. Jafari has also maintained close relations with commanders of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly known as the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI). His predecessor, Major General Yehya Rahim Safavi, was believed to be a close personal supporter of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose removal is further testament to the clerics’ insistence on continued Pasdaran loyalty for selectorate access.284

The selectorate has surely accrued tremendous benefits since consolidating its position. Aside from mere material gains, the Pasdaran and Basij enjoy an almost godlike status in Iranian society. Because of their unique constitutionally mandated mission, officers see themselves as legitimate participants in national politics on both overt and covert levels, and free from all governmental oversight other than that of the Rahbar. This was noted in 1992, 1994, and 1999–when Guardsmen ruthlessly suppressed major protests—in 1997—when the reformist camp attempted to roll back Iran’s support for terrorism following Khatami’s election, and the Pasdaran’s supporters in the religious leadership neutralized the 285—and between 2002 and 2004—when the organization arranged for cronies to gain major shares of parliamentary seats over reformists, who subsequently blamed the security services for manipulating the 2005 and

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284 See, for example, “Iran Sacking Row Hints at Ahmadinejad Power Struggle.” BBC International (21 April 2011); Vahid Sepherei, “Iran: New Commander Takes Over Revolutionary Guards.” Radio Free Europe (04 September 2007)

285 Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 54
2009 presidential election, and reelection, of Ahmadinejad. During a September 2009 speech, IRGC Commander Jafari admitted that his forces had monitored reformist politicians at the behest of the Rahbar, who cited a secret statement by Khatami that defeating Ahmadinejad in the election was necessary to eliminate the office of Supreme Leader.286 And Pasdaran elements now maintain their own domestic intelligence service, control political prisons, and are active in perpetuating the Rahbar’s ideology through cultural and media outlets, the educational system, and the Basij.287 Their role in selection, ideological indoctrination, professional development, and advancement of future senior civil servants is unparalleled, allowing them to consistently outbid attempts by non-clerical elements, particularly popularly elected ones, to try and control them. These dynamics have naturally blurred the line increasingly between “defending the revolution” and securing the selectorate’s own corporate interests. Conservative hardliners in the regime, for example, have consistently rewarded Pasdaran officers with coveted gubernatorial, ministerial, and diplomatic appointments.288

The IRGC has of course also raked in a considerable share of economic goodies, translating initial ventures in military-related engineering and defense contracts into an economic empire within the country’s business, manufacturing, and public works sectors. They are currently engaged in activities ranging from smuggling illicit goods, running concessions at airports, and constructing roads and dams, to automobile manufacturing, sports and summer camps for children (particularly aspiring Basijis) and even providing

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286 Parsi, “A Single Roll of the Dice,” 86
288 Rakel, “Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran,” 38
such boutique medical services as laser eye surgery.\textsuperscript{289} From a regime perspective, it appears that the continued benefits derived by the clerical-security alliance, in tandem with the state’s ability to offset the consequences of strategic economic malaises—\textit{inter alia}, such inefficient statist policies as rigid price controls and subsidies, as well as a substantial “brain drain”—through relatively high petroleum revenues, continue to militate against prospects for earnest reform.

Iran’s recent international environment would appear to render the continuation of the status-quo—and by extension, incentives for continued aversion—all the more likely. Economic sanctions, imposed by the U.S. since 1979 as well as the U.N. and other states more consistently since 2006, apparently permit the key selectorate constituencies to enhance their benefits at the expense of alternative societal strata. Along with \textit{Pasdaran} officers, quasi-state religious foundations, known as \textit{bonyads}, dominate major sectors and markets within the Iranian economy. Their executives, many of whom are powerful former officials with strong links to the \textit{ayatollahs}, enjoy special trading privileges and can pay them forward to such key hard-liner allies as the \textit{bazaar} merchants. They are also tax-exempt and subject to no regulation over import-export operations. Rather than eliminate these dividing lines, sanctions have served to reinforce them by allowing the clerics to tailor economic redistribution to those constituencies who will continue to support their worldview, even in the face of hard times.\textsuperscript{290} Interestingly, the leaders of

\textsuperscript{289} Frederic M. Wehrey et al., \textit{The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.} Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009, pp. 38, 93

Iran’s oppositionist Green Movement have vehemently opposed sanctions on these very grounds.291

The U.S. policy dimension is certainly not without considerable fault in the perpetuation of this dynamic. When in 1995, for example, the reformist presidential administration of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani attempted to thaw U.S.-Iran economic ties through a proposal that would permit U.S. oil conglomerate Conoco to develop one of Iran’s major offshore oil fields, the Clinton Administration—skeptical that Tehran was seeking a “compartmentalized relationship” in which it could reap some economic benefits while continuing to pursue terrorism and weapons programs—not only canceled the deal, but also imposed comprehensive U.S. sanctions in May,292 despite opposition from key European counterparts who believed that only through “critical dialogue,” vice trade embargoes, could Iran be induced to “behave responsibly.”293 While Iran’s reformists had undertaken several subsequent initiatives to improve its ties to the West, it often proved too little too late. Clinton’s steady hard line, including rejecting Khatami’s call for a “dialogue of civilizations” in 1997, dealt a serious blow to the reformist movement, and when the George W. Bush administration designated Tehran part of the “Axis of Evil” early in its tenure, Khatami was forced to urge parliamentary supporters to abandon any support for improved bilateral relations due to what he considered growing U.S. belligerency.294 During the same era, what Iranians conceived as unrelenting

antagonism toward their national sovereignty–embodied in opposition to the nuclear program–provided an unfortunately powerful popular rallying point at a time when religious fervor was not particularly salient. 295

New scholarship by Iranian-American academic Trita Parsi, based on interviews with both U.S. and Iranian officials as well as classified documents from the Wikileaks cables, indicates that in 2003 during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, the Iranians had delivered a proposal to the U.S. State Department through Swiss interlocutors spelling out the contours of a new bilateral relationship resolving key points of contention, including support for pro-Palestinian terrorist groups and allowing comprehensive inspections of their nuclear sites. Despite some signs from Bush administration officials that Washington was at least minimally amenable to some degree of renewed dialogue, hawks in the administration simply declared, “We don’t speak to evil.” 296 While the Obama administration came into office with a renewed determination to achieve rapprochement with Tehran, initial disagreements surrounding the particulars of a deal–specifically the exchange of a portion of its low-enriched uranium for foreign-made fuel rods to be used for strictly civilian research purposes–exhausted his administration’s room for maneuver, while Iranian perceptions of suspect U.S. intentions– signaled by, inter alia, a coterie of senior U.S. diplomats such as Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton and Special Envoy Ambassador Dennis Ross–provided fertile ground for the Rahbar’s camp to once again close ranks. 297

297 Parsi, “A Single Roll of the Dice,” particularly chapters 10 and 11

Sudan’s crackdowns against rebel groups and civilians in the western region of Darfur—which peaked in 2003, and began to gradually peter following a tenuous national peace accord in 2006, and 2010 Qatari-brokered forum–unleashed an impassioned public debate over whether Sudan’s President, Lieutenant General Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, had engaged deliberately in genocide, causing a major subset of global civil society to view the Khartoum regime with a sense of genuine disdain. What many casual observers of the country now probably fail to realize, however, is that the Sudanese state had been engaged in comprehensive military campaigns against the country’s southern areas since 1955, and that throughout a relatively brief period from 1989 until the mid-1990s, Sudan–under the rulership of an officer-‘ulama alliance led by General Bashir and Shaykh Hassan ‘Abd Allah al-Turabi–not only intensified the “jihad” against the south to levels of unparalleled atrocity, but also became a full-fledged state sponsor of terror, converting large swaths of land outside Khartoum into training facilities and living quarters for some of the most ruthless known violators–including Illich Ramírez Sánchez, a.k.a Carlos the Jackal, and Usama Bin Laden–as well as such organizations as Abu Nidal and HAMAS. The suppression inflicted by the Bashir-Turabi regime within Sudan was immense; Its military campaigns, which included artillery

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bombardment against civilian targets and the withholding of food and critical supplies from southern populations, produced over 4 million refugees, .5 million of which swelled the refugee camps of neighboring Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. In Darfur, the government-backed militias—or *Janjaweed*—terrorized the local populations at will through murder, rape, and forced deportation, resulting in over 70,000 fatalities and the displacement of 1.5 million refugees, 200,000 of which sought asylum in Chad where Chadian regulars have clashed with the *Janjaweed*. This regime regularly practiced the public discrimination of women, who were often arbitrarily dismissed from their jobs or publicly shamed for acting in violation of *shari’a*.

Unlike Iran, Sudan’s post-independence political system could at no point be aptly characterized as a theocracy, i.e. a system of government in which religious figures or scholars control matters of high policy. Yet, the military’s decision to integrate Turabi’s *al-Jabhat al-Islamiyah al-Qawmiyah* (National Islamic Front, or NIF) similarly materialized as a result of balancing formidable internal and external threats, and had the effect of accelerating Khartoum’s drift deep into the rogue orbit. Like Iran, however, Sudan’s independence was forged in the face of intensive meddling not only from international powers—specifically the British and later, according to Sudan’s elites, the U.S.—but also regional ones, namely Egypt. Historic Nubia, the lands covering most of modern-day Sudan, was in fact consistently dominated by Egyptian interests. While Nubia had undergone substantial conversion to Christianity by the 6th Century A.D., the south maintained a combination of Christian and African animist beliefs, while the northerners identified themselves increasingly with Egypt and a wider Arab-Islamic

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orientation. Fascinatingly, the intertwining of Islamic radicalism, military might, and international ostracism had become ingrained in Sudan’s national consciousness and threat assessment calculi well before the onset of the modern Bashir-Turabi rogue state.

From 1881 until 1885, Muhammad Ahmad bin ‘Abd Allah, a Sufi Shaykh of the Samaniyya order who proclaimed himself the Mahdi—or redeemer of the Islamic faith—prosecuted a successful military campaign against Ottoman-backed Egyptian forces and took Khartoum four years later, leading to the establishment of a Mahdist state. This state, referred to as the Mahdiyya, promulgated a backlash interpretation of Islam that challenged the legitimacy of Turko-Egyptian rule, replaced Haj (pilgrimage to the sacred city of Mecca) with jihad (holy war against infidels) as the fifth pillar of the faith, and mandated that subjects declare loyalty to the Mahdi in addition to God and the Prophet Muhammad as part of the Shahada—the Muslim declaration of faith. The Mahdi also purported to dismantle the four traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence, which alienated many Ulama in and outside of Sudan, while acquiring territory through an impressive army known as the Ansar, or followers, whose following was mainly limited to fellow Sufis and tribesmen from the area around Aba Island. Arguably a rogue before its time, the Mahdiyya’s unique brand of offensive Jihad facilitated strained relations with practically every neighboring country, leading it, for example, to reject an offer of alliance from the Christian Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes IV.301

Despite the importance of this historical episode, the Mahdiyya represented but a fleeting blip of genuine independence in the period of Sudan’s continued struggle with outside forces, and more importantly the legacy they would continue to impose on

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Sudanese political development throughout the run-up to independence. Following his death from typhus in 1885, the Mahdi’s successors held onto power only until 1898, at which point Sudan was retaken by the British, who installed an Anglo-Egyptian condominium that was to dominate the territory’s affairs until 1955. The arrangement—which established direct administration over the north and kept its Arab population isolated from the blacks of the south, who were over time also sold into slavery—sharply reinforced the country’s nascent ideo-geographic divisions. Perhaps the utmost hypocrisy of colonialism was that at the time of independence in 1956, the departing British were “urging” national union.

These years were rife with challenges. Internationally, Khartoum’s anti-Western stance facilitated frequent conflicts over the acceptance of U.S. aid throughout the 1950s, and Egyptian meddling—in the form of the construction of the Aswan Dam, and troop deployments to reclaim areas on the Nile and Red Sea coast—served as a constant reminder that the outside world was a dangerous place. On the domestic front, the new government of Prime Minister Ismail Al-Azhari quickly assumed the same burdens faced by the forces of Sudan’s former custodians; Indeed, neither the Mahdist nor Egyptian-British armies, with the exception of a few garrisons, could ever retain effective control of the south. After Khartoum reneged on its initial promise to create a federal system, and drafted a constitution leaving the Islamic character of the state an open question, southern army officers initiated armed insurrections beginning in 1955.

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302 This proved a recurrent problem throughout modern Sudanese history; Throughout the 1970s, under the military administration of Ja’far Al-Numayri, the government significantly mishandled Western-backed development schemes holding out great hopes to convert much of Sudan’s arable territory into the “food basket of the Arab world,” which contributed to Sudan’s established status as a debtor nation by the mid-1990s.


304 See “Background Note: “Sudan-History,” U.S. Department of State. Available online at:
political entrepreneurs regularly deployed rhetoric and imagery to re-conjure notions of the *Mahdiyya*, thereby capturing the popular imagination by propagating a siege mentality informed by Islam.

It was against this tumultuous backdrop that the first Arab-led administrations attempted to build a modern state in Khartoum. Their efforts would prove ultimately in vain, as the pattern quickly emerged whereby government oscillated inefficiently yet rather predictably between “pluralistic” and military rule, and mass popular protests. Intra and inter-party maneuverings, as well as a slew of legal and illegal strikes within Ismail Al-Azhari’s democratic government, led the Armed Forces, under General Ibrahim Abbud, to intervene in 1958. While its Supreme Council reversed economic decline experienced under Al-Azhari, the military refused to cede its control, sparking an armed civilian uprising–the so-called “October Revolution”–in 1964, which brought new groups, including the *Ikhwan*, or Muslim Brotherhood–in the form of the NIF forerunner Islamic Charter Front–to the national scene. While failing to fill positions of national prominence early on, Sudanese Islamists exerted a pervasive behind-the-scenes influence, particularly Sufi brotherhoods and elements of the *Ansar* movement, descendants of the original devotees of the *Mahdi*.305

Despite the welcomed return of parliamentary rule in May 1965, conditions quickly regressed to pre-1958 levels over the course of four years and several inefficacious coalition governments. The “May Revolution” of 1969 once again brought the army to control in the person of Ja‘far Muhammad Al-Numayri, who except during the early 1970s, was extremely unpopular domestically, surviving 24 coup plots and

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actual attempts. Numayri’s gambits to placate his critics, namely the Islamists—who had by then coalesced into an organized opposition featuring such key operators as Sharif al-Hindi of the National Front, Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Ansar, and Turabi himself, who was then in charge of the Islamic Charter Front\(^{306}\)—through national introduction of the “September Laws,” fueled the resumption of hostilities by southerners, now organized into the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).\(^{307}\) When Numayri was finally ousted in an internal coup by Lieutenant General ‘Abd Al-Rahman Siwar in 1985, the deteriorating security situation in the south, combined with the usual stagnation and economic decline associated with successive governmental turnover, facilitated an unparalleled sense of urgency among the now two key players in national politics: the military and National Islamic Front.

We should note here that throughout this interim juncture between Numayri’s deposition and Bashir’s ascension, Sudan appeared well-positioned to reverse its increasingly problematic international and domestic image. The 1986 Koka Dam Declaration between the SPLA and northern parties, for example, explicitly advocated

> the creation of a new Sudan . . . free from racism, tribalism, sectarianism and all causes of discrimination and disparity. . . [and] for lifting the state of emergency, for repealing the September 1983 laws. . .and for the abrogation of military pacts signed by the previous regime.\(^{308}\)

On the eve of the 1989 coup, moreover, northern political forces were on the verge of convening a constitutional conference to address the SPLA’s demands for a secular system to supplant Shari’a law.


Despite its potential, the military and Islamists had compelling reasons of their own to neutralize this opportunity. The Islamists had come to vociferously equate the incompetence of Sudan’s civilian administrations with elites they saw as little more than vestiges of colonial praxis. The prospect of a pro-peace Sudan, which would as a matter of course backtrack completely on its implementation of the September Laws while securing the future of the secular cadres and placing its confidence in the southern “infidels,” was understandably threatening. Turabi and others believed that a popular return to Islam could militate against these dangers. “Once they awoke from the blow of colonialism they looked to socialism and liberalism, they looked east and they looked west,” Turabi wrote, “and eventually they were content to choose Islam.”

The military had by now also come to view its general inability to effectively steward the political process through transitions between army and civilian rule as an embarrassment. Unlike Iran’s armed forces, presented with the immediate opportunity of the Iran-Iraq War to transition from an externally manipulated and partisan repressive apparatus to a nationally respected and united fighting force, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) remained a weak institution. Its nucleus emerged as auxiliaries within and trained by the Egyptian army, known as Al-Awitrah, and charged initially with internal security. On the eve of WWII, the British opened and closed Sudan’s military academies at will, and by extension, waffled constantly between augmenting and constricting SAF ranks. Aside from policing the south—which, in the face of the Equatorial Corps, a network of largely Christian units developed under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, became an increasingly trying and futile enterprise—the SAF’s only combat experience came through augmenting Allied operations in North Africa throughout WWII, as well as Egyptian

309 Ḥāmidī and Turābī, The Making of an Islamic Political Leader,” 59-60
offensives during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Interestingly, the latter had the perhaps unintended effect of further dividing the military, as only 250 combat-seasoned northern troops were dispatched to the Palestine theatre, whereas during WWII the Sudanese contingent constituted both Arab and black elements. Consequently, the version of the SAF left standing after independence was anything but a proud and cohesive body. It was indeed no surprise that many within its officer corps became amenable to political temptation, particularly leftist, virtually eliminating whatever sense of professionalism that had existed prior to independence.\footnote{Muhammad Muhammad Ahmad Karrar, \textit{Al-Jaysh Al-Sudani wa-Al-Inqadh? Khafyay wa-Khalfiyat} [The Sudanese Army and National Salvation? An Inquiry and Background]. Khartoum, Sudan: Dar Al-Balad, 1990}

It was against this background that the bonds between Sudan’s military and Islamist establishments began to crystallize. Throughout the 1960s, as foreign military sales and arms transfers from the Soviet Union—and shortly thereafter North Korea, China, and the so-called radical pan-Arab bloc of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt—allowed the SAF to intensify its southern campaigns, young officers became more determined to Arabize and Islamize the Christian south. It is important to understand that by the time al-Numayri seized power in 1969, Islamism was just beginning to emerge as a likely and unifying factor for an officer corps that had become increasingly divided along numerous radical ideological fault lines—Maoist, Marxist, Communist, Ba’thist, \textit{et al}. In 1969, for example, Sudan’s military academy began offering modules in Islamic Studies and \textit{Da’wa}, the Muslim tradition of proselytization. The failure of Arab armies to contend with Israel during the 1967 Six Day War, moreover, had only recently unleashed a deep sense of doubt toward the Arab nationalist project—hitherto affiliated loosely with many of these radical ideologies—among the secular intelligentsia of the Arab-Muslim world,
illuminating political Islam as a potentially optimal and more appealing forward path, particularly for struggling nations on the outer margins of global and even regional politics, like Sudan. Within this socio-political milieu of the 1970s, Sudan’s current military leadership came of age. From this perspective, it is easier to understand why al-Numayri, despite taking measures to appease the Islamists, was not yet in the position to erect an Islamist securitocracy in Sudan.

Beginning in 1973, all SAF officers were indoctrinated thoroughly in Islamic fundamentalist teachings, joining the ranks of what they considered a global Sahwa, or [Islamic] trend. Consequently, military morale was oriented increasingly toward the sacred anti-southern jihad. The armed forces grew awash with such radical Islamic commentaries as Sayid Qutb, Ibn Katheer, and even a treatise on Islamic war fighting by Major General Mahmoud Khalab of the SAF itself. Yet by al-Numayri’s ouster in 1985, the military was still unable to exert itself fully as a credible national institution, and was subject to further shame as the civilian government led by Sadiq Al-Mahdi’s Umma Party fielded a separate militia, whose haphazard efforts to curb the SAF led to further losses in southern Sudan.311

The convergence of Bashir and al-Turabi’s camps following the 1989 coup represented the furtherance of the course of differentiation already initiated by Sudanese Islamists and military officers described above. More specifically, the new regime could perpetuate the September Laws but with the backing of a strong central state apparatus, regain its honor in the southern jihad, and in so doing, cure the ills colonialism had bestowed upon Sudan’s fragile body politic and fill the power vacuum dispersed amongst

its traditional society with the Islamic faith. The regime’s choice of a new name, The Revolutionary Command Council of National Salvation (RCC-NS), signified a reinvigorated coalition guided with a defining worldview, in further contrast to the civilian mismanagement and corruptible military meddling characteristic of the prior three decades. It also represented a strategic mechanism through which the military could close ranks for purposes of jihad. Indeed, by the late 1980s, southern rebels had further exposed SAF vulnerabilities and emerged as a viable national security threat. By 1985, for example, SPLA fighters had begun successfully targeting Chevron oil pipeline installations to “prevent the possibility of rescuing the tottering Numayri dictatorship.” Bashir, who as commander of the 8th Infantry Brigade had witnessed firsthand the chaos enveloping the southern regions, was especially concerned that absent a renewed campaign, the intelligence services of Chad and Libya would foment further instability by supplying more arms to the rebels.

The RCC-NS worldview, reflected in both its rhetoric and influence on the actual restructuring of Khartoum’s administrative machinery, echoed the rejectionist and reactionary orientations of its founding members, in particular a deep distrust of civilian politicians and disregard for multi-party politics. Coalition members in fact pointed

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312 Francis Mading Deng, “War of Visions for the Nation” in John Obert Voll (editor), Sudan: State and Society in Crisis. Bloomington: Published in association with the Middle East Institute [by] Indiana University Press, 1991, pp. 24-42, 29; and K.D.D. Henderson, The Sudan Republic. London: Ernest Beam Ltd., 1965, p. 183: “By 1957 it seems to have been generally accepted in the North that the confidence of the Southern intelligentsia had been lost. It could only be recovered by concessions which the North was not prepared to make. The solution must have appeared to lie in taking a leaf from the book of the old government and putting southern policy into reverse, as it were. The influence of the existing intelligentsia could be weakened by cutting away its feeder system, the mission schools from which it was recruited. Substitute a system of Islamic education uniform with that of the North and within a decade you will have built up a new pro-Northern Arabizaied student body to replace the now discredited leaders of the nineteen-forties.” It is also interesting to note that at the coup’s outset, Bashir had Turabi arrested and placed in solitary confinement, which according to some accounts constituted clever subterfuge to allow the NIF to influence RCC-NS policy undetected.

313 Bechtold, “Modern Turbulence in Sudan,” 2

314 Ibid., 11
frequently to Western-style liberal democracy as divisive and dysfunctional in a country like Sudan, whose circumstances rendered “more appropriate” a modified strain of pluralism via “citizens’ committees”–which, perhaps ironically, was the approach nominally adopted by Qaddafi in Libya–and shura, the Islamic practice of consultation. Al-Turabi, who had considerable exposure to Western thought throughout his doctoral studies at the Sorbonne in Paris, resented what he perceived as the ultimate hypocrisy of Western governments. Their executors, in spite of preaching democracy worldwide, relied on dictatorial instruments like the UN to admonish developing nations to essentially “start from the beginning and go through all that they had gone through and, [in so doing], remain backward and underdeveloped.”\textsuperscript{315} All the while, sectarian political parties, themselves an obnoxious remnant of the West’s pernicious influence, continued to eat away at the post-independence national fabric.\textsuperscript{316} Like Khomeini, al-Turabi cast Sudan’s Muslim population as historical victims infected by the onset of pervasive anti-Arab and anti-Islamic malaises, evident in a local political structure whose distribution of natural wealth, particularly petrol, incredulously favored the infidel south. Like the prescriptions of the Mahdi a century before, jihad remained the principal duty incumbent on the collective Ummah, as well as the mechanism through which a downtrodden Sudan could convert itself into a “springboard for Islamist penetration” not only of the south, but all black Africa as well.\textsuperscript{317} Statements of both military and Islamist leaders throughout the era were peppered with notions of mutual interdependence to realize these

\textsuperscript{315} Ḥāmidī and Turabi, “The Making of an Islamic Political Leader,” 74-5
goals. Bashir, for example, referred to his lieutenants as martyrs in the imposition of God’s law, and promised the military enhanced resources, and Turabi remarked:

If Sudan’s fate is to turn away from Islam, then I, and Omar al-Bashir and all those with us will fall and give way to something else . . . If the West were to understand this, it would serve them a great deal and stop them from clinging on to false dreams, committing more crimes, or concocting fresh schemes and assassinations . . . Omar Al-Bashir is a symbol and a good example of this [struggle] . . . Omar Al-Bashir is me.

With the entrenchment of the Bashir-Turabi worldview followed intensified framing of and preparations for the civil war in pan-Arab/Islamist terms. In addition to further legitimizing the NIF-NS’ perspective, this tactic was intended to garner support from fellow Arab states and thereby further insulate Sudan from potential black African meddlers. The military-backed Popular Defense Force, a conglomeration of enthusiasts and press-gang members who undertook heavy recruitment drives encompassing the religious indoctrination of civil servants and high school graduates before they could enter university, eventually outnumbered SAF regulars. In addition came the consolidation of a new state apparatus swelled with NIF operators, within the military and security services in particular. The NIF augmented Sudan’s security establishment with completely new outfits such as The Guardians of Morality and Advocates of the Good—mandated to enforce Turabi’s Sahwa through, inter alia, the mandatory closure of businesses for Friday noon prayers, rigid dress codes for women, and the ban on liquor—and the Revolutionary Security Guards—empowered to interrogate and torture political dissidents in unofficial detention centers outside the purview of regular prisons authorities. The military in fact oversaw a sweeping reorganization of the entire state


intelligence structure to recruit Islamists and utilize them for scare tactics, and when in 1990 the RCC-NS announced a more intensive brand of *shari‘a* than appeared in al-Numayri’s September Laws, it also sanctioned a Popular Police Force as the muscle, whose footsoldiers were recruited by special agents from the Internal Security Bureau.  

The outbidding process materialized diligently until 1992, as the RCC-NS used its panoply of repressive institutions to stamp out civil society groups—the National Democratic Alliance in particular—which, under the normal previous circumstances, would probably have been able to pressure the military to authorize new elections and facilitate a subsequent return to civilian rule. Shortly thereafter, NIF loyalists began infiltrating all key government ministries, including Justice, Foreign Affairs (Turabi’s number 2, ‘Ali ‘Uthman Muhammad Taha, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and Social Planning), Education, Culture, Social Planning, and Finance; Bashir even sacked the judiciary in favor of Islamist sympathizers. Civil servants with unacceptable political affiliations or tendencies—particularly communist—and those accused of such foreign-associated vices as corruption, immorality, alcoholism, and especially illicit dealings in foreign currencies were purged.  

This radical shift in Khartoum’s selectorate apparently manifested several constraints on Sudanese policy throughout the early 1990s. The regime seemed to harden its already uncompromising stance toward the south on an almost daily basis, for example dismissing SPLA commander and pro-peace Dinka politician John Garang as a communist and Ethiopian agent, and perceiving his refusal to negotiate without strict preconditions—specifically pertaining to the abolition of *shari‘a* law—as indicative of the

322 Bechtold, “Modern Turbulence in Sudan,” 17
necessity to resolve the conflict by continued *jihad*.\textsuperscript{323} “The basic Islamic agenda of the regime,” remarked Bashir, “will not change. Islam is the cornerstone of our policy.”\textsuperscript{324}

The army further vowed “not to give up one inch of soil of this homeland;” and the NIF-filled diplomatic corps stepped up its campaign to win back “Arab” towns captured by “Africans” and “infidels.” This strategy was assisted by fellow rogues—namely Iraq, Libya, and Iran—whose provision of economic support and oil, military experts, and such sophisticated military equipment as warplanes helped perpetuate the *jihad*. In 1991, senior Iranian officials visited Khartoum and declared its anti-southern campaign a worthy *jihad*, signing bilateral military protocols and pledging to pay $300 million worth of Chinese equipment. Following fissures amongst the SPLA leadership—leading eventually to open combat between Garang’s Dinka-dominated SPLA and Zonal Commander Riek Machar’s Nuer-dominated SPLA-United—and Bashir’s subsequent assessment that victory was at hand, Khartoum’s regional behavior grew even more dangerous and aversive. In conjunction with a forefront offensive in 1992, for example, the SAF bombed Ugandan territory to route SPLA bases, causing Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to sever diplomatic relations.

Perhaps the most important—and for our inquiry’s purposes, germane—effect of the new regime’s approach was an expedient reorientation of its foreign affairs toward the purveyance of an activist *jihadi* diplomacy. Part of this strategy included solidifying ties between regime officials and high-profile international terrorists. Sudan received Usama Bid-Laden in 1990 to undertake large-scale projects in construction, development, and banking. The NIF also welcomed the notorious *Jama’a al-Islamiyya* and its leader

\textsuperscript{323} Burr and Collins, “Requiem for the Sudan,” 234
Egyptian Shaykh ‘Omer ‘Abd Al-Rahman, as well as a slew of other organizations spanning North Africa and the Levant. For al-Turabi, sponsorship of terror constituted more than mere strategy; it furthered the RCC-NS’ goal of unshackling Sudan from its outsider-dominated past and facilitating a fresh, organic approach to international relations. In discussing his longstanding relationship with former Egyptian Islamic Jihad Emir and current Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, for instance, al-Turabi remarked:

I cannot remember a single issue after that on which we had differed. We were in full agreement on all matters relating to Egypt and the Sudan. To me, this rapport could have remained at that level or even improved, but it seems that someone has spoilt the relationship, and there are many who would be willing to do so and create a rift between us. This was what happened in fact, on the personal as well as the national level . . . I also believe that the new rulers in the Sudan thought that their approach would bring them closer to Egypt than geography, or the waters of the Nile, or the League of the Arab States, which no longer represents anyone and every time it meets only highlights divisions and lack of consensus. We also thought that our relationship with Egypt would now be stronger than ever before. We have invested all our historic and cultural legacy in this relationship. Islam has brought us closer to many Arab and Muslim nations, so why not to our brothers in Egypt?325

The NIF also sponsored the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress, an international forum of the “who’s who” of global jihadis and former anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahideen, which in April of 1991 reportedly held a conference attended by 500 people from 45 different countries.326 Al-Turabi and his henchmen did far more than socialize with these individuals; Western intelligence agencies have linked Khartoum to some of the most heinous attacks of the 1990s, including, inter alia: the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993; assassination attempts against Egyptian Interior Minister Hassan Al-Alfi and Prime Minister ‘Atef Sidqi during the same year; the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which Egyptian security personnel linked to al-Zuwahiri and al-Turabi provided training for Somali insurgents responsible for the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers; the 1997 massacre of 62 tourists in Luxor, Egypt; and the 1998 U.S.

325 Ĥāmidī and Turabi, “The Making of an Islamic Political Leader,” 50-1
embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. Sudanese intelligence operations throughout
this period crossed a number of borders, including Eritrea’s—in the form of support for the
Eritrean Islamic Jihad anti-regime forces—and Ethiopia’s—where agents backed Islamic
groups and attempted to murder Egyptian President Husni Mubarak during a June 1995
state visit to Addis Ababa. Rather than distance himself from the strike, al-Turabi boldly
proclaimed, “The song of the Prophet Moses, the Muslims, rose up against him,
confounded his plans, and sent him back to his country . . . I found the man [Mubarak] to
be very far below my level of thinking and my views, and too stupid to understand my
pronouncements.”

Like the Iranian Pasdaran, Turabi’s NIF encountered tremendous benefits upon
entering the Khartoum selectorate, strategically entrenching its loyalists in the most
dynamic sectors of Sudan’s economy. Beginning under al-Numayri but greatly
intensified throughout RCC-NS rule, NIF members secured coveted positions in the
budding financial sector, initially the Faisal Islamic Bank, the first of its kind in the Arab
world. NIF cadres received generous shares in the institution, and later the national Bank
of Sudan (BoS), as well as employment in nationwide branches. A BoS directive
requiring all banks to devote 40% of local currency to fund agricultural initiatives shored
up selectorate support in the countryside, where military officers and party apparatchiks
could more readily seize assets belonging to potential rivals in the Khatmiyya and Ansar
movements of the northeast regions. NIF sympathizers also appropriated state-owned
firms, such as the White Nile Tannery and Sudan Textiles.

327 Quoted in Petterson, “Inside Sudan,” 179
328 Mosely Lesch, “The Sudan: Contested National Identities,” 318
329 Benaiah Yongo-Bure, “Sudan’s Deepening Crisis.” Middle East Research and Information Project, Vol. 21,
No. 172 (September/October 1991)
By the mid-1990s, the Bashir-Turabi coalition appeared on still relatively solid footing, despite the rising tide of international resistance it now faced. Multilateral non-economic U.N.S.C. sanctions, imposed in 1996, did little to thwart either the perpetuation of the RCC-NS’ economic interests, nor Bashir’s abilities to seek new sources of international fuel–largely Chinese but to some extent, French–for his rising military machine. U.S. sanctions, imposed in 1997, involved relatively trivial restrictions on economic relations (Sudan sold only 3.8% of its total exports to the U.S. between 1990 and 1997).\textsuperscript{330} The 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack against the \textit{Al-Shifa} pharmaceutical facility, which the Clinton administration mistakenly believed was engaged in developing a precursor ingredient of VX nerve agent–used for chemical weapons programs–gave the Islamists some political capital, leading Turabi to declare that Islam was “now entrenched in Sudan,” and the military to erect a memorial shrine.\textsuperscript{331} During March 1996 elections, Bashir and fellow RCC officers swore a \textit{bay’\textasciitilde}a–the traditional Arab-Islamic oath of allegiance, used initially throughout the founding period of Islam by followers of the Prophet Muhammad to pledge loyalty to his successors–to al-Turabi.\textsuperscript{332} Yet under the surface, intra-selectorate relations were steadily eroding.

Due to the regime’s increasing economic gains, the SAF was able, for the first time in the history of independent Sudan, to stand on its own two feet as a powerful and cohesive institution. This meant that revenues generated by senior personnel made them increasingly less dependent on the good will of private Islamists for financing. Simultaneously, less radically inclined elements within the NIF were beginning to


\textsuperscript{331} Scott Peterson, “Sudanese Factory Destroyed by US now a Shrine; President Bill Clinton Ordered a Cruise Missile Strike on the Pharmaceutical Factory in Khartoum in 1998; the Sudanese still Haven’t Forgotten.” \textit{The Christian Science Monitor} (7 August 2012)

\textsuperscript{332} Collins, “A History of Modern Sudan,” 187
critique al-Turabi’s short-sighted economic tactics, as well as the trade sanctions his support for terrorist groups was facilitating. NIF radicals, on the other hand, had perhaps come to over-relish their newfound power, going so far as to publicly critique the SAF’s vision of reorganizing local politics through popular councils. Despite his identity as a devout Muslim, Bashir was first and foremost a general, meaning his priority was to preserve the institutional integrity of the military. His lieutenants had by now come to find the PDF a hindrance on the battlefield, and intelligence officers questioned the continued benefits of al-Turabi and Taha’s vigorous pro-jihadi orientations to Sudanese national security, the conduct of the southern campaigns in particular. The implication of the intelligence services in the Mubarak assassination was particularly troubling to Bashir, who had always hoped to bring about a thaw in Khartoum-Cairo relations, leading him to replace the NIF stalwart-interior minister with a nonpolitical intelligence official. Emboldened by both the NIF’s increasing presence in Khartoum’s power centers as well as his own popularity within fundamentalist circles the Muslim world over, al-Turabi had no intention of backing down to the military. He responded to Bashir’s firing of the interior minister by placing him in charge of the NIF’s own security apparatus.\footnote{Mosely Lesch, “The Sudan: Contested National Identities,” 319} Sudan’s 1996 elections brought this potential conflict into the limelight. While Bashir had certainly solidified his position by absorbing NIF coercive assets into the SAF intelligence structure, the unopposed election of al-Turabi to Speaker of the National Assembly gave him a standing increasingly on par with—and by some accounts, exceeding—the president.

By the late 1990s, rationales for purging the NIF from government, and thereby scaling back the extent of Khartoum’s roguery, seemed clearer. For one thing, as alluded
to above, loyalty to the military featured heavily in Bashir’s psyche. Having been a
soldier since the age of sixteen, his military experience prior to becoming a general was
largely professional and had little to do with Sudan’s internal ideological battles. He
received his officer’s training at Cairo’s prestigious Egyptian Military Academy, served
in the Egyptian Army during the 1973 Yom Kippur War against Israel, and in 1975 as
Sudan’s military attaché to the United Arab Emirates. On top of that, his upbringing
reportedly emphasized the shunning of ideological and partisan politics, in the form of
both the National Umma Party-Sudan, as well as the Democratic Unionist Party. And
while these forces had certainly become part and parcel of the RCC-NS regime—which,
by the way, Bashir had begun to gradually dissolve after 1993—the weight of history did
not, as in Iran, seem to either necessitate much less justify an unyielding hold on the
‘Ulama’s power position. Indeed, as Sudan continued to face light sanctions throughout
the 1990s, there did not seem to follow any intensification of popular Islamic fervor,
which had effectively eroded by the decade’s conclusion. In addition, Sudan’s security
and clerical establishments had not yet formed the type of symbiotic and entrenched
bonds they had in Iran and more importantly, the SAF was still in a position to outgun the
NIF. Bashir thus ousted al-Turabi in December 1999, placing him under house arrest and
disbanding the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference.

These developments indicated that while Sudan was by no means headed toward
full-scale socialization, the regime was making some type of effort to recast its image,
and at the very least enjoy some of the economic fruits of enhanced global integration.
What is more, we now also know that these intentions were materializing well before

334 “Profile: Sudan’s President Bashir.” BBC News (25 November 2003); “Profile: Omar al-Bashir.” Al-Jazeera
(18 March 2009)
335 Tim Niblock, “‘Pariah States’ and Sanctions in the Middle East,” 213; and Nincic, “Renegade Regimes,” 115
1999. Indeed, Sudanese officials had indicated a desire to attract investors and expand development of the country’s oil reserves by the early 90s, and in 1994 assisted French intelligence in apprehending Carlos the Jackal and extraditing him to Paris. By 1999, moreover, Khartoum had also signed all twelve international counterterrorist conventions. Yet as in the Iranian case, U.S. diplomacy missed the potential for leverage and renewed relations presented by these opportunities, despite their being arguably for the taking. While secularist components within the RCC-NS were taking steps to distance themselves from the business of sponsoring terrorism, Washington remained convinced that Khartoum’s remained an *unconditionally* pro-terror regime. This perception persisted despite significant Sudanese overtures—including letters from Sudan’s chief of foreign intelligence, Gutbi Al-Mahdi, as well as Bashir himself—to senior U.S. diplomats and FBI counterterrorism officials offering counterterrorism cooperation and the sharing of critical intelligence files outlining the activities of Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda associates.\(^{336}\) In this context, it is easier to understand why the U.S. both was caught off guard by the August 1998 African embassy bombings and decided to respond with the strike against Al-Shifa. The strike, which occurred reportedly under orders from senior U.S. Departments of State and Defense officials absent consultations with the FBI, heralded the beginning of the end of U.S.-Sudan relations, as well as a major stumbling block to whatever proclivities toward successful re-socialization Khartoum may have demonstrated. Sudanese intelligence sent the embassy bombing suspects to Pakistan, where they quickly disappeared, and Khartoum withdrew its ambassador from Washington. We can also note throughout this period the making of a diplomatic context running increasingly against the tide of Khartoum

\(^{336}\) David Rose, “The Osama Files.” *Vanity Fair* (January 2002);
leveraging momentum, following the NIF expulsion, to fully break out of roguery through civilized international channels. Indeed, as the international community continues to condemn the regime unabatedly—the 2008 ICC indictment made Bashir the only sitting head of state to be charged with war crimes—and U.S. antagonism combined with the EU’s policy of “constructive engagement” has facilitated an environment of skepticism among Sudan’s opposition, what is to break the current deadlock?
PAKISTAN–THE ACCIDENTAL ROGUE

A supposedly invaluable partner to the U.S. in both its Cold War-era struggle against communism as well as the current Global War on Terror, few Western analysts would readily include Pakistan in the rogue states category. They might, by contrast, liken current Pakistani misgivings to that of a nearly failed state, lacking in efficient national institutions and accountable leaders. As Anatol Lieven writes, “Pakistan is divided, disorganized, economically backward, corrupt, violent, unjust, often savagely oppressive towards the poor and women, and home to extremely dangerous forms of extremism and terrorism.” “Yet,” as Lieven continues, “it moves, and [Pakistan] is in many ways surprisingly tough and resilient as a state and a society . . . Its pockets of successful modernity—including certain modern industries, motorways and universities, and competent public servants—render it quite different from such truly failed states as Somalia, Afghanistan and the Congo.”

Pakistan is indeed an ironic case in the context of our discussion of Islamic securitocracies, perhaps not as straightforward or deliberate as the latter two. Despite its military establishment’s clear overtures toward Islamists as a way to further the differentiation process, Pakistan never gave Islamists formal political control by integrating them into the selectorate, and more importantly, was effectively unable—and in the case of the empowered ISI, unwilling—to rein the Islamists in after emboldening them throughout the Soviet war in Afghanistan. By analyzing the Pakistani case along these lines, and paying particular attention to the interaction between the military and intelligence services, the Islamists, and the outside world throughout the independence and post-independence eras, we can better understand the paradoxical and perhaps not

completely purposive reality of its roguery. To those in both the scholarly and intelligence communities, this case can also illuminate the sometimes unintended dangers of instrumentalizing Islamist elements for the differentiation process.

