COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS: 
THE NEED FOR COORDINATION

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The growing number of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats requires the government of the United States to take an aggressive approach to protect its citizens and the world. This thesis examines the creation and evolution of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. CTR is the most relevant program to analyze for lessons learned to determine realistic and efficient proposals for future nonproliferation engagements with foreign nations. Other nonproliferation programs operated by various departments and agencies throughout the U.S. government are also studied. The paper examines the scope of activities within each program, to include the vulnerabilities that are being mitigated. Next, the thesis presents a wide array of literature that discusses the need for better coordination of CTR and nonproliferation activities. This literature, along with the material presented on CTR’s history and the other nonproliferation activities underway, is used in the final chapter to propose a solution to the United States’ need for oversight of WMD-related activities.

The proposal is to create an executive-level entity called the WMD Activities Coordination Office. This office would be responsible for monitoring the U.S.’s nonproliferation engagements around the world. Both the type of activity being conducted and the nations engaged would be closely tracked by this office. The establishment of a synchronizing office would greatly enhance the U.S.’s
nonproliferation portfolio. The proposal also ensures that redundant activities and engagements are identified and appropriately addressed. It would also be easier to identify existing threats that are not being addressed if a coordinating entity was created.

The U.S.’s portfolio for countering the threats posed by WMDs is impressive and encouraging. However, there is a dire need for a single office to oversee the scope of engagements and ensure the myriad of threats facing the U.S. are appropriately addressed.
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INTRODUCTION

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program experienced impressive successes in eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems following the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is a great need for CTR-type work to be expanded beyond the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Components of the CTR program can and should be used in a “lessons learned” approach when determining the most effective means to address current and emerging threats around the world. However, simply proposing to expand CTR into other parts of the world is not a viable option; there are domestic and international complexities that will require new and innovative solutions.

Just as CTR combatted a set of dire threats following the collapse of the FSU, the need for a solution to address today’s WMD-related threats is indicative of an extremely dangerous global environment. The implications of an attack involving WMD would without a doubt be astronomical and precedent-setting. The impact of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States was felt around the world. The aftermath of these attacks was astounding: Americans killed on American soil, fear instilled in general public, entire departments created within the United States government, new laws enforced, security protocols permanently changed, economies suffered, wars raged, troops from around the world killed to track down those responsible for attacks. The list goes on.

It is important to recognize that the September 11 attacks changed the course of history for the world. It is equally important to recognize that today the world faces known threats involving WMD. If an attack was successfully executed, its impact would
be so astronomical it could not even be measured on the same scale as 9/11. Attacks utilizing WMD carry the potential to wipe out entire populations, cripple essential governmental operations, create world-wide panic and terror, and cause an irreconcilable global conflict. Again, the list goes on.

Capable governments have a responsibility, both to their nations and to all of humanity, to combat WMD in every means possible. Mankind’s way of life would be at stake if an attack with WMD was launched. The loss of life and crippling of nations’ ability to operate is hard to actually fathom. Without question though, the validity of the risks require nations to take new and pioneering steps to counter the threat of an attack involving WMD.

CTR provides a framework to build on as concerned nations grapple with addressing the varying WMD threats around the world. Because of the unique and long-term role CTR has played in reducing proliferation threats, this thesis provides a history of CTR’s creation, evolution, and accomplishments. It also examines the unique factors that enabled CTR to experience success.

Immeasurable WMD threats exist outside the FSU and beyond CTR’s authority or purview. This thesis will broadly examine the types of programs and activities that the United States government has developed to mitigate these proliferation risks. In some cases these expanded programs fall under the umbrella of CTR, but in many cases agencies and departments have developed new solutions to address specific vulnerabilities.

The establishment of so many new WMD-related programs to engage nations around the world is a positive development. It demonstrates that the U.S. takes
nonproliferation work seriously and is willing to fund innovative solutions to counter of the most frightening global challenges. However, the U.S. has reached the point where a lack of communication and coordination among these programs threatens the activity’s ability to achieve optimal results. There is no cohesive, government-wide strategy to organize these activities. Equally concerning, there is no entity to identify gaps or redundancies across the spectrum of U.S.-sponsored programs.

This paper introduces literature that both addresses the need for synchronization of activities and proposes viable solutions to the problem. A wide array of sources that propose realistic and feasible resolutions are discussed. After analyzing various proposals for a coordinating mechanism, the thesis describes a viable solution to the need for synchronization of nonproliferation activities. This solution is called the WMD Activity Coordination Office. Its mission, responsibilities, and structure are explained in detail, putting to use the ideas introduced throughout the thesis.

The examination of threats posed by WMD and an understanding of their proliferation can be overwhelming. However, there is nothing productive achieved by living in the fear of an imminent, life-ending or life-changing attack. By exploring the encouraging work already underway, it becomes evident that the missing link is an entity to monitor, communicate progress or roadblocks, and truly understand all the work being done at various levels. This thesis proposes a hopeful and inspiring solution to help synchronize the innovative work being done and therefore further protect mankind from an attack involving WMD.
CHAPTER I

THE CTR PROGRAM

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 produced a set of threats unlike anything the world had seen. Nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities, materials, delivery vehicles, and human expertise were suddenly within the borders of newly created states. In addition to the political crisis causing the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic situation was equally dire. The newly formed states of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had new governments inexperienced with the safe handling of these dangerous possessions and there was very little funding to ensure the security of the assets. Perhaps most frightening was the command and control of these weapons: the new leaders literally did not know what they possessed.¹

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, also referred to as Nunn-Lugar, aimed to address the WMD threats posed by the Soviet Union’s breakup. An in-depth examination of CTR sheds enormous light on what does and does not have utility for developing a modern-day CTR-like model. In order to determine how CTR can be relevant for a future global nonproliferation framework, it is essential to examine the program’s origins, passage into law, implementation, successes, and difficulties.

Senator Sam Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), was one of the main forces behind developing CTR.² A number of incidents prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, starting in the early 1970s, had left Nunn skeptical of nuclear weapons security and kept the issue on Nunn’s radar.


His first alarming discovery was that there was numerous security deficiencies related to the U.S.’s tactical nuclear weapons located throughout Europe. Nunn also feared the ability of the U.S. and Soviet Union to “to determine with high confidence the origin of a ballistic missile strike directed at either country.”

These fears and discoveries led Nunn to team with Senator John Warner to organize the bipartisan Congressional Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction. In 1982, the group proposed developing centers in Washington and Moscow that would exchange launch information, as well as details on any nuclear-related accidents on land and at sea. The centers would also “provide a channel for exchanging critical information under normal circumstances and offer a reliable channel of communication in times of crisis.” After years of research, coordination, and discussions, an agreement was signed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in September 1987 to formally launch Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in the capital cities of both super powers.

Shortly after the August 1991 unsuccessful coup d’état against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and just a few months before the dissolution of the USSR, Nunn was in Budapest attending an Aspen Institute conference on issues related to the Soviet Union. He was invited to visit the Kremlin and personally met with Gorbachev. Their dialogue further fueled Nunn’s conviction that something had to be done to address the

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4 Ibid.


6 Ibid.

dangers posed by the Soviet Union’s WMDs. During their meeting, Nunn asked Gorbachev if, during the three days he was held hostage, the command and control of the country’s nuclear forces had been retained. According to Nunn, “President Gorbachev did not answer, and that answer was enough.”

Nunn had all the evidence he needed to return to Washington and begin work on a solution to the impending doomsday situation in the Soviet Union. In many respects he faced an uphill battle. An important positive development was learning that Republican Representative Richard Lugar shared his concerns with respect to the Soviet Union and their WMDs. By building a few key partnerships, particularly with Lugar, member of both the House Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees, he gained the bipartisan momentum needed to truly turn an idea into action.

Initial attempts at passing legislation to address WMD-related concerns in the Soviet Union proved to be a painful learning process for Senator Nunn and his allies. After Nunn’s return to the U.S. from his visit to Moscow, he began rallying for funding to develop confidence building measures between the two nations and various other military exchanges. The desired effect of these actions would be two-fold: help stabilize a dangerously unstable nation and show the U.S.’s desire for a transition into a safe post-Cold War environment.

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As Nunn was working on this legislation, Representative Les Aspin was developing “a separate proposal to provide humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union.” Aspin, a Democrat from Wisconsin, was the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). His proposal called for $1 billion from the fiscal year 1992 defense budget to be taken and used in the Soviet Union to provide “food, medicine, and other types of humanitarian assistance.”

