VARIETIES OF HESITATION: RELIGIOUS POLITICS AND US-MUSLIM COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

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ABSTRACT

US counterterrorism efforts—both pre- and post-9/11—prompted intense opposition among Muslim societies, but varying responses from Muslim states; some states worked closely with the United States, while significant tensions developed between the United States and other Muslim states over counterterrorism initiatives. What role, if any, did religion play in these varying levels of counterterrorism cooperation? I argue that it is the institutional condition in which religious groups operate that explains this situation. When religious contention occurs in the context of a close relationship between religion and state, the contention is channeled into changes to state behavior on religiously-contentious issues. When they are separate, the state is able to ignore or repress religious groups. The dissertation tests this through a mixed-method study, combining a quantitative analysis of religion-state connections and US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation with case studies of Pakistan and Turkey. I find that states with a close religion-state relationship were less cooperative with the United States on counterterrorism, and that this is related to the political dynamics surrounding religion-state ties. This dissertation contributes to the literature on religion and international affairs and US alliance politics.
# Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1

Why understanding Muslims states’ responses to “The Global war on terrorism” can help us understand international relations ........................................................................................................................ 5

My Argument: An Institutional Approach to Religion and International Affairs with a Multi-method Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 15

Overview of the Dissertation .................................................................................................... 17

Chapter 2: An Institutional Approach to Religious Politics and US-Muslim Counterterrorism Cooperation ................................................................................................................................... 22

An Institutional Approach to Religion and International Affairs ............................................. 25

US-Muslim Counterterrorism Cooperation .............................................................................. 43

Research Design ........................................................................................................................ 58

Figures ....................................................................................................................................... 67

Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis: Religion-State Connections in Muslim States and Cooperation on US Counterterrorism Initiatives ............................................................................................... 72

Quantitative Research Design ................................................................................................... 73

Findings ..................................................................................................................................... 88

Implications ............................................................................................................................... 92

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 98
Figures and Tables .................................................................................................................. 100

Chapter 4: US-Pakistani Counter-Terrorism Cooperation- Recurrent Tensions amid Islamic Opposition.................................................................................................................. 111

Historical Overview of Religion-State Relationship .............................................................. 113

US-Pakistani Counter-Terrorism Cooperation ....................................................................... 121

US Counter-Terrorism Pressure on Pakistan ...................................................................... 122

Pre-9/11 ....................................................................................................................................... 127

Circa 9/11 ..................................................................................................................................... 138

Post-9/11 ..................................................................................................................................... 148

Analysis................................................................................................................................... 157

Conclusions: Religion-State Connections and Pakistani Counter-Terrorism Policy .............. 174

Figures..................................................................................................................................... 178

US-Turkish Counterterrorism Cooperation: Close Cooperation Despite Domestic Opposition and Turkish International Assertiveness................................................................. 183

Historical Development of Religion-State Relations in Turkey.............................................. 185

US-Turkish Counterterrorism Cooperation ............................................................................ 192

US Counterterrorism pressure............................................................................................. 193

Pre-9/11 ....................................................................................................................................... 195

Circa-9/11 .................................................................................................................................... 207
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-9/11</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Conclusion</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of Findings</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded Findings</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Implications</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Implications</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: Robustness Checks</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B: Results of Factor Analysis and Reliability Tests</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reportedly called the head of Pakistan’s intelligence service. Armitage demanded that Pakistan join the United States in its newly-launched struggle against al-Qaeda—such as the upcoming invasion of Afghanistan—and take action domestically; this included restricting support for terrorism in Pakistan and allowing the US troops to operate from Pakistan’s border posts on the Afghan-Pakistan border. The demands included the threat that if Pakistan did not comply, the United States would bomb the country “back to the stone age.” Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, in a 2006 interview in which he related the story, claimed US demands were “ludicrous” and that “one has to think and take actions in the interest of the country” (2006). In the case of Pakistan, this involved a series of tense episodes between the two countries, as Pakistan partially complied with US demands but either actively or passively failed to cooperate in other areas.

This episode was the beginning of the United States’ “global war on terrorism.” On September 20, 2001, US President George W. Bush gave a speech to a joint session of Congress, in which he laid out the US response to the deadly 9/11 terrorist attacks. This was followed by a worldwide effort to disrupt the al-Qaeda network—which perpetrated the attacks—and reform political systems in the “Muslim world” to prevent similar violent movements from arising. The effort—soon dubbed the “global war on terrorism”—included two invasions, numerous negotiations in international forums, and covert actions around the world. US counterterrorism efforts also built on over a decade’s worth of US policies designed to understand and counter the growing threat from international and transnational terrorism.
And the example from Pakistan was not unique. The “global war on terrorism” involved heightened pressure on US-aligned Muslim states to cooperate with US counterterrorism efforts and take steps against terrorist groups and their supporters, with varying degrees of compliance. The Bush Administration called on Saudi Arabia to freeze the assets of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin after the 9/11 attacks and work with the United States on investigating the attack’s perpetrators, but Saudi Arabia initially refused to do so (Perlez 2001). After the deadly 2003 attacks by an al-Qaeda affiliate in the country, however, Saudi Arabia increased its counterterrorism activities and significantly disrupted militant groups’ presence in the country. In the United Arab Emirates, in contrast, while there were concerns over terrorist money laundering through the country’s financial system shortly after 9/11, the country cracked down on suspicious activities and limited the ability of militant groups to operate or find support (Shah 2012). And the United States pressed many countries in sub-Saharan Africa to increase their counterterrorism capabilities, although many struggled to do so.

US counterterrorism efforts quickly became a religious issue among Muslims, however, even before 9/11. Although many early terrorist threats were leftist or nationalist in nature, but the 1980s the most prominent terrorist groups were self-identified Islamic groups. This led to heightened attention to Islamic political activity among US policymakers and greater unease with Islamic groups than was seen in earlier eras, such as the US sponsoring of Islamic militants in the 1980s to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As the United States increased its activities against Islamic groups, many saw US counterterrorism efforts as directed against Muslims or Islam in general. And after 9/11, when US policymakers discussed the need to reform Muslim societies and promote a “moderate Islam,” these concerns grew stronger. Thus, many Islamic
groups saw US counterterrorism efforts in a religious light, with cooperation with these efforts
an un-Islamic activity. And even Muslims who were not part of organized Islamic groups or
were generally secular perceived US efforts as an attack on the worldwide Muslim community.
Although the vast majority of Muslims—including Islamic political groups—opposed al-Qaeda
and terrorism more broadly, many did not support US counterterrorism efforts. As a result, most
of the religious contention over US counterterrorism efforts involved opposition to US efforts
and Muslim states’ participation in them, some of which is justified on religious grounds.¹

The “global war on terrorism,” then, is an example of a religiously contentious
international issue, highlighting how religion affects states’ security policies. What explains this
variation in Muslim countries’ counterterrorism cooperation, and what role did religion play in
this variation? Does it indicate the limits of religion’s influence over state behavior, or do
tensions between the United States and Muslim states in aggregate represent a “civilizational”
clash? This touches on a broader theoretical question: under what conditions does religion
influence a state’s international behavior, especially in a high-stakes issue such as
counterterrorism?

Existing explanations for how religion affected US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation,
though, are insufficient. Many discussions on this topic are policy-related or focus on one or a
few cases; this dissertation, in contrast, systematically analyzes Muslim states’ cooperation with
US counterterrorism initiatives through both quantitative and qualitative methods. Others
downplay religion and point instead to security concerns or domestic politics to explain Muslim

¹ Of course, opposition to US counterterrorism efforts extends beyond Muslim countries, and even in Muslim
countries it is often framed in nationalist or anti-imperialist terms. And many Muslim groups have actively opposed
al-Qaeda and its supporters. See the discussion in Chapter 2 for more on this point. Also, I use the term “contention”
to refer to a specific class of interactions among political and social actors; I discuss the definition in-depth in
Chapter 2.
states’ responses to US pressure, which elides the incredibly significant role of religious contention in Muslim countries. Likewise, such explanations do not sufficiently account for the variety of strategies Muslim states adopted to balance domestic religious opposition, the state’s security interests, and US pressure. Alternately, some have pointed to broad “civilizational” explanations for US-Muslim tensions, which oversimplify the role of religion and also overlook the variation in Muslim states’ responses.

I argue that religious contention in Muslim states’ affects counterterrorism cooperation when it occurs in the context of a close religion-state relationship. Religious contention is important, but it is the relationship between religion and state that channels the contention into effects on state behavior. Muslim states have adopted various types of religion-state ties over the past few decades. These range from weak states that have implemented numerous connections to religion—like Pakistan—to strong states that have limited the role religious groups can play in politics, like Uzbekistan. When the United States began pressuring them on counterterrorism initiatives, those states with closer ties to religious groups were less likely to fully cooperate due to the greater power of religious groups and symbols in these states. In this way, religious politics contributed to tensions between the United States and Muslim states over counterterrorism, although it did so in a subtle manner, which was often not intended by either regimes or religious groups.

I test this with a multi-method research design. The quantitative portion uses an original dataset on US-Muslim counter-terror cooperation and religion-state connections to analyze the relationship between domestic religion-state conditions and Muslim states’ policies in this area. The qualitative portion involves case studies of Pakistan and Turkey, which analyze the
relationship between religious contention, religion-state ties, and cooperation with US counter-
terror efforts.

This dissertation contributes to several substantive and theoretical debates in international
relations. Theoretically, it contributes to work on religion and international relations by
specifying the conditions under which religion affects foreign policy in a specific area, and
demonstrating that religion can influence even a high stakes security issue like counter-terror
coopration.\footnote{For more on these elements of the religion and politics research program, see Bellin200, Philpott200, Wald and Wilcox2006b.} It also contributes to debates on the nature of US power in the international system and the dynamics of hierarchical relations in contemporary international relations.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I present background on US counterterrorism
efforts, followed by the broader debates this topic touches on: religion and politics and US
alliance politics. I then present my explanation, focusing on how the institutional conditions in
which religious contention occurs channels this contention into changes to state behavior.
Finally, I provide an overview of the dissertation, and its findings.

**Why understanding Muslims states’ responses to “The Global war on
terrorism” can help us understand international relations**

US counterterrorism efforts defined US foreign policy during the Administration of
George W. Bush, and had a major impact on the policies of the preceding and succeeding
committed the United States to forming international partnership to combat terrorism, and undertaking counterterrorist activities independently if needed. His predecessor, Bill Clinton, devoted a good amount of attention to terrorism towards the end of his term, after the deadly bombings by al-Qaeda against US embassies in East Africa; Clinton launched several cruise missile strikes against suspected al-Qaeda targets and exerted diplomatic pressure on states to cease supporting al-Qaeda. And President Obama, who succeeded Bush, continued US efforts to disrupt al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Yemen and North Africa in addition to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Naturally, many scholars and policymakers debated the nature of this “global war on terrorism.” Much of this focused on the causes of al-Qaeda and similar movements. Some pointed to aspects of Islam that produced extreme movements (Ben-Dor 1997, Kramer 1992). Others, such as Bernard Lewis, did not claim that extremism is inherent in Islam, but did argue that the state of contemporary Muslim civilization contributed to outbursts of violence as seen in the campaigns of al-Qaeda (Lewis 1990, Huntington 1996, Tibi 1998). Still others argued that extremist violence like that seen in al-Qaeda was related to debates within Islam, with al-Qaeda a reactionary element against more pluralist forces (Kepel 2006, Gerges 2005). Numerous observers, however, claimed the threat of terrorism had little to do with Islam or Muslim culture. For example, in an influential article, Robert Pape argued that suicide bombings—including those of al-Qaeda—are related to occupation of territory by a country, in this case the US posting of troops in Saudi Arabia and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Pape 2006).

Alongside the causes of terrorism, much attention was devoted to the roots of the tensions between Muslim societies—and states—and the United States. Echoing some of the discussions of terrorism, many argue that Muslim opposition to US counterterrorism efforts, and states’
unwillingness to cooperate on them, are related to a broader clash between the United States and the “Muslim world” (Lewis 1990, Miller 1993, Tibi 1998, Mousseau 2002). Alternately, the pressures of globalization have provoked a backlash among Muslim societies to US power, but Muslim states will eventually cooperate with US international efforts due to their ties with the United States (Lieber 2007). Numerous others, however, argue that Islam has little to do with Muslims’ opposition to the United States. Some claim resistance to US counterterrorism efforts has to do with US foreign policies, such as its military actions in Muslim countries or support for Israel (Roy 2005, Finnemore 2009). And state resistance to US counterterrorism efforts may have been due to domestic politics, regional security dynamics, or attempts to “soft balance” US power by limiting its ability to operate through allies and international organizations (Hadar 1993, Pape 2005, Lieber and Alexander 2005, Walt 2004).

Analyzing how religious contention affected US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, and the reasons for the varying responses of Muslim states more broadly, can thus contribute to understanding the nature of the “global war on terrorism.” If religious contention in Muslim states led leaders to refuse to cooperate with the United States, then those explanations focusing on civilizational divides would be accurate. If, instead, religion had little to do with Muslim states’ varying counterterrorism policies, and non-religious security interests drove state actions, then alternative explanations would be supported. This dissertation can also shed light on important debates beyond the immediate study of US counterterrorism efforts, however: specifically, it can contribute to the study of both religion and politics and US influence over the international system.

Religion and Politics
The primary literature to which this dissertation contributes is the study of religion and politics. There has been significant work outside of political science studying the nature of religious activity and its effects on society. Sociologists such as Peter Berger, Jose Casanova, Armando Salvatore and Peter Beyer have discussed the continuing importance of religion in the modern world and its ability to revive or intensify the public sphere in many countries; likewise, they have highlighted the unique nature of religious belief in the modern era, as it accepts the differentiation between religion and political authority and the pluralism of religious traditions (Berger 2009, Beyer 2006, Casanova 1994, Salvatore and Eickelman 2004). And many of these studies have highlight the globalizing nature of religion; as religious beliefs transcend any one community they connect individuals in different societies and enable transnational influences on domestic politics (Beyer 2006, Casanova 1994, Robertson , Thomas 2005, Rudolph 1997, Eickelman and Anderson 2003).

Many of these studies have focused specifically on Muslim countries. Several studies have highlighted the role of Islam in fostering debate in Muslim countries and pressing for the accountability of states (Esposito 1998, Sheikh 2003, Salvatore and Eickelman 2004). And numerous scholars have focused on the relationship between Islam and nationalism, with some arguing that it fuses with nationalism (Eickelman 1998, Zubaida 2004). Others, in contrast, point to globalizing forces among Muslims. For some—like Ernest Gellner—this is a worldwide Muslim community that undermines or replaces nationalism (Gellner 1981). For others, it is a set of discrete interactions and networks that connect Muslims around the world through religious practice (Anderson and Gonzales-Quijano 2004).
Political science has also contributed greatly to the study of religion. Studies of American politics have highlighted the nature of political activity among religious groups and the various ways that religion influences voters’ perceptions and preferences (Leege and Kellstedt 1993). And comparative politics has analyzed the nature of religious activity in numerous regions; comparativists have also contributed to the study of the interplay between state institutions and religion, demonstrating how institutions can structure the nature of religious activity in a state (Kalyvas 1996, Kuru 2009, Driessen 2010, Jelen and Wilcox 2002).

International relations is also increasingly focusing on religion. Many early studies focused on highlighting that religion does matter in international relations (Thomas 2005, Hatzopoulos 2003, Dark 2000, Fox and Sandler 2004, Banchoff 2008b, Shah, Stepan, and Toft 2012, Snyder 2011b, Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). And numerous studies have looked at how religion affects international and domestic conflict, although the findings vary; some have found a strong role for religion, others a limited one (Moghadam 2008/09, Toft 2007, Soysa and Nordas 2007, Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006, Hassner 2003, Chiozza 2002, Piazza 2009, Juergensmeyer 2003, Fox 2002, Henne 2012a, b, Horowitz 2009). Likewise, significant work has been done on the formation of the modern state system and what role religion played in that (Nexon 2009, Spruyt 1994, Philpott 2000, Hall 1999). Moreover, some studies have looked at specific instances of political debates and how religion affected the nature of the debate and the outcome (Henne Forthcoming, Hassner 2011, Adamson 2005).

The study of religion and international relations thus involves a few promising developments. The first is the finding that religious identity alone is not incredibly important. That is, one cannot generalize about the effects of Islam on state policies, for example, or assume
anything about a conflict between a Muslim and Christian state. The second is that religious
traditions or doctrines are not direct motivations for political behavior. That is, Muslims’
political behavior—or even the activities of explicitly Islamic groups—are not based on fixed
elements of Islam. Instead, religion functions as a type of discourse, in which actors debate
issues, deploy rhetoric, and utilize religious symbols to gain power in political struggles (Nexon
2011, Snyder 2011a). The final one is the emphasis on the political conditions surrounding
religion. This includes broader ideological struggles, the structure of states in which religious
groups operate, and the transnational linkages among religious groups (Nexon 2009, Owen 2010,
These studies have highlighted how religious contention interacts with these political conditions
to create different forms of religious influences on politics.

Not all agree with the importance of religion, however. Some point to examples of states
acting against religious beliefs—at times using straw-man conceptions of what this would
constitute—to argue that religion is secondary to state interests, or claim that a lack of support
for the class of civilizations undermines the importance of religion (Shaffer 2006). And many
scholars point to examples of religious groups—or Muslim individuals—being motivated by
ethnic or material concerns to argue against religion mattering; likewise, some claim that because
religious activism is sometimes the result of state repression or state sponsorship, religion is
secondary to state policies in importance (Brumberg 2005-2006, Anderson 1997, 1995), (Fuller
1997). While studies of religion and politics have highlighted areas where religion definitely
mattered, critics can claim they are either ungeneralizable examples or issues of little importance
to states.
There are thus a few steps the study of religion and international relations should take to improve the research program. The first is to avoid broad arguments over the transformative role of religion, and focus instead on specific mid-level theories that specify the conditions under which religion affects state behavior (Wald and Wilcox 2006a, Bellin 2008). Such arguments were useful initially to overcome international relations’ skepticism concerning religion and provide a paradigmatic basis for examining religious influences in international relations. But they are difficult to apply to specific instances of religious contention or explain variation in religious influences on international relations. Moreover, many actions by religious groups occur in a local context, and there are many instances of material interests overriding religious concerns. Religion has thus not completely transformed international relations, and such broad claims are easy for critics to refute.

The second is to expand the use of institutional analyses from comparative politics. Some studies of religion and international relations have called for attention to the role of state institutions and domestic politics (Philpott 2009). Works in comparative politics can facilitate such a move. Several have highlighted how religious contention and state institutions interact and develop over time (Kuru 2009, Kalyvas 1996). Others show that the interaction between these factors produces different types of religious politics in a country (Philpott 2007, Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011). And some have even highlighted how the nature of connections between religion and the state affect the extent to which religious contention drives state policies (Grim and Finke 2010, Gill 2008, Philpott 2000, Henne 2012b, Forthcoming).

The final step involves resolving methodological disputes in the research program, specifically hesitation over positivist methods. Many studies on religion and politics advocate an
interpretive analysis, and that the study of religion and politics requires rejecting existing methods or positivist approaches to social science altogether (Thomas 2005, Hurd 2004). Others claim that complex and context-specific nature of religious belief and practice makes it difficult to generalize across cases without oversimplifying the analysis (Casanova 1994). Yet, while religion is an incredibly complex and subjective phenomenon, so are most ideational forces scholars study; as seen in the development of constructivism in international relations, it is possible to approach ideas in a positivist manner using traditional methods (Checkel 1998). Likewise, while it is difficult to quantify religious politics, doing so allows for large-n analyses that can accompany more detailed single-case studies. And using mainstream methods to analyze issues of importance to scholars outside of this research program can allow for engagement with other areas of international relations. Interpretive studies are useful for understanding the meaning-creation and contestation that occurs with religious contention, but should complement, rather than replace, positivist studies.

Analyzing the effects of religion on counterterrorism cooperation can contribute to this research program. US counterterrorism efforts have become a religious issue, due to the significant religious contention surrounding it; it has also occurred in the context of broader religious contention in Muslim societies. Thus, the dissertation can highlight how religion affects international relations. Moreover, it involves a clearly defined dependent variable capturing the effects of religion—the extent of cooperation on counterterrorism—as the vast majority of religious contention over this issue has been in opposition to cooperation with the United States. More importantly it involves significant differences in the apparent influence of religion on state behavior, with even the positive cases—such as Pakistan—rather complicated due to their ties to
the United States. This provides variation in the dependent variable, increasing the explanatory leverage gained from the study. Finally, it is a high-stakes security issue, for both the United States and Muslim states, providing a chance to assess whether religion affects such areas of international relations.

US International Influence

A secondary area in which this dissertation contributes to the broader study of religion and international relations is that of US influence over the international system. Many have debated the nature of US power in the post-Cold War era. Some argue that the United States emerged from the Cold War (and remains) the dominant power in the international system, with other states either too weak to challenge the United States, dependent on the United States for security, or attracted to the United States due to its “soft power” (Lieber 2007, Lieber and Alexander 2005, Brooks and Wohlfforth 2008). Others, however, claim that US influence over the international system has been waning for some time, due to either the decline of US power or the rise of challengers to US dominance (Pape 2005, Paul 2005, Walt 2004, Layne 1993).

Much of this revolved around the George W. Bush Administration. Some have argued that Bush’s foreign policies—specifically the global war on terrorism—were effective and powerful; while they inspired resentment most states did cooperate eventually (Lieber 2007, Kagan and Kristol 2002). Others, though, pointed to widespread anger over Bush’s actions—especially among Muslim countries—as signs that his approach to counterterrorism was ineffective (Finnemore 2009, Walt 2004, Layne 2004). Of these, some believe the United States must adopt a more restrained approach to international affairs, avoiding such broad-ranging initiatives as the global war on terrorism (Bacevich 2009, Mandelbaum 2010, Kupchan 2002).
Others, however, claim that US international efforts can succeed if conducted through multilateral means, and the resistance to Bush’s efforts was due to the manner in which they were carried out (Ikenberry 2008, Mechanic 2008, Beinart 2008).

This also touches on a broader theoretical debate: the nature of the international system’s structure, specifically whether hierarchical relations exist among states. International relations has classically approached the international system as anarchic, with little enduring ties among states (Waltz 1979). Numerous scholars have criticized this approach, however. Some point to the existence of normative frameworks that provide some order to interactions among states (Ruggie 1993, Wendt 1992). And other works highlight the specific agreements and conditions that create hierarchical ties between powerful and less powerful states, as well as how contentious politics can disrupt these hierarchical relationships (Nexon 2009, Nexon and Wright 2007, Cooley 2005, Lake 2007, 1996, Donnelly 2006).

The study of religion and US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation can greatly to these debates as well. Understanding why some Muslim states did not cooperate on counterterrorism can clarify the nature of tensions between the United States and its international partners during the Bush Administration and beyond. Beyond this, US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation is an example of a hierarchical relationship. The United States sets the terms of the interaction and exerts various types of pressure on Muslim state to convince them to comply. The result is an informal arrangement through which the United States influences the domestic and foreign policies of Muslim states. Yet, this control is not absolute, as Muslims states often do not comply on certain aspects of counterterrorism. And some of this lack of compliance is due to domestic and transnational opposition to cooperation. Studying this issue can thus highlight not only the
dynamics of a hierarchical relationship in international relations, but also the conditions under which domestic and transnational contention undermine the dominant states’ influence.

My Argument: An Institutional Approach to Religion and International Affairs with a Multi-method Analysis

Drawing on a variety of recent studies on religion and politics, I argue that an effective way to analyze the effects of religion on states is to focus on the institutional conditions surrounding religious contention, specifically the nature of the religion-state relationship. Religious contention has dramatic effects on a country’s politics, increasing the salience of religious symbols and pressure from religious groups. There is also a transnational element to religious contention, as religious groups advocate on behalf of causes beyond the state’s borders and frame their actions in global terms.

But it is only when there is a close relationship between religion and the state that religious contention changes a state’s behavior. Close ties between religion and state increase the salience of religious issues in politics, increase the power of religious groups in society, and make the regime dependent on religious groups for support. When they are separate, in contrast, religious groups are restricted in their activities and regimes often appeal to secular elements of society for support, limiting the influence of religious contention. When an international issue becomes politicized among religious groups, they will pressure the state to take action in line with religious sentiment. Likewise, transnational religious contention over the issue will result in
groups aligning their actions across state boundaries and international audiences pressuring states on the issue. In cases of a close religion-state relationship, the power of religious groups and issues will result in leaders either being more amenable to such pressure or compelled to respond due to concerns over domestic backlash.

The religion-state relationship varies according to the strength of the state and the extent of connections between religion and state. Religion-state connections involve Constitutional provisions for an official religion, legal codes based on religion, restrictions on religious practice, and political ties between religious groups and the state. These intensify the salience of religious issues in politics and the power of religious groups in society. State strength, in turn, involves the openness of the regime—whether it is accountable to democratic elections—and the capabilities of the state to control society. State weakness makes it more difficult for the state to ignore religious pressure. The closest religion-state relationship—with the greatest religious influence over the state—occurs in weak states with extensive connections to religion. The most distant, with the resultant lowest effects of religious contention, is strong states with few connections to religion.

US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation is a specific case of an international religious issue over which religious groups are contending with states. It occurred in the context of widespread religious contention in Muslim countries, with Islamic groups pressuring the state to follow religious standards and states adopting a mixture of cooption and repression in response. And religious contention over US counterterrorism efforts for the most part involved opposition to Muslim states’ cooperation with the United States. Thus, in this case religious influences on states’ international behavior—which is a bit general and context-specific—involve specifically
Muslim states’ hesitation in response to US counterterrorism pressure, and decreased cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism in response to religious contention.

This influence varies according to the religion-state relationship in Muslim states. The greatest influence—with the lowest level of cooperation—is in states like Pakistan, which are weak states with extensive connections to religion. Moderate influence occurs in states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with numerous connections to religion and strong states. And lessened influenced, with the highest level of counterterrorism cooperation, is in weak states with few religion-state connections (like Turkey) and strong states with minimal connections to religion, like Egypt and Uzbekistan.

I test this through a multi-method research design. I use an original dataset on religion-state relationships and counterterrorism cooperation to assess the effects of the former on cooperation among all majority-Muslim countries. I combine this with case studies of Pakistan and Turkey, examples of a close religion-state relationship with low counterterrorism cooperation and a distant religion-state with high counterterrorism cooperation, respectively. The case selection leverages the extreme values of the cases to highlight the mechanisms posited by the theory; the quantitative analysis complements this case selection, in turn, by demonstrating the generalizability of the case studies’ findings.

**Overview of the Dissertation**

The dissertation includes six chapters, including the introduction and the conclusion. Chapter 2 presents an expanded discussion of the dissertation’s theory. I discuss the general institutional approach to religion and international relations, drawing on a variety of works on
religion and politics. I then apply this to the case of US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, specifying the different categories of religion-state relationships and their expected effects on counterterrorism cooperation. I also present the dissertation’s research design in this chapter.

Chapter 3 presents the quantitative analysis. I developed original quantitative measures of counterterrorism cooperation and religion-state relationships for all majority-Muslim countries from 1996 to 2009. I measure counterterrorism cooperation through the Counterterrorism Cooperation Index, which is an additive index of 32 indicators of types of counterterrorism cooperation; the index is the proportion of cooperative to noncooperative behaviors, providing a value between –1 (completely noncooperative) to 1 (completely cooperative). The religion-state measure is a combination of various measures of religion-state connections and state strength, which runs from 0 (completely separate) to 5 (close relationship). I also include several control variables—measuring state capabilities, ties to the United States, and terrorist violence in the country—and test this with a time-series regression; I run numerous robustness checks involving alternate measures of the independent and dependent variables, alternate models, and alternate control variables. I find that religion-state relationships are consistently significant and negative, with higher values on the religion-state relationship corresponding to lower counterterrorism cooperation. I also find that the religion-state relationship specifically affects counterterrorism cooperation on domestic counterterrorism acts, institutional reform, and action on extremist rhetoric and terrorist financing.

Chapters 4 and 5 are the case studies. Both studies present the history of religion-state relations in the country, and the nature of US counterterrorism pressure on the state. They then analyze the relationship between religion-state relations and counterterrorism cooperation. This
is done through discussion of religious contention, the religion-state relationship, and
counterterrorism cooperation in the pre-9/11, circa-9/11, and post-9/11 time periods. I then
analyze the effects of religion-state relations on counterterrorism cooperation through several
qualitative methods: the congruence method to determine whether the variables move in a
manner expected by the theory, process-tracing to highlight evidence that the posited
mechanisms explain the outcomes, historical analysis to demonstrate how earlier religion-state
ties affected short-term political decisions on counterterrorism, and the method of sequence
elaboration to assess the strength of alternative explanations.

In Pakistan, religion and state gradually grew closer since the country’s founding, so that
by the 1990s religious groups were very influential in politics, numerous religious laws were in
place, and the state had ties to several religious groups. When the United State began pressing
Pakistan on counterterrorism, there was widespread religious contention; some of this was
general pressure to increase the role of Islam in Pakistani politics but much of it was attacks on
the United States for its counterterrorism efforts and criticisms of Pakistani leaders for working
with the United States. Throughout this, Pakistani leaders often attempted to appeal to religious
groups for support and passed laws strengthening the importance of Islam in Pakistan; likewise,
the military maintained its ties to militant groups in Pakistan, Kashmir and—possibly—Afghanistan. This resulted in hesitation over counterterrorism cooperation, as Pakistan did work
with the United States on many areas but often took selective actions against militant groups.
The political salience of religious contention and the influence of religious groups made leaders
wary of generating a backlash by working too closely with the United States, while the long
history of close religion-state ties made it difficult for leaders who attempted to reform the system from achieving their goals.

In Turkey, religion and state have been separate since modern Turkey emerged in the early 20th century. The state is officially secular, with limitations on Islamic political activity and a role for the military to enforce this secularism. This has persisted into the 21st century, even though a religiously-influenced political party came to power in 2002. There has been widespread religious contention in Turkey, however, similar to that in Pakistan; some groups have pressed the state to increase the role of religion, and called for foreign policies in line with religious sentiment, including opposing US counterterrorism efforts. The distant religion-state relationship has persisted in Turkey, however, with secular groups pushing back against religious contention and the military threatening to take action against Islamic activism. Even religiously-influenced parties that have come to power have been relatively moderate, accepting Turkey’s secularism. This has given the government the freedom of action needed to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism, as the state is insulated from religious contention. Even though tensions emerged in some areas of international politics between the United States and Turkey—such as the Israel-Palestine issue—counterterrorism cooperation remains close.

Finally, Chapter 6 presents the dissertation’s conclusions. I discuss the findings of the quantitative analysis and case studies, and their implications for the institutional approach to religion and international relations and alternative explanations for the varying levels of counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Muslim countries. I also illustrate that the findings apply to additional countries and other areas of international relations. I do this through short case studies of other Muslim countries that extend the analysis to additional
categories of religion-state relations: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Uzbekistan. I also present the findings from other studies I have conducted on religion and international relations. Finally, I discuss the broader implications of the dissertation. I discuss the dissertation’s contributions to the study of religion and politics, hierarchy and international relations, and multi-method research designs. I then close with the policy implications of the dissertation’s findings.

In this dissertation I discuss the convergence of two major developments in late-20th and early-21st century international relations. The first is US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, which began in the 1990s, intensified with the 9/11 terrorist attacks and extended into the second decade of the 21st century. The second is widespread and intense religious contention in Muslim countries. The two are connected by the religious salience surrounding US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, with a good amount of religious contention focused on criticizing Muslim states’ counterterrorism efforts through religious justifications and symbols.

I argue that religious contention in Muslim states’ affects counterterrorism cooperation when it occurs in the context of a close religion-state relationship. Religious contention is important, but it is the relationship between religion and state that channels the contention into effects on state behavior. Muslim states have adopted various types of religion-state ties over the past few decades. These range from weak states that have implemented numerous connections to religion—like Pakistan—to strong states that have limited the role religious groups can play in politics, like Uzbekistan. When the United States began pressuring them on counterterrorism initiatives, those states with closer ties to religious groups were less likely to fully cooperate due to the greater power of religious groups and symbols in these states. In this way, religious politics contributed to tensions between the United States and Muslim states over counterterrorism, although it did so in a subtle manner, which was often not intended by either regimes or religious groups.
I test this with a mixed-methods research design. The quantitative portion uses an original dataset on US-Muslim counter-terror cooperation and religion-state connections to analyze the relationship between domestic religion-state conditions and Muslim states’ policies in this area. The qualitative portion involves case studies of Pakistan and Turkey, which analyze the relationship between religious contention, religion-state ties, and cooperation with US counter-terror efforts.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I present the general institutional approach to religion and international affairs. I then apply this to the specific topic of US-Muslim counter-terror cooperation, highlighting the specific way the variables combine in Muslim countries and how they affect states’ international behavior. Finally, I present the research design of the dissertation.

Definitions

I use Christian Smith’s (1996) definition of religion as a “system of beliefs and practices oriented towards the sacred or supernatural.” I distinguish among “religious contention,” “religious groups” and “religiously-influenced policies.” I focus primarily on religious contention when discussing religious beliefs and activities in society. By religious contention I mean sustained engagement with the state by social groups based in whole or in part on religious sentiment. This follows the conceptualization of contention by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). I use religious contention as it captures the specific manner in which I argue religion affects politics. Religious beliefs or sentiment do not by themselves cause changes in politics; it is only when social actors mobilize them in interaction with other actors and the state that
religion gives rise to unique types of politics. Likewise, I do not discuss religious politics or religious opposition, since religious contention is a broader term that can encompass these concepts as well as social phenomena relating to religion. This religious contention affects the state through religious groups, which are organized pressure groups that advocate for changes in state behavior through religious contention.

Religious contention is focused on religiously-influenced policies and religious issues. “Religiously-influenced policies” refers to policies enacted in response to pressure from religious groups, and does not indicate the policies are based on religious doctrine; similarly, “religious issues” are issues that have become politicized among religious groups. I take a deliberately constructive approach to religion and religious issues. That is, I do not specify a priori what issues are likely to become politicized among religious groups, or over what religious groups will contend with the state. Instead, the process through which issues become religiously-salient is often contingent on actors’ decisions and specific contexts.

I discuss religion in general in the theoretical section, and apply this to religious contention in Muslim societies. I therefore use “Islamic groups” to refer to groups that self-identify as Islamic or advocate based on Islamic causes; that is, religious groups that are composed of Muslims. This is thus more general than the term “Islamist,” which I reserve for political parties that are explicitly Islamic. Finally, I use “Muslim states” to refer to states whose population is majority-Muslim; it does not indicate the state’s official ideology is related to Islam.

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3 This generally follows the “relational” approach to contention, which Charles Tilly discusses in contrast to ideational and environmental approaches. See McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly200, Tilly200, Tilly2005
4 For more on the constructivist approach to religion, and what becomes a religious issue, see Appleby200, Asad200, Berger200, Beyer200, Casanova199, Masuzawa200, Nexon2011
In terms of terrorism, I follow Bruce Hoffman’s definition of terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of political change” (Hoffman 2006). “Terrorist violence,” then, is political violence resembling this definition of terrorism. Because of the ambiguities in classifying a group as a “terrorist group,” however, I refer to groups that conduct terrorist violence as “militant groups” (see (Tilly 2004). And I discuss militant groups that justify their actions through Islam as “Islamic militant groups.” I also occasionally discuss a Muslim state’s counterterrorism cooperation or counterterrorism policies; both refer specifically to that state’s cooperation—or lack thereof—with the United States on counterterrorism.

Also, I follow popular usage of acronyms for groups in Pakistan and Turkey. This is often the non-English version of the acronym (Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish or Urdu), although occasionally—as with the Pakistan People’s Party—it is the English version. I also provide the English-language versions of names will also be provided. This is intended to avoid confusion over differing English translations. For example, the Refah Partisi in Turkey is referred to as both the Welfare Party and the Prosperity Party in English-language sources.

**An Institutional Approach to Religion and International Affairs**

This section presents the theoretical background of the institutional approach to religion and international affairs, discussing both the general institutional approach to religious politics and how this translates to international relations.

*Religion and Institutions*
This dissertation draws its theoretical background from a group of studies that represent what I call the *institutional approach to religious politics*. Religious beliefs are important, but religious effects on politics and society do not flow directly from doctrine or religious texts. Instead, the ultimate effects of religious beliefs arise from the interaction between beliefs and the broader context, such as social structures, political institutions, and non-religious motivations. I focus specifically on institutional religion-state connections.

*Religious Politics*

The first element in this approach to religious politics is the nature of religious politics itself. Many contemporary scholars argue that the effect of religion is not the imposition of fixed elements of doctrine—like “Islamic law”—on society or the direct motivation of political action based on these doctrines; instead, it resembles the infusion of a religiously-grounded common sense into politics (see (Salvatore and LeVine 2005). That is, religion influences perceptions of appropriate state policies and societal behavior, leads to the questioning of institutions and policies previously “taken for granted,” and intensifies contention over issues that become religiously salient, even if those elements of society influenced by religion do not base their actions on religious texts or theological arguments (Beyer 2006, Casanova 1994, Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, Salvatore and Eickelman 2004). This is because religion is not a monolithic tradition driving adherents to impose religious dogma onto politics, but is a “discursive field,” in which, “religious beliefs, experiences and frameworks draw boundaries…around what constitutes acceptable arguments and beliefs” (Nexon 2011, Snyder 2011a).

Moreover, religious influences on politics and society do not necessarily involve actions motivated solely by religion. Contemporary religious politics often do not constitute rejection of
the differentiation between political and religious authority, e.g. the attempt to establish an
Islamic state. Instead, there are many cases of groups pushing for a public role of religion in a
country’s politics without calling for the imposition of religious law, or religious groups
advocating for government action on social and economic issues (Casanova 1994). Likewise,
religious politics often involve a mix of religious and non-religious motivations; religious groups
can be driven to action partially by economic concerns or nationalism, even if they act on a
religious issue or religion provides the frame or impetus for action (Gill 2001).

Work on this issue can reveal a few general ways in which religious contention affects
politics. First, it induces a normative debate in society, increasing the application of religious
Before the increasing public expression of religion, debates focused on economic issues, security
concerns, or ideational factors like nationalism or anti-imperialism. Once religious contention
increases, however, pressure groups will increasingly draw on religious symbols and beliefs
when advancing their causes, even if the causes themselves are not inherently religious. This can
also catalyze a debate in society between religion and secular groups over the proper role of
religion in politics (Kepel 2006, Kuru 2009, Owen 2010, Roy 2004). And elites can use religious
rhetoric to unify coalitions or break up possible opposition, by deploying religious symbols in
political arguments (Nexon 2009). Moreover, religious contention makes it harder for leaders to
act without regard to their citizens (Dark 2000, Fox and Sandler 2004, Mehta 2008, Thomas
2005, Smith 1996). Because of the intensity of religious sentiment, leaders will face greater
backlash from taking actions that upset religious groups than they would from policies upsetting

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{5} For an example of this in the early modern context, see Nexon 2009. For a general discussion of this effect of ideas, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993.}
economic interests. And the organizational strength of religious groups—based on existing structures such as places of worship with established patterns of mass participation (such as at Sunday sermons)—lowers transactions costs and enables coordinated action against the state (Smith 1996).

Finally, it intensifies transnational influences in the domestic sphere. Increasing societal religiosity tends to correspond to greater identification with coreligionists abroad and global religiously-salient issues (Casanova 1994, 1996, Rudolph 1997, Thomas 2005, Fox and Sandler 2004). Religion also creates tangible transnational connections through networks of activists, scholars and religious institutions (Banchoff 2008a). This transnational influence takes the form of a few specific types of “transnationalization” (Tarrow 2005). One is “global framing,” in which actors frame domestic struggles in global terms, connecting their contention to broader international issues. For example, a religious group protesting against a state policy it deems immoral would make reference to worldwide moral struggles or international religious audiences for the state’s actions. Another is “internalization,” when issues outside a country’s territory cause domestic publics to pressure the leader. An action by a state that upsets religious groups internationally—such as repressing members of a religious community—could provoke protest among religious groups in a country unaffected by the initial action. And a third is actual transnational connections among non-state actors, as organizations coordinate activities across national boundaries. Religious groups in separate countries working to influence the state—such as on an international religious issue like stem cell research—may start working together to affect both states’ behaviors.

*Religion and State Institutions*
The effects of religious contention on state behavior, though, depend on the institutional context in which they occur, i.e. the extent of religion-state connections. Religious sentiment thus alters the nature of politics in a country, but the effects of these alterations on state behavior and societal outcomes depends on the context in which the sentiment arises; following other studies on this topic, I focus specifically on the institutional context, the extent of religion-state connections.

By this I refer to the institutional configurations, state policies, legal frameworks and official rhetoric that define the relationship between religion and state. Institutional religion-state connections include: provisions for an official religion; active support for religious causes; a role for religious groups in the government; and policies restricting the activities of certain religious community, either disapproved minorities or elements of the approved religious community that do not follow the official state approach to the religion (Fox 2008, Grim and Finke 2010, Center 2011). And institutional separation between religion and state involves: the establishment of a state as secular; the lack of an official religion; restriction on the public expression of religion; and insulation of the government from religious groups, through either the power of secularist forces in society or active discrimination of religious groups’ involvement in politics (Gill 2008, Kuru 2009, Philpott 2007).

Scholars have taken varied approaches to conceptualizing religion-state connections. Some look at numerous discrete examples of religion-state ties, combining them into a numeric index (Fox 2008, Grim and Finke 2010, Center 2011). Others look at a few broad types of religion-state connections to establish categories of religion-state connectivity (Kuru 2009, Philpott 2007).
I follow the latter approach, emphasizing three aspects of religion-state connections. The first is ideological ties to religion and the use of religion to justify the state; these include Constitutional provisions for an official religion, the rhetorical use of this religion to legitimate the state’s existence, and favoritism towards the official religion in terms of subsidies for religious activities. The second is political connections between the regime and religious groups. This includes: powerful religious political parties in democracies; the inclusion of religious groups in governing coalitions in closed political systems; or official roles for religious groups, like advising the regime on legal matters. And the third is restrictions on religious practice, such as limitations on what groups can preach in public, proselytizing and conversion efforts, or religious broadcasting. The more of these factors that are present, the greater the connections between religion and state.6

The Effects of Religion-State Connections

The nature of institutional religion-state connections affects the form religious politics take. Numerous studies suggest that “deregulation” of religious practice promotes increased religious diversity and practice (Gill 2001; Stark and Finke). And restrictions on religious practice or the promotion of a certain religious tradition can marginalize disapproved groups, exacerbating tensions among groups and with the state and possible leading religious groups to take up violent tactics (Toft, Philpott and Shah 2011). Likewise, favoring a certain religious tradition can strengthen more extreme elements in that tradition, leading to greater religious

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6 These types of religion-state connections correspond to the categories used in other studies. For example: the Pew Forum (2011), Kuru (2008) and Philpott (2007) discuss ideological ties to religion; Gill (2008), Nasr Nasr2001 and Roy1994 discuss political power of religious groups; and the Pew Forum (2011), Grim and Finke (2011) and Philpott (2007) discuss restrictions on religious activity. One additional element highlighted by the Pew Forum is government violence against religious groups; I do not include this as it is not an institutional configuration.
contention in society; this can also enable these extreme elements to use violent tactics to advance their goals (Toft, Philpott and Shah 2011).

Finally--and most importantly for this dissertation--these institutional ties also affect the power of religious groups and symbols, determining in part the extent to which religious sentiment leads to a change in state behavior. Ties between religion and state--even when they take the form of restrictions on religion activity--increase the power of religious groups in society and politics. Greater separation between religion and the state, in contrast, minimizes religious influence over state behavior, even if religious practice itself is allowed. This occurs through three mechanisms.

The first is the opportunity structure. As scholars of social movements argue, opportunity structures—the institutional factors surrounding contention—can explain the success of social movements as much as the movements themselves, as favorable opportunity structures make it more likely groups will be able to succeed in raising and acting on grievances (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, Tarrow 1998). Religion-state connections increase the avenues through which religious groups can petition the state—making it more likely that groups will have elite allies in the government—and increase the power of religious groups through government support and subsidies (Grim and Finke 2010, Philpott 2000, Tahir-Khelli 1985, Nasr 2001). The effect of these official connections is to increase the pressure leaders face from religious groups, as religious groups have more means through which to pressure the state.

The second mechanism is the nature of a state’s legitimacy. The means through which a state legitimates its actions can affect the nature of contention, giving rhetorical tools to social groups through which they can pressure the state (Krebs and Jackson 2007). Close ties between
religion and the state increase the role of religion in the means through which elites legitimate their rule and justify their actions. This makes it more likely that debates will be framed in religious terms and religious symbols will be effective in supporting or opposing policies; also, by justifying a state’s existence through religion, leaders open themselves up to calls to act according to religious standards (Blum 2006, Dawisha 1985, Esposito 1992, Nasr 2001, Piscatori 1983). Thus, even when leaders themselves are not religious, close ties between religion and state can increase the salience of religious arguments to the point that leaders draw on and are influenced by them, even if they do not share the religious sentiment of portions of society.

The third is regimes’ dependence on religious groups’ support to maintain power. When a leader’s support base is composed of religious elements of society, religious groups gain greater leverage over state policies; similarly, when a leader faces threat to his or her rule from secular forces in society, religious groups become a powerful balance to that threat, increasing their prominence (Gill 2008). This is also a function of the nature of the electoral system, as some systems may favor religious groups, such as making it easier for religious political parties to operate or be the “king-makers” in electoral coalitions. Alternately, when a leader’s supporters are secular, religious groups will have little sway over state behavior, while leaders facing threats from religious groups to their power may reach out to secular groups for help, minimizing religious leverage (Gill 2008).