Like its population counterparts, the modern Pakistani state was forged not only under conditions of extreme perceived external hostility, but also a keen sense of national deceit, a claim the military would monopolize increasingly over time. Central to these perceptions was the role of India and the contested status of Kashmir. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the All-Indian Muslim League and founder of modern Pakistan, had originally not intended to press for a separate Muslim state. The 1916 Lucknow Pact, which was formulated by Jinnah, created a partnership between the Muslim League and Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress to sue gradually for Indian independence from Great Britain, while allowing the Muslim peoples to retain certain constitutional protections—particularly separate electorates and weightage—as well as residuary powers to be extended from the Hindu center to majority-Muslim provinces in India’s northeast and northwest areas.338 The 1928 Nehru Report, however—a memorandum by the Indian nationalist movement outlining a proposed new Dominion constitution for India—threw out these guarantees and challenged Jinnah’s faith in Indian nationalism, initiating what would become the gradual push for Pakistani independence.339

This proved a long and painstaking process, and in the years leading up to India’s 1947 partition and 1950 independence, the leaders of the Muslim League were given increasing reasons to fear New Delhi’s future intentions for India’s Muslim community. When Mahatma Gandhi, for example, joined the Khilafat Movement—a pan-Islamic pro-

Indian independence organization developed to influence British policy and preserve the Ottoman Empire following WWI–Jinnah saw it as little more than a mere stunt by the Indian Congress to tactically allay Muslim anxieties while gaining credit with Western democracies. Matters came to a particular head in 1946, however, when Gandhi objected to the so-called Cabinet Mission Plan, a last-ditch effort to keep India united by grouping Muslim-majority provinces in the east and west of British India. Nehru’s subsequent decision to annex Kashmir represented an ultimate slap in the face, and resulted in the enhancement of military-security elements among India’s nascent Muslim separatist movement–and soon after Pakistan–at the expense of all other extant institutions.

Such a development was not all that surprising in the context of Pakistan’s political-military development. Due to both the dominant societal status of the Hindu elite as well as the influence of mullahs–which, in the South Asian context, Hassan Abbas describes as the ubiquitous yet unenlightened network of pseudo-scholars who shunned available avenues of advancement to their followers, particularly enrollment in British schools and the learning of the English language–the Muslims of India were a consistently marginalized lot. This led them to enlist in disproportionate numbers relative to other fields, and the onset of both world wars gave them ample opportunity to cut their teeth in most of the world’s major strategic theaters.\(^{340}\) Concurrently, and perhaps largely as a result of its history, Pakistan had little credible institutional alternatives to the military establishment throughout independence. While a constituent assembly tasked with developing a constitution did exist, for example, it was largely ignored and in 1954 summarily dismissed; Islamabad was in fact to remain without a

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\(^{340}\) Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, pp. 5-6
constitution until 1956, nearly a decade after its independence.\textsuperscript{341} Civil politics throughout the independence era, by contrast, were dominated largely by a small coterie of Muslim elite emigrants—known collectively by the Arabic term, \textit{mohajir}—who made their way from the Indian Muslim heartland to achieve wealth and power in Karachi. The army, as it were, constituted the only instrument capable of breaking the \textit{mohajirs’} grip on power, as well as that of the Muslim League. To no surprise, all subsequent iterations of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML)—founded as a post-independence successor to the organization—hinged upon the leadership of pro-establishment politicians backed by the generals, particularly Ayub Khan—who was to become Pakistan’s first military dictator—Zia ul-Haq—President/Martial Law Administrator from 1978 to 1988 who both introduced Islamic law into Pakistani politics and assisted the West’s anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan—and Pervez Musharraf—president from 2001 to 2008 who helped reforge Islamabad’s official, yet for reasons we will soon explore dubious, counterterrorism cooperation with Washington. One can already begin to see in this narrative the making of Pakistan’s complex—if perhaps inadvertent—Islamist securitocracy.

As Pakistan’s first generation of generals began to cement their status as the undisputed kingmakers—either overtly or behind-the-scenes—of national politics, so with them they carried the suspicious worldview that remains a hallmark of national high policy. As John R. Schmidt explains in a recent study, while most senior army officers could reasonably be described as intelligent and worldly men, they are to a large extent defined institutionally by their single-minded mistrust of, and antipathy toward, India.\textsuperscript{342} Pakistani leaders believed simply that Kashmir, as all Muslim majority areas, should have

\textsuperscript{341} Schmidt, “The Unraveling,” 24
\textsuperscript{342} Ibid., 47
become part of their sovereign territory, and the generals further convinced themselves that the manner in which Indian forces seized the territory was a dishonorable and unfair usurpation—the ultimate reminder, as it were, that India could never truly accept the legitimacy of a separate Muslim state.

The course of recent historical events in Kashmir only fueled Pakistani perceptions of deceit and external collusion. While space does not permit us to elaborate fully on this most complex issue, we can summarize the main points that have come to constitute formidable inputs into Islamabad’s worldview. From the early fourteenth to eighteenth century, Jammu Kashmir was the subject of exclusive Muslim rule, first under the Shahmiri, followed by the Chak, then the Mughal, and finally the Durrani Afghan.\textsuperscript{343} When the area finally fell to the Sikhs in 1819, the territory’s heartland—the Jehlum Valley, or Vale of Kashmir—remained headed by an appointed Muslim governor.\textsuperscript{344} The area only came under Hindu rule in 1846, when the cunning Gulab Singh agreed to compensate the British for the costs of their military campaigns in the First Sikh War in exchange for London’s help in securing the Kashmiri throne. At the time of partition nearly a century later, however, Hari Singh, Gulab’s grandson, made certain overtures to the Muslims, including handing over responsibility of Kashmir’s postal and communications systems, which led Pakistan’s nascent government to believe it would regain full control.\textsuperscript{345} Through a complex turn of events, however, Hari Singh—in return for Indian military support to crush uprisings of the Poonch Muslims—signed the Instrument of Accession to India, which after a decisive military confrontation, left

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{344} Victoria Schofield, \textit{Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War}. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010
\item \textsuperscript{345} Schmidt, “The Unraveling,” 46-7
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Pakistan with only a small sliver of the territory’s southwest–Azad Kashmir–and a large but sparsely populated northern area in the Karakorum mountains. To add insult to the military’s injury, attempts at resolution through a UN-sponsored plebiscite were to prove hapless, due both to Indian demands that Pakistan demilitarize the zones under its control, as well as Indian implications that it would eventually act on its right to move its own forces into those areas and reclaim them.\(^{346}\)

These developments created the indelible impression among Pakistan’s nascent military leadership that if the country was ever to lower its guard, India would do it harm as it had done time and again throughout history.\(^{347}\) Schmidt, who himself served as Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad in the years prior to 9/11, presents an intriguing anecdote in which he asked a retired lieutenant general what would happen if another war erupted and India broke through Pakistan’s defenses, thereby threatening to cut the country in half. The officer replied that Islamabad would have no choice but to use nuclear weapons. We should also note at this juncture that despite its perceptions, not only was Pakistan not without blame in precipitating the dispute that led to its tragic loss of Kashmir, but also the manner in which it conducted the initial campaigns–namely the deployment of “unruly ragtag” Pashtun irregulars from the NWFP as proxies for cross-border incursions–set a precedent for the perceived necessity of unconventional–and increasingly by the international norms of successive decades, unacceptable–security strategies as coping mechanism to address its glaring power deficit vis-à-vis India. It is also no coincidence that the fighters hailing from these rugged frontiers would later coalesce into the Taliban’s rank and file. Indeed, the military had begun systematically

\(^{346}\) Ibid., 26
\(^{347}\) Ibid., 47
studying and indoctrinating officers in low-intensity guerilla warfare as early as the 1950s, drawing inspiration from successful insurgencies elsewhere, including North Korea. Yet if the processes I have traced in the preceding paragraphs represent the arduous yet ordinary conditions surrounding the political development of a historically unfortunate state born into a rough neighborhood, the rising power of the military-intelligence complex and its realization of increasingly intersecting interests with Islamists–namely through the domestic context of Zia’s rule as well as extraterritorial threats and opportunities provided by the fluctuating Cold War and post-Cold War security environments–illuminates a critical juncture in which Islamabad’s drift into roguery becomes realizable.

Post-partition politics in Pakistan were defined by two dominant, yet in many important ways, competing trends that would set the stage for Zia’s reactionary policies of the late 1970’s: The increasingly disproportionate share of scarce national resources devoted to the military, whose insatiable appetite for material wealth and pro-Western hubris had brought Pakistan effectively to the brink of national catastrophe; and the corrupt nature of civilian politics, particularly among the so-called “feudal” elements. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who served as President from 1958 to 1969, for example, had initiated intelligence contacts with the CIA that severely jeopardized Pakistani national security, and in 1965 and 1970 entered the country into its second and third wars with India–whose consequences ultimately facilitated the loss of East Pakistan to Bangladeshi independence in 1971, not to mention further massive humiliation to the amusement of Delhi. Ayub’s personal comportment was seen as brash and offensive; he had attempted

348 Ibid., 29
to remove the word “Islamic” from the official title of the state, and used his military
power to pursue pro-Western and business interests similar to the very *mohajirs* he had
claimed to neutralize. Ayub’s successor, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, moreover, was indicative
of the rising yet corruptible star of the feudal politician in national politics. As an
economic analyst of Pakistan wrote of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) *Election
Manifesto* in 1976, “The emphasis is entirely on who gets what—but not on where the
what comes from. It seems to regard economic growth as something which will happen
without the conscious attention of the party in power.”

Right alongside the drain of resources resulting from overzealous military spending, these individuals began to stunt
national development through continually entrenching their expansive secular patronage
networks. In contrast to the corporatist strategies employed by single-party regimes
discussed in Chapter 3, Pakistan’s feudal politicians—of which the Bhuttos, the prominent
family of Sindh Province, are a prime example—operate according to far more local
interests, subsidizing fuel and other vital commodities and dispensing them, along with a
vast range of favors and other personal rewards, in exchange for votes. In the context of
a civilian political establishment continuing to skim off the top, evading tax payments to
maintain this patronage-driven status-quo and, by extension, shortchanging the state of
opportunities for large-scale progress, there has not—until at least very recently—emerged
politicians capable of challenging the security sector’s dominance.

Interestingly similar to Sudan’s RCC-NS—whose “Young Turk” officer-
compatriots were inspired by NIF Islamism as a counterweight to the blatant corruption
practiced by civilian and military regimes prior—Zia ul-Haq’s nascent regime represented

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Publications, 1972
a break from corrupt secular business as usual. Earlier generations of Muslim officers—like Ayub Khan—who had their formative experiences in the British Indian Cavalry and Pakistan Armour Corps, came from the privileged so-called “martial races” of the “army triangle” region of northern Punjab—Rawalpindi, Attock, and Jehlum. Sandhurst educated, these individuals were content to pass their leisure time with music, drinking gambling, and dancing. Zia, on the other hand, hailed from a humble, pious Arain family who had left India for the rugged NWFP capital of Peshawar.351 His officer cohort—which had entered the service between the end of WWII and independence, and would assume senior command positions following the 1977 coup—had firm roots in Pakistan’s working and middle classes, and bore value systems far more conservative than their Anglophile gentlemen-officer predecessors.352 Zia’s, moreover, was an Islam quite distinct from that of Bhutto and the rest of Pakistan’s Barelvi majority—a peace-loving Sufi-inspired order that relied on the guidance of religious leaders, or pirs, and the spiritual intercession of saints and ancestors. Both Pakistan’s partition, and the dishonorable way the civilian and military establishment had comported itself in its aftermath, left an indelible impression on Zia,353 who saw increasingly within Islam a missing instrument to assertively balance Pakistan’s delicate domestic structures and regional security priorities. In 1979, a Zia protégé, Brigadier General S.K. Malik, published a doctrinal manifesto advocating a reorientation of Pakistan’s military strategy along these lines. Its central thesis, a call for revamping the national Islamic military

353 At an international conference on Islam in Islamabad in 1983, for example, Zia remarked: “I will tell you what Islam and Pakistan means to me . . . it is a vision of my mother struggling on tired, with all her worldly possessions in her hands, when she crossed the border into Pakistan.”
machine to end global oppression and usher a new national version of world justice, drew its main inspiration from the 7th and 8th century conquests of the Prophet Muhammad and his successors (khulafa) of much of the modern-day Middle East and North Africa through jihad. In his glowing foreword to the treatise, Zia wrote:

_Jihad fi-Sabillah_ [Jihad in the path of the Almighty] is not the exclusive domain of the professional soldier, nor is it restricted to the application of military force alone . . . The professional soldier in a Muslim army CANNOT [emphasis original] become ‘professional’ if in all his activities he does not take on the ‘colour’ of Allah. The non-military citizen of a Muslim state must, likewise, be aware of the kind of soldier that his country must produce and the ONLY [emphasis original] pattern of war that his country’s armed forces may wage.\(^354\)

In tandem with these novel sentiments, Zia could breathe new life into the military’s longstanding belief that Kashmir should remain unequivocally in Pakistani hands, and that the arrangements made by Delhi to deprive Islamabad of this sovereignty were deeply iniquitous. By the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, in which Zia served as a tank commander, the military was once again deploying irregular forces to Kashmir, but were now referring to them unprecedentedly as _mujahideen_, practitioners of the sacred Muslim duty of _Jihad_.\(^355\) Given their belief systems, rising power profiles, and Pakistan’s regional insecurities, Zia and his officers were compelled naturally to distance themselves from the Bhutto regime.\(^356\) While we have already commented above on the increasing yet questionable influence of the feudal politicians, we must reemphasize the feelings of alienation Bhutto’s PPP engendered among the middle class–what Zia and his generation considered the state’s _shuraafa_, or respectable citizens–from whence he and his officer-cohort hailed. Not only did they resent his increasing personalization of power (as befitted a strongman feudal politician in charge of the country, Bhutto, almost

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356 It was ironically Bhutto, who in 1976 appointed Zia Chief of Staff, was himself deposed and killed at Zia’s decree two years later.
reminiscent of Iran’s Shah, created a domestic protection outfit, the Federal Security Force, to ruthlessly suppress dissent,\textsuperscript{357} they also regarded Bhutto’s free-wheeling socialist policies as antithetical to the “ideology of Pakistan,” i.e. the notion of its destiny to provide Islam a secure place within South Asia.\textsuperscript{358}

Zia’s institution of shari’a constituted a last-ditch response to these pressures, and although some Islamization initiatives, including a ban on alcohol consumption, had already been undertaken by Bhutto–albeit for mostly tactical purposes to offset public outrage at his regime’s policies–it seems evident that Zia would have furthered them regardless.\textsuperscript{359} In contrast to the proponents of a Jinnahist vision–i.e. Pakistan as a state in which Muslims could thrive comfortably while living according to liberally defined Islamic values–Zia’s 1978 campaign utilized Islamic law as the basis to enforce conservative social policies, as well as revamp all institutions of state–particularly the legislative, judicial and financial–in the image of “the law of the Prophet,” \textit{Nizam-i-Mustafa}. Unlike Iran, Zia’s Islamization did not involve the active recruitment of scholars and fighters into selectorate ranks. When in 1985, for example, the \textit{Jammat-i-Islami}–founded by world-renowned Islamic revivalist scholar Abul Ala Maududi–attempted to exert its influence by proposing the installment of \textit{’ulama} in senior judiciary positions to more strictly enforce Hanafi code, Zia’s senate dismissed the initiative on the grounds there had already been sufficient parliamentary progress on Islamization.\textsuperscript{360}

How was it, then, that Pakistan ended up locked into the problematic behaviors–state sponsorship of terrorism and completion of a nuclear weapons program in

\textsuperscript{358} Burki, “Zia’s Eleven Years,” 7
\textsuperscript{359} Baxter, “Restructuring the Pakistan Political System,” 35
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., 38
particular—so endemic to roguery? The critical juncture seems to lay within the structural realities of the Cold War, particularly the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Unlike Iran, in which the state found an equilibrium allowing religion and muscle to coexist within the centers of power, and Sudan, in which the military was eventually able to purge religion under relatively stable circumstances, Pakistan has since this episode appeared increasingly unable to realistically consider these options, as either presents a scenario in which the current internal power balance—centered around the military-security and feudal political establishments—would remain infeasible while presenting little hope for a workable alternative. Continued Pakistani aversion is a tragic outgrowth of this reality. How did it come to this?

Interestingly, around the time of Moscow’s 1979 foray into Afghanistan, Pakistan’s international orientation was quite unsettling. Having already lost three wars to India as well as its eastern territories to the Bangladeshi independence movement, Islamabad found itself further outflanked in the period of transition between Bhutto and Zia. Relations with the Soviet Union were endemically poor, and the Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights did not bode well for Zia’s strongman tactics. While China could be counted on diplomatically for such tasks as contesting Bangladesh’s entrance into the UN, Beijing offered little practical assistance other than supplying antiquated weaponry. Within this dire strategic context, Pakistan once again faced an India perceived as seeking to outmaneuver it. Such initiatives as the 1971 signing of an Indo-Soviet treaty, and 1974 demonstration of nuclear competence were

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clear indication that the “Indira doctrine” represented a bid for Indian regional hegemony in which Pakistan could be strategically marginalized. Zia’s diplomatic overtures to India—such as asking Delhi to sign the NPT, as well as offering a “no-war” pact—were met with rejection, while the Indian military bolstered its position in such contentious areas along the Indo-Pakistani border and Kashmiri line of control as the Siachen Glacier and Rajasthan. Carter had no sympathy for Pakistan’s regional predicament; his disdain for what he perceived as a brutal military dictatorship led to the termination of economic assistance by April 1979, and attacks against U.S. persons and official properties—which, among other things, resulted in the death of four American citizens at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad—brought relations to an all-time low.\textsuperscript{363} Against this backdrop, the Soviet invasion was quite possibly Zia’s only saving grace.

It is beyond the scope of this section to explore in detail Pakistan’s multifaceted and pivotal role in the anti-Soviet operations. We can rather emphasize a few key points that further illuminate this period as a critical juncture facilitating the onset of Pakistani roguery. First, Zia relied on army intelligence—the eventual forerunner to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—rather than the formal armed forces structure to fight the war in Afghanistan. This presented seconded army officers loyal to Zia and his worldview unparalleled opportunity to grow into a massive apparatus holding almost exclusive operational control over the anti-Soviet fighters.\textsuperscript{364} As in 1965 and its previous campaigns against India, the military was running irregular troops referred to as mujahideen. Only this time, a strong and religiously sympathetic intelligence apparatus handling operatives with actual Islamic pedigrees rendered the jihad far more real and

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid., 140-7
\textsuperscript{364} Schmidt, “The Unraveling,” 70-2
dangerous; indeed, the ISI retained on its payroll warriors from across the Islamist spectrum. Second, Zia and ISI Director-General General Akhtar Abdur Rahman favored the “fundamentalists” among the mujahideen organizations—particularly that of the Afghan Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—over their more moderate elements.

As the war progressed along these lines, there was increasingly little Pakistan’s civilian officials could do to halt the ISI’s rising autonomy; Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo, who was installed after the 1985 election, and Benazir Bhutto, who served as prime minister from 1988-90 and 1993-96, reportedly disapproved of the organization’s tactics, but were unable and unwilling to confront ISI leadership.365 Throughout the Cold War, the CIA certainly had no qualms about continuing funneling arms, aid, and training to the mujahideen. Indeed, if there was one thing both institutions had in common, it was a hatred of communism. Of course, the intelligence establishment’s record of ferocity was not solely the result of religious fervor; the preference of Hekmatyar over his more moderate counterpart, Ahmed Shah Massoud, for example, also had ethnic and strategic considerations. Whereas Hekmatyar was an Afghan Pashtu with longstanding ties to Pakistan and sympathies for Pakistani frustration over Afghans’ historic attempts to encroach on Pashtun lands, Massoud was a Tajik oriented more toward Central Asia with no particular allegiance to Islamabad.366 Regardless, a dynamic had begun to crystallize in which the political-military successors of Zia—who, along with Askhtar, was killed in a mysterious 1988 plane crash—would be forced to convert post-war Pakistan into a haven for throngs of mujahideen who no longer had a jihad to fight, and—under the guidance of a vastly expanded ISI that was

366 Schmidt, “The Unraveling,” 71-2
prone to keep indulging them—ripe to become unconventional agents of Pakistan’s increasingly complex foreign policy.\textsuperscript{367} Nawaz Sharif, a steel magnate who headed the Pakistan Muslim League-N and served as the state’s 12\textsuperscript{th} prime minister, and whose substantial gestures to Islamists were originally intended to enlist continued support for the anti-Soviet jihad, is but one in a long line of Pakistani elites now forced to bow to this trend. And the national security establishment—whose military, intelligence, and nuclear scientific ranks are becoming steadily infiltrated by a vast yet unknown quantity of jihadi sympathizers\textsuperscript{368}—and its Islamist allies are forced to find new trails to blaze to reorient their pent-up energies: 1) Within Pakistan itself in terms of neutralizing sectarian fissures; 2) The West (namely U.S. interests in the region); and of course 3) India within Jammu and Kashmir.\textsuperscript{369}

The differentiation that had begun under Zia and set in throughout the Afghanistan episode would arguably also deeply influence Pakistan’s nuclear posture. According to one report, for example, facing renewed border tensions throughout the mid-1980s and the possibility of an Indian pre-emptive strike, Zia flew to India and told his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, that “if your forces cross our border by one inch, we are going to annihilate your cities.”\textsuperscript{370} Interestingly, although the Pakistani program had come to fruition under Zia’s tenure, the 1998 decision to test a device—or so-called “Islamic bomb”—which, of course, was to an overwhelming extent in response to India’s first fusion weapon test in May of that year, transpired within a domestic context of overwhelming pressure—particularly by the main Islamic

\textsuperscript{367} Abbas, “Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism,” 13
\textsuperscript{368} See Goldberg and Ambinder, “The Ally from Hell”
\textsuperscript{369} Schmidt, “The Unraveling”
fundamentalist party, the *Jamaat Islami*, and the military–on the Nawaz Sharif government, whose standing was weak at the time. A snap poll by the Pakistan Institute for Public Opinion in major Pakistani cities, in fact, found a staggering 97% support for the testing.\(^{371}\)

Those within the Pakistani power structure have in spite of these instabilities accrued major benefits, while allowing the state–along with the majority of its requisite infrastructure and institutions–to crumble to such great extents that a reversal of the status-quo would be as arduous as it is undesirable. As the military sees it, to undergo fundamental change would jeopardize its central mission and *raison d’etre*: protecting the nation and its Islamic mantle from the Indian threat. The second-largest budgetary item remains national defense, and Pakistan’s generals have gone to extraordinary lengths to secure their own corporate interests. They are among the country’s largest landowners, maintaining a vast agro-industrial empire designed exclusively to ensure the welfare of retired personnel. The army-owned Fauji Foundation—which oversees companies producing fertilizer, cement, and breakfast cereals, drills for natural gas and oil terminals, and manages investment banks and stock brokerages–and Army Welfare Trust–which, mainly under its Askari label, oversees sugar mills, hires retired enlisted soldiers for private security work, and leases helicopters and pilots for touristic and industrial ventures–are the two largest business conglomerates in the country.\(^{372}\) Feudal politicians similarly want to perpetuate their holdings, which will in turn prolong the problematic patronage networks discussed above and neuter incentives for major institutional improvements. And despite both the civilian and military establishments’ regular lip

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\(^{372}\) Schmidt, “The Unraveling,” 49-50
service to democracy and reform, all trends seem to point to a tacit agreement to shelve major problems in exchange for business as usual. When General Pervez Musharraf—formerly 13th Chief of Army Staff and President from 2001-2008—for example, staged a coup and reinstituted military control, rather than entrench power absolutely, he coaxed senior PML leaders to establish a pro-army faction of the party. Musharraf’s very coup, in fact, was indicative of the military’s recurrent willingness to neutralize those who would challenge its institutional legacy.373

Within this very tricky and messy political context, the beast that Pakistan’s Islamic securitocracy has inadvertently become will be difficult to dismantle, particularly in the context of such mounting and seemingly unfixable domestic security problems as the proliferation of radical madrasas and the unchecked weaponization (and Talibanization) of the NWFP. Consequently, not only does its nuclear program remain undeterred (the U.S. was compelled to lift sanctions by fall of 2001, in exchange for Pakistani support for U.S. war aims in Afghanistan and the subsequent GWOT),374 but

373 The generals’ outrage over Sharif’s peace overtures to Indian PM Atal Vajpayee during the Lahore Summit of early 1999 reignited conflict between the military—now under Musharraf—and civilian leaderships. Several months later, the army—with the assistance of Kashmiri footsoldiers and paramilitary operators under the command of Major General Ashraf Rashid’s Special Service Group (SSG), an army special forces outfit tasked specifically to infiltrate Kashmiri militants across the Line of Control—became enmeshed in near war with India by occupying Indian border posts at Kargil, which Indian units had abandoned for the winter. Following Pakistan’s withdrawal under U.S. pressure and the threat of a massive Indian counterattack, Musharraf and Sharif became embroiled in a bitter war of words and public relations battle that eventually led to the coup. As Schmidt recounts, this had also all occurred in the context of Sharif’s attempts to steadily consolidate his own power throughout the late 90s, culminating in the abolition of the 8th Amendment, which the army had basically utilized to let the political system blow off steam by facilitating alternative turns for various parties in the patronage trough. See Schmidt, “The Unraveling,” 52, and: “Musharraf Planned Coup Much before Oct. 12: Fasih Bokhari.” Daily Times, Pakistan (9 October 2002); and “Clash over India Led to Coup, Pakistan’s Ex-Premier Testifies.” The New York Times (09 March 2000); Manu Pubby, “Pak Commander Blows the Lid on Islama’s Kargil Plot.” The Indian Express (12 June 2009). Available online at: <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/as-spell-binding-as-the-guns-of-navarone/475330/>; “Sharif Admits He ‘Let Down’ Vajpayee on Kargil Conflict.” The Hindu (10 September 2007). Available online at: <http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/10/stories/2007091059781400.htm>; “1999 Kargil Conflict.” GlobalSecurity.org (Retrieved 31 January 2013). Available online at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm>

374 Even while they were in effect, U.S. sanctions against Pakistani nuclear activities were light, even featuring a 1999 waiver exempting U.S. grain sales from inclusion. Once sanctions were removed, moreover, the U.S.
Islamabad, its ISI in particular, remains a hub of support and training for such unsavory groups as the *Harakat ul-Mujahidin*—associated with the hijacking of an Air India flight in 1999—and *Lashkar e-Taiba*—which has utilized Pakistani resources to pursue an anti-India vendetta, of which the tragic November 2008 Mumbai attacks were likely the most recent and salient episode. Islamabad’s historically close relations with China and other rising regional powers like Turkey, combined with a willingness to participate tactically in such pro-Western collective security institutions as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, or “Baghdad Pact”) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)\(^\text{375}\) render its roguery even more difficult to address from a U.S. policy perspective. What is perhaps most frustrating is that, for reasons related to Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally in the GWOT, as well as glaring Western intelligence gaps, sanctions imposed by the international community in response to these developments have targeted only the leaderships of the respective terror groups themselves, and not elements within the Pakistani security establishment that appear continually intent on backing them.\(^\text{376}\)


\(^{376}\) This sense of free reign is certainly not lost among Pakistan’s intelligence community, whose constituents have risen to partake in almost every aspect of national public life, including the funding of political parties, influence of the media, manipulation of political violence, and control of inter-party alliances. See Frédéric Grare, *Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009
CHAPTER 5: AVERSION IN SEARCH OF A MISSION? ASSESSING THE SECULAR GARRISON

INTRODUCTION

The majority of rogue cases fall under the category of secular garrison states. Similar to cases explored in the latter chapter, these spawn and develop through their entrepreneurs’ linkage of an official reactive worldview to an ideationally receptive coercer. As discussed in Chapter 2, they also feature a virtually omnipresent combination of security institutions—which, in addition to large standing militaries and domestic intelligence apparatuses, may include expansive defense and armaments industries (as in the cases of South Africa and North Korea), often in addition to such more shadowy elements as warlords (as in the case of Burma), mafiosi (as in the case of Yugoslavia), mercenaries (as in the case of Libya) and other non-state selectorate associates benefitting a bit more discreetly from the state’s backlash posture. In contrast to the formal bodies of religious authorities or advisers deployed by Islamic securitocracies, secular garrisons rely either on the apparatus of a large ruling party, or (and in some cases, in tandem with) the personal designs of a charismatic entrepreneur as a disseminator of reactive temporal worldviews. Absent the staying power and somewhat more uniquely pervasive appeal of Islam as an inspirer of legitimacy and mobilizing force,377 we note a more nuanced approach among this subgroup of cases, dependent of course on variation in respective local conditions.

While, as noted in Table 3.9, ethnic concerns played into the power considerations of nearly every rogue selectorate—including the Islamist securitocracies

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and guerilla rogues–only two of the secular garrisons–Yugoslavia and South Africa–relied explicitly on ethno-nationalist claims to legitimize their leaders’ historic missions to defend, respectively, Serbian and white Afrikaaner interests in the face of perceived formidable adversaries. Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Burma, by contrast, relied implicitly on ethnic logics; while their regimes’ goals did not address in plain terms the defense of any one particular group or tribe, key societal strata–the ‘Alawi of Syria, the Qadhafa tribe of Libya, the Tikriti Sunnis of Iraq, and Burmans of Myanmar–hijacked the worldviews outright, thereby equating their continued dominance, albeit indirectly, with national survival. Although parties in some instances may have worked to disperse these regimes’ programs throughout and across their diverse societies, key selectorate portfolios–specifically senior command positions within the military and security services–remained overwhelmingly occupied by members of such privileged groupings.

Two garrison cases–North Korea and Cuba–seemed to eschew ethnic logics altogether, meaning their regimes neither integrated ethno-nationalist arguments in their worldviews, nor manipulated them to benefit any particular sectarian constituency within the selectorate. Both states in fact happen to be largely ethnically homogenous.\footnote{According to the CIA World Factbook, Cuba’s 2002 census reported its population as 65.1% “white,” 24.8% mulatto and mestizo, and 10.1% black, with Spanish the sole language; In North Korea, with the exception of a small Chinese community and a handful of ethnic Japanese, the population is entirely Korean.} It is also important to note that in addition to Iran, these two regimes represent not only the sole cases within the rogue population whose survival calculus was not ethnically tinged,\footnote{According to the CIA World Factbook, Iran’s population is 61% Persian, with a handful of other minorities: Azeri (16%); Kurd (10%); Lur (6%); Baloch (2%); Arab (2%); Turkmen and Turkic tribes (2%); and other 1%. Nearly 55% of the population uses Persian as its lingua franca.} but also the only ones which underwent true “social revolutions,” a-la Skocpol,
prior to the onset of their roguery. Like Iran, North Korea and Cuba used the pretext of “exporting revolution,” also justified largely on grounds of opposing forces perceived as favorable to a continued U.S. stranglehold—both directly and through American proxies—over their politics, to justify a backlash trajectory. Political entrepreneurs in both countries utilized their respective communist party machines as institutional vehicles to propagate a nationally, vice religiously or ethnically, charged aversive mission linked intimately to the supremacy and reputations of their militaries. It was indeed no coincidence that both Kim Il-Sung and Fidel Castro leveraged their formative experiences as anti-colonial guerilla commanders to achieve national prominence through their respective parties.

Juxtaposing the Libyan and North Korean cases will allow us to more critically assess the influence of these factors among, respectively, the least and most institutionalized instances of secular garrison states.

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REBEL WITHOUT A BASE: LIBYA UNDER MU’AMAR AL-QADHAFI

The regime of Colonel Mu’amar Muhammad Abu Minyar Al-Qadhafi in Libya, which lasted from 1969-2011, was as rogue as they come. An overview of some of the Jamahiriyya’s most notorious activities is important to help us both appreciate and underscore the extreme sense and deep scope of aversion with which Tripoli approached its international affairs.

Qadhafi routinely extended support to probably the greatest observable range of “liberation” organizations throughout the entire modern history of state sponsorship of terror: Rejectionist Palestinian outfits such as Black September and Abu Nidal; The Irish Republic Army (IRA); The Armenian Secret Army; The Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA); Action Directe; The Sardinian SIM; The German Baader-Meinhof; The Italian Red Brigades; The Japanese Red Army; The Omani Dhofari rebels; The Popular Forces of April 25 in Portugal; and secessionists in the Philippines and Thailand constituted only a handful of the Colonel’s beneficiaries.381 Libyan operatives were implicated in some of the most heinous acts of contemporary international terrorism, including the December 1985 airport attacks in Rome and Vienna—in which Abu Nidal gunmen killed 20 civilians headed toward Israel-bound flights using firearms purchased from Libyan intelligence—, the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103—in which 243 passengers and 16 crew members were killed as the aircraft exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, as well as 11 civilians on the ground—, and the 1989 bombing of French airliner Union des Transports Aériens

Flight 772—in which 15 crew members and 156 passengers, including the wife of the U.S. ambassador to Chad, perished.\textsuperscript{382}

Libya’s embassies abroad, or “People’s Bureaus,” constituted frontlines for these bloody campaigns. Senior diplomatic staff, supported by the Libyan Revolutionary Committees, directed material and logistical support for attacks on the grounds of and in the skies over their post countries. In November 2001, for example, a Berlin court convicted four people and found that Libyan secret agents and embassy staff had masterminded the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque frequented by U.S. military personnel, which left two U.S. soldiers dead and over 60 injured.\textsuperscript{383} In 1984, unprovoked shots fired from within the complex of the Libyan People’s Bureau in London on demonstrators outside there resulted in the death of Yvonne Fletcher, a British Police officer. The incident was but a small indication of the lengths to which Libya would go to silence disaffected exiles. Qaddafi in fact deployed infamous “hit squads” to not only settle scores with exiled dissidents, or “stray dogs,”\textsuperscript{384} of the regime, but also to eradicate national leaders he perceived as antithetical to the Jamahiriyya’s mission; Egypt’s al-Sadat and Mubarak, Sudan’s al-Numayri, Tunisia’s Bourghiba, Jordan’s King Hussein, Morocco’s King Hassan II, and even U.S. President Reagan all alleged they had been targeted, albeit unsuccessfully, by Libyan assassins.\textsuperscript{385} Libya’s external intelligence outfit also regularly subsidized the infiltration of regional military and government institutions in an effort to destabilize host regimes. In 1976, for example, Qadhafi

\textsuperscript{382} Blundy and Lycett, “Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution,” 2
\textsuperscript{384} This was a term that Qadhafi used repeatedly in reference to opposition elements. See Lisa Anderson, “Qadhafi and His Opposition.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 225-37
supported two major attempts to overthrow the al-Numayri regime in Sudan; in July of that year, 1,000 Libyan-trained and equipped rebels succeeded in reaching Khartoum, inflicting major damage in the city center before being suppressed.  

Qadhafi was also a frequent dabbler in WMD programs. Within months of seizing power, he attempted to purchase nuclear devices from China (1969-71), the USSR (throughout the 70s), France (1976), and India (1978). His government also reportedly placed funds in a Swiss bank for purchasing “loose nukes” and fissionable materials from non-state suppliers, and solicited the services of Argentinian, French, and U.S. companies, as well as Egyptian scientists, for the construction of a complete nuclear fuel cycle. The Jamahiriyya eventually found a willing partner in A.Q. Khan, the notorious head of Pakistan’s nuclear program and leader of a clandestine international network to traffic nuclear technology. By the late 1980s, Tripoli had operationalized a Soviet-made research reactor at Tadjoura, as well as a clandestine uranium enrichment program with a few thousand centrifuges. Outside of the nuclear realm, Qadhafi deployed chemical weapons against Chadian forces during Libyan offensives throughout 1986-7, constructed a massive underground chemical weapons facility at Tarhunah, and held stockpiles of various chemical agents, including nerve and mustard gas.

386 Dyer, “Libya,” 369
388 See “Libya,” The Middle East Military Balance
390 John Sweeney and Dennis Staunton, “Heathrow Tunneler Built Gaddafi Weapons Chamber.” The Observer (22 March 1998); Congressional Research Service. “Libya: Suspected Chemical Weapons Facility at Tarhunah” (23 October 1996), by Clyde Mark
391 “Libya,” The Middle East Military Balance
Despite having joined the Biological Weapons (BW) Convention in 1982, Qadhafi further engaged in limited research and development of a BW capability.392

The timing of these initiatives traces the bulk of Libyan aversion from the inception of the 1977 Sabha Declaration–during which Qadhafi, who had come to power through a coup eight years prior, converted a de facto military dictatorship, run exclusively by fellow officers in a Revolutionary Command Council, into the Jamahiriyya format for which it is most widely known–to the late 1980s. By this point, structural problems and the weight of international sanctions steered Tripoli’s selectorate to reenter the international fold, while reorienting its foreign policy activism away from global terrorism, regional destabilization, and WMD, and–similar to the approach of Cuba in Latin America–more toward a posture pan-continental diplomatic leadership.

Within this section I glean potential insights into the initial shift to and maintenance of Libya’s roguery throughout this window. Why was it, in other words, that the Colonel was persuaded to steer his regime away from the “normal/socialized” variant of military-backed autocracy–common throughout the Arab world at the time, typified by such states as Egypt or Algeria–only several years after its inception, under what circumstances did he judge the vision to be unsustainable, and what was done to cope? It is this author’s judgment at the time of writing that the crackdowns associated with the 2011 uprisings in Libya, which led to Qadhafi’s deposition and eventual execution, were primarily the result not of a par-for-the-course extension of his former roguery, but rather a gross tactical miscalculation at the wrong time, which set in motion

a series of irreversible—and certainly in the eyes of the fallen Brother Leader, regrettable—
consequences. Writing in spring 2011, Ali Ahmida put it succinctly:

Had Colonel Qaddafi responded with openness to the calls for reform and not overreacted to the
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, [Libya’s] urban elite might have been placated, and the violent
rebellion avoided. He blew it. Once his army and police shot at protesters, the pent-up disaffection
of Libyan society was unleashed, and it is too late for the regime to bottle it up. In recent weeks
the revolt has even gained support from the historically pro-Qaddafi rural populace. No matter
how much blood is shed today, the uprising will not be stopped.393

While the extent and diversity of the aforementioned transgressions alone render
it almost unthinkable to omit Libya from any study of roguery, Libya’s germaneness to
this inquiry extends well beyond the brazenness of its interstate behavior, as well as the
eccentricities of its “Brother Leader,” with whom the regime has been linked rather
inextricably throughout the bulk of the public record during its tenure. As a juxtaposition
of Tables 2.8 and 3.4 begin to show, Libya’s dual status as both intensely revisionist and
heavily personalistic rendered it a unique animal not only relative to other rogue states,
but to modern international political history as we know it. The extent to which
Qadhafi’s own beliefs and “cult of personality,” respectively, influenced actions abroad
and cemented legitimacy at home, seemed on par with—and perhaps even at times in
excess of—any type of regular institutional logic defined systematically by the Libyan
state. While its military-security complex was certainly pervasive within the regime
superstructure, Tripoli’s selectorate had no reliable equivalent, for instance, of an Iranian
IRGC, Iraqi Ba’th Party, or Korean People’s Army. As I will elaborate further below, its
geographically stratified, fiercely tribal, largely politically apathetic, and sparse society
provided quite infertile ground on which to construct and mobilize extensive institutions
in support of any real revolution. In other words, Qadhafi constructed a rogue state

online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/opinion/17ahmida.html>
largely without many of the traditional apparatuses traditionally associated with the
enterprise. Nevertheless, his Green Book developed and maintained a vision–albeit a not
entirely systematic and in some portions, for that matter, realistic one–for Libya’s place
in the world order. The Jamahiriyya’s trajectory is the story of a leader struggling to
realize this vision while consistently reinventing his regime in tandem with–and in many
ways in spite of–fluctuating external challenges, until time seemingly began to run out.

It is this complex reality, as opposed to any sheer erraticism, which cast Qadhafi
as a sort of walking contradiction to the outside world: Publicly disdainful toward
institutions like political parties and legislatures, while aiming to strengthen the army and
institutionalize the diffusion of power to local popular committees (neither, as it were,
proved very effective, and ultimately constituted the most pressing source of danger to
the Colonel’s hold on power); Paying homage to a revolutionary notion of “direct
democracy,” while doing little to dismantle–and probably in most cases encouraging the
perpetuation of–tribal cleavages characteristic of the preceding Sanusi monarchy,
repressing whatever nascent civil society existed, and driving most would-be democrats
into exile; Decrying the suspect intentions of technocrats and the merchant classes prone
to Western commerce, while relying on them implicitly for the growth of the national oil
industry and its prowess in the international market.

What are the roots of these contradictions, and how can we contextualize, with
guidance from our theory, the type of roguery they appeared to incubate throughout the
reign of the jamahiriyya?

Similar to the rest of the rogue population, the lands of modern Libya were
subject to a seemingly never-ending coterie of foreign rulers trying to subdue local
populations and exploit them for imperial-minded gain. Yet, the ruggedness of Libya’s terrain—95% of which is desert with very limited arable land—as well as its attendant deep and historically abiding sense of tribalism, seemed to imbue its populations with a spirit of independence from external control relatively unseen throughout the remainder of our cases. This was perhaps largely because most foreign rulers who tried their hand in the territory were simply unequipped to pacify the tribes of the Libyan interior. Indeed, the tribes remained largely unadministered from the 16th century while under Ottoman tutelage, and by the 18th, Istanbul’s grasp remained only nominal with real power in the hands of local tribal rulers such as the Karamanlis. When in 1835, the Ottomans attempted to reassert direct central rule, they came up against intense rebellion from the tribes, who had by this time also adopted the types of looting and pirating practiced by the Italians and other traders vying for positions within the country. In short, prior to the onset of modern colonialism and statehood, Libya’s image as a frontier “wild west” territory was ingrained within its popular consciousness. Italian colonialism, however, which according to one prominent Libyan historian was matched in scope of brutality perhaps only by that of the French in Algeria, constituted the first real threat to this cherished socio-political dynamic, and was to leave a truly irreparable tear in the whatever national fabric had existed hitherto.