Of the total defense budget for that year, Aspin’s proposed aid to the Soviet Union equaled less than half of a single percent. He used this statistic in arguments to persuade his fellow lawmakers that when considering all the defense funds spent to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War, this was a sound investment to “stabilize the massively dangerous situation.”

Both Nunn’s and Aspin’s proposals faced stiff opposition on Capitol Hill. The proposals did not have the backing of the Pentagon or the White House. The Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, referred to the legislation as “foolish.” President George Bush certainly did not have anything positive to say about the proposals. He made the following comments at a September 1991 press conference:

“I’m not going to cut into the muscle of defense of this country in a kind of an instant sense of budgetary gratification so that we can go over and help somebody

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13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.
when the needs aren’t clear and when we have requirements that transcend historic concerns about the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{18}

In the same set of comments to the press, the President went on to describe what would need to take place before he would be ready to back fiscal support to the Soviet Union:

What I hope is that, out of all of these changes in the Soviet Union, we'll see some recognition that we're not their enemy, and they'll stop aiming missiles at the United States of America. They'll stop deploying new weapons systems. They'll stop spending billions of rubles on modernization of defense systems. When we see that, then we'll be there. And when our friends in Europe tell us that there's no threat at all of any kind to their borders from anybody, why, then we'll take a look. But I'm not going to be stampeded into what I would think of is kind of some mood of euphoria that misleads the American people about the national security interests of this country.\textsuperscript{19}

These powerful comments from the White House sent a clear message that if the legislation passed, it would not be because of public support for the measures and there would be no round of applause from the Oval Office.

Aside from hostility at the White House and Department of Defense, Nunn and Aspin had more pressing opposition on their own turf on Capitol Hill. A number of factors contributed to weak support of the proposals from their fellow lawmakers. A major concern for a number of House members was that Aspin’s proposal had the potential to set a dangerous spending precedent. Much of the power for committees comes from the duty to use their discretion to decide how money should be spent in the topic area of their particular committee. For example, the Committee on Agriculture decides on agriculture-related funding and the Small Business Committee decides on

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

laws and spending related to U.S. small business operations. Members of committees other than the HASC did not like the idea of “reprograming defense money for nondefense purpose under Armed Services Committee budget control.” If passed, the SASC and HASC could essentially be accused of overstepping their jurisdiction by spending defense funds in areas outside the jurisdiction of their committee and inside the jurisdiction of a different one.

Because Nunn shared Aspin’s sense of urgency to address the Soviet situation immediately, when the SASC and HASC met for the conference on the defense authorization bill, the two decided to combine their two proposals into a single amendment. Aspin’s proposal was captured in the first part of the amendment, which authorized “the use of defense funds to transport humanitarian aid to the former Soviet Union.” The second part of the amendment addressed Nunn’s proposal. Specifically, this portion of the amendment called for technical assistance to the Soviet Union in their efforts to “safely transport, store, and dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons.” The second part of the amendment also authorized assistance with converting former defense sites and ensuring environmentally friendly cleanup of the sites. Lastly, and to the

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22 Ibid.


26 Ibid.
shock of many members of Congress, the amendment authorized spending to assist with
the “training and housing for decommissioned officers of the [Soviet] Strategic Rocket
Forces.”

Most Republicans in both chambers of Congress particularly opposed the Nunn-
Aspin amendment. A group of SASC Republicans held a press conference to publicly
criticize the components of the amendment that called for funding authorization to help
train and house Soviet officers. Despite intense opposition, the amendment passed in
both the SASC and the HASC and was added to the authorization bill. The measure was
approved “after straight party-line votes in both committees.”

The White House had little to say about the measure’s passage. The Bush
Administration decided not to oppose the amendment since the funding in it was
discretionary. This meant that the assistance outlined in the legislation was made possible
by its passage, but did not force or mandate the U.S. to provide the funding.

Nunn and Aspin knew that the measure’s narrow passage in committee by no
means guaranteed success on the floor. Aspin held a press conference pleading for White
House backing of the measure and expressing his fear that the amendment would fail on


27 Ibid.

28 John Shields and William Potter, Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS perspectives on the


30 Ibid.

31 Shields and Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 43.
the House floor if the President did not vocalize support. A bitter battle was also likely on the Senate floor.

In the midst of the struggle to secure support for the legislation and right before the bill got to the floor of the Senate, Nunn and Aspin faced another huge blow. Democratic Senator Harrison Wofford from Pennsylvania won a Senate seat formerly filled by a Republican. He won this seat by campaigning on a platform to largely stop foreign aid and focus on the needs of America. His victorious campaign “sent an anti-foreign aid shock wave through the House and Senate.”

The culmination of Republican criticism of many aspects of the legislation, no White House backing, and the new sentiment to focus on American needs was too much to overcome for Nunn and Aspin. They became fearful of “derailing the entire defense authorization bill with their proposal” and in November 1991 decided to withdraw the measure from the authorization bill. Both lawmakers expressed their frustration to reporters the day they withdrew the measure. Aspin said, “Maybe there won’t be another coup, or maybe if there is one it won’t succeed. Maybe we will be lucky. But if we aren’t, the Soviet people won’t be the only losers.”

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33 Shields and Potter, *Dismantling the Cold War*, 43.
34 Ibid.
36 Shields and Potter, *Dismantling the Cold War*, 43.
Although a discouraging loss for Nunn, Aspin, and their advocates, lessons had been learned and the beginnings of a path towards a solution had been paved. Many aspects of Nunn and Aspin’s attempts to pass the measure ended up contributing to the amendment’s demise. The two lawmakers did not work with their Democratic or Republican colleagues until their very final efforts to get the measure passed. The White House, in addition to not offering any public support, did not contribute to the development of the amendment’s language. Lastly, the measure “circumvented the normal foreign assistance authorization process” and most lawmakers are very uncomfortable setting new precedents in the formal authorization process. These painful lessons learned ultimately helped prepare for successful passage of bipartisan legislation achieving the aims of the Nunn and Aspin amendment.

Senator Nunn did not waste any time before pursuing a second attempt to pass legislation addressing the WMD concerns in the Soviet Union. An important key development was the emergence of Senator Lugar as a supporter of Nunn’s objectives. Lugar’s backing provided important bipartisan support that had previously been missing. As one of the Senate’s senior Republicans and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had the clout to rally support from his party’s lawmakers. He also had an excellent reputation in the arena of international affairs and shared Nunn’s concerns about WMDs in a collapsing Soviet Union.

Another important development was a game-changing briefing delivered to Senators Nunn and Lugar on November 19, 1991, only six days after the Nunn-Aspin

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amendment was withdrawn.\textsuperscript{40} Dr. Ashton Carter delivered the briefing in Nunn’s office. Carter had been leading a research team at Harvard University and they had just completed a study of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons program.\textsuperscript{41} The title of the report was \textit{Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union}.\textsuperscript{42} Its contents included specific measures that could be taken to improve command and control of WMD in the event of a Soviet collapse. The report also highlighted concerns about the Soviet Union breaking up into independent states that would inherit these WMD systems. In addition to the obvious security risk of a lack of knowledge, infrastructure, and funding to appropriately handle the weapons, the report stressed that these newly formed nations’ “possession of nuclear weapons could well be a destabilizing factor in the Eurasian region.”\textsuperscript{43}

The general conclusion of the report was “that the breakup of the Soviet Union posed the biggest proliferation threat of the Atomic Age.”\textsuperscript{44} It was predicted in the study that the massive arsenal was at an even higher risk if independent countries were formed out of the Soviet Union’s anticipated collapse. Interestingly, Carter’s prediction proved true as the Soviet Union dissolved in late December 1991, less than two months after his November briefing.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} Carter and Perry, \textit{Preventative Defense}, 71.


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 7.

\textsuperscript{44} Carter and Perry, \textit{Preventative Defense}, 71.

\textsuperscript{45} Shields and Potter, \textit{Dismantling the Cold War}, 43-44.
The study made a number of recommendations under an overarching idea of “a new form of ‘arms control’ to stop” proliferation of the Soviet’s WMDs. The central theme to this idea was for the U.S. and Soviet Union, former Cold War adversaries, to work together to combat the “common danger.” Prior to learning about the contents and recommendations made in Carter’s study, Senator Nunn, Senator Lugar, and staffers Robert Bell, Ken Myers, and Richard Combs had already begun “working on a similar scheme for joint action.” The meeting was so powerfully received that once it concluded, Carter stayed behind with the three staffers and together they drafted the language that eventually became the Nunn-Lugar legislation.

