
Al Thani began the lecture by giving an overview of Qtel and the changes it has undergone since being restructured in the year 2000. As the national telecommunications carrier, the long-term plans of Qtel were aligned with the vision that Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani set for Qatar. “Our success starts from strong leadership and clear vision,” he said. The newly restructured organization became a competitive international player, and its scope was broadened to include data, media, and technology. Qtel was no longer a domestic telecommunications organization, but, rather, one that had an international agenda. The new Qtel strategy focused on wireless, broadband, and services in three regions across the Middle East, North Africa, the Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. The organization went from having 500,000 customers in one market to gaining 89 million customers across seventeen markets.

Current trends and rapid transformations in the global telecommunications field include slow growth, falling prices, and a multitude of new innovations, Al Thani said. Other threats come in the form of fierce competition from non-traditional competitors such as media players, retailers, service providers, and handset manufacturers who are all claiming their stake in the new media field. However, Al Thani saw these challenges as a way to form new opportunities. He argued that “by the year 2014, the number of mobile connections will surpass the global population. Four out of five connections are made in the developing
Warm greetings from Doha. CIRS has spent the past few months engaging in productive research, publications, and public affairs programming. We are pleased to announce the commencement of several new research initiatives to address topics such as “Politics and the Media in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East” and “Weak States in the Greater Middle East.” CIRS is also offering grants to conduct original, empirically-grounded research on “Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC” and “The State and Innovation in the Gulf.” The grant cycle is designed to explore these topics through funding empirically-grounded, theoretically informed research proposals. We invite interested readers to apply for these grants. As with other research initiatives, our goal is to fill in existing gaps in the literature and to contribute original knowledge to these topics. Read more about these research initiatives and how to apply for the grants on page 5 of this newsletter.

CIRS has recently released several new publications, including three new Summary Reports on “GCC States’ Land Investments Abroad: The Case of Cambodia;” “Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East;” and “Sectarian Politics in the Gulf.” These publications contain synopses of papers delivered at the various working group meetings that we held at the Georgetown University in Qatar campus. We have also just published a new Occasional Paper on “Qatar’s Natural Sustainability: Plans, Perceptions, and Pitfalls” authored by Mari Luomi, a former CIRS Post-Doctoral Fellow. For more information on our most recent publications, refer to page 3 of this newsletter.

In order to enhance research opportunities for members of Georgetown University in Qatar, this year, CIRS has launched an annual fellowship to be awarded to a member of the SFS-Q faculty. The fellowship supports the carrying out of original research, and has been awarded to a faculty member who proposes to use the time granted to pursue high quality projects with promising prospects for publication in leading journals or university presses. In addition, in order to enhance local research productivity and build upon its established collegial relationship with Qatar University, CIRS has launched an annual fellowship to be awarded to a member of Qatar University’s faculty. Turn to page 4 to read more about the faculty members selected for both fellowships.

In the 2012-2013 academic year, I and the rest of the CIRS team look forward to hearing from you and seeing you at our upcoming lectures. You may also keep abreast of CIRS activities by joining us on our Facebook page and by logging on to the CIRS website at: http://cirs.georgetown.edu.

Sincerely,

Mehran Kamrava
Director of CIRS
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

About CIRS

The Center for International and Regional Studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar is guided by the principles of academic excellence, forward vision, and community engagement.

The CIRS mission revolves around five principal goals:

• To provide a forum for scholarship and research on international and regional affairs;
• To encourage in-depth examination and exchange of ideas;
• To foster thoughtful dialogue among students, scholars, and practitioners of international affairs;
• To facilitate the free flow of ideas and knowledge through publishing the products of its research, sponsoring conferences and seminars, and holding workshops designed to explore the complexities of the twenty-first century;
• To engage in outreach activities with a wide range of local, regional, and international partners.
Research and Scholarship

Latest CIRS Publications

“Qatar’s Natural Sustainability: Plans, Perceptions, and Pitfalls” by Mari Luomi

The latest CIRS Occasional Paper analyzes Qatar’s present and future challenges relating to natural resources and environmental sustainability through the concept of “natural sustainability.” By doing so, Mari Luomi proposes an alternative standpoint on sustainable development.

The paper asks: How is the relationship between development, economy, and the environment understood by different actors in Qatar? What implications do these different views have for planning and definition of desired outcomes in the areas of natural resource use and environmental sustainability? What can a more environment-centered focus contribute toward solving the existing unsustainable development in Qatar and the GCC? By refocusing attention from the economy and growth to the environment and its limits, and from technology and efficiency to institutions, people, and resourcefulness, Qatar and the GCC states might be able to avoid an impending collapse stemming from their fast exacerbating natural unsustainability.

“Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East” Summary Report

This Summary Report details the findings presented in the research initiative on “Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East.”

The initiative is comprised of original and empirically-grounded investigations that collectively offer the most comprehensive study available to date on food security in the Middle East. Some of the themes examined include the ascent and decline of various food regimes, urban agriculture, overseas agricultural land purchases, national food self-sufficiency strategies, distribution networks and food consumption patterns, and nutrition transitions and healthcare. Collectively, the chapters represent highly original contributions to the disciplines of political science, economics, agricultural studies, and healthcare policy. Please turn to page 12 for more details on the “Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East” research initiative.

“GCC States’ Land Investments Abroad: The Case of Cambodia” Summary Report

Despite the critical regional interest in food security and food sovereignty, there is a dearth of available information on the subject as it relates to the Middle East. It is widely acknowledged that there exists a lack of available data on the subject on which to base sound analysis. This scarcity of data and non-reliability of data means that academic work on the subject of food security in this region remains limited to non-existent. A scholarly approach to this issue is both valuable and timely. With that as its goal, CIRS launched a research initiative on “Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East” and held working group meetings to discuss the topic.

This Summary Report examines Cambodia as a case study of Gulf-state land investments in developing country agriculture to develop a long-term prognosis for this type of investment strategy. Foreign land acquisition offers the possibility of securing reliable long-term food supplies for GCC countries, but has been criticized as risking exploitation of communities in host countries.

“Sectarian Politics in the Gulf” Summary Report

With the reinvigoration of the subject brought about by current events, CIRS launched a research initiative on the “Sectarian Politics in the Gulf.” The central aim of this study is to examine the dynamic ways in which evolving sectarian identities and politics in the Gulf region intersect.