Initially viewed as a “leftover” area not yet subsumed by the British, French, or Germans following the 1884-5 Berlin Conference, Rome first approached Libya with a gradualist policy of slow economic penetration so as not to upset the designs on Africa of

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its greater power counterparts. Libya’s prominent tribal leaders, in turn, recognized the Italians as coastal traders and viewed whatever political agreements they were attempting to impose—such as concessions to Tripolitania that would facilitate rights to Parliament and Italian citizenship—as ephemeral. Yet alarmed by Egypt’s attainment of nominal independence in 1922, and following both repeated unsuccessful attempts to persuade Libyans to peaceably sell their land as well as the rise of Italy’s Fascists to power that same year, Rome’s presence became increasingly militarized and far more aggressive. Count Giuseppe Volpi, governor of Tripolitania from 1921-5, ordered his forces to begin the systematic suppression of all organized resistance and the establishment of a settler-colonial venture. Lands were confiscated and settled to the exclusive benefit of Italian peasant-immigrants, while Libyans were discouraged from exceeding primary education. Volpi voided previous Italian-sponsored accords granting Cyrenaica and Tripolitania independence, and maneuvered to keep tribal forces from the two regions cut off from one another. His administration employed terror routinely, sanctioning scorched earth tactics in the Cyrenaican heartland, bombing and gas campaigns against tribal installations, and limiting supplies and foodstuffs by poisoning wells and slaughtering flocks of livestock. By 1924-5, Italy was at war with most of Cyrenaica’s tribes, and had by 1929 extinguished the majority of residents in Tripolitania and Fezzan. Mass settlement schemes approved for 1939 exposed dire differences in treatment between Italian migrants and Libyans, as well as the gradual erosion of urban life and city structures based on kinship groups.396 While the population of Libya was in 1900 between 1 and 1.5 million, at least a half a million perished directly or indirectly under

396 Dyer, “Libya,” 366
Italian rule, and of the many eastern Libyans interned in concentration camps between 1938 and 1944, a paltry 35,000 came out alive.397

By the early 1950s, Libya was far from politico-economic self-sufficiency, and the post-Potsdam Council of Ministers espoused different ideas regarding the country’s political destiny: Italy wanted to reclaim her; China proposed immediate independence; the Independent Commonwealth countries supported a British trusteeship; and Egypt proposed it become an Arab League trustee. Muhammad Idris bin Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanussi, leader of the prominent Sufi order—the Sanusiyya—who throughout the independence era was widely perceived as favoring his native Cyrenaica to the detriment of Tripolitania (from whence Qadhafi, born in the town of Sirte, hailed)—eventually wrested control of the capital-starved and disunited polity.398 In many ways, his development strategy mirrored that of pre-revolutionary Iran’s Pahlavi Shahs, offering an unequivocally pro-Western government with strategic military base locations, and relying on foreign assistance as a preponderant portion of the federal budget and national income. While the discovery of oil in the late 1950s slightly attenuated this dynamic, it did not preclude extensive new opportunities for corruption and malfeasance on the part of the monarchy. A 1955 petroleum law, for example, invited major mismanagement and manipulation by outside firms. Early overtures for Libya to join OPEC were stymied by external operators offering bribes to Libyan officials for new incentives so as to veto membership, which delayed accession to the cartel until 1965.

398 The people of Tripolitania, for example, were reluctant to accept Idris as a religious leader and objected to the Sanusi nomenclature. For more on this, see Monte Palmer and Omar El Fathaly, “The Transformation of Mass Political Institutions in Revolutionary Libya: Structural Solutions to a Behavioural Problem,” in E. G. H. Joffé and K. S. McLachlan (editors), Social & Economic Development of Libya. Wisbech, Cambridgeshire, England: Middle East & North African Studies Press, 1982, pp. 233-542, 235
It is important to recall here that Libya’s status by the late 1960s as a young and unapologetically Western-friendly monarchy rendered it a misfit in this particular era of Arab politics, which until defeat by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War, marked the apogee of contemporary pan-Arab radicalism. Most of its ethno-regional counterparts, with the exception of the older, more well-entrenched “conservative” monarachies, were by now well on their way out of Western dependence and further along—due, in very large part, to the efforts of pioneering military officers—in the post-colonial healing process: The Free Officers’ movement in Egypt had neutralized the monarchy of the Muhammad ‘Ali Dynasty by 1952; Iraq’s military overthrew the ruling Hashemites in 1958, withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact and setting the stage for a Ba’thist takeover the following decade; The Syrian Ba’th had begun to replace the fractious era of successive military dictatorships—the so-called “Struggle for Syria”—with top-down stability measures following its electoral victory in 1963; Habib Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour Party, which—despite its Western alignment during the Cold War, pursued a fiercely independent foreign policy—was firmly in charge in Tunis since independence in 1956; and Sudan’s military, under General Ibrahim ‘Abbud, began to wrest power from the country’s first fragile democratic government as early as 1958. The fact that independent Libya—in terms relative to its Arab colleagues at the time—possessed neither a legitimate monarchy nor military or civilian institutional apparatus sufficiently competent to run the country truly independently facilitated what the nascent revolutionary leadership would soon

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399 See, for example, Charles O. Cecil, “The Determinants of Libyan Foreign Policy.” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1965), pp. 20-34. It is also notable that Libya paid some rhetorical homage to pan-Arab cases while under monarchical rule. It attended, for example, the August 1967 Arab League Summit in Khartoum—which agreed famously to “the three no’s” (No peace with Israel; No recognition of Israel; No negotiation with Israel). Regardless, the Sanusi administration staunchly retained its pro-Western ties, particularly as high oil prices buoyed proximity to Western markets throughout the latter part of the decade, as did the low sulfuric content of Libyan crude.
perceive as an equally iniquitous period of post-colonial adjustment, the fallout of which Qadhafi and his future RCC colleagues would eventually inherit and feel compelled to remedy by radical means.

The stature of the military apparatus prior to and throughout the ancien monarchical regime was instrumental in the formation of this perception, particularly by junior army officers whom—along with civil servants, peasants, and unemployed urbanites—remained blocked from upward mobility as a result of the monarchy’s unwavering patronage of mostly Cyrenaican feudal and tribal elements. It was not long before their personal loyalties began to shift steadily from the dictates of a corrupt monarchy betraying the Arab cause, to the powerful ideational currents of Nasserism. A fact unobserved in other cases in the population, Libya’s army prior to independence was neither politically cohesive nor remotely credible as a standing fighting force—not even as a basic proxy to the occupying colonial power. Although the British eventually stood up a Libyan Arab Force (LAF) during WWII to combat the Axis presence in Libya, its soldiers—totaling a measly 600—saw almost no combat as their British superiors withheld the specialized technical and mechanical training necessary for participation in highly mobile desert campaigns, instead largely limiting their participation to the defense of Allied installations. The outfit’s core units were predominantly Sanusi, naturally a deciding factor in perpetuating what would continue to be seen by the country’s have-

400 Palmer and El Fathaly, “The Transformation of Mass Political Institutions in Revolutionary Libya,” 235
401 After failing to persuade locals to sell their lands peacefully, Italy opted to police Libyan territory with its own troops rather than indigenous forces. In addition, the Sanusis—while nominally the face of the pro-independence movement—resisted systematic involvement in battling outsiders, probably to protect the wealth they had amassed prior to Italy’s invasion. While Sanusi insurgents did engage Italian regulars after WWI as well as the outbreak of WWII in 1939, infighting precluded their effective control over Cyrenaican territory throughout the entire pre-independence period.
nots as the Cyrenaican elites’ unfair edge in national leadership throughout the independence era. The Brits disbanded the LAF by the war’s end and following independence in 1951, the young Sanusi monarchy converted its preferred ranks into the Cyrenaican Defense Force (CDF), a well-stocked and brutal internal security organization comprised entirely of loyal Cyrenaican Bedouin. Runt of the litter veterans from the LAF including, *inter alia*, alienated city dwellers and peasant nomads from other regions–like Qadhafi–by contrast, formed the nucleus of the Royal Libyan Army (RLA). Fearful of the aforementioned “radical” affinity for Nasserism displayed by its officers and the implications of such for continued Western interests in Libya, Idris emasculated the military by limiting its ranks to 6,500 men and counterbalancing it with the CDF–advised and assisted by British military specialists–as well as the National Security Force, a highly mobile domestic security apparatus replete with helicopters and armored cars. If the army bought tanks, the CDF was provided anti-tank weapons, and vice versa.

Some brief insights into his upbringing are helpful in further understanding why, following the September 1969 coup, Qadhafi was intent on rendering the military the primary vehicle for bringing Libya out of its post-colonial past and once and for all into lockstep with the regional pan-Arab project. As young secondary school students in the Fezzani city of Sabha during the 1950s, Qadhafi and his peers were avid followers of the Cairo-based transnational Arabic language radio service, *Sawt Al-‘Arab* (Voice of the Arabs)–the primary medium through which the Egyptian president espoused his vision of Arab unity to the region. Many of their teachers in Sabha were in fact also Egyptian.

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403 Prior to independence, many of this outfit’s officers constituted a British-run Cyrenaican Police Force. See Dyer, “Libya,” 367
404 Global Security, “Libya: Military History”
Not only did their immersion in these new points of view lead Qadhafi and his erstwhile classmates to question the Sanusi approach of rule, but attention to Nasser’s utilization of the Free Officer movement in particular afforded them a deeper appreciation for the potential of a capable military instrument to translate into sovereign Arab political power. 

“Just like the Algerians,” Qadhafi remarked—whose leader, Ahmed Ben Bella, had in 1962 guided Algiers out of French colonialism and the horrific war of independence it engendered by using the armed forces to suppress potential rivals and would-be dictators from the FLN—“we are against the cult of personality.”

Particularly in a place so deeply affected by socio-geographic cleavages as Libya, the military offered the only avenue for any real change, particularly for those deeply marginalized elements such as the nascent bourgeoisie and semi-nomadic peasantry. Qadhafi is in fact reported as being told by schoolmates to prepare for a military career if he had any hopes to partake in a genuine revolution. While still young cadets enrolled in the national military academy in Benghazi, Qadhafi and his peers—many of whom would end up participating in the coup and subsequently constituting the RCC’s inner circle alongside him: Abdel Sallam Jalloud, who would become the Colonel’s right hand in such key posts as prime and finance minister; Mustafa Al-Kharrubi, future director of military intelligence; Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabir Bashir, eventual army chief of staff and minister of defense; and Bashir Al-Hawafi—had already begun conspiring in the construction of “first and second [covert] cells” to be used in a possible coup against the monarchy.

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408 Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 19
Similar to the officer cohort of Zia Ul-Haq in Pakistan, Qadhafi’s generation had become understandably quite disgusted by the handling of the ancien régime’s military affairs, as well as a perceived lack of standards in the comportment of officers. Egypt’s near defeat in the 1956 Suez War, for example—in which a tripartite coalition of Israel, France, and the UK invaded the Sinai, bombarded Cairo, and inflicted nearly 4,000 Egyptian casualties—aroused suspicions that Arab losses were due to Sanusi complicity in allowing the Brits to operate from their installations in Libya, particularly Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli, where both the U.S. and British armies maintained exclusive basing agreements. Idris’s neglect of the pan-Arab military project was perhaps best evidenced, however, by his administration’s refusal to commit troops to aid Egypt, Syria, and Jordan against the Israeli onslaught of June 1967, all during a period when the monarchy claimed duplicitously to be undertaking military “reforms,” and oil wealth was steadily lining the pockets of a narrow elite tied to the palace and unleashing tremendous social dislocation throughout the country.

Qadhafi’s behaviors surrounding the coup reflected his intentions for the military’s bolstered role in a new national course. The RCC, for example, had codenamed its bloodless operation “Palestine is Ours,” and to one of Nasser’s most senior advisers—Muhammad Hassanein Haykal—shortly after the coup, identified its movement as Al-Dubbat Al-Wahdawiyyin Al-Ahrar (The United Free Officers, an overt nod to the Egyptian senior officer cabal now running Cairo). Supporting word with deed, the revolutionary leadership proposed union with Cairo to afford Nasser a second Arab front

409 See, for example: Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East. Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988
410 Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 15
411 Pollack, “Arabs at War,” 359
against the Zionists, and Qadhafi and the RCC spoke of rapid “military modernization” for the sole purpose of destroying the Israeli regional presence.\textsuperscript{413} The new regime also moved quickly to eliminate enemies of the revolution, namely those institutional appendages of the monarchy who had perpetuated Libya’s dishonorable status: the army; CDF; police; Diwan and cabinet members; parliamentarians; and the royal family itself. It also removed the prerogative of Libyan citizenship for the Italian community, and forced its repatriation to Italy.\textsuperscript{414}

Despite whatever potential for change appeared to exist, Qadhafi’s “revolution” had begun losing steam amongst the majority of Libyans almost as soon as it got off the ground, and the leadership was increasingly pressed to find a course it could unanimously adhere to. It is important to recall here that when the RCC first took power, Nasser was still alive and the feud with Sadat’s Egypt that went on to shape much of Libya’s foreign policy throughout the 1970s had not yet begun. So while to the RCC 1969 represented Libya’s break from its own past, the initial mechanisms for achieving this were in fact thought to lay in emulating the rest of the pan-Arab radical movement, as signified by Egypt and the tenure of ‘Abd al-Nasser. Given the geographic proximity and ready availability of Egyptian advising at the time, it appeared to make logical sense for Qadhafi to head an Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in Tripoli, modeled after the very same large single-party format, name and all, used by Nasser to corporatize power in Egypt.\textsuperscript{415} In addition to the fact that a multi-party system would have exacerbated tribal cleavages, Qadhafi perhaps more importantly believed it would make him a worthier heir apparent

\textsuperscript{413} Dyer, “Libya,” 368, 371
\textsuperscript{415} Ibid., 95
to Nasser, as well as set the stage for a real political union with Cairo. Yet in what would be the first of many indications to come of irreconcilability between state political goals and on-the-ground realities, Libya’s conditions proved grossly unamenable to the one-party set-up. In short, lack of time and resources to develop an organic cadre apparatus caused the ASU to falter. The overwhelming lack of public interest in the party and revolution itself ended up attracting predominantly the more zealous and less sophisticated underbelly of Libyan society. It was these so-called “instant cadres” who interfaced between the party and society by settling personal scores rather than statebuilding. The ASU failed, as the RCC had hoped, to use the momentum of administrative reform to bind the masses to local government institutions, and break the congruence between Libyans and their traditional leaders and destroy mass faith in them.416 It also attempted to introduce exactly the type of large central bureaucratic apparatus Qadhafi had in his revolutionary idealism sought to avoid, one which had become bloated, idle, and “cut off from the people.” The one-party state destined to inspire a popular revolution remained in practice little more than a run-of-the-mill military dictatorship.417

Tripoli’s subsequent domestic political experiment, the *Lijān al-Sha’biyya*–or Popular Committees–proved equally problematic. The mission of the Committees’–whom Qadhafi had commissioned after proclaiming the start of a “Popular Revolution”418 in Libya during his 1973 speech in Zuwara–was essentially to localize and diffuse political participation across all societal strata. Popular elections for committees

416 Fatḥalī, Palmer, and Chackerian, “Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya,” 95
418 This is also referred to as the Cultural Revolution or Green Revolution.
were restricted to zones, and there were direct elections for representatives of zone committee members to municipal and provincial committees. Public corporations and government bureaucracies held their own direct elections, and their representatives were sent to municipal and provincial committees, etc. Qadhafi envisioned in such a system the potential to break down the barriers that had formed between the revolution and the masses in the four years prior, while in the process training citizens and purging the lower ranks of the bureaucracy. “If the interests of the people are going to be lost for the sake of the government,” Qadhafi had said, “down with the government and long live the people.” This so-called “Green Revolution” suspended all laws in force in favor of reviewing each case on individual merits—as opposed to under the guidelines of any institutionalized legal architecture—and sought to engender an administrative and cultural upheaval throughout extant popular institutions, notably university campuses, to “fight the demagogic spirit and foreign cultural influences.”

Yet Qadhafi was to be disappointed again by a mismatch between vision and implementation. Like the ASU, many citizens simply ignored the committees and eschewed participation outright, while others reused them to settle scores. Conflict ensued, moreover, between the committees and ASU, which was not officially disbanded until 1977, as to which was the main vehicle of popular mobilization. The instability prompted what existed of a private sector during this period—upon whom Qadhafi had initially counted to spur development—to invest in Europe rather than at home.

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419 Faṭḥālī, Palmer, and Chackerian, “Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya,” 96
420 Palmer and El Fathaly, “The Transformation of Mass Political Institutions in Revolutionary Libya,” 240
421 Quoted in George Lenczowski, “Popular Revolution in Libya.” Current History, Vol. 66, No. 390 (February 1974), pp. 57-61, 57
422 Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 137
423 Faṭḥālī, Palmer, and Chackerian, “Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya,” 99
424 Palmer and El Fathaly, “The Transformation of Mass Political Institutions in Revolutionary Libya,” 240
Politically, while a diffuse power structure constituted a better fit for Libya’s “Wild West” past, it did engender conflict with the tribes, as committee leaders were not keen on retaining tribal affiliations within their institutions’ activities, and some tribal constituents felt the committees were attempting to isolate them from their traditional leaders. \(^{425}\) The Committees also had the effect of destroying the tribes’ legal status, dividing tribal areas into zones which crossed formerly demarcated tribal boundaries, and combining portions of different tribes within one zone. \(^{426}\) The overall key implication of the Popular Revolution early on was a gradual erosion of local governments’ modernizing structures and a reduction of power of modernizing officials. As I will elaborate further below, debates between forces of modernization vs. traditionalism were to have a significant impact on how Libya conceptualized its foreign policy, and ultimately justified a rogue course for it.

Tripoli by 1974 appeared on the path toward a critical juncture, as the new regime felt progressively closed in between tepid popular responses to its early forays into revolutionary “egalitarian” politics at home, and betrayed by its Arab brethren abroad. Qadhafi was particularly troubled by Anwar Al-Sadat’s increasingly Westward strategic reorientation following the death of his hero, Nasser, only a few years prior in 1970. The new Egyptian leader had a penchant for luxury and little patience for grandiose ideological machinations; he also believed that Qadhafi was insane. Sadat and his generals had indeed deliberately left Libya out of the plans for the Yom Kippur War—which began as a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on Israel in October 1973—and further neglected to inform Qadhafi until well after the fact that it was to be a “limited

\(^{425}\) Fathalī, Palmer, and Chackerian, “Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya,” 97, 99; Fathaly and Palmer, “Political Development and Social Change in Libya,” 57

\(^{426}\) Ibid., 92
war”–intended merely to break the post-1967 diplomatic deadlock between Israel and
Egypt, and re-launch negotiations with U.S. backing that would facilitate Israel’s
disengagement from the Sinai and its return to Egypt–as opposed to an all-out attempt to
annihilate the Zionists.  For Qadhafi the betrayal was more than symbolic.  Libya had
begun using steadily accruing oil revenues to build up its military during the early 1970s,
a force the Brother Leader stated he had intended–despite any claims of Libya as a
conventional Soviet client–to commission as “the arsenal of Islam.”  Along with Sudan,
Libya had also provided assistance to Egypt throughout the 1969 War of Attrition,
allowing the transference of Egyptian military colleges and aircraft units not participating
in the fighting to Libyan territory.427  Ever the revisionist, Qadhafi had initially viewed
the Arab-Israeli dispute as a chance for Libya to make its mark as a regional player.
When the time came that other Arab states finally agreed to the necessity of wiping Israel
off the map for good and were in need of arms and military assistance, Libya would have
its moment, the larger voice at Arab counsels Qaddafi always felt she deserved.428  Yet
through his surreptitious war planning, 1977 visit to Jerusalem, and other pro-
socialization overtures, Sadat had begun to take it all away.

The 1975 publication of the Green Book therefore took place within a temporal
context that, in an ideal sense, offered a new approach for Libya to finally live up to its
revolutionary potential by combatting the forces that had caused the sacred inter-Arab
unity project to stall.  It was indeed the hardening of these considerations–born initially
out of the pan-Arab aspirations developed by Qadhafi and his fellow RCC colleagues
throughout their formative years–and not any inherently erratic of irrational thinking on

427 Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, From June to October: The Middle East between 1967 and 1973. New
428 Dyer, “Libya,” 371
the part of the new Libyan leadership, that set the tone for differentiation and the aversive behaviors the regime would soon begin deploying in its name. Domestically, the Colonel proposed war on ineffective institutions and bureaucracies which constituted vestiges of continued Western domination. Parties, parliaments, and other representative institutions were in fact perversions of true democracy according to the Colonel, and had suppressed the possibility for Arab individuals and governments to think beyond their own narrow and secular interests, and toward the more important goal of reunification.\textsuperscript{429} Qadhafi’s early speeches advocated converting popular education, moreover, from a passive to active process in which students should—rather than simply absorb information conveyed—turn themselves into active citizens who could determine their own destiny and the future of the \textit{Jamahiriyya} by becoming a bulwark against the West. The educational establishment sought to consequently distance itself from the influence of outside instructors—mostly Egyptian, Tunisian, and Palestinian—and rely mainly on Libyan women for the task.\textsuperscript{430}

In the regional sense, Qadhafi was intent to carry on the legacy of Nasserism, adopting the fallen Egyptian leader’s enemies—including communists and Ba‘thists—as his own. He completely discounted the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, and all its future associates as:

\begin{quote}
the servants of imperialism. They are members of the reactionary right-wing . . . enemies of progress, of socialism, and Arab unity. They are comprised of hooligans, liars, bastards, hashish smokers, drunks, cowards, and delinquents . . . . Those who once belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood are ashamed to mention their past involvement. It has become something rotten that the entire Arab and Muslim world hates. No, even if they had good intentions, I think that they ignored the reality of the Arab world.\textsuperscript{431}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{431} Francois Burgat and William Dowell, \textit{The Islamic Movement in North Africa}. Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas, 1992
Israel of course constituted a primary adversary, and as discussed above, Qadhafi was determined to uphold and assume the rejectionist front which was once a key, if not the utmost, common denominator of the pan-Arab cause. The early 1970s witnessed the birth of the modern Libyan military to this effect. Whilst prior to 1973 Qadhafi was concerned namely with diplomatic support for pan-Arabism—the concerted campaign throughout 1971-2 to destroy Israeli influence in sub-Saharan Africa being one example, and the intermittent attempts up to 1973 to prosecute moves toward unity arrangements with Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, and Tunisia being another—the global spike in oil prices and availability of the Soviet Union as a willing arms supplier allowed him to double the size of his force, thereby hopefully rendering it the executor of his neo-pan-Arabist vision.

Despite its small population, arms imports were considerable throughout the era, and Tripoli boasted the 10th-largest tank force in the world with a fleet exceeding 3,000. An impressive range of tracked and wheeled armor as well as air and tank transporters could in theory bring Libya’s force to bear ably against intruders as well as enable it to venture far beyond the homeland, as it would later do in Uganda and Chad.

**In a practical sense**, though, Libya’s local realities rendered the realization of its vision of regional leadership far more difficult, if not impossible. One unavoidable hurdle was deciding how to cope with the issue of Islam. Indeed, religion had occupied a

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434 Paola De Maio, “From Soldiers to Policemen: Qadhafi’s Army in the New Century.” *Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics* 1-3 (2006), pp. 17-26, 18. It is interesting to note that with the exception of Israel and Syria, all other states possessing large tank forces have at least ten times the Libyan population. While other oil-rich states, namely those of the Persian Gulf, have unconstrained defense budgets and purchase equipment not directed against any recognizable conventional threats, Libya is the only one to have attempted serious and sustained offensive operations. Indeed, Tripoli was not remotely capable of operating 3,000 tanks unless it dispensed entirely with the normal supporting arm—no army with that number of tanks has less than five times the manpower of Libya’s. See Dyer, “Libya,” 371
relatively minor role within the classical pan-Arab movement (Arab statesman did pay Islam occasional rhetorical homage and speak of their pride in the Arab peoples’ special place within a greater Islamic civilization, yet the faith was not significant in an operational sense), yet as a traditional society, Islam was extremely important to Libyans. The 1911-18 anti-Italian resistance movement took almost all of its ideational cues from Ottoman pan-Islamism in the framework of a Muslim religious order—the Sanusiyya. Indeed, “no other twentieth-century Arab nationalist movement,” Gwynne Dyer points out, “began within the framework of a Muslim religious order.”435 The pan-Arab strand caught on relatively concomitantly, as throughout a formative window of said resistance in 1914-15, Ottoman officers of Arab origin who were already involved in secret pan-Arab revolutionary societies served as the senior advisers to the Sanusiyya.436 It perhaps came as no surprise, then, that Qadhafi catered to the religious establishment with a bit more attentiveness than his contemporaries in the radical Arab camp, making Libya the first Arab state of its time, for instance, to embark on an at least partial re-Islamization of positive law.437 He also enforced some Islamic measures that had grown lax throughout the monarchy, including an anti-alcohol ban, fasting, and capital punishment. None of this is to say, however, that the Colonel had any interest in going the route of the Islamist securitocracies discussed in the previous chapter. Rather than integrate religious elements or precepts into the selectorate, Qadhafi preferred to tactically coopt them. He did this fairly effectively, converting the Sanusi-established Islamic University of Bayda’a, for example, into the agricultural faculty of Benghazi. Religious scholars were

435 Dyer, “Libya,” 367
436 Ibid.
absorbed into a regime-affiliated Institute of Islamic Studies, which Qadhafi later subsumed under his *Da‘wa al-Islamiyya*—or Islamic Call Society—which within a decade of its establishment in 1973, reportedly fielded 132 centers across Africa and was responsible, *inter alia*, for the conversion of a couple African heads of state to Islam.\(^{438}\)

Qadhafi’s attempt to play a sort of transitional role between Nasserism and political Islam—which by the latter 1970s and early 80s had already proven a destabilizing and in many cases deadly force for a number of African and Middle Eastern governments—was far-fetched, perceived widely as a stark contradiction that made him harder to accept among both Arabists and Islamists alike. As he moved further along in the implementation of the Green Book’s Third Universal Theory at home, for instance—which mandated the seizure of private property, including *awqaf*, or religious endowments—Qadhafi drew the intense ire of Libya’s own orthodox ‘ulama. In response to their criticisms, Qadhafi attempted to deinstitutionalize Libyan Islam as much as possible so that its constituents and their orthodoxies could not form any type of third pillar against the regime, as they had done in Sudan and Pakistan. He instructed the masses to “seize the mosques,” and declared Islam did not require a superfluous class of intermediaries between man and God.\(^{439}\) Qadhafi also demonstrated a blatant rejection of deeply held conventions within both Sunni and Shi’a Islam in his tactics, arguing, for instance, that every Muslim had the right to have personal recourse to *ijtihad*—or independent reasoning—in order to adapt Islam to modern conditions. He even went so far as to argue that the “Islamic calendar should be revamped so as to begin with the Prophet Muhammad’s death rather than with the *hijra* to Mecca, that the traditional *hadd*

\(^{438}\) St. John, “Libya: From Colony to Revolution,” 186

punishments were merely symbolic, that *hajj* to Mecca was no longer a pillar of Islamic belief, and that *zakat*–or Islamic taxation–could vary in nature and amount.\(^{440}\)

While Qadhafi did express rhetorical designs to export Islam to neighboring infidel nations through the creation of a Great Islamic State of the Sahel,\(^{441}\) it is important to understand that the efforts devoted to this mission were unsystematic and shady at best, which–in conjunction with the latter insights into Qadhafi’s notions of “reformist” Islam–renders it further safe to say that Libya’s overtures to the faith were overwhelmingly tactical and symbolic, not remotely equitable to those pursued by Islamic securitocracies. *Al-Faylaq ul-Islāmiyyu*–or the Islamic Legion–which the Colonel stood up in 1972 to supposedly realize this plan, was initially slated to be a 7,000-strong well-armed force of elite volunteers recruited from across the *umma*, dedicated to the Green Book’s teachings, and commanded by the finest Libyan and Palestinian officers. As William J. Foltz points out, however, it fell far short of that ideal:

Most members of the Islamic Legion appear to be among life’s losers, poor boys from Saharan and Sahelian populations who had hoped to find remunerative civilian employ at Libyan farms or factories. Brought by recruiters along the “Qadhafi trail” across southern Algeria, or simply seized on the streets of Tripoli, they are threatened with imprisonment and expulsion without papers if they do not accept military service. In effect, they are press-ganged in pure eighteenth-century style. Given the most summary military instruction–and evidently no political indoctrination–the foreign contingents are then sent into the most exposed positions.\(^{442}\)

Despite replacing the RCC in 1973 with the General People’s Congress (GPC)–which, in essence, became the state’s senior legislature as well as oversight body for the

\(^{440}\) Qadhafi’s flexible interpretations of the faith, including his concept of *ijtihad*–which in the modern era has remained predominantly confined to Shi’a circles and in the domain of its clerics (Libya is a Sunni country)–and rejection of the *sunna* and *hadith* (transcribed collections of sayings and action of the Prophet) are seen by most Muslims as almost heretical. See Joffé, “The Role of Islam,” 44


\(^{442}\) William J. Foltz, “Libya’s Military Power,” in René Lemarchand (editor), *The Green and the Black: Qadhafi’s Policies in Africa*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988, pp. 52-69, 57. During the 1979 Libyan intervention in Uganda, for example, many of the legionnaires were not told they were being sent into fight the Tanzanian invasion, but rather to participate in joint training exercises with the Ugandans. See Pollack, “Arabs at War,” 371-2
Popular Committee system—Qadhafi sought to maintain a critical influence, if more behind-the-scenes than overt, for the Council’s original officer-architects. Qadhafi’s own official job title had changed from RCC Chairman to both GPC Secretary-General as well as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. At the 4th GPC congress in 1977, the wider core membership of the General Secretariat was revealed to essentially mirror that of the original RCC: Major Khuwayldi al-Hamidi became Chief of the General Staff and headed the Popular Resistance Forces Militia; Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa al-Kharrubi was Inspector-General of the Armed Forces and Commandant of the Navy and Air Force; and Jallud assumed command over the Revolutionary Committees.  

The GPC also controlled internal security. Al-Hamidi’s brother, for example—Captain Abdul Majid Al-Khuwayldi—was in charge of the Security and Military Intelligence Service, a secret police outfit which also served as an executive arm for intrigues abroad. Qadhafi purged practically the entire senior officer corps left over from the ancien régime as they were seen in favor of the continued presence of British and U.S. military bases on Libyan territory, as well as a more limited level of involvement in the Arab-Israeli arena. Remaining officers were admonished to maintain “revolutionary discipline” and resist the temptations to corruption provided so easily by oil companies and contractors under the monarchy, avoiding “strong drink” and other “dissolute ways.”

Regardless of such maneuvers and his initial optimism, the military was not overwhelmingly enthusiastic about jumping wholeheartedly onto Qadhafi’s aversive bandwagon. Writing in 1977, Fathali, Palmer, and Chackerian noted the considerable

443 Dyer, “Libya,” 370
444 Metz, “Libya: A Country Study,” 244-5
445 Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 14
youth of the military leadership relative to its predecessors. Differences of opinion soon facilitated splits within the Libyan high command between “bureaucratic” advocates of an even more muscular foreign policy–Qadhafi and his allies, including Jalloud–vs. those more technocratically inclined officers favoring projects that addressed economic development and other domestic social priorities. Minister of Planning ‘Omar Al-Muhayshi, for example, who was representative of the latter faction, and such other senior colleagues as Minister of Foreign Affairs ‘Abd Al-Mun‘im Al-Huni, wanted Libya to invest all its earnings in agriculture and industry–heavy industry especially–and cut the exorbitant spending being devoted to “fomenting regional unrest.” Al-Muhayshi’s favored venture was Misurata’s iron and steel complex, which by 1981 many foreign firms were competing to finish. Jalloud’s clique, on the other hand, stoutly defended high defense expenditures for supporting guerilla warfare and subversion in such Arab states as Sudan, Tunisia, and Egypt, which it remained convinced were ripe for unification. Al-Muhayshi was implicated in an unsuccessful coup plot in 1975 and fled into exile along with Al-Huni. Unfortunately for Qadhafi, this marked only the beginning of what would remain a progressively fractious relationship with the officer corps throughout the regime’s duration. At least eight coup attempts were reported between 1980-83 alone. One of the most notable incidents occurred in May 1984 when security forces foiled a group reported to have ties with exiled opposition elements from striking the Colonel’s residential barracks directly.

446 Fatḥalī, Palmer, and Chackerian, “Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya,” 93
447 Ibid., 166
448 De Maio, “From Soldiers to Policemen,” 17; Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 167; Anderson, “Qadhafí and His Opposition,” 231
449 Anderson, “Qadhafí and His Opposition,” 225
Despite the regime’s expansive investments in national defense—which rose exponentially nearly every year until 1978, and of which arms imports represented more than half the total figure—the force also suffered from poor institutionalization and underdeveloped doctrine. Beyond Qadhafi, his immediate senior underlings, and the respective agencies they chaired, there was in fact little in the way of any constant structure whatsoever, with orders passing directly from the Supreme Commander to individual units absent a reliable or established chain of command. It was a contradiction indicative of a deeper and, as history would repeatedly prove, unavoidable syndrome within Libya, namely that with each successive opportunity for institutional enhancement came the potential—or if you will, counter-opportunity—for further perils to the political center: The desire to be a Nasserist disciple-state was checked by the inadaptability of Libya’s restive population to the ASU’s single-party rule; the aspiration toward a strong revolutionary regime was thwarted by the fact that the so-called Cornerstone of the Revolution—the Popular Committees—were in fact not that popular to begin with; and now, the will to become a substantial military power was checked by the political inability to field a fully professionalized force. Palmer and Fathaly capture this sense of contradiction, as well as imply the long-term institutional ephemerality, and to a large extent impracticability, of the Qadhafi’s project, quite impeccably:

[Libya’s] new institutions had to be revolutionary in deed as well as in word. If they were to take root in Libya’s less than fertile soil, they would have to destroy the existing institutions that provided the social underpinning of Libyan culture. Second, the new institutions would have to allow the masses to express their support for the regime while simultaneously eliminating both the subversive influence of the regime’s opponents and the very pervasive tendencies toward selfish, anti-social behavior resulting from generations of reactionary rule. A-la Rousseau the general will or inherent goodness of the masses, must be allowed to manifest itself. The selfish or private will would have to be stifled. This meant that parties and coalitions must be avoided, for it was doubtful that the revolution during its fragile years would withstand organized opposition based upon regional or ideological grounds. Third, new institutions could not dominate Colonel Qaddafi. His insights were needed to guide the revolution. Fourth, the new institutions had to be created from the top down without strong roots within Libyan society and wholly without benefit of dedicated cadres skilled in the art of organizational development. The rank and file of Colonel
Qaddafi’s new institutions would necessarily have to be drawn from the ranks of the very population that he was attempting to change. Colonel Qaddafi, himself, entered the political scene without political experience. Everything would have to start from scratch. Fifth, the new institutions had to be democratic. Institutions lacking the democratic aura would render Colonel Qaddafi merely another military tin horn, a position anathema to Colonel Qaddafi’s self-image and regional aspirations. Sixth, the institutions had to prove their utility almost immediately. The revolutionary leaders were in a profound hurry to develop a mass base for their revolution and to demonstrate their ability to develop Libyan society. Those institutions unable to meet the time frame of the revolution would be discarded and new experiments initiated.450

Well-attuned to these tensions, Qadhafi was compelled to accelerate and harden the outbidding process. For one thing, this meant bolstering the anti-technocratic narrative—which began to resonate more throughout the selectorate following purges and defections of those like Al-Muhayshi—and making it part and parcel of the Brother Leader’s entire claim to legitimacy. The irony, however, as alluded to above, was that in doing so, he had to unleash and embrace many of the very forces initially viewed as destructive by the original military regime of the RCC, namely the tribes. Yet differentiating himself and his regime from that of King Idris—whose efforts toward “modernization” had resulted in the whoring of Libya to the West and perpetuation of colonialism under a new face—had to be the primary focus. By this point, many of the old order’s most creative people—those skilled in commerce, industry, agriculture, and government bureaucracy—as well as Sanusi clansmen, were incarcerated or disenfranchised in favor of officers. Yet, the combination of oil wealth and Qadhafi’s charismatic appeal made the revolution palatable for the time being.451

Unlike his more traditional officer-counterparts in the pan-Arab establishment—including Nasser, whose own treatise, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution, expressed a vision of modernization, albeit one rooted in the use of Pan-Arab,

450 Palmer and El Fathaly, “The Transformation of Mass Political Institutions in Revolutionary Libya,” 236
Pan-African, and Pan-Islamic identities to resist imperialism—the Colonel had in essence begun trying to move forward by looking back, bringing the country into closer harmony with what he believed were its cherished Bedouin roots, basing its power in the hinterlands of the south-center, and nurturing a historic emphasis on kinship networks, pan-Islamic culture, and especially fear of the central state and mistrust of the West, and foreigners in general. In so doing he wanted to transform the basic notions of mere anticolonial sentiment that had hitherto constituted the mainstay of Libyan nationalism into a genuinely revolutionary ideology using language the ordinary Libyan could understand. Revolutionary charisma, embodied by an increasingly tougher stance in foreign affairs, was intended to mobilize Libyans and discredit opponents. Qadhafi internalized this image more as time went on, trading in his officer’s attire for Bedouin garb, eating and speaking progressively like a rural tribesman. This policy of “bedouinization”—which included the promotion of rural dress, music festivals, and rituals, and a revival of institutions such as tribal leadership councils—came at the deliberate expense of urban culture. Even as it grew, Tripoli lost much of its cosmopolitan character. More importantly for our purposes, at the elite level, bedouinization—which the regime was able to maintain due in no small part to the cushion

453 Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, “Why Qaddafi Has Already Lost”
provided by oil revenues and laborers from abroad—fueled patronage-driven appointments that further precluded the construction of a credible standing military; the Colonel in fact became increasingly notorious for frequently shuffling units and personnel so as to impede the development of independent power bases. Specifically, Tripoli began integrating senior tribal leaders with ties to the Qadhafi into sensitive command positions.

Further external forces at work during this era would also likely have compelled Qadhafi to up the differentiationist ante. Chief among them was the repeated failure of unification projects throughout the Arab world. While the Libyan leadership had designed these overtures with considerable genuineness of revolutionary purpose throughout the 1970s, supposed partner-nations seemed interested only for their potential political expediency, and at what the Colonel perceived increasingly was Libya’s expense. Egypt of course figured prominently into this equation.

As early as December 1969—while Nasser was still alive—Egypt, along with Libya and Sudan, had put forth a plan for “flexible federation” through the Tripoli Unionist Charter. Libya’s support within the framework, as alluded to above, was more than rhetorical; Qadhafi made Libyan military installations readily available to Egyptian assets throughout the 1967-70 War of Attrition—a limited Egyptian-Israeli dispute consisting primarily of artillery exchange, aerial warfare, and commando raids. Sudan, whose president, Ja‘far al-Numayri, was not particularly enamored of Qadhafi’s revolutionary zeal, and wanted more time to ensure both that all parties involved were developmentally self-supporting, and that sufficiently clear cultural and economic frameworks were in

455 Ahmida, “Why Qaddafi Has Already Lost”
456 Mattes, “Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East,” 8-9
place to facilitate smooth integration, withdrew from the group in April 1971. Sadat and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, who ended up acceding later the previous year, had nevertheless given Qadhafi their assurances that a joint Libyan-Egyptian-Syrian Union of Arab Republics would materialize by the spring of 1973. These events help further contextualize Qadhafi’s fury over his exclusion from Egypt’s subsequent war plans.

The deterioration in Libyan-Egyptian relations was forthcoming on initially political-diplomatic grounds. While Qaddafi castigated Sadat for his foundering pan-Arab credentials, the Egyptian leader insinuated the Colonel was little more than a minor dictator, a misfit of small consequence whose self-styling as a “man of the people” while increasing reliance on the military exposed him as a hypocrite and a fraud. He also offered sanctuary to senior Libyan defectors such as al-Huni and al-Muhayshi; the former was reported to be residing in Cairo by January 1976. It was not long, however, before Qadhafi opted to put Libya’s enhanced capabilities provocatively to the test by engaging Egypt in a war of wits. After a Libyan Airlines vessel en route to Cairo on 21 February 1973 had mistakenly flown over the Sinai and was shot down by Israeli defenses, Qadhafi attempted to coerce an Egyptian naval commander stationed in Libya to torpedo the British Queen Elizabeth II on a special sailing carrying prominent Jews from Southampton, UK to the Israeli port city of Ashdod; Sadat ultimately caught wind of and thwarted the operation.

And despite the fact that at the time the U.S. still regarded the Libyans—who were themselves avowed anti-Communists—with a sense of “benign approval,” Qadhafi hatched an assassination attempt against Herman Frederick Eilts in

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457 Rabinovich and Shaked, “From June to October,” 177-83
460 Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 106-7
1976. A senior adviser to Henry Kissinger, Eilts had served as U.S. ambassador to Egypt from 1974-9, and was considered instrumental in steering Cairo away from the Soviet orbit, and, as Qadhafi saw it, toward the “imperialist-Zionist” camp. Bilateral fallout continued after Libya covertly encouraged a “people’s march on Cairo” to force the Egyptians’ hand, creating a major ruckus along the Egyptian-Libyan border. The further provision of support to Islamist extremists in Egypt, believed to be linked to an assassination attempt on Sadat, brought the countries to large-scale border clashes by July 1977. Sadat and his General Staff had actually intended to launch a full-scale invasion by late July as a result of the Libyan provocations, but ultimately desisted, likely due to pressure from the U.S., whose military and intelligence assessments—based on Cairo’s performance in the Yom Kippur War—were wary of Egypt’s ability to prosecute a successful campaign in its logistically challenging western desert region.