The timing of the briefing overlapped with a visit to the Senate by a small group of Soviet officials: Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov, as well as Sergey Rogov and Andrey Kokoshin, both from the USA-Canada Institute in the Soviet Union. These officials briefed the senators on “Soviet problems with storing, destroying, and controlling nuclear weapons,” and other command and control issues related to their nuclear arsenal. The communications with the Soviet’s visit exacerbated Carter’s message that action needed to be taken and corroborated the assertions made in the report.

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 72.
51 Ibid.
Just two days after Carter’s briefing to Nunn and Lugar, the two organized a breakfast meeting with sixteen senators from both sides of the aisle. At the meeting, Carter repeated the briefing on his study’s findings. The group was shocked into action and decided it was time to set aside past grievances regarding aid to the Soviets and act on the dangers so succinctly presented to them by Carter’s group.\textsuperscript{52} Though the general consensus was that action needed to be taken, not all in attendance were necessarily moved to action by the presentation. Carter was sworn to secrecy by Nunn as he got the rare opportunity to “witness democracy’s horse trading at work.”\textsuperscript{53} By the end of the meeting, it had been decided that they would propose $500 million to be spent towards the destruction of WMD and $200 million for humanitarian aid. Nunn and Lugar took charge of advocating the destruction funding and Senators David Boren and Carl Levin ran with the humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{54}

On November 22, 1991, the day after the bipartisan breakfast meeting, the two senators published an op-ed piece in the \textit{Washington Post} to kick off their efforts to garner public support for legislative action.\textsuperscript{55} In the article, an urgent tone encourages swift action to be taken to help alleviate the immediate and long-term dangers posed by the Soviet Union’s WMDs. The senators addressed and refuted the issues that led to the demise of the Nunn-Aspin amendment and presented a clear case for passage of a replacement measure. The case made in the \textit{Post}, in addition to refuting arguments previously made by opposing parties, essentially served as a preview of the actual Nunn-

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{54} Nunn and Lugar, “The Nunn-Lugar Initiative,” 144.

\textsuperscript{55} Bernstein and Wood, \textit{The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction}, 7.
Lugar legislation and prepares the public for the amendment that is going to be offered on Capitol Hill.

We believe Congress must act now to authorize a program of cooperation with the Soviet Union and its republics on the destruction of these weapons, including such related tasks as transporting, storing and safeguarding them prior to destruction...U.S. assistance to the Soviet Union in these and other areas should not...constitute a blank check. It is essential that President Bush make clear to Soviet and republic leaders that U.S. assistance will not be available...if it fails to demonstrate a commitment to significant demilitarization. They must also commit to full compliance with all relevant arms control agreements...The president should also state forcefully and repeatedly that we expect all recipients of our assistant to respect internationally recognized human rights...We have been told by several of our colleagues: ‘Yes, we need to take this step now, but all my constituents are telling me—take care of our own needs; help the people of America for a change.’ We do not know of any better way to help the people of America than reducing the potential military threat that faces our nation...We are confident that the American people are perceptive enough to realize that using a few hundred million dollars in the defense budget to help destroy thousands of Soviet weapons of mass destruction is a bargain...This is not foreign aid. This is a prudent investment to reduce a grave threat....

Other types of public support were launched alongside this article. For example, Senator Boren made a public appeal “for a ‘bipartisan truce’ on the Soviet nuclear issue.” Because the senators wanted to introduce a measure as soon as feasibly possible, Nunn and Lugar spent the next days working to build a consensus among their colleagues. The Senate eventually offered the Nunn-Lugar measure as an amendment to an unrelated piece of legislation titled the Arms Export Control Act. The Senate voted on the amendment, formally titled the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” on

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57 Ibid.


59 Shields and Potter, *Dismantling the Cold War*, 44.
Twenty-four senators co-sponsored the bill, including two prominent Republican senators (Senators Robert Dole and Jesse Helms). The Senate approved the measure with 84 senators voting in favor of the Act and only 6 opposing.

This was a dramatic change in attitude from the very similar Nunn-Aspin measure that had to be withdrawn due to lack of support only weeks earlier. Opinions had shifted and now reflected an almost opposite viewpoint: the funding was considered a sound investment in domestic national security, not merely referred to as foreign aid. The shift was “the most abrupt major change in Senate opinion that Nunn and Lugar had ever experienced in Washington.”

The Senate Appropriations Committee had the final say of exactly how much funding would be approved. The Committee decided to decrease the amount provided for weapons destruction from $500 million to $400 million. They also cut $100 million from the humanitarian segment of the proposal, reducing that line of funding to $100 million. The reasons behind the funding reductions were never articulated, but it was speculated that the alterations to the allocations were “little more than a demonstration of their carefully guarded control of the country’s purse strings.”

The House of Representatives considered the measure shortly after it was approved by the Senate. Representative Aspin helped garner the support needed among

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61 Shields and Potter, *Dismantling the Cold War*, 44.


63 Shields and Potter, *Dismantling the Cold War*, 44.

64 Nunn and Lugar, “The Nunn-Lugar Initiative,” 145.

65 Shields and Potter, *Dismantling the Cold War*, 44.
his colleagues to ensure the measure passed. The House swiftly approved the bill by a voice vote on November 27, 1991. President George Bush signed the bill into law on December 12, 1991. This was less than a week after the initial steps were underway to formally dissolve the Soviet Union.

All of the funding contained in the Act was discretionary, which meant that spending the approved monies was not mandated. If the administration wished to spend the funds, the approval now existed for them to do so. Logistically, it was decided that the legislation’s activities would be paid for by a “funding mechanism” that enabled monies to be transferred from the Department of Defense’s operation and maintenance (O&M) and working capital accounts. Also, the approval of the bill “did not represent a new appropriation.” There were no new funds provided to DoD, just the permission for DoD to transfer existing appropriated funds from other accounts towards Nunn-Lugar efforts.

The key part of the law that describes the type of approved activities explains that the U.S. should work with the Soviet Union (and its republics or countries formed out of its dissolution) to “(1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other weapons,

66 Carter and Perry, Preventative Defense, 72.
68 Shields and Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 44.
71 Shields and Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 44.
72 Ibid.
(2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons. “73

Other parts of the law are displays of compromise between Nunn and Lugar and the Republicans in both chambers of Congress. The conditions for assistance that are spelled out in the bill capture a number of concerns raised by Republicans.74 These were concessions made by the sponsors of the bill to see to it that the measure got approved. For example, a major concession reflected in the bill was that prior to assistance being provided, the President was required to certify to Congress that the country receiving help was committed to:

(1) making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons; (2) forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; (3) forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons; (4) facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out under section 212; (5) complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and (6) observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.75

Senator Jesse Helms, a Republican from North Carolina, championed getting these conditions included in the legislation. Since it would have been virtually impossible to certify all these conditions in the chaotic and dynamic environment the newly


74 Shields and Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 45.

emerging nations were facing, adding the words “committed to” was the final compromise for the bill to be passed.  

The amazing feat of changing Congressional opinion so drastically over such a short course of time was a truly historical accomplishment for Senators Nunn and Lugar. Passage of this legislation was the first giant step towards assisting with the dismantlement of the FSU’s massive WMD arsenals. The real work, however, was just beginning. Now that the legislative groundwork had been laid, policies and programs to actually implement the activities spelled out in the bill had to be developed and coordinated. This effort would require extensive flexibility and cooperation both within the U.S. government and in working with foreign governments.

Senators Nunn and Lugar were eager to maintain momentum after the impressive accomplishment of getting their legislation passed and signed into law. After all, their sense of urgency was rooted in the very real crisis that was unfolding in the Soviet Union. Now that the legal approval and groundwork was laid out for them, they turned their attention towards developing specific policies and initiatives within the legislation to achieve the law’s goal.