The report highlights topics that focus on how sectarian issues play out in the realms of domestic politics within Gulf states, as well as those that address sectarianism’s impact on inter-state relations within the region. The synopses in this Summary Report have been authored by a renowned group of scholars who took part in the initiative and who examined issues of religious, communal, and ethnic identities in the Gulf, and how these impose themselves on both the domestic and international politics of the Gulf. For more details on the “Sectarian Politics in the Gulf” research initiative, please turn to page 6.
New CIRS Fellows 2012-2013

Qatar University Fellow

In order to enhance local research productivity and build upon its established collegial relationship with Qatar University, CIRS has launched an annual fellowship to be awarded to a member of QU’s faculty. The fellowship will support QU faculty members in pursuing original research projects, with the aim being to publish research outcomes in leading journals or with university presses. Any member of the Qatar University full-time faculty engaged in the Humanities, Social Sciences, Law, and Islamic Studies is eligible for this fellowship.

Maha Al-Hendawi was selected to be the 2012-2013 CIRS Qatar University Fellow. She is an assistant professor of Special Education in the College of Education at Qatar University. Al-Hendawi received her Ph.D. in Special Education and Disability Leadership from Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond. She also received the Holmes Scholarship from the Virginia Commonwealth University. Her research interests include educational policies and reform initiatives in the region; academic interventions for children with special needs and children at-risk; and quality preparation and training programs for educators.

SFS-Q Faculty Fellow

CIRS has launched an annual fellowship to be awarded to a member of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (SFS-Q) faculty in order to enhance research opportunities. The fellowship will support the carrying out of original research, and will be awarded to faculty members who propose to use the time granted to pursue high quality projects with promising prospects for publication in leading journals. The fellowship entails a one-course release from teaching per academic year, in either the fall or spring semester, to a deserving member of the SFS-Q faculty to enable concentration on a research project.

Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf was selected to be the 2012-2013 CIRS SFS-Qatar Faculty Fellow. She is an Associate Professor of Anthropology and author of Transforming Displaced Women in Sudan: Politics and the Body in a Squatter Settlement (University of Chicago Press, 2009) and Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America (Cornell University Press, 2002). She has edited Female Circumcision: Multicultural Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) and the 2010 special issue of South Atlantic Quarterly (Duke University Press).

CIRS Post-Doctoral Fellow

Manata Hashemi is the 2012-2013 Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International and Regional Studies. She is also a Research Associate at the Center for Ethnographic Research at the University of California-Berkeley. Hashemi received her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California-Berkeley, and has been the recipient of research fellowships and grants from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at UC Berkeley, and the Center for Ethnographic Research at UC Berkeley, among others. Her research interests deal with issues of poverty, development, stratification, and socio-economic mobility in the Middle East.

CIRS Visiting Scholar

Manochehr Dorraj is Professor at Texas Christian University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. His areas of expertise are in Comparative Politics and International Relations in general and Developing Nations, Middle East and North Africa in particular. Professor Dorraj has been the recipient of several awards for his research, teaching, and mentoring at TCU.

CIRS Visiting Scholar

Mansoor Moaddel is Professor of Sociology at Eastern Michigan University. He studies culture, ideology, political conflict, revolution, and social change. His work focuses on the causes and consequences of values and attitudes of the Middle Eastern and Islamic publics. He has carried out values surveys in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.
Frederic Wehrey on Libya’s Aftermath and Syria’s Future

Frederic Wehrey, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, gave the first CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture of the 2012-2013 academic year on September 17, 2012. The talk titled, “Analogies at War: Libya’s Aftermath and Syria’s Future,” examined the different approaches that the international community has taken towards the Libyan and Syrian conflicts through the language used to frame the debate. The lessons learned from Libya are often given as examples of how to deal with Syria, regardless of the key differences that exist between the two countries.

Before the actualization of any type of mediation effort, Wehrey explained, analogies and linguistic interpretations of a conflict are employed by administrations and governments to either support or reject intervention. Following the theories of analogy presented by author Yuen Foong Khong in his seminal book Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton University Press, 1992), Wehrey argued that “not only are analogies used to justify policies, but they actually form part of the psychological and cognitive process that policymakers go through when they embark on decisions.” As such, analogies and the lessons of history figure prominently in foreign policymaking. The US decision to intervene in Libya was itself based on the lessons learned from past conflicts: “the analogy was that Benghazi was not going to be another Srebrenica,” Wehrey argued. Many decision-makers at the White House would have had direct experience of the failures of the international community to prevent the atrocities that took place in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s. This would have prompted current policymakers to use past analogies to justify and build international support for an air campaign over Libya.

Assessing the overall impact of the NATO intervention in Libya, Wehrey recounted that it was a decisive turning point. The international community took multilateral action through consensus and so the intervention in Libya is being held up as a new model for foreign engagement, even being called “the Obama Doctrine,” he said. Moreover, in an era of increasing austerity in the US defense budget following the costly Iraq and Afghanistan wars, “certainly in the US, there is a mystique of airpower because it doesn’t put people at risk and it is relatively low-cost,” when used with precision. “This intervention, which did not cost a single US life, which was successful in toppling a dictator, and which used airpower and very minimal use of ground advisors, is very attractive,” Wehrey said.

This “Libya model” is now being used as an analogy in discussions on how the international community and the United States should approach the conflict situation in Syria. It is important to point out, Wehrey said, that there are a number of limitations in applying this model to the situation in Syria. Unlike the international community’s consensus towards the use of NATO airpower in Libya, there is no such agreement for a coalition operation in Syria. Further, in geographic terms, Syria has no extended coastline from which to guide operations and has high density urban areas making airstrikes a hazard to civilian populations. “The lack of a contiguous rebel-held zone in Syria is impeding our ability to deliver aid and the lack of an extended coastline that permitted NATO intervention and permitted the rebel logistics to move weapons around and the role of strategic geography is different,” he argued. As such, the Libyan model is not generalizable and cannot be applied to Syria. “We have to take all of these differences into account and be very wary of the misuse of analogies, however appealing they are,” Wehrey explained.