Frustrated by his lack of success in advancing union with the Mashreq—or Arab East—Qadhafi proposed the idea of a “People’s Maghreb,” a union of the North African states of the Arab West under radical pan-Arab tutelage, but to similarly little avail. The Colonel would once again eventually attempt to realize his goals by testing the waters of provocation. When an early 1974 proposal for union with Tunisia was quickly withdrawn by Tunisian President Habib Bourghiba, for example, Qadhafi sent a hit squad to abduct or assassinate Tunisian Prime Minister Hédi Amara Nouira, who was believed to be a primary advocate of the cancellation; in 1976 Libyan-trained agents were

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462 Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 106-7
463 Dyer, “Libya,” 369
464 Pollack, “Arabs at War,” 133-7
465 Yehudit Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p. 113
captured and confessed to penetrating Tunisia for this purpose.\textsuperscript{466} Morocco constituted another target for the Colonel’s agitation during the era. Libyan intelligence had subsidized two coups within the Moroccan military, in 1971 and 1972, both resulting in unsuccessful yet close-call attempts on the life of King Hassan II. Tripoli also extended support to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)\textsuperscript{467} with the stated objective of reversing the 1975 partition of the formerly Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania, and committed armed forces to Algeria should that country’s provision of bases and support to the Polisario draw it into war with Rabat. Libyan gains in this type of diplomacy were anything but spectacular. While the Colonel was ultimately unsuccessful in backing a bloody coup against Nigerien President Seyni Kountché, for example, he did manage to get Kountché to agree, following an urgent meeting with Libyan and Algerian leaders that April, to recognize the SADR in principle.\textsuperscript{468}

While we must also be cautious not to overstate the character of Mu’ammar Qadhafi in these affairs, we would be remiss to completely discount it at this point in our analysis. The Colonel had by most accounts invested himself quite heavily in the revolution, taking it as a personal defeat when supposed followers appeared to value money, power, and career advancement more than revolutionary achievements. He lambasted young Libyan guerillas sent to fight in the Israel-Palestine theatre as unable and ideologically unprepared, admonished subjects who refused to work in the salutary agricultural and other developmental projects being established in remote areas, and castigated university students for engaging in “subversive activities.” Qadhafi was in the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{466} Dyer, “Libya,” 369
\item \textsuperscript{467} This is a partially recognized state formed by the Polisario Front in 1976, claiming sovereignty over the entirety of the Western Sahara. Morocco, in reality, controls roughly 75% of the territory and refers to it as its Southern Provinces
\item \textsuperscript{468} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
face of such snags overcome by fits of depression during which he would withdraw to his family home in Sirte, or anonymous desert retreats, to meditate and write.\textsuperscript{469} He in essence needed to believe that his base of power was authentically popular, and that what setbacks did exist were the result of externally imposed and corrupted institutions, ill-crafted to Libya’s unique conditions. It was partially in this spirit that the Colonel developed one of his most notorious domestic political tactics throughout the 70s: the threat of resignation. He announced in 1971, for example, that he would not stand for candidacy for the position of president of the “Libyan Arab Republic,” but soon after claimed he had ceded to “popular pressure,” and would in fact remain in the running, even though there was ultimately no referendum nor position of president! Later that year, Qadhafi claimed he would step down from the RCC “to protest the shortcomings of the administrative apparatus in carrying out social, economic, and industrial projects.”\textsuperscript{470}

The Zuwara address of 15 April 1973, which as discussed above introduced the Popular Revolution, contained yet another threat of resignation should “the people” remain apathetic and resistant to following the guidance of their leader.

It is clear from the timing of aforementioned events and perceptions that Qadhafi had come into power already fairly determined to unsettle the international status quo into which his Libya was born. Recall that primary forays into the nuclear realm—the attempted purchase of devices from China—took place as early as 1969, the very year the RCC had come to power. Libya had also begun dabbling in the unification business by

\textsuperscript{469} Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 135. Major Abdel-Salam Jalloud, Qadhafi’s number two, was also cited as a peculiar individual. In 1992 a Tripoli-based diplomat who met frequently with him described Jalloud as “an impossible man . . . He speaks to you and sometimes he looks out of this world. Some say he is simply a drunk, but it’s not really that. He starts talking on a subject, then he’s silent for two minutes, then he starts fidgeting, then he talks on another subject. You ask yourself: What is happening in this man’s mind?” See Kim Murphy, “Lockerbie Crisis Fuels Libyan Power Struggle.” \textit{Los Angeles Times} (23 June 1992)

\textsuperscript{470} Cooley, “Libyan Sandstorm,” 136
the same time, and assassination attempts on foreign officials were underway within two years. It is further apparent that these initiatives occurred in tandem with Tripoli’s initial militarization, in turn an outgrowth of the Colonel’s desire to make the country a bastion of pan-Arab martial clout. It might from this perspective appear plausible to perceive Qadhafi’s Libya as having been born rogue, yet a closer reading of the country’s history in fact reveals that the dynamics of military empowerment alone did not facilitate a turn to roguery per se. Rather, it was the early revolutionary selectorate’s consistent inability to translate this empowerment into a meaningful leadership position within the wider pan-Arab project—not to mention the now glaring failure of that project itself—that by 1977 brought the regime to a critical juncture, heightening its self-perception of existence in a dangerous and lonely world, and spurring it on a course of modifications that would ultimately dramatically accelerate its use of provocation as a policy instrument, thereby militating increasingly, and largely irrevocably, against its socialization.

The Sabha Declaration of 2 March 1977 represented the long-awaited culmination of these processes. By this point in time, the neutralization of such formerly key regime figures as al-Muhayshi and al-Huni, which included the execution of 22 army officers accused of dissent, meant the ruling coalition’s technocratic wing had effectively lost its spokesmen, and that its ideologues—represented by Qadhafi and Jalloud’s faction within the GPC—now finally had the upper hand.471 Their endorsement of the “Declaration of the Establishment of the People’s Authority” officially dissolved the Libyan Arab Republic and proclaimed in its place a Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya. On the surface, Sabha had ushered the birth of the “direct democratic” polity for which Qadhafi had always strived. The term Jamahiriyya itself is not an actual

Arabic word; it was a philosophical concept devised within Qadhafi’s Green Book and invented as a pluralized variant of the Arabic word for republic—Jumhuriyya—denoting a government of mass popular authority, or “peopledom.” Libya’s citizens were slated to govern themselves through Basic People’s Congresses (BPC), local political forums—somewhat akin to town councils—in which all adults were expected to participate, deliberate, and vote on national decisions. These bodies supposedly constituted the Jamahiriyya’s supreme authority; Qadhafi and his senior colleagues in theory required their consent on all major decisions, rendering superfluous such previously functioning institutions as trade unions, professional associations, and women’s groups. And although the newly self-enshrined Ach al-Qa’id—or Brother Leader—had initially viewed the Qur’an as the Jamahiriyya’s guide and inspiration, he once again failed to succeed in locating an actionable compromise between the Islamic establishment and his own brand of Arab socialism.

While Sabha nominally represented the next stage of Libya’s revolutionary progress by empowering the masses, it more importantly constituted for Qadhafi and his colleagues the opportunity they had been seeking to entrench the selectorate and insulate its more hardline elements from potential challengers. In a manner not altogether dissimilar from the Islamic Republic of Iran—which, as outlined in the previous chapter, consists of a civilian leadership operated by reasonably pluralistic praxes, alongside a revolutionary theocratic structure that sets the course of high policy and can in most cases exercise a veto power over the autonomy of the latter—Tripoli achieved this feat on the ground through bifurcating its body politic between administrative and revolutionary

472 St. John, “Libya: From Colony to Republic,” 166-8
sectors. The GPC essentially subsumed the former; the latter, of course, became the domain of the Brother Leader and his key colleagues. Qadhafi announced his intention to concentrate exclusively on revolutionary as opposed to governmental activities, thereby officially resigning from his post as Secretary-General of the GPC, though he did remain commander-in-chief of the armed forces.\footnote{Vandewalle, “Libya’s Revolution in Perspective,” 26; St. John, “Libya: From Colony to Republic,” 169} The essence of Libyan power now rested within a three-tiered apex consisting of: 1) the \textit{Qiyadat al-Thawra}–or Revolutionary Leadership–an office which, like that of the Iranian \textit{rahbar} or North Korean \textit{suryŏng}, remained essentially exclusive to one individual–Qadhafi himself. He did, however, seek regular informal political council from senior military officer-colleagues–most of whom assisted in the 1969 coup and subsequently formed the RCC’s core–in the form of a so-called “Free Unionist Officers Movement, and from the mid-1990s onward, a cabal of close civilian companions–many of whom the Colonel knew from his days as a schoolboy–in the form of a so-called “Forum of the Companions of Qadhafi;\footnote{Mattes, “Formal and Informal Authority in Libya since 1969,” 63-5} members of the former RCC who were still in office. These were essentially Qadhafi’s hardliner officer-colleagues who emerged alongside him during the 4\textsuperscript{th} GPC Congress of 1977. Major General Abdel Sallam Jalloud, Major Khuwayldi al-Hamidi, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa al-Kharrubi, Lieutenant Colonel Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabir Bashir, et al. all retired from the GPC’s secretariat-general, leaving civilians in charge therein, and assumed senior command positions within the revolutionary sector;\footnote{Hanspetter Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” in Dirk J. Vandewalle (editor), \textit{Qadhafi’s Libya, 1969-1994}. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 89-112., 94-5} and of probably the greatest consequence 3) \textit{Al-Lijan al-Thawriyya}–The Revolutionary Committees (RC). Indeed, their commissioning unleashed into the country’s politics a radicalism the
intensity of which previous top-down modifications—the establishment of the ASU in 1969 and 1973 announcement of the Green Revolution—could not even begin to match, and that they held such sway in a country now unprotected practically declaratorily by institutional checks and balances made their influence all the more dangerous and powerful.\textsuperscript{477}

The first generation of RC members were graduates of the state \textit{mu'askarat}, or political indoctrination camps; later members had all participated in study courses on the Green Book, and at their zenith constituted some 1.2\% of the population. Their key actors were members of lower strata of youths who had grown up alongside the revolution. Uninspired by years of work in the very inefficient administrative and government services Qadhafi was critiquing, they developed little sympathy for the prescriptions of the regime’s modernizers.\textsuperscript{478} This is an important caveat. While Qadhafi did not \textit{initially} field as loyal a coercer as the Iranian IRGC, for example, his worldview had demographics on its side; indeed, within the first two decades of the revolution, more than half of the population was under 15 years of age, born after the coup, and subject to little scholastic material that was not in some way touched by the Third Universal Theory. By the time of Sabha, then, Qadhafi and his lieutenants had ample stocks of rebellious youngsters and children of the disadvantaged from which to recruit for the RCs.\textsuperscript{479}

The regime seized this opportunity to swell the ranks of the RCs and propagate a wide-scale \textit{tathwir}—or “revolutionization”—of Libyan society. By the early 80s, cadres of

\textsuperscript{477} Local RC chapters, for instance, were required to maintain little, if any contact, with one another, and reported only to a Central Coordinating Office. See, for example, Jonathan Bearman, \textit{Qadhafi’s Libya}. London: Zed Books, 1986, p. 188
\textsuperscript{478} Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 95-6
\textsuperscript{479} Anderson, “Qadhhi and His Opposition,” 227
the Coordinating Office for Revolutionary Committees and the World Center for the Study of the Green Book took over key positions within central specialized ministries—including education, scientific research and planning, economy and trade—in an attempt to solve a period of economic and political crisis through stronger “revolutionary controls.”

Education constituted a particularly important target of the strategy, and the regime’s new notion of *lijān fi kul al-makān*—or “committees everyplace”—sanctioned the RCs’ penetration into all educational institutions, universities in particular. At The Libyan University, for example, faculty were fired, curricula revamped along revolutionary lines, and professors instructed what to teach by student-members of the affiliated committees; Jalloud himself remarked that one’s revolutionary commitments, as opposed to either grades or merits, should determine candidacy for scholarships.

These moves were part of a wider two-pronged educational reform effort intended to win over popular support for the selectorate’s increasingly reactionary ideations.

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480 Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 96-7
482 Specifically, this included: 1) **A reorientation of educational instruction toward the teachings and interpretations of the Green Book**—Teachers cast the unsatisfactory nature of prior educational attempts as imposed foreign ideologies made irrelevant by the Brother Leader’s celebrated treatise and encouraged graduate students to write dissertations on it. By the point, a World Center for the Study and Research of the Green Book—which was destroyed by the NATO airstrikes in early May 2011—fielded more than 100 branches worldwide as well as a multi-million dollar annual operating budget devoted to translating the text into over 30 languages, underwriting international conferences, and producing nearly 140 studies and scholarly papers on Qadhafi’s theories. National educational emphasis was placed nominally on the education of the individual—philosophy, for example, would henceforth be introduced through *tafsir*, commentary on texts provided by the state; and 2) **Militarization of the masses**—Qadhafi had proposed transforming schools and universities into military-style barracks (*The Green Book* in fact foreshadowed the creation of a “popular army”). He brought the matter in front of the GPC and sold it on the idea that citizens could be armed to protect the revolution from foreign challenges. It is important to acknowledge, however, that this was a relatively diffuse vision of a civil defense program; Qadhafi contended, for example, that he was not interested in copying the more systematized approaches of Switzerland and Israel, though he still continued purchasing advanced weapons systems for these forces. The initiatives were more about using the pretense of developing confrontations between his regime and the West to justify the mobilization of university students into revolutionaries, and the creation of barracks on campuses. See Monastiri, “Teaching the Revolution,” 72-3, 87; Bazi, “What Did Qaddafi’s Green Book Really Say?”
482 Switzerland’s aforementioned highly organized civil defense program, for example, consisted of nearly 3,000 communities training and organizing well-equipped shelters in the event of a conventional, chemical, or nuclear attack. By the early 1960s, it was capable of mobilizing nearly 700,000 troops in two to four days. See, for
of course also impacted Libyan security doctrine. The articulation by 1979 of two interrelated concepts—bayt li-sakhinihi, or “the house belongs to those who reside in it,” and La thawri karij al-lijan al-thawriyya, or “there are no revolutionaries outside the Revolutionary Committees”—formalized the separation between administrative and revolutionary authority, giving the latter a virtual monopoly over the mechanisms of enforcement, foreign and domestic.\(^{483}\) This was confirmed at the third annual meeting of the RCs in Benghazi from 2-3 February 1980, when their key responsibilities were enumerated along a multi-point plan, including: Point 1—Pursuing the physical liquidation of the enemies of the revolution abroad; Point 3—Establishing RC outposts within People’s Bureaus (embassies) abroad; and Point 8—Increasing “revolutionary control”—which included, \textit{inter alia}, the power to oversee legal prosecutions and death sentences-to uncover “mistakes, deviations, and damage.”\(^{484}\)

The RCs subsequently afforded the Colonel significantly greater room to maneuver within the Jamahiriya’s ever-complex power structure. The fact their mandate was not systematically defined nor codified in any legal text—including, in contrast to the BPCs, the Green Book itself—and members oversaw and mobilized the BPCs without holding official positions, rendered their decisions virtually unquestionable. They were well capable of insulating the Brother Leader from such potential threats as the state’s officious non-revolutionary bureaucracy, and facilitating his further outbidding of dissident-exiles, military officers, and other sources of threat.\(^{485}\)

\(^{483}\) Palmer and El Fathaly, “The Transformation of Mass Political Institutions in Revolutionary Libya,” 235
\(^{484}\) Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 101; Mattes, “Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East,” 15
Despite their supposed autonomy of the Basic People’s Congresses, the RCs gradually overtook them and all their associated subunits. The Revolutionary Leadership moreover called the Congresses into session a few times a year to ensure they reaffirmed the wishes of the Qiyadat al-Thawra.\textsuperscript{486} The April 1979 Free Unionist Conference also sanctioned the targeting of military and police personnel by allowing RCs to form within their ranks, thereby essentially enabling them to bypass the normal hierarchy of Libyan forces, outrank regular officers,\textsuperscript{487} and transform the police into “local security forces totally dominated by loyal Qadhafi followers.”\textsuperscript{488} In May 1984, several committees managed to erect roadblocks near Qadhafi’s residence that led to the arrest and elimination of an infiltrated commando unit of the National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Libya, an armed Islamist insurgency.\textsuperscript{489} And at the height of their influence in 1985 the regime purged and assassinated by gunfire Colonel Hassan Ishkal near his military barracks. Ishkal, who commanded the Sirte military region and was by some accounts the number-3 man in the regime at the time, was an advocate of continued benefits and prerogatives for a professional officer corps. He also opposed, particularly in the wake of an economic shortage that had hit the country earlier that spring, investments in alternative sectors and revolutionary activities that were potentially destabilizing to the military’s integrity. His ouster was reported to free up and expand Jalloud’s position in the selectorate—which, as indicated above, included command of the RCs—as well as other Qadhafi loyalists intent to use the crisis as an excuse to justify drastic revolutionary

\textsuperscript{486} Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 92
\textsuperscript{487} Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 95-6; Bazi, “What Did Qaddafi’s Green Book Really Say?”
\textsuperscript{488} Hanspeter Mattes, “Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East”
\textsuperscript{489} Palmer and El Fathaly, “The Transformation of Mass Political Institutions in Revolutionary Libya,” 259
measures—in particular bolstering the role of the revolutionary organizations like the RCs and Libyan Revolutionary Guards (LRG)\textsuperscript{490}—which may have been otherwise less feasible.\textsuperscript{491}

Within a few years, Qadhafi was meeting regularly with senior delegates from the RCs to brief them on key domestic and foreign developments, and their rapidly expanding role within policy debates—including virtual ownership of major media outlets—seemed to harden Tripoli’s reactionary line. The RCs accused certain newspapers of not holding fast sufficiently to the tenets of the Green Book, and in their stead published \textit{al-Zahf al-Akhdar} (“The Green March”) and \textit{al-Jamahiriyya} to inject the public discourse on domestic and foreign affairs, respectively, with deeper emphasis on the anti-Western struggle. The 1979 construction of a Libyan Studies Center for the Study of the Italian Invasion in Tripoli—which painstakingly documented, indexed, and published the country’s encounter with fascism—an associated government-sponsored nationwide oral history inquiry into the colonial project and resistance, and increasing public calls for reparations were cases in point.\textsuperscript{492} Open demonstrations of the selectorate’s hardening were forthcoming. These included, \textit{inter alia}: an unsuccessful campaign in November 1977 to revitalize the now moribund Federation of Arab Republics; heavy public criticism of the French military intervention in the Western Sahara conflict in December 1977; the early 1978 publication of a list former

\textsuperscript{490} The Libyan Revolutionary Guards were essentially Revolutionary Committee units embedded within the armed forces. They were well-equipped with motor vehicles and controlled vast weapons caches.
\textsuperscript{491} Following the Ishkal incident, Qadhafi announced, “The regular army will disappear in the future and the people will replace them.” Further, rather than hold the annual military parade that took place on 1 September each year since the coup, the Colonel have a major speech at Sabha to RC and LRG cadres, praising them as the “pillar of the revolution.” See Judith Miller, Special Report: “Libyan Military Termed Restive Under Qaddafi.” \textit{The New York Times} (14 January 1986); Mattes, “Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East,” 15-6
collaborators with Italian colonialists; the 7 October 1980 takeover of the information ministry commemorating the 10th anniversary of the deportation of the Italian colonists; and the burning of Western musical instruments in June 1985 to mark the intensification of the Green Revolution announced at Zuwara. 493

Such consolidation of the Jamahiriyya’s revolutionary sector incubated a ruling coalition that grew steadily prone to the intensification of provocation beyond Libya’s borders throughout the latter 1970s and 80s. At a speech commemorating the anniversary of the Libyan revolution on 1 September 1978, for example, Qadhafi highlighted the broadly interpreted role of the revolutionary sector, and called on all nations, in accordance with the Third Universal Theory, to form RCs “outside the Jamahiriyya . . . and in countries where “popular revolution is taking place:”

The Mission of the Revolutionary Committees is to be everywhere, secret or public, according to the circumstances of the various countries, to carry out the duty of urging the masses to revolt in order to seize power and to destroy any organization that stands in the way, including political parties [and] reactionary conventional tools of government such as tribes, families, sects, and classes . . . The Revolutionary Committees will not exercise power after the success of the People’s revolution anywhere. But they will continue the process of mobilizing the masses to practice power and to affirm the power of the people . . . It is the responsibility of the Revolutionary Committees after the successful start of the People’s revolution to organize the masses, to urge them to complete the revolution and to secure complete exercise of power. For the first time revolutionary organizations are not formed to exercise authority, but to strengthen the historic role of the 1 September Revolution. 494

In this spirit, the Jamahiriyya set to tailoring the RCs for a panoply of subversive operations abroad. Their Coordinating Office for Revolutionary Committees provided direction for the formation of two specific types of outfits: 1) those formed by Libyans and with almost exclusively Libyan membership. Operatives here were primarily students, and set up shop in countries with large Libyan expatriate communities such as

493 Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 92, 97-9
Great Britain and France (1979), and Italy, Poland, and Bulgaria (1984); 2) non-Libyan operatives supported by various Libyan People’s Bureaus, or embassies, abroad. Some of the more substantial stations were stood up in Tunisia post-1987, Lebanon, Algeria, and post-Numayri Sudan. Musa Kusa—a Qadhafi relative who served as chief of al-
Amn al-Khariji (Foreign Intelligence) from 1994 to 2009, and thereafter as foreign minister until his March 2011 defection—constitutes a case in point of the rising synergy between the Jamahiriya’s revolutionary organizations, the success of selectorate members, and rogue activity during the period. After earning his Master’s degree in sociology at the University of Michigan, Kusa got his start as a security specialist at the London People’s Bureau. He was in fact expelled from this post in 1980 after openly backing the IRA, and giving an extraordinary interview in which he remarked two Libyan dissidents then residing in London would be executed. “The revolutionary committees decided last night to kill two more people in the United Kingdom,” he was quoted as saying . . . “I approve of this.” His next major assignment was the erection of Al-
Mathaba—an Arabic word meaning “center,” also an acronym for the “World Center for the Fight Against Imperialism, Racism, Reaction, and Fascism”—an external security bureau and sort of contact hub for “freedom movements of the world” that sponsored a

495 Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 100
496 Andy Bloxham and Damien McElroy, “Moussa Koussa, High-Profile Lockerbie Spymaster.” The Telegraph (30 March 2011). Available online at:
497 See Torcuil Crichton, “Gaddafi’s ‘Envoy of Death’ Musa Kusa Holds Key to Solving Lockerbie Atrocity Mysteries, says Scots Prosecutors.” The Daily Record (1 April 2000). Available online at:
<http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/gaddafi-envoy-of-death-musa-kusa-1099042>. Qadhafi himself confirmed in 1996 that the RCs had had the right to commit extrajudicial killings of enemies of the revolution—or “stray dogs,” as they were often characterized in official rhetoric—in order to “guarantee revolutionary order.” See Mattes, “Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East,” 31; Anderson, “Qadhafi and His Opposition,” 225
number of stridently anti-Western conferences in Tripoli, identified revolutionaries for ideological and military training in Libya, and arranged camps offering instruction in weapons, explosives, and indoctrination. The outfit fielded agents in all of the major People’s Bureaus, forming a sort of operational bridge between the RCs and foreign policy establishment that oversaw most of Tripoli’s most important and infamous terror operations of the 1980s, including the 1984 assassination of Woman Police Constable Yvonne Fletcher by gunmen from within the London People’s Bureau, 1986 German discoteque bombing, 1988 Lockerbie bombing, and 1989 UTA Flight 772 bombing.498

Beyond Qadhafi and his former senior associates whose personal wealth and access to the Jamahiriyya’s fortunes were relatively well-documented499—the acceleration of Libyan roguery throughout the 1980s transpired alongside an accrual of benefits for constituents of the revolutionary sector far exceeding mere ideological-spiritual salvation. By 1981, reports emerged of the RCs confiscating properties and assets of Islamists and former beneficiaries of the monarchy, appropriating private homes after forcibly removing the owners, and acquiring large, long-term, and interest-free loans from government banks.500 RC members were often permitted to travel abroad and live in the finest international hotel chains at Tripoli’s expense, dabbling in business ventures where possible, and taking commissions on government-imported products. Some, like Musa Kusa, even arranged full scholarships to universities in the U.S. and Europe, and

throughout their assignments abroad, were able to keep a pulse on various embassy operations and make sure they functioned more like People’s Bureaus than normal diplomatic posts. They used their positions to persecute Libyans who had fled and feared for their lives, compile death lists, and execute contracts on various Qadhafi opponents overseas. 501 Along with such benefits came a tremendous accrual of prestige and visibility. Almost immediately following the Sabha Declaration, the RCs became the most well-outfitted internal security apparatus in the regime, with ready access to light weaponry, jeeps, and telecoms. Their law enforcement functions were extensive, including a mandate to arrest counterrevolutionaries, man interrogation centers, and establish Revolutionary Courts. More widely dispersed than any other force—into 8 regional commandos—they had the distinct ability to report directly to the Qiyadat al-Thawra’s office502 and take part in agenda-making within the BPCs, a right enjoyed previously only by the general secretariat of the GPC.503

A number of alternative survival strategies in addition to garnering and rewarding supporters were critical to the post-1977 entrenchment of the Libyan garrison. I have already discussed at length above the regime’s doctrinal flexibility; its consistent reinterpretations of the how the revolutionary project should be manifest on the ground—from military regime, to early experimentation with single-party rule and the Popular Committees, to full-fledged Jamahiriyya while paying homage to Bedouin and tribal tradition—in tandem with local and international considerations were arguably quite extraordinary. There is simply no denying, however, that petroleum also figured

501 El-Kikhia, “Libya’s Qaddafi,” 87
502 Mattes, “Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East,” 15
critically into the overall equation. Without it, the Colonel would have been unable to sustain the aggressive combination of patronage and ultimately hollow initiatives committed in the name of revolutionary egalitarianism—*inter alia*, the abolition of retail trade, seizure of bank accounts and businesses, and destruction of land tenure records—that he did. Despite turning citizens to the black market—which, in contrast to other rogues with more sophisticated internal security capabilities like the DPRK, was not as easy to control—oil revenues gave Qadhafi flexibility to simultaneously oversee broad-based political acquiescence, the alienation of technocrats through highly visibly yet strategically unsound investments—the $22 billion Great Man-Made River project,\(^{504}\) designed to pipe water from southern oases to coastal agricultural installations, was a case in point—and sophisticated military upgrades, which following 1973, had well outstripped the ability of its population or its armed forces to independently handle.\(^{505}\) Until approximately the late 1980s the *Jamahiriyya* was able to shower upon its citizens many further benefits associated with the classic rentier model: widespread literacy; free medical care and education; and improvements in living conditions to name a few. The empowerment of women—who became doctors, judges, pilots, ministers, ambassadors, and even members of Qadhafi’s personal security detail—and other superficially socially conscientious programs earned the regime wide support from the lower and middle classes.\(^{506}\)


\(^{506}\) Vandewalle, “Libya Since Independence” 115-22; Ahmida, “Why Qaddafi has Already Lost”
On the international front, Qadhafi was also perhaps not as much of a “madman” as the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan and other foreign officials may have liked to believe. Through the period of international “non-alignment” during the revolutionary regime’s early days, particularly after abrogating defense agreements with the U.S. and Great Britain, Tripoli turned increasingly to France—whom it and others in the developing world viewed as less tied to superpower politics and more disposed to the pro-Arab position in the Arab-Israeli impasse—for a relatively lucrative arms-purchasing arrangement. Even regards to the U.S., of course prior to the military confrontations of the late 1980s, the Colonel made sure the bulk of the rivalry remained rhetorical. Tripoli and Washington in fact maintained a considerable volume of exchanges in the consulting, engineering, and petroleum sectors. In 1983, a Texan oil firm signed one of the most lucrative contracts in Libyan history, the proceeds on which went in 1989 to inaugurating the first phase of the Great Man-Made River, which had stalled following the 1977 Libyan-Egyptian dispute. An important caveat, Qadhafi wisely maintained some insulation between the Qiyadat al-Thawra and wider revolutionary sector by keeping such high-level pursuits and transactions off limits from the RCs. While in his thinking on foreign affairs, Qadhafi, like Khomeini and Kim Il-Sung, had envisioned a course alternative to both capitalism and communism—hence the title “Third Universal Theory—he was open about the fact that what he saw as a policy of confrontation practiced by the United States toward the Arabs justified—and to an extent predetermined—closer

508 Dyer, “Libya,” 368
510 Burgat, “Qadhafi’s Ideological Framework,” 54

Qadhafi’s initial behaviors surrounding the Lockerbie imbroglio—by far his most pressing diplomatic challenge to date and the one which arguably sealed Tripoli’s failure as a revolutionary garrison state—indicated a further knack for political survival, even at a time when the regime’s behaviors were considerably more constrained by U.S. sanctions—which had been increasing from 1982-86—and recurrent internal security threats from the military and Islamists. Following three years of close investigations, the U.S. and Great Britain had in November 1991 officially accused Libya of the bombing—which happened to coincide, moreover, with the French charge that Tripoli was responsible for the 1989 UTA Flight 772 attack—and demanded the surrender to either
American or British authorities the two suspected Libyan intelligence officers, ‘Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi and al-Amin Khalifa Fahimah. Beyond predictable retorts that such demands constituted, inter alia, a neocolonialist affront to Libyan sovereignty—all the more justified as Tripoli maintained no extradition treaties with London or Washington\(^{514}\)—there were sensitive domestic political considerations to which Qadhafi attended in the midst of the hubbub. While surrendering the two men would have almost surely been equated with betrayal to “potential challengers within Libya’s army, security forces, and the hardline circles of the Revolutionary Committees,” it also posed the risk of engendering conflict within the very upper echelons of the regime.\(^{515}\) Indeed, al-Maqrahi belonged to the same pivotal Maqarha tribal faction as did other key selectorate constituents, including ‘Abdel Sallam Jalloud. By 1986, moreover, reports had already emerged of a growing rift between the Colonel, who appeared to be entertaining a more moderate position in inter-Arab affairs, and Jalloud—by this point the Jamahiriyya’s second in command—who was intent on towing the hard radical line, specifically vis-à-vis Egypt and the question of its readmission to the Arab fold.\(^{516}\)

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515 See Niblock, “The Foreign Policy of Libya,” 221: “Of increasing importance in more recent years have been members of Al-Qadhafi’s family, especially those occupying senior positions in the security services. The central value around which the inner circle revolves is that of loyalty—a value that binds al-Qadhafi to others, as well as binding others to him. Al-Qadhafi has needed, therefore, to ensure that actions he takes do not run counter to his loyalties to the inner circle. The possibility of handing over to foreign governments individuals within the inner circle for trial for crimes in which they are suspected of implication, for example, has never been a practicable proposition; it would destroy the basis on which the system rests.”

516 Ronen, “Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics,” 43. At a Fall 1987 Arab League Summit, for example, Jalloud staunchly denounced any resumption of relations with Cairo as “American-inspired,” while Qadhafi was thought to side with the Arab moderates favoring Egypt’s readmission to the Arab League, particularly given its “enormous potential” as well as shared anger over Tehran’s continued provocations against the Arab world throughout the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. The two apparently also engaged in some tussling over certain domestic security portfolios, including oversight of Palestinian terrorist groups. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Arabs Smooth Way to Resume Ties with Egypt.” *The New York Times* (12 November 1987); Robert Fisk, “Why Gadaffi Must Chain the Monster; Libyan Action against Palestinian Terrorist Cells.” *The Times* (London, 29 April 1986)
With the intensification of UN sanctions against Libya—particularly following Security Council Resolution 731 in December 1993, which froze the regime’s overseas assets, and for the first time targeted its petroleum industry by banning sales of oil equipment—and its failure to secure strategic Arab relief, Qadhafi engaged in a series of clever face-saving measures that temporarily absolved the regime from rising socioeconomic—as well as potential political—hardships induced by the sanctions. First, he mounted an intense rhetorical campaign to fall in line with the populace’s traditional sensibilities. The Jamahiriyya was portrayed as a proud warrior-state victimized in a sort of clash of civilizations against “the most powerful forces on earth.” “We [and the West],” he exclaimed, “do not have the same blood, religion, or language . . . We are in a face-to-face confrontation with them. [The Lockerbie dispute] is not our fault at all, but rather ‘an excuse,’ envisaging that at any moment the Western sword is expected to strike.” The Brother Leader further urged Libyans to address the U.S. “in the language of bloodshed and breaking bones [and to] return to our pre-Islamic tribal traditions and deal with them with the logic of revenge.” He injected religious undertones into the discourse as well, insisting that Libya not surrender its two “sons” to trial in “a hostile Christian state,” and commissioning the state-appointed Imam of Tripoli to call for a jihad against the West on a live national television broadcast during the sacred Islamic feast of ‘Eid al-Fitr.

517 Between 1992 and 1995, the Jamahiriyya lost some $19 billion and 21,000 lives, many of whom could not access proper medical care abroad or medications and vaccinations at home due to the ban on air travel. See, for example: Tim Niblock, “The Regional and Domestic Political Consequences of Sanctions Imposed on Iraq, Libya, and Sudan.” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2001), pp. 59-67; Niblock, “Pariah States and Sanctions in the Middle East,” 19-94
518 Ronen, “Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics,” 44
519 Excerpts from a speech marking the 24th anniversary of Qadhafi’s ascent to power, Tripoli TV (1 September 1993) (DR) and Al-Shams (25 September 1993), quoted in Ronen, “Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics,” 47
520 Ronen, “Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics,” 45
Qadhafi did not refrain from testing the waters of diplomacy in tandem with such calls to action either. In early 1993, for example, he proposed—ultimately to no avail—that Libya hand over the suspects to stand trial in an Arab League member-state or other acceptable country. Following military uprisings in Misurata and Bani Walid the next October—which allegedly involved Islamic radicals—Qadhafi bided for time by offering the accused to stand trial in an Islamic court before an Islamic Jury. Shortly thereafter, he recommended delivering them to the ICJ. When these overtures, as well as limited demonstrations to Washington of mutual concern regarding curbing Islamic extremism, failed to bear fruit, Qadhafi embarked on a series of bold sanctions-busting maneuvers to offset the political strangulations he feared might befall the Jamahiriyya. In the spring of 1995, he violated the UN-imposed air blockade to send Libyan Muslim pilgrims to the annual hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, scoring a political victory when the UN sanctions committee met in New York and agreed on a compromise—supported even by the U.S.—to permit Libyan worshippers to travel to Mecca aboard Egyptian aircraft. “No American,” Qadhafi had said, “can prevent us from reaching Mecca, even if we have to do it by swimming there in a sea of blood.” Qadhafi’s continued defiance won him praise throughout the Muslim world, eventually inducing the OAU to call on all African nations to immediately suspend compliance with UN sanctions on Libya involving religious, humanitarian, or OAU-related flights, and advocate ignoring all UN sanctions from September 1998 onward if the U.S. and Britain did not meet the Colonel’s proposal to have al-Maqrahi and Fahimah tried in a third country. Following an

522 Ronen, “Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics,” 46, 48
523 See, for example, Mohamed Eljahmi, “Libya and the U.S.: Qadhafi Unrepentant.” *Middle East Quarterly* (Winter 2006), pp. 11-20
524 Ronen, “Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics,” 50
assassination attempt by *Harakat al-Shuhada al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Martyrs Movement) in May 1998, and with his domestic political capital nearly expended, the U.S. and Britain finally seemed to concede comprehensive enforcement of the air ban was unfeasible, and that the trial could take place in the Netherlands under Scottish law.\(^{525}\)

Its upgraded potential as a genuinely revolutionary state in the wake of Sabha aside, there emerged various indicators throughout the late 1980s and early 90s that Libya’s systemic modifications had, even from the outset, planted the seeds of their own destruction. Internally, the means on which Tripoli had relied to placate its subjects would become increasingly difficult to come by. The Colonel’s adventurist policies had in fact forced many bright Libyans studying and working abroad to return home, contributing to the further lagging of a country in which technological development skills—which were of course critical to an economy centered progressively on such highly technical projects then being pursued–were lost.\(^{526}\) Mandatory cuts in state largesse resulting from the regime’s failing economic and political experiments, as well as declining oil revenues, had by this point rendered the population less tolerant of the highly propagated “partners, not wage earners” doctrine in which they had been complicit hitherto. Nationalization measures announced by 1978 had already facilitated deep resentment, and a further tightening of the socialist screws thereafter–including such initiatives spelled out in the Green Book as the abolition of profit, followed by that of money itself–appeared increasingly out of step with the ordinary Libyan, “whose tradition is steeped in the skills of Arab commerce.”\(^{527}\)

\(^{525}\) Ibid., 53
\(^{526}\) Monastiri, “Teaching the Revolution,” 82
Developments in the educational sector showed similar indication that general patience was beginning to wear thin. A 1983 initiative to uphold the revolution through *al-ta‘lim al-manzili* (home education), for example—which during a subsequent February 1984 speech Qadhafi himself seemed to characterize as a failure—was met with a popular backlash. Parents believed the state should take responsibility for education, rather than place the onus on unqualified women to free up resources for further elaborate economic projects, with which by now the *jamahiriyya’s* propaganda machine had made them all too familiar. Indeed, while the educational system cannot be viewed as an indicator of Libyan roguery *per se*, its consistently radical permutations that clearly kept the populace grossly under-informed did represent the lengths to which the revolutionary leadership was willing to go to reduce a traditionally heavy dependence on expatriate teachers, which Qadhafi had long deemed damaging and suspect.\(^{528}\)

And by the mid-1980s, it was already clear that the RCs and their associated organs did not actually hold complete sway over the internal security situation. New threats—especially the proliferation of Islamist insurgent organizations—such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group—throughout the late 80s and early 90s by Libyans returning from the Afghan *jihad*—as well as recurrent ones—namely dissent from within the military, by this point from such key officers of the rival *Warfalla* tribal faction as Colonels Muftah M. Gharum, Balquasim Mas‘ud, and Sa‘d Salim Faraj—remained critically unsuppressed.\(^{529}\) Indeed, unlike the ideal paradigm of a capable revolutionary guard

\(^{528}\) Monastiri, “Teaching the Revolution,” 76-7

\(^{529}\) In 1986, for example, an eastern Libyan Islamist outfit led by Shaykh Muhammad al-Ushbi tried to capture and assassinate Ahmed Musbah al-Warfali, a leading RC figure. The regime caught the perpetrators shortly after the attempt, had 6 of them hanged publicly in a Benghazi sports stadium, and the other three reportedly murdered in their military barracks. See Alison Pargeter, “Qadhafi and Political Islam in Libya,” in Dirk J. Vandewalle (editor), *Libya Since 1969: Qadhafi’s Revolution Revisited*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 85-105, 92-8; De Maio, “From Soldiers to Policemen,” 25
provided by the Iranian *Pasdaran*, the Committees fundamentally lacked a sophisticated bureaucratic oversight and training capability, as well as the maturity, foresight, and respect of a population acquired from either connection to a predecessor army and/or participation in nationally significant battles or wars.\(^{530}\) Despite the formalization of contact between them and the *Qiyadat al-thawra* by 1979, the Committees remained relatively autonomous in both organization and operation.\(^{531}\) The wanton repression and revolutionary zeal they had consequently infused into almost every aspect of government and society, as well as the virtual extinction of any notion of a rule of law that had existed hitherto, made them more of a liability than an asset, emboldening a popular backlash that eroded whatever experiment in indigenous populism the Colonel had hoped for after Sabha.\(^{532}\) Their excesses had also clearly begun spilling over into the international arena as well. Throughout the hostage situation of 1984, for example, Qadhafi was unable to wrest the British detainees being held by the RCs without calling upon army regulars to force their hand.\(^{533}\)

The horrendous fate of Qadhafi’s foreign adventures throughout the mid to late 1980s provided further indication that the *Jamahiriyya*’s project was unraveling. Nowhere perhaps was this clearer than in Chad. Libyan interest there had long predated the *Jamahiriyya*’s foundation. France ceded the 27,000 square-mile Aozou strip border region to Italy in 1935 when Chad was under the control of the former and Libya the latter, but the transfer had supposedly not been effected by the time of the colonialists’ departures. Its large deposits of manganese and uranium ore made the area of strategic


\(^{531}\) Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 99; Mattes, “Formal and Informal Authority since 1969,” 65-7

\(^{532}\) Anderson, “Qadhafi and His Opposition,” 229

\(^{533}\) Fisk, “Why Gadhafi Must Chain the Monster”
value as well. To Qadhafi the episode reinforced the arbitrariness of colonial boundaries, particularly as population movements back and forth across the Chadian-Libyan frontier—some traceable to the caravan trade, others to patterns of seasonal migrations inherent to nomadic life, and some to the spread of Islam—had been ongoing for centuries. Throughout the early 20th century, moreover, the Libyan Sanusiyya maintained a presence in northern Chad, later extending its influence—along with its Sufi lodges, or Zawiyyas—southward, to evade Ottoman Turkish pressures in Cyrenaica and strengthen its grip over the trans-Saharan caravan trade.

These historical precedents undoubtedly impacted the Colonel’s designs for Chad as a potential augmenter of his Arab unity plans, and possible partner in the quest for a Greater Islamic State of the Sahel. Qadhafi apparently obtained Chadian President General Tambalbaye’s complicity in annexing the strip in 1973 through a secret agreement to cease Libyan support to rebels opposing him. Following the ascendance to power of southerner Félix Malloum in N’Djamena and his abrogation of the annexation agreement in 1978, however, Libya intensified subversion operations by supporting the Frolinat, a northern-based Muslim tribal insurgency. Qadhafi would go on to stage four separate interventions—in 1978, 1979, 1980-1, and 1983-7—before a series of decisive engagements throughout the so-called Toyota War forced Libya’s army back into the Aozou. The campaigns left behind over 3,600 dead, 1,165 prisoners, and $1

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534 Ogunbadejo, “Qaddafi’s North Africa Design,” 161
538 Dyer, “Libya,” 369
539 For a complete account of the Libya-Chad conflict, see Pollack, “Arabs at War,” 375-412
billion worth of military equipment—a tragic indication of the dire consequences of the Jamahiriyya’s attempt to “export its mission civilatrice—through people’s revolutionary committees, the Green Book, and the compulsory use of Arabic as a medium of instruction and communication”540—in earnest.

Libya’s prosecution of the conflict in Chad appeared, in some ways similar to that of Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq War, to correspond more with rising revolutionary zeal than sensible and strategic military logic. It also facilitated both increasingly negative security externalities for all associated parties as time went on, including the internationalization of Chad’s horrific civil war by 1978, as well as a major tarnishing of Libya’s diplomatic credentials in non-Arab Africa.541 The Libyan military, for example, employed Soviet-acquired weaponry against the explicit wishes of Moscow, who viewed the Chad campaigns as inconsistent with Soviet objectives in the continent.542 In 1980, nine nations—including Senegal, Gambia, Ghana, and Gabon—either expelled Libyan diplomats, closed Libyan embassies, or broke diplomatic relations with Tripoli outright. The OAU subsequently called for the withdrawal of Libyan troops in the summer of 1981 and their replacement by a pan-African peacekeeping force, whose ineffectiveness was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Gouvernement d’Unité Nationale Transitoire (GUNT), the Chadian faction led by Goukouni Oueddei who Qadhafi was backing at the time.543 Libya’s Sahelian and sub-Saharan counterparts grew anxious over the nexus of political-military maneuvering, religion, and foreign aid becoming increasingly inherent to Qadhafi’s policy, and feared that success in Chad would afford

540 Lemarchand, “The Case of Chad,” 106
542 “Background Note: Libya,” The United States Department of State–Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (October 2007)
him the opportunity to intervene elsewhere and exacerbate sensitive national cleavages.\(^{544}\) Of particular concern was the *Jamahiriyya’s* ongoing recruitment drives throughout the continent for its Islamic Legion.\(^{545}\) It was not long before some ten additional governments—including Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, and Mauritania—presented evidence of Qadhafi’s meddling in their internal affairs.\(^{546}\) In June 1983 during the run-up to the 19\(^{th}\) summit meeting of the OAU, Qadhafi became the first African leader in history to be denied conference chairmanship. His protégé organization, the Polisario, was further barred from attendance.