Extensions: Historical Dynamics and State Strength

I extend this institutional approach to religion by expanding discussion of some of its elements and applying it to domestic religious influences on states’ foreign policy. I draw on studies of the effects of state strength on politics, to elaborate on the institutional approaches
discussion of religion-state ties. I also incorporate work on institutional change to capture the
dynamics elements of religion-state ties. This extension to the institutional approach to religion
fits with the implicit but under-theorized discussion of both non-democratic state practices and
institutional change in several studies.

State Strength

The effects of religion-state ties on politics are closely related to the effects of state
strength. By state strength I refer to the extent to which the state is able to act independently of
society. This partly depends on the nature of the political system; closed political systems—
lacking democratic elections—will give the state greater freedom of action. It is also a function
of state capabilities and policy instruments; states that have greater resources with which to resist
domestic pressure or established means to do so—such as a codified role for security services—
will be stronger than those without these things. Thus, stronger states will be more able to resist
pressure from domestic groups, while weaker states will be more influenced by domestic
political dynamics. Conversely, however, stronger states can achieve more of the state’s policy
preferences (whether religious or not) and weaker states will achieve fewer of the policy goals of
their ruling coalitions.\(^7\)

This means that domestic pressure on the regime can affect state behavior even in
nondemocracies. In democracies, leaders are directly accountable to the public so public
demands will be expressed in the policy process. Non-democratic states are more insulated from
public opinion by the repressive power of the state and the lack of open elections.\(^8\) Yet, when

\(^7\)For general discussions of these points, see Migdal198, Skocpol1985
\(^8\) This is an admittedly simplified distinction, as there are numerous debates about the proper classification of
democracies, distinctions among non-democratic states, and intermediate regime types, such as “cartelized,”
these regimes are unstable and rely on a small coalition to stay in power, leaders must satisfy the demands of powerful domestic groups or risk losing support (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Snyder 1991). And widespread public opposition to autocratic leaders’ rule can lead them to adopt some policy demands of the public and even establish official routes for public expression, such as legislatures (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).

These dynamics extend to foreign policy. States’ international behavior is often a balance between international interests and domestic pressure. And domestic pressure can affect weak non-democratic states’ foreign policies as well as those of democracies. Although non-democratic leaders do not face the same public pressure as democratic leaders, the need to maintain support in weak states among the ruling coalition can result in some domestic influences on international behavior (Snyder 1991). And the need to balance the interests of the ruling coalition may result in seemingly extreme or erratic behavior that arose through log-rolling among coalition members (Goemans 2000, Snyder 1991, Weeks 2008). Moreover, because non-democratic leaders face more severe costs from losing power than democratic ones, weak leaders may adopt aggressive international behaviors in order to “gamble for resurrection” in the hopes of staving off defeat in an international incident and maintaining domestic support (Goemans 2000, Downs and Rocke 1994).

While most work in this area does not focus on religion, it is applicable to the effects of religious pressure on leaders. Leaders in strong states—often stable authoritarian regimes—may

“transitioning regimes,” “mixed regimes,” and “anocratic.” I use the simplified distinction to avoid an overly-complex typology. Also, I use a more detailed discussion of types of regime when I present the classifications of Muslim states below. For discussions, see Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland200, Geddes199, Goemans200, Levitsky and Way201, Snyder199, Snyder200, Vreeland2008a.
not feel the need to respond to religious contention due to their power over society. Leaders in weak states, however, will be more likely to adopt policies in response to religious contention. Democratic leaders with religious constituencies must appeal to them when making decisions, although their need to also appeal to secular elements of society may prevent overly-religious policies from being adopted. And in weak non-democratic states, when ruling coalitions include religious groups the regime will be compelled to adopt religiously-influenced policies to maintain the support of these groups, even if they are not necessarily in line with the preferences of the general public or even the rest of the ruling coalition. Moreover, when these regimes face significant opposition from religious groups in society, they may adopt policies to co-opt them or use them to undermine the power of pro-democratic forces in society. Also, when non-democratic regimes attempt to co-opt religious opposition groups this can create space for these groups to persist and challenge the state (Wickham 2002).

Institutional Change

The manner through which religion-state institutions change over time also affects their effect on politics. Policies or institutions enacted by the state in one period in response to religious pressure will influence both the policies enacted by the state and the nature of religious pressure the state faces at a later date. Leaving this dynamic out of the study ignores the slow-moving nature of increasing religious pressure on the state and the possibility of unintended effects from institutional changes that would be obscured by a static analysis. Also, the means through which religion-state connections developed may contribute to their effects on state

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10 The exception is when there are significant connections between religion and the state, which will be discussed below.

11 For examples of this, see Brumberg199, Brumberg199, Nasr2001.
policy, so an important source of variation would be missed. Finally, as the nature of religious contention and institutional religion-state connections are not independent of each other, including their historical development in the analysis can deal with issues of possible endogeneity. ¹²

The general process I focus on in this dissertation is that of gradual institutional change involving religion-state connections, in response to domestic pressure, state policies, and international issues. The level of religion-state connections at the initial time period determines the opportunity structure for religious groups interacting with the state; as they press the state to adopt religious policies and the state responds with a mixture of co-option and repression, religion-state connections change and increase. This sets in place a positive feedback loop in which state policies that increase religion-state connections enhance the political salience of religion, making it less likely the state will be able to resist calls for further actions (Mahoney 2000, Page 2006).

International dynamics can also affect this process. When the regime follows domestic pressure on a religiously-salient international issue or frames its policies through religious rhetoric to gain support this can increase expectations for similar behavior in the future and strengthen domestic religious groups (Krebs and Jackson 2007). If, alternately, the regime manages to ignore or repress domestic dissent, the international issues could have little effect on domestic politics. Similarly, the regime may adopt domestic policies favorable to religious groups to deflect opposition. Yet, these policies could radicalize domestic sentiment or—in the

¹² For discussion on these points, see Hall and Taylor199, Thelen and Steinmo199, Streeck and Thelen200, Mahoney and Thelen2010, Mahoney and Thelen2010, Fioretos201, Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreh1992.
case of co-option through adoption of alternative demands—increase religious groups’ power, making it harder for regimes to take such steps again in the future (Hafez 2003, Wickham 2004).

The primary implication of these historical processes for this dissertation is the slow moving—and often unintended—effects of religion-state connections on religious influences on foreign policies. Religion-state connections established in one time period will affect conditions in later ones, even if their ultimate effect was not intended at the time of their adoption. For example, legal reforms enacted in response to pressure from Islamist groups can give these groups greater political power to press for changes in foreign policy at a later date. And the point in the reactive sequence at which religious pressure occurs can determine its effect on foreign policy; at later stages, the path-dependent effects of increasing religion-state connections will be greater, as the regime will have fewer options to deflect opposition through institutional changes.

Religion-State Connections and International Relations

These domestic dynamics arguably extend to international relations. As an expansive research program has demonstrated, domestic politics can affect states’ foreign policies; domestic pressure pushes leaders to adopt certain policies, and regimes use international actions to increase domestic support or deflect opposition. In the case of religious politics, when there are ties between religion and state, religious contention can influence a state’s international behavior in a similar manner to their effect on domestic politics. Of course, much religious contention is focused on domestic politics issues, or even local ones. Occasionally, however, an international issue will arise that has become politicized among religious groups; that is, the

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13 For general discussions on this point, see Bennett and Elman2006, Mahoney200, Page200, Pierson2003
groups see it as a religious cause, or one that threatens a coreligionist. For example, while depictions of the Prophet Muhammad often occurred with little protest from Muslim groups, this issue became politicized after the Dutch newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published satirical cartoons of the Prophet in 2005. Islamic groups in several countries organized protests, which spread even farther and led to pressure on states to act accordingly; in one case, Turkey protested the choice of a Danish official to lead NATO in 2009.\(^\text{15}\) It is in these cases that domestic religious contention will translate into pressure on a state’s foreign policy.

Yet, the general dynamic of the institutional approach to religion and politics holds in international relations. Religious contention is important in determining the content of the pressure a state faces. It increases pressure on the state to act according to religious standards, and intensifies transnational influences on state behavior, making it more likely domestic publics will tie domestic issues to global ones. And when a contentious international religious issue arises, religious contention in a state will result in pressure on the state to change its foreign policy accordingly. But religious contention has little effect on state behavior in the absence of ties between religion and state. When a state with a close relationship to religion faces a religiously contentious issue, the power of religious groups over the state and salience of religious arguments will result in significant pressure on the regime to act in line with religious sentiment. Moreover, policies the state takes on religious issues in one period can increase religion-state connections in later periods, increasing the likelihood of religiously-influenced policies; similarly, existing political conditions may be the result of long-term developments in the religion-state relationship.

\(^{15}\) For more on the process through which this issue became politicized, see Hassner2011.
The factors I presented above—the strength of the state and the extent of religion-state connections—as well as the historical dynamics underlying a state’s religion-state relationship, will determine the influence of religion contention on the state’s foreign policy. When religious contention occurs in the context of extensive religion-state connections, these connections will intensify the salience of religious issues and the power of religious groups and channel religious contention into changes to state behavior. When it occurs in the context of minimal religion-state ties, however, the state will be able to ignore religious pressure to changes its policies. Likewise, religious contention in weak states will translate into greater effects on state behavior than in stronger states.

The combination of these two variables results in different general categories of religious influence on international relations. Religious influence is greatest in weak states with extensive religion-state connections, as the state will find it difficult to ignore religious contention to the influence of religious groups and the general power of the state over society. Religious influence is also present, albeit to a lesser degree, in strong states with extensive religion-state connections. The religion-state connections intensify the salience of religious issues and the power of religious groups, but the strength of the state allows it to resist domestic pressure. Moderate religious influence occurs in weak states with minimal religion-state connections. Because of the weakness of the state, leaders must respond to religious contention, but the lack of extensive ties between religion and the state prevents religious groups from gaining too much influence. Finally, minimal influence occurs in strong states with minimal religion-state connections. (See Figure 2-1)

[Figure 2-1 about here]
Overview

Thus, while this institutional approach to religion and international relations has several moving parts, it presents several straightforward implications for the effects of religious contention on states’ international behavior. Religious contention changes the nature of the domestic pressure a state faces, and the presence of a religiously-contentious international issues results in this pressure focusing on a state’s foreign policy. But this interacts with the religion-state relationship to result in changes to a states’ international behavior. When religious contention occurs in the context of a close religion-state relationship, the political influence of religious issues and groups results in the state adopting policies in line with religious sentiment.16

(See Figure 2-2)

[Figure 2-2 about here]

The first part of the theory deals with religious contention. I argue that religious contention has significant effects on politics. Politics often revolve around religious issues and symbols, and groups pressure leaders to follow religious standards. It also expands transnational influences on domestic politics. These transnational influences take the form of global framing, internalization, and transnational connections among religious groups.

The second part deals with the relationship between religion and state. This is a function of state strength and the extent of connections between religious groups and the state. When an international religious issue arises, it will translate into greater changes to state behavior when there is a close relationship between religion and the state. Religious contention in states with

16 Note: although I discuss religious contention and the presence of a religiously-contentious issue as a variable in this section, I treat them as a “constant” in the specific discussion of US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. This is because religious contention is widespread in Muslim countries, and a religiously-contentious international issue—US counterterrorism efforts—is present.
greater separation will have less of an impact. This theory can say something about the nature of religious politics more broadly. Societal religious contention will not result directly in policy changes, and the policies the state does adopt may not be exactly in line with public demands. Moreover, leaders will not always be motivated by religious concerns. Likewise, religious contention will not always be directed towards the establishment of a religious state. And the ultimate influence of religion on a state’s politics will often be unintended by either the public or the state. But religious politics that do not call for religious political systems still represent religious influences on state behavior, as do the political use of religion by leaders, or unintended effects of religious policies.

Scope and Caveats

There are a few caveats to this approach’s applicability, as it does not explain all aspects of religious effects on international relations. It does not specify what international issues become religiously-contentious ones, or whether religious policies “really are about religion” or if they represent the political use of religion. It also does not clearly specify the specific types of religion-state connections (beyond the three broad categories discussed above) and how they develop over time. And I only discuss variation in religion-state connections and regime type in the face of religious contention; I do not discuss religion-state connections in the absence of religious contention.

The first two caveats--about religious issues and religious policies--are due partly due to the manner in which I conceptualize these terms. Religiously-contentious issues are ones that religious groups contend over with the state, and do not need to be identified a priori. Likewise, religious policies are policies enacted in response to religious group pressure or justified through
appeal to religion, so even if they are not scripturally valid, they were formulated in response to religious sentiment. And since I do not claim that religious policies are not necessarily the result of sincere devotion on the part of regimes, religion still affects policies even if regimes turn to religion for political purposes.

The dissertation’s scope also affects the theory’s specificity. Certain issues may be more likely to be religiously-contentious than others. And some attempts to brand a policy as “religious” may be ineffective if the policy is out of line with religious sentiment. These are interesting topics for discussion, but are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Finally, some of the caveats are due to the general nature of this approach, and I deal with them when I apply it directly to the dissertation’s topic. Given the diversity of religious contention and religion-state connections across time and space, it would be difficult to clearly delineate all historical paths to and types of religion-state connections. In the below discussion of US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, however, I do provide greater detail, albeit on this one specific issue. And I do not address religion-state connections in the absence of religious contention because such conditions are more common in non-Muslim settings, like legacy church-state ties among Western European states. Finally, I emphasize gradual increases in religion-state connections, rather than decreases, because of the nature of religious politics in Muslim states in this dissertation’s time period; analysis at different time periods could involve differing historical dynamics.
US-Muslim Counterterrorism Cooperation

I explain the effect of religious contention on Muslim states’ cooperation with US counterterrorism initiatives through this institutional approach to religion and international relations, placing US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation from the 1990s to 2009 in the context of relations between religious groups and Muslim states since the 1960s. In this section, I first discuss counterterrorism cooperation and the religious contention surrounding this issue. I then discuss the nature of religious contention in Muslim states, and the role of religion-state connections in Muslim states’ religious politics. Finally, I present theoretical expectations for how this will affect US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation.

Counterterrorism Cooperation

This dissertation focuses on counterterrorism cooperation between Muslim states and the United States as a religiously-contentious issue that catalyzes domestic religious pressure on foreign policy in the context of religion-state connections. In the general institutional approach to religion and international relations, the dependent variable is changes to a state’s foreign policy in response to religious contention. In the case of US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, then, the dependent variable is changes to a Muslim state’s counterterrorism policies, specifically refusal or hesitation in response to US pressure on counterterrorism. This is due to the religious salience of the issue, and the hierarchical nature of US efforts, which I will discuss in turn.

Because of the issue’s religious salience, religious pressure from Muslim societies will generally involve calls for Muslim states to oppose US efforts; the states thus have a political incentive to minimize cooperating on counterterrorism initiatives. But opposing US counterterrorism initiative is potentially costly, as many Muslim states depend on US support
and aid or fear US retribution if they do not comply with its demands. Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies thus represent a balance between domestic sentiment and international—specifically US—pressure.

US attention to terrorist threats began in the 1960s and 1970s and expanded in the 1980s with the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism Center. US concern over terrorism intensified in the 1990s, with the threat to US interests posed by al-Qaeda; this spiked after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and continued through the Obama administration. A significant portion of US counterterrorism initiatives involved Muslim states. This included pressure on Muslim states to take action against terrorist groups, terrorist financing, and extremist rhetoric believed to increase support for terrorist groups. It also involved efforts to develop international agreements on counterterrorism, and convince Muslim states to comply with them. And, especially after 9/11, it encompassed US international actions intended to actively combat terrorist threats, such as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

US counterterrorism efforts and transnational terrorist threats gradually took on a religious, specifically Islamic, salience over time. Early terrorist threats—like the Red Brigades in Europe and various Palestinian groups—were leftist and nationalist in nature; beginning in the 1980s, though, explicitly Islamic groups became prominent, with the rise of Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in Israel-Palestine (Hoffman 2006). In the 1990s, this expanded with the emergence of al-Qaeda as a transnational force and insurgencies by Islamic groups in Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, and other countries (Coll 2004, Gunaratna 2003, Gerges 2005, Hoffman 2006, Kepel 2002, 2006, Wright 2006). And after the 9/11 attack, al-Qaeda became the dominant focus of US counterterrorism efforts, and the United States expanded efforts to combat
what it saw as extreme Islamic groups and support “moderate” alternatives (Bergen 2011, Commission 2004).

Counterterrorism efforts increasingly became religiously-contentious as they grew more closely connected to Islam. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladin drew on worldwide Muslim solidarity in opposition to the 1980’s Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to gain international support. After the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda and its supporters framed the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as attacks on Muslims, drawing fighters to those conflicts from around the world (Bergen 2011). And even the large proportion of Muslims who opposed the violent activities of al-Qaeda and other groups became concerned about counterterrorism activities, due to the perceived profiling of Muslims as potential terrorists and non-Muslim calls to “reform” Islam. A comprehensive study of Muslim populations’ attitudes towards the United States between 2006 and 2009 found that a great percentage of Muslims believed the United States intended to dominate Muslim countries and weaken Islam (Kull 2011). Many also saw US counterterrorism efforts after 9/11 as the United States “[acting] out rage against all Muslims” in response to the 9/11 attacks (Kull 2011). Thus, while not all opposition to US counterterrorism initiatives was among Muslims, and Muslims did not oppose US efforts because of religious beliefs, US counterterrorism efforts—and broader US power in the international system—took on a religious salience.

There was also a significant transnational aspect to US counterterrorism efforts and religious opposition to them. US counterterrorism initiatives transcended any one country or conflict, implicitly connecting terrorist violence in countries as disparate as Algeria and Indonesia. As a result, groups targeted by US counterterrorism efforts saw their struggle as part
of a broader, global one. And opposition to US counterterrorism efforts often focused on events occurring outside of a country, such as worldwide protests against the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the broad scope of US counterterrorism efforts promoted transnational ties among groups, such as al-Qaeda allying itself with militants in numerous countries.

Counterterrorism cooperation is also a high stakes issue. Many Muslim states have been aligned with the United States since shortly after World War II, and came to depend on the United States for aid, trade and security. And the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated US willingness to take action against states it deemed enablers of terrorism. Not complying with US preferences on an issue the United States deems significant—counterterrorism—thus posed major risks for many Muslim states. At the same time, several Muslim states have faced significant insurgencies, so their counterterrorism policies are of significant import to state survival (Hafez 2003, Juergensmeyer 2008, Kepel 2002, Schanzer 2005). Likewise, most Muslim states have dealt with widespread religious contention (Esposito 1998, Roy 1994, 2004). As a result, their survival is also dependent on not upsetting religious groups through close counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.

Counterterrorism cooperation is also a hierarchical relationship. The United States, as the dominant power in the international system, sets the terms of the interaction between the United States and Muslim states. This is especially the case with Muslim states, most of whom are far weaker in material capabilities than the United States, and many of whom are client states of the United States. Thus, US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation is essentially US demands of
Muslim states, and the level of US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation is the extent to which Muslim states comply with US demands.

**Religious Contention in Muslim States**

US-counterterrorism efforts took place in the context of widespread religious contention in Muslim countries. Religious politics have been increasing in prominence among Muslim countries since the end of World War II. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the officially Salafist state of Saudi Arabia, the homeland for South Asian Muslims in Pakistan, and that country’s powerful Islamist group—*Jamaat-e-Islami*—all emerged around this period. And with the decline of pan-Arabism as an ideology in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israel war, political Islam gained significant influence over Middle Eastern politics, while the political salience of Islam also increased in non-Arab countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia.\(^17\)

There is significant variety to religious politics among Muslim countries, however. Many Islamic groups participated in the electoral process—such as in Pakistan, Algeria, and Turkey—although in many cases their power was limited by military intervention (Esposito 1998). And some Islamic groups focused primarily on social causes, such as the Muslim Brotherhood at some periods and the Gulen movement in Turkey. Also, while certain Islamic groups attempted to institute Islamic rule, others endeavored only to expand the role of religion in a country’s politics; for example, the conservative religious *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* in Turkey has attempted to loosen legal restrictions on religious expression, rather than replace Turkey’s secular system with an Islamic one (Yavuz 2008). And many groups were violent, although even here there was significant variety, such as the transnational al-Qaeda network, the Islamic

\(^{17}\) See Esposito 1999, Juergensmeyer 1993.
resistance movements of Hizballah and Hamas, and ethnoreligious insurgencies in Russia and the Philippines (Gerges 2005, Kepel 2002).

Despite this variety, however, there was some commonality in the effects of religious contention on politics in Muslim societies. Religious symbols and rhetoric have become more prominent in numerous countries; the Muslim Brotherhood was incredibly popular in Egypt despite state repression, the Palestinian conflict with Israel gradually took on an Islamic—rather than leftist—tone, and religious parties in Turkey gained victories over previously prominent secularist forces. And debates over interpretations of Islamic standards and the proper role of Islam in Muslim societies have had a significant effect on politics in these countries, as seen in countries as diverse as Bangladesh, Turkey, and Egypt. Moreover, identification with religious causes and coreligionists abroad grew; worldwide Muslim attention focused on conflicts involving Muslims not only in Israel but also in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burma, Iraq and Russia.\(^{18}\)

Religious contention has also resulted in an increase in pressure on Muslim states, and the adoption of religious policies by many of them. States like Pakistan and Malaysia, which had previously been putatively secular, began to adopt official ties to Islam in response to public pressure (Nasr 2001). And officially Islamic Saudi Arabia increased the prominence of religion in its politics in the face of domestic pressure and denunciation of its legitimacy by Iran following its 1979 revolution, with the Saudi king taking the title of “Defender of the Two Holy Places” in the 1980s. Moreover, previously nationalist regimes like that in Egypt began to reach out to Islamist groups and incorporate Islamic law into their legal frameworks. And the strength of religious contention in Muslim societies and the political utility of appeals to Islam led even

Turkey—one of the most adamantly secular Muslim states—to adopt some religious policies, such as the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” under Turkey’s 1980’s military government. But religious contention in Muslim societies has also had the broader effect of making states more accountable to popular pressure, as arguably occurred in Turkey, Iran during its “Green Revolution” and the recent “Arab uprisings.”

There has been a transnational element to these developments as well. Religious groups in Muslim states have often framed their struggles as part of worldwide Islamic causes, appealing to the ummah, or global Muslim community. For example, some in Pakistan have rhetorically connected the insurgency in Kashmir to other conflicts involving Muslims around the world. And international religious issues among Muslims have translated into pressure on Muslim leaders to act, as in international opposition to Israel’s actions in the Palestinian territories.

*Varying Effects of Religious Contention based on Religion-State Relationships*

The political effects of religious politics on Muslim states varied greatly, however, corresponding to the religion-state relationship. States with a closer religion-state relationship experienced greater pressure from religious groups. Weak states with extensive ties between religion and state—like Pakistan—found it difficult to ignore religious pressure, while even stronger states with religion-state connections, like Saudi Arabia, also had to respond to religious contention. States with greater separation between religion and state, like Turkey, however, experienced less of an impact on their behavior from religious contention.  

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19 This is at first glance complicated by the electoral success of the religious-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. For more on this, however, see the case selection discussion below and the chapter on Turkey.
The close religion-state relationships are present in weak states with extensive connections to religion. These states include Islamic parties in governing coalitions, an official or unofficial advisory role of religious scholars, and sometimes have ties between the security apparatus and religious groups. They are also officially Islamic, and sometimes base their legal codes on Islamic standards. And they extensively restrict religious practice. This includes practices of non-Muslim communities, like Christians and Hindus, or reflect sectarian divides among Muslims (such as Sunni-Shia or mainstream-heretical sects like the Ahmadis). Some states also restrict the majority Muslim community by enforcing an official form of Islam, such as Saudi Arabia’s conservative Salafi beliefs or Brunei’s Hanafi school of Islam. And these states are also relatively weak vis-à-vis society. Often the state is unable to control domestic opposition groups, which at times threaten to destabilize society. They also occasionally have hybrid political elements, such as legislatures, leaving even nondemocratic regimes unstable. A prominent example of this type of state is Pakistan, although it also includes Malaysia and Yemen.

These states experience the greatest influence of religion on state behavior. In these states, religious issues are very salient and regimes depend on religious groups’ support to stay in power. When religiously-contentious international issues arose, regimes either hesitate to take actions that would upset groups, or implement unpopular policies but distract opposition through religiously-charged rhetoric or symbolic stands. Often leaders’ responses were determined by earlier regimes’ policies, as appeals to religion in one period made it difficult for leaders to ignore religious pressure in later periods. For example, Pakistan has alternated between military rule and weak civilian governments, both of which gradually increased the level of religion-state
connections. As a result, most regimes either depended on religious groups or religious appeals for support, or were wary of upsetting religious groups due to their prominent opposition. Appeals to Islam by early leaders established ties between Islam and the state and encouraged religious groups to pressure the state on policies. This led later regimes to either give in to religious pressure to maintain power—like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—or actively promote religious groups they supported, like Zia ul-Haq. Following Pakistani support for Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the state found it inconvenient or difficult to break with militants under pressure from the United States and other international actors. And the state also championed international causes in the United Nations and similar forums that resonated with religious groups as well as solidarity among developing countries.

Strong religion-state ties are also present in strong states with extensive religion-state connections. These states have significant political ties to religious groups, restrict religious activity, and are often committed to supporting Islam at their founding, increasing the importance of religion in the states’ functioning. Yet, these states have significant control over society. They often have extensive resource bases, as well as very powerful security forces. Examples of this category include Iran and Saudi Arabia.

These states are also influenced by religious contention, but have greater control over society. Religious groups pressure these states to “live up to” their Islamic ideals, pushing them to act according to Islamic standards. For example, some states would adopt policies intending to outbid domestic opposition—such as championing international Islamic causes—that gave religious groups more leverage to pressure the regime later on. Yet, as the states are relatively strong, they will only give in until regime survival is threatened, moving to repress religious
groups that go too far. This can be seen in the history of religion-state relations in Saudi Arabia. At several points, the regime faced pressure from strong religious groups, as in the backlash against economic modernization in the 1960s, the threat to legitimacy posed by the Iranian Revolution, and anger over support for the 1991 Gulf War. In each case, the regime attempted to outbid religious groups for legitimacy, such as officially declaring the Saudi King the defender of Mecca and Medina and getting post-hoc justification for working with the United States on Iraq from the ulemma. But when religious groups pushed too hard, as in the Sahwists’—young, conservative clerics—protests against the King’s legitimacy in the early 1990s, the regime responded with outright repression.

Moderate influence is present in strong states with connections between religion and the state that are not as extensive as the above categories. These states are non-democratic, although some have hybrid elements, like parliaments; but they remain strong vis-à-vis society. They are officially Islamic and restrict religious practice, but the regime is not politically connected to religious groups; similarly, religious scholars have less official power than in those states, and the security services are not closely tied to religious groups. This results in religious influence on behavior similar to the above category, but to a lesser degree. Examples of this state include Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Lower religious influence on behavior is present in weak states with few religion-state connections; these states are often relatively democratic Muslim states, like Senegal and Turkey. These states are officially secular but religious groups can affect politics through the electoral process. For example, in relatively democratic Senegal a cooperative relationship developed between Sufi orders and the state, contributing to a consensual incorporation of religion into
Senegalese politics and preventing the dominance of more radical groups. And Turkey long combined restrictions on public religious expression with democratic political processes; by the 1990s, this had allowed religiously-minded groups to participate in politics, culminating in the 2002 electoral victory of the conservative religious Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi.

There will be low religious influence on these states. In these states, the power of religious groups is diffused by the relatively broad electorate and the state’s security apparatus is often separate from—or even hostile to—religious groups. The state is thus less likely to adopt religious policies on important issues—like security or significant trade agreements—unless there is significant and widespread domestic contention surrounding the issue. For example, in Turkey, neither a short-lived Islamist government in the 1990s nor the aforementioned conservative religious movement resulted in drastic changes to the state’s security relationships with Israel and the United States, due to both the broad electoral coalitions supporting each party and the power of the secular military.

Finally, there are numerous non-democratic Muslim states that are generally secular; there is minimal religious influence on the behavior of these states. Some are opportunistic in regard to religion, like Egypt, which adopted ties to religion in order to co-opt religious groups but avoided substantive connections with these groups. Others remained secular, mostly formerly Communist states in Central Asia that significantly restrict religious political activity. And some are non-democratic states in Africa in which religion has never been a serious issue of contention. There is little to no religious influence on these states’ behavior. (See Figure 2-3)

[Figure 2-3 about here]
The application of the institutional approach to religion and international relations to the issue of US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation yields specific theoretical expectations for the role of religion. The dependent variable is the level of counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and a Muslim state. The explanatory variable, the religion-state relationship, has a negative relationship to the dependent variable, and interacts with religious contention in society. Specifically, religious contention is widespread in Muslim countries, but its effects on politics depend on the religion-state relationship. When there is a close religion-state relationship, leaders will hesitate to cooperate on counterterrorism with the United States due to the political influence of religious groups and issues.

First, religious contention in Muslim countries will involve pressuring the state to follow Islamic standards, which includes opposing US counterterrorism operations. This religious contention occurs alongside a religiously-contentious international issue, US counterterrorism efforts; these efforts have taken on a religious salience among Muslims, as they are seen as an attack on Muslim societies or even Islam itself. As a result, religious groups pressuring leaders to act according to Islamic standards will also push regimes to oppose US efforts. And due to the worldwide scope of US counterterrorism efforts, Muslim states will experience transnational pressure arising from religious contention. Religious groups will frame their opposition to counterterrorism cooperation not only in terms of the specific state’s policies, but as part of a worldwide religious struggle. And groups will pressure states not only in response to events occurring in the state, but also US counterterrorism efforts around the world. This religious contention is widespread throughout the Muslim world; accordingly I treat it as a constant in the analysis.
The effect of this domestic and transnational religious opposition to US counterterrorism efforts will vary depending on the religion-state relationship, however. The greatest effect will be in states with a close religion-state relationship: weak states with extensive religion-state connections. In these states, religious contention opposing US counterterrorism efforts will be the strongest, and the states’ cooperation with the United States will be the lowest. More minimal effects will be present in states with more distant religion-state relationships, both weak and strong states with few religion-state ties. In these states, religious contention opposing US counterterrorism efforts will still be present, but the lessened political influence of religious groups will allow the state to ignore this pressure. The nature of the religion-state relationship is thus the study’s independent variable.

The effects of religious contention on US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation arise from the political dynamics surrounding religious contention and religion-state connections, however, not principled stands on the part of Muslim leaders. Lessened cooperation as a result of religious pressure will occur not because leaders see this as an Islamic duty, but rather due to concerns about provoking intense opposition from religious groups in society. These concerns will likely be present in all countries, but those with more distant religion-state relationships will find it easier to control religious contention in response to close cooperation with the United States. And sometimes leaders’ hesitation to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism is due to short-term political calculations, but these calculations arose from earlier policies by the state that granted political influence to religious groups. These are the mechanisms that connect the independent and dependent variables. (See Figure 2-4)
Other factors besides the religion-state relationship matter, however. The extent of pressure by the United States and the extent of asymmetric interdependence between the US and the country in question will matter; as the US increases pressure on Muslim states to cooperate, the regimes will have to balance this with domestic religious pressure. The political benefits of counterterrorism efforts can also affect state behavior; when states face security threats from terrorists or religious groups, they may be more likely to work with the United States, or blame the United States for their aggressive counterterrorism policies to deflect opposition and advance their own interests. Some of these other factors may act as countervailing pressure against the effects of religious contention; for example, a state facing intense pressure from religious groups to not cooperate with the United States might also depend on aid and support from the United States. As a result, a Muslim states’ overall cooperation with the United States will be a mixture of cooperative and noncooperative behaviors, based on the interaction between the religion-state relationship and these other factors; that is, a state with a close religion-state relationship may still partially cooperate with the United States in order to benefit from ties to the United States. Yet, overall states with closer religion-state relationships will have lower levels of counterterrorism cooperation.

This is distinct from alternative explanations. Essentialist or civilizational arguments would point to the Muslim identity of states as explaining tensions with the United States, with religious difference and Islamic beliefs determining states’ responses to US counterterrorism efforts. Similarly, some may point to different types of Islamic belief, such as Sunni/Shia or Salafist/moderate to explain the differences. Explanations emphasizing religion as a global discourse or civil society would instead focus on the meaning-creation and contestation that
occurs through religious contention among Muslims, rather than the institutional conditions and regime strategies. Other explanations would downplay religion’s significance. Some would point to non-religious domestic politics, motivated by anti-Americanism, economic interests or nationalism. Others would see Muslim states’ hedging on counterterrorism cooperation as examples of “soft balancing” or regional security dynamics. And others would argue that religion may matter in Muslim states’ domestic policies, but the religion-state connections they establish serve to insulate their foreign policy from religious contention.

There are a few caveats to this approach. The focus on institutions does not mean that religious beliefs are irrelevant, or that apparent religious contention is “just politics.” It only suggests that religious politics arise from the interaction between institutions and beliefs. Also, I do not extend this argument to religious politics in non-Muslim states or counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and non-Muslim countries. This would require some adaptation of the general approach used here to account for differing political and religious dynamics among non-Muslim states.

The dissertation also does not analyze how counterterrorism or other issues become religiously-contentious or the causes of religious contention or religion-state connections in Muslim states. These are beyond the scope of this dissertation. I realize that some arguments concerning religious contention in Muslim states would counter my claims concerning religious influence on Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies; this includes the claim that apparent religious politics are motivated more by economic angst or anti-regime grievances than religious sentiment, and religion-state connections are actually empty gestures by regimes. I address these counterarguments by incorporating the nature of religious contention and religion-state
connections into the analysis itself—specifically the case studies (see below)—rather than taking them as assumptions.

**Research Design**

This dissertation uses a mixed-methods research design to test this theory. The theory presents three testable implications. The first is that much of the contention in Muslim states since the 1960s is religious in nature and opposition to US counterterrorism strategies is driven by religious contention. The second is that this religious contention is more likely to affect counterterrorism cooperation under certain institutional conditions, specifically greater religion-state connections. The third is that these institutional variables affect foreign policy by giving religious groups leverage over the regime and producing path dependent effects on state behavior.

The dissertation draws on the relative strengths of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Quantitative methods are useful in analyzing correlations between sets of variables and uncovering regularities among a large number of observations, while qualitative methods can identify the presence of mechanisms connecting independent and dependent variables (George and Bennett 2005, Bennett and Elman 2006b, Collier and Brady 2010, Bennett 2010, Mahoney and Goertz 2006, Lieberman 2005). Combining the two allows the dissertation to test all of the theory’s implications.

**Quantitative Analysis**
The quantitative tests analyze the relationship between religion-state connections and Muslim states’ cooperation with US counter-terror initiatives between 1996 and 2009.\textsuperscript{20} I use an original dataset, with observations by country-year for every Muslim-majority country. The dependent variable is the Counterterrorism Cooperation Index (CTCI), a measure of the counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and a Muslim state, which runs from -1 to 1. The independent variable is a five-level ordinal variable of religion-state relationships. This is based on the above discussion of different religion-state relationships in Muslim states and runs from 0 to 5. I also include several control variables, such as regime type, the intensity of violence in the country, state capabilities, aid from the United States, diplomatic representation with the United States, whether the country experienced a dispute with the United States in the last ten years, preference similarity between the United States and the country, and whether the state is in an alliance with the United States. I test the relationship between Religion-state and the CTCI through an ordinary least-squares regression (OLS), with year dummy variables included as fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country. I run alternate models as well, including a time-series regression and a generalized estimating equation. I also re-run the OLS regression using the time period observations.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{Qualitative Analysis}

The qualitative tests combine cross-case and within-case analysis. The studies focus on the nature of religious contention in Muslim states, the relationship between religion and state

\textsuperscript{20} The time period is based on the availability of the source for the counterterrorism measure. While the source continued after 2009, the information included in the report decreased, making it less useful beginning in 2010. The numerous robustness checks I perform on the measures, including for several different breakdowns by time period, ensure the findings are not dependent on this time range.

\textsuperscript{21} For a more extensive discussion of the variables and methods, see Chapter 3.
and what effect they had on the state’s counterterrorism policies. Data for the case studies come from translated media articles from Pakistan and Turkey and secondary studies.  

Case Selection

The cases are Pakistan and Turkey. These are both substantively important countries that have faced significant—and at times violent—religious contention. They were also aligned with the United States throughout the time period of this study, and played significant roles in both US efforts to contain Soviet influence during the Cold War and US counterterror efforts. At the same time, they vary on the explanatory and dependent variables. Pakistan has been officially Islamic since its founding, although both the official and informal role of Islam in its politics has increased steadily since the 1960s; over time, the state has increasingly restricted religious activity and established ties to Islamic groups. The state is also rather weak, facing powerful social groups and alternating between civilian and military rule. And Pakistan and the United States have experienced significant tensions over the former’s lack of cooperation on US counterterrorism efforts. Turkey, in contrast, is officially secular, although the visibility of Islamic groups has increased since the 1990s. The state is also relatively weak due to the democratic process, although the military has periodically intervened in the political process.

This case selection makes use of cases selected according to extreme values to highlight theorized mechanisms. That is, I selected cases based on the values of both the independent and dependent variables to ensure maximum variation between the two (Seawright and Gerring 2008). This can help illuminate whether posited mechanisms are present in the cases, although it

22 Translated news articles are obtained through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the World News Connections (the current name of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service). In the case studies, I provide the date and title of the translated report as citation.
does raise issues of generalizability (Seawright and Gerring 2008); pairing the cases with a large-
ness analysis, however, can address potential problems. Pakistan has a very close religion-state
relationship, and has had a low level of counterterrorism cooperation with the United States
throughout the time period of this study. The mechanism connecting religious contention and
hesitation over counterterrorism cooperation—a close religion-state relationship intensifying the
political power of religious groups and symbols and translating into the state’s hesitation to
cooperate on counterterrorism—would thus be active in this case. Turkey, in contrast, has a more
distant religion-state relationships, and closer counterterrorism cooperation with the United
States. The posited mechanism limiting religious contention’s influence—separation between
religion and the state insulting regimes from religious opposition—would be present here. (See
Figure 2-5)

One could argue that a more useful comparison would be between a weak state with
extensive religion-state connections (like Pakistan) and a strong state with minimal religion-state
ties, like Uzbekistan, to allow for the greatest variation in the explanatory variable. Yet, analysis
of a case like Uzbekistan would reveal state repression of Islamic political activity, and yield
little useful information on the interaction between religious contention and religion-state
relationships. Turkey, in contrast, has a vibrant domestic political sphere with widespread
religious contention, so can provide greater insight into the means through which the religion-
state relationship affects the political effects of this contention.

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\[^{23}\] I do provide brief discussions of religious contention, religion-state relationships, and counterterrorism
cooperation in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Uzbekistan in the Concluding Chapter, however.
As noted above, the electoral success of a religiously-influenced party in Turkey may complicate its selection as a negative case for religious influences on state behavior. Since 2002, the AKP—a conservative party with many religious supporters that has enacted several policies in line with religious sentiment—has been in power in Turkey. Moreover, tensions between the United States and Turkey have emerged in certain areas of international relations, such as the Israel-Palestinian conflict, although counterterrorism cooperation has remained high. The case study of Turkey can thus partly be conceptualized as two cases, before and after the AKP’s rise to power, with resulting changes to religious effects on the state. At the same time, the overall nature of the religion-state relationship remained constant—i.e. it does not change categories in the typology present in Figure 3—so the effect of religious contention on counterterrorism cooperation is not expected to change.

Qualitative Methods

I utilize several qualitative methodological tools to conduct the within-case analysis. The first is the congruence method, in which the analysis “posits a relation between variance in the independent variable and variance in the dependent variable,” “ascertains the value of the independent variables in the case at hand” and assesses whether the “outcome of the dependent variable” is in line with the theory’s prediction (George and Bennett 2005). In the dissertation, this involves assessing the levels of the “constant”—religious contention—the variable of interest, religion-state connections, and the dependent variable of religion-state connections.

The second is process tracing. The congruence method is primarily a qualitative confirmation of the quantitative analysis’ correlations, rather than evidence for the mechanisms posited to explain religion-state connections’ effects on counterterrorism cooperation. Process
tracing, in turn, can illustrate these mechanisms by providing evidence of them. Process tracing “attempts to identify the intervening causal process…between and independent variable…and the outcome of the dependent variable; this involves “[generating] numerous observations within a case” that are “linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation for the case” (George and Bennett 2005, Bennett 2010). As the case studies deal with long-term and society-level dynamics, however, they cannot provide proper process tracing evidence of the individual decision-making behind counterterrorism policies. They can, however, demonstrate that several of the claims concerning religion-state connections’ effects on counterterrorism cooperation were present in the countries.

I use process tracing in this dissertation by identifying evidence connecting the independent and dependent variables in the particular sequence specified in the theory. This involves uncovering evidence first that religious contention contributed to the development of religion-state connections in a country. Second, that a close religion-state relationship intensified later religious contention. Third that leaders adopted policies in line with religious sentiment due to the political influence of religious groups. Finally, that the state’s counterterrorism policies were connected to the political effects of religion-state connections.

The third method uses frameworks developed to study path dependence and broaden the historical scope of an analysis. Even with indications of religion-state connections’ effects on counterterrorism cooperation, one could still argue that leaders were responding to short-term political calculations. This would be “just politics” then, rather than the effects of religion on state behavior. But part of the theorized effects of religion-state connections on counterterrorism cooperation arise from long-term processes. Policies enacted in one time period increased the
power of Islamic groups in later ones, so what appears to be “just politics” in one period had its roots in religious dynamics in earlier periods. And these policies have a cumulative effect, so connecting religion and state in one period makes it more likely leaders will do so later.

Qualitative tools for analyzing historical processes can thus provide additional evidence for the role religion-state connections in US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. First, this relationship is captured by the concept of a “causal chain,” which Pierson describes as a situation in which “x initiates the sequence a,b,c, which yields y” (Pierson 2004). This extends the scope of an analysis—taking into account the historical background of an episode, like counterterrorism cooperation—and demonstrates how earlier policies regarding religion affected later political calculations. The relationship also represents a path dependent process with positive feedback; the ultimate outcome is the result of a long sequence of events, and “each step” in that direction “makes it more difficult to reverse course” (Pierson 2004). In this case, this was the intensifying power of Islamic groups with each policy connecting religion and state; this increased the pressure on the state to adopt policies supported by Islamic groups in the future, which further empowered the groups. Likewise, in the case of minimal connections between religion and state, these made later attempts to press the state to adopt religious policies difficult, decreasing the likelihood of religion and state growing closer.

Finally, I use Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu’s (2008) method for assessing interacting causal factors to assess the validity of competing explanations. The method of sequence elaboration can help to assess causal factors that each partially contribute to an outcome; unlike the historical analysis for which it was intended, however, I am using it to determine if the apparent effect of religion-state connections on counterterrorism cooperation is actually do to
other factors. Based on this method, adding an alternative explanation to the relationship between religion-state connections and counterterrorism could either contextualize or diminish the relationship. It would contextualize it when the alternative explanation contributed to the rise of the religion-state relationship and the low counterterrorism cooperation, but the religion-state connections and particular issues in the cooperation would not necessarily arisen as a result of the alternative explanation. Alternately, it would contextualize the relationship if alternative explanation intervened between religion-state connections and the counterterrorism cooperation, and the religion-state connections gave rise to both. And it would diminish it when the alternative explanation would completely explain the rise of religion-state connections. Finally, an alternative explanation may be incidental to the theory if it matters but does not affect the posited relationship between religion-state connections and counterterrorism cooperation, or if the alternative explanation is wrong.

The cases involve three sections on each country. The first is background on the religion-state relationship and counterterrorism pressure from the United States. I discuss the development of religion and state relationship over time, focusing on the implementation of Islamic law, the establishment of ties between religious groups and the state, restrictions on religious activity, and the relative strength of state and society. I then discuss the nature of US counterterrorism pressure on the country.

The second section focuses on the effects of the religion-state relationships on the country’s counterterrorism cooperation, broken into three time periods: pre-9/11 (1990-2001),

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Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu discussed other possible combinations of relationships, and framed this more explicitly in necessary and sufficient terms. For the purpose of simplicity, I have presented only those most relevant to this chapter.
The first segment analyses religious contention, asking whether religious groups pressed the state to follow Islamic standards and attacked the state for its cooperation with the United States; I also look at whether transnational influences on religious contention occurred and violent religious contention broke out. The next discusses the relationship between religion and state, specifically whether leaders appealed to and depended on religious groups in political struggles, whether the state supported religious groups, and whether the state implemented policies bringing religion and state closer together. Finally, I look at whether the state cooperated with the United States on counterterrorism, including participating in international efforts, taking action against domestic targets, and reforming state institutions. The third segment is the analysis, including the results from the congruence method, process tracing, historical analysis, and the method of sequence elaboration for alternative explanations.