On the day the legislation was signed into law, the Secretary of State announced that Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State, would serve as the main coordinator of the U.S.’s aid to the FSU. Secretary Baker also described plans to rally international support for meeting the immediate needs of the newly formed states. This

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76 Bernstein and Wood, The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction, 8.
77 Ibid., 9.
78 Ibid., 8-9.
support, which began with inviting NATO members and other allies to the U.S. for a
conference to plan assistance, was another means of garnering backing for the activities
outlined in the Nunn-Lugar legislation.\textsuperscript{79}

In January of 1992, Senators Nunn and Lugar began planning a Congressional
delegation (CODEL) trip to check in on the progress of implementing the legislation. The
plan was for the trip to focus on improving political and economic relations, encouraging
democratization, converting military industries into commercial ones, and fast-tracking
the elimination of WMD in the newly formed states. As the weeks passed leading up to
the trip, the FSU and newly created states were sending appeals for assistance, but the
funds that had been approved in late 1991, much to the Senator’s frustration, had not
even been obligated. A major hold up in funding disbursement was that the president had
not provided to Congress the required certification, as required by the law. He had not
provided the mandatory materials to show Capitol Hill that the states had met the
conditions spelled out in the Nunn-Lugar legislation.\textsuperscript{80}

Trip attendees included Senators Nunn and Lugar, as well as Senators John
Warner and Jeff Bingaman, both members of the SASC.\textsuperscript{81} William Perry, Ashton Carter,
David Hamburg and three staffers (Bell, Myers, and Combs), all integral players in the
creation and passage of Nunn-Lugar, joined the Senators. The leaders of the nations the
group visited were enthusiastic to understand more about the program and to meet the

\textsuperscript{79} Nunn and Lugar, “The Nunn-Lugar Initiative,” 145-146.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 146-147.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 146.
key players behind the legislation.\textsuperscript{82} Trip activities included a tour of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, meetings with numerous U.S. business people working on projects with Russian entities, and multiple defense and research-related meetings in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{83}

The trip report from the March CODEL became a foundation for the next passage of Nunn-Lugar legislation. The report was filled with numerous specific recommendations, honing in on topics such as expanding focus from Russia to the other new states, keeping an eye on chemical weapon destruction, and speeding up the military to commercial conversion processes. The overarching theme and summary of the report was that there was a dire need for the U.S. government to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with the newly independent states (NIS). This strategy, the senators argued, must address the destruction of the NIS’s WMDs, but must also address the nations’ frail and struggling economies.\textsuperscript{84}

The report’s recommendations were so compelling that, after briefing numerous administration officials on their trip, Nunn and Lugar eventually briefed President Bush on the CODEL.\textsuperscript{85} During the briefing, the president explained his initial hesitation about trying to address this issue on the Hill during an election year. However, he decided this was an opportunity the U.S. could not afford to pass. He had the Secretary of State compile a comprehensive package to be considered by Congress and promised the

\textsuperscript{82} Carter and Perry, \textit{Preventative Defense}, 72.

\textsuperscript{83} Nunn and Lugar, “The Nunn-Lugar Initiative,” 147.

\textsuperscript{84} Bernstein and Wood, \textit{The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction}, 9.

senators his personal support for the aid package.\textsuperscript{86} By early April, the State Department had put together the “Freedom Support Act” and sent it to Capitol Hill for consideration.\textsuperscript{87}

The aid package presented to Congress, the contents of which were based almost entirely on the CODEL trip report, provided new authority for activities such as “defense conversion, environmental cleanup, and housing assistance for displaced Soviet strategic weapons officers.”\textsuperscript{88} $400 million was added to the previous year’s $400 million, providing $800 million total.\textsuperscript{89} The Act also added $105.8 million in development and humanitarian assistance. These funds were to be handled and managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development.\textsuperscript{90}

Even though many Republicans in both chambers objected to using U.S. defense funds for these types of activities, the Democrats were the majority at the time and had enough votes to override any opposition. Since Senator Nunn chaired the SASC, he was able to ensure the addition of these authorities to the FY1993 Defense Authorization Bill. The other authoritative committees included the HASC and Senate and House Appropriations Committees. All three supported the legislation, paving the way for its approval.\textsuperscript{91} In July, the Senate passed the Act with 76 in favor and 20 opposed. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} Bernstein and Wood, \textit{The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction}, 9-10.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Nunn and Lugar, “The Nunn-Lugar Initiative,” 149.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Shields and Potter, \textit{Dismantling the Cold War}, 45.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Nunn and Lugar, “The Nunn-Lugar Initiative,” 149.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Bernstein and Wood, \textit{The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction}, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Shields and Potter, \textit{Dismantling the Cold War}, 45.
\end{itemize}
House voted 232 in favor and 164 opposed in early October. On October 24, President Bush signed the bill, making it Public Law No. 102-511.\(^92\)

Shortly after President William Clinton’s election in November 1992, Senators Nunn and Lugar took a second CODEL to the region. By this time, the economic and political situation in Russia had deteriorated to new lows and was threatening stability in the entire region.\(^93\) In one week, the group visited seven leaders in seven countries.\(^94\)

The group’s findings were extremely troubling, despite encouraging interest in learning how to improve on many fronts from most of the nations visited. Russian leaders detailed concerns about command and control of strategic nuclear weapons now deployed in Ukraine. The situation was so dire that Russia was considering relinquishing responsibility for the safety of those nuclear weapons.\(^95\) In Belarus, a senior official told the CODEL about a case where nuclear material was caught being smuggled from Belarus into Poland.\(^96\) He accurately described this as a “chance interception” and requested technical help from the U.S. to improve control mechanisms at the borders and on exports.\(^97\) Cases like these were also being described in intelligence reports coming out of Germany. These reports described smuggling of fissile material between Russia,


\(^{94}\) Nunn and Lugar, “The Nunn-Lugar Initiative,” 150.

\(^{95}\) Ibid.

\(^{96}\) Ibid.

\(^{97}\) Ibid., 151.
the Middle East, and North Africa. Another problem was the numerous highly trained nuclear scientists who, in the unstable conditions of the FSU, were now jobless.98

On a positive note, the leaders of the new nations that inherited nuclear weapons from the FSU (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) made clear their intent to rid their nations of the weapons.99 When visiting the seven nations, requests were made for help on a number of fronts: assistance in getting rid of nuclear weapons, establishing stable market economies, and converting military complexes into civilian ones.100

When the group returned to the U.S. from their trip, they produced yet another integral CODEL report emphasizing the need for swift action in the region to meet the needs of the nations and work to prevent catastrophe.101 The report stressed the need for a more aggressive approach than the Bush Administration had been providing. Upon their return, the two senators also wrote another column in the Washington Post to put the issue in the spotlight and help rally public support for the troubled region, while public attention had largely moved on to other crises around the world.102 Like their 1991 column, the senators again used the approach of publicly outlining their concerns and specific recommendations:

Our understandable national focus on the human tragedy in Somalia and Bosnia must not divert our attention from events in the former Soviet Union that will affect our vital national security interests for generations to come...What is now required...is (1) an overall strategy that integrates all aspects of our policy toward the former Soviet Union and (2) careful, Washington-based management of this

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98 Ibid.
100 Nunn and Lugar, “The Nunn-Lugar Initiative,” 150.
strategy...Our specific recommendations include...there must be no recess, no
time-out in formulating and implementing a national strategy...all aspects of our
policy for this part of the world should be organized under one high-level
coordinator, reporting to the secretary of state and the president, who is
responsible for the overall effort and can cut across departmental lines, who
works closely with the U.S. business community and who has no other
substantive responsibilities. This should be an early priority for the Clinton
administration.103

The article went on to describe other specific defense-related, economic, and
humanitarian activities the U.S. should engage in with the FSU.104 The report also built in
greater detail on the importance of ratifying the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START), which would enable the acceleration of weapons dismantlement. It also calls
for the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, at the time nuclear weapons
states, to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states.105
The senators briefed a number of senior officials on their recommendations outlined in
the article and report. Even though it was weeks away from the end of President Bush’s
time in office, they also met again with him to discuss on their recommendations.106

A number of promising developments occurred when President Clinton took
office in early 1993. Support for Nunn-Lugar activities came from the State Department,
the National Security Council, and the Vice President’s Office. Key players that had
played integral roles in the development of Nunn-Lugar legislation were put in high-level
positions to work effectively on achieving the legislation’s goals. Les Aspin, cosponsor

http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/

104 Ibid.


of the 1991 unsuccessful attempt to move threat reduction legislation through Congress, was named the new secretary of defense.\textsuperscript{107} William Perry and Ashton Carter, both crucial in the passage and implementation of Nunn-Lugar laws, were named Deputy Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Defense, respectively.\textsuperscript{108} Perry later took over as Secretary of Defense in February 1994.\textsuperscript{109}

Carter was responsible for working Nunn-Lugar activities within the Pentagon, signaling the White House’s commitment to the program. This appointment also enabled the threat reduction “enterprise to become institutionalized within the Department of Defense.”\textsuperscript{110} The office that Carter took over needed major structural revamping. One branch of the office had focused on targeting the Soviet Union and another on negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviets. None of the offices, though, “had ever assisted the Soviet Union; a whole new organization had to be set up for Nunn-Lugar.”\textsuperscript{111} Fortunately there was support from the top for Carter to set up an office dedicated solely to coordinating Nunn-Lugar activities. This organization was within his counterproliferation and nuclear security office.\textsuperscript{112}

The Clinton administration was responsible for terming the Nunn-Lugar program “cooperative threat reduction (CTR).”\textsuperscript{113} As it became clear that CTR needed to be a

\textsuperscript{107} Shields and Potter, \textit{Dismantling the Cold War}, 47.