Despite mending fences with a number of African states from 1983-1985, declining oil revenues precluded the *Jamahiriyya* from sustaining its previously lavish aid commitments, as well as retention of laborers from such states as Mali and Mauritania. Moreover, in contrast to the latter intervention in Chad—which proceeded at the request of the GUNT, at the time the only legitimate government there—during the subsequent campaign from 1983-87, Tripoli backed a rebel faction against a government that enjoyed official recognition by the majority of OAU member-states, aggressively declaring Chad an extension of Libya. Further international opposition from France—who was concerned for the security of its influence in Francophone Africa—and the U.S.—who was then beginning to become preoccupied with international terrorism—was pivotal in reinforcing pan-African opposition to Libya’s designs, and, in tandem with the Toyota

\(^{544}\) St. John, “The Libyan Debacle in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 131


Wars, evicting Qadhafi’s forces by March 1987.\textsuperscript{547} Ronald Bruce St. John sums it up nicely:

Especially in the early years of the revolution, the RCC focused on pan-Arab issues, with Africa seen as a subordinate arena for the promotion of the Arab position on Palestine. Later on, when Libya’s growing political isolation in the Mashriq and Maghreb gave way to a heightened interest in sub-Saharan Africa, Qadhafi proved unable to develop a credible ideological posture to the region . . . African interests, in the minds of many Africans, came to be perceived as secondary to, if not downright incompatible with, Qadhafi’s global political objectives . . . African responses to Qadhafi’s ideology brought to light the same widespread disbelief and disinterest previously accorded to his unification schemes in North Africa and the Middle East. Where the Arab world viewed Qadhafi’s ideology as inflexible if not anachronistic, sub-Saharan Africa saw it as simply irrelevant.\textsuperscript{548}

In stark contrast to the Iran-Iraq War, Libya’s campaigns in Chad failed to produce the type of rally-around-the-flag effect that Qadhafi had hoped for at home. The Jamahiriyya’s universities, for example, which Qadhafi initially envisioned as prime recruiting grounds for dedicated soldiers of the revolution, became by the late 1980s centers of rising discontent as students were tired of being forced into the ranks of popular army units.\textsuperscript{549} Qadhafi’s official denial of defeat—much less even an ongoing Libyan presence—in Chad, and imposed blackout of all media covering the war—despite that the killing or exile of some 10,000 souls, and the Jamahiriyya’s small population meant that nearly every Libyan family was affected by the fighting—did little to help his image. By this point in time, many Libyans refused to even venture outside their homes out of fear of being conscripted.\textsuperscript{550} Calls for “revolutionary work” by the RCs to assist in the war effort, moreover, fell upon largely deaf ears; the reportedly waning desire of

\textsuperscript{547} St. John, “The Libyan Debacle in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 133-6; Lemarchand, “Chad: The Road to Partition”
\textsuperscript{548} St. John, “The Libyan Debacle in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 135
\textsuperscript{549} Monastiri, “Teaching the Revolution,” 74
\textsuperscript{550} Jane Perlez, “For Libyans, War in Chad is a Whisper.” The New York Times (09 April 1987)
Libyans to devote their time streamlining foods and import distribution from the Tripoli and Benghazi ports is a case in point.\textsuperscript{551}

The events surrounding Libya’s limited military confrontations with the U.S. provide similar indication that in its increasing revisionism, the Jamahiriyya’s garrison had started to extend dangerously beyond its reach. Between 1981 and 1989, the two nations engaged in skirmishes over the Gulf of Sirte—located on Libya’s northern Mediterranean coast, stretching from Tripoli in the west to Benghazi in the east—at least four times. While the unclassified literature contains relatively little insight into specific Libyan military motives or rationales behind these events,\textsuperscript{552} the context in which they occurred certainly offers some compelling clues. On the domestic level, it appeared that by the early 1980s, Qadhafi—buoyed by his early successes in the Chad theatre but not yet bogged down by the weight of international sanctions\textsuperscript{553}—still held out hope for the Libyan military as a vehicle to regional preeminence. Indeed, he had embarked on a comprehensive military restructuring plan, reorganizing the force into seven military districts and five Presidential Guard Units. It was also upgraded to 45,000 active-duty troops dispersed over 21 mechanized infantry, 22 artillery, 10 armored, 15 Special Forces, and 8 air defense battalions.

A couple of further Libyan maneuvers began to raise international suspicions over Tripoli’s intentions. In August 1981, for example, Libya had signed an economic and political agreement with Ethiopia and South Yemen aimed at countering Western—primarily American—interests in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{554} Further, in

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\textsuperscript{551} Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 103
\textsuperscript{552} Pollack, “Arabs at War,” 413
\textsuperscript{553} Lemarchand, “The Case of Chad,” 106-7
\textsuperscript{554} De Maio, “From Soldiers to Policemen,” 19
\end{flushright}
contrast to even the most liberal interpretations of the International Law of the Sea, Qadhafi had claimed the entire 300-mile-wide body of water, in 1973 declaring the 32° 30” north latitude a “Line of Death,” the crossing of which would evoke military response. That same year, Libyan fighter planes harassed U.S. naval aircraft conducting Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in the area, intercepting and firing on a U.S. Air Force C-130 collecting signals intelligence off the Libyan coast.

In September 1980, the Libyans fired on a U.S. Boeing RC-135U Combat plane conducting reconnaissance over the Mediterranean. While U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s disdain for the Colonel was well-documented, his administration retained a relatively hands-off approach toward Libya. This would no longer be the case in 1981 when Ronald Reagan, a fervent anticommunist who believed that Qadhafi was not only a force for regional instability, but also a cat’s paw of the Soviet Union, took office.

While this is not the place to explore in depth the subsequent confrontations that transpired, two points merit emphasis for our purposes: 1) The Reagan administration was itself certainly determined to challenge, and to some extent provoke, Qadhafi when it perceived a justifiable opportunity to do so. In August 1981, only sixth month’s after the presidential inauguration, the U.S. dispatched the bulk of its Sixth Fleet—including the USS Nimitz, at the time the most advanced carrier in the world, replete with state-of-the-art Tomcat fighters—to the Gulf of Sirte for “stair-step” FON operations, designed

555 See, for example, Yehuda Z. Blum, “The Gulf of Sidra Incident.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 80, No. 3 (July 1986), pp. 668-677
558 Congressional Research Service. “Libya” (23 March 2012), by Clyde R. Mark, p. 6
559 Pollack, “Arabs at War,” 413
reportedly to progressively challenge the Line of Death.\(^{560}\) According to Robert M. Kimmitt—who served on the U.S. National Security Council staff from 1976-85—when asked about how U.S. personnel should respond in the event they were fired upon by the Libyans, Reagan claimed they had the authority to “chase [the Libyans] right into the hangar.”\(^{561}\) 2) Despite the relative provocativeness of U.S. military maneuvers under Reagan vis-à-vis Libya, Qadhafi reacted increasingly in ways that appeared to reflect his regime’s rising revolutionary zeal as opposed to sensible military logic, just as he had done in Chad. In response to the stair-step exercises, for example, the Libyan Air Force—which could barely scrounge more than 150 trained pilots, few of whom had the skills or flying experience of their U.S. counterparts\(^{562}\)—absurdly deployed Su-22 Fitter jets carrying AA-2 early generation Soviet air-to-air missiles against U.S. F-14s, which at the time were flying a nonthreatening race-track pattern designed simply to monitor for Libyan planes that might try to assault the American fleet. When the F-14s reengaged, neither Libyan pilot even attempted to evade pursuit before being shot down. And in March 1986 during Operation Attain Document III,\(^{563}\) the Libyans deployed five Soviet-made Nanutchka-type patrol boats to counter a U.S. three-ship surface-action group led by the brand new, ultra-sophisticated AEGIS cruiser USS *Ticonderoga*. Despite being devastatingly outclassed by the *Ticonderoga* and its escorts, Libya opened fire using

\(^{560}\) Ibid., 414

\(^{561}\) Kimmitt, “Reagan and Gadhafi”

\(^{562}\) Dyer, “Libya,” 373

\(^{563}\) Operation Attain Document III consisted of a panoply of provocative U.S. maneuvers over the Gulf of Sirte, reportedly in response to Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks. They included mock dogfights, mock airstrikes, and reconnaissance missions, many of which involved high-speed dashes directly at Libyan targets, with the U.S. jets veering off only at the last minute
early model Soviet anti-ship cruise missiles, resulting in heavy losses throughout 24-5 March, including at least 72 dead; the U.S. suffered no casualties.\textsuperscript{564}

While Qadhafi had in his view vindicated the continuation of the revolution through such actions—demonstrating to the world and his subjects that the \textit{Jamahiriyya} could not be bullied by a superpower, and to domestic rivals that the Libyan military, supposedly now firmly under his grip, was the only force capable of contending with existential security threats—the confrontations with the U.S., like those in Chad, did actually very little to boost the regime’s domestic standing. This reality hit home particularly in April 1986 following Operation El Dorado Canyon. The largest and most significant of the U.S. campaigns, it involved strikes against five critical Libyan targets: the Libyan Frogman School at Sidi Bilal; the military area of Tripoli International Airport; the al-Aziziyya barracks where Qadhafi himself was sleeping; and the Benina Airfield and \textit{Jamahiriyya} Barracks in Benghazi. Caught completely off-guard, the Libyans mounted a truly pathetic response; most of their anti-aircraft batteries in fact did not open fire until after the U.S. bombs began exploding, and the Libyan Air Force failed to deploy even a single interceptor aircraft during the raid.\textsuperscript{565} Whereas only a few months before, the possibility of such a massive U.S. troop presence in the Gulf of Sirte might have provided the regime a temporary diversionary respite, the aftermath of El Dorado Canyon saw almost no popular reaction. Alain Frachon of \textit{Le Monde} observed that after the raid, “there were more manifestations in Khartoum or Tunis than in Tripoli.”\textsuperscript{566} The failure to mobilize was repeated, moreover, \textit{inter alia}, in the wake of early January 1989

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\textsuperscript{564} See, for example: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Libyan SAMs and Air Defences.” \textit{Jane’s Defence Weekly} (17 May 1986), p. 881; Pollack, “Arabs at War,” 414-16
\textsuperscript{565} Pollack, “Arabs at War,” 418-19
\textsuperscript{566} Quoted in Burgat, “Qadhafi’s Ideological Framework,” 63
\end{footnotesize}
maneuvers by the U.S. Sixth Fleet to deter Libya’s chemical weapons production activities at the al-Rabta facility—located some 60 miles south of Tripoli—\(^{567}\) as well as a U.S. Libyan dogfight over the Gulf of Sirte several days thereafter.\(^{568}\)

The fallout from these episodes served, probably in complete contradistinction to what the Brother Leader had intended, to further underscore the hollowness of both the Jamahiriyya’s vision and, perhaps more importantly, the mechanisms available to enforce it. In 1986, for example, the Revolutionary Committees—which as a result of Libya’s military commitments throughout Africa and in the Gulf of Sirte, constituted the majority of troops patrolling the capital—lost control over Tripoli’s central prison. Unfortunately for the Jamahiriyya, the RCs seemed to be living up to Qadhafi’s early fears—expressed shortly after the broadening of their mandate in 1981—that if given too much authority they would threaten a “slide into chaos and anarchy.”\(^{569}\) Indeed, 1980-87 constituted a period of intense political violence in which the Committees excessively carried out arrests, punished perceived infractions in the revolutionary courts, imposed fines and prison sentences, and executed death sentences—even in absentia. The first round of Libyan dissidents were in fact executed after the third anniversary of the RCs’ founding, even before the expiration of a grace period established by the revolutionary leadership. The 1986 death sentence of dissident students and 9 Islamist militants—hastily approved by a Basic People’s Congress that had been penetrated by the RCs, who proceeded to


\(^{568}\) Burgat, “Qadhafi’s Ideological Framework,” 54

\(^{569}\) St. John, “Qaddafi’s World Design,” 136; “Qadhafi’s Speech to Revolutionary Committees Meeting,” *Summary of World Broadcasts,* BBC London, SWB/ME/6663/A/5-8 (3 March 1981), quoted in Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 106. This thesis is also explored in Anderson, “Qadhafi and His Opposition,” 229
confiscate and destroy the dissidents’ assets—was a case in point. Despite Qadhafi’s official termination of the RC-sponsored liquidation campaigns reportedly as early as 1980, it appeared to have no effect on basic policy as the largest number of Libyans were executed between 1985-87.\footnote{Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 104}

It was only in the context of this internal unraveling, as opposed to any independent influence of external political-economic pressure, that Libya eventually embarked on the path back to international society before committing the fatal errors it did two years ago. I provide further analysis in the concluding chapter.
SELF-RELIANCE ON MILITARY FIRST—MAINTAINING THE GARRISON IN P’YONGYANG

The seemingly constant nefarious presence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea, or the North) in recent international headlines regarding its military brinkmanship maneuvers and nuclear weapons activities, as well as speculation about the interrelationship of the two, may very well render the so-called “hermit kingdom” the country most commonly associated with the rogue state label.571 Considering the key events of the past two years alone, it is not difficult to see why.

The March 2010 attack on the South Korean Navy’s Cheonan Pohang-class corvette, for instance, resulted in the deaths of 46 South Korean sailors, and according to investigations undertaken by Seoul in collaboration with Australia, Canada, Britain, and Sweden, was confirmed to be the handiwork of North Korean torpedoes. The Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) artillery bombardment of South Korea’s Yeongpyeongdo Island—located some 12km south off the coast of North Korea’s Hwanghae Province and adjacent to the UN-mandated Northern Limit Line (NLL)572—only eight months later killed two ROK marines and resulted in civilian panic. The North Korean government qualified increased assertiveness as a response to South Korean refusals to desist military drills in the area,573 which in 1999 P’yongyang suddenly claimed was part of its sovereign

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572 A disputed maritime demarcation line in the Yellow Sea that constitutes the de facto maritime boundary between North and South Korea

territory under a newly and unilaterally declared maritime military demarcation—the so-called “Inter-Korean Military Demarcation Line.” This approximated an equidistant line between the coasts of the two Koreas, thereby circumscribing the five small ROK islands running considerably south of the NLL and protected by international norms originating from the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which ended the Korean War.\textsuperscript{574}

As recently as 12 December 2012, P’yongyang completed its first-ever successful launch of a satellite—the *Kwangmyŏngsŏng*-3—which was manufactured predominantly domestically, and sent into orbit using the *Unha*-3 carrier rocket, a ballistic missile technology.\textsuperscript{575} Despite DPRK claims that the satellite was to be used for “peaceful purposes,”\textsuperscript{576} the majority of the international community—including the UN and key individual states such as the U.S., Russia, South Korea, China, and Japan—perceived the act as provocative and running clearly contrary to established UN bans on launches involving ballistic technologies. Following new UNSC sanctions orchestrated primarily by the U.S. under Resolution 2087—which includes asset freezes and travel bans on critical DPRK firms and officials, as well as an expansion of existing sanctions\textsuperscript{577}—P’yongyang re-upped the ante with an unprecedented verbal abrogation of the Six-Party Talks, on top of heated threats of renewed confrontations and weapons testing; this all

\textsuperscript{574} Jon M. Van Dyke, Mark J. Valencia, and Jenny Miller Garmendia, “The North/South Korea Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea.” *Marine Policy*, Vol. 27 (2003), pp. 143-58, 143


\textsuperscript{577} United States Department of State, “USUN Fact Sheet on UNSC Response to North Korea’s Rocket Launch” (23 January 2013). Available online at: <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/01/20130123141364.html#axzz2JJADm7wH>
comes on the heels, moreover, of two previous nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. December’s events have also yielded indications of a previously unmatched intensity from China, North Korea’s chief ally and economic lifeline, that such behavior might no longer be tolerable by the Beijing leadership. Provocations by the regime continue unabated at the time of writing.

Why would one of the most underdeveloped countries on the planet—plagued by an agro-industrial apparatus so defunct that it routinely subjects its population to chronic food shortages, an industrial capital stock nearly beyond repair resulting from years of underinvestment, poor maintenance, and shortages of spare parts, and countless other structural deficiencies—behave in this manner? The abiding policy relevance of this case—recall that in addition to the aforementioned events, the U.S. and key allies, namely Japan and South Korea, attempted vigorously yet unsuccessfully through the Agreed Framework of 1994-2003 to curb P’yongyang’s nuclear weapons research in exchange for a light-water reactor (LWR); this was followed by six wrenching rounds of Six-Party Talks, which from 2003 until the present, yielded limited gains, particularly in February 2007 when Kim Jong-Il agreed to suspend his regime’s nuclear program in exchange for fuel aid, before beginning to totter following ferocious international condemnations toward the decade’s conclusion over satellite launches—has led to much speculation over the drivers of North Korean behavior and thinking.


Two broad strands appear to dominate the current conventional wisdom among analysts and policymakers on this matter. The first submits that P’ongyang’s provocativeness, primarily vis-à-vis its nuclear posture, can be understood as a defensive-paranoid reflex to long bouts of global isolation proceeding the devastation of the Korean War, a relentless series of U.S.-imposed countermeasures designed to support the South while repeatedly sabotaging the North in the war’s aftermath, a further deterioration in the balance of power throughout the fall of the Iron Curtain, and hence, loss of a loyal superpower patron and Marxist-Leninist comrade-in-arms in Moscow. Such conditions, as it were, left North Korea little choice but to fend for itself and search for its own means of strategic survival. The second, which focuses on the nature of the regime itself—primarily surrounding the Kims’ own grip on power and the personality cult they have cultivated and propagated in its pursuit—more closely resembles a sort of diversionary war thesis, underscoring the point that the country must act aggressively by employing external threats as a linchpin of internal consolidation and retrenchment.

While both explanations have their merits, and speak to—and partially reinforce—the dissertation’s central propositions conceptualizing roguery as a path-dependent and self-perpetuating process, independently they present incomplete pictures, overlooking the confluence of internal realities and interstate dynamics which initially led P’yongyang to adopt systematically—and from a contemporary historical perspective, irreversibly—a posture of confrontation vis-à-vis the outside world to begin, and the manner in which past processes and events inform, and in many ways dictate, current North Korean realities. In so doing much of the current thinking on the North has diluted a couple of key issues, which left unaddressed, perpetuate its image as a regime implacably doomed by either the weight of history or the near-irrationality of its own leadership, rather than a purposive actor whose behaviors—despite their attendant quirkiness as well as the utter nadir to which the Kims have allowed the country to plummet while maintaining them—we can analyze according to the more general logic of rogue state formation and consolidation identified by this dissertation’s central theoretical arguments, and echoed throughout the case-studies hitherto:

First, North Korea was never, nor is it currently, classifiable as a typical communist satellite state; it is rather mistaken to place too much stock in the effect of Cold War-era great power dynamics, as well as the fall of the Iron Curtain, on P’yongyang’s political-military trajectory. As the following pages will demonstrate in considerably further detail, the North went to great lengths throughout and proceeding the Korean War era to distance itself from Moscow and Beijing, in the process drawing the ire of states from both global poles. Its development priorities weighed local factors increasingly far more heavily than the concerns of its patrons. It is interesting to note that
nearly a half century before former U.S. President George W. Bush labeled North Korea a member of the “Axis of Evil,” it was Moscow who first applied the rogue state label, characterizing it as the last country with a Stalinist system and “surely the most isolated country in the world.” The origins of this date to 1949, when P’yongyang refused to join the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON), an organization Moscow had developed to establish “economic cooperation” between socialist countries, which realistically meant subservience under the pretext of “production specialization.” The North felt that COMECON would subordinate its economy to the Soviets, and deemed the unequal exchange of Soviet and North Korean commodities to be unacceptable.

Moscow responded by criticizing the North’s “nationalist inclination” and “isolation from the socialist system.”

Second, despite high—and in today’s world, perhaps unmatched—degrees of personalism, the origins of North Korean behavior cannot be attributed solely to an insatiable obsession of the Kim clan with staying in power, nor in the same vein can its juche worldview—the official state doctrine of self-reliance in all matters political, economic, and military—be conceived simply as a hollow ideological ploy to justify this status-quo. As shall also become clearer throughout the remainder of this case-study, juche provided the nascent DPRK’s aspiring communist leadership a deft mechanism through which to make sense of a cruel world that had for centuries subjected it to invasion and occupation at the hands of ill-intentioned outsiders, while differentiating itself from their Southern counterparts intent on linking their future progress to what

584 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 32
585 Ibid., 31
586 This thesis is pursued, for example, in B. R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House, 2010
appeared those very forces. In the process, juche also offered Kim Il-Sung—and his fellow guerilla commander-colleagues who had cut their teeth alongside him attacking Japanese positions in northern China with the 6th division of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army—a practicable (though ultimately, untenable) plan for heavy and military industry-centered national development that could pay homage to the spirit of anti-imperial resistance, while providing a litmus test to weed out those coalitional elements—namely the more internationalist-oriented Yan’an and Kapsan communist factions—who increasingly questioned its wisdom, particularly as the first series of economic planning strategies had shown clear diminishing returns by the mid-1960s. Speaking back to the first point, let us be clear that juche did not constitute North Korea’s attempt to conveniently superimpose Marxist-Leninist precepts and praxes onto its body politic.

The espousal of this worldview was in and of itself in fact an exercise in differentiation from the typical communist mold; its fusion of intensive nationalism and extreme self-reliance replaced any notion of “proletarian internationalism” as a guide to external political conduct. Juche was in this way an abandonment of the central Marxist precept that human and social relations are shaped by modes of and interactions associated with economic production. Its major constituent parts were rather drawn from a handful of various intellectual approaches: a) The Hegelian proposition that the noesu, or brain, of the political animal—as defined by its top leadership—determines the direction of social change; the party represents the nervous system channeling information; and the army its bone and muscle; b) The Maoist pursuit of multi-year economic plans based

on rural self-sufficiency practiced throughout the Yan’an era of the CCP, as well as the call to adopt Marxism to local conditions; and c) The Confucian notion of a state philosophy of independence espoused by Korea’s early rulers, as well as aversion to any form of slavery, likely stemming from a distaste for the historical practice of sadaechuii–whereby the well-educated elite and Confucian palace officials jockeyed for foreign support through sycophancy. The bottom line was that man alone, without the intervention of any external interlocutors, has control over the world and his own destiny as he alone possesses chajusong–creativity and consciousness.

Third, it is easy to forget that the contours of North Korean roguery far exceed and predate the current standoffs over its nuclear arms program. P’yongyang has in fact displayed a multifaceted history of aversive behaviors that have evolved considerably since their initial adoption, and encompass every instrument in the rogue arsenal. Nuclear brinkmanship is one of the later points of this evolution. Let me now broadly overview the historical trajectory of these alternative activities.

In addition to the fact that one of the DPRK’s very first actions as a new state was to launch a war against its southern neighbor–leading to its virtual flattening by UN saturation bombing 1952–similar to Pakistan, we might locate early roots for sponsorship of terrorism in guerilla tactics employed throughout the context of a national war of partition. Indeed, prior to launching a full-scale invasion, communist forces

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590 As Kim Il-Sung himself remarked, “To establish juche is a question of special importance for us in the light of our country’s geographical situation and environments, of the peculiarities of its historical development, and the complex and arduous nature of our revolution.” See: Kim Il-Sŏng and Yuk-Sa Li, “Juche!” 157; Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform. New York: W.W. Norton, 1995, pp. 48-52
592 Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Juche,” 109
593 Geldenhuys, “Deviant Conduct in World Politics,” 168-9
affiliated with the bourgeoning North Korean Workers’ Party lent support to a South Korean counterpart organization, and established a guerilla outfit in the south facilitating sustained uprisings by the South Korean Workers’ Party on Chedo Island, as well as communist-inspired strikes in Yeosu, Sun-chon, and Chun-nam. The SKWP’s decline following the war did not deter Northern guerilla units active throughout it from persisting in subsequent, albeit smaller-scale, anti-Southern operations,594 while simultaneously focusing efforts—with assistance from the Chinese—on nurturing and establishing political-diplomatic ties to revolutionary organizations in other Third World states—such as the Movimiento 26 de Julio of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the Sri Lankan People’s Liberation Front, the Sarawak Communist Organization in Indonesia, and a slew of Palestinian rejectionist groups.595 Among the most important early beneficiaries of North Korea in this field was the Chongryon—The Association of Korean Residents in Japan—which functioned as a critical base of anti-ROK and Japanese operations.596 It was from this group that Mun Se Kwang—a Korean national raised in Osaka, Japan, who carried out P’yongyang’s third unsuccessful attempt to murder ROK President Park Chung Hee during an August 1974 address at the National Theater, slaying the First Lady and a choir girl in the process—was initially recruited by DPRK intelligence.597

Between 1966 and 1972, nearly two decades after the conclusion of the Korean War, the DPRK’s Operation “Revolution in the South” was in full swing. A significant uptick from the limited asymmetrical and intelligence operations conducted before and immediately after the war, this constituted a ferocious onslaught of guerilla warfare,
assassination campaigns, and limited—though in many cases piercing—conventional assaults designed to sabotage the Seoul government as well as the U.S. position on the peninsula. Instances of heightened guerilla warfare included armed attacks on 5 and 13 September 1967 on ROK freight trains carrying U.S. supplies near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), as well as raids conducted by elite DPRK units from October 1968-early 1969 along the eastern coast of the ROK—the rugged Samch’ok and Ulchin areas in particular, as well as ROK islands in the Yellow Sea—designed to occupy small isolated villages, revolutionize the people, establish a military intelligence network, and return home.598 These eventually spurred the ROK and U.S. militaries to construct a complex integrated barrier system south of the DMZ, leading the KPA to steadily leverage its naval and aerial assets against Southern interests. The most significant instance of this occurred in late January 1968, when the KPA Navy captured the USS Pueblo—a state-of-the-art, 1,000 ton intelligence-gathering vessel which was at the time monitoring North Korean coastal defenses in international waters in the Sea of Japan near Wŏnsan—and held its entire crew hostage for 11 months.599

Throughout the 1970s and early 80, North Korea perpetuated limited conventional provocations in the Yellow Sea, particularly around the Northwest Islands—five offshore islands under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Command, and of which Yeongpyeongdo is a part. Between 1973 and 1975, DPRK patrol boats frequently entered the areas to challenge the NLL, and in 1975 and 1976, deployed fighter aircraft as well.

598 Ibid., 28-9

P’yongyang also sanctioned brazen attempts on the lives of senior ROK leadership, including—in addition to the incident cited above—a January 1968 failed raid on the Blue House—during which a 31-man squad attached to the 124th Army Unit infiltrated Seoul disguised as ROK soldiers with express orders to “cut off the head of Park Chung Hee,” thereby inviting civil unrest, the large-scale intervention of the KPA, and ultimately peninsular reunification—as well as the installation by three North Korean agents in June 1970 of a remote-controlled explosive device at the National Cemetery three days before Park was to speak in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Korean War (the bomb exploded prematurely and the attempt consequently failed). The 1978 discovery of a third North Korean tunnel beneath the DMZ, used by P’yongyang to shuttle operatives covertly back and forth from the ROK, added to extant strains over destabilization measures undertaken by the DPRK. In 1983, North Korean agents tried to kill then-ROK President Chun Doo Hwan during a South Korean delegation to Burma,

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600 Ibid., 10, 14-15
601 Geldenhuys, “Deviant Conduct in World Politics,” 171
detonating a bomb in the Aung San Martyrs’ Mausoleum in Rangoon, which killed 21 people, including four ROK cabinet members; President Chun survived uninjured.\textsuperscript{602}

The early 1980s also witnessed a marked increase in the use of “conventional” interstate terrorism as an instrument of North Korean foreign policy. The July prior to the Rangoon operation, North Korean forces attempted to infiltrate the ROK near a nuclear power plant in Woolseong, and the following September, the U.S. Information Service facility was attacked, killing four South Korean civilians.\textsuperscript{603} North Korean agents also made numerous attempts to sabotage the 1988 Seoul Olympics in the time leading up to the games, including the detonation of a bomb in Gimpo International Airport that killed 5 and wounded more than 30, as well as the mid-air explosion of Korean Air Lines Flight 858 bound for Bangkok from Abu Dhabi, which killed all 115 people on board. P’yongyang established itself, like Khartoum, as an international hub for terrorist training activities during this period, and was designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. State Department in January 1988.\textsuperscript{604}

While it was not until around 1993 that the North began its foray into nuclear and WMD-related diplomacy, increasingly in lieu of the types of more forward operations outlined above, we now know that P’yongyang had finalized its decision to launch a nuclear weapons development program by the late 1970s. The roots of this program can be traced to exchanges with Soviet and Chinese experts from approximately 1947-59, after which the DPRK government encouraged indigenous accumulation of knowledge and expertise.\textsuperscript{605} By the late 1970s, Kim Il-Sung authorized a rapid expansion of nascent

\textsuperscript{603} Bermudez, “Terrorism: The North Korean Connection,” 43
\textsuperscript{604} Michishita, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns,” 13
\textsuperscript{605} For more details on these processes, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program.” \textit{The Nonproliferation Review} 2, No. 3 (1995), pp. 25-38
nuclear R&D activities; I will elaborate upon this further in the subsequent section. Over the years, further evidence has emerged implicating North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear arms capability in purposeful rejection of international norms. In 2002, for example, the CIA had detected signs of krypton being released into North Korean airspace, indicating the reprocessing of fuel rods to make bomb material; the North further admitted it would begin reprocessing the rods. Following these discoveries, Pyongyang walked away from the 1994 Agreed Framework in which it agreed to freeze plutonium production facilities and not remove spent rods from supervision. Further reporting revealed that by 1989, Pyongyang—through earnings accrued from such illicit activities as narcotics trafficking, trading in conventional arms, and bartering missile technologies—obtained the material to complete one or two nuclear bombs. North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons program—replete with some 12 known factories producing over 4,000 tons per year of mustard gas, phosgene, sarin, and V-type chemical agents—is also well-documented, with throngs of defector reports implicating the regime in testing such devices on incarcerated human subjects.606 North Korea has also “sold every weapons system it has ever produced to regimes in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa that are unfriendly to U.S. interests, including Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria.”607

Understanding why North Korea has postured itself in this way requires a deeper look into the regime’s formative years, particularly the challenge of statebuilding that transpired under its founder, Great Leader, and posthumously designated “Eternal President,” Kim Il-Sung.

607 Cha, “The Impossible State,” 17
It is first important to note, however, that the peninsula’s exposure to intensive foreign meddling well predates the Korean War. Mongol invasions as far back as the 13th century, for example, forced Korea to become a tributary state, while further attacks from Manchurians, Han Chinese, and Japanese pirates and samurai rendered it—in the view of one historian—perhaps the most oft-invaded territory in the world. Reminiscent of Sudan’s Mahdist heritage, Korea is also no stranger to going it alone diplomatically. Under the Joseon Dynasty, which ruled from 1392 until the Japanese annexation in 1910, it became a “highly defensive state with a foreign policy of isolation toward the outside world,” earning it the nickname “hermit kingdom.” North Korean justifications for this position help contextualize rationales behind the regime’s current cynicisms. In an introduction to a collection of speeches and writings by the Great Leader, for example, Li Yuk-Sa implies that Korea’s pre-modern approach to international relations was benign and pacifistic, particularly vis-à-vis the Japanese. She notes proudly that the Paekche dynasty—which, along with Kokuryo and Silla, constituted one of the “Three Kingdoms” that ruled the peninsula for the bulk of the first millennium CE—was responsible for introducing Buddhist scriptures and images to Japan during the 6th century, in addition to state-of-the-art astronomy, geography, medicine, agriculture, metallurgy, and music. The Japanese had then referred to the Korean kingdom as King Ging Ho-Hoku (“treasure land of gold and silver), and following Paekche’s defeat by Silla and the Chinese Tang in 660, in fact, its court had taken refuge in Japan. Li also notes that delegations of scholars, priests, artists, artisans, and sons of nobility from Korea traveled frequently to Japan to enlighten the “backward natives,” as well as China to increase their knowledge of its rich

609 Ibid.
civilization. During the demise of the Koryo Dynasty—Joseon’s predecessor lasting from 918-1392—the Japanese, in an effort to exploit the massive corruption taking place within Korea as a result of independent power bids by the Buddhist clergy, sent 500 combat vessels to Kosong, inflicting rape, pillage, and murder.  

Its experiences and contacts in the modern era left Koreans further reasons to mistrust outsiders. Throughout its occupation of the peninsular from 1910-1945, though incredibly repressive, the Japanese left massive industries including mines and processing plants for deposits of coal, iron, magnesium, and zinc, in addition to large nitrogen fertilizer plants, scores of reservoirs, and hundreds of pumping stations that allowed the North to fully fertilize and irrigate its lands. By the conclusion of WWII, the North possessed 76% of the peninsula’s mining production, 80% of heavy industrial capacity, and 92% of electricity-generation capabilities. It is also important to recall at this juncture that prior to being largely obliterated by the carpet-bombing operations launched by the U.S. Strategic Air Command during the war, this infrastructure—along with the rest of the North’s territory and population—were now subject to further iniquities at the hands of its Soviet “liberators.” In spite of any pretenses about fraternal inter-communist bonds, the Soviet army arrived as an aggressive occupation force, handing out orders and directives, and freely wielding military power that endangered the lives of average citizens. Its officers plundered the North’s economy, expropriating industrial facilities, stripping Korean factories of critical parts—approximately 8,535 tons of goods without

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compensation—and shipping them back to Moscow. Nominally joint venture projects—such as the Chosŏn-Soviet Marine Company and the Chŏson-Soviet Petroleum Company—were primarily inexpensive tools for the Soviets to gain control and resupply their government with resources and products. Moscow also attempted to lease the three ports of Ch’ŏngjin, Najin, and Unggi, and refused much-needed assistance for post-war reconstruction.

While it is beyond the scope of this case-study to more thoroughly unpack the historical dynamics behind Korea’s transition from Japanese colonialism to the post-Korean War era, it is not difficult to see how the very formidable external forces with which Korea contended throughout its history may have set the stage for political entrepreneurs like Kim Il-Sung to advocate a return to the type of isolationism that had supposedly protected the peninsula in pre-modern times, prior to its tragic reintroduction to the volatile geopolitics of the post-WWII and Cold War era. It is now important to understand how Kim Il-Sung inserted himself and his visions into this complex milieu, and turned it quite remarkably to his advantage.

The story of Kim’s formative years as a fighter with the anti-Japanese resistance is fairly straightforward. Leaving behind a widowed mother and two brothers, he began following various bands of guerillas upon his release from prison in 1930. When the Chinese absorbed most of the Korean partisans for operations against the Japanese and

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616 Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Juche,” 108
Manchukukuo forces, Kim settled into a group organized predominantly among ethnic Koreans. Over his near 15-year service battling Japanese colonial regulars, Kim and his men lost nearly every battle, and particularly heavy losses incurred between 1940 and 1941 forced his brothers-in-arms out of the fatherland and into the Russian Maritime Province, whence Kim established temporary bases in the far-eastern regions of Siberia to oversee small-unit activities in Korea and southeast Manchuria. He returned to Korea with the Red Army following the liberation in August 1945. While from a purely historical perspective Kim’s military tenure was far from glorious, its complexly multifaceted geopolitical character propelled P’yongyang’s nascent leadership, as distinct from that of any other rogue case explored in this dissertation, to both fashion a worldview that could speak powerfully to local sensibilities regarding outside interference, as well as hone the set of political-diplomatic survival skills necessary to support it, prior to attaining independence. In other words, the makings of the type of political savvy crucial to maintaining roguery in North Korea appeared operative prior to the existence of a North Korea itself.

Tactically manipulating relations with China, for example, constituted critical lessons learned to a great extent throughout the anti-Japanese struggle. In contrast to the mainstream of Korea’s communist establishment throughout the early 1930s—whose actions, such as the reestablishment of the Korean Communist Party in favor of joining

620 Suh, “Kim II Sung,” 4
621 Recall that while battling Japan, Kim had to coordinate operations with the Russians and Chinese, two very challenging relationships he would have to continue to manage while soon also considering how best to keep the Americans and South Koreans from overtaking the peninsula.
the Manchurian Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), brought them into consistent conflict with Beijing–Kim Il-Sung managed to hold a high-profile position in the CCP and build a successful rapport with his Chinese comrades. They had indeed collaborated in the establishment of an integrated military unit comprised of both Korean and Chinese troops—the Anti-Japanese Allied Army—and together with Chinese communists, established the Anti-Imperialist United Front. By all accounts, the CCP viewed him very favorably, a considerable asset in that Kim could eventually come to rely on early bonds of kinship for continued ideological solidarity to what constituted a historically more organic sort of patron-client relationship, while maintaining deeper independence from Moscow and thereby avoiding the fate of more typical Eastern European communist satellites, whose subordination would never have allowed them to exert the type of independent spirit Kim envisioned all along.

This is not to say, however, that Kim did not also develop early on an acumen for dealing with the Russians that would serve him well later. His military movements in the early 1940s to the Russian-Chinese border area of Khabarovsk—in tandem with the establishment of temporary bases in Siberia and Mt. Paektu on the Korean-Chinese border—endeared Kim to such top Soviet military and political officials as K.A. Merchikov, commander of the First Far East Allied Army of the Soviet Union, and A. Zhdanov, political affairs bureau

622 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 25
623 The anti-Japanese campaigns in Northeast China featured veterans of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army—dispatched personally by Kim Il Sung—as well as 250,000 young Koreans; CCP Chairman Mao Zedong later remarked that one of the five stars inscribed on the Chinese national flag symbolized the blood shed by the Korean Communists. See Foreign Languages Publishing House, Kim Il Sung, Condensed Biography (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2001), 157, cited in Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 26, 38
624 For an elucidation of this thesis, see, for example, Ji-Young Lee, The Chinese System of International Relations in Early Modern East Asia: China at the Center in the Eyes of the Periphery. Georgetown University: Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 2009
625 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 26
secretary for the Soviet Communist Party.626 These contacts proved instrumental in affording Moscow the opportunity to assess the Kims’ worthiness in governing what it then considered Soviet post-war political space, and ultimately convincing the Russians to afford his faction the means it required to control North Korea after the liberation.627

Regardless of the opportunities it provided, their participation in the anti-Japanese guerilla experience undoubtedly and increasingly hardened Kim and his comrades, leading them to adopt a more militaristic outlook conceptualizing life as an “unremitting struggle,” and violent conflict as the “mainspring of history.” The diplomacy surrounding the conclusion of WWII and subsequent partitioning of Korea provided only further proof to the nascent leadership that the North’s destiny lay outside the bounds of an overly meddlesome international society. The 1945 Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference set the tone in this regard.

During this initiative, the U.S. proposed a 4-nation trusteeship for the peninsula–consisting of itself, Great Britain, China, and Russia–in which the superiority of the three would effectively dominate the Soviets, 628 who preferred a Korean provisional government. In contrast to the preferred model overtaking the South–where an American military administration initially maintained primary control in more limited collaboration with a clique of minority right-wing politicians–the Northerners were heavily involved in leading political development right alongside the Soviets, which included active

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627 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 26
participation in the North Korean Administration’s ten major bureau offices. Kim was intent not to relinquish this early independence; the sixteenth clause of the communiqué of the inaugural meeting of the Communist Party of North Korea, for example, alluded to the “unique character of North Korea,” and the need to keep the party’s central leadership institutions in Pyongyang as a precautionary strategy against potential attacks by the U.S., or other emergencies. The onset of the Truman Doctrine and attendant diplomatic pressure by such senior U.S. officials as Secretary of State George Marshall and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson for a capitalist-friendly government in the South, as well as the transfer of the Korea issue to the UN in 1948, further narrowed the gap between Northern independence and pariahtude itself. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution declaring the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to be a lawful government . . . having effective control and jurisdiction over the part of Korea where the [UN] temporary Commission was able to observe [elections] . . . based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in that part of Korea . . . and that this is the only such Government in Korea.

The North, which by contrast spawned from its own elections held in the Soviet occupation zone in August 1948, thus originated by rejecting Seoul’s claims to legitimacy and hence the validity of all future resolutions favoring the South, including the ROK’s formal advocacy of a two-Koreas policy to the UN in June 1973. Rather than stand idly by under international circumstances it felt was silencing the Korean national voice, Kim Il-Sung and his guerilla cohort were determined to differentiate

629 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 28
630 Ibid., 29
North Korea on the world stage while insuring they settled at its helm.\textsuperscript{633} The mediating mechanism lay in \textit{Juche}.\textsuperscript{634}

In contrast to the worldviews of other rogue nations, \textit{juche} is a fairly sophisticated concept, systematized through a considerable number of treatises and speeches published by both Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, as well as some of their colleagues and disciples.\textsuperscript{635} Like Ayatollah Khomeini’s notion of \textit{Velayat e-Faqih} in revolutionary Iran, it more closely approximates a comprehensive ideology, and is in and of itself a subject worthy of careful study.\textsuperscript{636} While space limitations prevent us from giving it a systematic treatment, assessing some of \textit{juche}’s key broad strokes allows us to better appreciate the implications of this type of thinking for the P’yongyang selectorate’s construction of perhaps what over time became the quintessential secular garrison.

It is primarily important to recognize that \textit{juche} entails far more than the simple definition of “self-reliance,” commonly extrapolated to autarkic economic proclivities attributed by much of the current commentary to the Hermit Kingdom. While the first official record of \textit{juche} is traced to a 1955 anti-Soviet speech given by Kim Il-Sung, its

\textsuperscript{633} It is worth pointing out here that Kim Il-Sung’s early land reforms—enacted in 1946 and instrumental in garnering support for the DPRK precursor North Korean Provisional People’s Committee—drove south a landed aristocratic class who had benefitted under Japanese colonial rule. That the mobilization of these individuals and their absorption into the ROK bureaucracy subsequently formed a critical component of the trade openness strategy of Syngman Rhee and subsequent South Korean administrations—not to mention the reliance on economic incubation from the U.S.—made Seoul an even riper target for demonization. See Chull Kim, “North Korea Under Kim Jong II,” 5

\textsuperscript{634} Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 29


origins lay somewhere in the annals of the anti-Japanese struggle, perhaps a speech given by a much younger Kim in 1930.\textsuperscript{637} It has three key component parts: 1) \textit{Chaju}, or political independence; 2) \textit{Charip}, or economic independence; and 3) \textit{Chawi}, or military independence.