25 The case studies thus incorporate more recent information than does the quantitative study. This is due to the limitations of the latter—as discussed above—and the relevance of events in the countries analyzed past 2009. The values of the independent and dependent variables (religion-state relationship and counterterrorism cooperation) did not change significantly between 2009 and 2012, however, so this should not affect the comparability of the two portions of the research design.
**Figures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak State</th>
<th>Strong State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High religion-state connections</strong></td>
<td>Significant religious influence</td>
<td>Moderate religious influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low religion-state connections</strong></td>
<td>Low religious influence</td>
<td>Minimal religious influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-1: Religious Influence over State Foreign Policy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic religious contention/international religiously-contentious issue</th>
<th>Weak state/extensive religion-state connections</th>
<th>Strong State/Extensive Religion-State Connections</th>
<th>Weak State/Minimal Religion-State Connections</th>
<th>Strong State/Minimal Religion-State Connections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong religious influence on foreign policy</td>
<td>Moderate religious influence on foreign policy</td>
<td>Low religious influence on foreign policy</td>
<td>Minimal religious influence on foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong religious influence on domestic politics, little attention to foreign policy</td>
<td>Moderate religious influence on domestic politics, little attention to foreign policy</td>
<td>Low religious influence on domestic politics, little attention to foreign policy</td>
<td>Minimal religious influence on domestic politics, little attention to foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-2: The Institutional Approach to Religion and International Relations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Influence</th>
<th>Officially Islamic</th>
<th>Restrictions on religious practice</th>
<th>Regime connected to religious groups</th>
<th>Overall extent of religion-state connections</th>
<th>State Strength</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongest</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Malaysia, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Numerous</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Qatar, Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Turkey, Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Egypt, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-3: Categories of Religion-State Connections
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion-State Relationship</th>
<th>Nature of religious influence on state behavior</th>
<th>Level of counterterrorism cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak State with Extensive Religion-State Connections</strong></td>
<td>Significant pressure on state by religious groups, regime hesitation in acting on contentious issues for fear of losing power</td>
<td>Minimal cooperation, with intermittent increases in some areas in face of countervailing pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong State with Extensive Religion-State Connections</strong></td>
<td>Pressure on state to “live up to” Islamic standards, influence of religious groups with eventual state pushback</td>
<td>Initially low cooperation, with gradual increase in face of countervailing pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong State with Numerous Religion-State Connections</strong></td>
<td>Pressure on state to follow Islamic standards, although state easily ignores or represses opposition</td>
<td>Initially low cooperation, with rapid increase in face of countervailing pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak State with Minimal Religion-State Connections</strong></td>
<td>Some influence of religious groups through electoral process, but diffused by democratic system</td>
<td>Moderate to high cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong State with Minimal Religion-State Connections</strong></td>
<td>Minimal influence</td>
<td>High cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-4: Nature of Religious influences on Counterterrorism Cooperation
Figure 2-5: Pakistan and Turkey values on Religion-State and Counterterrorism Cooperation

Counterterrorism Cooperation is the mean value of the CTCI over the entire time period of the study. Religion-State is the state’s quantitative coding for the religion-state relationship. See Chapter 3 for expanded discussion on both variables.

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26 Counterterrorism Cooperation is the mean value of the CTCI over the entire time period of the study. Religion-State is the state’s quantitative coding for the religion-state relationship. See Chapter 3 for expanded discussion on both variables.
Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis: Religion-State Connections in Muslim States and Cooperation on US Counterterrorism Initiatives

Based on the institutional approach to religion and international relations, religion should affect US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation through the extent of connections between religion and state. When religious contention over an international issue—like US counterterrorism initiatives—occurs, states with greater ties to religion are more likely to base their foreign policies on this religious contention. In the case of US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation, this means states with greater connections to religion will be hesitant to fully cooperate with US counterterrorism initiatives due to the widespread religious opposition to these initiatives in Muslim societies.

The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 produced three testable implications: contention over US counterterrorism initiatives in Muslim states is related to religion, states with greater ties to religion are less likely to cooperate with the United States, and this is due to the enhanced political salience of religious issues and power of religious groups in such states. This chapter tests the second implication through a quantitative analysis of religion-state connections and counterterrorism cooperation. Specifically it tests the claim that greater connections between religion and state will correspond to lower levels of cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism. Moreover, other factors—diplomatic and economic ties to the United States, general domestic politics, the extent of terrorist violence in the state—likely affect counterterrorism cooperation as well, religion-state connections will still have an effect when these other explanations are accounted for.
This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, it presents the quantitative research design, including information on the measures of counterterrorism cooperation, religion-state connections, control variables, the methods used in the analysis, and robustness checks. Second, it presents the findings from the quantitative analysis, including the effects of religion-state connections on counterterrorism cooperation, a discussion of different types of cooperation, and information on specific countries. It then discusses the implications of these findings, covering the significance of religion-state connections, what other factors matter in counterterrorism cooperation, and the broader theoretical importance. Finally, it presents brief conclusions. I also include three appendices with results from robustness checks and further information on the variables.

Quantitative Research Design

The quantitative portion of the dissertation uses an original dataset to analyze the relationship between religion-state connections and counterterrorism cooperation. I developed a measure of counterterrorism cooperation, the Counterterrorism Cooperation Index (CTCI), based on coding of US State Department Terrorism Reports; it runs from -1 to 1, with higher values indicating more cooperation. I also developed a six-level ordinal measure of religion-state connections, with higher values indicating greater religion-state ties, by synthesizing existing datasets. I test the relationship between these two variables and a variety of control variables using a time-series regression with year fixed effects. This section discusses the coding and calculation of the CTCI and religion-state measures, control variables, and the models used in the quantitative analysis.
The Counterterrorism Cooperation Index

The dependent variable of the dissertation is an original measure of counterterrorism cooperation between Muslim states and the United States, the Counterterrorism Cooperation Index (CTCI). This section discusses how I conceptualize counterterrorism cooperation, the data coding for the CTCI, and the calculation and validity of the measure.

Conceptualizing Counter-terrorism Cooperation

I approach cooperation as a series of discrete interactions between two states that cumulatively represent the level of cooperation between the two. That is, cooperation is neither a single type of interaction—like alliances or trade—or just a similarity among expressed preferences, such as in United Nations General Assembly votes. Instead, it is numerous types of interactions that either align or disalign the behavior of states, which combine to produce the overall level of cooperation. There are different types of cooperation based on specific issues, such as counter-terrorism; cooperation on different issue-areas is of course related, but not identical, and two states can be cooperative in some areas but non-cooperative in others.

Moreover, cooperation can be either equal or hierarchical. That is, in some instances two states cooperate as equals, with each partially setting the terms of the aligned behavior. In other cases, one powerful state sets the terms for the cooperation due to its influence over the other state—through either formal hierarchical relationships or a power imbalance—and the other state must comply or not, with little effect on the dominant state’s policies.

Thus, US-Muslim counter-terrorism cooperation is the cumulative set of interactions between the United States and Muslim states related to counter-terrorism issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, beginning in the 1990s and intensifying after the 9/11 attacks, the United States
attempted to disrupt international terrorist threats by pressuring Muslim states on a variety of 
counter-terrorism related policies. This includes domestic policies, such as actions taken to 
disrupt terrorist groups and arrest members. They also include institutional reforms to strengthen 
counter-terrorism capacities in the areas of legal frameworks, border security, and immigration. 
They include international initiatives as well, such as: regional counter-terrorism efforts; voting 
on terrorism-related United Nations resolutions; conventions and treaties; and compliance with 
international agreements relating to terrorist groups or individual targets. Another area is the 
rrendition of terrorist targets to the country in which they are wanted. Also, the United States 
launched several initiatives to combat terrorism, such as efforts to disrupt terrorist financing, 
counter terrorist rhetoric, and military actions against Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, they are 
represented by US official designations of states as sponsors of terrorism, and changes in these 
designations.

    US-Muslim counter-terrorism cooperation is a pseudo-hierarchical relationship. The United States, as the dominant power in the international system since the late 1980s and one of 
two superpowers between the end of World War II and the fall of the Soviet Union, exerts a 
great amount of influence on Muslim countries. And many Muslim states were allies or clients of 
the United States, further increasing US influence over these states’ policies. US-Muslim 
counter-terrorism cooperation is therefore an unequal relationship; the United States expresses 
its preferences concerning Muslim states’ counter-terrorism policies and activities, and Muslim 
states either comply or fail to comply. Muslim states, in contrast, have little effect on the United 
States’ counter-terrorism policies, at least in the time period covered by this study.
Therefore, counter-terrorism cooperation between the United States and Muslim states is the extent to which Muslim states comply with US preferences relating to counter-terrorism. Actions by Muslim states that are in line with US counter-terrorism policies increase cooperation between the two parties. Non-cooperative actions include the failure to take any of these actions, outright opposition to counter-terrorism activities, and a general downplay of the threat posed by terrorist groups. The various specific aspects of cooperation discussed above represent the underlying factor of counter-terrorism cooperation. More cooperative actions correspond to greater counter-terrorism cooperation, while more non-cooperative actions correspond to lessened counter-terrorism cooperation.

Data Coding

I developed a series of questions for whether or not a state took a specific counterterrorism related action, either cooperative or non-cooperative, and used these as dichotomous variables that I coded for each country by year. These were organized by the above categories of counterterrorism cooperation: international agreements, terrorism sponsorship, general actions against domestic counterterrorism, institutional reforms, compliance with US preferences on domestic counterterrorism policies, compliance with US initiatives on international counterterrorism policies, and support for US-led military actions. In each category, there are indicators of both cooperation and non-cooperation. Each country is given a 1 for a question if the action occurred.

I base the coding on US State Department Counterterrorism Country Reports. These reports, released annually since 1996, provide official US assessments of the level of terrorist activity in each country, state counterterrorism actions, the extent to which states are complying
with US and international counterterrorism standards, and the list of states the United States
designates as terrorist sponsors. The reports do not cover every country each year, just those in
which terrorist activity occurred, but most countries are covered. And while the amount of
content in the reports and their specific format changed over time—especially after 9/11—they
consistently covered counterterrorism policies around the world since the mid-1990s, so they are
a reliable source of information over time. I code each question if the State Department reports
included information concerning the question, indicating either cooperation or non-cooperation.
Lack of information on an indicator did not count as its cooperative/non-cooperative counterpart
occurring; for example, if there was no indication of a country refusing to take action on terrorist
financing, the country is not assumed to have taken action and both the cooperative and non-
cooperative questions on terrorist financing are left blank. The result is a raw dataset consisting
of dichotomous variables for each country year, indicating the areas in which the state
cooperated and did not cooperate; because no code is given in questions that lack relevant
information, numerous variables are blank for each country year and each country has a different
amount of recorded items. Before calculating the CTCI, I ran Cronbach’s alpha tests on the full
list of items, and removed a few variables that did not effectively measure counterterrorism
cooperation based on the test.27

CTCI Calculation

I calculate the CTCI by taking the overall level of counterterrorism cooperation,
following the above conceptualization. Counterterrorism cooperation is a latent variable with two
dimensions; it runs from completely non-cooperative to completely cooperative. There are

27 See Appendix B
various ways to construct indexes, both generally and on interstate cooperation. I use an additive approach, combining the various measures together manually to measure overall cooperation. Another possible approach is to use factor analysis to construct new variables that represent the underlying late variables. I use the additive approach as it is more transparent, in terms of interpretability. I also construct alternate variables using factor analysis, however, which I use in robustness checks.

I model the CTCI on measures of party alignment, such as the Comparative Party Manifesto’s “Rile Index.” In this index, items in party manifestos are coded as either “Left” or “Right;” the party’s overall alignment is the difference between the sum of the two sets of items. This is similar to my approach to counterterrorism cooperation. Specific elements of counterterrorism cooperation are either cooperative or non-cooperative—like elements of party manifestos are either “right” or “left”—and their overall cooperation arises from the combination of these factors. Cooperative countries have more cooperative actions than non-cooperative ones, while the situation is reversed for noncooperative countries.

The CTCI is the difference between the proportion of counterterrorism indicators that are cooperative and the proportion of counterterrorism indicators that are non-cooperative. I generate three sums for each observation: the total number of 1s recorded for cooperative questions, the total number of 1s recorded for non-cooperative questions, and the total number of 1s recorded for either set of question. I divide the sum of cooperative items by the total number of cooperative items and repeat this for the non-cooperative items. I then take the difference of the two. The result runs from -1 to 1, with -1 being completely non-cooperative and 1 being cooperative.

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28 For information on this, see [https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/](https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/).
completely cooperative. This captures the relative level of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior—by taking the proportions of each—rather than absolute level of counterterrorism activity, allowing states with significant amounts of counterterrorism activity and minimal amounts to be compared. Moreover, countries in which there is no counterterrorism activity for the year do not receive a score, and thus enter into the analysis as missing values; if the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative sums—rather than the proportions—were used, these countries would be recorded as 0s, and thus difficult to distinguish from countries in which cooperation and non-cooperation equaled each other. Taking the difference of the cooperative and non-cooperative proportions is preferable to either of these items alone, as it provides an overall sense of the country’s counterterrorism related interactions with the United States; I also run robustness checks with the cooperative and non-cooperative proportions separately, however.29

I also created sub-indexes capturing specific types of counterterrorism cooperation, following the above categories. I calculate these following the same method as the overall CTCI, with the relevant subset of questions. These sub-indexes are International Cooperation, Terrorism Sponsorship, Domestic Counterterrorism Activities, Institutional Reforms, Domestic US Initiatives, International US Initiatives, and US Military Actions.

I created several alternative versions of this. In one version, missing values are entered as zeros. In another I take the raw count of cooperative versus non-cooperative items, rather than the proportion; I also take this raw count set to a 0 to 10 scale. And I create a three level categorical variable, based on the CTCI, as well as a dichotomous variable measuring whether a

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29 See Appendix C for descriptive statistics of CTCI.
state’s CTCI score was positive (e.g. whether it was more cooperative than non-cooperative). I also create measures of cooperation and non-cooperation using factor analysis on the cooperative and non-cooperative variables, respectively; I then take the difference of these two variables for use as an alternate dependent variable. I also use the results of the factor analysis (see below) to create three variables, two measuring cooperation and one non-cooperation, as separate dependent variables.

Validity

The CTCI is a valid measure of counterterrorism cooperation on both mathematical and intuitive grounds. The scale reliability coefficient for the full set of variables is 0.68; the standard for such scores is 0.7 or above, although with difficulties involved in gaining information on counterterrorism cooperation (discussed below) a score that is almost at the optimal level indicates it is a useful measure. Moreover, the results from the regression analyses hold up under both the regular CTCI and the one based on factor analysis, discussed below. The CTCI’s values for each country also intuitively capture their cooperation with US counterterrorism initiatives. Some of the highest countries are Turkey and the Central Asian states, which worked closely with the United States on counterterrorism. Pakistan, in contrast, is rather low although its level of cooperation goes up over time.30

Indeed, the validity of these measures of counterterrorism cooperation can be seen when exploratory factor analysis is used on the complete list of indicators. When factor analysis is performed using all indicators, three factors have eigenvalues greater than 1, indicating they are the most valid of the factors produced, and most likely to represent latent underlying variables.

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30 See discussion of findings for more on this point, and Appendix B for results of validity tests.
In the first two factors, the variables that load the strongest are those measuring cooperation. The first cooperative factor corresponds to cooperation with US military actions, while the second corresponds to cooperation on US domestic initiatives such as institutional reform, actions against terrorist groups, and steps to counter terrorist financing and rhetoric. And non-cooperative variables load the strongest in the third factor. This suggests there are three latent variables among the indicators of counterterrorism cooperation, two representing cooperation, and one non-cooperation. As it is complicated to assess the relationship between three dimensions, and the first two factors are closely related to each other, the approach I use to calculating the CTCI is likely sound. Moreover, the robustness checks I perform using sub-indexes of CTCI—drawn both from my categories of cooperation and these three factors—provide additional checks on the validity of the CTCI.

There are some potential biases with the CTCI, but these are unlikely to undermine the analysis. First, as a high-stakes security issue, much information on counterterrorism is classified. A good amount of cooperation between the United States and Muslim states is thus likely not reported in open-source reports. If a certain type of cooperation is not reported—such as the details of intelligence-sharing agreements—then it would not be reported for every country; while this decreases the amount of information available, it does not bias the results. Moreover, it is unlikely that the counterterrorism cooperation with a state consists of only secret activities, so classified information will likely be accompanied by information on other activities that are publicly-available.

\footnote{See Appendix B for results of factor analysis.}
A related issue has to do with changing reporting over time. Obviously the United States was more focused on counterterrorism following the 9/11 attacks, so the State Terrorism reports were more extensive, and there were more US efforts to report on. This occurred for all countries, however, so the change in information would not affect the scores of only a few countries. Also, in the analysis I take subsets of the observations by time period, to deal with potential bias from including pre-9/11 years.

Another potential issue is the biasing of the reporting by US interests. That is, the US government may attempt to portray some states that are important for US counterterrorism efforts but often do not act in line with US interests—like Pakistan—in a positive light; other countries that generally cooperate, but are hostile to the United States, like Libya, may be given a more negative assessment. This likely occurs, although this issue does not bias the CTCI. As was noted, based on CTCI scores, Pakistan has been rather non-cooperative with the United States; the extent of its non-cooperation might be even greater, but even with this conservative bias the results still are intuitively plausible. Moreover, with the exception of being designated a sponsor of terrorism for much of the time period this dataset covers, Libya was generally cooperative with the United States on counterterrorism, based on its CTCI scores.

**Religion-State Connections**

The independent variable is an ordinal measure of religion-state connections in Muslim states, following the framework discussed in Chapter 2. I code different categories of religion-state connections, rather than a continuous measure of religion-state ties. The former approach is useful for this dissertation as the theory focuses on different types of religion-state connections, rather than just the cumulative amount of religion-state ties. Moreover, in existing indexes of
religion-state ties, most Muslim states’ scores are very similar as the vast majority of these states have some ties to religion. By creating my own categories of religion-state ties among Muslim states—based on existing measures—I can better analyze the variation among these states that I posit affects their counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.

As discussed in chapter 2, there are six categories of religion-state relationships among Muslim states, based on types of religion-state connections and the strength of the state. The closest religion-state relationship is in those states with extensive religion-state connections and a weak state, like Pakistan. The next are states with extensive religion-state connections but a strong state, like Saudi Arabia. Moderate religion-state relations are present in strong states with extensive religion-state connections, although not to the extent of states like Saudi Arabia—these state are officially Islamic and restrict religious activity but do not have political ties to religious groups—like Qatar. Similarly, moderate religion-state relations are present in weak states that are not officially Islamic but have ties to religious groups; this includes relatively democratic states like Turkey and Senegal. The most distant religion-state relationship is in strong states that restrict religious practice but are not officially Islamic; this includes authoritarian states like Egypt and Uzbekistan.

I coded each country based on the types of religion-state ties discussed in chapter 2: official religion, ties to religious groups, and religious restrictions. States are classified as officially Islamic if they tie the state’s legitimacy to Islam, attempt to advance Islamic causes as part of the state’s mission, and base the legal code on Islam. States are classified as having ties to religious groups if religious groups play an important part in electoral or regime coalitions; that is, if they may up a significant part of a political party or play an official role in a regime
functioning. Finally, states are coded as having restrictions on religion if they extensively limit religious practice of some or all religious groups. I code state strength, in turn—again following the discussion in chapter 2—by the stability and openness of a country’s regime. A weak state could be one that is democratic, as this political system gives society influence over state behavior. It could also be a nondemocratic state that is relatively unstable, or transitions between democratic and nondemocratic systems.

I used a variety of existing data sources to code this variable. One is the Pew Forum’s “Global Restrictions on Religion” project; this project coded 20 types of government restrictions on religion and 13 types of social hostilities relating to religion for every country between 2007 and 2010. Another was the Religion and State dataset, which includes nearly a hundred indicators of religion-state ties for all countries from 1990 to the present. Finally, I used the State Department’s International Religious Freedom reports, which document state and social activities relating to religion from 2000 to the present. I also drew on background knowledge on countries and secondary studies for some of the coding, especially for the earlier periods not covered by all sources. And I code state strength using Polity IV scores over time, which indicate whether the country is democratic or authoritarian, and how stable the system is.

As I posit that increasing levels of religion-state ties lead to increasing effects on foreign policy, in this case decreased cooperation on counterterrorism, I rank the above categories in increasing order for use in the data analysis as Religion-State. This results in a six-level categorical variable; 0 represents the most distant religion-state relationships, and 5 is the closest.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{32} See Appendix C for descriptive statistics of Religion-State.
I developed two alternative versions of this variable. One collapses it into a four-level variable, to follow the general approach to religion and international relations. Another uses alternate coding for a few countries (Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Djibouti, Somalia).

Control Variables

I include numerous control variables in the study, to deal with potential alternative explanations for the level of counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Muslim states. Some control variables deal with domestic factors, while others focus on international factors, specifically a state’s ties with the United States. Other variables are used in robustness checks.

Domestic factors beyond the religion-state relationship might affect a Muslim states cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism. States with minimal capacity for action would be unable to move against terrorist targets, while democracies might have similar issues; likewise, states facing significant terrorist violence might be less likely to take action against al-Qaeda and other groups, or they might be more likely as this could aid in state survival. One variable, Democracy, is a dichotomous measure of democracy based on the Democracy and Dictatorship dataset by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2009); this dataset is particularly useful for studies involving political violence. Another control variable is Power, a measure of the state’s power using the CINC variable from the Correlates of War dataset. Finally, Terrorism is the two-year rolling average of deaths from terrorist attacks, using Global Terrorism Database data.

Another set of control variables deals with international factors. US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation may be affected by the country’s dependence on or alliance ties to
the United States, the similarity of the two states’ preferences, the level of diplomatic interaction between the two, and previous conflicts between the two states. That is, states that have closer ties to the United States may be more likely to cooperate on counterterrorism. 

Affinity is a measure of preference similarity between the United States and the Muslim states, using Gartzke’s United Nations voting data. 

US Aid is the total amount of economic and military aid the United States gave to the country. 

US MID measures whether the countries had an interstate dispute with the United States since 1990, using MID data. And 

Diplomatic Representation is the maximum level of diplomatic representation between the United States and the Muslim country, using Correlates of War data. Finally, Trade, measure the amount of trade between the United States and the Muslim state, also using Correlates of War data.

I also have several control variables I use in robustness checks. Some are alternative versions of control variables in the main models. This includes: Polity scores for regime type, rather than DD data; alternate measures of the severity of terrorism violence—one that is the number of deaths each year, and another that is a categorical scale of the severity of terrorist violence—Uppsala data on conflict intensity instead of terrorism data, economic aid and military aid from the United States included separately rather than combined, and a measure of public approval of the United States. Others add additional control variables for regions, time periods, and conflicts, specifically: a model including dummy variables for the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa; a model excluding Iraq and Afghanistan; and
a model with dummy variables for observations that are before 9/11 and circa 9/11. Finally, a
series of robustness checks use the alternate specifications of the CTCI, discussed above.\footnote{See Appendix C for descriptive statistics of control variables.}

**Methods**

I use a time-series regression with year fixed effects to test the relationship between
*Religion-State* and the CTCI. The CTCI is a bounded continuous variable, running from -1 to 1. Few of the predicted values for the observations—using the full model, discussed below—
approach the bounds of the CTCI range so the effect of the bounding may be minimal; moreover, the robustness checks using an ordinal and dichotomous version of the CTCI can deal with
potential issues arising from the binding. The dataset covers 49 countries with 14 year
observations per country. I also use a time-series regression with random effects, an ordinary
least squares regression with standard errors clustered by country and year dummy variables, and
a generalized estimating equation as robustness checks.

I use three main models. Model 1 includes just CTCI and *Religion-State*, to determine the
effect of *Religion-State* in the absence of any control variables. Model 2 includes the domestic
control variables: *Intensity*, *Democracy*, and *Power*. And Model 3 adds the international control
variables: *Alliance*, *US MID*, *Diplomatic Representation*, *Affinity*, *Trade*, and *US Aid*.

I also run four additional models to assess the effects of specific regions, time periods,
and conflicts. Model 4 includes the region dummy variables. Model 5 removes Iraq and
Afghanistan. Model 6 adds dummy variables for the time periods; this model is OLS rather than
a time-series regression, as the dummy variables are omitted when year fixed effects are used. I
run numerous robustness checks as well, using alternate control variables and measures of CTCI.
Finally, I run seven models to assess the relationship between *Religion-State* and specific aspects of counterterrorism cooperation, as measured by the above sub-indexes. Models 7 through 13 follow the specification of Model 3 with the sub-indexes as dependent variables. These are, in order: *Terrorism Sponsorship, International Cooperation, Domestic Counterterrorism Activities, Institutional Reform, Domestic US Initiatives, International US Initiatives*, and *US Military Actions*.

**Findings**

The results from these quantitative tests indicate there is a strong and consistent relationship between religion-state connections and US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. *Religion-State* was consistently significant, even when different time periods and countries were taken into effect. *Religion-State* also had rather substantively significant effects on counterterrorism cooperation. Moreover, *Religion-State* affected some aspects of counterterrorism more than others; specifically, it had the strongest effects on domestic counterterrorism activities, counterterrorism related institutional reforms, and compliance with US domestic initiatives.

*Religion-State and CTCI*

As seen in scatterplots of the CTCI and *Religion-State*, there is a definite negative relationship between the two variables. Although there is a good amount of variation within each religion-state category, there are many more noncooperative states than cooperative ones at the higher end of the religion-state scale. When the mean CTCI levels for each state are compared by time period, a similar pattern emerges. There was less cooperation before 9/11, although states
with higher religion-state scores tended to be less cooperative; after 9/11, there was an overall increase in cooperation, although it followed this pattern and by the post-9/11 period most cases of non-cooperation were among states with the highest levels of religion-state connections. (See Figures 3-1 and 3-2)

The regression models resulted in similar findings. Religion-State was highly significant in all models, with a negative relationship to CTCI. This persisted even after the domestic and international control variables were included, indicating that Religion-State’s apparent effects on counterterrorism cooperation were not due to other factors. Likewise, this relationship was not due to the inclusion of Iraq or Afghanistan, the dynamics of specific regions, or a particular time period. Moreover, Religion-State remained significant in all robustness checks. (See Tables I and II and Figure 3-3)

Some of the control variables were significant as well, specifically Alliance, Diplomatic Representation, Trade, Terrorism and US Aid. Alliance, Diplomatic Representation, Trade and US Aid were all significant and positive in the models, indicating higher levels of these variables increased counterterrorism cooperation. Terrorism was negative, however, so states experiencing more terrorist violence had lower levels of cooperation.

The substantive significance of Religion-State also suggests its importance. Straightforward interpretation of CTCT is difficult, as it represents the overall level of cooperation, in terms of proportions of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors. Thus, a
change represents smaller changes in both cooperative and non-cooperative actions. But it can be used to compare the relative effects of Religion-State and other variables. Religion-State’s substantive significance -0.21 coefficient in Model 3 indicates an increase in religion-state ties results in an 21 percent decrease in overall cooperation, or a nine percent decrease in cooperative behaviors. This is greater than both Trade and US Aid, and equivalent (although opposite) to Diplomatic Representation. Alliance’s effect is much higher, although the validity of this variable is undermined by the fact that only Turkey has a formal alliance with the United States. (See Figure 3-4)

[Figure 3-4 about here]

Sub-Indexes and Individual Countries’ Scores

The sub-indexes reveal interesting nuances to the effects of religion-state connections on counterterrorism cooperation. As can be expected, religion-state connections did not affect all aspects of counterterrorism cooperation. Internationally, it seemed to have little effect on states’ cooperation on US international initiatives and military actions. It had a significant and negative effect on states’ cooperation on international counterterrorism objectives. Interestingly, it had a positive effect on whether or not a state was designated a terrorist sponsor; that is, states with closer religion-state relations were less likely to be designated sponsors of terrorism.

Domestically, Religion-State was highly significant, for Domestic Counterterrorism Activities, Institutional Reform, and Domestic US Initiatives. (See Table III and Figure 3-5)

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34 It should be noted that the sub-indexes for which Religion-State were not significant also contained those indicators that were problematic in the Cronbach’s alpha tests. The lack of significance might indicate issues with measuring these aspects of counterterrorism. For example, terrorism sponsorship delegation is based on numerous factors, many of which predate other aspects of the states’ counterterrorism cooperation in the dissertation’s time period. And issues with intelligence sharing are most likely classified, so the information in the data sources for this indicator may be less reliable than for others, such as institutional reform.
Likewise, the subindexes revealed interesting nuances in the effects of the control variables on specific types of counterterrorism cooperation. States with an alliance to the United States, and greater affinity and levels of diplomatic representation were less likely to have been designated a terrorist sponsor, while states that had experienced a militarized dispute with the United States were more likely to have been. And for domestic counterterrorism acts and institutional reform, US allies, states with greater trade, and states with greater diplomatic representation with the United States were more cooperative in these areas. Democracies, in contrast, were less cooperative. Similarly, states with higher diplomatic representation, and greater aid from the United States were more likely to be cooperative on domestic US initiatives.

The relationship between CTCI and religion-state connections is also apparent when examining the CTCI scores of individual countries over time. Egypt is expected to be highly cooperative on counterterrorism; as seen in its CTCI score, this is the case, with Egypt increasing slightly over time but overwhelmingly cooperative during this time period. Turkey, a democratic state, is expected to be cooperative as well, although at a slightly lower level; this can also be seen, as its CTCI score is high, and consistently rising, throughout the time period. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates—expected to be moderately cooperative—starts out low but becomes very cooperative after 9/11. Different dynamics are present in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Both started out low and increased after 9/11. Pakistan’s CTCI score became positive after 9/11, but went back into negative territory afterwards; Saudi Arabia’s rose over the three time periods, but remained lower than the states with less religion-state ties.\(^{35}\) (See Figure 3-6)

\(^{35}\) I examine these countries in greater depth in the case studies (for Pakistan and Turkey) and conclusion.
Implications

These findings strongly support the theorized role of religion-state connections in Muslims states’ cooperation on US counterterrorism efforts. Greater connections between religion and state negatively affect Muslim states’ cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism, even when other factors accounted for. Specifically, states with extensive religion-state ties are less likely to make changes to domestic institutions and policies in response to US counterterrorism pressure than states with greater religion-state separation. This supports the institutional approach to international affairs, as the greater political salience of religion in states with greater religion-state connections appears to lead to increased religious effects on foreign policy.

Religion-State Connections

Thus, states with greater religion-state connections were less likely to be cooperative on counterterrorism with the United States, across regions and time periods. Higher level of religion-state connections resulted in lower levels of counterterrorism cooperation, which cannot be reduced to domestic or international factors that might be driving US-Muslim counterterrorism relations. This was the case even when the models removed Afghanistan and Iraq—which are unique situations—and accounted for specific regions; likewise, the results were not dependent on any particular time period, as they held up when dummy variables for the different time periods were included in the model. Thus, the greater political salience of religion—and lessened freedom of action for regimes regarding religious issues—among states
with extensive religion-state connections limited their cooperativeness with US counterterrorism initiatives.

Higher levels of religion-state connections also had substantively significant effects on US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. There was approximately a 100 percent difference in the level of cooperation between states with the closest religion-state relationship and those with the most separate. Give the numerous states with close religion-state relationships in the Middle East and South Asia—where numerous counterterrorism operations took place—this lessened cooperation undoubtedly had significant effects on US actions and relations between the United States and the non-cooperative states; for example, if Pakistan had hewed as closely to US counterterrorism preferences as Egypt in the post-9/11 period the course of the conflict in Afghanistan might have been incredibly different.

Although the substantive significance of religion-state connections was not overwhelming, it had one of the strongest effects on counterterrorism cooperation of any of the statistically significant variables. Higher levels of trade between the United States and a Muslim state and greater aid flows from the United States to a Muslim state increased counterterrorism cooperation, but to a lesser extent than did differences in religion-state connections. Religion-state relations, in contrast, had an equivalent—but opposite—effect of the level of diplomatic representation between the United State and a Muslim state, and thus matter as the extent of diplomatic relations between two states in determining a Muslim state’s counterterrorism behavior.

The findings also shows that states responded differently to increased US pressure on counterterrorism in the face of domestic religious politics opposing such behavior, based on the
States with close religion-state ties faced the greatest difficulty in increasing their level of cooperation, due to the greater political influence of religion in these countries. Although these states’ cooperation increased after 9/11, it did not increase to as high a level as states with more separate religion-state relations, and for a few deteriorated over time. States with lower religion-state connections, in contrast, were generally cooperative in the 1990s, and increased their cooperativeness after increased pressure from the US following the 9/11 attacks; these states were for the most part able to insulate their foreign policies from domestic religious contention. And those in the middle range—such as the UAE—started out low but increased dramatically after the United States began pressuring them after 9/11.

The types of cooperation that religion-state relationships affected also suggest how religion-state ties matter. The political effects of religion-state connections did not affect cooperation on the highest stakes aspects of counterterrorism; this includes support for US military initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan and intelligence sharing. The United States put the most emphasis on these initiatives, and they represent the most purely security-related aspects of counterterrorism. They are thus those areas a state would be most likely to act on based on international interests—specifically its US ties—rather than domestic politics.

Where religion-state connections did influence Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies was the changes to states’ domestic institutions and policies in response to US pressure on counterterrorism initiatives. States with greater religion-state connections were less likely to take action against terrorist groups in their territory—either on their own or in response to US pressure—follow US preferences on terrorist financing and rhetoric, and reform their legal codes and borders and immigration services to combat terrorist groups. These are areas of real
significance, as they involve standing up to powerful religious groups to control charitable giving, legal codes, and official pronouncements that are popular among some religious groups but the US deems enable terrorist activities. Likewise, they also involve taking military action against terrorist groups that may pose a threat to the state. The religion-state relationships also made states less likely to cooperate with the United States in international forums.

This is where the domestic political dynamics are most likely to affect states’ international behavior, specifically counterterrorism cooperation. Regimes that tie their rule to religion and have political connections to religious groups will be unwilling to take such actions, as they may undermine their support base and suggest a lack of commitment to religious causes. They do not involve actually refusing to take part in US counterterrorism initiatives, however, so pose less of a risk than do the areas in which religion-state had less of an effect. States with greater separation between religion and state will be more likely to undertake these activities, as they are less concerned about losing the support of religious actors and may even benefit from weakening religious groups in society. Likewise, some studies have shown that states’ behavior in international forums—like voting in the United Nations General Assembly—partly reflect domestic political dynamics (Henne Forthcoming, Vreeland 2008b). This appears to be the case with counterterrorism as well, as states with close ties to religion are unlikely to vote in support of counterterrorism initiatives in international forums, due to the political salience of these issues domestically.

Finally, the findings demonstrate the robustness of the effects of religion-state relationships on counterterrorism cooperation. Religion-state relationships’ effect on counterterrorism cooperation was not dependent on a specific model, choice of control variable,
or measure of counterterrorism cooperation. Moreover, it was not driven by Iraq and Afghanistan—who counterterrorism policies are for the most part directed by US forces—or a certain time period, such as the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks. Finally, the effect of religion-state relations on counterterrorism cooperation as not confined to one particular type of cooperation, but affected a variety of counterterrorism-related behaviors. The robustness of the findings indicate that, while no model or variable is perfect, the quantitative analysis does capture the effects of religion-state relationships on counterterrorism cooperation.

Other Influences on Counterterrorism Cooperation

The findings also indicate other influences on Muslim states’ counterterrorism cooperation. As was noted, a formal alliance, higher levels of trade with the United States, US aid, and diplomatic representation with the United States corresponded to greater cooperation. This is intuitively plausible, as those states that are closer to the United States diplomatically and economically, and more dependent on the United States for aid, will be less likely to ignore pressure on counterterrorism. Likewise, states that experience greater violence from terrorist groups are less likely to be cooperative; this may be because they fear upsetting powerful terrorist groups or simply face greater challenges in taking actions that are in line with US initiatives. Affinity between the United States and a Muslim state, conflict history, and the state’s material capabilities had less of an effect on counterterrorism cooperation, so it does not appear to reflect preference similarity or a general capacity on the part of the Muslim state. Finally, democracies were less cooperative than non-cooperative, but this variable was only weakly significant so it is difficult to tell if this result is valid.
Some interesting dynamics were apparent in the sub-indexes. For example, being designated a terrorist sponsor is more likely among states that have had a dispute with the United States or have greater material capabilities. This suggests this aspect of counterterrorism is driven by geopolitics; that is, designation of terrorist sponsorship might relate to broader rivalries between the United States and a Muslim state. Democracies were much less likely to adopt counterterrorism related institutional reforms; as such reforms often involve expanding monitoring and state interference in groups suspected of terrorist ties’ activities, this result is likely because such reforms are often unpopular among voters.

*Theoretical Implications*

These findings support the institutional approach to religion and international relations I presented in the previous chapter. This approach posits that religion will affect states’ counterterrorism cooperation when religious contention occurs in the context of a close religion-state relationship. When a religiously-contentious issue arises—like US counterterrorism initiatives—those states with closer ties to religion and religious groups will be less likely to take action that runs counter to religious sentiment, like working closely with the United States on counterterrorism. As *Religion-State* was statistically significant in all of the models—and had its strongest effect on domestic counterterrorism activities in Muslim states—this indicates the political effects of religion-state connections drove much of Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies.

Alternative explanations are less effective based on these findings. The diversity among Muslim states belies civilizational explanations. Granted, more nuanced civilizational explanations might allow for variation among Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies but
expect those states whose foreign policies are affected by religion to reject all aspects of US counterterrorism initiatives. This was not the case, however, as religion-state connections had little effect on higher stakes military operations. Explanations that point to broader geopolitics, general domestic politics, and economic and diplomatic connections between the United States and Muslim states to explain counterterrorism cooperation found support in these findings. Yet, these non-religious factors did not account for the effect of religion-state connections, so apparent religious influences on Muslim states’ counterterrorism policies cannot be reduced to things like trade or “soft balancing.”

**Conclusion**

Thus, greater religion-state connections correspond to lower levels of counterterrorism cooperation, in line with the expectations of the institutional approach to religion and international affairs. Religious contention—specifically religious opposition to cooperation on US counterterrorism initiatives—matters in Muslim states’ foreign policies. Yet, religious contention alone does not determine their behavior, as such opposition existed in nearly all Muslim states. Instead, it is the combination of religious contention and close ties between religion and the state that produce religious effects on foreign policy, in this case lessened cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism.

Yet, these quantitative findings provide only partial insight into the nature of religion-state connections’ effects on counterterrorism cooperation. They suggest that higher levels of religion-state ties lead to lower cooperation, but do not show why this occurs. Moreover, they indicate different dynamics among different types of religion-state connection categories but do
not provide much detail into these dynamics. Case studies, however, can complement these findings by demonstrating how religion-state connections evolved over time, how regimes responded to religious contention, and what effect this had on the states’ foreign policies relating to counterterrorism.
### Figures and Tables

Table 3-1: Main Models

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<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>-0.20***</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3-2: Regions, Time Periods and Afghanistan/Iraq

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<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
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<td>Diplomatic</td>
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<td>0.21**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
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<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>pre-9/11</td>
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<td>circa 9/11</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3-3: Time Period Observations

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<td>Democracy</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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### Table 3-4: International Subindexes

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Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3-5: Domestic Subindexes

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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Figure 3-1: Scatterplot of CTCI and Religion-State
Figure 3-2: Mean CTCI score by time period and religion-state connections

Figure 3-2a: Pre-9/11

Figure 3-2b: Circa-9/11

Figure 3-2c: Post-9/11
Figure 3-3: Coefficient and confidence errors of Religion-State and other variables in Model 3

36 Alliance and Power were removed from the figure as their large coefficients and confidence intervals complicated visual display.
Figure 3-4: Substantive Significance of Religion-State and other statistically significant variables
Figure 3-5: Coefficients and Confidence Intervals of Religion-State and CTCI Sub-Indexes

These are the coefficients of Religion-State from models 7-13, in order, with the dependent variable indicated; control variables are not displayed.

---

37 These are the coefficients of Religion-State from models 7-13, in order, with the dependent variable indicated; control variables are not displayed.
Figure 3-6: Mean CTCI scores over time of selected countries

- Egypt
- Turkey
- United Arab Emirates
- Saudi Arabia
- Pakistan
Chapter 4: US-Pakistani Counter-Terrorism Cooperation - Recurrent Tensions amid Islamic Opposition

Counter-terrorism cooperation between Pakistan and the United States involved frequent moments of tensions even as the two worked closely on security issues throughout most of Pakistan’s existence. The United States pressed Pakistan to break its ties with militant groups and aid in the fight against al-Qaeda beginning in the 1990s. This intensified after 9/11, with calls for Pakistan to take action against Kashmiri and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in its territory, and reform its education system to remove the influence of extremist voices; the United States later called on Pakistan to take military actions in the border region with Afghanistan and allow the United States to conduct military strikes in Pakistani territory.

Pakistan hesitated or took half-measures in response to US pressure. Pakistan arrested some al-Qaeda members in the 1990s, but continued supporting Kashmiri groups. It increased its efforts in both areas after 9/11 but did not act as comprehensively as it could have against either Kashmiri militants or al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And tensions between the two states emerged in later years, as US pressure increased and Pakistani leaders became increasingly critical of US actions, even as they secretly assented to them.

The religion-state relationship in Pakistan contributed to these issues in its counter-terrorism cooperation. The Pakistani state was relatively weak in the face of society, so leaders had to formulate policies in response to domestic pressure; this
contributed to the rise of religion-state connections and the influence of Islamic groups over the state. Religion-state ties in the country increased greatly from its founding to the 1990s. By the time US counter-terrorism efforts began Islamic groups were very influential in Pakistani politics, numerous Islamic standards had been incorporated into the legal system, and leaders had to appeal to Islamic sentiment when formulating policy. This was especially intense in debates over support for militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir, due to the religious framing of those conflicts. Pakistani leaders therefore faced significant opposition from Islamic groups and the military when trying to cooperate with the United States on counter-terrorism. This resulted in hesitating counter-terrorism policies, as leaders did not want to provoke intense opposition by cracking down on militant groups and their supporters.

This chapter demonstrates five things, in support of the dissertation’s theory. First, it shows that counter-terrorism cooperation between Pakistan and the United States was low. Second, it discusses the extensive religion-state connections in Pakistan. Third, it highlights the significant religious contention in the country—focusing on pressuring the state to follow Islamic standards and opposing counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States. Fourth, it discusses how the religious contention affected state behavior through the political effects of the religion-state connections. Finally, it demonstrates that these political effects of religion-state connections contributed to the low level of counter-terrorism cooperation.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, it provides an overview of the development of religion-state connections in Pakistan between the country’s founding in
1947 and the beginning of US counter-terrorism efforts in the 1990s. It then discusses the
relationship between US counter-terrorism efforts and these religion-state connections.
This includes a section on US counter-terrorism pressure on Pakistan and sections on the
pre-9/11, circa-9/11, and post-9/11 time periods; each of these sections includes
discussion of religious contention, state responses to religious contention, and Pakistani
responses to US counter-terrorism pressure. The next section presents the analysis of the
case. This includes the findings from the congruence method, process tracing and
historical analysis; it also presents alternative explanations. Finally, the chapter presents
conclusions.

**Historical Overview of Religion-State Relationship**

Although Pakistan was generally secular at its founding, there were some ties
between religion and state in this early period. These increased over time, as a result of
the weakness of the Pakistani state, pressure from Islamic groups and appeals to religion
by leaders. This intensified the connection between religion and state, making Islamic
groups and symbols more powerful in Pakistani politics and increasing leaders’
dependence on Islamic groups to stay in power. And it closely tied Islam to Pakistani
security, specifically its tensions with India and support for Islamic militants in
Afghanistan and Kashmir.

*1947-1970*

Pakistani leaders’ manipulation of religious sentiment and appeals to Islam in its
first few decades increased ties between religion and the state and the political power of
Islamic groups. Islamic groups pressured the state to orient itself towards Islam from its founding. Pakistan’s early leaders increased state support for and restriction on religious activity to gain the backing of Islamic groups. And appeals to Islam by the state in the context of disputes with India and Bangladeshi secession intensified the salience of Islam in politics and connected Pakistani security more closely to religion. Moreover, the military supported Islamic militants in several conflicts, which established ties between the military and Islamic groups.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, envisioned the state as a homeland for Muslims (Jalal 1985, Cohen 2004). His early political efforts in the Indian National Congress were actually not focused on creating a separate Pakistani state but only ensuring Muslims had an influential role in an independent India, and ensuring that Jinnah would serve as their leader. As his efforts progressed, he shifted focus to a separate Pakistani state that included the majority-Muslim areas of pre-independence India. Jinnah did include some Islamic appeals in his efforts, and tried to gain the support of Islamic groups by promising to implement Islamic laws (Ahmed 2009, Haqqani 2005).

When Jinnah began pushing for the creation of a separate state for Indian Muslims, conservative Islamic groups at first opposed his efforts (Cohen 2004). They desired instead a state that incorporated Islamic laws into its politics, and were wary of allowing a legislature to enact laws (Haqqani 2005, Niaz 2010b). Once Jinnah secured their support, though, they endeavored to ensure the state followed Islamic standards. For example, the Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Party, JI), an influential Islamist party, formed
shortly after Pakistani independence and pushed for the adoption of Islamic laws through the state’s political system (Ahmed 2009, Niaz 2010a).

Islam took on a more prominent role in Pakistan’s politics after Jinnah’s death, through 1949’s “Objectives Resolution” (Haqqani 2005, Niaz 2010b, Watsi 2009). This resolution, which Jinnah’s successor as Prime Minister—Liaquat Ali Khan—helped to pass in the parliament, established the standards by which Pakistan would be governed. It called for an independent judiciary, minority rights, and democracy. But it circumscribed these liberal rights through reference to Islam. The document stated that Muslims “shall be enabled to order their lives” in line with Islamic standards, and that sovereignty “belongs to Allah Almighty alone;” the Pakistan state operated “within the limits prescribed by Him.”