Despite the recent attacks on the US ambassador in Benghazi, Wehrey said that he remains guardedly optimistic about Libya. The country still faces endemic instability as “the people are still digging out of the legacy of 42 years of brutal Orwellian tyranny that pitted different elements of the society against one another,” he explained. What we are seeing now are “the micro convulsions of a revolution. These are conflicts that are playing out between tribes and between towns, and they are really a testament of how Qaddafi ruled. Despite patronage towards certain tribes, he marginalized others.” Libya has no institutions and, in many ways, this is a blessing as it allows the public to have some say in how these institutions get built from the very beginning. “It is important to remember that the legacy of Libya is still being written,” Wehrey concluded.
CIRS Concludes “Sectarian Politics in the Gulf” Research Initiative

CIRS held a second working group meeting to conclude its research initiative on “Sectarian Politics in the Gulf” on May 15-16, 2012. Scholars and experts on the topic were invited to return to Doha for a second time to share their chapter submissions and to solicit feedback from members of the working group. CIRS will gather the complete chapters into a monograph under the title, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf.

The participants discussed different disciplinary definitions of what the terms “sectarian” and “sectarianism” might mean. In the literature on the topic, it has been notoriously difficult to come to agreement on a single workable definition of the terms involved. The CIRS project does not aim to reduce the term “sectarian” to a single definition, but to reveal the diversity at the heart of the subject and to open the debate up to its complexities. Although the term “sectarian” has strong—often negative—religious connotations, it is not based simply on religious difference, but implies a multifaceted mix of communal identifiers ranging from ethnic and tribal distinctions to political and philosophical beliefs. Regardless of the many theoretical and epistemological assumptions making up the discourse, the participants agreed that the heterogeneity of the subject was one that merited further nuanced study, especially in the wake of the Arab uprisings. The participants emphasized the conditional nature of sectarian issues and examined why ethnic and religious differences come to the fore in some Gulf societies and not in others.

Most countries in the Middle East are heterogeneous societies that were created as a result of the design of colonial empires and their subsequent dissolution. Littoral settlements on the Gulf were born of maritime cultures based on pearling, fishing, and trade, allowing tribes to travel freely across waterways, intermingle with other cultures, and defy the limited and arbitrary borders of modern nation-states. As a result of independence, newly formed Gulf nations had to contend with the breakdown of the political order of the past, and many different ethnic, tribal, and religious groups clamored for political control, thereby unleashing sectarian struggles that may have been dormant, suppressed, or non-existent in the past. The dominant group that rose to power had to engage in the formation of a new identity for the nation—often one that was based on glorifying the regime’s own particular sectarian or tribal history at the expense of others. These new articulations of a largely unrecorded past had to be cultivated in these new Middle Eastern states in order to create a new sense of national identity as well as to bolster political legitimacy for the ruling elite. Ruling groups created an official narrative of the state’s formation, which did not always reflect the reality of diversity and heterogeneity on the ground.

The participants agreed that the historical reference to cultural and tribal purity is a symptom of modernity where nations attempt to rebuild cultural identities after years of colonial struggle. In these states, newly formed citizens were the first generation to grow up with a national, rather than a regional identity—a process that was not without friction to notions of identity. In this sense, many of national heritage and renovation projects underway in Gulf states are state-sponsored and are in service of the idea patriotism, rather than loyalty to a certain communal sect. Today, the media plays simultaneous key roles in both upholding national unity and enhancing sectarian divisions. The Al Jazeera network in particular has given voice to fragmented regional discourses, with many taboo topics on sectarian issues being openly discussed and debated.

The more contentious issues surrounding sectarian politics in the Gulf states, the participants agreed, are primarily shaped by shares in the rentier economy and the resulting political status of privileged groups over others. Mass protests in Bahrain, for example, were largely a product of socio-economic frustrations that ran along sectarian lines. The participants argued that it was important to examine how ruling regimes choose to either engage these sectarian elements or subdue them depending on how much extra wealth and benefits the state is willing to share.

In the new political order of Iraq, the growing power of Iraq’s Shi’i has worried many Sunni governments who question the loyalty of the Shia communities in their states. This has been especially prominent in Bahrain, with Saudi Arabia having to intervene militarily in order to control the uprisings. The participants argued that these recent events have shown how sectarian struggles in one Gulf state have direct implications in another. A sectarian issue, therefore, cannot be thought of as indigenous to any one Gulf state, but as something that affects all of these countries and their identity formations.

In the wake of the Arab Spring, analyzing the varied sectarian communities in the Gulf is especially relevant to understanding silent and marginalized groups who have finally found a space to voice their discontents as a result of successful public uprisings elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. The CIRS initiative is designed to not only study the different social groups who feel marginalized, but to also highlight those that have existed peacefully with one another and who perceive themselves to be an inherent part of the social fabric of Gulf states.
The Khalijis: Iranian-Arabian Biculturalism in the Gulf Region

William O. Beeman, Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota and President of the Middle East Section of the American Anthropological Association, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on "The Khalijis: Iranian-Arabian Biculturalism in the Gulf Region" on October 22, 2012. As an introduction, Beeman gave the audience some background to what he described as "one of the longest running toponymic battles." There has been disagreement in the recent historical period over whether the body of water between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula should be called "the Arabian Gulf" or the "Persian Gulf."

"The Khalij is a rich mélange of cultural differences made up of Arabic, Persian, South Asian, East African, Portuguese, French, and English," among others, Beeman noted.

Linguistically, the people who live in this region have been comfortable communicating in a number of languages, and even forming new ones that are a mix of Arabic, Persian, and Indian languages. A similar example is Swahili—meaning "coastal" in Arabic—and the mutual influence of Arabic and East African languages on each other as a result of contact and trade across the Gulf of Aden. "Many people living on either side of the Khalij are fully bilingual, and frequently tri- and quad-lingual," Beeman said.

The "geographical impenetrability" that separates the Khalij from the inland regions meant that people on both sides of the water had a closer cultural identity than what they shared with their own inland Arab or Persian communities in terms of cuisine, dress patterns, marriage patterns, religious rituals, and discourse structures. Often, because of the strong marriage and trade ties, families would be dispersed on both sides of the Khalij and, to this day, have strong cross cultural and cross border ties. Before modern air travel, the ease of maritime travel across the Gulf and the difficulty of inland travel across deserts and mountains meant that "people living on the coast of the Khalij found that it was much easier to communicate with each other than it was to communicate with people who lived inland," Beeman said. Boats could carry much heavier loads much more easily than any form of overland transport, and so the Khalij was an area that thrived both culturally and economically.