\textit{Chaju} asserts that sovereignty and non-intervention are central tenets for mutual respect among nations. Yielding to foreign pressure would render it impossible to maintain \textit{chaju}, and Kim Jong-Il in fact later predicted that foreign power dependence would lead to the failure of the socialist revolution in Korea.\textsuperscript{638} \textit{Charip} is the material basis for \textit{chaju}, expressing the fear that economic dependence abroad would in time render the state a political satellite of others. A viable socialist republic, Kim emphasized, required material and technical foundations of an independent national economy with a focus on strong heavy industry (particularly machine-building) in order to equip light industry, agriculture, transport, and other vital sectors.\textsuperscript{639} Self-reliance in defense matters, \textit{chawi}, was also critical. It called for the mobilization of the entire state; those not taking up arms directly were to contribute to and maintain of the domestic defense industry, while remaining ideologically prepared to keep the home front united in a sense of socio-political superiority.\textsuperscript{640} A belligerent national security posture seeking to counter any “perceived imperialist moves of aggression and war” with violence, moreover, was completely justified for winning the revolutionary cause.\textsuperscript{641} As Kim Il-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{637} Hyung-chan Kim and Tong-gyu Kim, \textit{Human Remolding in North Korea: A Social History of Education}. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005
\item \textsuperscript{638} Kim Chŏng-il, “Accomplishing Juche;” Kim Il-Sŏng and Yuk-Sa Li, “Juche!” 157-8
\item \textsuperscript{639} Kim Il-Sŏng and Yuk-Sa Li, “Juche!” 160
\item \textsuperscript{640} Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Juche,” 107
\item \textsuperscript{641} Kim Chŏng-il, “Accomplishing Juche,” 53
\end{itemize}
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Sung said, “We do not want war, nor are we afraid of it, nor do we beg peace from the imperialists.”

_Juche_ also went much deeper than a mere intellectual exercise among revolutionary romantics; inherent to its primary three tenets were _practical_ methods for pursuing differentiation while simultaneously insuring flexibility of approach. _Chaju_, for example, spoke to Kim’s extreme leeriness of flunkeyism toward Moscow and Beijing, and commitment to steer clear of the attendant Marxist-Leninist dogmatism he had come to know and abhor working with these two states as a guerilla commander. North Koreans, Kim later stated, must “resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically.” Similar to Qadhafi, Kim Il-Sung had the sense that his country was born unique; he often in fact told his people that the peninsula constituted the origin of world civilization. At the same time, Kim continued advocating cooperation with other revolutionary communist states such as Cuba, while maintaining flexibility and distance vis-à-vis Russia and China with the onset of the Sino-Soviet split. While P’yongyang made sure to avoid rocking the boat with Moscow to the point it would lose vital military and economic aid, it eventually repudiated both countries as “socialist imperialist states” whose leaders had pursued capitalist opportunities at the expense of authentic Marxism-Leninism. As Kim gradually accumulated power approaching independence, for example, his government limited the circulation of translated Soviet literature, reduced rhetorical references to socialist

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642 Ibid., 53
643 Ibid., 106
644 Kim Il-Sŏng and Yuk-Sa Li, “Juche!” 159
645 Oberdorfer, “The Two Koreas,” 19
internationalism as well as the contribution of the Soviet Union to North Korean independence throughout official historical accounts, and precluded purist Marxist ideologues from occupying the majority of posts in the KWP. At the National Agricultural Cooperatives Congress in January 1959, for example—which was of course right in the midst of the so-called “transition controversy”–despite intense criticism from the Soviets and German Socialist Party–Kim set forth North Korea’s “three revolutions of ideology, technology, and culture,” and Rodong Sinmun, the KWP’s official daily, announced the North would pursue a policy of “anti-imperialist struggle at the expense of peaceful coexistence.”

While Kim, as discussed above, naturally gravitated toward Beijing–due in large part to longstanding historical, cultural, and geographic linkages–in counterbalancing his relationship to Moscow (North Korea and China had initially taken much of the same policy positions abroad, most notably refusing to sign on to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty), he was also careful to avoid appearing as too pro-Chinese. The Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung, for example, was not highly viewed in P’yongyang, and official communist organs such as Nodong Sinmun and Kulloja noticeably disregarded Mao’s contributions to communist doctrine and praxis.

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649 This concept referred to the Soviets’ expectation throughout the early Cold War that in nations where Moscow had backed the construction of a socialist regime, an “all-people’s nation” would mark the culmination of transition between capitalism and a victorious socialism. As a result of its juche thinking, however, the DPRK was wary of following any externally imposed international trends, regardless of which ideo-military block they belonged to.
650 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 32
651 S.H. Lee, “Party-Military Relations in North Korea,” 129
Like Qadhafi in Libya, the role played by Kim’s own personality in the development of juche thought and practice was also clearly notable. Kim’s highly exaggerated and romanticized experience as an anti-Japanese guerilla fighter was essential to juche’s success. The fact that he and his men had survived such trying episodes as the “anti-Minsaengdan campaign”652 and “Arduous March”653 boosted their image; that their portrayals of these incidents overlooked more sobering historical realities, such as the assistance of outside parties, boosted it further, rendering them the gold standard within the North’s network of factions.654 A severe inferiority complex regarding the major powers further informed Kim’s perceptions of the potential dangers of Sino-Soviet fallout, and as an avid admirer of Stalin, he reportedly felt extremely uneasy over the revisionist measures then being pursued by Khrushchev, including a gradual warming of U.S.-Soviet relations throughout the 1960s.655 Kim also cultivated an expansive personality cult; unlike traditional forms of Marxism, Kim proponed that he himself constituted an integral component of the revolutionary struggle for the working classes.656 A status of suryŏng (Great Leader) enshrined him as the “secure god-king, the fount of all wisdom and genius, the omniscient and omnibenevolent father of a devoted and submissive people.”657 Unlike Qadhafi, however, Kim struck a considerably

652 The Minsaengdan was a counterrevolutionary organization of stooges and spies developed by Japanese forces based in Jiandao, China in February 1932, in response to the alarming growth of Korean revolutionary forces throughout the prior few years. Its mission was to destroy Korea’s revolutionary ranks from within. See Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 37
653 Throughout the so-called “Arduous March” (konan ŭi haenguri)–which lasted from December 1938 to March 1939–the primary guerilla units under Kim’s command braved a Japanese suppression campaign, frigid weather (reportedly 40 degrees below zero), food shortages, and exhaustion from combat while successfully inching their way from Nampai to the border region of Yŏn an and the Amnok River. The episode strengthened the morale and unity of the rank-and-file. See Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 37
654 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 19
655 Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Juche,” 108
effective balance in marrying cult of personality with the strategic institutionalization of the regime, and like the office of rahbar in Iran, the Supreme–or in this case Great, and later Dear–Leader became an institution all its own.

Indeed, in addition to securing North Korean sovereignty in its external relations, Kim knew it was imperative to have strong internal political forces to insure chaju. The key initial ingredients, as he saw it, were both a popularly legitimate party–the Korean Workers Party (KWP)–and suryŏng. As will be discussed further below, the military-security complex became a third indispensable component following the intensification of various internal and external challenges throughout the early to mid-1960s. These items were necessary not only to differentiate Korea from the corrupted regimes in its midst, but also steer it away from the severe internal factionalism that plagued North Korea’s politics since before independence.658

Chaju, as it were, constituted a key benchmark for early outbidding maneuvers following the Korean War. During this era, many North Korean elites–particularly those associated with the so-called “Soviet-Korean” faction of Ko Ka-I and Pak Chang-ok659–looked favorably to Soviet models of culture and education.660 According to juche however, Kim was able to sell the idea that such affinity created the potential for Moscow’s taegukchuŭi–or great-power chauvinism–to endanger North Korea’s policy of sadaejuuŏ–or serving the great. It was actually in the midst of this conversation that in 1955 Kim made his first official public reference to juche in a speech calling for party

658 Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Juche,” 106
659 These were composed mainly of descendants of emigrants to the USSR and progressive intellectuals of southern origin who fought alongside Soviet troops against the Japanese. They typically retained Soviet citizenship and membership in the CPSU. See Suck-ho Lee, “Party-Military Relations in North Korea,” 71-2
660 The two sons of KWP Yan’an faction leader Kim Tubong were studying in Moscow; Ch’oe Ch’angik, another senior faction official, had a son studying law in Sverdlosk. See Armstrong, “The North Korean Revolution,” 178-9
members to eradicate “dogmatism and formalism in ideological activity and stand firm in establishing juche.” Kim managed to preclude these individuals from senior party posts, further castigating leaders of its southern faction for failing to incite popular revolution in the South. In an internal sense, chaju also justified Kim’s gradual entrenchment of power among an increasingly restricted circle of anti-Japanese guerilla associates and family members. As a result of Kim’s genius in the mythmaking surrounding his faction’s combat experience as well as the strategic utilization of Soviet military aid, he was able to devalue, and eventually purge, other factions—such as the Yan’an and Kapsan—associated with the nationalist and communist mainstreams, and linked more closely to either Beijing or Moscow. Key party portfolios, for example, went increasingly to graduates of the Man’gyŏngdae Revolutionary School, attended principally by descendants of the guerillas themselves. Upon later becoming president under a new constitution in 1972, Kim Il-Sung began to groom his son, Kim Jong-II, for key positions in the KWP that he would assume officially in 1980, in addition to other maneuvers designed to keep the top echelon of the party—the Political Bureau—close to the Kim clan. The following slogan sums it up nicely: “The KWP is the direct successor of the glorious revolutionary tradition achieved by the Korean Communists’ anti-Japanese armed struggle.”

Another area relevant to this discussion of effective regime institutionalization where Kim succeeded and Qadhafi did not was conceiving of ways in which to make the worldview relatable to and appreciated by the masses, while simultaneously insulating

662 Kim, “North Korea under Kim Jong II,” 10
663 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 24
the selectorate from any popular instability. Both leaders spoke of the need to instill revolutionary values in their subjects as a means to counteract the malevolency of intense bureaucratism. Unlike Libya, though—which, as discussed in the previous section, largely eschewed party organization altogether—North Korea devised and implemented elaborate mass-targeted schemes through the auspices of the KWP, nominally in support of a labor-peasant alliance and typically emphasizing the value of ideological commitment over conventional material incentives. Interesting examples included the Ch’ŏllima Movement of the 1950, which, like the Stakhanov movement of Stalinist Russia, rewarded over-achievement in labor and production; the Taean method of 1961 similarly directed party cell leaders to inspire workers through intense ideological fervor to achieve production goals. In another highly celebrated national project—the “Ch’ŏngsan-ri method and spirit”—introduced in 1960, Kim Il-Sung provided on-the-spot guidance at Ch’ŏngsan-ri Collective Farm to encourage agricultural management methods that relied on spiritual incentives. The state motto at the time—“not to live today for today, but to live today for tomorrow”—was indeed representative of P’yangyang’s official resolve to endure hardships in exchange for avoiding foreign meddling at all costs.

Charip, the economic piece of juche, also bore out key practical internal and external applications throughout the stormy post-independence period. Kim Il-Sung’s argumentation drew naturally from Korea’s perceived success under self-isolation prior to the Japanese occupation, to justify the DPRK’s gradual withdrawal into the far-

665 Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 51, 69
666 Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 25
667 Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 69
reaching peripheries of the world economy, and eventually near-autarky.669 Yet, he was simultaneously careful to maintain, particularly during these formative years, that juche did not necessitate a total international quarantine. After all, the South’s GDP throughout the immediate post-war years consisted nearly entirely of American aid, and P’yongyang knew that development through some type of economic cooperation—in particular with other newly emerging likeminded nations—was warranted and in fact necessary.670 On the domestic front, self-reliance in economic affairs constituted another key facet of the outbidding process, even if it meant choosing development strategies that proved suboptimal. As Young Chul Chung wrote:

Pyongyang at time had to strike a balance between utopian socialist goals and pragmatic developmental necessities. At other times, it was forced to choose among various economic development strategies, which placed different priorities on heavy and light industries. The cross-cutting pressures generated by individualism and collectivism constituted another dilemma, over which various political forces, offering divergent solutions, competed, decisively affecting the North’s political institution that placed suryŏng above all else . . . the institution has in turn generated a perverse logic of its own. The political institution, centered on suryŏng, once established, has delimited the trajectory of the North’s development by facilitating some choices and excluding others.671

Indeed, by the early 1950s, Kim was beginning to face intense opposition from fellow communists regarding his economic planning; these opponents argued that “heavy industry [was] being [continually] favored when the people’s lives [were] hard;” “food,” they admonished, “does not grow out of machines.”672 The so-called “August Factional Incident” of 1956, for example, pitted Kim against the Yan’an faction of the party. Its constituents—who boasted a strong record of anti-Japanese resistance fighting alongside the Chinese in China, and were later disarmed following their 1945 reentry into Korea—advocated a policy of “pragmatic materialism,” i.e. a shift in focus to light industry, the

669 Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005
production of consumption goods, and a currency system based on the exchange value of commodities.\footnote{Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 51-2, 55} A heated debate ensued within the KWP, in which challengers to Kim Il-Sung publicly supported Soviet criticisms of Stalin through writings in the Party daily Nodong Sinmun, as well as the directives of the CPSU 20\textsuperscript{th} Congress, in which Khrushchev called explicitly for the abandonment of the personality cult. These critiques held further weight by the late 50s as the North’s economy encountered severe setbacks—particularly in the extractive, energy, and communications sectors—resulting from overinvestment in heavy industry.\footnote{Buzo, “The Guerilla Dynasty,” 72} Instrumental to the eventual purge of the Yan’an was Kim’s and his colleagues’ citation of them as traitors to charip and dishonorable advocates of dependence—albeit within the socialist universe—at the very delicate moment when Korea was attempting to lift itself from the ruins of the Korean War, whilst avoiding the onset of anti-Stalinism and breaking the bad habits of overreliance on Russia and China. The ideas being presented by Kim’s dissenters mirrored those of 1960s Russia, a fact he used to portray them in kind as foreign superpower stooges. It was probably no coincidence that in 1955, two years following Stalin’s death, Kim Il-Sung had unveiled juche to the public in a bid to discredit pro-socialization arguments.\footnote{Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 52, 55, 69} Kim would redeploy these arguments in later critical purges throughout the mid-1960s, as I will discuss further below.

Chawi, or juche in national defense, also constituted a key practical component of the North’s differentiation strategy. First and foremost, Kim Il-Sung viewed armed struggle—as embodied by the anti-Japanese liberation movement he prosecuted both “successfully” and “independently” of Chinese or Soviet support—as the wellspring of the
North Korean state, and to a large extent, *juche* itself.\(^{676}\) Second, *juche* compelled the state to maintain an indigenous production and armament capacity to cope with the possibility of war at any time.\(^{677}\) P’yongyang’s stress on heavy industry with military application meant that *chawi* and *charip* were of course greatly intertwined. Similar to Khomeini’s Iran, the simultaneous concurrence of state formation and war appeared to imbue the leadership with a sense of paranoia regarding the next great victory; North Korea’s elites held a lingering assumption that another peninsular war would soon be upon them, and in this instance with no foreign aid.

This type of thinking bore key consequences for the North’s military development; rather than developing a sound conventional military doctrine, the KWP was more concerned with the military’s appearance as a pro-*juche* force. From the 1960s onward, for example, KPA commanders were noticeably quiet regarding the influence of their former Soviet supervisors on acquiring key warfighting tactics, such as maximum use of tank firepower in battle.\(^{678}\) While it was not uncommon for other revolutionary communist states of the era, such as China and Vietnam, to coordinate guerilla and party activities during the independence struggle, the post-independence period typically saw the advancement of their military doctrines through acquisition of more sophisticated training and technologies. In the North Korean context, however, *chawi* enshrined revolutionary armed struggle as a *raison d’etre* of the state, rendering the bonds between party and military—and by extension, ideology and strategy—stronger as time went on.\(^{679}\)

\(^{676}\) Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 19
\(^{677}\) Yuk-Sa Li, “Juche!” 162-3; Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Juche,” 107
\(^{678}\) S.H. Lee, “Party-Military Relations in North Korea,” 144
\(^{679}\) Part of the conflict between Kim and the Yan’an and Soviet-Koreans during the mid-1950s, in fact, had to do with those factions’ insistence that the military—along with the state’s legislative, juridical, and mass institutions—should remain outside the control of the party leadership. His dual status as president and Supreme KPA Commander—and later Kim Jong-Il’s role as Chairman of the National Defense Commission—was meant to
Indeed, P’yongyang’s official narrative attributed military failures throughout the Korean War specifically to inadequacies in guerilla and partisan combat operations conducted in the South; the KPA’s widespread resort to banditry to survive, as well as lousy degrees of coordination between various guerilla units and the central command, neutralized not only their battle potential, but more importantly their political ability to win the loyalty of Southern locals.680 As Kim Il-Sung remarked:

If the people of south Korea had risen in the rear of the enemy and fought along with the advancing People’s Army at the time of the war of liberation [i.e. The Korean War], we could have exterminated the enemy thoroughly and resolved the problem of the unification of the fatherland. If the revolutionary forces in south Korea had been strengthened, we could have hastened the victory of the south Korean revolution.681

P’yongyang’s failure to take full advantage of the 1960-61 student unrest against the government of Syngman Rhee in Seoul heightened the belief that offensive capabilities and military preparedness required revitalization.682 DPRK military doctrine, as it were, attempted to internalize the values of the anti-Japanese struggle by emphasizing an increasingly irregular warfare approach, including combined operations and bolstering of juche ideology. Kim effectuated this in December 1962 by announcing the so-called “four military lines:” 1) Training the entire army as a cadre force; 2) Military modernization; 3) Arming the whole population; and 4) Fortification of the entire territory. On a political level, this blending of defensive modernization and popular mobilization was meant to counter the potentially deleterious onset of a “reds vs.

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682 Bermudez, “Terrorism: The North Korean Connection,” 23
684 Buzo, “The Guerilla Dynasty,” 59
685 S.H. Lee, “Party-Military Relations in North Korea,” 134
686 Bermudez, “Terrorism: The North Korean Connection,” 21
pervaded virtually every aspect of the system to an extent unparalleled by any autocracy, or other rogue regime that matter, in the modern world. As Adrian Buzo points out, *juche* developed into a highly reactive perspective, a siege mentality gleaned from the blurring of past mistrust and present threats rendering Kim’s guerilla faction—who along with their progeny and disciples, were beginning to swell the ranks of P’yongyang’s power center—forever deeply attached
to the prewar guerilla style of revolutionary mobilization and to wartime Soviet production methods . . . This ideology was profoundly anti-modern in many important respects . . . Economic and social development were not ends in themselves, but were the means of achieving political and military objectives determined by a leader whose visions of the ultimate purpose of life lay in the ever-receding past . . . As the modernization process gained momentum in the 1960s, it further exposed this contradiction.687

Once set into motion, the dynamics of the *juche* system’s reproduction were expeditiously forthcoming, particularly given the lingering presence of old challenges, as well as the emergence of new ones. Although Kim Il-Sung was well atop the political pyramid in P’yongyang by the early 1960s, his rule was by no means yet absolutely legitimate in the eyes of both domestic and foreign contenders. Similar to post-revolutionary Libya, North Korea’s masses—including farmers and workers—exhibited “fatigue symptoms,” i.e. expressions of disillusionment toward and questionings of the wisdom of *juche*’s austerity measures. Popular backlash reached a crescendo by the mid-1960s, as investments in light industry continued to decrease and ordinary citizens experienced diminishing returns for their contributions toward building up the garrison state. Disenfranchisements with *charip* threatened to substantially hinder the economic growth sought by Kim, whose emphasis on defense-related projects and spending was outshining, and by now subsuming, the resources and progress of such other potentially critical sectors as science and technology—which, despite yielding moderate results till the

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687 Buzo, “The Guerilla Dynasty,” 58
early 1960s, had started to wane thereafter. By 1963, all major sectors had fallen under target and projections in steel and textiles dipped far below previous levels.  The first seven-year-plan put forward in 1965-6 did not reach fruition, and gross agricultural and industrial output registered in negative digits. National income plummeted with the continued rise in national security expenditures, and poor harvests and failures to adjust to lower levels of foreign aid did not help matters.  Like Qadhafi, Kim and his cohort perceived such factually sound critiques as direct challenges to the reactionary project, instances of “negativism” and “conservatism” that constituted “obstacles to technological innovation.”

And while Kim had eliminated significant rivals in the 1956 purges, he still had enemies seeking to exploit the public reactions as fodder against his regime, its ideological goals, and the suryŏng tradition that upheld it. “Whereas the crisis of the 1950s could be characterized as a challenge to juche,” Young Chul Chung explains, “the crisis of the 1960s was very much a challenge to the ‘traditionalism’ that sought to consolidate it.”

The era, in other words, marked a critical juncture after which the regime became compelled to place far greater stock in the militaristic and assertive side of juche, thereby backing away from its origins as the defensive, inward, and “leave us alone”-type attitude more reminiscent of the pre-modern Hermit Kingdom.

P’yongyang perceived a number of external developments as particularly threatening to the longevity of its regime during this era. In May 1961 military officers led by ROK Major General Park Chung Hee took power in a coup d’état in Seoul. The operation challenged P’yongyang in a number of ways: 1) The elimination of tenuous

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688 Ibid., 72
689 In 1966, national income growth was -8.5%, agricultural output growth -13.6%, and industrial output growth -3%
690 Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 56
691 Ibid., 57
democratic rule—with which the South had been experimenting for a year following the overthrow of Syngman Rhee by student-led revolt—and its replacement by an intensely security-conscious regime presented a challenge to subversion efforts by North Korean agents and indigenous leftists; 2) While the North’s relatively impressive economic growth allowed it to surpass the South during the immediate post-Korean War era, Park would deploy new forces—including Western-trained economists and dynamic business leaders—and practices—close bureaucratic guidance coupled with taking full advantage of a low-cost, hard-working, and well-trained labor force—to build a modern market economy modeled on that of Japan. This project was constitutive of precisely the type of “state capitalism” the North was working so hard to reject, and the unprecedented boom it would unleash in Seoul posed a major hurdle to P’yongyang’s potential stewardship of a reunification scenario, a fact that became all the more real stark as the limits of the command economy set in.

As for the Soviet Union, the 1962 outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis constituted a particular thorn in the KWP’s side. Indeed, the party perceived Moscow’s agreement to remove medium and intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missiles from Cuba as an outright concession by the socialist world to the capitalists’ blockade of the Caribbean, and abandonment of a key frontline state for the sake of improving relations with the enemy. Further diplomatic tussles between Moscow and P’yongyang—including controversial historical accounts of the peninsula published by the USSR

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693 Pyŏng-no Philo Kim, “Two Koreas in Development,” 123; Lankov, “From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, 135.
Academy of Sciences, as well as Soviet criticisms over Sino-Korean economic practices as presented at the second international seminar on Asian economy held in P’yongyang from 16-23 June 1964—added tension to the relationship. The Soviets’ delay, moreover, in condemning the U.S. Gulf of Tonkin incident the following August—which effectively led to the U.S. Congress authorizing the use of military force without a formal declaration of war in Vietnam, another communist state—created the impression that Moscow could not be trusted as a reliable strategic partner who would come to North Korea’s aid in the event of a U.S. or South Korean assault. It is important to remember that South Korea had by now already begun strengthening its security relationship with the United States in addition to normalizing ties to Tokyo, and by January 1965 had deployed troops to Vietnam.

North Korea’s relations with the Chinese also began to turn in a more unsettling direction. As alluded to above, Sino-DPRK relations were traditionally quite solid, and throughout the late 1950s and early 60s, both countries had found common ground in opposing Khrushchev’s “Soviet revisionism”—which included, *inter alia*, a policy of peaceful coexistence vis-à-vis the United States—as well as Moscow’s aspirations for leadership of the global communist movement. Significant conflicts of interests began to arise by 1964, however, as Leonid Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev, and P’yongyang consequently sought some type of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Recently

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695 Suh, “Kim Il Sung,” chapter 10
697 Suh, “Kim Il Sung,” 190
released diplomatic reporting from the Central State Archives of Albania indicates that North Korean antagonisms toward the USSR throughout the decade prior were, in fact, far more anti-Khrushchev than anti-Soviet,\textsuperscript{699} and North Korean officials assessed repairing relations with the Soviets might provide greater maneuverability than had their previously one-sided orientation toward Beijing, as well as a boost to P’yongyang’s languishing economic development,\textsuperscript{700} which would in turn help counterbalance the now unstoppable rise of Seoul under General Park.\textsuperscript{701} Yet Chairman Mao’s Cultural Revolution, in full effect by May 1966, and its enforcers, the highly dogmatic and unruly Chinese Red Guards, had little tolerance for one of Beijing’s chief client states rekindling ties to so powerful and hated an adversary.

By 1967, China was engaged in deep psychological warfare against the North, denouncing Kim and putting up wall posters that spread rumors about sensitive domestic political issues involving his top deputies. These included false reports of high-level arrests within the KWP Central Committee, as well as the deposition of Kim himself by generals of the KPA. Another poster signed by Chinese veterans of the Korean War accused Kim of being a “revisionist and a disciple of Khrushchev,” and sabotaging the Vietnamese people by refusing to commit North Korean volunteers to the conflict.\textsuperscript{702} According to then-Bulgarian Premier Todor Zhivkov’s records of a 1973 visit with Kim Il-Sung in the DPRK, China assembled loudspeakers along its 800-mile-long border with


\textsuperscript{701}Suh, “Kim Il Sung,” 190

\textsuperscript{702}Ibid., 190-3
the North and broadcast anti-regime propaganda at piercing volumes during all hours of
the day and night. Chinese troops had also briefly penetrated North Korea and agitated
border villagers, in tandem with the PLA’s anti-Soviet provocations of 1969.\footnote{Ibid., 193-203}

The Chinese brazenly accused the North Koreans of ignoring the Cultural Revolution, casting
Kim as a revolutionary charlatan, a capitalist who himself engaged deeply in revisionism
and materialistic pleasures, and a slanderer of Chairman Mao who neglected to distribute
his good works throughout the country. These incidents were accompanied by the
downgrading of ambassadorial relations between Beijing and P’yongyang, as well as the
escalation of a territorial dispute over the Mt. Paektu border area—which holds a seminal
status in the national mythology of Korea and constitutes a former base of Kim Il-Sung’s
later anti-Japanese guerilla activities—replete with further PLA troop buildups along the
Yalu River.\footnote{Ibid.; “On a Conversation with the Acting Ambassador of the People’s Republic of Poland, Comrade Pudisz.” 9
International Center for Scholars–North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP). Obtained and translated
1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. From the personal collection of former Bulgarian
Documentation Project (NKIDP). Translated from Bulgarian by Donna Kovacheva. Available
online at: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114533>}

Internal challengers, whom the regime had not yet completely neutralized, sought
to capitalize on the potential fallout; the Kapsan faction proved the most formidable
among them. Comprised of ex-partisans who had fled to the Soviet Union from
Manchuria around 1941 and reentered Korea with the Red Army, Kim was previously
allied with them throughout the early days of the liberation struggle alongside the Soviet-
Koreans.\footnote{Lee, “Party-Military Relations in North Korea,” 72}

They began to pose a threat during this juncture, however, by eulogizing Pak
Kŭmphŏl, one of the faction’s leaders, and using the state propaganda bureau then under
their control to produce plays and films equating Pak’s revolutionary efforts with those of Kim himself. It was interestingly Kim Jong-Il—then a recent university graduate and up-and-coming leader within the KWP Central Committee specializing in propaganda and intelligence matters—who discovered these efforts, neutralized them, and orchestrated Pak Kŭmchŏl’s demise. Some hardline military officers—including Cho’e Kwang, Hŏ Pong-hak, Kim Ch’ang-bong, Kim Ch’ang-dŏk, and Sŏk San—also fell out of ranks with Kim Il-Sung during the episode, and their purge throughout 1968-9 possibly lent some credibility to the anti-DPRK propaganda propagated by the Chinese Red Guards.

The seemingly overwhelming confluence of threats during the mid-to-late 1960s militated largely against whatever extant hopes existed for North Korea’s socialization, and reinforced the leadership’s nascent perception that that it would have to walk its political-diplomatic path alone. As Hwang Changyŏp—at the time Kim’s senior adviser in ideological affairs and a key developer of the juche idea (in 1997 Hwang would dispatch himself to the ROK embassy in Beijing on his way home from an official trip to Tokyo, becoming the highest-ranking DPRK defector to date)—had remarked, Kim, disillusioned by both Soviet revisionists and the wild leftists behind the Cultural Revolution in China, “decided that his party had to rely on its own strength to liberate South Korea and achieve reunification.” This meant shoring up the two institutions that had hitherto allowed Kim to surpass his fellow domestic contenders—the KWP and the suryŏngje—while eventually introducing a third, the military complex.

706 Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 68, 70-1
707 Suh, “Kim Il Sung,” 191
As to the former, just as Kim had earlier cultivated an image of success as a supreme guerilla commander surrounded by loyal henchmen, he would now strengthen the party through breeding new generations of citizen-soldiers, inspiring a novel form of collectivism focused on realizing the suryŏngje.\(^{709}\) It entailed augmenting to P’yongyang’s extant superstructure the trappings of a prototypical totalitarian regime (see Chapter 2 for a more thorough review of this concept). Another area in which Qadhafi had failed vis-à-vis his experimentations with the ASU and Popular Committees, respectively, Kim would effectively empower the KWP as a mass-based organization, absorbing increasingly large numbers of citizens by subsuming the entirety of extant social units, and dispelling the tenets of juche and suryŏngje from the central party apparatus to the mass organizations. This was in a way a further nod to the DPRK’s differentiation from its “typical communist” Soviet patron, in which “elite vanguards”–comprised of more limited groups of exemplary citizens–were intended to represent all societal strata.\(^{710}\)

The Fifth KWP National Congress of November 1970 proceeded by putting forth juche as the leading, and eventually sole, state philosophy. And while Qadhafi had attempted to compensate for lack of a strong party by institutionalizing the Qiyyadat al-thawra–or Revolutionary Leadership–and placing himself at its helm as Ach al-Qa’id–or Brother Leader–Kim achieved both, overseeing a change in the political superstructure to


\(^{710}\) The KWP appears an exceptional institution in terms of ration of population to party membership relative to other single-party apparatuses worldwide. According to Young Chul Chung (2007), said ratio registered at over 15%, compared to 6.7% for the Soviet Union during 1983, 14% for Czhekeslovakia, 14% for Romania, 3.0% for Vietnam, and 3.8% for China. At the Party’s founding congress in August 1946, it registered 366,000 members, which increased to 1,164,945 in 1956 during the Third National Congress at the height of factional struggles, and nearly 3.25 million by 1980. The number of party cells increased from 65,000 recorded at the Fourth National Congress in 1961 to 210,000 recorded at the Sixth National Congress in 1980.
insulate and amplify the office of suryŏng in tandem with party development. He created the position of chusŏk, or state president, and empowered his closest colleagues to oversee the operations of the party, government bureaucracy, and military. These measures annulled the powers of the Cabinet and Supreme People’s Assembly, and through the 1972 constitution bestowed absolute power upon the chusŏk; Juche underwent further systematization and codification with the publication of a ten-volume work.\textsuperscript{711} The irony of this era, which mirrored that of Libya post-Zuwara, was that as the regime took more measures to supposedly “empower” the people, the more the people became disenchanted with and isolated from the regime. The regime had in turn come to the realization that the masses were not willing to get on board in exchange for the highly ideational, vice material, terms being offered up front. The original visions for “collectivism” and “mass participation” therefore had the unintended paradoxical (or, depending on how one views it, brilliantly crafted) effect of replacing the central power of the advocates of collectivism (i.e. the state) with collectivism itself,\textsuperscript{712} and facilitating an increasingly hardline regime that stifled individual creativity and personal development, largely stamping out whatever extant notions of a “civil society” had existed hitherto. Kim Jong-II himself, who was a Political Bureau member by 1973-4, remarked that “creativity was impermissible for ideology,”\textsuperscript{713} and the so-called “10 Principles on Establishing the Monolithic Ideological System” that he supported further institutionalized a worship system of Kim Il-Sung and his heirs [emphasis mine]. The

\textsuperscript{711} Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 72
\textsuperscript{712} Ibid., 62
apparently uncompromising inflexibility with which P’yongyang approaches diplomacy today must be understood within the context of regime consolidation that unfolded during this era. The use of ideological education to gloss over problems of “individualism” and “bureaucratism” allowed the Kims to overcome immense challenges, including the eventual collapse of Soviet Russia, yet it started to lock into place a system in which it proved increasingly difficult to pursue any development strategy not based on the suryŏngje.714

Similar to Khomeini in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War, P’yongyang was now proposing an even harder bargain for the masses to stomach, which, especially in the face of increasing popular dissatisfaction over failing development strategies, required a more reliable and ideationally receptive enforcer. Chawi, as discussed above, had already started to assume a greater importance within juche thinking by the early 60s. The 5th Meeting of the 4th Workers Party Central Committee in December 1962 formalized the policy of simultaneously developing the national economy and defense, as well as the intent to construct an indigenous defense industry.715 In an October 1963 speech at Kim Il-Sung Military University, Kim remarked:

What is our Party’s policy to strengthen it (i.e. military force)? It is a policy of self-defense. We must get ready to defend ourselves. We must not expect others to defend us. By self-defense, we do not mean, of course, that we will receive no foreign aid whatsoever. If they give us aid, we will accept it, but even if they do not, we can go by ourselves. This is our principle . . . We must continue to strengthen our military force. Our Party intends to reunify the country by peaceful means as far as possible. However, when the enemy hampers the advance of our revolutionary movement by force of arms, we must certainly use our armed forces to reunify the country . . . We must be firmly prepared, both ideologically and militarily, for perfect self-defense, so as to protect ourselves with our own efforts, in the military sphere, just as in the economic sphere. Then what is to be done? First, we must develop our People’s Army into a revolutionary army . . . A revolutionary army always faces a formidable enemy.716

714 Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 63
715 See Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 42
Thus proceeded in earnest within the DPRK the militarization of the selectorate itself. In a process that unfolded gradually throughout the 1960s, North Korea had finalized the transition of its reunification doctrine away from the purely conventional military focus of the decade prior to the combined military-political-diplomatic approach that would soon undergird its aversive diplomacy, and so continues to day to this very day. The targets of the so-called “Three Fronts Strategy”—articulated by the KWP Central Committee in February 1964, and designed to set out the material conditions for far-ranging political, economic, and military transformations that would prepare Korea for “further reunification” under party stewardship—were a case in point: 1) **Within the DPRK**, P’yongyang would maintain its commitments to the “Four Military Lines,” which included upgrading the political and technical training of the KPA so that all of its troops could become “cadres;” 2) **Within the ROK**, the DPRK security community was tasked to establish a Marxist-Leninist Party, support anti-government forces, and instill within them revolutionary consciousness guided by the party; and 3) **Internationally**, the regime would encourage *hyŏngmyŏng yŏngnyang*—or revolutionary forces—poised to exert maximum pressure on the U.S. to withdraw its forces from Korea, as well as a commitment to battle all imperialists.717

By its 14th plenary meeting in October 1966, the KWP’s Central Committee began to support word with deed, absorbing an unprecedented increase of professional soldiers. A 6-member presidium—essentially an inner party directorate—was further established. From the 80 full and 50 candidate members of the Central Committee, Kim chose only men with experience as military commanders like Chose Yong Kon, Kim Il,

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and Kim Kwang Hyop. Elites with predominantly civilian backgrounds, such as Pak Kum Chol and Yi Hyo Sun, were purged.\footnote{Benjamin Welles, “North Korean Militancy Linked to 1966 Meeting,” \textit{The New York Times} (1 February 1968)} Attention to timing in this case lends further credence to the observation that North Korea’s roguery was by no means predetermined from the get-go. While it was certainly largely responsible for launching the war against the South and engaging in minor provocations thereafter, the peninsula enjoyed a relative calm from the war’s conclusion in July 1953–as Kim became preoccupied by domestic power struggles—until the latter 1960s—which finally saw greater stability though the entrenchment of a system based on a now-dominant central institution—the KWP—linked to a now-dominant worldview—\textit{juche}. The defining capstone of Kim’s consolidation strategy, however, was the incorporation of the national security establishment, particularly those guerilla commandos who helped bolster his position within the KWP, as the “brain of the party.”\footnote{Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 52-3}

It is important to note that—as alluded to in the latter—this was not an entirely novel approach in the North Korean context. The Korean communist movement had in fact long been involved in military affairs; Kim and his compatriots commenced party activities in tandem with their military service as members of the CCP, and their subservience to the Soviet Far East Command following 1940 facilitated their opportunity to focus on party-building projects. They later turned this to their advantage by establishing bases in the provinces to ultimately envelope and seize the North’s center from alternate factions—like the Yan’an—whose military competencies proved relatively far inferior.\footnote{Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 24} The military establishment in turn boasted a deeply political pedigree.
When Kim stood up the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army in February 1948, for example, the outfit was equipped with ideological foundations to establish the concept of People’s State Power (*inmin chŏngkwŏn*). And while in its early days in government Kim made concessions to other factions and took second-level positions in many of the government bureaucracies, his direct control over the newly formed KPA was non-negotiable.

It was not until the explicit militarization of its politics in 1967, however, that the DPRK appeared compelled to focus in earnest on the attainment of a so-called “revolutionary agenda” vis-à-vis the ROK, and the later the U.S. Beginning with a vigorous build-up of both conventional and unconventional offensives, it was this juncture that marked the true birth of the garrison state in P’yongyang. The period entrenched a progressively point-of-no-return mindset among a steadily militaristic coalition, which served as the basis for future generations to devote extraordinary percentages of national income toward military expenditures, despite any and all attendant hardships—including famine—the populace would have to endure.

Assessing developments materializing concomitantly in South Korea permits us to further highlight the exigency of purpose with which Kim had begun to accelerate

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723 This was actually where the concept of *sŏn ‘gun*—which Kim Jong-Il significantly reconstituted following his succession—was born. See Kim, “The Making of the North Korean State,” 25
724 This thinking is echoed in the arguments of several North Korea scholars. See, for example, Michishita, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns,” 7
726 From 1966-72, as many as 715 DPRK servicemen were killed, more than double the number of ROK personnel killed during the same era. See Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Juche,” 107, 111; Yuk-Sa Li, “Juche!” 162-3
differentiation. Although Park Chung Hee believed—as did all Korean leaders—to an extent in the precepts of Juche, the South Korean version became increasingly wound up in acceptance by—vice opposition to—the international community. Park himself had expressed an open admiration for the Japanese Meiji Ishin, and secretly dispatched scholars to Taiwan to study the political-economic approaches it was utilizing to emulate the Meiji model.\(^{727}\) He believed that Japanese capital and technology would prove indispensable to modernization and economic development at home, which soon became a national preoccupation in official thinking.\(^{728}\) As two Korea scholars put it, “[Park] mixed the Japanese ethos of top-down mobilization and the U.S. ideas of technocracy with Korean nationalism in the most un-Japanese and un-American ways to clear the way for economic growth.\(^{729}\) His administration subsequently proved willing to make tough concessions and overcome fierce domestic opposition in the realization of these pursuits, especially the 1965 bid for normalization with Japan, during which Seoul accepted strong U.S. pressure.\(^{730}\)

While South Korea faced existential security threats comparable to—if not exceeding—those of the North throughout its formative years, and a predecessor administration—that of Syngman Rhee from 1948-1960—dominated by a profligate military and backed by the Liberal Party—who opposed fiscal and monetary conservatism—Park and his coalition of technocrats reversed course in 1964 by launching


an internationalizing strategy that nearly doubled the country’s trade openness within four years. Rather than unleashing them, Park reined in the ROK military leadership and politicized the force only to the extent that it could help his administration perpetuate its development plan while maintaining—and in fact, dramatically increasing—military professionalization. To accomplish this, Park compartmentalized the military into two tracks: one for soldiers raised to lead the “professional” field command posts; and another trained to become the regime’s “political” praetorian guard. While Seoul had commenced a clandestine nuclear weapons program by the early 1970s, moreover, Park ultimately decided that, along with other considerations, his regime could not stomach the U.S. threat of withholding loans and financial and technical assistance so critical to its export-led growth; the program was completely dismantled following Park’s 1979 assassination.

Political restructuring throughout the North’s militarization, by complete contrast, corresponded with the proliferation of politically charged security organizations, such as the 124th and 283rd Army Units, which were better equipped, and in many ways designed specifically, to carry out the subversive Three Fronts Strategy. This focused predominantly at the time on sabotaging the ROK through repeated armed assaults with high volumes of agents along the DMZ, Joint Security Area (JSA), and Panmunjom

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731 Solingen, “Mapping Internationalization,” 529
735 Bermudez, “Terrorism: The North Korean Connection,” 5
Only the most politically reliable individuals who were well-regarded KWP members, and possessed a minimum of 4-7 years of combat experience, could serve in these elite outfits. If, in other words, consolidation of national power went hand in hand with militarization, militarization proceeded hand in hand with provocation. Indeed, this period witnessed some of the most significant activities associated with the regime’s roguery.

The seizure of the *USS Pueblo* in particular provided a significant boon to the P’yongyang leadership, which could now proclaim to its base that the DPRK had successfully hampered U.S. intelligence activities, not to mention diverting U.S. and ROK attention from the Vietnam theatre, while placing a tremendous strain on their bilateral relations. In addition, the U.S. was pressured to engage unprecedentedly in direct “negotiations” with the North Koreans at Panmunjom regarding the status of their ship and its crew, succeeding only in securing the release of the latter. It is also important to note that the seizure occurred merely three days after the failed commando raid on the Blue House, which had the further desired effect of frustrating such senior U.S. officials as Rear Admiral John Victor Smith—then senior U.S. representative in Panmunjom—and Congressman L. Mendel Rivers—then chairman of the House Armed Services Committee—who were notably hard-pressed to strike a reasonable balance between freeing the 82 hostages and punishing P’yongyang for its effrontery.