In addition to changing the legal code in line with Islamic sentiment, early Pakistani leaders also used Islamic appeals to advance their political agendas. Pakistani leaders framed tensions with India as an assault on Islam to gain popular support; they also quieted JI’s opposition to the state’s alliance with the United States by pointing to the threat of both India and Communism to Pakistanis (Chengappa 2004, Haqqani 2005, Saif 2011, Ziring 1997). And leaders used Islam to craft an identity for Pakistan that superseded ethnic differences(Aziz 2008, Chengappa 2004). Also, Pakistan’s military justified its power as necessary to defend Muslims in the country and abroad (Aziz 2008).

Pressure on the state—which at times was violent—to follow Islamic standards continued into the 1950s. For example, in the early 1950s, riots targeting Ahmadis—a heterodox sect of Islam—broke out in response to both anti-Ahmadi sentiment and
manipulation by political figures (Haider 2010, Haqqani 2005). This progressed into a campaign to have Ahmadis declared non-Muslims; while this did not succeed, it demonstrated the political salience of religious issues and the ability of Islamic groups to influence the country’s politics (Ahmed 2009, Haqqani 2005, Niaz 2010a).

Pakistan’s military rulers in the 1960s—Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan—used Islam for political gain. Ayub Khan appealed to Islam to unify the country in the face of its ethnic divisions (Cohen 2004, Haider 2010, Haqqani 2005, Niaz 2010a, Ziring 2010). He also framed tensions with India in a religious light, especially during the 1965 India-Pakistani war (Cohen 2004, Haqqani 2005). Yahya Khan continued this process in the context of tensions with India, and also intensified ties between the state and Islamic groups (Haider 2010, Niaz 2010a). He directed state resources towards Islamist political parties, in the hopes that supporting them would undermine leftist opposition groups. And when violence broke out between Islamic and leftist groups in the late 1960s, the state supported the Islamic groups.

Yahya Khan’s use of Islam extended to internal Pakistani tensions, specifically between East and West Pakistan (Ahmed 2009, Haqqani 2005). In the late 1960s, East Pakistan began pushing for greater autonomy from Pakistan. Yahya Khan allowed multiparty elections in 1970, and East Pakistan elected the pro-autonomy Awami League to seats in the national assembly. In response, Khan cancelled the opening of the National Assembly and gave Awami League seats to Islamist parties. This set off riots in East Pakistan; when the army moved to intervene the riots grew into a general uprising, drawing in Indian troops and precipitating a civil war (Haqqani 2005).
The dynamics of the East Pakistan/Bangladesh secession demonstrate both the political use of religion and the growing political power of Islamic groups in the country. First, Khan and other military elites framed the conflict in Islamic terms (Haqqani 2005). And the government organized Islamic groups to travel to East Pakistan to fight against Bangladeshi insurgents (Haqqani 2005, Gul 2011). But Khan was less a devoted adherent of a supposedly Islamic cause than a shrewd manipulator of Islamic sentiment. Although Khan increased Islamic appeals in the military, he saw this as a generic ideology to increase solidarity, rather than a principled stand in defense of the religion (Haqqani 2005, Ahmed 2009, Cohen 2004, Haider 2010).

1970s and 1980s

The political use of religion by both Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul-Haq further connected the Pakistani state to religion, and increased the power of Islamic groups. Bhutto’s attempts to gain the support of domestic and international Islamic groups through Islamic policies intensified the extent to which the Pakistani state was involved in religion, and the prevalence of Islamic symbols in Pakistani politics. Zia’s policies, in turn, drastically increased Islamic groups’ influence over the legal, judicial and education systems. And his support for Islamic militants in Afghanistan established ties between the military and militant groups, so that the latter became an important tool of the Pakistani state in advancing its interests.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto succeeded Yahya Khan as the leader of a civilian government under his Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). He was a socialist, but made several appeals to Islam while in office. In response to Islamic opposition to his rule, Bhutto attempted to
institute what he called “Islamic socialism,” and passed restrictive laws on Ahmadis and drinking (Haqqani 2005, Haider 2010). He also intensified restrictions on blasphemy that had been in place since the colonial period, enabling criminal prosecutions of alleged blasphemers. And he advanced Islamic causes internationally, including establishing ties with Gulf states, increasing the prominence of Pakistan in the OIC, and describing Pakistan’s nuclear program as an “Islamic bomb” (Cohen 2004).

Bhutto’s military chief of staff, Zia ul-Haq, overthrew and executed him; Zia then became President. Zia was a very devout military officer, who came from the Islam-oriented officer corps, which grew out of Ayub Khan’s policies (Chengappa 2004). Zia intensified the importance of Islam in Pakistan’s military and extended Bhutto’s Islamic policies (Ahmed 2009, Haider 2010, Cohen 2004, Haqqani 2005, Nasr 2000). He implemented severe conservative Islamic punishments, made tithing mandatory for some groups, and increased restrictions on Ahmadis and blasphemy (Ahmed 2009, Chengappa 2004). Zia also brought the JI into the cabinet and gave conservative Islamic groups influence over the courts and education system (Chengappa 2004, Niaz 2010b).

Zia’s primary foreign policy initiative—support for insurgents fighting Soviets in Afghanistan—was oriented towards Islam as well. The Inter-services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)—Pakistan’s military intelligence service—had established ties with Afghan Islamic militants in the 1970s for use as proxies against the then-revanchist Afghan regime; these included Burahanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami. Zia intensified support for these and other Islamic groups after the Soviet invasion, funneling resources from the United States and Saudi
Arabia into Afghanistan Haider 2010(Haqqani 2005). He also worked with conservative Islamic groups in Pakistan to provide aid for Afghan refugees (Fair et al. 2010). And the ISI began supporting Islamic militants in Kashmir, to fight against Indian troops.

Pakistan first reached out to Kashmiri groups like the ethnonationalist Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front in the 1980s, and helped to establish several groups that were more explicitly Islamic (Byman 2006, Schmidt 2011).

Social turmoil in Pakistan, much of it related to religion, increased in this time period. Sectarian violence broke out, some of it inspired by the Iranian revolution (Nasr 2000). And conservative Islamic groups became more prominent in Pakistani politics through state support for militants in Afghanistan and reliance on these groups to aid for Afghan refugees. International events also contributed to tensions in Pakistan; for example, in 1979 a mob attacked the US Embassy in Islamabad because of rumors that the United States was responsible for the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca that year.

Overview: Steadily Increasing Religion-State Ties

Thus, the history of religion-state relations in Pakistan involved a steady increase in the ties between Islamic groups and the state and the importance of religion in Pakistani politics. The Objectives Resolution and other early actions connected the state to Islam and empowered Islamic groups. Later leaders appealed to Islam to gain support, further intensifying these ties. By the 1990s, Islamic groups had an important part in the government and leaders often appealed to religion to justify their policies.

This increasing relationship between religion and state was not due to a dedicated mission on the part of Pakistani leaders or Pakistani society as a whole to Islamize
Pakistan, however. The Pakistani state was weak from the beginning, due to economic issues, ethnic divides, and powerful Islamic opposition; as a result, leaders had to adopt policies in order to satisfy or deflect domestic audiences, even if they were not democratically accountable. Leaders often implemented Islamic laws to gain Islamic support and undermine opponents (Malik 2011). And many of the international Islamic appeals resulted in greater aid from Muslim countries (Chengappa 2004, Cohen 2004). Also, several of the religion-state ties were the unintentional result of earlier state policies regarding religion (Watsi 2009).

Even if they were politically expedient, the increasing religion-state ties resulted in a close connection between Islam and Pakistan’s security. Both civilian and military leaders framed tensions with India in religious terms, giving that conflict an Islamic, rather than purely nationalist, salience. And state support for Islamic militants in Bangladesh and Afghanistan established this as a tool to advance the states’ national security. Finally, Zia’s Islamization of both domestic politics and the military increased support among military officials for Islamic groups and gave them a stake in the continued role of Islam in Pakistani politics.

These religion-state connections took on a variety of forms, both formal and informal. There were numerous laws that restricted religious practice—in favor of conservative interpretations of Islam—and set Islamic standards for government policies. This includes the Objectives Resolution—which gave Islamic groups tools through which to appeal for more Islamic legislation—and restrictions on blasphemy. Islamic groups were also politically powerful, due to their ability to mobilize followers and disrupt
society; regimes were thus dependent on them for support, and wary of crossing them. 
And the military established numerous ties with Islamic groups—both Islamist parties in 
Pakistan and Islamic militants in the region—which gave these groups influence over 
security policy and made the military supportive of Islamic policies. Finally, religious 
issues were salient in society due to the prominence of Islamic political activity.

**US-Pakistani Counter-Terrorism Cooperation**

Thus, when the United States began its counter-terrorism efforts in earnest in the 
1990s, Pakistani politics were marked by close ties between religion and state that were 
intimately connected to the state’s security. Weak civilian leaders contended with both 
powerful Islamic groups and the military to remain in power. The military, meanwhile, 
had established numerous connections to Islamic political parties in Pakistan, and militant 
groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir as a means of influencing Pakistani politics and 
countering Indian power.

These religion-state connections gave leaders an incentive to adopt Islamic 
policies and appeal to religion when justifying their actions. Islamic groups called on 
leaders to implement Islamic laws and strongly opposed activities they perceived as un-
Islamic, such as cooperating with the United States against Islamic militants. Pakistani 
leaders, in turn, appealed to Islam to gain their support and stay in power, and found it 
difficult to change policies that Islamic groups opposed.

US counter-terrorism pressure on Pakistan intersected with these domestic 
dynamics. US-Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation was very low in the pre-9/11
period; it increased after 9/11, but then deteriorated into the post-9/11 period. The United States called on Pakistan to end its support for militant groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir, take action against al-Qaeda and other militants in the country, and reform its education system. Pakistani leaders partially cooperated with US efforts, taking some action against militant groups and broader societal support for terrorism. Yet, in the face of opposition from Islamic groups and the military, leaders often took halting steps against militants and allowed some ties to persist between the military and these groups. (See Figure 4-1)

This section will first discuss US pressure on Pakistan regarding counter-terrorism, beginning in the 1990s. It will then discuss religious contention in Pakistan, Pakistani state attitudes towards religious contention, and Pakistan’s response to US counter-terrorism pressure in the pre-9/11, circa-9/11, and post-9/11 periods.

**US Counter-Terrorism Pressure on Pakistan**

The United States steadily increased its counter-terrorism pressure on Pakistan between the early 1990s and the 2000s. Before 9/11, the United States pressed Pakistan to cut its ties with Kashmiri militants, and arrest al-Qaeda targets in the country. After the 9/11 attacks, this intensified, as the United States pushed Pakistan to turn against the Taliban, move against al-Qaeda and other militant groups in the country, and reform its education system. Later, the United States called on Pakistan to take military actions
against militants in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and allow the United States to conduct military strikes in Pakistani territory.

In the 1990s, the United States pressed Pakistan to cut its ties with Kashmiri militant groups. In 1991, a US official met with Pakistani leaders about their support for Kashmiri groups, and in 1992 the United States threatened to put Pakistan on its terrorist designation list (Haqqani 2005). In 1993, US officials claimed Pakistan was supporting terrorism because of its support for Kashmiri groups. This intensified in the mid-1990s, as some Kashmiri groups began targeting Westerners. And in 1995, the United States designated *Harkat ul-Ansar*, a Kashmiri group that had abducted Westerners, a terrorist group (Haqqani 2005, Stern 2003). These efforts decreased towards the end of the 1990s, however, as US officials did not want to exacerbate tensions with Pakistan after the dispute over its nuclear tests in 1998 (Commission 2004).

The United States also pressed Pakistan to arrest individuals affiliated with al-Qaeda in the country, as well as militants who had conducted anti-US attacks. The United States worked with Pakistan to arrest both Mir Aimal Kasi and Ramzi Yousef and turn them over to the United States; Kasi attacked the CIA headquarters in 1993—killing two and wounding several others—and Yousef helped to plan the first World Trade Center bombing (Coll 2004, Wright 2006). The United States also called on Pakistan to expel Arab militants from the country after the formation of al-Qaeda, and to pressure the Taliban to stop harboring Osama bin Ladin (Coll 2004, Schmidt 2011). In addition to this, US officials tried to prevent Pakistan from enabling a Taliban military victory in Afghanistan (Coll 2004).
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States pressed Pakistan to join its efforts against al-Qaeda, and other militants in the region (Fair et al. 2010). The United States called on Pakistan to break its ties with the Taliban and cooperate in the US invasion of Afghanistan. This included giving the United States over flight and landing rights in the country, working with the United States on counter-terrorism and law enforcement activities, and increasing border enforcement with Afghanistan (Harrison 2009). Also, following the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament by militants, the United States pushed Pakistan to break its ties with Kashmiri militant groups.³⁸

The United States also pressured Pakistan to take actions against al-Qaeda members in the country (Harrison 2009). Due to the country’s support for militants in Afghanistan, and the many al-Qaeda members who fled into Pakistan after the US invasion of Afghanistan, the United States believed al-Qaeda elements were hiding in Pakistan.

In addition to these efforts, the United States also endeavored to minimize the spread of what it deemed extremist messages in Muslim countries. In Pakistan, this translated into attention to the numerous conservative religious schools throughout the country. The United States called on Pakistan to reform its education system, replacing schools run by conservative Islamic groups with ones that were more under state control. For example, in 2005, the US State Department met with Pakistani education officials to change curriculum the United States deemed “inciteful.”³⁹

³⁸ Pakistani analyst sees steps against 'terrorism' as reversal of previous stance, 14 Jan 02
³⁹ Pakistan: Editorial Disapproves US Demand of 'Excluding Jihad' From Curriculum, August 22, 2005
Later in the 2000s, this pressure intensified. The United States called on Pakistan to increase enforcement of the border, to prevent militants from moving between the two countries. It also pushed Pakistan into direct military action against militants in the region, as many Taliban forces had fled into Pakistan and Pakistani militant groups operated from the border region to attack US troops.

And the United States continued its pressure on Pakistan to cut all ties with militant groups in Afghanistan. The greatest tensions emerged over Pakistani ties to the “Haqqani network,” the militant group started by Jalaluddin Haqqani that Pakistan and the United States sponsored in the 1980s and Pakistan continued to work with into the 1990s. The group was allied with the Taliban, and conducted attacks against US and NATO troops after the invasion of Afghanistan. For example, in 2011, US officials publicly stated that the ISI was still aiding the Haqqani network, with Admiral Michael Mullen—the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—calling it a “veritable arm” of the ISI.40

Finally, and most controversially, the United States tried to gain Pakistani assent to US military operations in Pakistani territory. Some of this involved cross-border attacks on militants who would flee to Pakistani territory after attacking US forces in Afghanistan. This also included numerous US drone strikes; unmanned US aerial vehicles would conduct reconnaissance and increasingly strike actions against targets in Pakistan. And the most famous example of such an effort was the US raid into Pakistan to kill Osama bin Ladin in 2011.

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40 AFP: Pakistan Stares Down US Pressure Over Action Against Haqqanis, October 3, 2011
US efforts involved a good amount of diplomatic pressure. High-level US officials like Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice frequently visited Pakistan to pressure it on counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{41} And US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reportedly threatened to "send Pakistan back to the stone age" if it did not comply with US demands about the Taliban, although Armitage later denied making that statement.\textsuperscript{42} Armitage did visit Pakistan in 2002 with another high-level US official to press Pakistan to end its support for Kashmiri militants. Similarly, in a high profile visit in 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, CIA Director David Petraeus, and the current Joint Chiefs Chairman pushed Pakistan to take immediate action against the Haqqani network.\textsuperscript{43} And the United States set up several official bodies to coordinate these efforts, such as the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue and the Defense Consultative Group (Fair et al. 2010).

The United States also threatened to cut off aid to Pakistan. Shortly after 9/11, the United States made its significant aid to Pakistan conditional on Pakistani cooperation on counter-terrorism, as well as nuclear proliferation and democratic reforms.\textsuperscript{44} This intensified during the aforementioned tensions over the Haqqani network, as some in Congress called for US aid to Pakistan to be made dependent on Pakistan changing its policies regarding the Haqqani network.

\textsuperscript{41} Rice Visiting Pakistan with Heavy Agenda, March 16, 2005
\textsuperscript{43} AFP: Pakistan 'Appeared' To Give Commitment To US To Dismantle Militant Havens, October 21, 2011; Clinton in Afghanistan Urges Pakistan to Act Against Haqqanis, October 20, 2011
\textsuperscript{44} Pakistani daily says conditions for US aid do not suggest strong relationship, 19 Jul 03
Pre-9/11

The connections between religion and state that had developed prior to the 1990s resulted in Islamic groups having a good amount of political influence, and Pakistan’s security policies were connected to Islam. Islamic groups in the 1990s pushed Pakistani leaders to implement Islamic law and generally expand the role of Islam in the country’s politics. They were able to greatly influence the political process through their ties to the state and the state’s weakness. As a result, both leaders in this time period—Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif—implemented some Islamic policies and continued to support Islamic militants in response to the military’s urging to gain the backing of Islamic groups.

This is where US counter-terrorism and domestic religious contention in Pakistan intersected. The United States began pressuring Pakistan to break its ties with militant groups in Kashmir, as well as take action against al-Qaeda members in Pakistan. Pakistani leaders took some steps to remove the al-Qaeda presence from the country. But they did little to deal with support for Kashmiri groups or their Afghan allies’ support for al-Qaeda. Before 9/11, then, US-Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation was marked by Pakistani hesitation in the face of strong religious contention in society and intermittent appeals by leaders to Islamic groups.

Religious contention

Religious contention was widespread in Pakistan pre-9/11. Domestic Islamic groups were very active, and pressed the state to follow religious standards; transnational forces also affected Pakistani politics through the internalization of international religious
issues and domestic actors framing their contention in global terms. This contention extended to security issues, as Islamic groups called on the state to support Islamic militants and avoid working with the United States. Religion-related political violence also occurred throughout the 1990s, with both sectarian violence and organized terrorist campaigns.

Islamic groups pushed for the implementation of Islamic law throughout the 1990s. In the 1993 election, the *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam* (Assembly of Islamic Clergy, JUI), an influential Islamist party, called for an explicitly Islamic constitution. And another Islamic party called for the implementation of Islamic law. Islamic groups also pushed for reforms through non-electoral means; both JI and JUI often organized rallies and protests that pressured the government. And during a 1997 protest, some JI members reportedly attacked stores selling alcohol; other such incidents occurred throughout the decade.

Islamic groups also strongly opposed Benazir Bhutto’s rule. Many groups accused Bhutto of being anti-Islamic, or too pro-Western (Haqqani 2005). During 1990 debates over a shariah bill in parliament, one opposition leader said that “Shariah will be our new rallying cry in the anti-Bhutto crusade,” and expressed concerns about her being a woman. And an anti-Bhutto election advertisement from this period accused her of being un-Islamic, and linked her to the controversial Indian author Salman Rushdie.

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45 Sep 22 93 SUP1 – JUI Seeking Islamic Constitution  
46 Sep 22 93 SUP2-3 --- MDM calls for Sunnah laws  
47 Pakistan: Religious Parties’ ‘Challenge’ Discussed , 16 Oct 97  
48 Pakistan: Islamic Party Forecasts Islamic Revolution in Pakistan; Schmidt 2011  
49 Jul 25 90 73-74 – Islamic law bill serious challenge for Bhutto  
50 Oct 15 90 74- Bhutto portrayed as anti-Islamic in Election Ad
Similarly, in announcing their 1996 coalition with Islamic parties to remove Bhutto from power, a Muslim league spokesman accused Bhutto of trying to “confine religious parties’ role in national politics to mosques and religious affairs” and removing their influence on politics.\(^{51}\)

Despite his generally closer ties to Islamists, Islamic groups also attacked Sharif for not following Islamic standards. Although he campaigned on adopting an Islamic law bill in his first term, he slowed its implementation once elected.\(^{52}\) This led to the resignation of an Islamist from his cabinet and Islamic groups’ protests against his government.\(^{53}\) Sharif eventually gave in, and amended the bill in line with Islamic groups’ demands.\(^{54}\)

Much religious contention focused on security issues, namely the tensions with India. Islamic groups pressured the state to continue supporting Kashmiri militants. For example, in the late 1990s, the JI claimed the government must “keep to its Kashmir stand.”\(^{55}\) And Islamic groups often discussed the fighting in Kashmir as a “jihad.”\(^{56}\) Several Islamic groups also actively aided Kashmiri militants independently of the government (Byman 2007).

Anti-American attitudes in the country were also connected to religion. Anti-Americanism had long been prevalent in Pakistan; some of this was connected to

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\(^{51}\) 1996-05-30; Pakistan: PML, Religious Parties Unite To Oust Bhutto
\(^{52}\) Mar 7 91 58-59 – Nawaz Sharif cautious on adopting sharia bill
\(^{53}\) Mar 7 91 58-59 – Nawaz Sharif cautious on adopting sharia bill
\(^{54}\) *Apr 9 91 87 – Prime Minister to Announce Islamic reforms; May 8 91 44 – Prime Minister Agrees to Amend Shariah bill
\(^{55}\) Pakistan: JI: Government Must Keep to Kashmir Stand
Islamabad The News (Internet Version) in English 6 Jun 98
\(^{56}\) *Feb 23 90 67 – Jamiyyat-i-Islai chief on need for nuclear device
conservative Islamic beliefs and the perception that the United States was targeting Muslims around the world (Kizilbash 1988). This occasionally translated into acts of violence against US targets, motivated by religious sentiment. For example, after his arrest, Mir Aimal Kasi told an interviewer that he “attacked the CIA for both religious and political reasons” and that American’s actions were “anti-Islamic” (qtd. in Stern 2005, 175).

Islamic groups attacked both Bhutto and Sharif about this issue. For example, Bhutto was criticized for her efforts to negotiate with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, even being accused of forming a “Bhutto-Gandhi alliance” (Haqqani 2005). And in the early 1990s, some Islamic groups criticized Sharif for opposing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but not being more forceful on Indian’s rule over Kashmir. Likewise, JI “threatened massive resistance” if Pakistan signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Islamic groups also pushed back against Pakistan’s efforts to arrest al-Qaeda-affiliated militants. In April of 1993, the head of JUI attacked the government for arresting Arab nationals in Peshawar, and called Islamic groups throughout the country to protest. And the head of JI criticized the United States for trying to arrest the “Arab Mojahedins of Islam.” Some JUI members even said they were willing to “stand with

57 Aug 8 89 71 – Bhutto Accused of Accepting Indian Hegemony; Sep 20 89 72-73 – Opposition leader sees Gandhi-Bhutto conspiracy.
58 May 7 91 68 – US double standard on Kashmir assailed
59 Pakistan: JI Chief Insists Pakistan Must 'Go Nuclear', 22 Dec 97
60 Apr 16 93 44 – Islamic party chief opposes anti-Arab nationals’ arrest
61 Apr 16 93 44 Religious Parties Condemn Arab Nationals’ Arrest
bin Ladin” after the 1998 attacks on US embassies. And many Islamic groups—including JI and JUI—publicly criticized Sharif for extraditing a terrorism suspect to the United States.

There were also transnational elements to religious contention in Pakistan in this time period. Some of this was global framing, or connecting struggles in Pakistan to international issues. Islamic groups claimed the United States was interfering in Pakistani politics and advancing worldwide “anti-Islam conspiracies.” Some commentary placed US counter-terrorism efforts in the context of conflicts involving Muslims around the world; for example, one editorial claimed the United States was launching a “perpetual campaign against the Islamic world,” tying its efforts in Pakistan to Bosnia, Lebanon and elsewhere. This included some appeals to international Muslim audiences to support Pakistani efforts in Kashmir and oppose US counter-terrorism efforts.

There were also indications of transnational connections among Islamic groups to support efforts in Kashmir and pressure on Pakistan to not cooperate with the United States. The Taliban reportedly sent fighters to Kashmir in the late 1990s, and at one point an Afghan militant leader claimed Afghan militants would travel to Kashmir to fight with the insurgents there (Gunaratna 2003). And international Islamic bodies also expressed support for the Kashmir struggle, with the Organization for the Islamic Conference

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62 Pakistan: JUI Members 'Ready' To Join Bin Laden
63 Pakistan: Government, US Criticized for Arresting, Extraditing Kansi Islamabad, 21 Jun 97
64 *Feb 3 92 50 – JUP Marks US Anti-Islam Conspiracies; *Jun 29 93 72 – JI leader says US interference at alarming level
65 *Aug 24 93 71-72 – Pakistan: Editorial views US, Western Anti-Muslim posture
66 Urdu Daily Urges Muslim World To 'Wake Up', Counter Anti-Islamic Forces, 03 Oct 00; Jan 13 94 45 – Islamic nations urged to unify against India, 5 Jan 94
67 May 5 93 71 – Hikmatyar : Afghans will take part in Kashmir movement
passing numerous resolutions in defense of Muslims in Kashmir. There was also some transnational pressure on Pakistan to avoid working with the United States; for example, in 2001 bin Ladin threatened Pakistan if it cooperated with US efforts, and there were protests throughout the country after the US airstrikes on suspected al-Qaeda targets in the late 1990s (Coll 2004, Gunaratna 2003).

And the transnational aspects of Pakistani religious contention translated into some internalization of transnational issues, as events outside Pakistan’s borders resulted in pressure on the Pakistani state and turmoil in Pakistani society. Some groups pressured Pakistani leaders to align their foreign policies with international Muslim causes. And in 1998 JI organized protests throughout the country in response to US strikes on Iraq, claiming US embassies would be attacked if such strikes continued.

Violent religious contention also took place throughout this time period. There were reportedly threats to assassinate Bhutto while she was in office. And a failed coup occurred in 1995, an attempt by military officers aligned with Islamic groups to overthrow the government (Haqqani 2005). Moreover, in the late 1990s, Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Kashmiri militant group, claimed it would launch a “holy war” to establish an Islamic state. Also, sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia often broke out; some of the Sunni sectarian groups reportedly had ties to al-Qaeda (Gunaratna 2003, Nasr 2000, Syed 2001).

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68 Islamic Conference Likely To Pass Resolutions on Kashmir, Afghanistan, 28 Jun 00
69 Al-Qaida urges Pakistan no to help US action against Usama Bin Ladin, 03 Sep 01
70 Leading Daily Counsels Musharraf To Push Islamic Solidarity in Mid East Visits
Rawalpindi Nawa-i-Waqt in Urdu 08 Jan 01 p 6
71 Pakistan: ISLAMISTS TO TARGET US MISSIONS IF IRAQI STRIKES CONTINUE
19 DEC 98
72 Pakistan: Lashkar-i-Taiba Vows 'Holy War' for Islamic State
State Attitude Toward Religion

This domestic and transnational religious contention occurred in the context of a close relationship between religion and the Pakistani state. The prominence of Islamic groups in Pakistani politics due to their ties to the Zia regime gave them influence over the electoral process, while the military’s support for Islamic groups in Pakistan and abroad intensified the salience of religious issues in the country. Likewise, the weakness of civilian leaders in the face of domestic opposition and the military limited their freedom of action. As a result, both Bhutto and Sharif attempted to gain the support of Islamic groups and the military through implementation of Islamic domestic and foreign policies.

Bhutto appealed to domestic and international Muslim audiences while in power (Cohen 2004). For example, in the early 1990s, Bhutto brought the JUI into a coalition government with the PPP, granting JUI members significant cabinet portfolios; this enabled the JUI to establish the initial links between Pakistan and the Taliban (Schmidt 2011). And she tried to avoid openly challenging Islamists, such as during the aforementioned debate over a shariah bill in parliament. Likewise, in her second, term, Bhutto gave in to demands by an Islamic group in Malakand province and instituted Islamic law in the region. Bhutto also made several appeals to international Muslim audiences, calling for solidarity among Muslim countries.

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73 Jul 25 90 73-74 – Islamic law bill serious challenge for Bhutto
74 May 17 94 58-59 – Bhutto Approves Islamic law for Malakand region
75 *Mar 28 90 52-53- Bhutto speaks on Foreign Policy, Investments; 1996-08-13
Pakistan: PM Asks Erbakan To Influence Pakistani Religious Parties; *Jun 20 89 53 – Bhutto Interviewed on US, Afghanistan
And Bhutto backed the military’s support of Islamic groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Bhutto established ties with and support for the Taliban, at the urging of the ISI (Coll 2004). She also connected support to the Taliban to Islam; for example, in a speech commemorating the anniversary of the Afghan invasion in 1989, Bhutto said the Afghans fought in “defense of their religion, nation and freedom” and that Pakistan took “great pride in saluting them for setting an example of Islamic valor and faith.” Bhutto later assured the mujahideen in Afghanistan of Pakistan’s continued support.

Sharif made similar overtures to gain Islamic groups’ support while he was in office (Cohen 2004). The foreign policy of his party involved “pan-Islamic” efforts, according to contemporary analysis. Sharif called the success of the Islamic militants in Kabul a “success of Islam;” he also connected the conflicts in Kashmir and Bosnia, calling for worldwide Muslim solidarity. And in 1991, he brought the leaders of the Afghan mujahideen to his palace for consultation. He also directed state resources to support the insurgency in Kashmir, as well as Islamic militants in Afghanistan (Haqqani 2005).

In addition to this, Sharif made some efforts to increase the role of Islam in Pakistan’s legal code. Sharif introduced a bill in Parliament that would have implemented Islamic law throughout the country, which gained him some support of Islamic groups

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76 Dec 28 89 65 – Pakistan: Bhutto comments on Afghan Invasion Anniversary
77 Apr 23 90 42 – Leaders Assure Afghan Mujahidin of Support
78 PPP, PML(N) Stands Contrasted, Compared
79 May 5 92 54 – Pakistan: Sharif: Mujahidin Rule in Kabul Success of Islam; Feb 3 93 70-71 – Pakistan: Sharif speaks of Muslim Plight in India, Bosnia
80 Jan 10 91 57 – Pakistan: President Discusses Strategy with Mujahidin
Sharif also proposed other Islamic reforms to the legal code, such as an effort to end interest on loans, in line with Islamic beliefs.\textsuperscript{81}

The military in turn maintained its earlier ties to Islamic groups, and often used them to influence political dynamics in the country. In 1992, the new chief of the ISI—Javed Nasr—was a member of the conservative Islamic group Tablighi Jamaat, and worked with Pakistani Deobandi groups to organize activities in Kashmir; the military also helped to organize the \textit{Islami Jamhoori Ittehad} (Islamic Democratic Alliance, IJI), an Islamic umbrella party that campaigned against Bhutto in the 1989 elections (Haqqani 2005). And in 1990, Nawaz Sharif claimed he had the support of the military in his efforts to remove Bhutto from power.\textsuperscript{82}

The ISI’s support for Kashmiri militant groups increased in this period. This increased in the 1990s, as the ISI began coordinating militant groups’ activities and funding groups (Byman 2007, 2006). Later in the decade, offshoots of these movements were more supportive of both joining Kashmir with Pakistan and Islamizing Kashmir. The groups also developed ties within Pakistan, establishing bases and religious schools (Byman 2006, Schmidt 2011).

The military supported Islamic militants in Afghanistan and other countries in the region as well. After the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to back Islamic militants in their attempt to take over the country; this included the Taliban, as

\textsuperscript{81} May 8 91 44 – Prime Minister Agrees to Amend Shariah bill
\textsuperscript{82} Oct 18 90 67-68 Bhutto opponents hint at military support; Haqqani 2005
well as other militant groups.\textsuperscript{83} The ISI worked with the Taliban to provide security for a supply convoy in the early 1990s, and provided funding and diplomatic support as the decade wore on (Coll 2004, Gul 2011). And the Uzbekistani government, as well as several other governments, accused Pakistan of training militant that conducted attacks in that country.\textsuperscript{84}

\emph{Pakistan’s Response to US Pressure}

In addition to these examples of Pakistani leaders crafting policies to appeal to the significant religious contention in the country, they also hesitated in response to US pressure on counter-terrorism. Pakistani authorities refused to take significant action against militant groups in response to pressure from the United States. Both Bhutto and Sharif initiated some crackdowns on militant activities in the country, but this did not extend to support for Kashmiri groups. And the ISI continued its ties to the militants.

Both Bhutto and Sharif partly cooperated with the United States on counter-terrorism. In her first term, Bhutto reached out to India to negotiate, and also tried to improve ties with the United States (Haqqani 2005).\textsuperscript{85} And Bhutto arrested Ramzi Yousef in response to US requests, and expelled Arab militants in the country, although the latter was partially in response to the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in 1995 (Coll 2004, Commission 2004, Wright 2006).\textsuperscript{86} Sharif arrested numerous non-Pakistani militants who were connected to extremist groups in Pakistan under US pressure (Haqqani 2005). And

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\textsuperscript{83} Jun 2 89 40 – Pakistan supplying rebels with Tanks, Aircrafts; Apr 26 93 45 – Masud Accuses Pakistan o Siding with Hikmatyar; 1996 01 04, Taleban Said Backed by Pakistan Secret Service
\textsuperscript{84} Uzbekistan: Uzbek President: Wahhabite Militants Training in Pakistan, 26 Mar 98; Fair 2009
\textsuperscript{85} Oct 20 93 71 – Bhutto seeks to improve ties with West, Japan
\textsuperscript{86} 1996-05-17, Pakistan: Bhutto--No More 'Terrorist Elements' in Country
\end{flushleft}
Sharif worked with the United States to help capture Mir Aimal Kasi (Coll 2004). Sharif also passed a controversial anti-terrorism act to control militant activity in Pakistan.\footnote{Pakistan: Minister: Terrorism Reduced 'Drastically' After ATA}

But there was little change in Pakistani support for Kashmiri militants under either leader. Bhutto took a hard line on Kashmir in her second term, calling for a peaceful solution but indicating an unwillingness to compromise with India.\footnote{Jul 19 90 57 – Bhutto speaks on peaceful Kashmir settlement; Mar 22 94 45 – Bhutto-Kashmir issue threatens regional security; Apr 22 94 55-56 – Bhutto on BOsnia, Kashmir, Nuclear Policy} Bhutto also publicly supported the insurgency in Kashmir, implicitly backing ISI support for the militants (Haqqani 2005). Similarly, Sharif continued the sponsoring of Islamic militants in Kashmir. And he made numerous public pronouncements of support for Kashmir, including calling for a “Kashmir Solidarity Day Strike” in 1991.\footnote{*Feb 5 91 55-56 – Sharif Calls for Kashmir Solidarity Day Strike}

Both leaders also resisted US pressure involving the Taliban. Bhutto continued Pakistan’s ties to militants in Afghanistan, and reportedly lied to the United States about the extent of Pakistan’s support for the Taliban (Coll 2004, Fair 2009, Haqqani 2005). And Bhutto allowed the ISI to organize training camps for militants in the country (Coll 2004). Likewise, under Sharif, Pakistan hesitated to press the Taliban too strongly on turning over bin Ladin in the late 1990s (Schmidt 2011).

The Pakistani military, in turn, did little to respond to US counter-terrorism pressure. A military caretaker government in 1996 did reportedly fire several ISI officers affiliated with Islamic groups.\footnote{1996-07-27; Pakistan: Report Says ISI Purged of Extremists on U.S. 'Order'} But the same government informed the United States that it was not supporting terrorism in Kashmir, but would continue to provide “moral”
support to Kashmiri militants.\textsuperscript{91} These denials aside, the ISI did persist in supporting Kashmiri insurgents after the US pressured it to stop.

And the Pakistani military did not pressure the Taliban to turn over bin Ladin. The military arranged for Pakistan to formally recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan without the knowledge of then-Prime Minister Sharif (Coll 2004). And despite US pressure, Pakistan did little to help the United States gain access to bin Ladin. Indeed, some sources indicate that Pakistan notified the Taliban of the timing and target of the airstrike, allowing bin Ladin and other high profile al-Qaeda targets to escape (Coll 2004).

\textbf{Circa 9/11}

After the 9/11 attacks, religious contention intensified in Pakistan. Islamic groups continued their efforts to have the regime implement Islamic law; they also attacked leaders for participating in US military actions against Muslim countries. The Musharraf regime pushed back against this more strongly than did its civilian predecessors. But Musharraf also relied on Islamic groups for support due to the close ties between religion and the state, supporting Islamist parties in elections and passing some Islamic laws. Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation increased in this period, as Pakistan broke ties with the Taliban, moved against al-Qaeda elements and made some reforms to its educational system. But these efforts were rather ineffective, as the regime was hesitant to take on Islamic groups too strongly for fear of provoking backlash.

\textit{Religious contention}

\textsuperscript{91} *May 4 93 63 – Prime Minister meets US ambassador, denies terrorism
Religious contention remained widespread after 9/11, and intensified as Islamic groups opposed the Musharraf regime’s cooperation with the United States. Islamic groups continued to call for the adoption of religious standards, and attacked Musharraf for limiting the role of religion in the country’s politics. Islamic groups also led opposition to Musharraf’s cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism. In addition to this, transnational forces influenced domestic religious contention through international criticism of the Musharraf regime and political violence spread in response to US and Pakistani actions against al-Qaeda.

Islamic groups continued to press for the adoption of religious standards in Pakistan. For example, in 2003, Fazlur Rahman—the head of JUI—called on Musharraf to establish a political system like the one “pursued by the first four caliphs of Islam,” and not to “present an Islam tainted with Western culture.” Rahman also expressed admiration for the Taliban, calling their government an “ideal political system,” although he hoped to bring it about democratically in Pakistan. And the JI strongly opposed Musharraf’s attempt to change the country’s blasphemy law in 2002. Moreover, after winning the NWFP in the 2002 elections, the Mutthida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council of Action, MMA)—an umbrella party for Islamic groups—implemented several Islamic reforms, such as a shariah bill, although there is a sign they later moderated (White 2008).

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92 Pakistan: Opposition Leaders Demand Islamic Govt, Policies Free of US Influence, 13 Sep 03
93 Pakistan: Author views Musharraf’s criticism of NWFP’s Islamization drive
Islamabad The News, 12 Jun 03
94 Pakistan: Religious party leader opposes changes in blasphemy law, 19 Feb 02 p 10
Islamic groups also expressed concern that Musharraf was limiting the importance of religion in Pakistani society. JI accused Musharraf of “inciting” Pakistanis against “religious parties” in 2005. Other pushed back against Musharraf’s restrictions on mosques and educational organizations, with one Islamic figure pointing out that “even in India there is no ban on mosques or religious schools.” And in 2005 an Islamic figure called on Musharraf to stop working with the United States to minimize the role of Islam in the country; this included calls to “not promote Westernized enlightenment and liberalism” and instead “march in the right direction by harmonizing Pakistan with its fundamental Islamic ideology.”

Anti-Americanism persisted, in part due to the perception that America was targeting Muslims. For example, in 2005, an Islamic figure claimed that US pressure to change educational curriculum was actually aimed at “removing Quranic…verses on Jihad and fundamentals of Islam.” He continued, stating that the “war against terror” was invented by Washington…to use as a garb for invading Muslim countries;” and that “talk of curbing extremism” is meant to “crush [the] spirit of jihad and martyrdom.”

Much religious opposition to the United States focused on Musharraf’s security policies, specifically his cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism. The head of JI accused Musharraf and other pro-US leaders of being “servants” in the United

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95 Pakistan: JI Chief Alleges Musharraf 'Inciting' People Against Religious Parties
Unattributed report: "Musharraf inciting people against religious parties: Qazi," June 5, 2005
96 Pakistan: Afghan Defense Council Leader Criticizes Ban on Jihadi Organizations, 14 Jan 02
97 Pakistan: Jihadi Leader Asks Musharraf to Enforce Islam to Eliminate Extremism, August 11, 2005
98 Pakistani Leader: USA ' Biggest Terrorist' on Earth, Musharraf Acting as Servant, Saturday, December 10, 2005
99 Pakistani Leader: USA 'Biggest Terrorist' on Earth, Musharraf Acting as Servant, Saturday, December 10, 2005
States’ attacks on Muslims.\textsuperscript{100} And some of this was connected to Islam, as in a 2005 protest over Musharraf’s US cooperation in which an Islamic figure claimed this was “distorting the Islamic identity of Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{101} Shortly after 9/11, the head of JI called on a massive protest in Islamabad to “remove the Musharraf government” for siding with the United States “against Afghan brothers.”\textsuperscript{102}

They also attacked Musharraf for his moves to limit support for Kashmiri militants. The head of JUI called on Musharraf to take a “courageous stand” on Kashmir, instead of giving in to US and Indian pressure to crack down on militants.\textsuperscript{103} Others attacked Musharraf for banning \textit{Lashkar-e-Taiba} and other Kashmiri militant groups.\textsuperscript{104} And the head of JI in 2003 warned Musharraf against changing Pakistani policy on Kashmir.\textsuperscript{105} This was also connected to Islam; the head of one banned militant group said that “Islam, democracy and jehad [sic] are being eliminated from Pakistan and the American New World Order is being imposed.”\textsuperscript{106}

Like before 9/11, some transnational influences were apparent in religious contention. There was some global framing; for example, some Islamic groups connected support for Kashmiri insurgents to international issues involving Muslims, like Israel.\textsuperscript{107} There was also internalization of international issues, as seen in a 2001 Pakistani

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{100} Pakistani Leader: USA 'Biggest Terrorist' on Earth, Musharraf Acting as Servant, Saturday, December 10, 2005
\textsuperscript{101} FP: Islamic Parties Rally Against President Musharraf Over Pro-American Policies, Sunday, March 20, 2005
\textsuperscript{102} Pakistan: Religious leaders ready to launch movement for Musharraf's removal, 29 Oct 01
\textsuperscript{103} Pakistan religious leader urges Musharraf to adopt 'courageous' stand on Kashmir, 14 Jun 02
\textsuperscript{104} Pakistan: Afghan Defense Council Leader Criticizes Ban on Jihadi Organizations, 14 Jan 02; AFP: Muslim Hardliners Protest Against Pakistan's Crackdown on Militants, July 22, 2005
\textsuperscript{105} Pakistan: JI chief warns Musharraf against change of stance on Kashmir, Israel, 23 Jun 03
\textsuperscript{106} Pakistan: Religious, Militant Groups React Adversly to Musharraf's Address, 13 Jan 02
\textsuperscript{107} Pakistan: JI chief warns Musharraf against change of stance on Kashmir, Israel, 23 Jun 03
\end{flushright}
newspaper editorial that pointed to the international anger over Afghans’ “misery”—due to the US invasion—as a risk for the Pakistani state.\textsuperscript{108} And transnational connections persisted; al-Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called on Pakistanis to overthrow Musharraf.\textsuperscript{109}

And political violence increased greatly. Musharraf’s ban on Kashmiri groups and cooperation with the United States led several militants to target him (Fair et al. 2010). In 2003, three men tried to assassinate Musharraf for his pro-US actions. Another plot emerged in 2005, in which a Harkatul Mujahideen member was arrested for plotting to kill Musharraf.\textsuperscript{110} Political violence against Western targets also increased, as in a 2002 attack on a Protestant Church in Islamabad (Schmidt 2011).

\textit{State Attitude towards Religion}

Religion and state remained close in this time period. Musharraf took steps to distance the Pakistani state from Islamic groups, although this was limited by the political power of Islamic groups in the country. He cracked down on militants and made some efforts to decrease the influence of conservative Islamic groups in society. But as Islamic groups had gained significant political power and religious issues were salience in politics, he could not go too far in these efforts. Musharraf depended on Islamic groups for support against liberal opposition; this included helping Islamist parties get elected and formulating some policies in line with Islamic groups’ pressure.

\textsuperscript{108} Pakistani daily: Misery of Afghans fuels resentment in Muslim world, 20 Oct 01
\textsuperscript{109} AFP: Pakistani Muslim Reject Purported Al-Qa`ida Calls To Topple Musharraf, 29 Sep 03
\textsuperscript{110} FP: Pakistani Militant Arrested Over Terror Attacks, Musharraf Death Plot, January 17, 2005
Even before 9/11, Musharraf had placed some restrictions on Kashmiri groups’ ability to operate in the country. This increased after US pressure in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, as will be discussed below. And Musharraf opposed the implementation of Islamic laws and the power of conservative Islamic voices in Pakistan. For example, in 2003, Musharraf criticized the Islamic reforms of the MMA in the Northwest Frontier Province, calling it the “Talibanisation of Pakistan.” He also took actions against mosques and religious schools, as will be discussed below.

Musharraf relied on Islamic groups for political support, however (Jetly 2009). For example, in the 2002 elections, his party—the Pakistani Muslim League (N) (PML-N)—formed a coalition with the MMA. There are indications Musharraf actively aided the MMA in the election, including changing the education requirements for candidates in favor of the MMA and using the ISI to undermine its rivals (Harrison 2009, White 2008). The ensuing victory gave these parties their greatest electoral victory, limiting the power of the PPP and granting the JUI the majority in the Northwest Frontier Province and the ability to implement Islamic law there (Haqqani 2005).

And Musharraf made several appeals to Islam, and put in place some Islamic reforms in an attempt to gain these groups’ favor. In the run-up to the 2002 elections, Musharraf claimed he would “gradually” eliminate interest in the country’s banking system, in line with reforms preferred by Islamic groups. Musharraf also promised to return to democracy after he seized power, but a democracy “based on Islamic values;”

111 Pakistan: Author views Musharraf’s criticism of NWFP’s Islamization drive, 12 Jun 03
112 AFP: Pro-Musharraf Parties Reopen Coalition Talks With Islamists, 13 Nov 02
113 Musharraf For Gradual Islamic Banking System in Pakistan, 18 Sep 02
he also said he would not change any of the Islamic laws in the Pakistani constitution.\textsuperscript{114} And like earlier Pakistani leaders, Musharraf often appealed to international Muslim solidarity, such as pushing for greater trade among Muslim countries in 2005.\textsuperscript{115} In addition to this, he expressed a willingness to limit perceived indecency on television in line with “Islamic values,” and implemented other restrictions such as separating men and women in races.\textsuperscript{116}

\textit{Pakistani Response to US Pressure}

Cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism cooperation was one area in which the close relations between religion and state affected state behavior. Pakistan increased its counter-terrorism cooperation in this period, although issues remained. Intense US pressure resulted in Musharraf taking some actions against al-Qaeda and its supporters. He also tried to undermine the power of conservative Islamic groups in the education system. But these moves were incomplete due to the significant religious pressure opposing close cooperation with the United States.