"Many people living on either side of the Khalij are fully bilingual, and frequently tri- and quad-lingual."

In conclusion, Beeman said that, as a result of state and historical processes, there were several events that had a profound effect on changing the unified nature of Khalij culture, including colonial territorial demarcations and competition. He argued that "the early impositions of state structures in the region, which had been blissfully absent for centuries, caused an overlay of state identity, which has served to obscure the basic commonalities between the members of the population of this region." Other events also contributed to the separation of the Khaliji communities, including the consolidation of Iran under Reza Shah; the consolidation of Saudi Arabia under Ibn Saud; the departure of the British from the Khalij that left a vacuum to be filled by local ruling families who demarcated their territories accordingly; and, finally, the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 that changed the shape of the Iranian political and cultural landscapes, and caused a break in the historical alliance between the cross-Gulf communities.

Finally, the gradual encroachment of modern state structures into the region required a newly "imagined" idea of identity that necessarily distinguishes one group or nationality from another. Beeman concluded that the shared culture of "Khaliji" identity belies this imagined separation of nationalities and promotes the idea of a diverse community that is inherently multicultural. "This," he said, "is an 'unimagined' community; a community in fact, but not in name, and not in its social identification."

William O. Beeman was formerly Professor of Anthropology and Director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. Best known as a Middle East specialist for more than 30 years, he has also worked in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Japan, China and South Asia. He has served as consultant to the United States State Department, the Department of Defense, the United Nations and the United States Congress.
Sir Tim Lankester, Chairman of the Council of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Advisor on South East Asia to the consulting firm Oxford Analytica, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “The Politics and Economics of Britain’s Foreign Aid” on October 8, 2012. The talk was based on his recent book, *The Politics and Economics of Britain’s Foreign Aid: The Pergau Dam Affair* (Routledge, 2012), which he described as “a case study of what can go wrong when you do development assistance badly.”

“[The Pergau Dam] was one of the most controversial projects ever funded by British aid.”

Giving a background of the history of British foreign aid, Lankester said that the program was initiated in the 1960s and was driven by the British government’s belief that it had a moral obligation to its former colonies as well as practical political interests in those countries. In the 1980s, Lankester was the Permanent Secretary of the Overseas Development Administration—the ministry responsible for development aid. During his time in the ministry, “one of the most controversial projects ever funded by British aid” was taking place. This was the establishment of the Pergau Dam and power-generating project on the Malay-Thai border, which “was the largest funding in the history of British aid,” Lankester recalled.

The controversial Pergau Dam project was the result of a private agreement between some key members of the Malay and British governments and was based on Britain providing Malaysia with 200 million pounds worth of civil aid in return for sales of 1 billion pounds of defense equipment. Lankester recalled that an agreement based on the offer of British aid in return for arms sales was both unprecedented and against British policy and was thus divisive from the start. To make matters worse, once the agreement was signed between the two governments, the powerful contractors and companies assigned to building the project increased their estimates and the total cost for the project almost doubled.

Despite the increasing costs, and against the advice of British government officials and economists, the project went ahead with the support of Mrs. Thatcher and a host of others who had special interests. Since both the prime ministers of Malaysia and Britain had backed the project, the other government departments buckled under the pressure and did not offer sufficient opposition to their leaders. Lankester described the situation as being one that suffered from conflicting policy agendas and the “excessive mixing of politics, business, and conflicts of interest.”

In his capacity as Permanent Secretary, Lankester was tasked with evaluating whether or not the money for the project was being properly and lawfully spent. Although the legal assessment at the time showed that the project was indeed lawful, the spend for the project was based on taxpayers money and was so inefficient and uneconomic that Lankester felt obliged to formally disassociate himself and the civil service from it. “This,” he said “is a story of politics and special interests trumping sound development and sound economics.” Had there been more transparency, it may have been possible for parliament, the media, and other interest groups to formally oppose the project that ultimately damaged British-Malay relations at the time.

In conclusion, Lankester said that he was curious to know whether the very same project would have been viable today. His ex-post assessment, in light of increased gas prices over the years, was that the project would still be an uneconomic one by today’s calculations. As a final thought, he advised that the Pergau Dam case study provides valuable lessons for governments, and his advice was that “it is better to be transparent than obscure,” “don’t say one thing and do another,” “when things go wrong, don’t cover up,” and, lastly, “if you make one mistake, don’t compound it by making another.”

“This is a story of politics and special interests trumping sound development and sound economics.”

Sir Tim Lankester is a member of the joint advisory board of the Georgetown University School of Foreign in Qatar, as well as the CIRS Advisory Board. He was UK Executive Director on the boards of the IMF and World Bank, and later Permanent Secretary of the Overseas Development Administration. He was Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, and from 2001 to 2009 President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. He has published articles and book reviews on aid and development.

While still being classified as a developing country, Qatar has evolved from being a primarily oil based economy to one that includes the largest natural gas field in the world, the North Field. But there is almost no academic literature that examines why joint venture agreements between the Qatari state-owned petroleum company, Qatar Petroleum, and international oil companies (e.g. ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Marubeni, Mitsui, Shell, and Total) are preferred in the Qatar gas industry. My book in progress (based on my doctoral thesis) has sought to fill this gap.

My research address the following question: Why are joint venture agreements preferred over other types of agreements such as concession agreements, service contracts, and production sharing agreements in the Qatari gas industry? In order to answer this question, I recognize joint venture agreements as an outcome of a decision-making process between Qatar Petroleum and international oil companies. In analyzing this decision-making process, I developed an approach that integrates a micro-level analysis, more specifically within international oil companies, with a macro-level analysis that spring from the organizational culture of the Qatari gas industry.

At the micro level, my research draws on John Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of ownership, location, and internalization (OLI) advantages in the field of international business to argue that international oil companies (as multinational enterprises) undertake joint venture agreements (as foreign direct investment) in order to confer three sets of interdependent advantages: ownership advantages, location advantages, and joint internalization advantages.

First, with reference to ownership advantages, I argue that international oil companies participate in joint venture agreements in order to capture three types of assets: asset specific advantages reflected in a high level of technological development; transaction cost-minimizing advantages reflected in multinational experience; and institutional advantages reflected in effective human resources management.