Interestingly, however, the proximity of North Korean provocations during this period had the likely unintended effect of convincing U.S. officials such as Admiral

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737 Joseph S. Bermudez, “North Korean Special Forces,” 61
738 Senior ROK officials were resentful over their exclusion from the Panmunjon discussions, and the South Korean military favored a robust response to the DPRK’s brazen assault on their capital.
739 Martin, “Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader,” 129
Smith that the DPRK desired all-out war,\textsuperscript{740} when in reality all signs pointed to more limited goals, designed in large parts for domestic consumption: 1) Appearing on an even diplomatic keel with the great powers of the day. Not only was the U.S.–who at the time did not even officially recognize the DPRK–in fact compelled to engage P’yongyang directly–but in the process also directly one-upped by its North Korean interlocutors,\textsuperscript{741} who after over 36 hours of imprisonment, beatings, and torture, managed to secure a confession from the captive servicemen, as well as the U.S. Government’s admission to, and apology for, espionage; 2) The diversion provided by the \textit{USS Pueblo} incident away from the Blue House raid not only drove a wedge between the Americans and South Koreans, but also appeared to call the bluff of the U.S. military. Indeed, Washington appeared extremely reluctant to deploy its fleet of seven F-4 bombers stationed in South Korea–all of which were nuclear-armed–to repel the \textit{USS Pueblo}’s seizure, and consequently upset any further the security environment in Asia, where it was bogged down in another land war that had proven far more frustrating and divisive than its experience in Korea 17 years prior;\textsuperscript{742} 3) Although Kim Il-Sung was not by any means near his goal of “liberating” South Korea and unifying the peninsula, he did manage to portray Operation Revolution in the South as bearing some considerable fruit. Throughout the posturing associated with the \textit{USS Pueblo} incident, for example, it

\textsuperscript{740} Trevor Armbrister, \textit{A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair}. London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1970, pp. 245-6, 381
\textsuperscript{741} Following U.S. protest of the Blue House raid at the Panmunjon meeting, and demands for the immediate return of the Pueblo and its crew, KPA Major General Pak Chung-kuk–the North Korean representative to the talks–was reported as replying:

\begin{quote}
Our saying goes, ‘A mad dog barks at the moon.’ . . . I cannot but pity you who are compelled to behave like a hooligan, disregarding even your age and honor to accomplish the crazy intentions of the war maniac [U.S. President Lyndon B.] Johnson for the sake of bread and dollars to keep your life. In order to sustain your life, you probably served [U.S. President John F.] Kennedy, who is already sent to hell. If you want to escape from the same fate of Kennedy, who is now a putrid corpse, don’t indulge yourself desperately in invective.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{742} Ibid., 128-9

\textsuperscript{742} Ibid., 129, 131
became clear that the U.S. and Seoul’s ultimate reticence toward a counterattack was due in large part to the revelation that Southern airfields were “soft,” i.e. unprotected and vulnerable to attack and penetration, whereas the North’s had been thoroughly hardened for battle.\textsuperscript{743}

Kim Il-Sung could now consequently proudly proclaim his forces ready to fight “staunchly at any time to force the U.S. imperialists out of South Korea and carry the revolutionary cause of unification through to the end,” and that “everyone knows how to fire a gun and carries a gun with him.”\textsuperscript{744} The resolve demonstrated by the regime’s recently articulated motto, “arms in one hand and sickle in the other,”\textsuperscript{745} in fact helped stimulate a crackdown by Park Chung Hee against the South Korean population, further legitimizing P’yongyang’s derision of Seoul, disconcerting the Americans of their confidence in South Korea as stable ally, and perhaps even reigniting the validity for P’yongyang resolve once and for all the “ongoing” Korean War.\textsuperscript{746}

The late 1960s also witnessed the selectorate’s reorganization of state assets to streamline foreign terrorist and pro-revolutionary operations, which had throughout and immediately after the Korean War taken place on a relatively \textit{ad hoc} basis. This somewhat mirrors the Sudanese case, in which official sponsorship of terrorism became more systematized only after the NIF’s entry into the selectorate. Once Kim had undertaken the militarization campaign, the DPRK, like Sudan following the RCC-NS coup, converted itself into a training and recruitment hub for terrorist operatives. Indeed, approximately 6-10 training facilities emerged in the vicinity of P’yongyang, Yongbyon,

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\textsuperscript{743} Ibid., 129
\textsuperscript{745} Buzo, “The Guerilla Dynasty,” 59
\textsuperscript{746} Kim Pyŏng-no, “Two Koreas in Development,” 123-4
\end{footnotesize}
Sangwon, Haeju, Namp’o, and Wonsa; all provided intensive modules replete with large quantities of ideological indoctrination, in addition to such operational skills as marksmanship, ambush and counterambush, explosives, and intelligence-gathering. The North Koreans mentored some 3-4,000 operatives representing nearly 60 different organizations by the mid-70s, who in addition to the above disciplines, received instruction in more specialized skills such as propaganda, psychological warfare, and assassination.  

The North Korean State Security Department had reportedly also used the trainees as area specialists and foreign language instructors.

The rising political star of Kim Jong-Il—who by 1973-4 had become a Political Bureau member, and Party Secretary by 1980—within the selectorate was particularly critical to the regime’s acceleration of terrorist and other aversive behaviors mentioned above. By most available indications and reports, these maneuvers constituted further attempts by Kim Il-Sung to shore up legitimacy among the national security establishment by moving forward the militarization campaign he had begun the decade before, and restructuring of the DPRK’s intelligence community to consolidate the future position of his son, who increasingly monopolized those organizations involved in “international revolution” and anti-ROK subversion. In what proved soon to be the most influential reorganization of DPRK security and intelligence assets to date, the powerful Research Department for External Intelligence (RDEI) was thereafter reconstituted and subordinated directly to Kim Jong-Il. The timing of these moves, moreover, were, at least in the view of this author, also critical in and of themselves, as they followed a near-six-year lull in well-executed anti-ROK operations. Indeed, from approximately 1976-

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747 Bermudez, “Terrorism: The North Korean Connection,” 37
748 Ibid., 39
1983, a far more technically proficient ROK security apparatus, backed by superior resources from a government now asserting itself as a rising global economic player, was better-suited to neutralize most DPRK infiltration attempts, and in July 1979 arrested 11 members of a North Korean spy ring that had been active for nearly 20 years.\textsuperscript{749} The Great Leader, by this point comfortable in his fulfillment of the primary component of the Three Fronts strategy devised in 1964–consolidating revolution of the Fatherland–was compelled to entrust the two remaining and perhaps most important pieces of the puzzle–a complete revolutionizing of the ROK, as well as the deployment of \textit{hyŏngmyŏng yŏngnyang}, the revolutionary forces to be used abroad to secure the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Korea and battle all imperialists–to the next generation. The fact that he could accomplish this level of regime security so far in advance of his 1994 death, moreover, spoke volumes to the institutional sophistication of the garrison state he had cultivated in P’yongyang, as well as the vitality of \textit{suryŏngje} to the continued legitimacy of the Kim clan.\textsuperscript{750}

This process had become well-ingrained by the early 1980s, as key selectorate constituents loyal to both Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il now exercised a virtual monopoly over foreign operations. The Reconnaissance Bureau, for example–operated directly by the General Staff–controlled domestic training in addition to handling some agents abroad, while the Liaison Department–under the auspices of the KWP-CC’s Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau–established a “Foreign Operations” section.\textsuperscript{751} The latter was responsible for planning the 1983 attempt on South Korean President Chun

\textsuperscript{749} Ibid., 40-1
\textsuperscript{750} \textit{Kim Il Sung chŏkjak sŏnjip} [Selected Works of Kim Il Sung], vol. 3. Pyongyang: Chosŏn Nodong-dang Ch’ulp’ an-sa, 1968, pp. 150-1, cited in Koh, “The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea,” 123
\textsuperscript{751} Bermudez, “Terrorism: The North Korean Connection,” 29-30, 44
Doo Hwan in Rangoon, and delegated its actual execution to the Reconnaissance Bureau sniper brigade. The 695th Unit, the KPA’S guerilla/unconventional warfare training school, was expanded to handle a bolstered domestic instruction program, and its commander, General Choe Hyon, would later become Minister of National Defense. Other key operations, including a multitude of exercises designed to subvert the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and the bombing of KLA Flight 858, soon followed suit.

The KLA Flight 858 operation, authorized on approximately 7 October 1987 by RDEI Director Yi Yong-hyok, was considered especially critical. As a report by South Korea’s national intelligence service, the K.C.I.A., relayed Yi’s orders, “This project, to be carried out at a critical juncture in time will pour cold water on the desire of all nations of the world to participate in the Olympics and will deal the south Korean puppet regime a fatal blow.” Kim Hyŏn-hŭi—a female foreign intelligence agent, who, along with one male colleague named Kim Seung-Ill, carried out the bombing (and defected to South Korea shortly thereafter)—recounted that her first briefing regarding the operation was delivered in private by Director Yi himself, who began by informing the two agents that the order was “written by Our Dear Leader himself, Kim Jung Il. Handwritten, that is.” Yi emphasized that the “whole mission is in fact Our Dear Leader’s own idea . . . it’s probably the most important undertaking that Foreign Intelligence has ever attempted. Our entire national destiny will depend on it.” Yi continued that the political climate of South Korea—at the time dominated by constitutional revisions in light of the 1987 pro-democratic student protests, as well as critical legislative elections, in which the

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752 Joseph S. Bermudez, “North Korean Special Forces,” 133-6
753 Bermudez, “Terrorism: The North Korean Connection,” 30, 57
754 Ibid., 40-1
governing Democratic Justice Party of President Roh Tae-woo, a former general and close associate of Chun Doo-hwan, unprecedentedly lost its absolute parliamentary majority—was at its most volatile point since the “War of Liberation,” and that increasing the sense of chaos there would not only intimidate other nations from participating in the games for fear of either the destruction of their own planes or the subjection of their athletes to terrorist attacks once in Seoul, but also create actionable conditions for the reunification of Korea.\textsuperscript{756} The K.C.I.A. report further revealed that the two operatives underwent a month-long specialized explosives course from October to November 1987, during which they were closely supervised and briefed further by Director Yi, who repeatedly emphasized the importance and timeliness of the mission, as well as the fact its authorization came directly from Kim Jong-Il.\textsuperscript{757}

Under Kim Jong-Il’s guidance, P’yongyang also drastically beefed up its terrorist support infrastructure, assigning increased numbers off Special Purpose Forces personnel to the program, providing larger facilities and a greater number of courses, and making use of more overseas training facilities. The bulk of this training remained tightly connected to the selectorate’s upper echelons, as it was overseen by Special Purpose Forces personnel under the guidance of the RDEI, as well as the Liaison and State

\textsuperscript{756} Kim Hyŏn-hŭi, \textit{The Tears of My Soul}. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1993, p. 84

\textsuperscript{757} On the day of her departure from P’yongyang, Kim Hyon-hui was administered an oath in front of a picture of Kim Jong-II:

At this juncture, when the whole nation is undergoing the grand construction of socialism at the pace of the 1980s, the revolution in the South is at a high pitch and the enemies’ attempt to perpetuate the two Koreas is getting increasingly malicious, I, having been assigned to a combat mission beyond the frontlines, will keep in mind the Party’s trust and consideration, will abide by the Three Revolutionary Codes [for organization, mission and life] and will truthfully carry out my mission in close cooperation with my partner. I will fight to the death for the lofty authority and prestige of the beloved leader.

Cited in Bermudez, “North Korea: The Terrorism Connection,” 49
Security Departments. In contrast to the decade prior to Kim Jong-Il’s assumption of these portfolios, terrorist training had progressed to providing courses covering nearly every aspect of guerilla, revolutionary, conventional, and asymmetrical warfare, including a company commander course to 21 PLO members held in the DPRK between 1 April-10 October 1979. In addition, training programs grew considerably under the supervision of Kim Jong-Il, with an estimated 10-15,000 individuals trained within the DPRK, and an addition 5-8,000 trained overseas, by the 1990s.

It is also apparent that as these developments were taking place, selectorate success was correlated strongly with the operational efficiency of its attendant security institutions. In early 1984, for example, following the failed assassination attempt against ROK President Chun, Kim Jung-run–then director of the Unification Front Department and chairman of the Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau–was demoted from the KWP Central Committee Party Secretariat, and replaced by Ho Tam, an able North Korean diplomat and Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Father (and husband of one of Kim Il-Sung’s cousins). Reminiscent of the aforementioned proximity between the Blue House raid and seizure of the USS Pueblo, the North Korean security establishment appeared resolved to redeem itself immediately following the reshuffle–organizing an infiltration of the southeastern ROK port city of Pusan via a five-ton semi-submersible high-speed infiltration device, initiating a rendezvous with an agent already planted there, and bombing key public facilities.

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758 In addition to ten known active training facilities within the DPRK as of late 1989, the regime maintained ones, during one time or another, in Algeria, Angola, Chile, Cuba, Guyana, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, South Yemen (PDRY), Peru, Somalia, and Uganda.
759 Bermudez, “Terrorism: The North Korea Connection,” 53
760 Kim Nam-shik, “The Changing Power Hierarchy of North Korea since the 6th KWP Congress (I).” Vantage Point XII, No. 2 (February 1989)
Although the two North Korean agents were intercepted by ROK troops before disembarkation, they admitted upon capture they had undergone a staggering 25 iterations of simulated infiltration training in the DPRK prior to launch.\textsuperscript{762}

Kim Jong-Il further used his rising revolutionary profile within the security establishment to rein in other parts of the regime, including the foreign affairs bureaucracy. His enforcement mechanism in this regard was the Central Committee’s Organization and Guidance Department, which had overtaken the KWP’s Political Bureau as the primary overseer of “examination and control of the ideology of all key military-security organizations,” including the Ministry of Public Safety (Police), party National Security (Intelligence) Department, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). If investigations revealed that employees of these institutions had been influenced by “bourgeois” ideas, they were sent to a “revolution,” i.e. hard labor at a work farm or coal mine.\textsuperscript{763} Following 1985 Kim Jong-Il shifted power away from the KWP’s International Affairs Department—which formerly provided policy guidance to the MOFA, and oversaw party-to-party relations with other countries—to the MOFA, and limited the International Affairs Department’s oversight exclusively to international interparty diplomacy. This was followed by an elaborately orchestrated purge of the Department—during which the Dear Leader insisted on dance lessons for its officials in order to bolster their “diplomatic credentials,” mobilized actors and sponsored dance parties with the attendance of wives, and then proceeded to have other departments complain that the “bourgeois influence” had struck the International Affairs


According to Adrian Buzo, the DPRK’s foreign affairs bureaucracy began as a relatively successful network of objective intelligence-gathering institutions, which collected and disseminated a wide range of information on international and ROK affairs among Party cadres on a daily basis. Yet at the senior policy-making level, “the Kimist ideological framework has clearly and stringently affected their capacity to absorb and use broadly based, objective analysis of international political and economic trends;” the biased view of ROK society as evil and hell on earth, for example, played heavily into Buzo’s first-hand observation of senior MOFA officials.

This era of course also marked the escalation of North Korea’s nuclear research. Kim Il-Sung empowered, along with the DPRK Academy of Sciences, the KPA and Ministry of Public Security to oversee a rapid expansion of nuclear-related facilities, and development of infrastructure for a weapons program at Yongbyon. This site, some 56 miles north of P’yongyang, quickly boasted over 100 various nuclear facilities alone. Along with other facilities—including a 200 MWt power reactor at Taejong, nuclear research centers in P’yongson, Ch’ongjin, Pakch’on, Hamhung, Kimch’aek, and a subcritical facility at Kim Il-Sung University in P’yongyang—the North was now involved in activities ranging from reprocessing spent fuel to mining, dressing, smelting, and enriching uranium.

Since Kim Il-Sung’s 1967 militarization campaign and the developments that it engendered within the regime thereafter, North Korea’s selectorate has accrued a vast array of benefits and, by extension, incentives to maintain the aversive status-quo. This

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764 “North Korea: Defector Gives Inside Account of Politics,” 19
765 Buzo, “The Guerilla Dynasty,” 51, 256-7
fact is interestingly somewhat inherent to the juche system envisioned by the Great Leader all along. In contrast to most of its communist contemporaries in which power was divided and corporatized more diffusely—including the Soviet Union itself—Kim Il-Sung saw the guidance of an “exceptionally brilliant and outstanding leader” as essential to the mobilization of the masses. To perform its tasks said leader required an omnipotent revolutionary hierarchy directly under his command, rather than any series of various sub-leaderships.\textsuperscript{767} There also existed a strong precedent of lavish lifestyle by the Korean elite even during the era of partisan politics that preceded the suryŏngje. When the Soviet-Koreans held political sway in the North during the 1940s, for example, many were dismissed from their positions for hosting immoral parties and residing in opulent settings.\textsuperscript{768} In any event, the post-1967 leadership cartelized the entirety of the state’s lucrative operations. Let us highlight some key manifestations of this.

Participation in illicit revenue-generating activities among senior officials has been especially rampant. One of Kim Jong-II’s close associates, Chief Kil Jae-kyung—who served as ambassador in Stockholm in the 1970s—was declared personae non gratae by the Swedish authorities for trading in drugs.\textsuperscript{769} And O Kuk-yol—Chief of General Staff who was later promoted to membership in the National Defense Commission—and several of his family members were linked by U.S. and other intelligence agencies in the covert production and distribution of high-quality counterfeit $100 bills known as “supernotes.”\textsuperscript{770} In the 1980s, O Kuk-yol oversaw the Mirim Electronic Warfare Institute, a premier training center for electronic warfare, and reportedly established a

\textsuperscript{767} Tai Sung An, “North Korea in Transition,” 57-63
\textsuperscript{768} Suh, “Kim Il Sung,” 197
\textsuperscript{769} “North Korea: Defector Gives Inside Account of Politics,” 19
\textsuperscript{770} Bill Gertz, “Exclusive: N. Korea General Tied to Forged $100 Bills.” \textit{The Washington Times} (2 June 2009)
foreign trading corporation. He capitalized on these connections to later become a member of the Party Central Committee, and now Vice Chairman of the Defense Commission.771

The national security establishment is also intimately connected to the regime’s money-making operations and the most dynamic sectors of the state economy. The General Staff Department’s subordinate bureaus, for example, are linked to the 44th bureau of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF), which coordinates foreign currency earning activities with the Second Economic Committee. The latter is in charge of Office 99, the outfit reportedly responsible for arms sales, and the oversight of a “slush fund,” the proceeds of which allegedly flowed directly into the coffers of Kim Jong-Il and his senior staff. The Office is also believed to play the most prominent role in Pyongyang’s nuclear and other WMD and missile-related development programs, as well as arranging and conducting arms-related exports for cash.772 Throughout the 1980s, the North shipped some $3 billion worth of rockets, pistols, and submarines to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. A defector previously affiliated with the state munitions industry was dispatched to the Iranian island of Kish in 1987 to aid in constructing missile batteries that would permit Tehran to better control ship movements through the Hormuz Straits. The Iranian IRGC was the operation’s primary interlocutor, and its officers reportedly developed a strong camaraderie with the North Koreans.773 Chun Byung-ho—a North


Korean arms chief and head of the Second Economic Committee—and Yun Ho-Jin—former ambassador to the IAEA—leveraged their positions in the security apparatus to acquire leading roles in atomic weapons development, as well as the vast and spreading arms-trade. They established front companies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East and have partnered with Southeast Asian, Japanese, and Taiwanese criminal syndicates to move cash and contraband. Hwang Changyŏp identified Chun as the broker of a pivotal barter trade with Pakistan during the 1990s—in which in exchange for long-range missiles sent to Islamabad, the A.Q. Khan network supplied centrifuge equipment used in producing nuclear fuel—that significantly advanced Pyongyang’s nuclear infrastructure.\footnote{Jay Solomon, “North Korean Pair Viewed as Key to Secret Arms Trade.” \textit{The Wall Street Journal} (31 August 2010)}

The rise of Chang Song Taek, now perhaps the most important selectorate constituent to date,\footnote{Chang is the husband of Kim Jong-un’s aunt Kim Kyong-hui, a Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and was apparently promoted to 4-star general at the time of Kim Jong II’s death (as he paid his funeral respects in uniform). In 2010 he was elected a member of the Central Military Commission, a KWP organ that coordinates party activity within and infiltration of the military services; he is only one of 5 elite members to hold positions in both the CMC and NDC. See Andrew Salmon and David Blair, “Kim Jong-il Funeral: Kim Jong-un Steps up as Nation Mourns.” \textit{The Telegraph} (28 December 2011)} epitomizes the accrual of benefits that became possible through association with Kim Jong-II’s empowered national security establishment. Upon marrying into the family and taking a post as a notification instructor at Pyongyang KWP City Committee in 1972, he—like Qadhafi vis-à-vis the Libyan Revolutionary Committees—conceived of the idea of using diplomatic personnel to carry forth the revolution abroad by earning currency for the regime. Chang ascended the ranks quickly—in the early 1980s he was head of the Kim Il-Sung Youth League and youth labor brigades; in 1986 he was elected deputy to the 6\textsuperscript{th} Supreme People’s Assembly; in June 1989 an alternate KWP Central Committee member and full member by late 1992, at which time he became senior deputy director of the Organization Guidance
Department responsible for daily oversight of key judicial and security offices, including the Ministry of Public Security. He also became an affiliate of Taesong Corporation, which is a holding entity of Office #39, a KWP organization engaged in a range of such illicit activities as the production, smuggling, and distribution of narcotics and attempted procurement and transfer to the DPRK of luxury goods (including two Italian-made yachts, worth more than $15 million, for Kim Jong-Il). In December 2007, Chang became director of the reconstituted CC KWP Administration Department, giving him management responsibilities over the entirety of internal security agencies and policy inspection groups, as well as effective control over state-owned enterprise. Chang and his wife are tied to numerous state corporations and business dealings; i.e. supervising the construction of some 100,000 new apartment residences in Pyongyang, developing the Rason Economic Zone and other ventures with the PRC, as well as the Taepung International Investment Corporation and State Development Bank. Cronies attached to Chang’s patronage network have also benefitted immensely.

The case of Yun-Ho Jin is further indicative of how the level of entrenchment that has pervaded P’yongyang’s selectorate may militate against opportunities for the North’s socialization, even when they appeared possibly for the taking. A fluent speaker of both

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777 Specific narcotics activities include the production and sale of methamphetamines to small-scale North Korean smugglers for distribution throughout China and the ROK, as well the maintenance of poppy farms for production of opium and heroin.


779 Lee Young-jong, “Bigwigs in North Vie for Power Over Investments.” *Korea Joongang Daily* (5 July 2010)

780 Pak Myong-chol, for example—who had been removed as head of Korea Post and Telecom in 2003 and restored in 2005—became involved in dealings with the Egyptian firm Orascom, which built a 3G mobile network and developed Koryolink, one of the DPRK’s two cellular providers. Yi Kwang-gon—previously removed as Minister of Foreign Trade and installed as Deputy Director of Office #39—was a key player in the development of the Rason (known formerly as Rajin-Songbong) economic zone. See “Jang Song Taek.” *North Korea Leadership Watch*
English and German, Yun was regarded highly by the international community in 1985 upon arriving in Vienna to assume his IAEA ambassadorial duties. He also appeared dedicated to reversing the DPRK’s growing isolation by leading negotiations to arrange an IAEA inspection and overseeing a visit by Hans Blix, the agency’s then-managing director, to the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Yet as IAEA demands for inspections grew more robust following 1993, and the Clinton administration—in addition to alleging that Pyongyang was secretly stockpiling plutonium for a nuclear weapon, and demanding information as to the location of the materiel—threatened to bomb Yongbyon pending a halt to the negotiations, Yun apparently grew frustrated and “disappointed” in his dealings with the international community. He used his position increasingly to expand contacts with managers of companies, in addition to government ministries, abroad, and hinted to German IAEA official Willi Theis—then head of the agency’s safeguards division—that the collapse of the IAEA negotiations could facilitate his “having no choice” but to revert to directly supporting the state nuclear program. In 2003 a German businessman Hans Werner Truppel was arrested and eventually convicted for selling 22 metric tons of aluminum tubes to Yun, whose company—Namchongang Trading—was responsible for placing the orders—reportedly in conjunction with a state-owned Chinese aircraft industry—as well as furthering P’yongyang’s military ties to Burma.781

The conclusion of the 1980s presented a number of key challenges to North Korea’s leaders. On the domestic front, the 1994 passing of the suryŏng—Kim Il-Sung—took place amid several other devastations for which the DPRK’s dilapidated infrastructure was tragically underprepared: severe hailstorms in 1994; heavy flooding in 1995 and 1996 that affected over 1/3 of the national harvest of rice and grain and left

781 Solomon, “North Korean Pair Viewed as Key to Secret Arms Trade”
more than 5 million homeless; an extreme drought in 1997 that devastated as much as 70% of the maize crop; and further floods in 1999. The post-Cold War international environment presented a number of difficult challenges as well. In January 1991 the USSR, who had been the DPRK’s principal trading partner hitherto, unilaterally abolished the barter trading system in favor of trade in convertible currencies at world market prices. Moscow also gave notice that large-scale investment in the DPRK economy would be suspended, and that P’yongyang would have to start servicing its debt to Moscow. China insisted on payment for trade in hard currency at market prices instead of the long-standing barter arrangements and friendship pricing system; there had been a substantial reduction in the supply of crude oil and cereals to the DPRK even before the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{782} The escalation of tensions with the international community, the U.S. in particular, over North Korea’s nuclear issues also seemed to be reaching a head. By the early 1990s, contradictory elements within DPRK nuclear policy—i.e. wanting the world to know about its program, while simultaneously trying to avoid blame for its nuclear ambitions and expanding economic ties with other countries—were becoming untenable, and most intelligence sources—particularly South Korea’s National Defense Intelligence—assessed the North’s weapons program could be up and running by the mid-90s.\textsuperscript{783}

Yet North Korea’s responses to these trials marked a determination to hunker down and preserve the garrison—despite what attendant burdens this would unleash upon the populace—rather than, as Qadhafi was compelled to do, open up and risk its

\textsuperscript{782} Geldenhuys, “Deviant Conduct in World Politics,” 170
\textsuperscript{783} Michael J. Mazarr, \textit{North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation}. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. 48
The regime’s post-1994 doctrinal reorientation toward sŏngun chŏngch’ŏl—or military-first policy—was certainly critical in this regard. This did not represent a radical break in doctrine or strategy; indeed, as discussed above, military power figured deeply into the juche philosophy as well as the calculations of Kim Il-Sung. Sŏngun chŏngch’ŏl represented a tactical continuation of juche but with modifications reflecting the direction and pace of change, and signaling a shift in popular appreciation from guerilla fighters increasingly toward the regular army. Sŏngun chŏngch’ŏl afforded Kim Jong-Il an organic middle-of-the road strategy to continue paying homage to juche while taking critical ownership of it, at the same time shoring up his own support base within the military apparatus. Part of this seemed to include new projects and renovations in the name of “Military-First,” such as the Paekma-Cholsan Waterway, a gravity-fed irrigation system, which according to official media was “successfully completed and commissioned as a monumental edifice in the sŏngun era.”

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784 It is still important to acknowledge that the North has made concessions to limited economic openness for gradual foreign investment, as well increased its emphasis on light industry, in the post-Cold War period. Some analysts ascribe increasing importance to these maneuvers for regime liberalization. See, for example: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Kim Chong-il Praised ‘Light Industry Revolution.’” North Korean Central News Agency (8 August 1984) Geldenhuys, “Deviant Conduct in World Politics,” 170-1; Hassig, et al., “North Korean Policy Elites,” IV-3. Other narratives, however, conceive of planning laws adopted in the late 1990s that essentially re-codified the principles and praxes of a command economy, as well as such symptoms as poor infrastructure, the lack of a firm legal basis for private business, and ongoing interstate hostilities as sufficient to keep foreign investors at bay. See Buzo, “The Guerilla Dynasty,” 216-17; Cummings, “Korea’s Place in the Sun,” 426. Regardless of whether or not these changes are significant, the North continues to reference juche as a driver of its economic practices, e.g. a 2004 North Korean news report that pointed to the “successful” economic undertakings of the Kim Jong-Il government through, inter alia, “Juche self-reliance principle-oriented iron-making methods.” See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “North Korean Leader Carries on Father’s Policies—Legacy.” Korean Central News Agency (18 November 2004)

785 Michishita, “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns,” 6

786 Suh, “Introduction: Making Sense of North Korea,” 10


788 Chung, “The Suryŏng System,” 64

Developments on the nuclear front at this time surely lent themselves toward shoring up military support. Recall from above that Kim Il-Sung had made the KPA a key stakeholder in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program during its expansion in the late 1970s. Yet only a decade later, various economic, financial, and scientific snags, difficulties in nuclear procurement and further R&D resulting from P’yongyang’s enhanced political and economic isolation following the end of the Cold War, and pressure for IAEA inspections rendered the military aspect of the program subject to termination. The regime had apparently further undertaken measures to hide previous activities in violation of the NPT. ⁷⁹⁰

Other moves by P’yongyang’s center indicated a further shift toward the security establishment and away from the party. Following the Cold War for example, the regime omitted all references to Marxism-Leninism. The most critical of these, however, occurred on 23 May 1990 at the 18th session of the Central People’s Committee, during which Kim Jong-II established the National Defense Commission as its own independent organ. Whereas the Commission had been previously subordinated to the KWP Central Committee, it would soon rise to match and ultimately surpass it as the lifeblood of the state. ⁷⁹¹

The regime continues to frame practically all of its past and present international diplomatic achievements as a function of military prowess, including the Pueblo incident and nuclear diplomacy of the 1990s. ⁷⁹² The realization of the military-security sector as a central political actor toward the end of Kim Jong-Il’s tenure seemed to perhaps mark the

culmination of yet another iteration of the type of comprehensive militarization undertaken by his father four decades prior. In 2007, for example, the National Defense Commission increased significantly its number of full-time senior staff, part of which included a move of certain members of the top military brass who had traditionally held dual posts within their own commands as well as that of the Commission exclusively to the latter body.\textsuperscript{793}

\textsuperscript{793} “N. Korea Leader Stages Military Reshuffle to Bolster Power.” \textit{Agence France Presse–English} (21 May 2007)
CHAPTER 6: NEGATIVE CASES—EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF ROGUERY IN INDONESIA AND ALGERIA

INTRODUCTION

Analysis of negative cases—those whose common antecedent conditions, which, in addition to sizeable yet non-great power autocratic regimes assessing the threats of third world state-building, while struggling to chart novel post-colonial trajectories, we can conceive for the purposes of the present chapter as states: 1) with majority Muslim populations in which Islamic identity played a key role in the independence struggle; 2) in which the question of Islam in national politics was germane internally to post-independence statebuilding debates, and 3) in which the military-security apparatus was a principal national institution perceiving itself as having a significant stake in said debates; rendered their construction of either an Islamist securitocracy or secular garrison state possible yet ultimately unrealizable—brings into sharper focus the operability of key variables contextualized in the positive cases, namely differentiation and the benefits associated with it.

The relevant post-independence regimes in Indonesia—under the “New Order” system of Suharto from 1967-1988—and Algeria—under the military-backed format of Chadli Benjedid and his presidential successors from 1977 until the present—and their respective aftermaths are well-equipped for such an analysis. The fact that these negative cases present two distinct trajectories, in and of themselves, of how states so endowed can survive or change stripes without going rogue adds a further layer of depth to our inquiry.
PANDERING TO PANCASILA—THE NEGATIVE CASE OF INDONESIA

Given a democratic transition in the late 1990s and its subsequent deepening following the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia represents what Western observers would probably consider a “better-case” scenario. Like its counterparts in the rogue population, the country deservedly bore a deep distrust of outside powers. Dutch colonial rule, which strangled the archipelago and exploited its local divisions since the 17th century, left a devastating impact on national politics,794 and jockeying between Japanese and Allied forces throughout the WWII era imposed cruel conditions on locals. These dynamics provided fertile ground for intensive anti-colonialism within Sukarno’s post-independence rhetoric and policy, while Indonesia’s substantial size795 left the question of foreign adventurism on the table. Armed with a powerful military who—along with a vast arsenal of local militia—suppressed mercilessly various domestic insurgencies throughout the independence era, demonstrated aggressive posturing toward Malaysia, and reportedly harbored intentions to develop nuclear arms,796 Jakarta appeared well on a potential path to roguery. The pervasive presence of Islam throughout both the entirety of anti-colonial resistance as well as the nascent national consciousness,797 moreover, might arguably have also coaxed military leaders to, as in Sudan’s case, close ranks with their Islamist counterparts, particularly those santri who, throughout the 1950s and 60s were tightly affiliated with Islamist movements advocating a sovereign shari’a state.798

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794 Even after Indonesia’s independence in 1949, the Dutch retained control over the Western half of New Guinea until the early 1960’s (known as Irian Jaya, and since 2000 as Papua)
795 According to the CIA World Factbook, with an area of 1,904,569 sq. km (15), and population of 248,216,193, Indonesia ranks worldwide 15th and 4th, respectively
798 Indonesia’s Muslims are divided broadly into two groups: Santri—those Muslims who come from a traditional religious background; and Abangan—those who practice Islam nominally and often combine it with local custom.
Nevertheless, a number of factors—among both elites, civil and military, as well as the Islamist establishment—seemed to push Jakarta away from the route of roguery.

First, despite the intensity of anti-colonialism within Indonesia’s early public discourse, Sukarno—who from 1945-1967 served as the country’s first post-independence president—propagated an official worldview of Pancasila. In contrast to the reactive doctrines espoused in the latter cases, pancasila emphasized internationalism, vice self-isolation, as the linchpin of national survival. While Indonesian internationalism maintained an “aggressive” component through Sukarno’s vision of Indonesia as a gotong-royong (mutual help) state in the world struggle between “new emerging forces” (NEFO) and “old established forces (OLDEFO), Pancasila’s overarching emphasis was on international friendship, a “friendship among nations . . . possible only if all nations are free.” As Theodore Friend observed, through the design of Pancasila—translated simply from Bahasa as “five principles”—Sukarno had deftly added to the three major values of independence cited by Sun-Yat Sen—nationalism, democracy, and the popular livelihood—an “element of global humanity and hospitable monotheism.

Such a syncretic approach permitted Islamists—even some who proponed a religiously


“Sukarno, 23 December 1962, on Mohammed’s Ascension Day,” quoted in Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution. New Haven, CT: Southeast Asia Studies–Yale University, 1966, p. 27

These were: 1) Nationalism; 2) Humanity (neither humanism nor humanitarianism but rather a type of nationalism embedded within internationalism; a recognition that all humankind bears common characteristics; 3) Democracy (based not on plurality of votes, but on the ingrained Indonesia custom of deliberation to consensus); 4) Social justice; and 5) Belief in one Supreme Being.

oriented state—to see *pancasila* as generally accommodating, rather than contradictory to, the basic tenets of the faith.\(^{804}\) It also helped establish a precedent whereby the secular leadership and Islamists could resolve disputes through civil, vice militarized, approaches, such as an agreement to eliminate a contentious clause from the preamble to the 1945 Constitution mandating the implementation of *shari’a* law for all Indonesian Muslims.\(^{805}\)

Perhaps more important than *Pancasila*’s ideational content was the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*’s (Indonesian National Armed Forces, or TNI) dogged self-conception, as well as pervasive public regard, as the guardian of both the worldview and secular nationalism in general. The TNI’s official code of conduct, the *Sapta Marga* (translated as “Seven Pledges”), states unequivocally that no Indonesian soldier could explicitly adhere to any particular ideology that in any way contradicts *Pancasila*.\(^{806}\) In addition, the TNI’s tried-and-true legacy of fighting subversive forces seen as capable of dismantling the *Pancasila* state from the inside-out—which, in addition to the Dutch and Japanese, included the *Dar ul-Islam* revolts throughout the 1940s and 50s as well as such protracted communist insurgencies as the *Republik Maluku Selatan* (South Moluccan Republic, or RMS) of the 50s and late 1960’s—rendered it the paramount national institution capable of transcending the populace’s many ethno-religious stratifications.

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\(^{804}\) Assyaukanie, “Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia,” 16-7  
\(^{805}\) Robin Bush, “Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power,” 54  
and securing the flourishing of a multicultural society. Consequently, according to Ian MacFarling, *Pancasila* would remain the “sole basis” of TNI politics.  

Ironically, it was Sukarno himself who—by moving Indonesia closer to other Southeast Asian communist governments, and tacitly empowering Indonesia’s own *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Communist Party of Indonesia, or PKI), then the largest communist organization outside the USSR and China—would come to endanger this equilibrium. His overtures to the PKI, including provision of arms, facilitated its emergence as a virtual “fifth column.” When party sympathizers in the military, including elements from Sukarno’s palace guard, occupied key locations throughout the capital and assassinated six generals, it became too much for the TNI to bear, leading Suharto, then a major-general in the TNI and commander of Sukarno’s *Konfrontasi*—a series of limited political-military operations directed against the creation of an independent Malaysia—to take Indonesia’s reins.

If Sukarno’s tricky political configuration of “guided democracy” in the name of *Pancasila*, on the one hand, with an increasing sense of communist-leaning self-isolation and flaunting of international norms, on the other,  indicated a preference for socialization more in theory than practice, Suharto’s “New Order” advocated a fierce and unabashed dose of top-down secular internationalism as the necessary medicine for Indonesia’s proper reorientation. It was an approach not unlike that taken by Park Chung Hee in the ROK, discussed in the previous chapter. Suharto’s regime would deliver economic rehabilitation and development through an avowedly non-ideological

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808 Solingen, “Mapping Internationalization,” 529-31, 534-6, 540
authoritarian single-party apparatus, the GOLKAR, composed primarily of senior military officers and Western educated technocrats. Although Suharto did not refrain from making tactical overtures toward such national Islamist orders as the Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals when necessary—particularly throughout the 1980s as he cultivated their support to counterbalance the rise of certain ambitious officers—809—he would never entertain their becoming part of Indonesia’s power structure. Quite to the contrary, given the fact that the PKI was now largely out of the picture and the country faced no major external threats, the Islamists emerged as the TNI’s next likely target. As a matter of course, however, Jakarta’s national security establishment, unlike those of our positive cases, would avoid and condemn ideological infiltration at all costs. The TNI’s new Special Forces Command, or Kopassus, deployed intelligence operations intermittently and effectively against all potential enemies of the GOLKAR’s reinvigorated Pancasila—including, in addition to Islamists, student movements and criminal gang leaders who had fallen out of favor with the military chiefs. While an argument could be made that such repressive tactics brought Indonesia to the brink of normative inappropriateness—the military’s suppression of Acehnese separatism and occupation of East Timor resulted in some 200,000 deaths—they facilitated no immediate interstate destabilization, and following the end of the New Order era in 1999, a democratizing Jakarta was able to help deliver self-determination for East Timor, as well as a political settlement to Aceh in 2005.

None of this is to say that Suharto’s was a benevolent regime. Like other autocratic coalitions, the GOLKAR manipulated selective domestic and foreign commercial linkages to sustain significant corporate interests and holdings, all while

809 Rabasa and Haseman, “The Military and Democracy in Indonesia,” 84

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continuing to speak hypocritically in the name of national development and redistribution of wealth. Consequently, military officer-cronies and privileged families derived unparalleled economic security from monopolistic control over the imports of particular goods and licenses to exploit natural resources, including oil. To supplement his pervasive intelligence machine, Suharto lamented repeatedly the “possibility of a repeat of [the anti-communist crackdowns of] 1965,” which proved an extremely effective, albeit incredibly ruthless, shock and awe tactic. Regardless of these facts on the ground, when confronted by massive popular demonstrations following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, a number of key characteristics both within and outside the country permitted Jakarta to democratically transition rather than retrench or backtrack into the grips of a rogue regime.

On the geo-strategic level, Indonesia and its TNI were fairly safe in the knowledge that both no outside state nor domestic insurgency could realistically prosecute an overwhelming conventional attack against the massive and dispersed archipelago. Its strategic location along or astride the major sea-lanes linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, moreover, would clearly render Indonesia a continued beneficiary of massive foreign aid—in the form of both security and financial assistance—for the foreseeable future. As a result, it would have been increasingly more difficult for the security establishment to propagate a backlash regime on the basis of any credible external threats. Yet in addition to that, the military, despite its massive political ascension under the New Order—the concept of dwifungsi (dual functionality), promoted by Suharto as well as such top commanders as former Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Haris Nasution, formally legitimized senior officers’ corporate representation in
parliament, cabinet, civil administration, and state industry—never seemed to shirk its primary image or responsibility as high protector of the Indonesian people. Indonesian military doctrine, for example, continued to emphasize sishankamrata (total people’s defense)—a plan of mass mobilization to defend the country, in the event of any assault, by mobilizing popular militias to supply TNI regulars with logistics, intelligence, and combat assistance until the arrival of reinforcements—in tandem with dwifungsi. Hence, as opposed to the cases explored hitherto, there remained within Indonesia’s political fabric a fundamental connection between citizen and soldier, something which not only reinforced steadily the TNI’s popular legitimacy, but also rendered progressively unappealing any elements seeking to offset this favorable balance. More secure from the threat of communism by Suharto’s reign, Islamists affiliated with such movements as the Dar ul-Islam and Komando Jihad remained the only such elements, making them unlikely candidates, on either a popular or elite level, for any type of national political role, whether overt—as in the cases of Iran and Sudan—or covert—as in the case of Pakistan. The TNI, as it were, would remain overwhelmingly resistant to ideological penetration.