Although Pakistan initially hesitated to break its ties with the Taliban, it did so under US pressure following the 9/11 attacks. While Musharraf did not give the United States blanket overflight rights, he allowed the US some rights in Pakistani territory, as well as the use of bases in Pakistan in its campaign against Afghanistan (Haqqani 2005, Harrison 2009). And Pakistan began cooperating with the United States on US law enforcement and counter-terrorism operations in the country (Harrison 2009).

\textsuperscript{114} Daily lauds Musharraf’s pledge to introduce democracy based on Islamic values, 04 May 02; Musharraf Assures Politicians No Plan to Amend Islamic Laws in Constitution, 08 Feb 02

\textsuperscript{115} Pakistan: Musharraf Calls For Greater Trade Among Muslim Countries, August 10, 2005

\textsuperscript{116} Pakistan: Government Urged To Take Moderate Course in Formulating Media Policy, 08 Mar 02; Analyst Says Domestic Problems, Renewed Terrorism Pose Threat to Musharraf’s Rule, June 3, 2005
The Pakistani government also moved against al-Qaeda elements in the country. For example, in 2005 Pakistan conducted an offensive against militants connected to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, with over 40 militants being killed. Pakistan also arrested numerous al-Qaeda operatives in the country (Bergen 2011). This included Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—an al-Qaeda planner responsible for the 9/11 attacks, the murder of Daniel Pearl, and other operations—and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, another al-Qaeda planner. And Pakistan worked with the United States to conduct air strikes against al-Qaeda targets, like the one that killed Hamza Rabia, an al-Qaeda operations chief. Musharraf also conducted broader operations, arresting and expelling many suspected militants as part of his crackdown on religious schools (Haqqani 2005). And he pushed out ISI officials with Islamic leanings (Gul 2011).

Pakistan also banned many Kashmiri militant groups in response to US pressure. This included *Jaish-e-Mohammed*, *Sipah-e-Mohammed* and *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*; Musharraf froze the assets of many groups in the country as well (Gul 2011). And Pakistani forces arrested militants and activists affiliated with the groups.

And Musharraf took steps to counter extremist voices in education. In 2002 he issued an ordinance requiring religious schools to register with the government, report on the source of donations, expel foreign students, and not teach anything that “promoted

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117 AFP: Pakistan Troops Kills up to 40 Islamic Militants in Tribal Area, October 4, 2005
118 Pakistan: Editorial Terms Al Rabi’ah’s Death ‘Major Success’ in War on Terror, December 6, 2005
119 AFP: Pakistan Arrests 800 Suspected Islamic Militants, July 30, 2005
120 Pakistani analyst sees steps against ‘terrorism’ as reversal of previous stance, 14 Jan 02; Pakistani Daily Hails Musharraf’s Steps Against Extremists, Comments on Kashmir, 13 Jan 02
121 AFP: More on Pakistan Arrests Most Wanted Sunni Militant, September 28, 2005; Pakistani analyst sees steps against ‘terrorism’ as reversal of previous stance, 14 Jan 02; Pakistani Daily Hails Musharraf’s Steps Against Extremists, Comments on Kashmir, 13 Jan 02
militancy;” this was followed up with a 2005 bill in parliament.\textsuperscript{122} Musharraf also tried to create government-run schools that would teach a more moderate message.\textsuperscript{123} Musharraf took similar steps outside education. He discussed changing conservative Islamic laws that disfavored religious minorities and women, planned to arrest people “promoting sectarianism” under anti-terrorism regulations, and called for the removal of all “hate materials” from markets.\textsuperscript{124}

Yet, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism actions were not completely cooperative with the United States. Musharraf initially hesitated to break ties with the Taliban, instead trying to negotiating with them to turn over bin Ladin (Schmidt 2011). When he did change policies, Musharraf justified his cooperation as being in Pakistan’s strategic interests, and pointed out that the international community should be sure to also address the plight of Muslims in India and Israel.\textsuperscript{125} He also argued that the cooperation was an alliance of convenience, and referred to an Islamic story of a short-lived alliance between Muhammad and Jews in Medina (Harrison 2009). And Pakistan soon came under criticism that it was doing too little to deal with militants who fled the US invasion of Afghanistan into Pakistan, but continued to strike across the border (Bajpai 2009, Bergen 2011, Gul 2011, Saikal 2009). There are also indications Pakistan’s military maintained some times to the Taliban and other militant groups (Gul 2011). For example, Pakistan

\textsuperscript{122} Pakistan: Govt To Amend Law Regarding Registration of Islamic Seminaries
\textsuperscript{123} Pakistan: Govt's Efforts To Reform Islamic Seminaries Achieve Little Success, May 9, 2005
\textsuperscript{124} Pakistan: Govt's Efforts To Reform Islamic Seminaries Achieve Little Success, May 9, 2005 ; AFP: Musharraf's Call For Review of Islamic Laws Draws 'Mixed' Response, 17 May 04 ; AFP: Pakistan's Musharraf Launches New Fight Against Islamic Extremism, July 15, 2005
\textsuperscript{125} Pakistani daily backs Musharraf's stance on attacks on Afghanistan, 09 Oct 01; Daily Finds Pakistani Stand on Terrorism Casting Shadow on Relations With India, 21 Sep 01
for the most part left Taliban agents in Pakistan alone, and did little at first against al-Qaeda operatives in the border region (Schmidt 2011).

Pakistan’s actions against Kashmiri militants were also half-hearted (Haqqani 2005, Bajpai 2009). Musharraf differentiated between al-Qaeda and “freedom fighters” in Kashmir (Haqqani 2005). Although the government banned numerous groups, its actions were selective; for example, *Jaish-e-Mohammed* was able to mostly continue operating; Pakistan also did not shut down militant training camps in the country, and allowed *Lashkar-e-Taiba* to change its name and continue operating (Schmidt 2011). And there are some indications that the ISI maintained its links with Kashmiri groups after Musharraf’s crackdown.  

Pakistan took similarly halting steps against extremist voices in the education system. In the 2005 negotiations over the registration of religious schools, Musharraf amended his orders so that registered schools would not have to report their donations. And a US government analysis from that year found that the expulsion of foreign students was occurring intermittently, and the government was slow to implement procedures for registering educational organizations. Likewise, there are indications that the government-run alternative religious schools did not receive the promised funds.

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126 Indian daily skeptical about peace bid, says Pakistan cannot take on terrorists, 07 May 03  
127 Indian Columnist Says Arrested Terrorist Confirms Pakistan’s Role in Terrorism, 20 Feb 02  
128 Pakistan: Govt To Amend Law Regarding Registration of Islamic Seminaries  
129 FBIS Analysis 25 Aug: Limited Progress in Crackdown on Religious Schools,  
130 Pakistan: Govt's Efforts To Reform Islamic Seminaries Achieve Little Success, May 9, 2005
Post-9/11

Religious contention continued to intensify in this period, as anger at US counter-terrorism efforts increased and Musharraf fell from power. Islamic groups attacked Musharraf’s efforts, and also attacked President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani—his civilian successors—for taking action against the United States and perceived attempts to change Islamic standards in the country. While Musharraf pressed back against these groups, Zardari and Gilani for the most part tried to appease Islamic groups and avoid attracting their opposition. US-Pakistani counter-terrorism relations worsened in this period, as Pakistan took hesitant steps against militants in the country, maintained ties between the military and militant groups, and hindered US counter-terrorism efforts in reaction to US military actions in the country.

Religious contention

Religious contention remained widespread. Islamic groups pressed the state to adhere to Islamic standards; much of this involved attacks on Pakistani leaders for actions deemed anti-Islamic or cooperation with the United States. Transnational influences on religious contention also continued, primarily internalization of international religious issues and international attacks on Pakistan. And political violence spread and worsened due to Islamic militant attacks on both the Pakistani military and civilians.

Islamic groups continued to push the state to follow Islamic standards in the post-9/11 period. For example, a conservative Islamic cleric denounced the female Minister of Tourism in 2007 for hugging French paragliders in a picture; under pressure from the
cleric and other conservative groups, she was forced to resign.\textsuperscript{131} Also, Islamic parties strongly opposed any efforts to change the country’s blasphemy laws after the deadly blasphemy-related violence in 2011.\textsuperscript{132} The JUI chief Fazlur Rehman said, “if the secular forces can go to the extreme of resenting [the] dignity of the Prophet...we can also become extremists,” and called on the government to resist US pressure on the blasphemy law.\textsuperscript{133}

A good amount of this was directed towards the governments of Musharraf and his civilian successors. Shortly after he resigned as the President, some Islamic groups called for Musharraf’s punishment for cooperating with the United States.\textsuperscript{134} And the MMA—formerly Musharraf’s ally—strongly attacked him for his actions against the Taliban. Musharraf was also attacked by Islamic groups for his raid on the Red Mosque in 2007. The MMA accused him of “granting eternity to Bush’s anti-Muslim policies,” and its chief quit parliament in protest, while Islamic groups held protests throughout the country.\textsuperscript{135}

And this continued into Zardari’s reign as President. JI and other Islamic groups attacked him for allowing the United States to conduct military activities in Pakistan—such as the 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Ladin—and supposedly harassing Islamic

\textsuperscript{131} AFP: Faced With Red Mosque Fatwa, Former Pakistan Minister Vows To Fight Extremism, July 28, 2007
\textsuperscript{132} Pakistan: JUI Chief vows to resist Gov’ts Alleged Efforts to Amend Blasphemy Law, January 17, 2011; Pakistan: PML-Q Chief Warns Govt Not to Pardon Christian Woman on Death Row, November 24, 2010
\textsuperscript{133} Pakistan: JUI Chief vows to ressit Gov’ts Alleged Efforts to Amend Blasphemy Law, January 17, 2011
\textsuperscript{134} Pakistan: Taliban Demand Punishment for Musharraf for Army Action in Tribal Belt, August 22, 2008
\textsuperscript{135} MMA Leaders Condemn Lal Masjid Operation; Flay Govt for Desecrating Seminaries, July 16, 2007; Protests in Pakistan over Red Mosque operation, July 14, 2007; Pakistani Islamic Alliance Leader Quits Parliament, July 14, 2007
Likewise, the JI dropped out of the government in 2010, in protest against cooperation with the United States and efforts to change the blasphemy law (Gul 2011).

Transnational elements were also present. There was some internalization of international religious issues in Pakistani politics. One example was the 2011 controversy over a US pastor who burned the Quran, which set off protests around the world, including in Pakistan. This resonated in Pakistani politics; in March 2011, an Islamic scholar praised President Zardari’s criticism of a US pastor who burned a Quran, for “[expressing] the sentiments of…Muslims across the world.” There was also transnational pressure on the regime because of its ties to the United States. For example, in 2007, bin Ladin declared “war” on Musharraf for his actions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And militant Islamic sites in Indonesia supported bin Ladin’s “call for jihad” against Musharraf” in 2007.

Political violence also intensified greatly. Taliban and other militant groups in the Afghanistan border region conducted numerous attacks in response to Pakistani military operations there. For example, in 2008, an Islamic militant group conducted a suicide bombing at a Pakistani military base in northwest Pakistan that killed 13 people. Other attacks occurred in the interior of Pakistan, such as a 2007 suicide bombing by al-Qaeda in the military capital of Rawalpindi, and a 2007 threat against Musharraf’s life in

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137 Pakistan: Religious Leaders Appreciate Presidents Recent Address, March 23, 2011
139 Indonesia: Jihadist Sites Support Bin Ladin's Call for Jihad Against Musharraf, September 27, 2007
140 AFP Told: Pakistani Taliban Claim Responsibility for Suicide Attack, May 19, 2008
response to the Red Mosque raid. And the Taliban threatened to conduct attacks throughout the country in response to US and Pakistani military actions in the border regions. Not all political violence was connected to organized militant groups, however. For example, in 2011, Shahbaz Bhatti—the Minister of Minorities—and Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, were assassinated for criticizing the country’s blasphemy laws.

Religion-State Relationship

Religion and state remained close in this period, even as the regime shifted from Musharraf’s military government to a democratically-elected civilian one. Despite Musharraf’s reforms, Islamic groups remained able to influence politics through electoral means and non-electoral protests; at the same time, religious issues—like blasphemy—were incredibly contentious in society. Musharraf continued to take action against Islamic groups, but his civilian successors for the most part avoided upsetting them.

Musharraf kept pushing back against extremist elements in the country, although his ability to do so was limited by widespread protests against his rule. For example, in 2007, he ordered a raid against the Red Mosque, a prominent mosque and women’s school in Islamabad that had begun harassing the community and stockpiling weapons.

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141 Pakistan: Local Taliban, Tribesmen Vow Revenge on Musharraf for Lal Mosque Clash, July 10, 2007; More on AFP: Pakistan Police See Al-Qa’ida Link to Bombing Near Army Office, October 31, 2007; Gul 2011
142 FP: Alleged US Missile Strike Kills Four Militants in Pakistani Al-Qa’ida Stronghold, November 22, 2008
The raid resulted in many fatalities, and, as was noted, significant criticism of Musharraf.\textsuperscript{143}

After taking office following Musharraf’s resignation, President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani made some efforts to resist the pressure of Islamic groups, but generally attempted to appease them and maintain their support. This can be seen in the response to the 2011 blasphemy-related violence. The government initially announced three days of mourning after Taseer’s death, and appointed a liberal PPP member who had previously been strongly critical of the blasphemy laws as the Ambassador to the United States.\textsuperscript{144} But initial efforts to change the country’s blasphemy laws stalled; this was reportedly due to Gilani fearing protests from Islamic groups if the laws were changed.\textsuperscript{145} Similarly, Zardari called on the United States to punish a US pastor who burned a Quran in March 2011.\textsuperscript{146} And Gilani signed a bill allowing Islamic law in an attempt to satisfy violent Islamic groups in the country.\textsuperscript{147}

\textit{Pakistani Responses to US Counter-Terrorism Pressure}

As in earlier periods, Pakistani leaders hesitated on counter-terrorism operations in response to this religion-state relationship. Pakistan partially cooperated with US efforts, although significant tensions emerged between the two countries. Pakistan conducted military actions in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region at a great cost to Pakistani soldiers. But the significant religious opposition to counter-terrorism

\textsuperscript{143} AFP: Further on Pakistan Places Curfew Around 'Radical' Mosque, Warns Violators, July 4, 2007; FP: Pakistani Soldier Killed, Dozens of Students Injured in Battle at Red Mosque, July 3, 2007
\textsuperscript{144} AFP: Pakistani PM Appoints New Envoy to US, November 23, 2011; AFP: Pakistan Announces 3 Days of National Mourning For Slain Minister, March 3, 2011
\textsuperscript{145} Pakistan: Ex-Minister Says PM Preventing Efforts to Amend Blasphemy Laws, February 4, 2011
\textsuperscript{146} Pakistan: Religious Leaders Appreciate Presidents Recent Address, March 23, 2011
\textsuperscript{147} Pakistan Editorial Criticizes Zardari for Signing Islamic Law Regulation, April 18, 2009
cooperation and the political power of Islamic groups led Pakistan to negotiate frequent ceasefires with militants, and maintain some ties to certain militant groups. Although some instances of tension involved US military operations in Pakistani territory, and were to be expected—such as the 2011 raid against Osama bin Ladin’s compound—others represented broader issues in the relationship between the two countries.

Pakistan did take numerous actions against militant groups. In response to increased US pressure and some militant attacks in Pakistan, the Pakistani military eventually moved into the border regions (Bergen 2011). The Pakistani military later launched an offensive against militant positions in the Swat Valley, and conducted several other operations under US pressure, such as a 2006 raid on a religious school that provoked widespread protests by Islamic groups throughout the country (Gul 2011). Prime Minister Zardari pledged to continue these operations after he came to power.148 And even though there were significant tensions over supposed Pakistani support for the Haqqani network, Pakistan at times promised to take action against the group, and arrested some Pakistanis for connections to the group and other militants.149

Nevertheless, the state allowed militant groups to keep operating, and may have been supporting certain groups. Several sources suggest that, despite official Pakistani protestations, Pakistan gave the Haqqani network a haven in the country and may even have coordinated some of their operations to destabilize the Afghan government (Gul

148 FP: Pakistan Prime Minister Urges US Not To Act ‘Unilaterally’ Against Militants, July 29, 2008; Pakistan Editorial Flays Zardari for Agreeing With US To Launch Operation in NWA, November 11, 2011
149 AFP: Pakistan Promises To Take Action Against Haqqani Militants, September 22, 2011; Report: Pakistan Army Interrogates 4 Majors Over Links to Banned Organization, June 23, 2011
Pakistan resisted US pressure to crack down on the Haqqani network, denying any links between the ISI and the group even as some officials privately agreed contacts persisted. Ties also reportedly continued between the military and several other militant groups (Fair et al. 2010, Gul 2011, Schmidt 2011).

And while the extent of Pakistani complicity in Osama bin Ladin’s presence in Abbotobad is unclear, the Pakistani response to the US raid on bin Ladin’s hideout revealed additional tensions. By May 2011, the United States had discovered bin Ladin was in a compound in Abbotobad, a city in the interior of Pakistan that was the site of the country’s military academy. US Navy SEALs conducted a raid against the compound that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Ladin. In the uproar over the raid, Pakistani leaders took some actions that degraded counter-terrorism cooperation. After the raid, Prime Minister Gilani said that Pakistan would “review US anti-terror cooperation,” which many interpreted as a threat. And Pakistani authorities refused to turn over bin Ladin’s wives to the United States, although the CIA was granted some access to them. Likewise, Pakistan arrested the Pakistani doctor who worked with the United States to find bin Ladin.

In addition to this, Pakistan did not move as comprehensively against militants in the border region as it could have. Some analysts claimed the military was unwilling to

150 Indian Article Examines Reasons Behind Pakistan Intel Agency’s Links With Taliban, October 16, 2011; Commentary in Indian Daily Says Islamabad Encouraging Taliban Operations in Kabul, October 15, 2011
151 AFP: Pakistan Stares Down US Pressure Over Action Against Haqqanis, October 3, 2011
152 Report: Pakistan Army Interrogates 4 Majors Over Links to Banned Organization, June 23, 2011
153 AFP: Pakistan To Review Counter-Terrorism Cooperation With US, May 13, 2011
154 Pakistan Government Not to Handover Bin Ladin’s Widows to US; CIA Allowed Access, May 15, 2011
155 US Intel Head Arrives in Pakistan to Help Release Suspected CIA Agent, July 25, 2011
commit to military efforts against the Taliban (Schmidt 2011). Pakistan negotiated numerous ceasefires during the course of its military efforts, which gave militants a chance to regroup and continuing operating in Afghanistan (Fair et al. 2010, Gul 2011). For example, in 2008, the government negotiated a truce with a militant group that gave the militants control over the Swat valley; this deal also allowed the militants to implement Islamic law in the territory (Gul 2011). And among numerous other examples of such truces, earlier in that year Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire with the militant group suspected in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Pakistani leaders were also publicly critical of US actions. Even though he claimed he would work with the United States, Zardari called for the United States to take a cautious approach to militants and not act “unilaterally.” Similarly, after the bin Laden raid, Pakistani leaders publicly called for a reduction in US troops in the country (Cloud 2011). Later in 2011, under pressure from the United States to act against the Haqqani network, Gilani claimed that “Pakistan cannot be pressurised [sic] to do more” on counter-terrorism.

The tensions over counter-terrorism also degraded US-Pakistani intelligence cooperation. After the bin Laden raid, Pakistan closed three military intelligence liaison centers in the country, which the United States used to share intelligence with Pakistan on

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156 UK: IISS Sees Pakistan's Zardari Possibly Facing Threat From Army, September 18, 2008
159 FP: Pakistan Prime Minister Urges US Not To Act 'Unilaterally' Against Militants, July 29, 2008
160 AFP: Gilani Says Pakistan 'Cannot Be Pressurised To Do More' in War on Terror, September 29, 2011
al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Cloud 2011). And in December 2010, the name of the CIA station chief in Islamabad was leaked in the Pakistani media, with US officials claiming the ISI was the source; Pakistani media later reported the name of the next station chief, although the name appeared to be inaccurate (Walsh 2011).

Pakistan also complicated US resupply efforts in Afghanistan. After numerous attacks on US supply convoys in the border region, Pakistan had to close the border in order to conduct an offensive against militants. And in late 2011, a US airstrike hit a Pakistan border post, killing over 20 Pakistani soldiers; US forces claimed they were taking fire from the position, and did not know the Pakistani military was there, but Pakistan claimed it was an intentional US attack. In response, Pakistan closed US and NATO supply routes to Afghanistan and ordered to CIA to vacate a base from which it coordinated drone strikes (Masood 2011).

Pakistan’s response to US actions in Pakistani territory often took the form of public denunciation but private tacit consent. Pakistani leaders responded furiously to US military actions that crossed the border. And they protested against US drone strikes that killed Pakistani civilians. For example, in 2008, Prime Minister Gilani called US drone strikes an infringement of the country’s “sovereignty” and “intolerable.” Yet, numerous reports indicate Pakistani leaders agreed to US military actions in private (Gul 2011, Schmidt 2011).

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161 AFP: Pakistan Closes NATO Supply Route To Fight Militants, December 30, 2008
162 Pakistan: PM Terms Drone Attacks Against Sovereignty; Says Govt To Stop Them, October 27, 2008
Analysis

This discussion illustrates the dynamics of US-Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation. The religion-state relationship in Pakistan gradually intensified over time, so that by the 1990s Islamic groups were influential in Pakistani politics and leaders often appealed to them for support. Pakistani leaders were also hesitant to cooperate too closely with the United States in its actions against militant groups. These were connected; religious opposition to US counter-terrorism efforts and ties between religion and state provided a disincentive for Pakistani leaders to cooperate closely with the United States. This section presents this analysis of the case study, drawing on evidence from the congruence method, process tracing, and historical analysis. It also assesses alternative explanations through this evidence and the method of sequence elaboration.

Congruence Method

The congruence method can demonstrate the connection between religion-state connections and the low level of counter-terrorism cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. By the 1990s, there were numerous Islamic laws in place, Islamic groups were very influential in Pakistani politics, and the state supported Islamic militant groups in the region. When religious opposition emerged to US counter-terrorism efforts, these religion-state connections gave Islamic groups significant leverage over the Pakistani state. As a result, leaders did not cooperate extensively with the United States on counter-terrorism.

Pakistan experienced significant religious contention—both domestic and transnational—much of it connected to security issues. Islamic groups consistently
pressed the state to implement Islamic laws and follow Islamic standards. And they opposed attempts to stop supporting Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Transnational issues also affected Pakistani politics, as Islamic groups framed their contention in global terms and international issues often became internalized as pressure on Pakistani leaders. This extended to opposition to US counter-terrorism efforts. Much of the opposition to US counter-terrorism efforts was presented in Islamic terms, while Pakistani leaders were attacked on similar terms for cooperating. Likewise, although this opposition was widespread through Pakistani society, Islamic groups were often the most visible in their attacks on Pakistan for working with the United States, and they often spearheaded protests against working with the United States. 164

This religious contention occurred in the context of a close relationship between religion and the state. Islamic laws and official appeals to Islam had, by the 1990s, intensified the political power of religious groups and the salience of religious issues. Leaders often made religious appeals to gain support, and depended on Islamic groups to stay in power. The state occasionally attempted to limit the influence of religious groups, but these initiatives were ineffective. Moreover, the military supported Islamic militants in neighboring countries and had close ties to Islamic groups in Pakistan, connecting the country’s security policies to Islam.

This resulted in a low level of cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. It was politically unpopular to turn on Islamic militant groups, so the governments’ actions against these groups were minimal. And some in society viewed

reforms intended to limit the influence of Islamic groups, as well as actions against al-Qaeda, as attacks on Islam. Moreover, the military strongly opposed these actions, decreasing leaders’ ability to cooperate with the United States.

The transnational elements of religious contention in Pakistan likely also contributed to this low counterterrorism cooperation. By attaching the legitimacy of the Pakistani state to Islam, Pakistani leaders were answerable not only to domestic audiences and conditions, but to international audiences and on international issues due to the global nature of Islam. As a result, groups that framed their criticisms of the Pakistani regime and calls for the state to follow Islamic standards in global terms—as occurred several times in the context of US counterterrorism efforts—may have had more of an impact on political elites than if they had done so through domestic appeals alone.

Likewise, Pakistani leaders’ attempts to gain international support for their efforts in Kashmir by tying that conflict to others ones involving Muslims around the world turned that from a regional dispute into a global one with international ramifications. This likely made it more difficult for Pakistani leaders to cease support for Islamic militants in Kashmir under pressure from the United States.

Figure 4-2 presents the evidence from the congruence method in graphical form. It demonstrates the value of each of the explanatory factors: religious contention, religion-state connections, the political effects of religion-state connections, and the level of counter-terrorism cooperation. (See Figure 4-2)

[Figure 4-2 about here]

Process Tracing
There is process tracing evidence for the role of religion-state connections in Pakistan in minimizing the country’s cooperation with the United States. While detailed information on specific decisions is not available, evidence can connect the independent variable—a close relationship between religion and state—to the dependent variable, low cooperation with US counter-terrorism efforts through several mechanisms. There are indications that the religion-state connections in Pakistan did increase the power of Islamic groups, and that these groups (and their allies in the military) wielded influence over the state. There is also evidence that specific decisions by leaders from Bhutto to Zardari were the result of pressure by Islamic groups, and some indications that appeals to religion by leaders were the result of political calculations, not principled stands.

First, religion-state connections appear to have influenced Pakistani politics by increasing the power of Islamic groups and issues in society. Some analysts have noted that policies supporting religious causes increased the role of Islamic groups in society. One prominent example is the support for militants in Afghanistan, which brought Islamists into the Pakistani government, giving them greater influence over the policy process (Malik 2011). And militants supported by the ISI were able to open religious schools in Pakistan, giving them some influence over society (Schmidt 2011). Also, state support for religion not only increased Islamic groups’ power over society, it also increased the salience of religious issues in politics. For example, after Zia supported conservative Sunni groups during his reign, sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias intensified, due primarily to the rise of militant anti-Shia groups (Haider 2010, Haydar 2001, Ziring 2010).

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There are also indications that Islamic groups in Pakistan influenced leaders’ decisions. Islamic parties were not electorally successful, as was noted, so they could not directly determine state policy. But they still affected state behavior, through their ability to mobilize protests and their influence over parts of society. For example, in the 1993 elections, Islamist parties organized a coalition to compete against Bhutto’s PPP. While the coalition did not win on its own, it did influence the elections’ outcome by allying with Sharif.\textsuperscript{165} And JI was regularly able to organize protests to disrupt society and influence leaders to adopt policies they favor; for example, over 150,000 people attended an October 1998 rally by JI (Schmidt 2011).\textsuperscript{166} Likewise, while militant Islamic groups did not have mass appeal, their role in important sectors of society gave them influence; this can be seen in their role in running religious schools, which resulted in many leaders being hesitant to criticize them due to the importance of these schools in Pakistan (Schmidt 2011).

There is evidence that leaders’ appeals to Islam were based on political calculations, not principles. This can be seen most clearly in the case of Nawaz Sharif, who was the closest to Islamic groups out of all the post-Zia Pakistani leaders. Even though Sharif campaigned initially for Islamic reforms, his party’s manifesto in the 1993 elections focused primarily on economic development.\textsuperscript{167} This suggests his appeals to Islam were intended to gain the support of Islamic groups, and were not a serious move on his part. Also, many observers have claimed that his attempt to implement Islamic law

\textsuperscript{165} Sep 22 93 SUP30-31 – IJM may emerge as powerful bloc  
\textsuperscript{166} Pakistan: Editorial Examines Resurgence of Jama‘t-i-Islami Islamabad The News (Internet Version) in English 27 Oct 98  
\textsuperscript{167} Sep 22 93 SUP – PML(N) Manifesto Viewed

161
in the country was designed primarily to give him more power, both by increasing the power of his office and intensifying support from Islamic groups (Cohen 2004, Haqqani 2005, Niaz 2010a, Watsi 2009).

And several specific policies by Pakistani leaders were due to their concern over losing power by opposing the military and Islamic groups. Many of Bhutto’s security policies were designed to prevent the military and Islamic groups from openly opposing her. One example is her continuation of the country’s policy in Afghanistan, supporting Islamic militants in their attempt to take over the country. Bhutto reportedly attempted to change the country’s Afghanistan policy, as she worried the conflict could destabilize Pakistani politics and undermine her rule. But she did not proceed with this action due to her fear that it would provoke opposition from the military (Haqqani 2005). And Islamic opposition did weaken Bhutto while she was in power, with widespread protests and electoral coalitions against her in elections; likewise, as was noted, the military actively supported her opponents in elections. This extended to Zardari too. Zardari reportedly faced threats from the military if he moved too strongly against militants; this suggests his public opposition to US counter-terrorism activities was related to this pressure.

This was evident during Musharraf’s time in office as well. Musharraf’s halting steps on counter-terrorism were connected to the power of Islamic groups in society and the military, and his fear of these groups turning on him. Benazir Bhutto claimed that

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168 Jun 7 89 42 – Bhutto Reportedly Changing Foreign Policy
170 UK: IISS Sees Pakistan’s Zardari Possibly Facing Threat From Army, September 18, 2008
pressure from the military limited Musharraf’s ability to break ties with the Taliban. And others pointed out a similar dynamic concerning Islamic parties. Musharraf was hesitant to take too many actions in Afghanistan—such as moving strongly against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the border region—that would upset these groups, as he relied on them for support (Haider 2010). This extended to Kashmiri militant groups as well, as he was afraid of losing domestic support and provoking a backlash by these groups by taking too many actions against them (Haqqani 2005, Saikal 2009). And the ability of Islamic groups to threaten his government limited his actions against religious schools.

Figure 4-3 presents this in graphical form. It demonstrates the process-tracing evidence connecting the explanatory factors. (See Figure 4-3)

[Figure 4-3 about here]

Path Dependence

Even with the indications of religion-state connections’ effects on counter-terrorism cooperation, however, one could still argue that Pakistani leaders were responding to short-term political calculations. Islamic groups and symbols are very powerful in Pakistani politics, so it would be a poor political decision to take a stance that is religiously contentious, such as cutting ties with popular Islamic militant groups or getting rid of all conservative Islamic schools. This would be “just politics” then, rather than the effects of religion on Pakistani state behavior.

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171 Pakistan: Bhutto Believes Musharraf in 'Trouble', Faces 'Establishment' Pressure, 30 Sep 01
172 Afghan Paper Wants Pakistan to do More in Combating Terrorism Kabul Anis in Dari 0306 GMT 26 Jun 03
173 FBIS Analysis 25 Aug: Limited Progress in Crackdown on Religious Schools
Analysis of the historical process behind the effects of religion-state connections on US-Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation demonstrates the effects of these ties on Pakistani behavior, and the political calculations behind the state’s hesitation on counter-terrorism. The “causal chain” (Pierson 2004, 87) in Pakistan is evident in the establishment of religion-state connections, which increased the salience of religious issues and the power of Islamic groups. This increased the political power of Islamic groups, giving leaders a disincentive to work with the United States on counter-terrorism. Likewise, the path dependent nature of this process can be seen in the intensifying power of Islamic groups with each policy connecting religion and state; this increased the pressure on the state to adopt policies supported by Islamic groups in the future, which further empowered the groups.

The causal chain began with the founding of Pakistan, intensified under Zia, and resulted in the significant pressure on leaders to not cooperate with the United States on counter-terrorism. The establishment of Pakistan as a Muslim state, and the significant role for religion in the Objectives Resolution gave Islamic groups influence over the state and led leaders to justify their policies—such as the tensions with India—through Islam. This made religious issues salient in society, contributing to both the fall of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization program. The religious contention in this time period and Zia’s Islamic reforms further increased the role of religion in the country’s politics, as did Zia’s ties between Islam and Pakistan’s security through his support for Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir. By the transition to civilian rule in the 1990s, Islamic groups were rather powerful, religious issues were very salient, and the
military had oriented its security policies towards supporting Islamic militants. The hesitation of Pakistani leaders in the face of US counter-terrorism pressure makes sense in light of these short-term conditions, but these conditions were the result of longer-term dynamics that arose through the interaction between religion and the state.

The positive feedback element of the development of religion-state connections is apparent in the fact that earlier ties between religion and the state made it easier for later ties to be established. Some have argued that the Objectives Resolution established the importance of Islam early on in Pakistan’s history, with later additions arising from this baseline (Cohen 2004). And the ties between Islam and Pakistan’s security Ayub Khan and other early leaders established facilitated Zia’s Islamization program in both society and the military (Chengappa 2004). Zia’s Islamization reforms, in turn, increased the power of Islamic groups over the courts, the media and education; similarly, Sharif’s appeals to Islamic groups increased their leverage with later governments (Haqqani 2005). And some have argued that the religious rhetoric of Pakistan’s leaders exacerbated Pakistan’s instability, contributing to the later rise of more extreme Islamic groups (Niaz 2010a).

The effects of this positive feedback process and the causal chain on Pakistani politics are apparent in the increasing expectations in Pakistan that leaders would appeal to Islam when formulating decisions and not take actions that Islamic groups opposed. Some have argued that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s international Islamic appeals—while politically-motivated—set a precedent for later leaders, like Bhutto and Sharif; these leaders were expected to similarly appeal to Islam in domestic and foreign policies by the
public (Cohen 2004, Malik 2001). This is also evident in Pakistani support for Islamic militant groups, which steadily increased beyond the intentions of any single leader; for example, Bhutto claims she was “slowly, slowly sucked into” Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in the 1990s (qtd. in Coll 2004, 293). Likewise, many Pakistani leaders found it difficult to change Islamic laws in Pakistan, as many in society assumed that these Islamic laws—once in place—were for the best and they faced significant opposition from Islamic groups (Schmidt 2011). These examples indicate that, while leaders’ hesitation to cooperate with the United States on counter-terrorism cooperation due to pressure from Islamic groups made sense politically, this pressure arose from earlier connections between religion and state in the country.

The relationship between the historical development of religion-state connections and Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policies is captured in an interesting example from the debate over educational reform in Pakistan. As was noted, under US pressure Musharraf attempted to increase state control over religious schools and remove supposedly extremist elements from the education; this provoked significant opposition, as it was seen as an attack on Islam and Pakistani culture, and giving in to the United States. The development of religion-state connections in Pakistan connected Islam to both Pakistani society and security, so attempts to change that provoked religious opposition. In one editorial attacking Musharraf for trying to change the educational system and remove “jihad” from the curriculum, the author claimed that jihad is not only a “basic concept of Islam,” but also “part of the motto of the Pakistani Army since independence.”

174 Pakistan: Editorial Disapproves US Demand of 'Excluding Jihad' From Curriculum, August 22, 2005
the author was angry not only because Musharraf was decreasing the role of religion in
the country, but also because religion was connected to the state’s security since its
founding.

Figure 4-4 demonstrates this in causal form, showing the short-term
explanation—Pakistani leaders responding to political incentives and not cooperating
with the United States—and the longer-term historical explanation demonstrating the role
of religion-state connections. (See Figure 4-4)

[Figure 4-4 about here]

**Alternative Explanations**

Alternative explanations provide some insight into US-Pakistani counter-
terrorism cooperation, but neither completely explain the relationship nor undermine the
importance of religion-state connections. I demonstrate this through the method of
sequence elaboration, which assesses the effect of adding an alternative causal factor to
an analysis to the initial relationship; this specifies whether the alternative factor is
invalid, incidental to, contextualizing, or undermining the role of religion-state
connections. Although many alternative explanations were valid, and affected US-
Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation, at most they contextualized the effect of
religion-state connections, rather than undermining their importance.

The primary alternative explanation would be that Pakistan’s resistance to US
counter-terrorism was due to its concerns over India. That is, Pakistan’s support for the
Taliban is connected to its desire to minimize Indian influence in Afghanistan (Fair 2009,
Fair et al. 2010, Schmidt 2011). And its refusal to break ties with Kashmiri militants
groups was an attempt to maintain a weapon against India. This is correct, but does not completely explain the effects of religion on Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policies.

Although it was in Pakistan’s interest to support militants to oppose India, it was not inevitable that Pakistan choose to oppose India by supporting Islamic militant groups. That is, the tension with India contextualizes Pakistan’s support for militant groups and its hesitation to stop doing so. The fact that the tensions with India gave rise to support for Islamic groups does not mean the support for Islamic groups itself is not important. Pakistan could easily have supported leftist militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir, but the connections between Islam and security early in its history—and their intensification over time—made this an undesirable option. And the fact that Pakistan had supported Islamic militants made it less likely it would cooperate with the United States on counter-terrorism, as there would have been less religious opposition to changing its policies if they had not been framed in Islamic terms.

The US-Pakistani counter-terrorism issues may also have been the result of the weakness of the Pakistani state. There have long been tensions among the different provinces, and issues with a corrupt and ineffective civil service and elites who use Pakistan’s legal system for their own personal gain (Niaz 2010a, Talbot 2005). The military also had a good amount of influence over the state. Moreover, these issues did degrade Pakistan’s counter-terrorism capabilities (Byman 2006). Yet, this weakness was partially the result of the religion-state connections in Pakistan. As discussed, they increased the power of Islamic groups to the extent that the state was wary of taking actions that would upset them, while also indirectly strengthening militant activity in the
country through support for Afghan and Kashmiri militants. And when the Pakistani state did feel it was under threat—as when militants seized significant territory in the country in the post-9/11 period—it was able to push them back. Thus, the weakness of the Pakistani state also *contextualizes* the effect of religion-state connections.

Others argue that anger over cooperation with the United States and support for militants had nothing to do with religion; instead, it arose from anger at the corruption of the state or anti-Americanism, and Islamic groups are influential because of the anger over US actions (Harrison 2009). These other factors did contribute to the opposition. Corruption and state repression in the tribal areas increased support for the Taliban and other militants among Pakistanis (Gul 2011). And there was long-standing anger over perceived US support for India and non-democratic leaders in Pakistan (Kizilbash 1988). But the argument that religious opposition to US counter-terrorism cooperation contributed to Pakistan’s hesitation does not mean that all opposition was related to religion. And religious opposition cannot be reduced to these other factors, as much of the opposition to working with the United States involving religious rhetoric, and many of the protests were organized by Islamic groups. Anger at the United States certainly increased support for those groups, but it did not explain all opposition to counter-terrorism cooperation or the influence of those groups in the first place. This alternative explanation thus also contextualizes the relationship, although it may also be incidental to the relationship.

Still others points to ethnic issues in Pakistan to explain counter-terrorism issues, rather than religion; that is, the government is most worried about ethnic separatism, and
some of the military’s support for Islamic parties may be due to this (Haleem 2003, Harrison 2009). Indeed, sectarian divides motivated Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan, as they feared a “Pashtunistan” arising among Pashtuns on both side of the border, and as was noted, Pakistani leaders appealed to Islam in the face of Bangladeshi independence efforts in the late 1960s.(Wirsing 1991). Yet, it would be difficult to explain all aspects of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism hesitation through ethnic divides. The support for militants in Kashmir was not related to ethnic tensions. And while there were strategic interests for supporting Islamic militants in Afghanistan, as was noted, the fact that Pakistan chose to support Islamic groups indicates both the effect of religion-state connections in the country and the power of Islam in political disputes. Likewise, Islamic reforms in Pakistan may have been intended to cover up ethnic divides, but this still indicates the power of Islam in society and, by the 1990s, likely took on a life of its own. Again, this alternative explanation either contextualizes the relationship or is incidental to it.

Some have also claimed that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policies—both when it worked with and resisted the United States—were based on its own security, not domestic religious opposition. Some claim that it was initially in Pakistan’s interest to turn on the Taliban (Fair 2009). And Pakistan did take action against militant groups that threatened society, like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Schmidt 2011). This explanation has issues similar to the above alternative explanations. This chapter actually does claim it was in Pakistan’s interest to take on the Taliban, although I argue this was due to pressure from the United States. The fact that it only partially moved against the Taliban and then backtracked indicates the significant opposition to this move. And while Pakistan’s
discriminating crackdown on Kashmiri militants group might correspond to which groups posed the greatest threat to the country, its failure to take greater action was connected to domestic opposition. This argument is thus primarily incidental to my theory, and also a bit underspecified.

One could argue that Pakistan’s level of counter-terrorism cooperation had more to do with what the United States was requesting of it, or the amount of pressure from the United States, than religion-state connections. That is, Pakistan did not cooperate at first because the United States was not pressing it greatly, but once US pressure increased so did Pakistani cooperation. Or that the reason for the low level of Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation was because the United States called on Pakistan to conduct so many counter-terrorism which was difficult for Pakistan to accomplish. Both of these are valid, but do not undermine the importance of religion-state connections. As seen in Figure 4-1, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism cooperation did increase after 9/11, due to the intensified US pressure. Yet, issues with the state’s counter-terrorism activities remained, and its counter-terrorism level deteriorated by the post-9/11 period. And Pakistan did have some trouble complying fully with US counter-terrorism requests, but as was discussed above part of its weakness arose from religion-state connections; also, when it did decide to move against groups, it was rather effective in doing so.

Or Pakistan’s low level of counter-terrorism cooperation might be related to the severity of terrorism violence in the country. The terrorism violence in Pakistan could make it difficult to crack down on militant groups, or it could make leaders hesitant to do so for fear of attracting violent opposition. Like other explanations, however, this would
contextualize the role of the religion-state relationship. As was discussed, the political violence in Pakistan is partly the result of earlier religion-state connections in the country. At the same time, this counterargument is also a bit underspecified; widespread terrorist violence could give the state more of an interest in working with the United States on counter-terrorism, as this would help the state disrupt militant groups.

Another alternative argument would claim that religion did influence counter-terrorism cooperation, but not through religion-state connections and pressure on leaders but rather widespread religious sentiment and support for Islamic groups in Pakistan. Yet, while Pakistanis were generally opposed to US counter-terrorism efforts, they did not wholeheartedly support Islamic parties and Pakistani leaders were for the most part not motivated by religious beliefs; thus, it was the political dynamics surrounding religious contention, rather than religious contention itself, that mattered. There were few mass-based Islamic movements in Pakistan. (Cohen 2004). No Islamist party received more than 5% of the vote until the 2002 elections, in which the MMA did well in the NWFP; yet the MMA lost in the 2008 elections to a Pashtun nationalist party, indicating the limits of their appeals (Cohen 2004). Thus Islamic parties did not represent the majority of Pakistanis. And their influence over the state was not due to religious beliefs on the part of leaders, as seen in the numerous instrumental appeals to Islam by various regimes.

Likewise, the issues with US-Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation were not due to widespread support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Pakistani society as a whole is unhappy with US counter-terrorism policies, but most Pakistanis are also critical of al-Qaeda and the Taliban; even though Pakistanis who favor conservative Islamic law were
less critical of militants than those that did not, they still had an overwhelmingly negative
view of these groups (2009).

Moreover, the low counter-terrorism cooperation was not due to the lack of
secular contention in the country. Several liberal figures supported Musharraf’s actions
against militants. For example, in a 2005 editorial, one of the largest newspapers in
Pakistan argued that “establishing a moderate, liberal, and enlightened society” is in line
Jinnah’s initial vision for Pakistan, and that a “moderate society is in Pakistan’s best
interests.” Also, the movement protesting Musharraf’s removal of the country’s Chief
Justice—which precipitated his resignation in 2008—was secular in nature, being led by
lawyers. Thus, not all contention in Pakistan was religious in nature.

Finally, one could argue that there is an endogenous relationship between
religious contention and the religion-state relationship in Pakistan, so it is difficult to
isolate the causal effect of the latter. It is true that religious contention in Pakistan has
contributed to a close religion-state relationship, while this relationship intensified
religious contention in the country. But this is in line with the theory presented in Chapter
2. I argued that close ties between religion and state arose partly in response to religious
contention in society, but that these ties both affected later religious contention and
channeled the religious contention into effects on state behavior.

By analyzing the relationship between religious contention and US-Pakistani
counter-terrorism cooperation—which began in earnest in the 1990s, when religion-state
ties had already developed—religion-state connections can be shown to have an effect

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175 Pakistan Daily Stresses Practical Steps to Implement ‘Enlightened Moderation,’ March 4, 2005
even though they also continued to interact with religious contention. As discussed above, religious contention did not directly affect Pakistani leaders’ counter-terrorism policies, such as through devotion to religious sentiment. Instead, it was the political dynamics surrounding religious contention—the salience of religious issues and the power of Islamic groups—that affected the regimes’ decisions. And as will be shown in the Turkey case study, religious contention does not always occur alongside close religion-state ties and minimal counter-terrorism cooperation.