\textsuperscript{108} Bernstein and Wood, \textit{The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction}, 11.


\textsuperscript{110} Bernstein and Wood, \textit{The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction}, 11.

\textsuperscript{111} Carter and Perry, \textit{Preventative Defense}, 73.

\textsuperscript{112} Bernstein and Wood, \textit{The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction}, 11.

\textsuperscript{113} Shields and Potter, \textit{Dismantling the Cold War}, 47.
more thoughtful, long-term endeavor, the program was given its own line in the FY1994 Department of Defense budget. This was a major positive development and meant that CTR now had its own, dedicated budget and was a huge step for establishing a solid foundation for CTR. The approach used to fund the FY 1992 and 1993 legislation was done away with. Funding for those two years was discretionary and the actual money, if decided to be put towards the initiatives, had to be reprogrammed or transferred from somewhere else in the Defense budget.

Another major accomplishment of the new administration was getting the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to sign the Lisbon Protocol on March 23, 1992. This meant that these three nations were now parties to START. By being signatories to START, these nations would have to, over time, reduce their nuclear arsenals and dismantle their weapons systems. They also pledged that their nations would abide by the NPT as soon as feasibly possible.

Even though the presidents signed the agreement, their own parliaments had to approve the agreement. By early 1993, Ukraine and Kazakhstan began to tell the U.S. they were having reservations about giving up their weapons and were not sure that the parliaments were on board with becoming signatories to START. In response, the White House offered significant CTR support in exchange for swift denuclearization and ratification of START. This reaction set an important precedent that CTR program participation and funds could be used as rewards or incentives for countries to take certain actions the U.S. wanted taken. Using CTR in this fashion did not necessarily

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115 Shields and Potter, *Dismantling the Cold War*, 47.
116 Ibid.
contradict the core of the program. It did, however, deviate from the initial Congressional understanding that the Nunn-Lugar program was created primarily for U.S. security reasons and to technologically assist with destroying WMDs. \(^{117}\)

Another important issue that had to be addressed as CTR gained momentum over its first few years was whether the Department of Defense was the appropriate department to provide funding and management to CTR activities. Carter and Perry believed the Department of Defense was the appropriate administrator of the program. First, they argued that it was primarily militaries that the U.S. had to work with to complete CTR work. They also noted that DOD housed the expertise and know-how to do the actual weapons dismantlement work outlined in CTR. \(^{118}\)

Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch had been in charge of the White House’s lobbying for CTR funds in 1994. He decided this was a legitimate enough concern that it needed some attention. He succeeded in getting interagency agreement to transfer three of the major CTR programs (under which were four individual programs) from the Defense Department to the Departments of Energy and State. This move began in FY 1995 and meant that the funding for those three programs would now come out of the Energy and State Departments budgets. \(^{119}\) When Republicans became the majority party in late 1994, they were unsatisfied and continued their push to move what they viewed as non-defense related CTR activities out of the Defense budget. Defense Secretary Perry and his colleagues insisted to lawmakers that the types of activities

\(^{117}\) Ibid., 47-48.

\(^{118}\) Carter and Perry, Preventative Defense, 75.

\(^{119}\) Shields and Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 49.
Congress wanted moved out of DOD, like developing a storage facility for fissile material in Russia, were “defense by another means.”

There were two programs transferred to Department of Energy (DOE). The first was a program between U.S. national laboratories, whose funding is provided by DOE, and Russian equivalents to create measures to improve and enhance Russian nuclear facility’s fissile material security. A smaller government-to-government program between DOE and the Russian equivalent was also transferred to DOE. The two programs that became the State Department’s responsibility were the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and a program that helped the NIS protect their critical technologies by developing more thorough export controls. The ISTC was a personnel program that helped former Soviet military scientists redirect their expertise on nonmilitary opportunities.

Another potential stumbling block that had to be delicately handled was the establishment of mutual, shared objectives for the program. For the program to be a lasting success, the U.S. and NIS obviously had to see benefits of the specific activities within the program. This involved extensive negotiations between Carter’s staff and the staffs within the NIS. A recurring underlying allegation that came up during these negotiations was that the U.S. was taking advantage of their former enemy’s weakness and trying to uncover their military secrets. Since this was not the case, the U.S. had to be patient with these countries and make sure programs enabled them to “shield their

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120 Ibid., 55.
121 Shields and Potter, *Dismantling the Cold War*, 49-50.
122 Ibid., 50.
military secrets” from U.S. personnel. The timeline of NIS signatures on aid implementation agreements is a testament to how timely and challenging negotiations were: the U.S. and Russia signed an implementation agreement enabling CTR work to begin in June of 1992, Belarus in October of 1992, and Kazakhstan and Ukraine in late 1993.

As the Pentagon began the herculean task of planning execution on the CTR program activities, they had to develop a way to handle acquisitions. Mismanagement of the CTR funds would undoubtedly be a catastrophic setback for the program with the potential of killing the program altogether. Even in the best case scenario, officials would face extreme questioning and programmatic delays on Capitol Hill, where support for CTR was already unstable and any opportunity to dismantle the ground-breaking program would be taken by CTR’s opponents.

The NIS were already facing extensively grueling inspections and audits, as required by the Defense Department’s legal office. This was especially difficult to do with the NIS because these nations were in the midst of an historic revolution and had extremely young governments whose structures and protocols were still in the process of being established. DOD’s acquisition system was being challenged to accomplish something never attempted before: managing multimillion-dollar projects in newly formed countries that were recent former enemies where the U.S. had zero experience doing business.

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John Deutch and Harold Smith led the Pentagon’s acquisition office. They decided the best way to handle this challenge was to create an entire new organization whose purpose was solely to work the contracting of Nunn-Lugar programs. To staff this office, they specifically sought out “personnel who could be inspired by the challenge of doing something that history had never before permitted.”

These major adaptations, although often cumbersome, controversial, and the cause of frequent infighting, helped lay the foundation for CTR to withstand the test of time. The forward-thinking of CTR’s initial supporters enabled the creation of a framework that could allow the program to expand and change as needed over years to come. This proved to be the case, as the program adapted to the ebbs and flows of Congressional interests, administration changes, and geo-political developments around the world.