Second, with respect to location advantages, international oil companies are attracted to exploiting the Qatari gas industry, as a location rich in natural gas, through joint venture agreements with Qatar Petroleum, given that these agreements provide them with the right to access gas production in the Qatari gas industry.

Third, with respect to joint internalization advantages, it is beneficial (and less costly) for international oil companies to jointly internalize with Qatar Petroleum in a joint venture agreement because of Qatar Petroleum’s role in reducing transaction-related costs arising from opportunism (seeking individual gain) where all partners are expected to pass up short-term advantages for the sake of long-term joint profit maximization; and social-related costs arising from uncertainty, given that partnering with Qatar Petroleum can provide the complementary resource of local know-how.

At the macro level, my research draws on Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory in the discipline of sociology for operationalizing the organizational culture of the Qatari gas industry based on the examination of rules and resources under the three structures of domination, signification, and legitimation.

First, with reference to the domination structure, I point out that joint venture agreements are preferred in the Qatar gas industry because these agreements can provide shared positions of power for both Qatar Petroleum and international oil companies.

Second, with reference to the signification structure, I argue that Islam engenders high costs with respect to local religious know-how, which international oil companies investing in Qatar can potentially minimize through joint venture agreements.

Third, with reference to the legitimation structure, I suggest that the normative rules and moral obligations specifying the importance of facilitating technology transfer for the Qatari gas industry help explain why joint venture agreements are preferred, since joint venture agreements are considered the most efficient technology transfer mechanism.

In doing so, the research connected theory with practice to introduce a new perspective of joint venture agreements both, as one form of foreign direct investment as well as one type of co-operation agreement in the gas industry.
Sheikh Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Saud Al Thani, continued from page 1

Moving from global challenges to regional concerns, Al Thani outlined how new media and technology have impacted the Arab world. He argued that social media access was one of the key driving forces behind the events of the Arab uprisings in 2011. “From January to March 2011, the usage of Facebook increased by more than 30% across the whole of the Middle East,” Al Thani said. The internet and mobile technology was so critical to the fuelling of these social movements that the governments of Egypt, Libya, and Syria attempted to block all forms of access to internet technologies. “Digital technology is increasing the expectation of transparency and accountability from government bodies and officials,” he said.

Sheikh Al Thani identified this new technologically-literate demographic as the “Arab Digital Generation,” or ADG, who have grown to represent 4% of the digitally active globally. He described this contingent as being politically active, educated, independent, and business-minded. These youth, he said, will have a significant impact on the future of the Arab World. He cautioned, however, that “while the ADG will fundamentally change Arab society, it will do so keeping our rich traditions and values intact.”

Because “social media has become a powerful tool for social change in the Arab states,” a serious challenge that Al Thani identified as affecting global and regional societies is the issue of the gender gap in relation to the use of, and access to, new technologies. “There are 46 million Arab users on Facebook. Of this group, 70% are between 15-29 years old, and the majority is male.” He identified the reasons for this gender gap as “social and cultural constraints on women, privacy and security concerns, access to technology, and education and ICT literacy.” Through its global operations, Qtel has backed new media as the primary tool of social empowerment and is attempting to narrow the gender gap by providing special services that help women to gain better access to education, small business management, healthcare, and childcare services. Al Thani said that “providing women with access to ICT tools such as mobile phones can lead to a better quality of life and wider economic growth. Empowering more women with more phones can accelerate social and economic development.”

In conclusion, Al Thani argued that despite the new challenges presented by the changing telecommunications space, “as business leaders, citizens, students, governments, and institutions, we all need to rise to the occasion and use our influence to inspire, engage, and create opportunities for the next generation. Overall, leaders in the Arab world should view these changes as positive.” As a final thought, he said that the Arab Digital generation should become empowered through communication and technology to help shape the future of industry and society in order to ensure the stability of the Arab world.

“From January to March 2011, the usage of Facebook increased by more than 30% across the whole of the Middle East.”

“Social media has become a powerful tool for social change in the Arab states.”

H.E. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Saud Al Thani has been the Chairman of the Board of Directors for Qatar Telecom (Qtel) and Qtel Group since 2000. In his capacity as Chairman, His Excellency enjoys State Minister status. He has presided over Qtel’s expansion into 17 countries and has enhanced Qtel’s revenue streams and its corporate governance in line with international practices.

Research and Scholarship

CIRS Takes Part in the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) Conference in Denver

The Center for International and Regional Studies participated in the 2012 annual Middle East Studies Association (MESA) Conference held in Denver, Colorado, on November 17–20, 2012. During the conference, Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, presented a paper titled, “State Building and Political Consolidation in Qatar,” and Zahra Babar, Assistant Director for Research at CIRS, delivered a paper on “Inclusion/Exclusion: Citizens and Migrants in the State of Qatar.”

In addition, CIRS displayed publications and research initiatives at the conference’s annual book bazaar, where participants perused CIRS materials.
The Center for International and Regional Studies kicked off the 2012-2013 academic year with a two-day working group meeting to discuss “The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East” on September 15-16, 2012. The members of the working group were invited to Doha for a second time to conclude the research initiative and to discuss their individual paper submissions on the topic. The first working group meeting took place on February 19-20, 2012.

The working group members, comprised of international and regional scholars of the Middle East, discussed the current period of “transition” in various Arab countries. Although social and economic grievances have been simmering in countries of the Middle East for decades, mass protests, rapidly sparked by individual acts of protest in Tunis and Egypt, took place at moments where the old ruling bargain was suddenly viewed as unacceptable to a newly emboldened public. Thousands took to the streets in defiance of authorities to demand a new bargain with the state or to do away with that government altogether. The participants discussed histories of political regimes and other forms of social engineering to see how one state differs from another and how these changes may affect the future of these countries.

Before delving into the individual areas of inquiry, the participants questioned the terminology used to address issues related to the Arab uprisings. They analyzed the language employed in the discourse and marked the parameters of the debate on how to conceptualize the recent events in the Middle East. They discussed whether the events could be considered as “revolutions” leading to radical transformations of society, community, and political structure, or whether these upheavals would more properly be called “uprisings” or “rebellions” that have ousted an old regime by replacing it with a new one. Further, they questioned whether the social, economic, and political arrangements that existed in these countries can be termed “social contracts,” as this term implies involving at least two parties that negotiate to achieve mutually acceptable or agreed-upon arrangements.