Figure 4-5 presents each of the alternative explanations, and their validity. (See Figure 4-5)

[Figure 4-5 about here]

**Conclusions: Religion-State Connections and Pakistani Counter-Terrorism Policy**

Therefore, religion did affect counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Pakistan, but through the religion-state relationship in the latter. Religious contention—both domestic and transnational—was widespread in Pakistan, and some of it translated into opposition to the state’s ties with the United States. But religious contention alone does not explain Pakistan’s hesitating responses to US counterterrorism pressure. Instead, the close relationship between religion and the state—official support for Islam, politically influential Islamic groups, and ties between the military and domestic and international Islamic groups—channeled this contention into changes to state behavior. Because of the political salience of religion—and religious opposition to
US counterterrorism efforts—Pakistani leaders risked provoking significant backlash by working closely with the United State and al-Qaeda and other militant groups. And this backlash threatened regime stability due to the political influence of Islamic groups. Finally, the military connections to Islamic groups in Pakistan and neighboring countries resulted in it resisting Pakistani leaders’ efforts to take action against these groups.

Alternative explanations provide some insight into the reasons for this low level of counter-terrorism cooperation, but are not complete explanations and do not undermine the importance of religion-state connections. Tensions with India, the weakness of the Pakistani state and general anti-Americanism contributed to counter-terrorism issues; the political effects of religion-state connections did as well, however, and sometimes contributed to the rise of these other explanations, such as the weakness of the Pakistani state. Likewise, Pakistani leaders’ appeals to Islam may have been intended to serve non-religious purposes—like overriding ethnic differences—but this still illustrates the power of Islam in Pakistani politics, and such policies often had the unintended effect of strengthening Islamic groups in later time periods.

The relationship between religion-state connections and counter-terrorism policy in Pakistan can corroborate the relationship among all majority-Muslim states revealed in the quantitative analysis. The close ties between religion and state contributed to Pakistan’s low level of counter-terrorism cooperation. Moreover, this was due to the political effects of religion-state connections—increasing the power of Islamic groups and salience of religious arguments—rather than a principled commitment on the part of Pakistani leaders. And although other factors like US ties and security interests mattered,
the effects of connections between religion and state still had an impact on the counter-terrorism cooperation.

The nature of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism cooperation also corresponded to the types of cooperation highlighted in the quantitative analysis. Pakistan did work with the United States internationally, in terms of military cooperation. Much of the tension between the two states emerged over domestic counter-terrorism initiatives, such as border enforcement and taking actions against militant groups. The increased salience of religious issues due to religion-state connections made it difficult for the Pakistani state to take these actions in the face of domestic opposition; in contrast, it appeared Pakistani leaders were able to insulate military cooperation with the United States from domestic attention, as with the apparent consent for US drone strikes.

This discussion also highlights the mechanisms through which religion-state connections develop and affect counter-terrorism cooperation. Religion-state connections resulted in lower counter-terrorism cooperation by structuring the political calculations of leaders. Islamic groups were influential in Pakistani politics, so leaders were afraid of countering them. And religious issues were very salient in politics, so taking a controversial stance provoked significant protests. So cooperating with the United States on counter-terrorism—which was religiously contentious—was politically costly. Also, because Pakistan’s security had been tied to Islam, changes to its security policies—such as cutting ties with Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir—was opposed by both elements of society and the military.
Figures

Figure 4-1

US-Pakistani Counter-Terrorism Cooperation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious contention</th>
<th>Religion-State Connections</th>
<th>Political effects of Religion-State Connections</th>
<th>Level of counter-terrorism cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic groups call for Islamic laws, support for militants</td>
<td>Islamic laws, politically powerful Islamic groups, military ties to Islamic groups, weak state in face of domestic contention</td>
<td>Islamic groups and issues were politically influential</td>
<td>Leaders hesitant to break ties with Kashmiri groups; incomplete actions against Taliban, al-Qaeda targets; halting efforts to reform education system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4-3: Process tracing evidence</td>
<td>Religious contention</td>
<td>Religion-State Connections</td>
<td>Political effects of Religion-State Connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious contention</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>State adopted religion-state ties to satisfy Islamic groups’ pressure</td>
<td>Leaders believed cutting ties with Islamic militants, opposing Islamic causes would cause them to lose support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion-State Connections</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Leaders were dependent on religious groups for electoral support, the military had an interest in maintaining ties to militant groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political effects of Religion-State Connections</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Religion-state connections empowered Islamic groups to further pressure the state</td>
<td>Leaders feared losing power for cooperating too closely with the United States on counter-terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4-4: Historical analysis

| Islamic standards in Pakistan’s founding, military framed security issues through Islam | Islamic groups empowered by religion-state connections, pressured for expanded role for Islam | Leaders implemented further Islamic laws, supported Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir, to ensure support of Islamic groups, the military | Broader historical analysis | Short-term analysis
| Islamic groups and issues politically influential | Pakistani leaders hesitant to cooperate with the United States due to political pressure | Islamic groups and issues politically influential | Pakistani leaders hesitant to cooperate with the United States due to political pressure |
### Figure 4-5: Alternative Explanations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Effect on relationship between religion-state connections and counter-terrorism cooperation</th>
<th>Contextualize</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tensions with India</td>
<td>Valid, but tensions with India would not necessarily require support for Islamic militants</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contextualize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Weakness</td>
<td>Valid, but state weakness related to religion-state connections</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contextualize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic issues</td>
<td>Valid, but religion-state ties used to overcome, later affected politics on their own</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contextualize/Incidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-religious opposition to United States</td>
<td>Valid, but Islamic groups drove much opposition to United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani interests</td>
<td>Unclear what interests were, also related to religion-state connections</td>
<td></td>
<td>Underspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of US pressure</td>
<td>Changing US pressure did result in changing cooperation, but not completely</td>
<td></td>
<td>Underspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad-based commitment to Islamic causes</td>
<td>Islamic groups were not electorally successful, leaders’ Islamic appeals were political moves</td>
<td></td>
<td>Invalid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive Terrorist Violence</td>
<td>This partly arose through the religion-state relationships, and it is not clear that this would necessarily result in low counterterrorism cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contextualize/Underspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous Relationship Between Religious Contention and Religion-State Relations</td>
<td>Valid, but expected under the theory. And religious contention does not always occur alongside close religion-state relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contextualize</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
US-Turkish Counterterrorism Cooperation: Close Cooperation Despite Domestic Opposition and Turkish International Assertiveness

Counter-terrorism cooperation between the United States and Turkey involved close cooperation even in the face of tensions in some other areas of international politics. The United States reached out to Turkey for assistance in disrupting al-Qaeda elements in the country and supporting international US initiatives. US officials were critical of Turkish counterterrorism operations against Kurdish separatists in the early 1990s due to human rights concerns. Yet, the United States later called on Turkey to take action against al-Qaeda elements in the country, and participate in US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the United States relied on Turkey to present a “moderate” example of an Islamic democracy as a way to counter al-Qaeda’s message.

Turkey cooperated with the United States in most areas of counterterrorism. Despite US criticism of Turkey in the early 1990s, the two began working more closely after the emergence of al-Qaeda. After 9/11, Turkey expressed strong support for the United States and condemned terrorist acts; Turkey also launched operations against al-Qaeda members in the country and contributed to the international mission in Afghanistan. Some tensions developed—especially over Turkey’s refusal to participate in the invasion of Iraq—but counterterrorism cooperation between the two remained high.

The religion-state relationship in Turkey facilitated this cooperation by decreasing the political power of Islamic groups that protested US counterterrorism actions. Turkey is officially secular, and the state repeatedly took actions to limit Islamic groups’ power.
As a result, religious issues and contention were not very influential in Turkish politics and leaders were able to act on religiously-contentious issues even in the face of domestic opposition. By the 1990s, Islamic groups had increased in visibility—with an Islamist party in power for a short-time in the mid-1990s and an Islamic-oriented party in power from 2002 on—but the country remained officially secular and restrictions on religious practices persisted. When US counterterrorism activities began, there was significant religious opposition but Turkish leaders were able to work with the United States due to the separation between religion and the state.

This chapter demonstrates four things. First, it shows that counterterrorism cooperation between Turkey and the United States was high. Second, it discusses the separation between religion and state in Turkey. Third, it highlights the significant religious contention in the country—focusing on pressuring the state to follow Islamic standards and opposing counterterrorism cooperation with the United States—although secular contention was also widespread. Fourth, it discusses how the nature of the religion-state relationship in Turkey limited the influence of this religious contention on US-Turkish counterterrorism cooperation.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First it provides background on Turkey, including an overview of the historical development of religion-state relations in Turkey and US counterterrorism pressure on Turkey. It then discusses the relationship between US counterterrorism efforts and this religion-state relationship. This includes sections on the pre-9/11, circa-9/11 and post-9/11 time periods; each of these sections includes discussion of religious contention, state responses to religious contention, and Turkish
responses to US counterterrorism pressure. The next section presents the analysis of the case. This includes the findings from the congruence method, process tracing and historical analysis; it also presents alternative explanations. Finally, the chapter presents conclusions.

**Historical Development of Religion-State Relations in Turkey**

The history of religion-state relations in Turkey is one of gradually increasing religious contention in the face of persistent official secularism. The country was founded as a secular republic in the 1920s, and the military periodically intervened in politics to ensure it remained so. Religion continued to be important, and religious groups became more active as global Islamic activism intensified, but this did not seriously alter the official secularism of the state. And Turkey developed close security ties with the United States beginning after World War II and persisting for the rest of the century.

*Early Years of the Turkish Republic*

The early years of the Turkish Republic involved the removal of Islam from its formerly official status under the Ottoman Empire. Under Kemal Ataturk, Turkey became a secular Westernized republic; although religion continued to be important to many Turks, it was removed from the public sphere. Ataturk also called for neutrality in Turkey’s foreign policy to prevent losing more territory after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire.

Mustafa Kemal—a military officer also known as Ataturk—created modern day Turkey. After the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I, Ataturk led the Turkish
nationalist movement to defeat Allied forces and gain Turkey’s independence. Ataturk accelerated the secularizing reforms that began in the latter days of the Ottoman Empire (Fuller 2008). He abolished the Ottoman-era Caliphate and removed Islam as the state religion; he also required the adoption of Western dress and script (Fuller 2008, Cagaptay 2006). In addition to this, the Turkish state restricted the role of Islam in schools and limited the ability of women to wear headscarves, and restricted the practice of Sufi orders (Kuru 2009). The military committed itself to strongly defending this “Kemalism” from being undermined by society or political leaders (Dismorr 2008).

Despite this, Islam continued to play an important role in Turkish society. Ataturk’s reforms upset many in the country, resulting in numerous protests in the 1930s (Fuller 2008, Kuru 2009). Much of Turkish society remained heavily religious despite this reforms (Cagaptay 2006, Karasipahi 2009, Kuru 2009). Moreover, Islamic law remained influential in rural and some urban areas (Yilmaz 2002).

Turkey’s early foreign policy was marked by defensiveness over losing territory. Some discuss this as the “Sevres Syndrome;” this refers to the Treaty of Sevres between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire after World War I, which effectively broke up the Ottoman Empire (Fuller 2008, Mufti 1998). Early disputes with Iraq and Syria over borders, and Stalin’s expansionary behaviors after World War II further increased these worries (Fuller 2008, Pope and Pope 1997). As a result, Ataturk desired to avoid becoming too entangled in European contests, and adopted a policy of “active neutrality;” this translated into Turkey remaining on the sidelines during World War II, declaring war on Germany only when it was clear the Axis powers would lose (Ahmad 2004).
Post-World War II: Multiparty Elections, Military Rule, and Social Disruption

Turkey experienced increased religious contention after World War II and short-lived closer ties between religion and the state, although the country’s official secularism persisted. Discontent with the ruling party among business interests and conservative rural voters led to multiparty elections in 1950 and the victory of Adnan Menderes. Menderes increased the visibility of religion in Turkey, although this threatened the military, who overthrew and executed him. This was followed by weak secular governments and significant clashes between rightist, leftist and Islamists in society. In this time period, Turkey developed close ties with the United States, although tensions emerged over the lack of US support for Turkey in its tensions with Greece.

After World War II, Turkey transitioned to a multiparty electoral system, with the conservative religious Democratic Party in power. Significant segments of the rural population and business community were upset with the ruling secular Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), and there was greater demand for an increased visibility of Islam (Pope and Pope 1997, Karasipahi 2009). This led to multiparty elections in 1950, in which a combination of pious conservative voters and business interests helped Adnan Menderes’ Democratic Party come to power. Menderes increased the public visibility of Islam in Turkish politics. He opened religious schools throughout the country, had the Arabic call to prayer used in mosques, and started observing Ramadan; his policy changes increased the influence of Islamic groups in Turkish politics (Pope and Pope 1997, Karasipahi 2009, Ayata 1996).
These reforms threatened the military, which overthrew Menderes in 1960, giving way to significant social disruption. The military accused Menderes of violating the Constitution and executed him in 1961. Following the coup, a series of weak coalition governments ruled the country in the 1960s and 1970s; widespread clashes occurred among leftists, rightists and secularists throughout the 1960s and 1970s and Islamic groups became more active in politics (Kepel 2002, Pope and Pope 1997).


*The 1980 Military Coup and late 1980s-early 1990s reforms*

In 1980, another military coup occurred, although the country’s politics opened up significantly by the end of the decade. The military acted in the face of political violence and Islamic activism, and set up a new government that limited the influence of Islamic groups; they also increased state support for religion in an attempt to channel Islamic political activity through the state. After the return to civilian rule, however, Turkey’s economic and political system liberalized in a manner that increased the visibility of religious elements of society. Moreover, religious contention intensified—
with some transnational influences—as did Kurdish separatism. And the country’s relations with the United States improved dramatically in this period.

The increasing unrest in Turkish society led to another military coup in 1980. As was noted, political violence was increasingly intensifying in the 1970s. At the same time, Islamic activism became more pronounced. Islamic groups became more organized and held more frequent protests; a key figure in this was Necmettin Erbakan, who had long been active in politics and would later lead an influential political party and briefly serve as Prime Minister. Erbakan provoked the coup by calling for Islamic law in the country during a protest against Israel (Pope and Pope 1997).

The military government attempted to decrease the power of Islamic groups, while at the same time increasing state support for religious activities (Rouleau 1993). The military increased the ability of the government to move against opposition forces; this included the establishment of articles specifically banning Islamic political activity; it also restricted religious education and set up secular pro-military parties to compete in elections (Pope and Pope 1997, Kuru 2009). At the same time, the military government created the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis,” which ideologically fused Turkish nationalism and Islamism to draw both nationalists and Islamists into supporting the regime (Aybet 1994, Yavuz 2008, Gordon and Taspinar 2008).

The country transitioned back to civilian leadership under Turgut Ozal, who dramatically changed Turkey’s domestic and foreign politics. Ozal liberalized Turkey’s

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176 Erbakan led a variety of political parties throughout the next few decades, as they frequently were banned for their religious leanings. These are (in chronological order): the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, and the Felicity Party.
economy through a series of reforms that empowered Anatolian middle class business interests and lower classes in urban areas, making them more prominent in politics (Fuller 2008). He was also close to the United States, with good relations with both President Bush and Clinton. Ozal supported the United States in the First Gulf War in order to increase Turkey’s international prestige (Fuller 2008, Pope and Pope 1997, Sayari 1997). This occurred in the broader context of improving ties with the United States, as the United States began to send aid to Turkey and allow it to buy US arms in the 1980s (Pope and Pope 1997).

Ozal’s reforms also increased the prominence of religion in Turkey. Ozal reformed state control of religion, increasing the power of the Director of Religious Affairs and facilitated Islamic banking and investment from the Persian Gulf (Ayata 1996) (Pope and Pope 1997). He also publicly called for the acceptance of religion in Turkish politics, and supported religious schools (Pope and Pope 1997, Kuru 2009). And Ozal relied heavily on conservative religious voters and Islamic groups for political support (Pope and Pope 1997).

Thus, religious contention increased in the 1980s. Some Islamist parties formed after the end of the military government, and Islamic publications proliferated (Fuller 2008). And religiously-minded voters became more prominent due to the migration of conservative Anatolians to the cities and the rise of a conservative middle class under Ozal’s reforms; at the same time, tensions between secularists and Islamists became more pronounced (Gole 1997, Angrist 2004, Yavuz 2008, Fuller 2008, Yavuz 2003, Sayari 1997, Kuru 2009).
Kurdish unrest began in this period. While this did not directly involve religious contention, the military often saw Kurdish and Islamic activism as linked security threats, necessitating strong measures in response (Yavuz 1997, Olson 2000). The Kurds are a non-Turkish ethnic group located in southeast Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Kurdish separatism in Turkey emerged in the 1970s and fighting began in the 1980s (Brown 1995). The primary combatant on the Kurdish side was the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) a Marxist nationalist. This development greatly concerned both the military and Turkish nationalists, who saw it as a threat to Turkish identity and territorial integrity (Brown 1995). The military conducted aggressive campaigns against the PKK, which continued into the 1990s, and fighting broke out between the PKK and Hizballah, an Islamic militant group in the southeast some believed had military ties (Pope and Pope 1997). Over time, the PKK gained support from numerous other countries, including Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Transnational influences on Turkish religious contention also became apparent in this period. For example, the incident in which Islamic figures called for Islamic law and provoked the 1980 coup occurred at a protest against Israel (Kepel 2002). And some claimed that transnational Islamic trends—such as the Iranian revolution—strengthened Islamic groups in Turkey (Calabrese 1998). Moreover, as will be discussed below, the Turkish public pushed the state to take action against Serbian violence against Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s.

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177 Hizballah is a Kurdish militant group unconnected to Hizballah in Lebanon. There is significant debate over its origins and backing; some claim it is backed by the Turkish military to combat the PKK, while some argue it is supported by Iran.

178 1995-02-23 Iranian-Turkish Islamists' Interaction Seen; 1990-05-06 U.S. Stand Said 'Changed' After Cold War End; Editorial Claims Country Becoming 'Like Iran.'
Overview of Religion-State Relationships

Thus, from its founding in the 1920s to the 1990s, religious contention intensified in Turkey but its official secularism remained intact. When Ataturk established the Turkish republic, he set it up as a secular, Westernized state in which the military would act to preserve this secular system. Even though religion became an important part of Turkish politics and occasionally affected the country—such as during the reign of Menders in the 1950s or during episodes of political violence in the 1960s and 1970s—this “Kemalism” persisted. Religious contention became even more pronounced during the 1980s, due to the military’s “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” and Ozal’s reforms, however. And throughout its modern history, Turkey established gradually closer ties with the United States, cooperating on a variety of security issues.

US-Turkish Counterterrorism Cooperation

By the 1990s, then, there was a distant relationship between religion and state in Turkey. At the same time, Turkey experienced significant religious contention both before and after 9/11. Islamic groups called for a greater role for religion in Turkish politics, and protested foreign policies that were religiously controversial, such as support for US counterterrorism activities. And the country has been ruled by an Islamic-leaning party since 2002. But Turkey remained an officially secular state, with the military and judiciary at times intervening to limit the influence of religion on politics. Moreover,
even though the ruling party is more religious than previous political parties, it is a
diverse coalition in which Islamists have only moderate influence.

This corresponded to the high level of counterterrorism cooperation between
Turkey and the United States. The two countries cooperated closely on counterterrorism
from the 1990s through the post-9/11 era. Although the United States was critical of
Turkey’s counterterrorism operations against Kurdish separatists in the 1990s, after the
9/11 attacks the United States called on Turkey to take action against al-Qaeda members
in the country and participate in international US actions; this included the invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq. Turkey for the most part cooperated, arresting al-Qaeda members,
participating in the invasion of Afghanistan and supporting international counterterrorism
initiatives. Some tensions emerged, particularly with Turkey’s refusal to take part in the
invasion of Iraq, but the overall level of counterterrorism cooperation between the two
remained very high. (See Figure 5-1)

[Figure 5-1 about here]

**US Counterterrorism pressure**

US pressure on Turkey involving counterterrorism evolved from concern about
human rights abuses to reliance on Turkey as a key state in the international US efforts
against al-Qaeda. In the 1990s, US officials pushed Turkey to moderate its
counterterrorism activities against the Kurdish separatist PKK, because of human rights
concerns. After the 9/11 attacks, however, the United States called on Turkey to
contribute to its actions against al-Qaeda, both domestic and internationally.
Early US counterterrorism pressure on Turkey was the reverse of much of later US counterterrorism pressure: criticism of Turkish actions against Kurdish separatist groups. Turkey had been conducting campaigns against Kurdish separatists since the 1980s, with the PKK being the primary combatant in the 1990s. Many international observers viewed Turkish actions as overly aggressive with little consideration for human rights. This included concerns among many human rights groups and legislators in the United States. Several US officials and activists were openly critical of Turkey in the early 1990s (Brown 1995). In 1994, the United States Congress tried to make aid to Turkey conditional on its activities in the southeast. This did not translate into US policy, however, as the US Secretary of State stated he would push back against Congress on this and the Senate later dropped these conditions. And the United States helped Turkey to capture the leader of the PKK in 1999 (Gordon and Taspinar 2008).

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States reached out to Turkey to support its counterterrorism operations. The United States called on Turkey to take action against al-Qaeda elements in the country, and crack down on terrorist financing. The United States also drew on Turkish experience in fighting terrorism, working with Turkish anti-terrorism police to establish counterterrorism standards. In addition to this, US officials requested Turkish participation in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. The United States also requested assistance from Turkey on intelligence and humanitarian operations in

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181 Ciller Welcomes U.S. Decision on Military Aid Article Type, 1994-07-01; Columnist Views ‘New Snag’ With U.S. Relations, 1993-03-29
182 US Requests Help From Turkish Police in Fight Against Fundamentalist Terrorism, 11 Nov 01 p
Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{183} And the United States wanted Turkey to allow the use of its territory during the invasion of Iraq; when Turkey refused, the United States pushed instead for Turkey to allow the US to use airbases in Turkey for resupply and logistics missions, as well as Turkish involvement in the stabilization of Iraq.

The United States also hoped to leverage Turkey’s status as a powerful Muslim democracy to advance its broader efforts to fight terrorism. In his second term, US President Bush called for a widespread effort to promote democracy in the Middle East and surrounding regions, as a means to undermine support for al-Qaeda and other groups. Turkey was a major aspect of this, as the United States hoped to point to Turkey as an example of a Muslim democracy. This involved Turkey taking the lead in advocating for democratic reforms and counterterrorism activities in the region.\textsuperscript{184} These efforts continued into the next decade. For example, in 2011 the United States and Turkey launched an international initiative to promote counterterrorism cooperation internationally, the Global Forum on Counterterrorism.

**Pre-9/11**

Before 9/11, some US-Turkish counterterrorism cooperation occurred alongside domestic religious contention. Islamic groups pushed for the state to follow religious standards, and transnational forces influenced domestic politics. Yet, the country remained officially secular, and the state took action against Islamic groups they believed threatened the political system. And while there were tensions over Turkish military

\textsuperscript{183} Turkish Government Tasks 90-Person Special Force in Response to US Request, 01 Nov 01

\textsuperscript{184} Turkey's Vision, Role in 'Greater Middle East Project' Viewed, March 2, 2004
actions against Kurdish separatists, the two states worked closely against al-Qaeda after the United States began its international counterterrorism activities in the late 1990s.

Religious contention

Turkey experienced significant religious contention in the pre-9/11 period, as well as secular opposition to Islamic groups. Islamic parties and social groups became more prominent in this time period; they criticized Turkish secularism, called for the application of Islamic law, and pressured the state to take action on international religious causes. Transnational forces also influenced the nature of religious contention, and religious terrorism occurred throughout the country.

Islamic groups increased in political power in the 1990s. Islamic foundations proliferated, many of which had ties to political parties (Yavuz 2008). Islamic media outlets also increased in prominence. And the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) performed well electorally, beginning with the 1994 elections. This culminated in the premiership of the RP’s Necmettin Erbakan in 1996 as part of a coalition government with the leftist Tansu Ciller.

Some Islamic groups pressured the state to apply Islamic law. One third of RP supporters wanted Islamic law, according to a 1995 poll. And in 1994, the RP Deputy

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185 1990-01-04 Rightists in State
186 Islamic Foundations Grow in Number, Influence, 1995-03-10
188 Welfare Party's Increase in Popularity Viewed, 1994-11-01
189 The Welfare Party is sometimes also referred to in English as the Prosperity Party.
190 1995-01-22 Pro-Islam Prosperity Party Voter Profiled
Chair called for the application of “Koranic law.”\footnote{Welfare Party Official Calls For Koranic Law, 1994-11-10} Likewise, Erbakan argued that “no one has the right to insult and provoke religious sensibilities” in a Muslim country.\footnote{Opposition Leader Comments on Government Plan, 1993-07-07}

Much religious contention involved criticism of Turkey’s official secularism. In 1995, a RP member called Ataturk an “illegitimate child.”\footnote{PKK, Islamic, Left-Wing Terrorism Viewed, 1995-01-27} Other Islamic groups argued that the state was “built on the blood of Muslims.”\footnote{Diversity Among Islamic Groups Observed, 1992-09-04} Abdullah Gul—who would later be foreign minister and President—gave an interview when he was an official with the RP in 1994. He pointed out that Islam is a unifying force in Turkey, but claimed he was not opposed to secularism, only “anti-Islamic” secularism.\footnote{Prosperity Party Official Interviewed, 1994-08-16} And in 1999, a leader of the Nur sect claimed an earthquake was God’s punishment for secularism.\footnote{Nur Sect Leader Kutlular Arrested by Ankara Court, 19 Oct 99}

Many Islamic figures, however, argued not for the application of Islamic law but an increased role for Islam in Turkish politics. In a 2001 interview with a secularist paper, Recep Tayyip Erdogan—an important figure in Turkey’s Islamist parties who later became Prime Minister—said he was against “a state based on Islamic principles,” and instead wanted a country “where the community can live like a Muslim.”\footnote{Turkey’s Erdogan on Political Views, AK Party’s Objectives, 28 Aug 01} Moreover, several members of the Virtue Party (\textit{Fazilet Partisi}, FP)—which succeeded the banned RP—claimed they did not want to set up an “Islamic state” and instead emphasized “religious freedom.”\footnote{Turkey: Islamists Seen Turning Away From Political Islam, 16 Feb 00} Also, Gul stated that he saw Islamic law “as a matter of view of
piety and religious freedom,” not actions by the state. A leader of the FP expressed similar sentiments, and called for an “Anglo-Saxon” style of secularism.

A good amount of religious contention focused on foreign policy. Some Islamic pressure involved calls for Turkey to support coreligionists abroad, primarily in Bosnia. Gul called for action to defend Bosnian Muslims in part because they are targeted due to their religion. And a demonstration in 1994 over Serbian attacks on Muslims turned into an Islamic protest that involved attacks on UN building. The RP also opposed participating in the international intervention in Somalia, and instead called for intervention in Bosnia.

Religious contention also extended to other foreign policy issues. For example, in 1995, Saudi Arabia executed a Turkish man, prompting many protests in Turkey. Erdogan attacked critics of Saudi Arabia, arguing that these criticisms were a campaign against Islam. Islamic groups also attacked the military for its ties with Israel. And in 1996, Erbakan spoke to an international Islamic conference in Istanbul, claiming that the “West” views Islam “as a threat.”

Much of this anger was directed at the United States. Many Islamic groups believed the United States was manipulating Turkey. After Islamists were purged from security forces in the early 1990s, some accused the United States of interfering in

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199 Virtue Party’s Abdullah Gul Interviewed on Split, Sharia Istanbul, 9 Feb 00
200 Turkey: FP Leader Kutan on Freedom of Expression, Secularism, 1 Jul 98
201 Prosperity Party Official Interviewed, 1994-08-16
202 PKK, Islamic, Left-Wing Terrorism Viewed, 1995-01-27
203 PP Opposes Sending Troops to Somalia Article, 1992-12-09
204 1995-08-25 Istanbul Mayor Says Press Targets Islam, RP
205 1996-05-23 Turkey: Military Said Firmly Behind Agreement With Israel
206 Turkey: Erbakan Addresses International Islamic Conference, 1996-03-18
207 Diversity Among Islamic Groups Observed, 1992-09-04
And Erbakan argued Operation Desert Storm was a Western campaign against Muslims, and that the United States pressured Turkey to participate in this and later operations in Iraq in order to advance its interests in the region. Erbakan also claimed NATO “regards green [representing Islam] as a hostile color” and “equates Islam with terrorism.” And an FP official criticized the air strikes the United launched against Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the 1998 al-Qaeda attacks.

Islamic-secular clashes continued into the 1990s, partly in response to this religious contention. The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP)—a right-wing nationalist party that emerged in the 1980s—increased in prominence in this time period (Yavuz 2002). The MHP frequently attacked Islamic groups, at one point calling the RP a “threat to the state.” And in 1990, the leader of a leftist party called Islamists a “theocratic movement” and claimed they are “exploiting the religious feelings” of the public. Some secularists were concerned about judges with religious education, and the militancy of Friday prayers. Similarly, a leftist political figure in 1994 vowed to “counter certain forces associated with Islamic fundamentalism” in 1994. And a 2000 editorial warned against a growing “reactionary” threat from Islamic organizations.

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208 Prosperity Member Scores ANAP for ‘Purges,’ 1991-09-09
210 Erbakan Comments on Visit to Washington, 1994-10-26
211 Turkey: Kutan Comments on Cakici, Missing RP Funds, US Strikes, 22 Aug 98
212 Opinions Assessed, Islamic-Secularist Debate, 1990-11-30
213 MHP Says Welfare Party Threat to State, 1994-08-30
214 1990-03-01 Inonu Pledges To Fight 'Theocratic' Movement
215 Editorial Claims Country Becoming 'Like Iran,' 1990-07-09
216 Ciller on Islamic Fundamentalism Issue, 1994-07-26
217 Lawsuits Against Turkish Islamists Listed, 26 Jan 00
Religious terrorism intensified in this period.\textsuperscript{218} Much of it was domestic. As was noted, Hizballah fought with the PKK in the southeast, and also targeted numerous intellectuals.\textsuperscript{219} Other militant groups operated outside the southeast, in an attempt to establish an Islamic state; this included the murders of numerous secularist intellectuals (Pope and Pope 1997).\textsuperscript{220} One particularly violent group was the Greater Eastern Islamic Raiders-Front, which conducted attacks against bars and Jewish cemeteries.\textsuperscript{221} The group also claimed credit for killing a prominent journalist in 1993.\textsuperscript{222} And it organized a riot in an Istanbul prison in 1999, and maintained a presence in Istanbul for some time after that.\textsuperscript{223} There was also a plot by terrorists to fly a plane into Ataturk’s mausoleum in Ankara (Coll 2004).

International terrorist threats arose as well. In 1990, “Islamic terrorists” with Kuwaiti passports reportedly attempted to enter Turkey and attack in retaliation for its cooperation with the United States.\textsuperscript{224} And bin Ladin used Turkey as a transit point for al-Qaeda logistics operations in the 1990s; there are also indications al-Qaida had a presence in the country (Gunaratna 2003).\textsuperscript{225} Al-Qaeda planned attacks against US targets

\textsuperscript{218} Opinions Assessed, Islamic-Secularist Debate, 1990-11-30
\textsuperscript{219} Islamic Organization’s Link With Iran Reported, 1995-02-14; Cost of Fight Against Terror, Casualties Seen, 27 January 1995; Turkey: 3 Bodies Uncovered in Ankara Hizbullah Operation, 20 Jan 00
\textsuperscript{220} Cost of Fight Against Terror, Casualties Seen, 27 January 1995; 1990-10-07 'Islamic Movement'
\textsuperscript{221} PKK, Islamic, Left-Wing Terrorism Viewed, 1995-01-27
\textsuperscript{222} Islamic Group Claims Credit, 1993-01-27
\textsuperscript{223} Turkey: IBDA-C Said Moving Toward Districts, 8 Dec 99
\textsuperscript{224} Alert on for Terrorists With Kuwaiti Passports, 1990-10-31
\textsuperscript{225} Bin-Ladin Contacts, Activities in Turkey Reported , 17 Dec 99; Five bin Laden 'Terrorists' Enter Turkey in Past 3 Months, 30 Oct 99; Gunaratna 2003
as well, including a failed 2000 plot against the US consulate in Istanbul and a threat against the US Embassy in Ankara in 2001.226

Transnational influences affected Turkish religious contention as well. Many Islamic groups framed their actions in global terms. In 1993, Erbakan argued that the Turkish government’s actions reflected poorly in both the country and the broader “Islamic world.”227 This can also be seen in the strong calls for Turkish action to defend Bosnians as well as action on other conflicts involving Muslims, like Afghanistan and Algeria.228

There was some internalization of international events in Turkish politics as well. As was noted, several protests broke out over Serbian treatments of Bosnian Muslims, some of which took on an Islamic tone and became violent.229 And Islamic protests occurred in 1992 in response to the Algerian coup and the killing of a Hizballah leader in Lebanon.230 Moreover, one militant group that conducted deadly attacks in the late 1990s emerged in response to anger at Israel.231

Turkey also came under international criticism from Muslims, and transnational connections developed among Islamic militants. The international criticism focused on its secularism and cooperation with the United States. As was noted, there was a reported threat against Turkey by international terrorists due to its support for the United States in

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226 Terror Alert at US Consulate General In Istanbul; Three Bin-Ladin Men Sought, 17 Nov; Turkey: US Embassy Road-Block Against Possible Suicide Attacks Reported, 07 Jul 01
227 Opposition Leader Comments on Government Plan, 1993-07-07
228 Prosperity Party Official Interviewed, 1994-08-16; Diversity Among Islamic Groups Observed, 1992-09-04
229 PKK, Islamic, Left-Wing Terrorism Viewed, 1995-01-27; Weekend Demonstrations on Bosnia Viewed, 1994-04-18
230 Pro-Islamic Demonstrations Reported in Istanbul, 1992-02-24
231 Kislali Murderers Said To Belong to 'Jerusalem Fighters, 15 May 00
the first Gulf war. And in 1999, a Palestinian newspaper attacked the Turkish military for its opposition to women wearing the headscarf.\textsuperscript{232} Moreover, in 2000, a senior cleric in Iran attacked Turkey for its close ties with the United States.\textsuperscript{233} And militants in Turkey reportedly had ties with Islamic groups abroad. For example, in 2000, the Turkish Interior Military claimed the Turkish Hizballah had ties to both a militant group in Iraq and al-Qaeda, while others argued some ties existed between Islamic groups in Turkey and al-Qaeda (Gunaratna 2003).\textsuperscript{234} And some Turkish militants fought in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{235}

\textit{Religion-State Relationship}

Despite this religious contention, religion and state remained separate in the 1990s. Secularists frequently criticized Islamists, and government actors took steps against religious elements of society. The military also maintained policies opposed by religious groups. And even though the country had an Islamist Prime Minister for a short period—Necmettin Erbakan—he was forced to moderate his views in the face of secularist pressure and was ultimately removed from power.

Erbakan’s rise and brief tenure did result in some changes to Turkey’s foreign policies that demonstrate the effects of the political expression of religion. Upon taking power, Erbakan moved beyond the state’s limited outreach to Muslim states; he emphasized Turkey’s Muslim identity in his foreign relations, meeting with Iran, Libya, and Muslim Brotherhood members from Egypt (Yavuz 2003, Jung and Piccoli 2001, Martin 2004). He also mirrored popular dissatisfaction with Turkey’s ties to Israel by

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{232} Ramallah Paper Criticizes Turkish Military Over Headscarf, 13 May 99
\item\textsuperscript{233} Rafsanjani: US Supports Turkey's Anti-Islam Stand, 29 Apr 00
\item\textsuperscript{234} Turkish Sources: Hizbullah Has 'Close Ties' to UBL, 06 Feb 00
\item\textsuperscript{235} Pakistani article cites six Turkish fighters martyred in Kashmir, 30 Aug 01
\end{itemize}
publicly criticizing the state (Martin 2004). These foreign policy moves were
accompanied by Islamist-oriented domestic policies (Shankland 1999).

Yet, secular forces in society limited the impact of Islamic groups. The military,
judiciary, and civilian secular elites were frequently critical of Islamists and the influence
of religion on politics. 236 In 1995 a military official said that “antisecularist propaganda”
was a threat to the state, and warned against electing the RP. 237 Military officials in 1996
said that Islamists represented “separatist and extremist” forces trying to disrupt
society. 238 And in the early 1990s, the Prime Minister called on religious leaders to keep
their mosques out of political activities in response to an outbreak of political violence. 239

The state also took actions against religious members of the security forces and
individuals who were critical of Turkey’s secularism. In 1991, numerous people deemed
too religious were removed from security positions. 240 And the military discharged over
1000 troops for ties to Islamic groups in 1991. 241 The state also took actions against
individuals who were critical of Turkey’s secularism. The judiciary barred Erdogan from
political participation for his political activities. 242 And in 1999, the state arrested a leader
of the Nur movement—an Islamic social group—for “inciting hatred” after he claimed an
earthquake was divine punishment for secularism. 243

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236 1990-05-06 U.S. Stand Said 'Changed' After Cold War End
237 Military Prosecutor Warns Against RP Victory, 1994-12-01
238 Turkey: Military Presents Views 'Diametrically Opposed to RP, 1996-07-25
239 Demirel Warns Muftis on Political Involvement, 1993-03-08
240 Prosperity Member Scores ANAP for 'Purges', 1991-09-09
241 1991-11-16 Military Discharges Linked to 'Reactionary Views'
242 Sabah Columnist Says Legal Efforts Against Erdogan Politically Motivated, 22 Aug 01
243 Nur Sect Leader Kutlular Arrested by Ankara Court, 19 Oct 99
In addition to this, the state exerted strict control over religious activity in the country. The state attempted to use a counterterrorism law to influence the activities of religious foundations. Security forces also took several steps to control what it called “antisecular” education in schools, and attempted to censor Islamic publications. In 2001, the state closed an Islamic youth foundation it claimed had ties to militant groups. The state also tried prominent Islamic leader Fethullah Gulen, claiming he had formed an organization to implement Islamic law.

Turkey also continued its close ties to Israel, despite significant protest from Islamic groups. As was noted, Islamic figures protested Turkey’s friendly relations with Israel, including military cooperation. Yet, the military maintained its close ties with Israel throughout the 1990s (Fuller 2008). The two countries held joint training in 1996, gave Israel access to Turkish airspace for training, held arms deals (Bolukbasi 1999, Aybet 1994, Jung and Piccoli 2001). And the military overrode the objections of Erbakan to naval maneuvers with Israel when he was Prime Minister, conducting the exercises against his wishes.

The strongest example of secular forces’ power is the “soft coup” that removed Erbakan from power in 1997. Erbakan faced increasingly strong secularist protests during his rule. On February 28th, the top officials of the Turkish military implemented several policies further restricting religious activities in Turkey (Kuru 2009). The military then

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244 Islamic Foundations Grow in Number, Influence, 1995-03-10
246 Turkey: Closure of National Youth Foundation Halts Support to Islamic Terrorism, 27 Jan 01
247 Turkey: Fethullah Gulen Trial To Start on Oct 16 at Ankara State Security Court, 07 Sep 00
248 1996-05-23, Turkey: Military Said Firmly Behind Agreement With Israel
249 Turkey: Turkish Army Defies Erbakan in Bid To Force Him To Quit, 15 May 97
increasingly minimized Erbakan’s power, excluding him from security-related decision-making in an attempt to push him to quit.\textsuperscript{250} He stepped down on June of that year, and the state soon banned the RP (Kepel 2002).\textsuperscript{251}

\textit{Counterterrorism Cooperation}

Turkey and the United States began the 1990s with some tensions over counterterrorism, although they cooperated closely by the end of the decade. The United States was critical of Turkey’s military actions against the PKK and other Kurdish militant groups in the southeast, which frustrated Turkish leaders. Yet, Turkey later took steps to address human rights issues. And the state’s insulation from Islamic groups gave it the space to take action against al-Qaeda in cooperation with the United States in the late 1990s.

There was some tension between the two countries over the Kurdish issue. The United States criticized Turkey for its supposed human rights abuses against the Kurdish population during its fight with the PKK. This angered many Turks. A prominent politician claimed in 1995 that there were “double standards” in place, and called on support for Turkish efforts against the Kurds.\textsuperscript{252} And Turkish officials claimed they would “reconsider” their ties with the United States due to this criticism.\textsuperscript{253}

The two countries became closer on counterterrorism by the late 1990s, however. In 1999 the United States noted that Turkey had improved its human rights record in the

\textsuperscript{250} Turkey: Turkish Army Defies Erbakan in Bid To Force Him To Quit, 15 May 97
\textsuperscript{251} Turkey: Diplomat' Cited on Army Plan To Ban Welfare Party, 13 Jul 97
\textsuperscript{252} Ozal on Antiterror Stand, 1995-04-21
\textsuperscript{253} Turkey: Ankara 'Reconsidering' Relationship With U.S., 1996-07-09
context of counterterrorism.\textsuperscript{254} And the United States took a stronger stance against the PKK in the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{255} By 2000, the US State Department praised Turkey as a “model country” for its counterterrorism activities.\textsuperscript{256}

After US efforts against al-Qaeda began in the late 1990s, Turkey took several actions to support the United States. In early 2001, the Turkish Prime Minister called on adherence to UN sanctions against the Taliban.\textsuperscript{257} And there were reports that Turkey was supporting anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{258} Turkey supported US air strikes against purported al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998.\textsuperscript{259} And the Turkish Foreign Minister condemned the al-Qaeda attacks on US embassies in Africa in 1998.\textsuperscript{260} Turkish officials also expressed support for US counterterrorism efforts in 1999, and called for continued cooperation.\textsuperscript{261}

Turkey also took actions against al-Qaeda elements in Turkey. In 2000, regional authorities increased security at the US airbase at Incirlik in response to a potential al-Qaeda threat.\textsuperscript{262} And in 2001, Turkish authorities worked with US and UK officials in response to potential threats against Western targets in Turkey.\textsuperscript{263} Likewise, in 1999, Turkish authorities arrested a senior al-Qaeda official who attempted to travel through Istanbul airport.\textsuperscript{264}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{254} Turkish Envoy Notes 'Giant Leap' in Human Rights, 24 Jun 99
\item \textsuperscript{255} Turkey: Turkish Envoy Lauds US Stand Against PKK, 20 Nov 98
\item \textsuperscript{256} United States Praises Turkey, Criticizes Greece on Terror, 01 May 00
\item \textsuperscript{257} Turkey: Ecevit Issues Circular Urging Implementation of UN Sanctions on Taleban, 27 Mar 01
\item \textsuperscript{258} Afghanistan: Anti-Taleban Leaders in Turkey to Get Support, 9 Sep 98
\item \textsuperscript{259} Turkey: Turkey Expresses Support for US Air Strikes, 21 Aug 98
\item \textsuperscript{260} Turkey: Foreign Ministry Condemns Kenya, Tanzania Bombings , 9 Aug 98
\item \textsuperscript{261} Demirel Notes Turkey's Role in NATO Southern Wing, 7 Nov 99
\item \textsuperscript{262} Adana Security Director Says Measures Taken at Incirlik Against Terror Threat, 25 Oct 00
\item \textsuperscript{263} Turkish Security Alerts US, UK, Israel Embassies Against Bin-Ladin Attacks, 29 Mar 01
\item \textsuperscript{264} Turkish Police Arrest Senior Aide of Bin-Ladin, 16 Sep 99
\end{itemize}
Circa-9/11

Turkey and the United States grew closer on counterterrorism after 9/11, even though religious contention in the former intensified. Religious groups opposed US counterterrorism activities—and Turkey’s participation in them—and also pushed for broader adherence to religious standards. Moreover, an Islamic-leaning party rose to power in 2002. Yet, the country remained officially secular, and worked with the United States to combat al-Qaeda elements in the country and abroad.

Religious contention

Religious contention continued after 9/11. Much of it involved opposition to US counterterrorism activities. Islamic groups saw US efforts against al-Qaeda as an attack on Islam, and criticized the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) for working with the United States; transnational influences were also apparent. In addition to opposition to counterterrorism there was some attempt to increase the public role of religion in the country.