In the years after the program was launched and before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, CTR continued to accomplish great feats and make encouraging progress in the former Soviet Union. In 1996, Senator Pete Domenici, a Republican from New Mexico, joined Senators Nunn and Lugar in creating a response to new warnings that had been released about threats specific to chemical and biological weapons. As a result of their lobbying efforts, Congress approved an expansion of CTR and provided funding for new activities to counter the threats. Most of the new activities were focused specifically on preventing the proliferation of WMDs in the FSU.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.}\]

Beyond the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, programs were added to CTR throughout the 1990’s, at times in response to the NIS requests and other times out of U.S. concerns about particular issues within the NIS.\footnote{Ibid.} In 1998, Russia was suffering a severe financial crisis and was unable to pay hundreds of thousands of government employees. Many of the workers that were no longer being paid were responsible for the security of Russia’s military programs, including ones related to weapons security. In President Clinton’s State of the Union address in 1999, he responded to the crisis by requesting another significant expansion of CTR. Although Congress did not increase funding by as much as the White House requested, they did provide significant increases over the next two years.\footnote{Ibid.}

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush requested that CTR funding be significantly increased. Congress responded in October of 2001 with the largest program increase since the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici funding growth. Equally important for CTR’s future, the White House released the results of a CTR review that had been launched in early 2001. With the announcement of that a review would take place, some officials reportedly commented they questioned the value of the program. However, in December of 2001, the Bush Administration released their review and commended CTR programs, saying that most of them “work well, are focused on priority tasks, and are well managed.”\footnote{Felton and Morrison, \textit{The Nunn-Lugar Vision: 1992-2002}, 12.}

In the years following the 9/11 attacks, focus continued on preventing terrorist attacks and especially attacks involving WMDs. A key development occurred in the FY
2004 National Defense Authorization Act: Congress approved $50 million to be spent in nations outside the FSU. However, this was slow to take off and towards the end of 2006, Albania was the only non-FSU country that had been engaged. Approximately $38.5 million was spent there destroying stockpiles of chemical weapons.\(^{131}\)

In a move to encourage the expansion of CTR, in 2010 Senator Lugar led a group of Pentagon officials and arms control experts to Africa to work on securing lethal biological agents that could be used as weapons.\(^ {132}\) Since the Soviets obtained many of their biological specimens for their own biological weapons program from Africa, the decision to secure dangerous materials there was a logical move.\(^ {133}\) While in Africa, the group visited Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi.\(^ {134}\)

The Africa visit is just an example of the push to expand CTR to other regions and to address emerging threats, whatever they may be. President Barack Obama highlighted the expansion of the program in a December 2012 speech to celebrate CTR’s 20\(^{th}\) anniversary:

\[\ldots\] We haven’t just sustained programs like Nunn-Lugar over the past four years. We’ve worked with all of you to strengthen it, expanding it to some 80 nations, far beyond the old Soviet Union -- moving ahead with the destruction of chemical


\(^{134}\) Ibid., 3.
weapons -- partnering with others, countries from Africa to Asia and global health organizations to prevent the spread of deadly diseases and bioterrorism.\textsuperscript{135}

CTR has an incredibly impressive track record over the past two decades that is full of tangible results, such as: 7610 warheads deactivated, 902 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles destroyed, and 48 nuclear weapons carrying submarines destroyed. Those figures are just a sampling of the remarkable destruction of WMDs the program has achieved.\textsuperscript{136} Equally important, there are also intangible results from the program that can never be measured or easily documented. It will never be 100\% clear the exact role the CTR program played in the prevention of a devastating attack, particularly as the Soviet Union collapsed and weapons were spread across the region with unclear command control systems in place. The fact that there has not been an attack with FSU WMD materials is amazing and CTR certainly deserves significant credit for the role the program played in that prevention.

In this chapter, there was a discussion on how exactly CTR was created and who played pivotal roles in its formation. This chapter also reviewed roadblocks that had to be overcome for the program to survive, as well as key changes made to the program over the course of its existence. The geographical area of area of focus for Chapter I was CTR activities in the former Soviet Union. Chapter II will broaden the discussion by exploring U.S. nonproliferation activities and support in other parts of the world. In some cases these are CTR programs that have recently expanded outside the FSU and in other cases the chapter will examine programs outside the CTR umbrella.


\textsuperscript{136} Nuclear Threat Initiative, \textit{The Nunn Lugar Vision}, 4.
CHAPTER II

U.S. NONPROLIFERATION ENGAGEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD

Since the early 1990’s, the former Soviet Union (FSU) has been a focal point for U.S. concerns regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated components: facilities, delivery systems, materials, and expertise. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided a unique opportunity to engage this region in mutually beneficial activities to secure, dismantle, and destroy WMDs and their attributes. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, with its numerous programs targeting specific areas of concern, provided the vehicle for this engagement.

As the region began to stabilize and CTR work with the FSU was successfully underway, lawmakers and other government leaders began to identify the need for similar types of engagement with countries outside the FSU. Many nations around the world either had WMDs, their components, or expertise on their soil or were threats for these materials being trafficked through their country. Depending on factors such as the country’s internal security mechanisms surrounding the WMD programs and the nation’s relations with the U.S., some countries were solid targets to work with on reducing the WMD threat.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. support for developing and expanding programs to engage other nations in activities to secure WMD materials grew exponentially. Leaders were terrified by the idea of a terrorist attack like 9/11 happening again, and potentially involving WMDs. The U.S. was willing to invest in helping to secure WMDs in other nations: our allies and even countries not traditionally considered friends of the U.S. The U.S. also had a vested interest in helping other nations prevent
attacks involving WMDs, which included a wide array of anti-trafficking measures, detection systems, and other preventative countermeasures.

There are a number of programs operated and funded by the U.S. government that work, in a variety of different ways, to decrease the threat of a WMD attack. These programs fall under different departments within the U.S. government and vary by specific programmatic missions. The commonality among these programs is that they are all working with and in countries around the world to reduce WMD threats.

The Department of Energy (DOE) is one of the departments that houses and supports programs to reduce WMD threats. DOE has a deep history of working with nuclear weapons components, dating back to the weapon’s origins. Their work in the WMD arena focuses on nuclear and radiological threats. These programs are operated by an agency within DOE called the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Congress established NNSA in 2000 to manage the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation programs.¹

The First Line of Defense is an NNSA program that provides a Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program (MPC&A) to Russian and former Soviet nuclear sites. The goal of this program is to improve and enhance the security of actual nuclear weapons and materials where they reside. The program provides updates to the nuclear site’s material protection, control, and accounting systems.²


NNSA also operates a program called the Second Line of Defense (SLD). The two main components of SLD are the Core Program and the Megaports Initiative.\(^3\) The Core Program “installs radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and strategic feeder ports in Russia, former Soviet Union states, and other key countries.”\(^4\) The program has achieved great successes in coordinating with over 20 countries to enhance their radiological detection capabilities, which includes: fixed radiation detectors, handheld detectors, communications tools, and personnel training.\(^5\) As of 2012, over 500 international ports and border crossing sites had radiation detection equipment installed under this program. This figure includes each of the 383 Russian customs sites. By 2018, the program is scheduled to have about 650 sites equipped in roughly 30 nations.\(^6\)

The second program under NNSA’s SLD, the Megaports Initiative, works with an array of personnel in foreign countries to “systematically enhance detection capabilities for special nuclear and other radioactive materials in containerized cargo transiting the global maritime shipping network.”\(^7\) Services provided by this program to major international seaports include radiation detection equipment, alarm communications systems, maintenance coverage, technical support, and training for major foreign personnel.


\(^5\) Ibid.


seaports, alarm communications. By 2016, the program plans to equip 100 seaports around the world and scan “50% of global maritime containerized cargo and over 80% of U.S.-bound container traffic.”8 As of 2012, installation is complete at 27 ports around the world and underway in 16 ports.9

To begin Megaports Initiative work, NNSA developed a Maritime Prioritization Model that took into consideration a number of factors to prioritize the ports around the world and help make best use of resources. When NNSA has decided to reach out to a nation, their personnel engages in bilateral discussions and negotiations with the foreign government. In most cases a bilateral agreement formalizes the relationship and then work begins in that nation.10

NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) is home to a number of programs that engage with more than 70 countries “to build international partner capacity to reduce nuclear dangers while promoting beneficial nuclear technology.”11 There are four pillars within the NIS that support various global initiatives: Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, Office of Nuclear Controls, Office of Nuclear Verification, and the Nonproliferation Policy Office. Each of these pillars within NIS has their own set of goals and strategies.12

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9 NNSA, “Megaports Initiative,“


12 Ibid., 5.
In total, through its nonproliferation programs listed here and various others not listed, NNSA has established working relationships with over 100 countries, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).\textsuperscript{13} To help with implementation of these international programs, NNSA has an Office of International Operations in Austria, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine. These offices ensure programs are implemented consistently around the world in accordance with NNSA protocols and guidelines. They also provide support to personnel working on NNSA activities in foreign nations.\textsuperscript{14}

Outside of its structured programs, NNSA, in concert with other U.S. agencies, provides support to nuclear security Centers of Excellence (COE). Establishment of the COE was a direct outcome of President Obama’s April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, where leaders from 47 nations gathered to collaborate on nuclear security.\textsuperscript{15} The communique that followed the Summit acknowledged, among other things:

The need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels for the promotion of nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education, and training; and stress the importance of optimizing international cooperation and coordination of assistance.\textsuperscript{16}

Since the 2010 Summit, the U.S. has worked with India and China, both nuclear


weapons nations, to assist them in establishing their nuclear COE. The Department of Energy coordinated extensively with its interagency partners to seamlessly implement Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) that the U.S. signed with India and China. These MOUs contain the details of the collaboration that will take place on nuclear security related topics.  