Often, ruling bargains are based on formally codified laws, while others are unspoken assumptions that have evolved over time. In many cases, formal opposition and political parties in the Middle East represent the semblance of democratic processes without gaining any actual power. The participants argued that these parties do not challenge regime stability, but, in fact, strengthen the regime’s position at a symbolic level. The state presents itself as the provider of the national interests in return for political acquiescence. Yet, the participants said, despite this arrangement loaded in favor of the state, the government and opposition parties are in a constant state of negotiation—a push and pull attempt to redefine the boundaries of power, albeit in a controlled and limited way.

The scholars noted that the demands for a new ruling bargain were caused by a number of factors. The general public in many Middle East countries suffered similar economic and social grievances in relation to unemployment, corruption, inequality, and crony-capitalism. Additionally, there is a unique youth factor, where a growing population bulge exists for many Middle East and GCC countries. Within this segment of society are many young, educated, unemployed, and increasingly frustrated people whose aspirations, economic opportunities, and political liberties have been curtailed. Many of these young people have access to communication technologies in order to voice their frustrations on both national and international levels. Despite regime restrictions placed on the internet at the height of social unrest in Egypt, for example, social media played a pivotal role in circumventing state control and leading to unauthorized mobilization of the masses.

Other topics discussed include the rise of Islamic parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and the polarization of societies along Islamist-secular lines; the emerging forms of relationship between state institutions like the military and police with different forms of civil society; the new forms of codifying the ruling bargain through recently formed laws, constitutions, and judiciary processes; as well as individual case studies related to the similarities and differences between Egypt, Tunis, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, among others.

Finally, the participants argued that it was too early to draw conclusions regarding the outcome of any of these uprisings and how recent upheavals will shape future social or political relations in the Middle East. With the fall of old regimes, many past restrictions have been lifted and new forms of electoral processes and vehicles of political expression will need to be placed effectively within existing state structures. At the conclusion of the CIRS initiative, the chapters will be collected into an edited volume to be published within the coming year.
CIRS concluded its “Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East” research initiative with a working group meeting on April 22-23, 2012. Scholars participating in the initiative were invited to Doha for a second time to share their findings with working group. Among the participants were nine of the CIRS research grant recipients who gave updates on the progress of their research projects.

The strength of this CIRS research initiative is in its multi-disciplinary approach to the questions of food security and food sovereignty in the Middle East. The participants include economists, anthropologists, historians, and experts in agriculture and nutrition. The diverse range of expertise enables the project to bridge the epistemological divide between the qualitative and quantitative methodologies of social science. Current food security issues and corresponding world events are shifting from a largely economics-dominated model where the debate centered on macro-level issues of international development to one where sociopolitical factors are becoming increasingly active in how food is conceived, valued, and distributed as a human right rather than a market force. The individual papers cover a large portion of the Middle East, with case studies into the characteristics of food security projects of Qatar, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestinian, Yemen, Egypt, and Iran, as well as studies into GCC foreign land investments in Cambodia and Ethiopia.

The global food crisis of 2008 was a defining moment for issues of food and the lack of access to it, and steered individual countries’ attention towards aiming for “food security” and “food sovereignty” in the face of future crises. Importantly, the recent Arab Spring protests and political unrest across the Middle East region were partly triggered by rising food prices. Critics point out that such crises are as a direct result of global liberalization policies that allowed for multinational corporations to dominate food production and distribution chains, making food a commercial commodity and making resistance to such international regimes much more difficult. As a result of current market dominated food systems, a central dilemma is whether it is more important to have a renewed promotion of a domestic production food security strategy, or to promote non-agricultural exports and use the resulting foreign exchange to import food stuffs.

The participants engaged in a historical analysis of food regimes and the systems that have allocated food resources through different economic, political, and market models. Different means of production since the nineteenth century, including increased industrialization and mechanization of farming and transportation in the early half of the twentieth century, had varying effects on countries’ relationship with food. Food took on an international aspect where products grown in one place were exported to another in a network of colonial projects.

Over the decades, countries began growing cash crops that had a comparative market advantage and so food took on a different meaning as something subject to market pressure rather than a means of human sustenance. Increased incomes and rapid population growth led to changing patterns of food consumption and demand for ever diverse types of food, which in turn placed further ecological constraints on land and water. A concomitant lifestyle shift from “traditional” diets based on the consumption of local market produce to “modern” diets based on meat, sugar, and processed foods purchased in supermarkets has had adverse effects on health with increased levels of diabetes, malnutrition, and obesity in the Middle East. Further to its market value, food was used as a political weapon of coercion and a tool of foreign policy, where dominant countries would either encourage or discourage the distribution of surplus food as reward or punishment.

Because Middle East countries import a large percentage of their food requirements, volatile hikes in global food prices have had severe adverse effects. At the macroeconomic level, this has contributed to inflation and trade deficits, and at the microeconomic household level, increased prices have contributed to increased poverty and food insecurity. Many countries have responded to the global food crisis of 2008 with decisions to increase domestic production of food. Other solutions include investment in highly controversial “foreign land acquisitions,” to grow food abroad. This may be at the expense of local populations in the host country who may become displaced and further impoverished by often unregulated and unscrupulous land deals.

In conclusion, the participants argued that the recent uprisings in the Middle East and the role of popular resistance to oppressive political and economic regimes may become an important factor of food security scholarship. The scholars agreed that for the past few decades, research into the question of food security had been the domain of international economic and trade bodies that took a narrow and market-driven approach to analyzing food in relation to human existence. The CIRS project is an attempt to engage with a new paradigmatic shift in the field by suggesting that research into food security should incorporate the individual level of analysis as well as macroeconomic and political factors. This cross-disciplinary CIRS-sponsored book adds value to the literature on food security in its response to this changing orthodoxy. CIRS will gather the complete chapter submissions into an edited volume to be published in the coming months by a university press.
For the past few months, I have been researching the fascinating story of the encounter between the Queen of Sheba and Solomon, King of Israel and prophet of Islam. The Queen’s dramatic arrival at the court of King Solomon some three thousand years ago is briefly recorded in the sacred books of the three Abrahamic religions, most dramatically in the Quran (27: 20-44), but she is not named in any of them. The Ethiopian’s revered book, Kebra Nagast, however, identifies her as Makeda. She is popularly known as Bilqis in the Judo-Islamic traditions.