Several Islamic groups pushed for an increased visibility of religion in Turkey. Much of this focused on the ban on women wearing headscarves in government buildings and universities. Several protests broke out in 2004 calling for an end to the headscarf ban.265 Some of this involved criticism of Erdogan for not acting quickly enough to end the ban.266 And groups called on the government to increase support for religious schools in the country.267

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265 Turkish Islamist Press Review 11 Oct, 04
266 Highlights: Turkish Islamist Press 22 November, November 22, 2005
267 Turkey: Imam-Hatip Assembly Criticizes Govt Education Policies, Headscarf Ban, May 23, 2005
Islamic groups also protested US counterterrorism actions. In 2003 a member of the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) attended an international meeting of Islamists in Pakistan that called for the formation of an international Muslim bloc to oppose the United States.\(^\text{268}\) And many Islamic groups protested the US invasion of Afghanistan; while most protested in moderate terms, a few used more extreme language, with one branding the United States the “Great Satan” and calling the invasion a “crusade.”\(^\text{269}\) And in 2004, a column claimed that US operations in Fallujah were a “Crusade…bent on the massacre of the billion-strong Islamic world,” due to supposed religious symbols and music used during the operation.\(^\text{270}\) There were also reports of Islamists threatening journalists that were critical of al-Qaeda.\(^\text{271}\)

Some Islamic groups were critical of the AKP’s policies. For example, in 2005, some attacked the party for failing to move quickly enough on ending the headscarf ban.\(^\text{272}\) And after the 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul, a SP official claimed that the attacks may have been planned by Mossad or the CIA, and “[warned] the AKP” to avoid connecting Islam to terrorism in its investigation.\(^\text{273}\) Likewise, in 2005 an Islamic writer criticized Turkey’s “willingness to accommodate the CIA’s demands” in response to reports of a secret CIA flight into Turkey to interrogate an al-Qaida operative.\(^\text{274}\)

\(^{268}\) Pakistan: Islamic Movements Call for Creation of Muslim Bloc Against US Designs, 23 Aug 03
\(^{269}\) Turkey's Islamist Parties, Press Said Divided Over Strike on Afghanistan, Turkish 09 Oct 01
\(^{270}\) Turkey: Column Sees Neo-Cons as Delusional Devil-Worshiping Crusaders, 11 Nov 04
\(^{271}\) Turkey: Islamic Fundamentalists Threaten Columnists With Anti-Terrorist Views, 17 Oct 01
\(^{272}\) Highlights: Turkish Islamist Press 23 Nov
\(^{273}\) Turkey: SP's Sevket Kazan Questions CIA, Mosad Involvement in Istanbul Attack, 18 Nov 03
\(^{274}\) Highlights: Turkish Islamist Press 5 Dec, December 5, 2005
some Islamists believed Erdogan and other “reformists” were serving the interests of the United States. 275

But Islamic political activity in Turkey—even with an Islamic-oriented party in power—did not take as extreme a form as in many other Muslim countries. Instead, many Turkish Islamic groups rejected extremism, and called for greater religious expression in public life. In a 2004 interview, Gulen argued that there is not a major threat of “reactionism” in Turkey, and that the “clamor about reactionism” is more threatening to society that Islamic activism. 276 And on a 2001 television show an Islamic intellectual argued that there was a difference between Turkish Islamism and that “influenced by radical Arab Islam.” 277 Another argued that Islamists who supported the 9/11 attacks were “marginal” in the country. 278

In addition to domestic religious contention, transnational elements of Turkish religious contention persisted. Some international audiences were critical of Turkey’s stance towards religion. In 2005, a Pakistani writer attacked Pakistani President Musharraf’s policies by comparing them to Ataturk’s, who, the author claimed, “eliminated Islamic values from Turkey,” which “accomplished” the “task” begun by “crusaders.” 279 A 2003 article in a Pakistani paper called on Turkey to not support the US invasion of Iraq and “become a source of bloodshed of its Muslim brothers.” 280 And in 2004 an Iranian media outlet criticized Erdogan for “decriminalizing” adultery as part of

275 Reformists Said to be Groomed by America for Moderate Pro-US Islam in Turkey, 23 Jul 01
276 Turkish Religious Leader Comments on ‘Reactionism,’ Charges Against Him, 25 Mar 04
277 Turkey ‘Islamists,’ ‘Liberals’ Said Split in Reaction to September 11 Events, 21 Oct 01
278 Turkey ‘Islamists,’ ‘Liberals’ Said Split in Reaction to September 11 Events, 21 Oct 01
279 Writer Warns Musharraf’s Secularism Will Not Solve Pakistan’s Problems, March 6, 2005
280 Pakistan Daily Urges Turkey Not To Cooperate With US Against Attack on Iraq, 22 Feb 03
the EU accession process, which helped its “secular leaders.”  

Some of this was positive, however, as in 2003 when a Pakistani newspaper called Erdogan a “role model to Muslim leaders.”

There was also some internalization of international events and transnational connections among militants. In 2003, Islamic groups organized several protests in Turkey against the US military operations in Fallujah, Iraq, attacking the United States for its “Crusader spirit;” the protesters also criticized the Turkish government for its “silence.” Some of this was violent, as seen in the emergence in 2001 of an al-Qaeda affiliated group that was critical of Turkey’s cooperation in the US invasion of Afghanistan. And transnational connections among militants emerged; after the US invasion of Afghanistan, numerous Turkish citizens who had travelled to fight with al-Qaeda were arrested.

Although religious terrorism was not as widespread in this period, al-Qaeda was present in Turkey and conducted a few destructive attacks against Turkish targets. Al-Qaeda elements in Turkey helped to coordinate activities in the Balkans (Gunaratna 2003). And in 2003, al-Qaeda launched attacks against synagogues in Istanbul, killing 27 and injuring over 300. Later in the year, the group launched another series of attacks against a bank and the British consulate in Istanbul, killing 40 and wounding hundreds.

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281 Iran: Editorial on Turkey’s ‘Decriminalization’ of Adultery in Order To Join EU, 27 Sep 04
282 Pakistan Paper Hails Turkish Prime Minister, Says Role Model to Muslim Leaders, 19 Jun 03
283 Turkey: Idealist Hearths Protest US Operations in Al-Fallujah, 12 Nov 04
284 Turkey: Adana Police Carry Out Operation on Hizb-ut Tahrir; 7 Arrested, 16 Oct 01
285 Turkey: Column Gives Details From Testimony of Militants With Al-Qa’ida Links, 20 Jun 2002
286 UK Paper: Al-Qa’ida Claims Istanbul Bombings, Threatens Attacks in US, Elsewhere, 17 Nov 03
Despite this widespread religious contention, secular contention also remained important. After the 9/11 attacks, several figures expressed anger at the attacks and pushed for a campaign against “Islamic fundamentalism” using secularism.\textsuperscript{287} And secular writers were critical of Islamists who tried to avoid condemning the attacks, with a few expressing strong support for Turkey’s involvement in the invasion of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{288} Some of this involved criticism of Erdogan. One secular figure attacked Erdogan for not working closely enough with the United States, and hesitating to reach out to Israel.\textsuperscript{289} And others argued that the increased visibility of Islam in Turkey was connected to the rise of al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{290}

\textit{Religion-State Relationship}

The religion-state relationship in Turkey changed significantly with the rise of the Islamic-oriented AKP in 2002, although the country’s official secularism remained. The AKP—a coalition of Islamists, conservative voters, and business interests—won in the 2002 parliamentary elections, and stayed in power for the rest of the decade. The party increased the role of religion in Turkish politics, but maintained a commitment to the country’s secularism. And the military continued to exert influence over politics to avoid secularism being undermined.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{287} Turkey: Islamic Fundamentalists Threaten Columnists With Anti-Terrorist Views, 17 Oct 01; Turkey: Paper Calls for Global Cooperation Against Terrorism, July 9, 2005; Turkey: Secular, Democratic Flag Must Be Held High To Free World of Bin Ladins, 15 Dec 01
\item \textsuperscript{288} Turkey: Columnist Civaoglu Views Reaction to Usama Bin Ladin Videotape Released, 15 Dec 01; Turkey: Column Lauds Government Decision To Send Special Force to Afghanistan, 02 Nov 01; Turkey Said Pleased With US Determination To Fight Terrorism, 22 Sep 01
\item \textsuperscript{289} Turkey’s Birand Censures Ruling AKP for Failing To Adopt Decisive Policies, May 4, 2005
\item \textsuperscript{290} Turkish Columnist Calls Bin Ladin 'Coward,' Criticizes Religious Headcovers, 19 Dec 01
\end{itemize}
When the AKP came to power in 2002, the country had a religiously-oriented party in charge of a single-party government for the first time in decades. After the FP was banned, the party split into two factions. The more hard-line Islamists in the party formed the SP. The “moderate” wing, in turn—combining Islamic-oriented figures like Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul with business interests—became the AKP (Yavuz 2008). The party benefited from economic problems and widespread anger at the ruling parties to win in the 2002 elections (Robins 2003).

Once in power, the AKP pushed for an increased public role of religion. Erdogan, as Prime Minister, tried to criminalize adultery and increase the ability of women to wear headscarves (Fuller 2008). And the AKP attempted to make it easier for students to study in religious schools (Fuller 2008). Erdogan also advocated for Muslim causes internationally. He was strongly critical of European states’ restrictions on Muslim women’s ability to wear headscarves, arguing that this was a decision for a “Muslim theologian” not secular courts. And he was also critical of the idea of “moderate Islam,” starting that “there is no need to place a word before or after Islam.”

Erdogan changed Turkey’s foreign policy as well. The AKP broke with many long-standing security policies, including relations with Middle Eastern states, Cyprus, and Armenia (Aktay 2010). He increased outreach to other Muslim countries. This included a peacekeeping trip to Iraq to resolve Sunni-Shia tensions, increased economic and diplomatic ties to Syria, and relations with Iran (Fuller 2008, Rabasa and Larrabee

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291 Highlights: Turkish Islamist Press 16 Dec 2005
292 Turkey's Erdogan: Muslim Theologian, Not ECHR, Authorized To Rule on Headscarf, November 16, 2005
293 Turkey's Erdogan on 'Moderate Islam,' Iraq, EU, Israel-Palestine Conflict, PKK, April 26, 2005
Erdogan also took more steps to support Palestinians, leading to some tensions with Israel. And Turkey increased its visibility in the OIC; it hosted an OIC meeting for the first time in 2003, and became chairman in 2004 (Fuller 2008).

Moreover, Islamic groups had some influence over the party due to the makeup of its electoral coalition. The AKP appealed to conservative working and middle-class voters, many of whom the Islamist parties also courted. And Islamist members of the AKP helped it to maintain its electoral power. As a result, the AKP did have to partially answer to Islamists. For example, a 2003 article noted that some AKP supporters are hesitant to acknowledge that the 2003 attacks were conducted by religious groups, resulting in Erdogan having to hedge in his responses.  

Yet, the AKP repeatedly emphasized it was not going to implement Islamic law. In a 2001 interview with a secular paper, Erdogan said he was against “a state based on Islamic principles,” and instead wanted a country “where the community can live like a Muslim.” Erdogan also discussed Turkey as a “model country” that “[fused] the culture of Islam with that of democracy.” And at a 2004 conference, Erdogan argued that the “AKP does not believe it is right to pursue politics on the basis of religion,” but does hold to the “importance of religion as a social value.”

The AKP was also not very closely tied to Islamic groups. Some observers have noted the minimal links between the AKP leadership and more hardline Islamist followers (Sultan 2007). Also, the party adopted some policies to combat extremism. For

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294 Turkey: Writer Cites AKP Gov't's Difficulties Combatting 'Religious Terrorism,' 23 Nov 03
295 Turkey's Erdogan on Political Views, AK Party's Objectives, 28 Aug 01
296 Turkey's Vision, Role in 'Greater Middle East Project' Viewed, 2 Mar 04
297 Turkish Premier Says Party Against Religion-Based Politics,” BME-P, 10 January 2004.
example, shortly after the US invasion of Afghanistan Turkey’s Religious Affairs Department claimed it would send clergy to Afghanistan and rebuild a religious school in had constructed in Afghanistan before the Taliban rose to power. The head of the Religious Affairs Department said this was intended to “promote real Islam” in Afghanistan and combat the Taliban.\(^{298}\) Turkey also sent religious advisors to promote tolerance among Turkish communities in Europe.\(^{299}\)

And the military maintained its support of state secularism, with frequent clashes with the AKP. The military expressed concern about AKP efforts to end the ban on headscarves and facilitate religious education.\(^{300}\) Also, in 2005, a top military official publicly opposed US efforts to support “moderate Islam” and said that “the secular state and moderate Islam cannot coexist.”\(^{301}\) And the military may have plotted a coup against the AKP in 2003; numerous military officers reportedly attempted to organize “Operation Sledgehammer,” which would create social unrest as an excuse to overthrow the AKP government.

*Counterterrorism Cooperation*

Turkey worked closely with the United States after 9/11, as the state remained separate from Islamic groups protesting US actions. Turkish leaders expressed strong support for US actions against al-Qaeda, and moved against al-Qaeda targets in the country. Turkey also participated in the US invasion of Afghanistan. Some tensions emerged, especially over the US invasion of Iraq, but cooperation remained extensive.

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\(^{298}\) Turkey Said Decided To Send Muslim Clergymen to Afghanistan To Fight Fanaticism, 13 Dec 01
\(^{299}\) Religious Affairs Official Asserts Turkey's SecularTrait, Condemns Terrorism, 25 Apr 04
\(^{300}\) Selection List: Turkish Press 27 Jun 05
\(^{301}\) Turkey: Gen Basbug's Speech Said Shows Turkish-US Policies Mostly Overlapping, June 8, 2005
Several Turkish officials expressed strong support for the United States after the 9/11 attacks (Dismorr 2008, Tschirgi 2003, Walker 2006). The defense minister in 2001 praised US support for Turkey on terrorism while criticizing Europe’s inaction on Kurdish groups. And Erdogan strongly condemned the 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul. Erdogan also publicly called for a strong role for Turkey in the US democracy-promotion efforts—intended to undermine support for terrorism—in the second term of the Bush Administration (Sever 2007).

Turkey also took actions against several al-Qaeda targets in the country, many of which were closely coordinated with the United States. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Turkish forces moved against militant groups in the country’s southeast, and arrested a top al-Qaeda operative and extradited him to Tunisia in 2003. Likewise, in 2005 it disrupted a plot to attack Israeli ships via a speedboat by a man affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. And in 2002, Turkey and the United States established information sharing capabilities, while Turkey moved to freeze the assets of designated terrorist groups in line with UN directives.

302 Turkish Justice Minister Addresses International Conference on Terrorism in Warsaw, 06 Nov 01; Turkey's Cem Vows To Combat Terrorism in UN Anniversary Message, 23 Oct 01; Turkey's Sezer Sends Messages to Bush 'Harshly' Condemning Terrorist Strikes, 11 Sep 01
303 Turkey: Cakmakoglu Thanks US for Support in Fight Against Terror, Warns EU, 18 Dec 01
304 AKP Reaction to Terrorism Seen Generating 'New Turkey,' 19 Nov 03
305 Turkey's Vision, Role in 'Greater Middle East Project' Viewed, March 2, 2004
306 Turkey: Adana Police Carry Out Operation on Hizb-ut Tahrir; 7 Arrested, 16 Oct 01; Fundamentalist Sources Cited onProminent Al-Qa'ida Figure's Arrest in Turkey, 23 Jun 03
307 Suspected Top Terrorist Arrested in Turkey Lived in Germany, August 14, 2005
308 Turkey: Column Gives Details From Testimony of Militants With Al-Qa'ida Links, 20 Jun 2002; Turkish Cabinet Freezes Assets of 9 More Persons, Organizations Funding Terror, 12 Apr 02; Turkish Government Decides To Freeze Assets of Terrorist Organizations, 30 Dec 01
Turkey contributed to the US invasion of Afghanistan as well. Turkey sent troops as part of the international coalition and established a special task force with the United States to assist with intelligence and humanitarian operations. This continued under the AKP. Erdogan opposed the invasion but did express support for an “international joint fight against terrorism.” And in February 2002, Erdogan stated that Turkey’s involvement in Afghanistan was “important for the peace of the world.”

Some differences emerged between the two countries on counterterrorism, however. The biggest involved the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. As was noted, the United States tried to gain Turkish support for its effort against Iraq, and the use of bases in Turkey to launch a northern front as part of the invasion. There was significant opposition in Turkey to this, from both Islamic and secular groups (Grigoriadis 2010, Gordon and Taspinar 2008). The AKP had the Turkish parliament vote on whether or not the country should participate, and many observers believed the party expected it to pass; due to complications in the voting process, however, the parliament did not approve working with the United States on Iraq (Yavuz 2008, Robins 2003). Many US policymakers grew angry at this development, and some even threatened to reduce aid to Turkey (Larrabee 2003, Munir 2003).

Other points of contention arose. Erdogan opposed the use of the term “Islamic terrorism” to describe al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Erdogan also repeatedly called for

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309 Turkey Said To Assume Key Role in Afghanistan as Member of International Group, 16 Nov 01; Dismorr 2008; Turkish Government Tasks 90-Person Special Force in Response to US Request, 01 Nov 01
310 Turkey's Islamist Parties, Press Said Divided Over Strike on Afghanistan, 09 Oct 01
311 Turkey: AKP Leader Erdogan Comments on Death Penalty, Other Issues, 27 Feb 02
312 Turkey's Erdogan Opposes Use of Term 'Islamic Terror,' July 27, 2005
action to resolve the Israel-Palestinian dispute, and was very critical of both Israel and the “Western world’s…double standards” (Jenkins 2003). And Turkey opposed contributing combat troops to either Afghanistan or Iraq. In 2004 Abdullah Gul expressed hesitation over US requests to send more troops to Afghanistan, pointing to incidents of US troops killing civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued conflict between Israel and Palestinians. And after the invasion of Iraq, Erdogan stated Turkey would assist with the stabilization of Iraq but would not “go to Iraq as police.”

Turkish authorities also pressured the United States to take stronger action against the PKK (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008). In 2005 a top military official claimed that “merely putting them on a list [of designated terrorist groups] meant nothing,” and called for strong action against the group. And Turkish officials worried that the United States may be sympathetic to the PKK in its reports on terrorism. A major controversy erupted in 2003 when Turkey sent commandos into Iraq to take action against Kurdish targets; US troop arrested the Turkish commandos, causing significant anger among Turkish leaders and public (Gordon and Taspinar 2008, Larrabee 2010).

Despite these issues, however, the two worked very closely on counterterrorism after the 9/11 attacks. Turkey continued to participate in the international coalition in Afghanistan throughout the decade, and cooperated with the United States on disrupting al-Qaeda elements in Turkey. And even though Turkey did not participate in the invasion

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313 Turkey: AKP Leader Erdogan Comments on Death Penalty, Other Issues, 27 Feb 02
314 Turkey's Gul Expresses 'Extreme Concern' over Recent Mideast Developments , 21 May 04
315 Erdogan Says Turkey Not To Be Police Force in Iraq; Wants To Expand Ties With US, 13 Sep 03
316 Columnist Opposes Erdogan's Remarks on Strategic Relationship Between Turkey, US, June 9, 2005
317 Turkey: Gen Basbug's Speech Said Shows Turkish-US Policies Mostly Overlapping, June 8, 2005
318 Turkish Officials React to Inclusion of PKK Goals in US Terrorism Report, April 30, 2005

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of Iraq, Erdogan did agree to work with the United State after the invasion; Turkey granted the United States overflight rights and allowed the United States to use its airspace and bases in its territory for resupply and emergency landings (Walker 2007/2008, Robins 2003).\(^\text{319}\) In 2005, Erdogan’s foreign policy advisor noted that the two countries worked closely on numerous issues, and that “the only problem in those issues was seen in Iraq.”\(^\text{320}\)

**Post-9/11**

Similar dynamics continued in the post-9/11 era. Islamic groups pressed for an increased role for religion in Turkish politics, and attacked the United States and the AKP for cooperating with the United States. The AKP took more aggressive actions against the military and secular opposition, but maintained the country’s officially secularism. Meanwhile, some tensions grew between the United States and Turkey over Middle Eastern politics, but counterterrorism cooperation remained high.

*Religious contention*

Religious contention continued in the post-9/11 era. Islamic groups pushed for an expanded role for religion in Turkish politics, and attacked the United States for its international activities. Islamic groups also criticized the AKP for its close cooperation with the United States, while secular opposition to both the AKP and Islamists continued. In addition to this, al-Qaeda plotted some attacks in Turkey, and transnational influences on Turkish religious contention persisted.

\(^\text{319}\) Turkey: Gen Basbug's Speech Said Shows Turkish-US Policies Mostly Overlapping, June 8, 2005
\(^\text{320}\) Turkey: Erdogan's Foreign Policy Adviser Details AKP's 'Active' Foreign Policy, December 1, 2005
Islamic groups continued to press for a role for religion in Turkish politics. At a 2009 election rally, Erbakan called for an end to interest rates and a “just order” based on Islam, while also calling on Turkey to leave NATO and turn away from the EU.\textsuperscript{321} And Islamic groups protested against restrictions on headscarves in Turkey and the Danish cartoon controversy.\textsuperscript{322} Moreover, in 2010 an Islamic writer attacked secularists for expressing concern about religious individuals serving in the judiciary, education and military while not being critical of “freemasons, Sabbateans” and “atheists” in these positions.\textsuperscript{323}

Islamic groups also attacked the United States for its perceived crimes against Muslims. In 2010 an Islamist writer claimed that the “covert target” of the US and NATO actions against terrorism was “Islam,” which would eventually target the “entire Islamic geography.”\textsuperscript{324} After the formation of South Sudan, an Islamist figure argued that this was the result of the US “Greater Middle East Project,” which he claimed was an effort to reshape Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{325} And some Islamic groups saw these efforts as part of broader US attempts to control the region (Sever 2007).

Islamic groups continued to oppose the AKP as well. Several Islamic groups attacked the AKP for not taking strong enough action on international Islamic causes. In 2011 an SP official criticized Erdogan for not doing more to work with Syria and stop the

\textsuperscript{321} Turkey: Felicity Party Rally Features Islamic Rap, Erbakan's Rhetoric, March 2, 2009
\textsuperscript{322} Turkey: Kazan Says State Council Ruling on Headscarved Teachers Unconstitutional, February 13, 2006
\textsuperscript{323} Highlights: Turkish Islamist Press 9 Oct, October 9, 2010. The three groups named are often the targets of criticism by conservative Islamic voices for their supposed secretive nature and anti-Islamic activities. “Sabbateans” are the followers of a heretical 17th century Jewish rabbi who later converted to Islam.
\textsuperscript{324} Highlights: Turkish Islamist Press, November 28, 2010
\textsuperscript{325} Turkey: SP Leader Kamalak Says 'Sudan Victim of Greater Middle East Project', April 29, 2012

219
civil unrest in that country, claiming this was because Erdogan “acts under the direction of the US.” Some attacked the AKP for trying to join the European Union—which they called the “crusader union”—and not focusing on the “Islamic world.” Islamic groups also attacked the AKP for not doing enough to protect Turkish citizens during the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident, and for not taking a stronger stance against the Danish cartoon controversy. They also opposed the AKP electorally; the SP ran against the AKP in parliamentary elections, forming an alliance of Islamist parties in 2011.

Islamists also attacked the AKP for its ties to the United States. In a 2010 interview, a SP member claimed the AKP “has surrendered to the International Monetary Fund and the Greater Middle East Project;” the official also attacked the AKP for allowing the United States to use Incirlik Air Base to conduct operations in Iraq. In 2008, an Islamic writer criticized the AKP for its counterterrorism activities, claiming its actions against “al-Qaeda and Hizballah suspects who have nothing to do with those organizations” were conducted to appease the United States. At another point, an Islamic writer claimed that raids against al-Qaeda targets were due to US pressure, and that public protests in support of al-Qaeda might emerge if they continue.

Religious terrorism also took place in this time period, primarily attempted al-Qaeda attacks in the country. Al-Qaeda plotted attacks against the US airbase in Incirlik,

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326 Turkish Daily Highlights Reactions to Latest Atrocities in Syria, July 13, 2012
327 Turkey: SP Leader Kamalak Says ‘Sudan Victim of Greater Middle East Project’, April 29, 2012
328 Turkey: Felicity Party Faults Government For Not Protecting Aid Flotilla, June 4, 2010; Turkey: Felicity Party Calls on Erdogan To Reveal ‘True Stand’ on Caricatures, February 9, 2006
329 Turkey: SP, DP, TP, BBP To Continue With Erbakan’s Election Alliance Plan, March 1, 2011; Turkey’s Birand Says Anti-AKP Circles Surprised With Outcome of Elections, July 24, 2007
330 Turkey: SP Leader Kurtulmus Interviewed on Differences Between SP, AKP, February 18, 2010
331 Highlights: Turkish Islamist Press 10 Jan, January 10, 2008
332 Highlights: Turkish Islamist Press 04 Feb, February 4, 2007
the US consulate in Istanbul, and the city of Gaziantep in the southeast.\textsuperscript{333} And Turkish counterterrorism operations revealed al-Qaeda had a presence in Istanbul, the southeast, and other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{334}

Transnational influences on religious contention in Turkey were also present. Turkey continued to be criticized internationally, although primarily by al-Qaeda and its supporters. For example, al-Qaeda figures threatened Turkey at several points for working with Israel and sending troops to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{335} And some Islamic groups framed their contention in global terms. For example, in 2011 an Islamist party leader called for an “Islamic United Nations” and “Islamic Defense Organization” to unite Muslims around the world.\textsuperscript{336} Another figure attending an anti-Israel protest in Istanbul claimed that ‘All the Muslims in the world should unite’.\textsuperscript{337} There was also some internalization of international events. Several protests broke out in response cartoons published in European newspapers of Mohammed.\textsuperscript{338} Islamists also attacked the Pope after a controversial speech about Islam, claiming it was part of “the hatred and detestation that have been felt against Islam and the Muslims since the first Crusade.”\textsuperscript{339}

\textsuperscript{333} Turkey: Al-Qa’ida Missile Attack Planned Against Incirlik Air Base, February 19, 2006; Turkey: Consulate Attack Possible Revenge for Turks Slain in Afghanistan, July 13, 2008; Turkey: Gaziantep Governor Says Al-Qa’ida Was Preparing for Sensational Attacks, January 24, 2008
\textsuperscript{334} Turkey: Authorities See Possible Al-Qa’ida Link to Ammonium Nitrate Seized, August 31, 2012; Turkey: 8 Al-Qa’ida Suspects Detained in Simultaneous Operations in 4 Provinces, March 29, 2012; Turkey: 13 Al-Qa’ida Suspects Detained in Southeastern City, December 19, 2011; Turkey's AA Reports Police Detain 15 Persons in Al-Qa’ida Operation in Konya, November 22, 2011 ; Turkey: Agency on Police Raids Against Al-Qa’ida Suspects in Several Provinces, July 10, 2010; AFP: Turkey Arrests Instanbul's Al-Qa’ida Chief, April 12, 2011
\textsuperscript{335} Column Links Al-Qa’ida ‘Threats’ Against Turkey to Gaza Flotilla Incident, August 20, 2010
\textsuperscript{336} Turkey’s Kamalak Calls for Islamic United Nations, Islamic Defense Organization, September 21, 2011
\textsuperscript{337} Turkey: Raid Salah Visits SP's Jerusalem Watch Tent, Calls for Unity of Muslims, January 3, 2010
\textsuperscript{338} Turkey: Felicity Party Protests Prophet Mohammad Cartoons, September 4, 2007
\textsuperscript{339} Turkey: SP Holds Anti-Pope Rally; Erbakan Calls For ‘Preventing’ Arrival of Pope, November 27, 2006
Secular forces remained significant in Turkish politics (Zeyno 2008). Secularist parties claimed they opposed the AKP because of fears it would “Islamize Turkey.” After the death of bin Ladin, some secularists claimed this indicated that Islamism had lost influence in the region. Secularist protests against the AKP also occurred. And some secularists believed the United States created the AKP to undermine Kemalism.

**Religion-State Relationship**

Religion-state connections increased in this period, although the state remained officially secular. The AKP took further steps to expand the public role of religion, and also took action against secularists in the country. But the AKP remained committed to Turkish secularism, and the military attempted to minimize the AKP’s influence.

The AKP continued to emphasize the importance of religion in Turkish politics and advocated for international Islamic causes. In 2011, the Turkish minister for EU accession claimed Turkey was an example of a state combining “Islamic culture together with democracy.” And Erdogan, at a ceremony honoring the Mevlevi Sufi order, argued that Islam is a peaceful religion that “cannot coexist” with terrorism. After the controversial 2012 film that was sharply critical of Muhammad, Erdogan called for “Islamophobia” to be recognized as a “crime against humanity.”

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340 Turkey’s Birand Says Anti-AKP Circles Surprised With Outcome of Elections, July 24, 2007
341 Turkey: Column Views Bin Ladin's Killing, May 9, 2011
342 Police, Students Clash in Turkey, January 27, 2011; AFP: Thousands Rally for Secularism in Turkey, April 29, 2007; Column Slams Opposition for Criticizing Turkish Military Presence in Afghanistan, March 20, 2012
343 Turkey: Column Views 'Structural' Anti-American Sentiment Among Turkish People, July 27, 2010
344 Minister Bagis Says Turkey Example of State Combining Islamic Culture, Democracy, March 5, 2011
345 Turkey's Erdogan Says 'Islam, Terrorism Cannot Coexist', December 18, 2007
346 Turkey's Erdogan To Comment More on 'Innocence of Muslims' at UN 25 Sep Assembly, September 17, 2012
At the same time, the AKP took action against secularist forces. The government ordered the arrest of several former government officials involved in the 1997 overthrow of Erbakan. And in 2012 the government tried hundreds of Army officers for purportedly planning the aforementioned 2003 plot against the AKP government. The government also launched the controversial investigation into the “Ergenekon” movement. The government claims this movement is a coalition of military officials, journalists, and government employees that had been working to harass Islamic groups and keep them from participating in politics. As part of the investigation, the AKP has arrested numerous journalists, military officials and other members of civil society on suspicion of belonging to the movement. The veracity of the claims are unclear, as some argue the AKP is using this to harass opponents. It does indicate the AKP’s efforts to combat secularist forces in society.

The AKP remained committed to Turkish secularism, however, and much of its efforts involved economic development. In 2007 an AKP official sent a letter to many US politicians and foreign policy figures in which he said the party “favors a full-fledged democracy based on secularism and the rule of law.” Some have noted that the AKP focused primarily on democracy, human rights and economic liberalization (Dagi 2008, Sultan 2007). For example, in a 2007 interview, Gul pointed to Turkish support for EU accession and economic and political liberalization, continuing “why would we do this if we were trying to Islamize Turkey?” (qtd. in Gordon and Taspinar 2008, 9). And in

347 Turkey: Former Education Board Members Detained in 28 February Probe, June 23, 2012
348 Turkey: Bagis Sends Letter to World Statesmen on AKP’s Commitment to Secularism, June 23, 2007
2008 Erdogan announced a massive project to develop the economy and infrastructure of southeastern Turkey as a way of preventing terrorist violence there.\textsuperscript{349}

The AKP also continued to face pressure from the military. The most prominent example of this was the tension in 2007 over the appointment of Abdullah Gul as President. The President had traditionally been seen as guardian of Turkey’s secularist system, and many secularists—especially in the military—were concerned about Gul due to his Islamic leanings. During debates in Parliament over his appointment, the military placed an article on its website discussing its commitment to secularism and hinting it might take action to protect the country’s secular system. Many saw this as a warning it would intervene if Gul became President, and the incident became known as the “e-coup.” Despite the warning, however, Gul’s appointment went through and he became President (2010). And in 2008, a court indicted the AKP for trying to create a religious political system, resulting in a decrease of public funding to the party (Gordon and Taspinar 2008).

\textit{Counterterrorism Cooperation}

With this separation between religion and state, Turkish leaders were able to undertake policies Islamic groups opposed, such as counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. Turkey continued to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism, even though they differed in several other areas of world politics. Turkey launched operations against al-Qaeda targets in the country and worked with the United States on international counterterrorism initiatives.

\textsuperscript{349} \textit{Turkey: GAP Action Plan for Southeast AnatoliaOutlined, May 27, 2008}
Turkey launched several operations against al-Qaeda elements in the country. Turkish forces arrested al-Qaeda operatives in numerous cities in 2009 and 2010. This continued in 2011, with a large operation against al-Qaeda elements in the southeast city of Gaziantep and other cities. And in 2012, Turkish forces arrested al-Qaeda operatives in provinces throughout Turkey.

Turkey also worked closely with the United States on international counterterrorism efforts. Turkey remained involved in the international coalition in Afghanistan, which included attempts to mediate tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Turkey and the United States also had significant intelligence sharing in place throughout this period, and cooperated to combat IEDs in the southeast. And in September 2011, the United States and Turkey launched the Global Forum on Counterterrorism, an information platform intended to promote international cooperation on counterterrorism (2012). Moreover, while some international concerns emerged over weak money laundering laws in Turkey that could aid militant groups, Turkey passed a new terrorist financing law in 2013 that dealt with this issue (2013).

Some tensions between the countries did continue, although—as before—their overall cooperation on counterterrorism did not diminish. Several observers noted a
decline in Turkish-US relations due to tensions over US actions in the Middle East, and Turkish beliefs that the two countries had different interests in the region (Fuller 2008, Carpenter 2010). Turkish leaders continued to express concerns over US actions that implicitly linked Islam and terrorism. And Gul argued that terrorism concerns in the United States and Europe had harmed Muslims since 9/11. Turkey also refused to send combat troops to Afghanistan in response to US requests.

Turkey continued to press the United States to take greater action against Kurdish groups as well. While calling for an “international platform to combat terrorism,” Erdogan claimed that other countries were not sufficiently interested in fighting terrorism due to their minimal action against the PKK. And while noting Turkey’s extensive intelligence sharing on terrorism, a Turkish official complained that other countries did not reciprocate with information on Kurdish groups. Also, an AKP official, while visiting the United States, claimed to Congress that the al-Qaeda threat to the United States was equivalent to the PKK threat to Turkey.

**Analysis**

This discussion illustrates the dynamics of US-Turkish counter-terrorism cooperation. Religion-state connections in Turkey were low, although Islamic groups increased in visibility beginning in the 1990s. And Turkey worked closely with the

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355 Gul Comments on Syria, Austria, Says Bin Ladin's Death 'Significant Development,' May 4, 2011  
356 Gul Comments on Syria, Austria, Says Bin Ladin's Death 'Significant Development,' May 4, 2011  
357 Report Says Turkey 'Not Willing' To Change Mission 'Parameters' in Afghanistan, December 4, 2009  
358 “TURKEY-FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM , May 10, 2011  
359 Turkey’s Cicek Comments on Al-Qaida, Security Measures Against Possible Attacks, May 3, 2011  
United States to combat al-Qaeda both in Turkey and internationally. These were connected; the separation between religion and the state enabled Turkey’s leaders to ignore religious contention and work closely with the United States on counterterrorism.

This section presents this analysis of the case study, drawing on evidence from the congruence method, process tracing, and historical analysis. It also assesses alternative explanations through this evidence and the method of sequence elaboration.

*Congruence Method*

The low religion-state connections in Turkey corresponded to the high level of counterterrorism cooperation between that country and the United States. By the 1990s, religious contention had increased in the country, with Islamic groups and religiously-inclined voters becoming more visible. Yet, the state remained officially secular and the military and judiciary intervened to prevent religious groups from influencing state behavior. When Turkey began cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism in the late 1990s, leaders were able to ignore religious opposition to this counterterrorism cooperation due to minimal connections between religion and the state. As a result, counterterrorism cooperation remained high even as opposition increased and tensions emerged between the two countries in other areas.

Like many other majority-Muslim countries, Turkey experienced significant religious contention, both domestic and transnational. Islamic groups pressed the state to increase the public role of religion and follow Islamic standards, and for a time the country was ruled by an Islamist prime minister. Religious contention also focused on the state’s foreign policies; Islamic groups called on the state to support international Islamic
causes and refuse to work with the United States in its struggle with al-Qaida. Turkey also faced significant violent religious contention. Transnational forces affected Turkish politics as well; international events became internalized through Islamic protests, some groups framed their contention in global terms, and international audiences were critical of Turkey’s secular system.

Yet, religion and state remained separate. Turkey remained officially secular, with numerous restrictions on public religious activity. Moreover, the state took steps to limit the influence of Islamic groups on politics; this included purges of suspected Islamists, a “soft coup” in 1997 and warnings about the Islamic-oriented AKP after 2002. And even though the AKP was religious in nature, it was not as closely tied to Islamic groups as were more explicitly Islamist political parties.

This facilitated Turkey’s extensive counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. Even though there was significant religious opposition to Turkey’s counterterrorism activities, Islamic groups did not have sufficient power to threaten regimes for working with the United States. As a result, Turkey took significant actions both domestically and internationally in support of the United States initiatives against al-Qaeda. This was not a case of Turkey being subservient to the United States, however. When both Turkish leaders and the public were strongly opposed to US actions—as in the case of the invasion of Iraq—Turkish did not cooperate. And tensions emerged between Turkey and the United States over other international issues, such as broader Middle East politics. Moreover, the transnational elements of religious contention in Turkey had little effect on the regime due to this separation between religion and state, as
Turkish leaders did not see themselves as accountable to international Islamic audiences and did not give their foreign policies a religious salience.

Figure 5-2 presents the evidence from the congruence method in graphical form. It demonstrates the value of each of the explanatory factors: religious contention, religion-state connections, the political effects of religion-state connections, and the level of counterterrorism cooperation. (See Figure 5-2)

[Figure 5-2 about here]

Process Tracing

There is process tracing evidence for the role of religion-state connections in Turkey in enabling the country’s cooperation with the United States. While detailed information on specific decisions is not available, evidence can connect the independent variable—low religion-state connections in Turkey—to the dependent variable, high cooperation with US counterterrorism efforts through several mechanisms. There are indications that the religion-state separation in Turkey minimized the power of Islamic groups, so that even though these groups were actively contending with the state they had little effect on Turkish politics. And both the public and leaders framed Turkey’s security policies in nationalist terms, minimizing the connection between Turkish security and religion.

The low level of religion-state connections in Turkey limited the influence of religious contention on state policy. While Islamic parties were often successful electorally, they rarely made lasting changes to Turkish politics due to interventions from the military and judiciary. The officially secular system in Turkey gave legal
justifications for such acts, as necessary to uphold the republic. As a result, Islamic
groups were unable to translate electoral success into policy impacts. And due to the
minimal electoral power of Islamic groups, the state rarely responded to religious
contention by changing its behavior. When it did increase ties to religion—as with the
1980s “Turkish-Islamic synthesis”—this was an attempt to maintain control of
increasingly active religious groups.\footnote{Turkey: Army's Erratic Policy on Religion Viewed, 1996-04-08}

Also, there was a broad secular-oriented constituency that supported Turkey’s
official secularism. The country’s political system was long dominated by urban secular
elites, who supported secularist parties like the CHP. The reforms of Ozal had such a
major impact because they empowered more conservative Anatolian voters. Yet, secular
elements of Turkish society remained influential. And, as was noted, many secularists
were strongly supportive of the secular system. They were also concerned about the
increasing visibility of Islamic groups. For example, some secular voices were worried by
US and European efforts to push democratic reforms in Turkey, which they saw as a
threat to its secular nature.\footnote{Columnist Asks Whether EU, US Support Turkey's Religious or Secular Identity, 01 Mar 04}

This was apparent even when the AKP came to power. The AKP’s religious
policies have focused primarily on expanding the public role of religion in the country
(Mecham 2004, Rabasa and Larrabee 2008, Fuller 2008). As M. Hakan Yavuz has noted,
the AKP is “deeply involved in Islamic social ethics…and stresses the religious values
and interests of its pious electorate;” it does not, however, “seek the religious
transformation of state and society [emphasis removed]” (2008, 8). And while it does
contain Islamist members, its support base is diverse enough that it is not completely reliant on them to stay in power (Sultan 2007, Vick 2002). Moreover, the AKP worried about the military intervening if it made too dramatic a break with existing Turkish foreign policy, which in part motivated its persistent ties with the United States (Yavuz 2008). In this way, the official secularism of the state—as expressed in military actions against Islamic governments—minimized the influence of religious contention on state behavior.

Moreover, Turkey’s security policy was not as intimately connected to religion as in other Muslim states, like Pakistan. Instead, many—both Islamic and secular—saw Turkey’s security activities as necessary to maintain Turkey’s national integrity. This can be seen in discussion of counterterrorism actions against Kurdish separatists. Many in Turkey supported Turkish actions against the PKK. Some saw working with the United States on counterterrorism as a way to gain more support for Turkey’s efforts against Kurdish separatism. And this support for Turkey’s counterterrorism activities extended to many Islamists. Some of this involved attacks on the United States not being helpful enough against the PKK.

This was also apparent in Turkish opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Erdogan framed his opposition to the Iraq war in terms of Turkey’s interests, not religion. In a

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363 Turkey: Erdogan Comments on Kurdish Issue, Presidential System, Regional Issues, November 30, 2012
364 Turkey Said Pleased With US Determination To Fight Terrorism, 22 Sep 01; Milliyet Column Sees Terrorist Attacks Making US More Sympathetic Toward Turkey, 12 Sep 01; Turkey: Column Lauds Government Decision To Send Special Force to Afghanistan, 02 Nov 01
366 Turkey: SP's Kutan Says US 'Not Sincere' About PKK, March 26, 2006
2003 interview, he pointed to the consequences of the first Gulf War—specifically the lost trade and increasing terrorism in the southeast—and stated that “we do not approach the issue of Iraq from the religious standpoint. We approach it from the standpoint of universal law.” Many in Turkey were also afraid of Kurdish unrest if Turkey supported the Iraq invasion.

Figure 5-3 presents this in graphical form. It demonstrates the process-tracing evidence connecting the explanatory factors. (See Figure 5-3)

Path dependence

Even with the indications of religion-state connections’ effects on counterterrorism cooperation, however, one could still argue that Turkish leaders were responding to short-term political calculations. Islamic groups are not very powerful, and the Turkish state has an interest in working with the United States on counterterrorism. This would be “just politics” then, rather than the lack of religious effects on Turkish behavior. religion and state in one period make it more likely later leaders will continue to do so.

Qualitative tools for examining long-term historical processes can demonstrate the role the religion-state relationship played, however. A causal chain is apparent in the establishment of official secularism by Ataturk, which decreased the salience of religious issues and the power of Islamic groups. This enabled leaders to work with the United

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367 Turkey's Erdogan Comments on Role of Army, Iraq, EU, Islam, 24 Jan 03
368 Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View, Suha Bolukbasi, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 21-35
States on counterterrorism in the face of religious opposition. And a path dependent process with negative feedback occurred with the weakening power of Islamic groups over time; by the time Islamic groups became more active in the 1990s, it was difficult for them to affect state behavior due to the long causal process.

This causal chain began with the establishment of the Turkish republic as officially secular by Ataturk. Ataturk’s reforms set up a political system that limited religious influences through official standards and policy instruments, like the military’s role in enforcing Kemalism. This made it more likely the military would step in against Islamic-leaning governments or in times of unrest related to religion, as it did in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. And the political system made it more difficult for religious groups to operate, as they must be wary of taking too strong a stance or risk action against them.

The negative feedback element of the development of religion-state connections is apparent in the fact that earlier separation between religion and the state made it harder for religious groups to influence politics at later dates. An important part of this is the military’s policy of intervening in politics through coups to uphold secular systems. The coups the military launched against religious-leaning governments disrupted the ability of Islamic groups to operate and made later governments more hesitant to adopt religious policies. For example, some have argued that the AKP’s hesitation to break ties with the United States came partially from its fears of being overthrown after the February 28th process (Yavuz 2008). And the state increasingly codified restrictions on religious activity which were implicit in Ataturk’s initial reforms. The 1961 Constitution established official protections for several of Ataturk’s secularizing policies, making it
harder for them to be changed in the future (Kuru 2009). And after the 1980 military coup, the military governments’ policies to decrease the power of Islamic groups—such as Article 163, which banned communism and Islamism—made it more difficult for later Islamic groups to operate. Moreover, these actions increased the power of secularist groups, which challenged Islamic groups for power. This can be seen in the MHP, whose nationalist contention was often directed towards Islamic groups; some have argued that the MHP arose in part through the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which increased the broadened acceptance of its nationalist ideals (Yavuz 2002).

The effects of this negative feedback process and the causal chain on Turkish politics is apparent in the minimal response of Turkish leaders to religious contention, and the lack of connection between religion and Turkish security. Because Islamic groups’ influence was limited due to the official secularism—while secular elements were strengthened—Turkish leaders were enabled to act on issues that were opposed by religious groups. And even when leaders might have wanted to take stronger stands on religiously-contentious issues, they were limited in doing so by the system. For example, some claim the military’s power limited Erbakan’s ability to change Turkey’s foreign policy (Bolukbasi 1999). And others argue that the AKP was moderate in its approach to religious issues due to pressure from secularists (Mecham 2004).369

This is also apparent in the relatively moderate nature of Islamic groups in Turkey. While violent Islamic militant groups exist, most Islamic parties tend to be nonviolent. Even Erbakan’s various parties worked within the system and, while they

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369 Turkey's Birand Says Anti-AKP Circles Surprised With Outcome of Elections, July 24, 2007
held protests, refrained from disrupting Turkish society in the way that Islamic groups in other countries—like Pakistan—have. And the most influential Islamic groups in the country—like the Nur and Gulen movements—advocate pluralism and religious tolerance. Some have argued that this is due to the nature of Turkey’s official secularism. Even though religious activities were restricted and the military overthrew governments, this never rose to the same level as repression in Nasser’s Egypt or Iran under the Shah. Some argue the—albeit limited—opportunities to express themselves politically prevented the rise of a broad-ranging militant Islamist movement, as in Iran (Karasipahi 2009). And others claim the democratic openings under Ozal—which persisted despite the “soft coup” in 1997—contributed to the success of the reformist wing of the Islamist movement (which became the AKP) over the more hard-line elements that formed into the RP (Yavuz 2008).

Figure 5-4 demonstrates this in graphic form, showing the short-term explanation—Turkish leaders responding to political incentives and cooperating with the United States—and the longer-term historical explanation demonstrating the role of religion-state connections. (See Figure 5-4)

[Figure 5-4 about here]

Alternative Explanations

Alternative explanations provide some insight into US-Turkish counterterrorism cooperation, but neither completely explain the relationship nor undermine the importance of religion-state connections. I demonstrate this through the method of sequence elaboration, which assesses the effect of adding an additional causal factor to an
analysis to the initial relationship. In this case, it is the addition of alternative explanations to the posited relationship between religion-state connections and counterterrorism cooperation. The effect may be negligible, if the alternative explanation is fallacious or unconnected to religion-state connections. More often, though, the additional causal factor did matter in some way.