Beyond India and China, the type of support provided by the U.S. has varied depending on the specific country, its region, and the needs identified by the nation. Although the IAEA, as an international body, is appropriately the lead for coordinating COE-related activities, the U.S. provides a wide array of support. Examples of U.S. support include assistance with: developing techniques to account for nuclear materials, implementing methods to detect nuclear materials and denotations, establishing national nuclear forensics libraries, and various types of training.  

Like the Department of Energy, the State Department has a host of nonproliferation programs that engage foreign nations to prevent a WMD attack. Many of the State Department’s initiatives reside within its Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN). One of the programs within ISN is called the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). GNDA “is a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols that serve to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and


radiological materials that are out of regulatory control.” 19 The initiative relies on and is relied upon by a number of other nuclear detection assets around the world. 20 Due to the sensitive and complex nature of this program and the coordination with so many external entities, there is limited open source information available.

The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program is another initiative operated within State Department’s ISN. The purpose of EXBS is to work with nations that either possess WMD components or are probable conduits for transit of WMD materials to assist them in developing protective export control systems. The program is funded each year by the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. The State Department can obligate funds to other U.S. government entities or to the private sector to help achieve EXBS program goals. In some cases Program Advisors are stationed in recipient countries, usually as part of the Embassy team for that country. The program currently operates in over 50 countries. 21

A reputable program run by the State Department is called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Specifically called out in President Obama’s famous April 2009 Prague speech, PSI receives tremendous backing from the White House. 22 The goal of PSI is for nations to collaborate with one another to interdict WMD shipments. 23


20 Ibid.


works differently than many other nonproliferation programs. Countries have the option of endorsing PSI. By endorsing the initiative, which over 100 countries has chosen to do, they are committing themselves to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, which provides instruction on things like boarding vessels at sea.  

These nations are expressing a commitment “to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop WMD, their delivery systems, and related items.”

PSI is loosely organized. Nations regularly hold meetings with high-level participation and frequently test interdiction techniques during exercises. Since the program’s debut, the Operational Experts Group informally leads the member nations in discussions and exercise plans. 21 PSI member nations contribute their legal, intelligence, military, law enforcement, and diplomatic experts to help with the decision making process.

For a legally nonbinding initiative that relies on preexisting national authorities and international laws, PSI has experienced great successes. There have been over 24 interdictions of WMD-related technologies. These interdictions include shipments to Iran. One of PSI’s high profile interdictions involved a North Korean vessel heading for Myanmar. Since the vessel was flagged as Belize, perhaps to throw off the intelligence

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25 State Department, “Proliferation Security Initiative.”

26 Nikitin, Proliferation Security Initiative, 5.


community, and they are a PSI member, Belize gave the U.S. permission to board the vessel in accordance with PSI agreements. Although the vessel ended up not being boarded, the ship returned to North Korea and did not complete its shipment to Myanmar.29

Another program within the State Department is called the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI). This program’s goal is “to enhance partnerships with key countries around the world to strengthen capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling.”30 The initiative strives to identify the nations around the world that play key roles in preventing nuclear smuggling. The NSOI team engages with individual governments and reaches agreement on the present capabilities of that nation as they relate to preventing nuclear smuggling. Then the team examines how the nation is working with other U.S. and international programs. This analysis helps identify the capability gaps that NSOI will strive to address.31

NSOI’s accomplishments are impressive. They have finished Joint Action Plans and established bilateral projects in the following countries: Armenia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Slovakia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Plans are underway in many other countries with several additional engagements planned for the future.32


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
An interesting component of NSOI is their donor program. Part of what NSOI strives to achieve is soliciting support from other foreign nations and organizations that have a vested interest in nuclear smuggling prevention like the U.S. These nations and groups provide different types of support to the projects that NSOI has developed. The donor entity is then profiled on NSOI’s website with details on the type of support they have provided. Donors to NSOI include: Canada, Czech Republic, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, IAEA, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.33

The State Department operates a unique program called the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). Under this initiative, U.S. government agencies or State Department offices can submit project proposals with detailed information on the threat and proposed remedial action. Under Section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act, funding is provided annually in the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs appropriation. A review panel makes decisions on proposals and a project implementation team has a number of tasks which include negotiating details with the foreign country where work will be done. NDF offers the flexibility to quickly engage with other countries to mitigate risks related to nonproliferation. The types of cases NDF usually accepts are situations that have not been anticipated and therefore unlikely budgeted for in agencies annual budget requests. NDF cases are typically extremely

difficult, sensitive situations and of tremendous importance to U.S. national security interests and administration goals.\textsuperscript{34}

Another office within ISN is the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, now referred to as Global Threat Reduction (GTR). The two GTR programs are Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) and the Chemical Security Engagement Program. The mission of BEP is “to develop cooperative international programs that promote the safe, secure, and responsible use of biological materials that are at risk of accidental release or intentional misuse.”\textsuperscript{35} BEP has worked extensively with FSU nations, Iraq, and Libya. Beyond these countries, the program’s pilot projects were: Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, Yemen, and Egypt. By rolling out programs in these countries, BEP exhibited the capability to effectively work in the two differing regions of the Middle East and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{36}

There are many types of frameworks for assistance to be offered by BEP. One way is through pathogen security and biosafety projects, which involves U.S. collaboration with a foreign nation’s bioscience laboratory. Under BEP, the U.S. can also provide training for foreign personnel on biosecurity topics that encourage meaningful safeguards and safety protocols at the nation’s laboratories. Assistance with surveillance and diagnostics, as well as standards development is offered within BEP. Lastly, BEP

\textsuperscript{34} State Department, “Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund,” \url{http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ndf/} (accessed February 12, 2013).


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 7.
operates a Grants Assistance Program. If an initiative advances BEP’s agenda, a nation can submit a proposal to be considered for grant funding.  

The Chemical Security Engagement Program (CSEP) works with 21 nations around the world, to include countries like Afghanistan, Indonesia, Lebanon and Algeria. The program strives to engage with foreign nations to provide them assistance with: improving chemical safety in laboratories, collaborating with local chemical industries to protect hazardous materials, encouraging collaborations for peaceful purposes between chemical professionals, and establishing best practices in chemical weapons-related operations. CSEP also provides three types of grants programs: travel grant funding, chemical security improvement grants, and chemical security and safety training grants.

One of the Department of Defense’s non-CTR programs that has experienced great successes is called the International Counter Proliferation (ICP) Program. The program’s original parameters were “to prevent the acquisition and proliferation of WMD by organized crime and other organizations in Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries and


the states of the former Soviet Union." Since its inception, the program has expanded both in its scope and geographical areas of interest.

The program currently works with countries to enhance nation’s prevention and counter proliferation capabilities as they relate to WMD. The program also provides aid to nations to support their internal efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to the full spectrum of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical crimes. Assistance comes in the form of equipment, guidance, and training. The overarching goal of the ICP program is to develop a cooperative relationship with both the nation and its internal agencies. By the establishment of this mutually beneficial relationship, the hope is that universal counter proliferation goals are more likely to be realized. In terms of geographical expansion, the program works with over 30 nations across the globe, in countries like Cyprus, Mexico, and Singapore.