The Queen of Sheba is a virgin beauty, some say from Ethiopia, others say from Yemen and Southern Arabia, but no one is really sure. The short and enigmatic narratives in the sacred texts have left millions of creative artists, scholars, and ordinary people curious about the purpose of her trip and what transpired in that dramatic moment of the encounter between a powerful man and an intelligent and beautiful woman. Since then, the story has not lost its popular appeal.

By all accounts, the Queen’s grace, intelligence, leadership, and wisdom has been acknowledged in the sacred texts and upheld popularly worldwide. What sociomoral lessons, collective or individual, are conveyed in this meeting? Is the Quranic story of the Queen’s sovereignty and political leadership of a prosperous and idyllic society pose for King Solomon and for patriarchy?

The first step toward unpacking these puzzling developments would be to ask what brought the Queen of Sheba to the court of this wise, just, and powerful King Solomon to begin with.

Taking an interpretive approach, my objective in this research is to understand what motivated the Queen of Sheba to embark on that long journey to Jerusalem and to the court of King Solomon. My reading of this story, still in progress and at a speculative stage, is akin to reading poetry in a different language, where one strives to discover the latent messages and meanings as well as revisiting the manifest ones. I want to highlight the tensions, dilemmas, contradictions and ambivalences within the narratives that emanate from the Patriarch’s and patriarchal desire to appropriate the persona of the Queen of Sheba, i.e., women, by mediating the sacred texts through trickery, sexual humiliation, coercion, and occasional acts of kindness.

The discourse of power and might that is thus reproduced through the textual retelling of the story reaffirms the differences between genders, highlights gender identity and hierarchy, and male domination and control, but not without ambivalence. I would argue that the Queen’s encounter with the King and what transpired between them is a simple story on the theme of sex and violence, and domination and representation, though it has plenty of this. It is also a more layered and nuanced story of gender identity and hierarchy, persuasion and politicking, witty exchanges, and of domination and subjugation, individually and or collectively.

The story does not end when the King and the Queen bid each other goodbye. It follows the Queen of Sheba to Ethiopia or Yemen, though exactly where one is not sure. It is an ongoing dynamic—a two way processes of “appropriation” where the challenge of political authority remains for both genders, even though the moral of this story, backed by natural and supernatural forces, is that only Kings—men—ought to appropriate and dominate.

If we follow the Queen of Sheba either to Ethiopia or to Yemen, we may learn that while her authority was usurped and she was pushed away from the public domain, she did not disappear, nor did her power evaporate. She might have moved behind the throne (as women have done so eternally) to continue her activities ever so discreetly, until an opportune time to emerge as a queen on the scene again. It happened in the 11th century in Yemen when Queen Arwa, also known as the Little Queen of Sheba, became one of the longest-reigning rulers of Yemen (1067-1138). It is also happening now as Muslim women are demanding gender parity and political representation all over the Muslim world, some even drawing on their noble pedigree that goes all the way back to the Queen of Sheba. The 2011 Noble prize winner, Tawakkol Karman from Yemen, is just one example.
“Social Change in Post-Khomeini Iran” Working Group Meeting

The Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) launched a new research initiative for the 2012–2013 academic year, “Social Change in Post-Khomeini Iran,” through a two day working group held in Doha on October 20–21, 2012. Over the course of the meeting, international and regional scholars addressed political, economic, and social aspects of ongoing domestic transformations within the Islamic Republic. Via a multidisciplinary approach, the working group offered in-depth analysis of the evolution of Iranian society in the post-Khomeini era, highlighting contemporary social and cultural trends.

Working group participants debated sources of the Iranian regime’s legitimacy, its survival strategies, and how successfully it has penetrated society over the past twenty-three years. The group discussed the role and functions of prominent state institutions, such as the Velayat-e Faqih and bonyads, along with economic and political elites in contemporary Iran. The Velayat-e Faqih has been seen as gaining increasing political power rather than religious influence during the post-Khomeini years. While many grand ayatollahs in Qom have rejected their authority, its institutional strength and capacity extend throughout Iran. Acting as parallel institutions to the state, the bonyads have also flourished and serve as both economic and political sources of state power. By addressing the needs of disadvantaged economic stakeholders, the bonyads serve to build a core of populist support for the regime. Although they are commonly viewed as inefficient and corrupt, their distribution of state largesse aids the regime in developing a social base and in spreading its power to marginalized, rural parts of the country.

Some participants posited that both the political and religious legitimacy of the regime are in fact quite narrow within Iran, with the silent majority of the population rejecting the logic and essence of the system. Participants argued that there has been a social evolution in Iran that belies the ideological discourse often associated with the Islamic Republic. Through clientelism and institutional penetration, the regime has developed its capacity; however, most scholars agreed that Iranian society presents a dichotomy between how people live and what the state wants to impose on its citizens. Some scholars attributed the gradual rise of liberalism within Iranian thought and society in the post-Khatami era to the deficiency of the Iranian state in garnering ideological support. This has also given rise to positive individualism within society, where religion as a political reference point is on the decline, and tolerance for the differences of others is a growing trend amongst the youth. Modernizing family dynamics, gauged through the lower birth rate, the rising age of marriage, and decrease in gender inequality perceptions indicate that Iranian society has transformed dramatically in the post-revolutionary years.

During the past twenty years, Iran has experienced shifts and transformations in its growing economy. The gradual transition from a government-run, closed economy to a relatively diverse and open economy has led to an economic mindset guided by a nationalism based on technology. The participants discussed the securitization of commercial decisions coupled with techno-based nationalism and how this has had a relatively positive impact on enterprise development. The business community is increasingly focused on efficiency, profitability, and innovation. Contrary to common negative perceptions of the impact of international sanctions within the country, the scholars also deliberated the multi-faceted impact of sanctions on business development. Although average Iranians certainly suffer from sanctions, being cut off from regular import tracks has spurred entrepreneurs to diversify their activities, and has also led to a greater regionalization of Iranian businesses.