One alternative explanation for the close counterterrorism cooperation would be a lack of Islamic pressure in Turkey. That is, Islamic groups may not be as opposed to US-Turkish counterterrorism cooperation as they are in other states, and leaders would face fewer political costs for working with the United States. Yet, as was discussed above, there was significant opposition to counterterrorism cooperation by Islamic groups both before and after 9/11. This alternative explanation is therefore not valid. A related alternative would be that Islamic groups are opposed to cooperation, but are more moderate than those in other countries, so there would be less pressure on the state. It is true that many Islamic groups in Turkey are not as extreme as in other majority-Muslim countries, but they still did strongly opposed counterterrorism cooperation, so leaders would face pressure against this. Moreover, as discussed above, the relative moderation of Islamic groups in Turkey may actually be related to Turkey’s religion-state relationship. This explanation would thus be either invalid, or contextualizing the effect of religion-state relations on counterterrorism cooperation.

Another has to do with the strength of the Turkish state. Unlike many other majority-Muslim states, the Turkish state is relatively strong vis-à-vis society and the military regular intervenes to maintain control. Thus religious groups would have less of
an effect on Turkish politics due to the power of the state. It is true that the Turkish state 
wields a great degree of control over society. Yet, starting in the 1980s, the public 
increased its influence over the state but counterterrorism cooperation remains high 
(Larrabee 2003). Moreover, the nature of the Turkish state’s control over society is 
related to religion-state connections, as the official secularism empowers the military to 
intervene in politics. This power appears to have decreased in the post-9/11 era, however, 
as the AKP has reformed the political system to limit the military’s power; it is possible 
that this will weaken the Turkish state in the future and increase religious influences on 
politics, although this will occur through changes to the nature of religion-state relations. 
This explanation thus also contextualizes the effects of religion-state relations on 
counterterrorism cooperation.

The prominence of Kurdish separatism could also explain the close 
counterterrorism cooperation. Turkey has long sought international support for its efforts 
against the Kurds, and fear of Kurdish separatism has affected its foreign policy, such as 
in tensions with Iran and Syria and its opposition to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. So 
Turkey might have worked with the United States on counterterrorism to further this 
goal. This is partially valid; as discussed above, Turkey connected its struggle with the 
PKK to US actions against al-Qaeda. But seeking help with the PKK did not necessarily 
require the plethora of measures Turkey took counterterrorism; if it had confined its 
efforts to international agreements on counterterrorism, this would be a stronger 
counterargument, but Turkey also took numerous steps against al-Qaeda elements in the 
country. Likewise, Turkey remained frustrated with the lack of US and international
support on the Kurdish issue by the post-9/11 era, so it likely would have limited cooperation with the United States if this had been the motivation. And Turkey’s concern with Kurdish separatism is, as was discussed above, connected to the nature of its religion-state connections, especially the importance of secular nationalism. Finally, other countries that experienced significant, often separatist violence—like Pakistan—did not cooperate extensively with the United States.

Moreover, there are indications that Turkey became less focused on the Kurdish issue around 9/11. Some have argued that Turkey’s improved ties with Iran and Syria in the 2000s was related to a decrease in the fear of Kurdish unrest in the region (Fuller 2008). And the AKP tried to reach out to Kurdish groups to resolve tensions, including lifting the state of emergency in the southeast, broadcasting program in the Kurdish language, amended the anti-terror law to make it harder to punish people for supporting minority rights (Dismorr 2008). Some in Turkey even accused the AKP of being soft on Kurds in order to increase economic ties with Iraq (Zeyno 2008). Thus, if concern over Kurdish separatism drove US counterterrorism cooperation, cooperation would have decreased along with this concern. This alternative explanation either contextualizes the effects of religion-state connections or is incidental.

Or Turkey’s desire to enter the European Union could have influenced its decision to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism. That is, the AKP is moderating its policies and working closely with international partners to increase its appeal to European audiences. Yet, the counterterrorism cooperation was likely not tied to EU

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370 It should be noted that violence between the PKK and the Turkish state increased after 2010, but there was a relative decline circa-9/11.
accession. US counterterrorism actions were not incredibly popular in Europe, so it is unclear if working closely with the United States would increase support for Turkey’s EU accession. Indeed, some in Turkey believed rejecting US requests for help in the 2003 Iraq invasion would endear the country to Europe (Dismorr 2008). And as was noted, Turkey remained frustrated with the lack of European support for its struggle with Kurdish groups. This explanation is thus incidental to the effects of religion-state connections on counterterrorism cooperation.

Alternately, the United States and Turkey may have similar goals in the region, and would thus be expected to work together. The two did have close ties due to similar security concerns throughout the Cold War. Yet, Turkey faced some potential political costs to working with the United States, due to the religious opposition. And, as was discussed above, tensions developed after the Cold War. This became especially apparent under the AKP, when the two disagreed on approaches to Israel, Iran and other issues. And Erdogan made far-reaching changes in several areas of Turkey’s foreign policy. This alternative explanation is thus invalid.

The level of Turkey’s counterterrorism cooperation may also be related to what the United States called on Turkey to do. That is, it may be the case that the counterterrorism tasks Turkey undertook after 9/11 were easier to undertake than those by other countries, so it was easy for Turkey to cooperate with the United States. It is true that Turkey already had significant counterterrorism capabilities before 9/11, due to the Kurdish issue. Yet, the United States requested a significant amount of help from Turkey
on counterterrorism, including potentially costly measures like participating in the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This alternative argument is thus invalid.

Finally, it may have been in Turkey’s interest to work with the United States. 
Turkey may have desired to crack down on militant groups both domestically and abroad, 
and working with the United States was a good way to do so. It is true that Turkey did 
benefit from its counterterrorism activities, as discussed in the case of Kurdish groups 
above. And preventing numerous al-Qaeda attacks was beneficial to Turkey. But the 
Turkish government did face some potential political costs from working with the United 
States, as seen in the opposition to these activities. And Turkey’s interests vis-à-vis 
religious militant groups arose from the nature of its political system, specifically its 
emphasis on secular nationalism. This alternative argument is thus a bit underspecified.

It should be noted that most explanations are valid, in that there were numerous 
reasons why Turkey would desire close counterterrorism cooperation with the United 
States. Most majority-Muslim states had reasons to cooperate, however, including those 
with low levels of cooperation. What is interesting about the Turkey case is that it did 
cooperate even in spite of significant religious opposition to counterterrorism.

Figure 5-5 presents each of the alternative explanations, and their validity. (See 
Figure 5-5)

[Figure 5-5 about here]
Conclusions

Therefore, the separation between religion and state in Turkey facilitated the close counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries. While Turkey’s motivation for this cooperation was related to its concerns over domestic terrorism and desire to maintain ties to the United States, it was able to act on this due to the separation between religious groups and the state. Turkey’s official secularism persisted in the face of increasing religious contention and the electoral victory of Islamic-leaning political parties. As a result, the Turkish state was able to ignore widespread, often religious, opposition to US counterterrorism efforts and work closely with the United States after 9/11.

Alternative explanations provide some insight into US-Turkish counterterrorism cooperation, but do not undermine the role of religion-state relations. Concerns over Kurdish separatism, the strength of the state and a broader interest in counterterrorism activities contributed to the level of cooperation between the two states; the political effects of the religion-state relationship did as well, however, and contributed to the rise of some of these other explanations. Concerns over EU accession, a lack of religious opposition to counterterrorism activities, and a similarity of interests between the United States and Turkey had less of an effect.

The relationship between religion-state connections and counterterrorism policy in Turkey can corroborate the relationship among all majority-Muslim countries revealed in the quantitative analysis. The minimal ties between religion and the state contributed to Turkey’s extensive cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism. Moreover,
this was due to the political effects of this religion-state relationship—minimizing the influence of religious groups and symbols—rather than a lack of religious contention over the issue in the country.
Figures

Figure 5-1

US-Turkish Counterterrorism Cooperation

pre-9/11  circa 9/11  post-9/11
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious contention</th>
<th>Religion-State Connections</th>
<th>Political effects of Religion-State Connections</th>
<th>Level of counterterrorism cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic groups call for Islamic laws, opposed to working with the United States on counterterrorism</td>
<td>Officially secular state, powerful secular parties, state intervention to limit the influence of religion on politics</td>
<td>Islamic groups and issues were not politically powerful</td>
<td>Leaders cooperated closely with the United States to combat al-Qaeda elements in Turkey and support international US counterterrorism efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5-3: Process tracing evidence</td>
<td>Religious contention</td>
<td>Religion-State Connections</td>
<td>Political effects of Religion-State Connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious contention</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>State restricted religious groups’ political activity in response to religious contention</td>
<td>Leaders faced minimal pressure to respond to religious contention by changing state policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion-State Connections</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Islamic groups were not very powerful electorally, and elements of the state restricted the ability of leaders to adopt religious policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political effects of Religion-State Connections</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Religion-state separation minimized the political power of Islamic groups and symbols</td>
<td>Leaders faced few political costs for cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term analysis</td>
<td>Broader historical analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic groups and issue not politically powerful</td>
<td>Turkish leaders had little incentive to respond to religious contention by refusing to cooperate with the United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Turkey established as a secular republic, with policy instruments through which religious influences on politics are minimized | The Turkish military intervened at several points to remove governments that were too influenced by religion, further decreasing the influence of Islamic groups |
| Democratic openings occurred in the 1980s, but restrictions on Islamic political activity persisted | Turkish leaders had little incentive to respond to religious contention by refusing to cooperate with the United States |
### Figure 5-5: Alternative Explanations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Effect on relationship between religion-state connections and counterterrorism cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Religious Opposition</td>
<td>Significant religious opposition to counterterrorism cooperation, although more moderate than in other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Strength</td>
<td>State is strong vis-à-vis society, but strength is related to nature of religion-state connections and been decreasing by 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish Separatism</td>
<td>Concerns over PKK did motivate counterterrorism policies. But did not require extent of cooperation, and concerns had been decreasing around 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Accession</td>
<td>Desire to join EU drove some international actions, but not clear counterterrorism activities would have helped in the process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarity of US-Turkish goals</td>
<td>There were similar goals, but Turkey also faced potential cost in counterterrorism cooperation. Also, differences emerged after 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of US counterterrorism requests</td>
<td>The United States requested numerous counterterrorism activities from Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish interest in counterterrorism</td>
<td>Did have an interest, but is related to nature of religion-state connections and Turkey did face some potential costs for cooperating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: Conclusion

The “global war on terrorism” had its roots in the 1990s, stretched well into the 2010s, and dominated US foreign policy and much of the world’s politics during the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. With two invasions, domestic and international legal reforms, and a plethora of covert (and overt) counterterrorism operations, the war on terrorism affected societies all over the world. And it brought renewed attention to the question of how religion matters in politics, as well as concerns among Muslims that they were being targeted by the United States and Islam was being denigrated by analysts and policymakers.

The global war on terrorism was also a case of a powerful state—the United States—organizing an international efforts through hierarchical relationships. Yet, domestic and transnational contention—in this case religious contention in Muslim countries—at times complicated and undermined these efforts. Muslim regimes were forced to balance between US pressure to comply with its counterterrorism initiatives and domestic opposition to these efforts, much of it driven by religious groups.

Muslim states’ balancing acts were complicated by the prevalence of religious contention in Muslim societies and the numerous ties that had developed between religious groups and the state over the latter half of the twentieth century. Religious groups rose in prominence from Northern Africa to Southeast Asia, replacing previously influential leftist and nationalist groups. They also pushed states to increase support for Islam in legal codes and state behaviors, and occasionally replaced regimes—through both violent and nonviolent means—that resisted. The result was a mix of co-option,
sponsorship and repression by Muslim states, and a variety of relationships between
religion and the state by the time the United States began its international
counterterrorism efforts in earnest.

This dissertation analyzed the relationship between these two phenomena:
variations in Muslim states’ cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism and
religious contention in Muslim societies. It did this through a multi-method study,
combing a large-n analysis with case studies of Pakistan and Turkey. This chapter
presents conclusions from the dissertation, including an overview and discussion of the
findings, a discussion of the expanded findings—applying them to additional cases not
covered in the dissertation and additional areas of international relations—the theoretical
implications of the dissertation, and how the dissertation can inform policy debates.

**Overview of Findings**

I argued that the varying relationships between religion and state in Muslim
countries channeled religious contention into differing effects on counterterrorism
cooperation. This is based on the institutional approach to religion and international
relations. Religion has a dramatic effect on politics, altering the nature of political
debates, increasing pressure on states to follow religious standards, and enabling
transnational influences on domestic politics. But religious contention alone does not
affect state behavior. It is only when it occurs in the context of a close relationship
between religion and the state—which involves a weak state with extensive connections
to religion—that religious contention in society results in states changing their policies.
In the case of US counterterrorism efforts, this issue became a religious one, as US efforts were seen as targeting Muslims or Islam and many of the groups the United States focused on held Islamic ideologies. As a result, many religious groups opposed US efforts and Muslim states’ cooperation with them; while opposition to counterterrorism extended beyond religious groups in Muslim societies, for many, working with the United States on counterterrorism came to be seen as against Islamic beliefs or Muslim identity. This contention is thus more likely to affect state counterterrorism cooperation when it occurs in a state with close ties to religion.

The quantitative analysis and case studies demonstrated that this indeed was the case. In the quantitative analysis, I used an original dataset on counterterrorism cooperation and religion-state relationships, which included numerous control variables to account for alternative explanations. I found that closer religion-state ties corresponded to lessened counterterrorism cooperation, with a negative substantive effect equivalent to the positive effects of diplomatic relations; that is, increasing the relationship between religion and a Muslim state decreased counterterrorism cooperation by the same amount that increasing diplomatic ties between the United States and a Muslim state would increase it. Moreover, religion-state relationships had the strongest effect on domestic counterterrorism activities—like actions against terrorist groups, legal and institutional reform, and crackdowns on extremist rhetoric and terrorist financing—while it had little effect on cooperation with US military and international efforts. This relationship held up even when the effect of certain regions and countries were taken into account, and alternative measures of the independent, dependent and control variables were used.
The Pakistan case study demonstrated how religion-state ties channeled religious contention into decreased counterterrorism cooperation. Pakistan has a close relationship between religion and the state. The state’s constitution and legal code have referenced the importance of Islam since its foundation, and religion and state have grown close over time, with leaders appealing to and depending on religious groups for support and religious groups successfully pushing the state to increase restrictions on religious practice and support religious causes domestically and abroad. Beginning in the 1990s, the United States pressed Pakistan to cut its ties to militant groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan and take action against al-Qaeda targets in the country; this increased after the 9/11 attacks, as the United States also called on Pakistan to work closely with its forces in Afghanistan to disrupt al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan complied in many areas, but many of its efforts were selectively enforced, while Pakistani leaders often publicly denounced the United States, which at times compromised US counterterrorism efforts.

The close religion-state relationship in Pakistan made it difficult for leaders to work closely with the United States on counterterrorism. Religious groups protested US counterterrorism efforts and attacked Pakistani regimes for working with the United States. The political influence of these groups made Pakistani leaders wary of opposing them, as they often relied on these groups’ support to remain in power. Moreover, religious groups often appealed to the Pakistani state’s existing connections to religion when opposing cooperation with the United States, accusing Pakistani leaders of betraying the religion and the country. And the military’s ties to Islamic militants in
Pakistan and in neighboring countries caused it to resist any attempts to change this relationship under US pressure. While many other factors contributed to the low counterterrorism cooperation, the religion-state relationship had a major effect.

The Turkey case study, in contrast, highlighted how a distant religion-state relationship limited religious effects on counterterrorism cooperation. Turkey has been officially secular since its formation, and state restrictions on public religious practice and military intervention in politics has ensured the system remained secular even in the face of growing religious contention. Religious groups became more prominent in the 1990s, with a religiously-influenced party in power since 2002, but the officially secular system has persisted. Turkey has worked closely with the United States on counterterrorism, moving quickly against al-Qaeda targets beginning in the late 1990s. Turkey participated in the US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, continued to conduct operations against al-Qaeda members in the country, and supported US counterterrorism efforts internationally. Despite some tensions—such as over the 2003 US invasion of Iraq—Turkey and the United States have remained close counterterrorism partners.

The distant religion-state relationship in Turkey contributed to this close cooperation. Religious groups are active in Turkey, and opposed US counterterrorism efforts; this included frequent attacks on Turkey’s cooperation with the United States through appeals to international Islamic sentiment. Yet, these groups had little influence in society due to powerful secular groups and institutional factors like the military and secular-leaning judiciary. Turkish leaders cooperated with the United States for a variety of reasons—including concerns over domestic Kurdish terrorism and a desire to develop
closer ties with the United States—but the insulation of the regime from religious contention provided an opportunity to do so even in the face of opposition.

The case studies also highlighted the role transnational influences played in religious effects on US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. In both cases, religious groups: framed their contention in global terms through appeals to worldwide Muslim audiences; international events were internalized, provoking protests in the countries; and religious groups formed connections across state boundaries. In Pakistan, the close religion-state relationship intensified the effects of this transnational contention. By tying the state’s legitimacy to Islam and framing its foreign policies—as namely support for Kashmiri militants—as international religious causes, Pakistani political elites opened themselves up to transnational religious contention; global framing by religious groups resonated with the public due to leaders’ global framing, while the state was expected to act on international events involving Muslims. In Turkey, in contrast, while global framing and internalization happened, the distant religion-state relationship insulated leaders for the effects of transnational contention. Thus, the globalizing nature of religion contributed to the political effects of religious contention, although this too was channeled through the relationship between religion and the state.

The combination of the two through a multi-method research design provided significant insight into the means through which religion affected US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation. Using cases chosen according to extreme values highlighted the posited mechanisms connecting religion and counterterrorism cooperation, namely that a close relationship between religion and the state intensified
the political influence of religious groups and symbols, making it more likely regimes will adopt policies in line with religious sentiment (or in this case, avoid adopting policies religious groups oppose). Conversely, a distant religion-state relationship limits the influence of religious contention, allowing states to adopt policies even if they are religiously contentious. Moreover, these case studies corroborate the quantitative analysis’ findings, indicating that the relationship between religion-state relations and counterterrorism cooperation in the latter is due to the political dynamics surrounding ties between religion and the state.

Combining this with a large-n quantitative analysis, in turn, demonstrates the generalizability of this relationship and the relative magnitude of religion-state relationships’ effects on counterterrorism cooperation. As noted, one concern with case studies—especially case studies based on extreme values—is the generalizability of the findings to the entire population. The relationship between religion-state relationships and counterterrorism cooperation was not confined to Pakistan and Turkey, however; it held up in the entire population of majority-Muslim countries and under numerous robustness checks. Moreover, the effects of the religion-state relationship was one of several contributions to the level of counterterrorism cooperation; while case studies can assess whether a mechanism exists or a variable matters, it is difficult to assess the relative significance of valid explanations from a case study. The quantitative analysis, however, could do this by providing a counterterrorism cooperation score that could be compared among significant variables. This indicated that religion-state relationships had
one of the strongest effects on counterterrorism cooperation among the various competing explanations.

**Expanded Findings**

These findings are applicable beyond the empirical chapter I presented in the dissertation. Although Pakistan and Turkey are extreme cases of religion-state relationships and counterterrorism cooperation, the relationship between the two variables holds up when looking at other categories of religion-state ties. Moreover, the general institutional approach to religion and international relations has provided insight into the effects of religion on interstate conflict and United Nations voting in other studies I have conducted.

**Other Religion-State Categories**

[Figure 6-1]

As seen in the Figure 6-1, the cases I presented in this dissertation—Pakistan and Turkey—represent extremes in the relationship between religion-state ties and counterterrorism cooperation. While the quantitative analysis demonstrates the relationship is generalizable beyond these two cases, it is also useful to briefly demonstrate that the religion-state relationship influences counterterrorism cooperation across the other categories I discussed in Chapter 2. In this section, I discuss the three countries I highlight in Figure 6-1—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt—which represent the rest of the categories I did not cover in the case studies. For each of them, I briefly discuss the religion-state relationship and their counterterrorism
cooperation with the United States. This discussion indicates that the relationship highlighted in the Pakistan and Turkey case studies in present across other types of religion-state relationships, and that the general linear relationship the quantitative analysis found is supported by qualitative evidence. In each of the countries, closer religion-state relationships corresponded to lower counterterrorism cooperation although for Saudi Arabia and the UAE the cooperation increased greatly under US pressure. (See Figure 6-2)

[Figure 6-2 about here]

Saudi Arabia

In Saudi Arabia, strong religious influences on state behavior resulted in moderate counterterrorism cooperation. Saudi Arabia has close ties between religion and state, although it is also a relatively strong state, with significant repressive capacity. Saudi Arabia was initially uncooperative on counterterrorism, due to significant religious opposition to limiting fundraising activities and extremist voices in education; after a series of terrorist attacks in 2003, however, Saudi Arabia dramatically increased its counterterrorism activities.

Saudi Arabia has been officially Islamic since its founding, basing its legal code and its very basis for existence on Islam. The state is also closely connected to Islam; Islamic clerics administer the judiciary and must approve state actions, and the state enforces conservative Islamic standards on society through an official morality police force known as the “mutaween.” The state’s ties to Islam have increased over time, with the Saudis supporting Islamic movements—both nonviolent and violent—around the
world since the 1970s; the most prominent example of this is Saudi support for anti-
Soviet Islamic militants in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This occurred domestically as well,
as the King Fahd—who ruled Saudi Arabia from the 1980s through the early 2000s—
adopted the title of “Defender of the Two Holy Sites” in the 1980s in response to
domestic unrest following the Iranian Revolution. The country has experienced
increasing religious contention—much of it critical of the regime—since the 1990s, with
groups calling for both greater openness in the political system and adherence to
conservative Islamic standards. The state has remained strong, however, repressing
dissent easily when it appeared to pose a threat to regime survival.

The state’s moderate cooperation on counterterrorism is connected to this. Saudi
Arabia resisted US efforts in the 1990s. The regime was hesitant to move strongly against
domestic anti-US groups and broader support for al-Qaeda and other Islamic militants
that took the form of funding and rhetorical support. This continued even after 9/11,
causing some tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia. After an al-Qaeda
affiliated group conducted a series of brutal attacks in the country in 2003, Saudi Arabia
launched an offensive against militants in the country. Also, then-Crown Prince Abdullah
(who became King in 2005) initiated reforms of the country’s political system intended
partially to decrease support for extremism, including changes to educational curricula, a
series of official National Dialogues on contentious issues, and local elections. Thus,
while Saudi Arabia’s close ties to Islam resulted in initial hesitations on counterterrorism,
the strength of the state enabled it to move against militants when they threatened the
regime.
United Arab Emirates

In the United Arab Emirates, moderate religious influence on state behavior corresponded to initially low counterterrorism cooperation that increased significantly under US pressure. Religion and state are rather close in the UAE, although the state limits the ability of Islamic groups to participate in political debates. Although the government initially allowed fundraising of terrorist groups and the presence of some individual affiliated with al-Qaeda, under US pressure it quickly increased its counterterrorism operations.

The UAE has a moderately close religion-state relationship. The UAE is made up of seven semi-autonomous emirates; the Emirs rule through traditional religious and tribal authority. Likewise, the Constitutional establishes Islam as the state religion, and there is a Shariah court system for family and criminal cases. The state also restricts religious practice, controlling Islamic religious activities and banning non-Islamic practices like proselytism by Christian groups. At the same time, religious groups play less of a role in the UAE state than in Saudi Arabia; the government oversees Muslim clerics’ activities and prevents them from raising controversial topics in their sermons. Islamic groups thus have less influence on politics in the UAE than in Saudi Arabia.

The country’s high level of counterterrorism cooperation is connected to these dynamics. In the 1990s, there were concerns over the UAE’s passive enabling of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. This was primarily due to funding for these groups passing through and being located in UAE financial institutions; there were also some individuals connected with al-Qaeda residing in the country. And the UAE was one of three countries.
to recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan. After the 9/11 attacks, however, the UAE quickly moved to crack down on terrorist financing and arrest and extradite US counterterrorism targets in the country. Thus, while the state’s ties to Islam resulted in minimal counterterrorism cooperation in the 1990s, under US pressure the insulation of the regime from Islamic groups and strength of the state allowed the UAE government to cooperate extensively with the United States.

*Egypt*

In Egypt, minimal religious influence on state behavior led to very high counterterrorism cooperation. The Egyptian state, while maintaining some symbolic ties to religion, for the most part represses Islamic groups and limits religious influence on politics. As a result, it was for the most part insulated from opposition to counterterrorism activities it undertook against domestic terrorist groups and its extensive cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism.

Egypt has maintained a distant religion-state relationship, even while adopting some trappings of an officially Islamic state. In response to domestic Islamic activism in the 1970s and declining international prestige following Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat increased the state’s ties to religion; this included putatively basing the Constitution on the Quran and allowing many Islamic groups to operate in society. And many restrictions were placed on religious activity in the country for both Muslims and Coptic Christians. After Islamic militants assassinated Sadat, however, his successor—Hosni Mubarak—repressed Islamic groups and limited their visibility in politics. Even after the 2004 parliamentary elections, in which many
members of the Muslim Brotherhood won seats—even though they could not officially run under the group’s name—the state limited the ability of religious groups to influence the state’s politics.

Egypt’s close counterterrorism cooperation with the United States was connected to this religion-state relationship. The Egyptian state faced recurring threats from Islamic groups beginning in the 1950s; this intensified by the time of the dissertation’s time period, with a violent campaign by the Gamaah Islamiyah threatening to destabilize the country. Egypt therefore worked closely with the United States against Islamic militant groups both before and after 9/11. Moreover, the state’s repression of nonviolent religious groups limited the extent to which popular religious contention and opposition to US counterterrorism efforts could affect the state’s behavior.

Other Areas of International Relations

The effect of religion-state relationships on states’ behavior extends to other areas of international relations beyond counterterrorism cooperation. I have conducted two other studies, which applied the institutional approach to religion and internationals to interstate conflict and United Nations voting. They revealed similar dynamics; religion affected international relations in these areas through the relationship between religion and state. This suggests the findings of this dissertation are valid beyond the immediate area of counterterrorism cooperation. Moreover, since these articles used different datasets, it indicates the results are not dependent on the specific measure of religion-state relationships I used in this dissertation.

Interstate Conflict
I analyzed the relationship between religion-state relationships and interstate conflict in a 2012 article in the *Journal of Peace Research* (Henne 2012b). Most studies of religion and interstate conflict focused on civilizational divide; i.e. whether Muslim states were more likely to fight with Christian states than other Muslim states. Others focus on single cases of religious affecting conflict, or single examples of religious issues that drive conflict. I argued, in contrast, that a generalizable effect of religion on interstate conflict may be through differing connections between religion and the state. With close ties between religion and state, religion plays a greater role in a state’s politics. When such a state is in a conflict with a secular state, the differing ideology of the combatants focuses religious contention on the conflict. As a result, the government of the religious state will be concerned about a loss in the conflict undermining its legitimacy. Such conflicts are more likely to involve greater hostilities due to this escalatory pressure.

I tested this with a quantitative analysis. I used a measure of religion-state connections based on Jonathan Fox’s Religion and State database (2008), and the Correlates of War’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset; the study covered ten years, 1990-2000. The independent variables were the various dyadic combinations of religion-state relationship combinations. I found that religious variables did not affect whether or not a conflict occurred. They did affect conflict severity, though. Religious-secular dyads (conflict dyads with one state with close religion-state connections and one with religion-state separation) were likely to experience greater hostility in a dispute, even when standard explanations for dispute hostility were controlled for. Other combinations were
less significant, including religious-religious dyads; likewise, the religious identity of combatants had little effect on conflict severity. (See Figure 6-3)

[Figure 6-3 about here]

This indicates the political dynamics surrounding religion-state connections influence interstate conflict as well as counterterrorism cooperation. If religion alone mattered, then whether or not a dyad is made up of states of the same religion would affect conflict onset and severity. If, in turn, religion was irrelevant, then the dyadic religion-state combinations would not be significant in the analysis. Moreover, the fact that dyadic religion-state combinations affected conflict severity rather than conflict onset suggests it is the political influence of religion, rather than religious sentiment itself, that drives religious effects on international relations. That is, this was not an example of states entering into conflicts because of religion; instead, once a conflict has begun, religion affects state conflict behavior according to its political significance.

United Nations Voting

I analyzed the effects of religion-state relationships on United Nations voting in a forthcoming article in Politics and Religion (Henne Forthcoming). I focused specifically on debates over a United Nations General Assembly resolution that would ban the international defamation of religion, which were introduced between 2005 and 2010. These resolutions attracted significant attention from human rights activists, as they threatened to undermine religious freedom and freedom of speech in countries, just as domestic anti-blasphemy laws did in numerous countries. They are also interesting for scholars, as the Organization for Islamic Cooperation introduced them into the General
Assembly and backed their passage, but nearly half of the state’s voting in support of the resolutions were not majority-Muslim. Some argued they are related to Islamic beliefs, specifically Muslims’ concern over blasphemy. Others pointed to general repressiveness or broader “Third World solidarity” to explain support for the resolutions. I argued, instead, that they were connected to domestic religious dynamics. Specifically, states that repress religion domestically were more likely to vote for the resolutions, as they provide international cover and legitimacy for restrictions on religious practice and political opposition.

I tested this with a multi-method analysis. I used a measure of state restrictions on religion the Pew Research Center developed—and on which I worked—as well as a measure of social hostilities relating to religion from the Pew dataset to assess whether domestic religious tensions mattered (Center 2011). I combined this with an original dataset of states’ votes in the General Assembly on the resolutions. I also conducted short case studies of Pakistan and Belarus. I found that greater restrictions on religion corresponded to a greater likelihood of supporting the resolutions, even when alternative explanations were accounted for. Some other explanations mattered, specifically Muslim population size and Third World solidarity; general domestic religious tensions did not, however. The case studies, in turn, indicated that restrictions on religion were related to attempts to control political opposition, and that support for international religious issues was tied to these domestic dynamics. They also highlighted the fact that these dynamics extended beyond Muslim countries, as they were present in Orthodox Christian Belarus. (See Figure 6-4)
This article demonstrated that religion-state relationships affect debates in international forums as well as counterterrorism cooperation. If support for the resolutions was due to general religious tension or specific Islamic concerns over blasphemy, then the social hostilities variable and Muslim population size alone would be significant; likewise, the case studies would have shown that the restrictions on religion were related to religious sentiment, not political dynamics. And if support was due to non-religious factors, then domestic restrictions on religion would be insignificant when general repression or Third World solidarity were included in the analysis. While restrictions on religion are a specific type of religion-state connection—one of the three types I use in this dissertation’s measure—they suggest the manner in which religion and state are connected affects the policies states take on international religious issues, in this case international religious defamation.

**Theoretical Implications**

The dissertation’s findings present implications for several theoretical debates in international relations beyond the study of counterterrorism cooperation. This includes the study of religion and politics, debates over hierarchy in international relations, and multi-method research designs. This section discusses each of these in turn.

*Religion and Politics*

This provides the field of international relations greater understanding of the role religion can play in international relations. Specifically, the dissertation can help move
the discussion from whether religion matters to the conditions under which it does and broaden the conception of what counts as religious politics, in addition to providing some methodological insights into the study of religion and politics.

First, the finding that religion-state relationships channel religious contention into effects on state behavior highlights the importance of both religion and political conditions. Religious debates or activism alone does not change state policies, and studies confined to such topics are insufficient. For example, studying the discourse of religious groups surrounding an issue like blasphemy is not enough to understand why states enact or change anti-blasphemy laws; one must also look at how these religious groups are connected to their states, their influence in political debates, and the incentives of leaders to respond to religious contention. Yet, religion is not irrelevant, or epiphenomenal to political conditions, as religion provides both the impetus for states to change their policies and the content of the pressure states face. Studies reducing religious politics to interest-based calculations on the part of regimes and social movements miss a crucial aspect of this phenomenon.

The dissertation can also broaden what counts as religious politics. As I noted in the introduction, some critics of religion’s importance point to the lack of doctrinal influence on religious politics, self-interested calculations behind apparent religious behavior, and avowedly religious actors taking “irreligious” stands to downplay the role of religion in politics. Yet, because religion affects counterterrorism cooperation through politics does not mean the presence of politics in religious contention undermines religion’s significance. That is, religious contention matters because it changes regime’s
political calculations; moreover, religious contention does not involve a direct connection between religious dogma and behavior, but the framing of behavior through religious symbols. Even when states adopt religious policies for political reasons, religious contention still provides the catalyst for these changes in state behavior. And changes in state policies on religious issues can affect the religion-state relationship, thus intensifying religious contention even if the leaders did not intend this outcome.

Moreover, the dissertation highlights the role of transnational influences in religious contention, which differentiates it from nationalism. As scholars like Benedict Anderson have noted, religious communities are universal in scope, with sovereignty residing in divine forces; nationalism, in contrast, is limited to a particular territorial area with sovereignty in the nation itself (2006). As a result, religious contention will involve more transnational influences on domestic politics than would nationalist contention. This can intensify pressure on states tied to religion to act, as they are accountable to global audiences, not just the domestic public.

Finally, the intersubjective nature of religious beliefs does not preclude conventional analyses, and the significance of religion does not mean all of international relations will be transformed. Studies of religion itself, or religious debates, may require interpretive methods. But because religion affects state behavior through political conditions—such as domestic pressure on states and state institutions—the methods normally used to analyze these conditions can also provide insight into religious effects on international relations. Moreover, using such methods can connect the study of religion and politics to mainstream research programs, broadening the acceptance of
religion’s importance. Also, because religion affects states through means similar to other types of politics—such as liberal activism and economic interests—positing a role for religion in international relations does not require changing conventional understanding of the field; instead, the study of religion and international can fit into established research programs, as some have noted (Nexon 2011, Snyder 2011a, Bellin 2008). The dissertation also suggests steps for additional research. Additional studies could apply the institutional approach to religion and international relations to other issues, similar to my articles I discussed in this chapter. And studies of how religious contention affects or does not affect religion-state relations—which I discussed, but not as a primary element of the theory—would be useful. Scholars could also assess the effects of religion-state relationships in different religious traditions; dynamics in Western Europe will likely be different from those in Hindu-Buddhist South Asia. Moreover, additional research on the transnational aspects of religious contention could further highlight the unique nature of religious politics. Finally, studies could examine how issues become religious issues, or which religious issues have the greatest effect on state behavior.

**US International Power and Hierarchy**

The findings contribute to the study of US standing in the international system, as well as broader debates over hierarchy and international relations.

US-Muslim counterterrorism cooperation represents neither complete US dominance over the international system nor a broad-ranging backlash to US power. The United States did exert influence over many aspects of Muslim states’ behavior,
indicating the United States remains the dominant actor in the international system. At the same time, this compliance was never complete. This presents mixed findings for the debate over the role of the United States in the international system; understanding the extent of US influence over other states requires a more subtle approach than either positing balancing or durable US hegemony.

Moreover, while this dissertation focused on the conditions under which religion undermined cooperation, rather than hierarchical relations themselves, it can corroborate studies pointing to the role of hierarchy in international relations. US counterterrorism efforts involved the exertion of influence over numerous states, with many of them hewing closely to US preferences and even those that resisted in many areas—such as Pakistan—cooperating on some key initiatives. This included influence over many Muslim states’ domestic affairs. The interaction between Muslim states and the United States in the context of US counterterrorism efforts, especially after 9/11, thus resembles a hierarchical relationship more so than a classical anarchical one.

The dissertation contributes to a specific approach to the study of hierarchy, however. The hierarchical relationship between the United States and Muslim states resembles an “informal empire,” but one maintained through interactions between the United States and other countries rather than a fixed institutional system or normative framework. This supports those studies emphasizing the relational nature of hierarchical relationships (Nexon 2008, Nexon and Wright 2007). Moreover, it supports the suggestion of others that intense contention accompanied by transnational ties over an international issue can undermine such hierarchical relationships, especially when it
combines with unsteady political conditions, as in states with close ties to religion (Nexon 2009).

The dissertation presents a few implications for further research in this area. Evidence for both US control over other states and resistance to US international efforts can be found by selective studies; such efforts in the future should involve systematic analysis of particular issue-areas to highlight the variety of relations present in contemporary international relations. Moreover, the dissertation’s measurement of cooperation between the United States and Muslim states represents an avenue through which client-patron relationships can be analyzed quantitatively. And studies of non-religious transnational contention—such as over humanitarian norms—can indicate whether religion has a unique effect on international relations. Finally, the dissertation focused primarily on noncompliance with US efforts, rather than compliance; further study into the reasons why Muslim states cooperated on counterterrorism can provide insight into the nature of US power in the international system.

**Multi-Method Research Designs**

The dissertation can also contribute to methodological debates in the field of international relations, specifically over the value of mixed methods research designs. Alongside growing interest in qualitative methods is an increasing awareness of the complementary nature of quantitative and qualitative analyses, as I discussed in the research design portion of Chapter 2. Yet, debate persists over the value of mixed methods. Some argue that mixed methods require scholars to be experts in both the countries they use as case studies and quantitative methodology, resulting in substandard
applications of both sets of methods. Others claim the methodological assumptions inherent in quantitative analysis undermine qualitative research (Ahmed and Sil 2009). Finally, some point out that both quantitative methods and commonly employed qualitative methods are examples of neo-positivist methodologies, and thus do not adequately leverage alternate methodologies (Jackson 2011).

This dissertation demonstrates that multi-method studies can be conducted in a sufficiently large format, if the scholar leverages more specialized expertise in both elements of the research design. Separate chapters for the quantitative analysis and each of the case studies provide space to develop the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the research design, as well as enough detail and rigor to adequately present and analyze the findings. I developed an original dataset for the quantitative analysis, and conducted primary research for the case studies. Granted, I used standard estimators for the quantitative analysis and did not draw from an area studies-level knowledge of either of the countries. The latter problem is present for all qualitative scholars who compare cases from across different regions, however. And many quantitative scholars have raised concerns over overly-complex estimators, especially with social science data as I use in this dissertation. By leveraging more specialized studies, however, I believe I am able to deal with both of these issues, in a manner similar to Lustick’s “triangulation” approach to historical analysis (Lustick 1996). Referencing numerous secondary studies on Turkey and Pakistan calibrates my own research on the two cases, while basing my quantitative research design on other similar quantitative projects ensures that portion of the dissertation is in line with “best practices” in the field. While a multi-method research
design may place more of a burden on the researcher and require the scope of a
dissertation or book-length project, it can still provide enough insight into their topics to
warrant continued investment by scholars.

The dissertation’s findings can also speak to the broader philosophy of science
debates over mixed methods, as they arguably draw from differing methodologies to test
the theory I present in Chapter 2. This dissertation does generally hold with what Jackson
calls a “neo-positivist” approach to social science (2011). But the case studies are not
merely illustrations of the quantitative findings, or closely controlled comparisons based
on matched observations. They are intended to examine whether the mechanisms I posit
in the theory were present in the cases, in addition to assessing whether the quantitative
findings are valid. I follow George and Bennett (2005) in conceptualizing process tracing
as a scientific realist method, as it identifies mechanisms that are always latent in cases,
rather than demonstrating variation in explanatory and dependent variables. Admittedly,
some—including Jackson (2011)—would characterize my qualitative analysis as
neopositivist, rather than what he terms “critical realist.”

Policy Implications

The dissertation also provides implications for policymakers, primarily those
assessing the means through which the United States can influence other states and the
effects of increasing religious contention in Muslim countries.

The findings present pessimistic implications for US international initiatives. The
backlash the United States faced during its international counterterrorism efforts does not
represent “Muslim rage,” but neither can it be prevented through greater outreach to Muslim countries. Instead, it is connected to the convergence of a transnational issue—religious opposition to counterterrorism efforts—and domestic political conditions in Muslim states that are the result of decades-long processes. Diplomatic efforts and development assistance may alleviate some of the effects of domestic opposition, but if international actors hope to undertake broad-ranging initiatives on religiously-contentious issues they must prepare themselves for similar hesitating responses on the part of the states affected as seen during the US “war on terror.”

The findings are a bit more optimistic regarding the effects of religious contention on world politics. The increasing visibility of religious groups in Muslim politics is not necessarily a cause for concern. Much Islamic activism is focused on expanding the public role of religion, rather than imposing an Islamic political system. While more conservative Islamist groups are active in most Muslim countries, when they operate in an open political system more moderate elements rise to prominence. This can be seen most clearly in the case of Turkey, in which the AKPs’ relatively moderate approach to religion and politics is much more effective politically than Islamist parties. Where problems arise, however, is the intertwining of religion and politics, which is often accompanied by a repressive political system. This radicalizes some religious groups, limits political participation, and makes leaders likely to adopt seemingly extreme foreign policies in an attempt to co-opt domestic opposition. Such a dynamic is evident in Pakistan, but also in countries ranging from Malaysia to Iran.
At the time of writing, numerous Middle Eastern countries are experiencing unrest, much of which is driven by Islamic groups. This “Arab Spring” has destabilized regimes and brought Islamic groups to power in Egypt and Tunisia, and increased the power of Islamic militants in Syria. If these countries transition into relatively open political systems that keep religion and state separate, a situation like Turkey might arise. Religious groups will influence politics, often contrary to the interests of the United States, but cooperation on areas of importance to both countries will be possible. If, instead, elites appeal to Islamic groups for support and put in place restrictions on religious practice and support for conservative Islamic groups, a situation like Pakistan might emerge, in which a weak state vies with powerful religious contention to the detriment of US and international initiatives.
Based on mean value of CTCI for entire time period of the study. The UAE’s lower overall CTCI score relative to Saudi Arabia is due to Saudi Arabia’s higher score by the end of the study, in the post-9/11 period.
Based on Religion-State score and mean CTCI value by time period.

Figure 6-2: Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia

372 Based on Religion-State score and mean CTCI value by time period
Figure 6-3: The Effects of Religious-Secular Dyadic Combinations on Interstate Conflict

Figure taken from Henne2012b: 762.

\[\text{Religious-Passive Secular} \quad \text{Religious-Assertive Secular} \quad \text{Civil Religious} \quad \text{Civil Religious-Secular} \quad \text{Civil Religious} \quad \text{Religious} \quad \text{Same Religion} \quad \text{Democracy} \quad \text{Trade} \quad \text{Peace Years} \quad \text{IGOs} \quad \text{Distance} \quad \text{Territorial Conflict}\]
Figure 6-4: Domestic Restrictions on Religion’s ($GRI$) Effects on Support for the UN Religious Defamation Resolutions$^{374}$

$^{374}$ Taken from HenneForthcoming: 13

277
Appendices

Appendix A: Robustness Checks

Alternate CTCI measure using difference between factor analysis of cooperative and noncooperative

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{Religion-State} & \quad -0.22^{***} \\
    & \quad (0.02) \\
    \text{Alliance} & \quad 1.30^{***} \\
    & \quad (0.26) \\
    \text{US MID} & \quad -0.03 \\
    & \quad (0.16) \\
    \text{Diplomatic Representation} & \quad -0.10 \\
    & \quad (0.06) \\
    \text{Terrorism} & \quad 0.00 \\
    & \quad (0.00) \\
    \text{Affinity} & \quad 0.95^{**} \\
    & \quad (0.25) \\
    \text{Trade} & \quad 0.00^{**} \\
    & \quad (0.00) \\
    \text{Democracy} & \quad -0.08 \\
    & \quad (0.11) \\
    \text{Power} & \quad -59.95^{***} \\
    & \quad (13.18) \\
    \text{US Aid} & \quad 0.00^{**} \\
    & \quad (0.00) \\
    \text{Constant} & \quad 1.20^{***} \\
    & \quad (0.24) \\
\end{align*}
\]

Observations \quad 594 \\
Number of year \quad 14 \\
R-squared \quad 0.31

Robust standard errors in parentheses
\quad *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Two-year rolling average of CTCI values

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Observations: 395  
Number of year: 14  
R-squared: 0.32

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
US approval in Muslim country as control variable

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Observations: 284
Number of year: 14
R-squared: 0.29

Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dichotomous CTCI measure with time-series logit

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Observations 594
Number of year 14

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Trichotomous CTCI measure with ordered logit

- cooplevel_threelevel

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Observations 638

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Alternate CTCI measures with cooperative and noncooperative scores run separately

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Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Alternate models: Generalized estimating equation, ordinary least squares regression, and time-series regression with random effects

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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Alternate CTCI measures: including missing values as zero with all indicators, including all indicators, and the raw count on a zero to ten scale

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<th>(3) Coopcountten</th>
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<td>-0.16*** (0.02)</td>
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<td>0.89*** (0.13)</td>
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<td>0.11 (0.15)</td>
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<td>0.20*** (0.04)</td>
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<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00*** (0.00)</td>
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<td>0.00*** (0.00)</td>
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<td>0.04 (0.10)</td>
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Observations | 594 | 448 | 594 |
R-squared     | 0.28 | 0.33 | 0.28 |
Number of year | 14 | 14 | 14 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Alternate CTCI measures, 2: Raw count with problematic indicators removed, raw count set on a zero to ten scale with problematic indicators removed, CTCI with missing values as zeros

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

288
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
## Alternate Religion-State Measures

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Appendix B: Results of Factor Analysis and Reliability Tests

Figure B1: Cronbach’s Alpha Test Results

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Figure B2: Problematic Indicators removed from CTCI

375 An alternate version of CTCI includes these variables.

375 An alternate version of CTCI includes these variables.
Figure B3: Factor Analysis Results (eigenvalues in parentheses)

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## Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics

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Table C1: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory, Dependent and Control Variables

![Histogram of Religion-State](image)

Figure C2: Histogram of Religion-State
Figure C3: Histogram of CTCI
References

Primary Sources

Primary sources for the case studies are foreign-language news articles from Pakistan, Turkey and other countries translated into English by the US government’s World News Connection/Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The news articles are available in World News Connection/Foreign Broadcast Information Service archives available online at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/ (last accessed April 30th, 2013).

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