Also critically important is that regardless of the rising presence of jihadi groups within the country, the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims continued to support a secular state based on Pancasila over a traditional shari’a format. The country’s two largest and most important religious organizations—the Muhammadiyah and Nahdat ul-Ulama—were key protest participants throughout the post-Suharto era, and student groups, women’s organizations, and NGOs affiliated with these Islamist networks played pivotal

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811 Robin Bush, “Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia,” 115
roles in voter education and elections monitoring, developing democracy education curricula in schools, and promoting human rights and religious freedom. A veritable Indonesian civil society—a further element largely absent from our population—which had maintained a relatively robust presence even under Suharto, provided further nourishment to the progress of national political development.812

The overall presence of these variables, and their interaction, provided a context in which military leaders could largely resist temptations to hijack the democratic transition process. New civilian elites, for their part, were able to take expedient actions to depoliticize the security establishment, separating police and military functions, and revoking the right of active-duty officers to sit in parliament or hold political party positions. While TNI officers could retain some of their business holdings left over from the New Order, even this would eventually become the subject of tighter state controls. Given their stake in a backlash existence, and attendant prospering, of rogue regimes, such a scenario would have appeared virtually unthinkable to the security establishments of our rogue population. The TNI, with its deserved—though to no small extent, unquestionably tainted—heritage of defending the country from enemies foreign and domestic, managed to strike a balance between protecting its own interests while instituting a widely acceptable vision for national progress, playing a behind-the-scenes roles in a democratic transition without forcing any particular outcome.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that U.S. policy toward Indonesia—which, like most other developing countries throughout the “third wave,” included “Washington Consensus” demands for more highly mobile capital, unrestricted investment rights, and

strategic liberalization—was not perceived by the top brass in Jakarta as imposing new and
inorganic realities from scratch, but rather an opportunity to move extant visions for
genuine internationalism forward. Particularly under the weight of the Asian financial
crisis, Indonesia was unwilling to upset the IMF and other major international
institutions—whose loans, numbering a staggering approximately $40 million between
1998 and 1999, constituted the lifeblood of national revitalization—even if it meant facing
international condemnation and accepting responsibility for the East Timor campaigns,
which it did not only from the United States, but also Japan and other key world
powers.\footnote{In fact, then U.S. President Bill Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen threatened bluntly to
suspend IMF and other loans to Indonesia unless the military accepted peacekeeping forces in East Timor, which
it eventually did.}
ALGERIA–THE SOULLESS GARRISON

The Algerian case—which, due to space limitations and relatively less reliable intelligence on its military-security establishment, I will assess in slightly lesser detail—yields strong parallels to Indonesia, in terms particularly of its core antecedent conditions—sizeable land and demographic resources, a powerful army, semi-rentier economy, past dalliances with the non-aligned cause, and most importantly a calculated reluctance to allow Islamists near the major centers of national power. Its leadership also harbored a relatively steady outward orientation toward the international community—as opposed to an inward perspective revolving around rejectionist mythmaking—to keep the post-independence polity afloat. As Clement Henry and Robert Springborg note, Algiers adjusted far more quickly during the late 1990s to structural adjustment programs set out by the “Washington Consensus” than did Egypt or other “star pupils” of the IMF. Rather than, in conjunction with these reforms, embrace democratic openings later throughout its tenure, however, Algeria diverged from Indonesia by retreating to a much narrower and harsher brand of autocracy, in which a de facto behind-the-scenes ruling military junta has sanctioned (and, in some cases, fabricated evidence to perpetuate) fairly brutal repression against its internal enemies, namely the Islamists.

Algeria’s trajectory represents an important, albeit tragic, truth within current international politics: With the right combination of structural circumstance and deft political maneuvering, a regime can remain perceived as internationally socialized—i.e. not rogue—while still stubbornly, yet successfully clinging to the reins of brute tyranny.

814 According to the CIA World Factbook, Algeria ranks 10th worldwide in terms of land area (2,381,741 sq. km) and 35th worldwide in terms of population (35,406,303)
815 According to Freedom House’s 2011 ratings, Algeria ranked as “not free”
As opposed to Indonesia, in which democratization occurred in tandem with—and arguably as a natural extension of—structural adjustment, the Algerian state was willing and able to massacre tens of thousands of civilians to create space for what proved draconian economic policies. In spite of this, Algeria’s selectorate has also worked seemingly hard and well to prevent the type of both differentiationist mindset and on-the-ground developments that could facilitate its going rogue. What might help explain Algeria’s continued practice of seemingly cool authoritarianism as opposed to either roguery or the more “progressive” post-New Order trajectory of Indonesia?

Algeria has had as extensive a negative association with outsiders as Indonesia or any of its rogue counterparts, if not more. Beginning in 1830, France had organized Algeria’s northern territory into colonial overseas departments to the exclusive benefit of French farmers and businessmen, while isolating Muslim populations in the rural hinterlands of the south. Independence was finally achieved in 1962 only after a very bitter eight-year anti-colonial war. Like Indonesia, Algeria’s nascent military had cut its teeth throughout the independence struggle; its future generals hailed from ranks of fighters associated with the *Front de Libération Nationale* (National Liberation Front, or FLN, which would subsume the ruling party after independence), and viewed themselves as protectors of a secular order which generally regarded Islamists as *personae non gratae*. While the Association of Algerian ‘Ulama (AUMA) did in fact play a key role throughout Algerian politics prior to the liberation war, its organizational deficiencies relative to the FLN rendered it largely powerless to assert its position, especially vis-à-vis the imposition of a *shari’a* state, following independence. The organization’s ideational

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contributions were nonetheless undeniable, with Islamic symbols occupying a pervasive place in early statebuilding discourse, and leaders from various FLN factions invoking reformist Islam to bolster the legitimacy of their claims.\textsuperscript{818} Given such a particular permutation of conditions—an effective and battle-hardened military-security apparatus and Islamist establishment which, although popularly legitimate, did not, as in the Indonesian case, pose salient security threats to the regime early on—hitherto unseen in this dissertation, probing the worldview of the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP) should provide key clues regarding the Algerian trajectory.

In contrast to both Indonesia and the Islamist securitocracies, Algeria’s political-military elites, although classically committed to notions of anti-Western resistance, have apparently lacked any systematically defined vision for national progress, including the state’s place in the regional order, that could either potentially outmatch the selectorate’s hold on power or constrain its room for maneuver. To the extent it is even possible to speak of an official Algerian worldview, the analyst cannot overlook a sense of clear ambivalence. FLN governments have lent support to such various “anti-imperialist” Third World causes as the Palestinian liberation struggle, yet displayed a clear uneasiness about their links to the wider Arab world. Algeria’s fairly homogenous elite is, to the contrary, relatively relaxed about its Arabness, often reminding interlocutors they are distinct from the Mashreq and see their orientation as somewhat Euro-Mediterranean. And despite stewarding a gruesome independence struggle, the elite—its officer corps in particular—was and remains largely impressed by French language and culture. Belaid Abdessalam, Algeria’s chief economic planner throughout the 1970s, for example, drew

\textsuperscript{818} Michael J. Willis, \textit{The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History}. Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1997, pp. 35-7
much of his inspiration from French economist Gerard Destanne de Bernis, whose *dependencia* leanings broke from traditional disconnection theorists like Andre Gunder Frank and advocated a model of self-reliance in which opening to the outside world could proceed through very tight state controls.\footnote{Clement M. Henry, “Algeria’s Agonies: Oil Rent Effects in a Bunker State.” *The Journal of North African Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 68-81, 69} Internationalization, as it were, became linked increasingly to the selectorate’s maintenance of power and status, rather than either a defined entrepreneurial vision of national evolution or comprehensive professionalization of the military.

This stark reality was by no means predetermined; throughout the 1962-65 tenure of Ahmed Ben Bella, fierce rhetorical commitments to “positive neutrality” and “non-alignment,” as well as public commiseration with seemingly all causes Arab and *Maghrebi*, led many governments throughout non-Arab Africa to believe that Algiers would champion subversive movements throughout the continent. At this time more than ever, perhaps, the foundations for roguery were present. During the FLN 1964 Congress, party apparatchiks, as well as opposition elements from Islamist and Marxist movements, had even gone so far as to declare the army—which was after all the only organized national institution—a potential adversary. When at this critical juncture, the military under Houari Boumedienne overtook the state, it clearly renounced all “revolutionary romanticism” and vowed to restore order through a modern economic approach. Algeria’s generals, unlike their counterparts in Libya or the Syrian Ba‘th’s Revolutionary Command Council, remained since independence altogether uninterested in fashioning themselves as guardians of a sacred backlash order; and the historical record portrays their minimal presence within discussions of such rising regional rogue counterparts as
Syria and Iraq. Government expenditures on the Algerian military relative to these other states, we should note, were also remarkably low.\textsuperscript{820}

Boumedienne’s successor, Chadli Benjedid, furthered this process by steering Algiers away from Soviet clientship, and in 1985 heightening ties to Washington, beginning with a state visit.\textsuperscript{821} This reorientation has over time imbued the Algerian selectorate with a hard pragmatism allowing leaders to assume a cool, albeit ruthless, and workmanlike approach to dealings with the West.\textsuperscript{822} A coterie of seasoned diplomats—among them Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia, who was instrumental in negotiating the 1981 release of U.S. hostages from Tehran, and Lakhdar Ibrahimi, U.N. special envoy to Afghanistan following 9/11—assisted this process of presenting Algeria as a socialized country within international forums.\textsuperscript{823} In addition, Algeria’s first wave of flag-rank officers—French educated former guerrilla commanders who with the accrual of power promoted themselves from colonel to general—remained highly influenced by their francophone professional training, continuing to use French, rather than Arabic, as the lingua franca of day-to-day military business. Like the other cases explored hitherto, they also became accustomed to the good life, initially embezzling from state-run industries while the general populace suffered in the context of an underperforming and bureaucratically bloated dirigiste system, and later reaping immense economic gains through speculation in the new “liberal” economy ushered in by Chadli’s reforms. While a similar process unfolded throughout the Indonesian New Order, Algeria’s technocrats and military officers would, in contrast to the GOLKAR, never come to see or work eye-

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\textsuperscript{820} Charles Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present. London: Hurst, 1989, pp. 136-8
\textsuperscript{821} Keenan, “The Dark Sahara,” 134
\textsuperscript{822} Graham E. Fuller, Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State? Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996, pp. 10, 17
\end{footnotesize}
to-eye. Rather, if technocrats like Abdessalam and his protégés in state industry attempted to carve out independent space within the system, the dense mafia-like network of competing “military clans” and business extensions would visciously outmaneuver them, resulting in large-scale purges throughout the 80s.824

The rise of Algerian Islamism—specifically that of the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS)—can be traced to the riots of 1988, a popular backlash that materialized when declining international oil prices rendered the PNA’s extant spoils system increasingly unsustainable. Unlike Indonesia, who had over the years beat back its Islamist problem through repression and deft political neutralization, Algeria was now face to face with Islamism as a formidable force for the first time in its post-Ben Bella consolidation. For its part, the military was unprepared to permit any more flexibility than it previously had. Indeed, while the 1976 National Charter might have enshrined Islam explicitly as a guiding component of the state ideology and personality, it also made sure to emphasize that Islam was “linked to no particular interest, to no specific clergy, and to no temporal power . . . the erection of [state] socialism is identified [sufficiently] with the blossoming of Islamic values.”825 So when in December 1991 Islamist politicians associated with the FIS poised themselves to dominate parliamentary elections and thereby transform Algeria into an Islamist state, it was not hard to see why the military cancelled them and stepped back into power.

An analysis of developments within Algeria since the subsequent “civil war” lends further credence to the observation that Algeria was afraid of approaching an Islamist securitocracy. The FIS’ *Da’wa* Organization, for example, was devoted to

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824 Henry and Springborg, “Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East,” 120-1
penetrating the military and intelligence establishment and brainwashing susceptible young officers, while PNA doctrine was intent on maintaining a unified fighting force rather than delegate violence to militia outfits. The generals, representative of perhaps the most secularized elements of Algerian society, feared Islamist ascendancy because of the damage it could do to their vision—however tainted—of guided internationalism. Many of their wives, for instance, worked as schoolteachers witnessing first-hand the rising infiltration of Islamist credos into the educational milieu. The FIS program, the brass feared, might abrogate not only its wives’ ability to work and lead public lives, but also its own ties to Europe and the outside world—inter alia, French language and literature—that had come to define the PNA’s corporate identity.

These fears were evident in the sheer relentlessness with which the Algerian intelligence community pursued its Islamist adversaries throughout the 1990s. Smaïn Lamari, counterintelligence chief of the Direction des Renseignements et de la Securite (Directorate of Intelligence and Security, or DRS), reportedly told subordinates in January 1992, “I am determined to eliminate 3 million Algerians if necessary to maintain the order threatened by the Islamists.” Other officials—such as General Mohammed “Tewfiq” Mediene—and security agencies—such as Securite Militaire (SM)—reportedly penetrated and backed elements of Islamist forces such as the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), going so far as to even carry out atrocities while disguised as jihadi fighters, to legitimize receipt of continued financial and diplomatic support from the U.S. on the

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826 Fuller, “Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State,” 95, 99
grounds of a counterterrorism partnership. For its part, the U.S. has at least passively incubated these trends. Washington’s fears of Algeria going the route of other rogues—namely Iran in 1979 and Sudan in 1989—and nourishing extremism that could spread into southern Europe, have continued to fuel the military, while Western conglomerates like Halliburton have tightened their grips on the Algerian oil market.

A few other noteworthy variables help to shed light on Algeria’s trajectory of foregoing both roguery as well as a more “enlightened despotism.” One is the nature of the Islamist establishment itself. Unlike the bulk of Indonesia’s Islamists, who by the time of the New Order no longer espoused serious designs on hijacking the state, or those of the Islamist securitocracies whose adverse perception of the outside world the regime exploited dangerously to its advantage, the FIS were expressing completely new designs for Algeria’s foreign and security policies, which of course the PNA saw as within its exclusive domain.

Due also in no small part to the repressive nature of post-independence governments, Algerian civil society—religion in particular—was given little opportunity to independently expand. This had the unfortunate effect of precluding the proliferation of more moderate organizations, which, like the Indonesian Nahdat ul-Ulama or Muhammadiyah, could initiate a dialogue permitting Islamist groups to participate in the system without overhauling it in favor of a fundamentalist agenda. It also reinforced the international community’s (to a certain extent, legitimate) fears that the Islamist groups

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829 Keenan, “The Dark Sahara,” 147-9
existing within Algeria were too radical for their own good, as well as the government’s ability to continue casting the entire Islamist establishment as firebrands and outlaws, despite the presence of some moderate elements.\textsuperscript{832} Algeria also represents an interesting exception to other Middle Eastern “bunker states” that went rogue—Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Iran—in that its regime did not feature tribal or religious minorities linking themselves to the selectorate to, in part, justify rule over an unwilling or restive majority.

\textsuperscript{832} Shirley, “Is Iran’s Present Algeria’s Future?”
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Throughout the course of this dissertation, I have attempted three primary tasks.

**First**, in contrast to the extant conventional academic and policy wisdoms, I made the case for roguery as a viable concept within the contemporary study of international politics. To this effect, Chapter 2 reviewed the concept of socialization—essentially the process by which nations internalize norms originating outside their own borders—and established its generally agreed-upon parameters within modern international society, specifically in regard to security—and to a lesser extent, economic—conduct. This exercise allowed us to hone in on the particular puzzle presented by rogue states, that is, why do countries—which, for our purposes, I limit to autocracies—of *marginal* military and economic stature—in other words neither great powers nor revisionist ones genuinely capable of overturning the global status-quo—pursue policies that isolate them from potential regional colleagues and at times the wider international community, and ultimately prevent them from living up to their full political-economic potentials?

I further delineated and expanded upon the particular practices inherent to anti-socialization—or, as I term it, *aversion*: A) *Suppression*, explained as acts of extreme internal repression bearing interstate consequences; and B) *Provocation*, constituent of the three principle sins of: Bₐ) WMD procurement; Bₐ) sponsorship of terrorist and other illicit non-state entities; and Bₐ) regional destabilization; and argued that their perpetuation among marginal actors is not only out of sync with globally conceived notions of appropriateness, but also seemingly unnecessary among the ever-adapting community of surviving authoritarian states. Upon establishing a population of cases based on these criterion, I further differentiated rogue states from other types of regimes
with which they are typically confounded: 1) Pariah, or isolated states, those excommunicated from the outside world solely—or at least overwhelmingly—at the international community’s discretion, due likely to the latter’s intense disapproval of one or a number of the former’s policies; 2) Genuine practitioners of defensive isolation, which as a result of their regimes’ perceptions of the uniqueness of their official institutions and ideas, feel compelled to safeguard themselves by remaining hermetically—and non-provocatively—sealed off from the outside world; 3) Challenger states, regimes whose behaviors have not (yet) escalated into full-fledged aversion, but assume rhetorical and policy postures favoring an ideational strain alternative—or at least generally non-sympathetic—to the normative status-quo of their respective regions; and 4) Failed states, whose possible display of certain aversive tendencies—especially providing safe havens to terrorist groups—is more a result of their being unable to both perform the basic functions of government and maintain control over large swaths of territory, than any intentional or purposive policy program of the regime nominally in power. Rogue states, as I submit, are those residing in the bizarre orbit between types 1 (outside-in) and 2 (inside-out).

**Second,** in the spirit of path-dependence, I established a theoretical framework to account for both the onset and perpetuation of roguery. Why and under what conditions, in other words, do countries purposively adopt the practices of aversion? And once they have initiated this rogue pathway, what sorts of domestic and foreign policy strategies aid in their survival? This framework is primarily grounded in the current comparative politics wisdom on authoritarian regimes, and builds from the assumption that rogues—like all other autocracies—seek survival first and foremost. A deeper look into Barbara
Geddes’ (1999) seminal study on authoritarian durability brought me to conclude that all cases within my population operated through “hybrid set-ups;” in other words, as opposed to their oft-cited characterization as either dictatorships (i.e. personalist regimes), military regimes, or single-party regimes, rogues exhibited tendencies–of course to varying degrees–of all three, and further displayed a common overwhelming proclivity to field senior security apparatchiks in the very upper echelons of the regime. A compelling explanation of rogue behavior, then, had to focus on not only the individual leaders at the helm of their regimes, but also their relations to the selectorate, i.e. the subset of the wider population–which, in the case of autocracies, we might conceive as a ruling “coalition”–possessing a say in policy outcomes.

Situating rogue states within the wider conventional wisdom on authoritarianism permitted me to arrive at the study’s central question: What was it about the selectorates in these cases that inspired them to steer their respective states along a trajectory of aversion? A cursory overview of the rogue population and consideration of the available theoretical literature (particularly Solingen 2001; 2007) led me to focus on the issue of worldviews–those sets of ideals, principles, and doctrines that explain how society should work, what aspects of the current societal order need be revised and corrected, why these imperfections existed in the first place, as well as blueprints for achieving these ends. While we may conceive the majority of nation-states, whether democratic or autocratic, as operating according to progressive worldviews–those which emphasize the state’s own cultural and historical experiences to define and over time, reformulate and reinvent, a place within the international community–some adopt reactive ones. Characterized by a sense of historical nihilism, reactive worldviews underscore a notion–often a completely
justified one at that—that the world outside has treated the state unfairly, perhaps leaving it beggared relative to its neighbors, or vulnerable to attacks—whether physical or ideational—from the outside. They espouse perceptions of threat increasingly through a filter of encirclement, a siege mentality, which in the mind of extant or budding political entrepreneurs necessitates what I call differentiation—the belief that survival entails internalizing and routinizing practices and behaviors that further distinguish, rather than connect, their states to the outside world.

The success or failure of the political entrepreneurial establishment—which, as my case-studies demonstrate further, may range from large single-party apparatuses and ethno-sectarian groupings to specific families and religious scholars—in identifying an ideationally receptive coercer willing to attach itself to said establishment’s vision, neutralize those who would stand in its way, and ultimately commit itself to the practices deemed to further differentiation, marks the critical juncture at which states do or do not become rogue. A period, or successive periods, of intra-elite outbidding, during which our entrepreneurs cultivate resilient linkages to their chosen enforcer to either marginalize or eliminate outright those advocates of socialization—in most cases represented by those more technocratically inclined individuals seeking to devote state resources to whichever drivers of economic development—light industry, export-led growth, foreign investment, etc.—they feel will best suit the needs of a growing population, as opposed to the requirements of the selectorate’s backlash mission—is bound to follow suit. Upon colliding—as this moment most almost always seems to do—with an external balance of power perceived as highly unfavorable to the nascent status-quo, so arises the perception both that “extreme times call for extreme measures,” and further
demonstrations of selectorate resolve–imposing states of emergency, expanding the instruments of coercion, reorganizing military-security assets for confrontations and operations abroad, embarking upon WMD/nuclear research, etc.–are critical.

The subsequent self-perpetuation of roguery is traceable to a few broad factors. For one thing, once ruling coalitions have staked their very legitimacy on bold claims of saving the nation from a corrupted ancien régime or defense against existential adversarial forces, the behaviors purported to support those claims over time become ends in and of themselves, indispensable to the continued perceived success not only by the masses, but more importantly by the now vested constituents of the selectorate itself. Second, practitioners of roguery–like so many other social or political processes–undergo enhanced learning with the passage of time, developing a panoply of survival strategies–both domestic and foreign–with which to cope with the challenging and often lonely road of differentiation.

Among the most important of these in the international realm are: 1) Strategic clientelism, the practice of selectively manipulating and/or interspersing foreign relations among two or more patrons so as to avoid a particular overreliance on any one; 2) Doctrinal flexibility, the ability to undertake tactical reformulation of the worldview and straddle disparate ideological lines to accommodate fluctuating political circumstances; 3) Brinkmanship, upping the ante on aversive behaviors to extract diplomatic concessions in negotiations and stall addressing core or sensitive issues raised by the international community–such as human rights abuses and weapons programs–which might threaten the selectorate’s grasp on power; and 4) and The international cult of aversion, a support network among the sub-society of rogue and challenger states responsible for, inter alia,
the transmission of nuclear and WMD assistance, provision of safe haven and training facilities for terrorists, and conduct of arms transfers.

Nascent rogue states internalize a series of survival strategies on the domestic side as well: 1) Either purging or expanding the ranks of the selectorate depending on the needs of its mission; 2) Tailoring the worldview to equate notions of success and progress with ideational—as opposed to material—incentives, which in turn makes it easier to justify structuring political economies around the needs of the selectorate rather than the population; and 3) Further orienting the political economy to manage and offset the potential domestic political risks of external punishment, sanctions in particular. Finally, and in the spirit of the latter two points, roguery becomes entrenched because the selectorates who initiate it find ways to accrue immense benefits—power, prestige, material wealth, lifetime security for their families, control of key economic portfolios, etc.—from occupying positions for which they have come to believe only they are suited. By such logic, desisting the rogue pathway might concede the point that the services of the selectorate are no longer as essential as they once purported to be, leaving open the possibility for new centers of power to emerge, and, by extension, much for the old ones lose.

A number of intervening domestic factors, moreover—such as the presence of ethno-nationalist grievances, and rentierism—as well as international ones—such as the state’s geo-strategic orientation—can mitigate or intensify the reproduction of roguery. The success or failure of a rogue state, by extension, depends not only upon how deftly its selectorate masters the latter survival strategies and copes with the latter factors, but more importantly, how it manages itself in light of these trials.
Third, I produced case-studies of 5 rogue states–Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, Libya, and North Korea–and in so doing essentially attempted to tell their stories through the lens of my theoretical framework. Case selection occurred as a result of several considerations: 1) These cases represent the most prevalent two (out of four) subsets of rogue regimes I identified within the population–1a) Islamic securitocracies, or those states whose selectorates drew upon predominantly Islamist precepts and elements–intellectuals, clerics, paramilitary and terrorist forces, etc.–to shore up their credentials; and 1b) Secular garrison states, those whose selectorates came to depend–a-la Laswell–on various combinations of specialists of violence–large standing militaries, domestic and foreign intelligence apparatuses, warlords, defense and armaments industries, etc.–and disseminators of a reactive yet mainly temporal worldview–typically a large party and its associated propagandist elements, a charismatic leader (or leadership), and/or a mix of the two.

2) As per Table 2.8, these cases capture a fairly broad range of attributes along the institutionalization/revisionism matrix. In other words, they allow us to observe the unfolding of roguery in states whose systemic institutions were well-crafted and degrees of revisionist thinking in foreign policy goals high, and vice versa.

3) As part of an initial inquiry, or plausibility probe, into roguery as a subject of serious scholarly inquiry, they constitute cases conceivable as most typical–i.e. fielding high values on the dependent variable–and commonly associated with the rogue label (Iran, Libya, and North Korea), as well as ones with relatively lower values who are not (Pakistan, Sudan).
4) They all exhibit varying attributes, timings, and outcomes which—in addition to being of interest in and of themselves, or to area specialists—underscore the notion that while roguery is not as uniform a process or concept as some in the academic and policy establishments might like to believe, all of its associated cases do share common underlying threads, which hopefully my theory has at least begun to uncover.

Iran is indeed the sole genuine theocracy of the population, as well as the only case whose roguery was precipitated by a social revolution. The onset of differentiation there materialized very soon—although not immediately—after the 1979 Islamic Revolution itself. The clerical Shi’a establishment led by Ayatollah Khomeini sought to replace the corrupted regime of the Shahs—along with the repressive institutions their subservience to the West had facilitated—with a new vision based on strict divisions between good and evil, the oppressors (mustakbarin) and the oppressed (mustazafin), and to be carried out through *Velayat e-Faqih*, or Guardianship of the Jurisprudent. While this was a tall order to complete within Tehran’s complex post-revolutionary space, Khomeini found within the *Pasdaran*—or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—a willing enforcer who was able to prove its worthiness as a selectorate constituent throughout its zealous participation in the Iran-Iraq War, as well as subsequent command of critical operational portfolios which have become inherent to the regime’s mission of “exporting the revolution.” The consolidation of Iran’s system has become evident not only through the immense benefits accrued to the IRGC and clerics over the years, but also the fact that key power players in the regime appear, in one way or another, themselves current or former officers or associates of the *Pasdaran*. While those elites, particularly in Tehran’s civilian structure, who attempt reformism at the expense of
clerical visions may achieve occasional relative gains, their strategic success has time and again proven ill-fated.

Sudan and Pakistan demonstrate fascinatingly how the onset of roguery can materialize in reverse order. In other words, as opposed to a religious or spiritual establishment integrating a coercer to launch its reactionary vision, the militaries in these states became compelled to themselves integrate Islamist actors and ideals as a means to inject legitimacy into political systems that had, respectively, either failed outright or been perceived as corrupted and vulnerable to threats by senior officers for quite some time following independence. In Sudan–whose post-independence politics had been characterized by unstable fluctuations between successive civilian and military governments–Brigadier General ‘Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir closed ranks with the National Islamic Front of Shaykh Hassan ‘Abd Allah Al-Turabi by 1988 in a bid to bolster the military’s ruling credentials. In Pakistan–whose army and military intelligence services have since the mid-1970s alternated between ruling the country directly and exerting an overwhelming behind-the-scenes influence over civilian governments–the security establishment adopted Islamic credentials throughout the 1970s, particularly during the tenure of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, to bolster its status as both the leading national institution and sole defender against the Indian nemesis. In both cases, these maneuvers appeared to constrain the evolving policy priorities of their respective centers by heightening instances of aversion and bringing them into greater conflict with the international community even as this posture appeared progressively less desirable. The difference is that Bashir, apparently in firm control over his military instrument by the late 1980s, was able to successfully purge the NIF from
government and revert to a predominantly military-led autocracy. Pakistan, however—as a result of the messy, corrupt, and entrenched patronage-driven civilian political network that exists alongside its military establishment, as well as the seemingly unbreakable ties of said establishment to Islamist operatives forged throughout the anti-Soviet jihad of the late 1970s and maintained thereafter—demonstrates the pitfalls of pursuing roguery in an under-institutionalized context, including the gradual drift toward failed stateness that seems to be occurring at present.

Qadhafi’s Libya, which boasted fairly underdeveloped political institutions in tandem with an intensely revisionist domestic and foreign policy outlook, was a unique animal relative to the rest of the rogue population. As my analysis demonstrates, however, this uniqueness was by no means attributable solely to the visions and machinations of a leader viewed by many as erratic and irrational. Indeed, Qadhafi assumed power with a particular vision of leading and reviving the pan-Arab project at the time of its imminent demise. Unlike Iran, however, Libya did not succeed in locating an actionable blend of brain and muscle right at the outset. Indeed, the Colonel experimented initially with a number of permutations of the Libyan system—from the military-led regime of the Revolutionary Command Council from 1969-71, to implementation of single-party rule under the Arab Socialist Union from 1971-73, to the rule of Popular Committees as set forth in the Cultural/Green Revolution from 1973-77—while attempting to rely on his military as the projector of Libya as an Arab revolutionary power. As these efforts facilitated one disappointment after another—in particular, successive coup attempts from with the military domestically, and failed Arab unification schemes inter-regionally—Qadhafi in 1977 finally found what he perceived as a winning
combination. The Jamahiriyya operated subsequently through a diffuse distribution of domestic civilian power among the Basic People’s Congresses, while rendering a “revolutionary leadership”–comprised of Qadhafi himself, members of the original Revolutionary Command Council, and security apparatuses linked to the Revolutionary Committees–the mainstay of the regime. I argue that it was these processes that were behind the evolution of Libya as a rogue state. And while sanctions and deft international diplomacy–particularly surrounding the Lockerbie incident–were certainly critical in bringing Libya “in from the cold” toward the late 1990s and early 2000s, equally–if not more–important was the undeniable unraveling of this combination’s legitimacy and operability from the inside-out.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea represents perhaps the finest–or at least certainly most avid–practitioner of roguery within the population. My study of North Korea highlights that it, like Libya, was not necessarily born rogue, even in spite of the fact that it provoked a peninsular war in 1950, and that its soon-to-be suryŏng, or Great Leader–Kim Il-Sung–had begun devising the juche worldview during his pre-independence days as an anti-Japanese guerilla fighter. Rather, the onset of roguery in P’yongyang materialized as the result of a confluence of extremely trying international challenges–inter alia, the burgeoning Sino-Soviet split, a continued U.S. military presence, and 1961 military coup by Park Chung Hee in Seoul–and domestic exigencies–namely a nearly 15-year-long power struggle with contending factions of the Korean communist movement who favored heightening international linkages and light industry at the expense of Kim Il-Sung’s vision of self-reliance through a combination of collective agriculture and a heavy, military-centric industrial base–which in 1967
compelled Kim to undertake a comprehensive militarization campaign as the only means to systematize a juche-focused polity. The durability of this system, as well as the entrenchment of roguery within it, was demonstrated clearly not only by the onset of aversive practices immediately thereafter, but also from the mid-1970s onward, as the Great Leader paved the way for the succession of his son–Kim Jong-Il–by entrusting him and his associates with those elements of the North Korean security apparatus responsible for subversive and revolutionary operations abroad. The regime’s doctrinal reorientation from juche to sŏngun chŏngch’ŏl–or military-first–following the 1994 death of Kim Il-Sung, moreover, in tandem with P’yongyang’s relatively perpetual inflexibility regarding its nuclear posture, signaled the deep and ongoing synergy between the guarantors of North Korean power and those provocative behaviors upon which they must continue to stake their legitimacy.

Finally, negative case-studies of Indonesia and Algeria–in addition to some more minor references to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) within the DPRK case-study–help shore up our analysis by demonstrating why certain states with similar antecedent conditions and, arguably by extension, the potential to “go rogue,” ultimately veered away at the critical juncture depicted in the theory, or perhaps backtracked slightly later in time. That both of these cases constituted non-theocratic or religiously inclined regimes–yet featured majority Muslim populaces in which Islamic identity played a central role in the independence struggle, and questions of Islam’s role within both national politics and military affairs were central to post-independence statebuilding debates–renders their conclusions generally applicable across the entire spectrum of positive cases under review. My analysis of the respective regimes in Indonesia–under
the “New Order” system of Suharto from 1967-1988–and Algeria–under the military-backed format of Chadli Benjedid and his presidential successors from 1977 until the present–provided the added benefit of demonstrating two distinct pathways away from roguery. Indonesia, whose political-military establishment following the 1967 transition of power from Sukarno to Suharto committed itself to an internationalizing strategy perceived as constitutive of the Pancasila worldview, found its way to a democratic transition by the late 1990s. Algeria, whose military leadership resisted initial temptations to foreign adventurism in favor of a posture oriented increasingly toward the Euro-Mediterranean region rather than the Arab world, remains a closed autocracy. While the former scenario is of course more beneficial to everyone, both are arguably preferable to roguery from the standpoint of international society.

We can draw a number of further general conclusions from this analysis, many of which might be useful to both academics and policymakers concerned with rogue states. Perhaps the key lesson to take away from this dissertation is that rogue states are only as strong as the selectorates–and their attendant institutions–which guide them. Well-institutionalized regimes–particularly those like North Korea who field solidly Geddes’ three hybrid-autocratic criterion of personality, party, and military–are extremely difficult to break or deter. Assuming many rogues’ propensity toward successful strategic clientelism, unilateral sanctions or other forms of condemnation against them–particularly by states perceived as the primary adversary like the U.S.–shall likely remain futile. Given the importance of status and imagery within rogue selectorates, however, as well as a hard-nosed realization among their leaders that it is impossible and unprofitable to survive in the modern world without any friends, genuinely multilateral instances of
international shaming, particularly under conditions of auspicious timing, can yield relatively more beneficial results. The events surrounding North Korea and its disruptions of the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul provide a case in point.

While P’yongyang had engaged in numerous lesser attempts to subvert the games in their run-up, the clear association of the tragic bombing of KAL flight 858 on 29 November 1987 with North Korea’s external intelligence service set the stage for a particularly devastating international fallout. The Soviet Union applied tremendous political pressure as a result of both its own concerns as well as direct discussions between then-U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and his Soviet counterpart Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze on the eve of that year’s Reagan-Gorbachev summit. The severing of diplomatic ties with a number of countries, as well as restrictions on political and economic activities with even more, heightened the sense of seriousness with which P’yongyang came to view Soviet demands to desist from targeting the Olympics. Further security countermeasures taken by a number of countries appeared to raise the stakes of noncompliance: Japan, for example, revoked the passports of six Japanese women known to have links with North Korean intelligence agents, and cooperated with American and Filipino authorities in arresting key members of the Japanese Red Army in all three countries; Thailand commenced anti-terrorist measures in August by deploying commandos and armored units to Bangkok’s international airport; The Philippines undertook robust security measures in cooperation with the ROK; South Korea had since early 1984 been pursuing—and following the KAL bombing, intensifying—comprehensive preparations for the games, including placing its army on full alert and establishing an elite anti-terrorist task force tailored specifically to provide
security for the Olympic athletes and facilities; and the U.S. had made clear it would not rule out the use of military force to insure a peaceful Olympics—placing 42,000 ROK-based troops on alert, redeploying a squadron of U.S. Air Force F-18 fighters from Japan to Korea, providing continuous AWACS coverage of the Korean peninsula, and ordering one U.S. Navy carrier task force to conduct operations in the Sea of Japan. That all of these developments were occurring, moreover, during a period when Kim Jong Il’s competence within the North Korean power structure was reportedly being tested, might help explain why—despite a clear eagerness by P’yongyang to obstruct the games prior to the attack—by the time of the opening ceremonies early the following September, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement that it had not the slightest intention to obstruct the Games or threaten them by force of arms. If anything happens in south Korea during the Olympic Games, it will have nothing to do with us and the United States and the south Korean authorities themselves should be held responsible for it. As for “terrorism,” it is utterly alien to us and the United States itself is the chieftain of state terrorism as already exposed to the world.

In a similar vein, we must remain humble and realistic as to when and why the tools of coercive diplomacy might actually “work.” Nowhere is this more evident than in the case Libya, which is typically hailed as a paradigm of successful multilateral deterrence. Missing from such accounts, however, is in this author’s a view a sound appreciation for the dramatic changes taking place inside the Jamahiriyya that precipitated its eventual opening to the outside world. In a highly regarded 2005 International Security article, for example, Jentleson and Whytock posit that while the U.S. had begun to press in earnest for changes to the Qadhafi regime as early as the

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833 Bermudez, “North Korea: The Terrorism Connection,” 51-2
834 Kim Hyŏn-hŭi, “The Tears of My Soul,” 84
Reagan administration, conditions within Libya throughout the *Jamahiriyya* during the 1980s were not yet conducive. As my analysis suggests, however, the unraveling of Qadhafi’s revolutionary project was already quite evident by the conclusion of that decade, particularly in consideration of the failure of both his military campaigns in Chad and confrontations with the U.S., the lackluster and in many ways debilitating domestic responses to those events, and the rising abuses of the Revolutionary Committees, which ultimately had to be reined in. While Qadhafi was by the 2000s certainly desperate to save Libya’s crumbling economy and exposed to the rising influence of a younger generation of modernizers—at the time represented by his son Saif Al-Islam—increasingly staffing the country’s bureaucracies, the *a priori* assumption that he was desperate to reenter the international fold needs to be placed in its proper context. In other words, Qadhafi’s initial proclivities militated completely against international cooperation; his reentry into the global community, as it were, materialized predominantly as a result of realizing there was simply no other way to survive, and only following a period of tit-for-tat experimentation in which his regime gradually grew further accustomed to the idea. The Colonel’s reorientation away from pan-Arabism and toward pan-Africanism throughout the 1990s is a case in point. As he remarked in an interview regarding his political legacy:

> It must be remembered that Libya is now a member of the African Union. From now on there is no room for nationalism and ethnic claims. International communities based on regions and continents are more appropriate in our age. Libya belongs to the African continent and, as the Africans have decided to create the United States of Africa, we cannot run two types of policy at the same time: one policy for the Arab League and another for the African Union. It would be too difficult!  

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838 See, for example, Jentleson and Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya?” 81
In other words, the findings of this dissertation should urge analysts and practitioners to ascribe more weight to the relatively independent domestic developments that may—and in the case of Libya, did—undergird changes in rogue behavior, as opposed to placing the majority of the emphasis or expectation on external deterrence strategies.

On a number of levels, our findings unfortunately raise more questions—or what we might regard as inconvenient truths—than provide answers, further underscoring the realization that roguery is an extremely difficult process to stop. One of these truths is that the very antidote to roguery might also constitute its cause. According to one scholar, Pakistan prior to Zia, for example, featured a civilian administration and professional military-security apparatus, which, due to their strong linkages to the U.S. at the time, were technically and ideationally prepared for internationalization. Yet it was these very elements that Zia and his cohort condemned upon seizing power. In a similar vein, the North Korean case exemplifies how a rogue regime can instrumentalize a WMD program and the entire gamut of its associated activities to oscillate between outcomes viewed as both negative—such as missile tests—and positive—such as multilateral negotiation frameworks—by the international community. If played cleverly, as the P’yongyang leadership apparently has, this oscillation might proceed unbounded. By reverse logic, it is rather impossible to predict in advance how and when the conditions initially behind roguery’s genesis will in fact facilitate it, or a scenario of socialization instead. The Algerian and Indonesian militaries—just like the North Korean one—formed

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840 See, for example, Bilal Hashmi, “Dragon Seed: Military in the State,” in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (editors), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State. London: Zed Press, 1983, pp. 148-172, 163. As the author notes, “The military establishment in Pakistan, by the late 1950s was equipped, not only with formidable technical and material resources, but also with an ideological stance favourable to world capitalist interests. As the basic structural contradictions resulted in the political instability of Pakistan, the military took over the state apparatuses in alliance with the bureaucracy, and finally destroyed even the semblance of political democracy in Pakistan.”
and consolidated by cutting their teeth as anti-colonial/imperialist resistance forces. What they or regimes like them choose to do with that afterwards, and the lens through which they opt to see the world around them, are difficult forces for either policymakers to manipulate or academics studying them to control.

Given what this dissertation has revealed regarding the vitality of military and coercive institutions within rogue regimes, a number of policy focuses for the U.S. and other international actors and organizations may be warranted, including: 1) Encouraging a reorientation of the mission focus of national armed forces completely away from internal security and toward external defense, and by extension, removing the equities of internal security organizations in international activities and operations; 2) Promoting security sector reform that eschews ethno-nationalist or other forms of nepotism, and spurs cross-cutting capabilities within the society; and 3) Helping to allow the power players within these organizations to remain economically engaged while gradually phasing out their political stakes. The current situation in Syria and the experience of de-Ba'athification in Iraq highlight the potential pitfalls of removing too much power too quickly; and the seemingly continued influence of the generals in Burma’s military campaigns against the ethnic states—despite last year’s installation of a “civilian” government—moreover, is a true testament to how delicate such processes may prove.

Realizing these objectives is of course a tall, if not impossible, order at the present time, but that does not mean those of us involved in the rogue states conversation must sit idly by. We can start simply by improving the public debate on rogue states by developing a greater appreciation for the institutions that support them. As I have demonstrated, even Libya, generally regarded by political scientists and Middle East area
specialists as an aberration, and by historians as a state which fundamentally eschewed institutions, operated according to a type—albeit diffuse—of institutional logic. This means we, along with the intelligence and policymaking communities that protect and represent us, would be well-served to extend the discourse on rogue militaries beyond talk of capabilities and battle-ready assets, along with our conception of rogue security and intelligence services as mere instruments of internal political control, to the strategic-political functions of these organizations, their worldviews, and what this ultimately means for the regime and the individual leaders with which we too often casually equate it.

Scholars might also take care to pay more attention to the nuances of military doctrine within rogue states, for instance, the political role of such concepts as “irregular warfare” and “popular” or “people’s defense.” From the cases explored, there appears a high correlation between the inclusion of such notions and the pursuit of aversive security strategies. Our negative cases, by contrast, indicate that in cases where such doctrine was largely absent (Algeria), or compartmentalized securely within a professional military superstructure and deployed selectively by the high command for expressly defensive and nonpolitical purposes (Indonesia), regimes were better-suited to militate against the possible temptations of aversion.

Another potentially fruitful avenue for future research is case-study analysis of guerilla rogue states; the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Democratic Kampuchea qualify as such within my population. While I was unable to comprehensively address these cases throughout my dissertation, insights gleaned from North Korea and Cuba, which of course themselves spawned from the bases of guerilla movements, demonstrate
that these cases may be particularly “sticky,” and should make us both curious and concerned as to the possible materialization of guerilla rogue regimes in places where terrorist movements are now steadily accruing power, including Mali, Lebanon, and Somalia. In North Korea, the bonds forged by senior leadership during its guerilla days indeed became key reference points for future generations of elites, and key aspects of Kim Jong-Il’s success—including the fluid extension of his personality cult—can be attributed in part to an intimate identification with the ageing guerilla leadership following the death of his father. In addition, known beneficiaries of Kim Jong-Il’s patronage were not the ones occupying seats in the Political Bureau following the succession; rather, these key appointments were made by Kim Il-Sung during his final days as reappointments of former guerilla commanders that were previously dismissed or demoted.841 Certainly, more research into this area is required, but if guerilla movements represent the likeliest candidates to constitute the rogue states of tomorrow, we had better develop a stronger appreciation for them.

841 Buzo, “The Guerilla Dynasty,” 54
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