Iran exhibits a mixed socio-economic picture; it maintains the 10th highest ranking in the Human Development Index of the Middle East, as well as a middle income status among developing countries. The lack of deep pockets of poverty and the fact that the state has ensured access to basic needs of food, electricity, and water, have meant that holistic understanding of the conditions of the poor in Iran have been overlooked. Additionally, current framing of marginalized youth in the broader region depicts them as disenchanted with social and political life, drawn to more radical forms of political Islam. These speculative conclusions that the poor are more likely to be radicalized are not backed by empirical evidence. Broader scholarly efforts are needed to examine how urban poor in Iran have responded to poverty and marginalization.

In terms of education, Iran is performing relatively well with declining levels of gender and geographic inequality. However, the current youth bulge in Iran is similar to that in countries around the region, where the inability of the labor market to absorb the bulge creates visible employment problems for young people exiting the educational system.

The participants also discussed the transformation in terms of demographics and its impact. Lower birth rates and the low male-to-female ratio, in combination with rising standards of education for women, have all led to delayed marriages. In the context of women’s status and marriage, the scholars delved into discussions on legal development in terms of the Islamic Republic’s reinstitution of family law and family courts and their consequential impact on the status of women within society. Some of the family laws, with particular reference to the divorce laws, were viewed by the working group members as having the unintended consequence of leading to the individuated subjectivity of women due to their increased litigating role. The continuous modification of marriage laws in Iran was regarded by the discussants as coming from different levels within society.

Article by Dooaa Osman, Research Analyst at the Center for International and Regional Studies
Lawrence G. Potter, a 2011-2012 CIRS Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Associate Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “The Rise and Fall of Port Cities in the Gulf” on May 16, 2012. Potter’s lecture was designed to explain the economic, political, and ecological reasons why port cities in the Gulf came to prominence or declined over the centuries. As a conceptual introduction to the lecture, he argued that a distinction should be made between a port and a harbor. “A harbor,” Potter said, “is a physical concept, a shelter for ships;” whereas “a port is an economic concept, a center of exchange.”

“One striking fact about port cities in the Gulf is that many have had only a temporary period of fluorescence.”

Littoral settlements on the Gulf were born of maritime cultures based on pearling, fishing, and trade, allowing tribes to travel freely across waterways in search of ideal locations to pursue their livelihoods. The strength of these commercial and familial connections along the coast meant that “some tribes had settlements on both sides of the Gulf, most famously the Qawasim based in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah who temporarily governed Bandar Langeh,” Potter said.

The migratory and transitory nature of sea-faring cultures meant that “the Gulf was oriented outward, toward the Indian Ocean, rather than inward toward the Middle East, and was part of a cosmopolitan world of mixed race, religion, and ethnicity,” as well as language, Potter said. Because of these maritime ties, port cities have always maintained a degree of economic and cultural independence from their inland counterparts. Importantly, these cultures defied the limited borders of nation-states where “settlements along the Persian coast often had closer relations with those on the Arab side than those in the interior, due to ease of communication,” he explained. Multicultural connections, whether based on family ties or trading relationships, often shielded these port communities from the sectarian strife that afflicted many other parts of the Middle East. This cosmopolitan history of Gulf ports is starkly different from that of the more settled inland cities of Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Herat on the Iranian plateau. Historically, these were largely populated urban areas that had an established culture and that cultivated centuries of art and literature particular to a single geographical area.

“One striking fact about port cities in the Gulf is that many have had only a temporary period of fluorescence,” Potter said. In medieval times, the most important ports were to be found on the northern Persian shore of the Gulf, but in the 19th and 20th centuries, the ports on the southern Arab shore rose to prominence. Since ports are principally economic areas, their primary purpose is to facilitate regional and economic trade. If an environmental or political factor was to obstruct these trade routes in any way, “the Khalijis could easily move if dissatisfied. In a region where boats and not land constituted capital, it was easy to sail away and reestablish themselves elsewhere,” he argued.

“The Khalijis have overcome the challenges of climate and lack of water, and continue to excel as the businessmen that they always were.”

The often harsh environment in the Gulf and lack of water and wood played key roles in the migration of populations from one port to establish another. Other reasons for abandoning a port include its physical destruction due to the harbor silting up, “In medieval times this happened to old Hormuz. In the 20th century, this happened to Sharjah, severely damaging its trade and giving the advantage to Dubai.” In order to overcome these environmental challenges and the lack of water and wood, some settlements imported fresh water and wood from nearby areas. Even though littoral settlements were maritime societies, the wood to build ships and dhows had to be imported from India and East Africa. Potter explained how such ecological challenges can have profound effects on the forming of a nation’s security apparatus by arguing that “the lack of wood was undoubtedly one reason why Iran did not have a navy until the twentieth century.”

In conclusion, Potter highlighted the continued trajectory regarding the importance of port cities in the Gulf. “Today, the Khalijis have overcome the challenges of climate and lack of water, and continue to excel as the businessmen that they always were. The port cities are multinational, as they always were. The modern shopping malls of Doha and Dubai are just a modern version of what the great emporiums of Hormuz and Muscat must have looked like,” he said.
Call for Papers

The Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (SFS-Q) is pleased to announce a call for contributions to its publication series. CIRS publishes original research in a broad range of issues related to the Gulf region in the areas of international relations, political science, economics, and Islamic studies. Other topics of current significance also will be considered.

Papers should be a maximum of 10,000 words and cannot have been previously published or under consideration for publication elsewhere. Papers must adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style (16th edition) and all transliterations must adhere to the International Journal of Middle East Studies. All submissions are subject to a double-blind review process. Any copyright concerns are the full responsibility of the author. Please submit manuscripts to cirsresearch@georgetown.edu. Inquiries about publications or other related questions may be directed to Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications at sm623@georgetown.edu.

Post-Doctoral Fellowship

The Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (SFS-Q) awards Post-Doctoral Fellowships. The fellowship supports a recent Ph.D. recipient in any discipline working on the area of the Middle East with priority given to those working on the Gulf. The Fellowship is for a period of one academic year. Compensation, benefits and other terms of employment are highly competitive.

Interested candidates should visit the website for more information: http://cirs.georgetown.edu/research/fellowships/114126.html

Visiting Scholar/Researcher

The Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar’s Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) awards nonresidential Visiting Scholar Fellowships. The position is open to scholars in all disciplines working on any area of the Middle East, with priority given to those working on the Gulf. This position is ideal for mid- and senior-level academics. Compensation, benefits and other terms of employment are highly competitive.

Interested candidates should visit the website for more information: http://cirs.georgetown.edu/research/fellowships/114127.html

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