There are a few unique characteristics to the ICP program that have helped it succeed in working with foreign countries. The Department of Defense requires establishment of a government-to-government agreement specific to counter proliferation. This agreement must be in place before the U.S. can deliver any equipment to the nation. The utility of these counter proliferation agreements expands beyond use within the ICP program. Because the agreements required under the ICP program exhibit a commitment by the nation at the highest level to prevent the proliferation and

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trafficking of WMDs and their components, the agreements have been utilized by other U.S. governmental entities to coordinate their own WMD programs with the nation. Additionally, the State Department has granted DOD authority to negotiate directly with foreign governments being engaged by the ICP program.\textsuperscript{44}

The ICP program is not a military-to-military program, even though it is operated by the Department of Defense. The program relies heavily on coordination with other U.S. government agencies and offices, to include: the FBI, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Department of Energy. Subject matter experts are also brought in to provide assistance with training. These experts provide specialized knowledge in areas like first response (fire and medical), WMD policy, and hazardous materials. The host nation also has a diverse group of personnel that participates in training and exercises, exposing as many appropriate individuals to the information as possible.\textsuperscript{45}

The newest of relevant departments, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), also has a few initiatives that coordinate with foreign governments. One of these is the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Although the office primarily focuses on domestic detection of a nuclear event, according to their mission they are also responsible for “coordinating the development of the global nuclear detection and

\textsuperscript{44} Moroney, et al., \textit{Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program}, 66.

\textsuperscript{45} Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “Making the World Safer, One Border at a Time.”
reporting architecture, with partners from federal, state, local, and international
governments and the private sector.\textsuperscript{46}

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is operated by DHS. This initiative
focuses on scanning cargo in other nations being shipped to the U.S., as a protective
measure for the U.S. The goal of the program is not as much about building capacities in
our partner nations as it is about immediately ensuring the detection of WMD-related
shipments are stopped before arriving at U.S. ports. However, under CSI, DHS still had
to work with foreign countries to set up their 58 operational ports scattered throughout
North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{47}

The last initiative this chapter will examine is called the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540 (1540). In April of 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously
adopted 1540.\textsuperscript{48} According to the resolution’s text, the nations that signed 1540 are
obligated to:

\begin{quote}
\ldots Refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to
develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery...adopt and enforce
appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture,
acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their means of delivery...take and enforce effective
measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery...develop and
maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in
production, use, storage or transport; develop and maintain appropriate effective
physical protection measures; develop and maintain appropriate effective border
controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{46} Department of Homeland Security, “About the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,”


including through international cooperation when necessary...establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items....

Although an incredibly ambitious set of tasks, there has been encouraging progress made around the world. In the case of the United States, there is a tremendous amount of work already being done on many of the obligations outlined in 1540. In 2006, the U.S. completed a National Action Plan to guide its compliance with 1540. Currently being reviewed and updated from its 2006 version, the Plan explains the U.S.’s intent to continue work in a variety of capacities with partner nations. In particular, the U.S. plans to utilize regional organizations whenever possible. Examples of these international organizations that are regionally operated include: the ASEAN Regional Forum, the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Organization of American State, and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe.\textsuperscript{50}

In April 2011, the U.N. Committee responsible for implementation of 1540 was extended for an additional 10 years, via Resolution 1977.\textsuperscript{51} A few months later, the Committee visited Washington, DC to meet with U.S. officials and review its fulfillment of 1540 obligations. This revolutionary type of visit gave the U.S. an opportunity to come together and present its work on various fronts and on a number of topics.\textsuperscript{52} 1540 could provide the U.S. a unique opportunity to better organize its nonproliferation activities

\textsuperscript{49} State Department, “Resolution 1540 (2004),” \url{http://www.state.gov/t/isn/73519.htm} (accessed February 13, 2013).

\textsuperscript{50} State Department, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” \url{http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm} (accessed February 13, 2013).


\textsuperscript{52} State Department, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540.”
under the umbrella of 1540. Since so much of what is called for under 1540 is already
being done by the U.S., complying with 1540 provides a chance for the U.S. to get a
better grasp of the scope of nonproliferation activities already underway by various
government entities.

This chapter reviewed numerous nonproliferation programs and initiatives
operated by U.S. departments and agencies. Specifically, the programs reviewed engage
foreign nations to help build their capacities to counter WMD threats in a variety of ways.
The review was by no means a comprehensive list of nonproliferation programs operated
by the U.S. government. Rather, it was a concrete sampling of programs and activities to
shed light on the various types of work already established and underway. Chapter III
will discuss the need to develop a mechanism to synchronize and coordinate the various
activities underway. This will ensure funds are put to the best use by reducing
redundancy and will also promote information sharing between U.S. programs and
activities.
CHAPTER III

THE NEED FOR COORDINATION OF CTR AND NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Given the multitude of nonproliferation activities established within various U.S. governmental departments and agencies, the need for an umbrella entity to ensure synchronization of these related activities is clear. Additionally, the continuing emergence of new WMD-related threats around the world creates the dire need for prompt U.S. responses that are executed within an informed, flexible, well-communicated approach. The successes of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program provide an incredibly useful reference model and building block when developing a coordinating mechanism for nonproliferation activities. However, CTR in its current form is too limited in scope, both geographically and programmatically, to serve as the solution to the U.S.’s complex and diverse needs in meeting the challenges within the nonproliferation arena.

Simply expanding CTR or broadening the program’s scope is not the answer for the type of umbrella solution needed to oversee all U.S. nonproliferation work and identify gaps, redundancies, and opportunities for collaboration. Rather than a solution, an expanded CTR is an example of yet another stovepipe of activity to coordinate under the umbrella solution. There are numerous U.S. projects, programs, and initiatives that do not fall under the domain of CTR. A concrete sampling of these non-CTR programs were provided in Chapter II. There are also emerging needs that cannot be met in CTR’s legal and programmatic structure in its current state or in an easily modified state in the foreseeable future.
However, CTR is an established U.S. program that has, for the most part, fulfilled its mission over the years. The type of framework that CTR operates within has components that would be necessary in a solution to coordinate all U.S. nonproliferation activities. More importantly, pressure to expand CTR has resulted in important recommendations to broaden the scope of CTR. Pieces of this research can be put to use when constructing the U.S.’s solution to the bigger-picture nonproliferation coordination problem.

The most important example of this type of research is a report titled, “Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction.” This report has fueled most of the momentum for expanding CTR. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to work with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to launch a study to explore and propose ways to expand CTR and make it more a viable foreign policy tool. To meet this requirement, NAS and the National Research Council (NRC) worked with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to carry out the mandated study. In the study, DTRA acted on behalf of the Department of Defense.¹

As work on the study began, the research team found that if the report was to fulfill its purpose in any meaningful sense, the solution or recommendations proposed in the report would have to be based on a whole-of-government approach.² This important finding early on shaped the contents of the report, its findings, recommendations, and proposed model for an expanded CTR. Because this idea became one of the foundations


² Ibid.
of the report, much of the content was built in the spirit of that whole-of-government premise. Therefore, the report is of great utility and relevance to this thesis’s proposition that the varying activities scattered and embedded throughout the government need to be somehow synchronized under an umbrella entity.

Recommendations and findings from the report that are relevant to this thesis’s argument will be introduced in this section. In the next chapter, these components will be revisited and discussed as they relate and apply to the solution that this paper argues. Much of the pertinent content from the plan derives its relevance not from the particular nations or activities being proposed under an expanded CTR, but from the characteristics of the actual model and mechanisms being recommended.

The term CTR 2.0 originates from the report and refers to the model or framework for a new and improved CTR. It describes CTR’s end state if the U.S. accepts the report’s numerous recommendations and findings. In short, CTR 2.0 is a proposed approach for the U.S. to implement in its security engagements around the world. CTR 1.0 is considered CTR in its current form, while CTR 2.0 is considered CTR after the recommended changes are implemented. When CTR 2.0 is referenced, it can be assumed that this plan and its recommendations are at the base of the reference.

A foundational concept of CTR 2.0 is the idea of partnerships. To develop CTR 2.0, the U.S. needs to focus on building mutually beneficial relationships with new and existing U.S. partners. These relationships should focus on sustained, ongoing

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3 Ibid., 8.

4 Ibid., 56.
To support these sustainable relationships, the engaged nations should provide contribution to the work being done in their country. In some cases nations may be required to fund the work being done as a way to support it, while in other cases, especially less developed countries, the support may come in the form of planning or implementation. At any rate, the report argues that U.S. work with and in a nation should be a partnership building process that enhances the nation’s capability to counter WMD threats; the U.S. needs to take in the whole picture of the nation and scope of work being done there by all entities instead of narrowly focus on individual programs.6

The report stresses that the U.S. needs to take into consideration other entities engaged with the partner nation:

As CTR 2.0 programs are implemented, they will need to take into account the myriad of other programs, organizations, and conditions in new high-priority engagement areas. Regional development banks, and assistance programs from countries and organizations that were not part of the calculus in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) may become new partners.7

CTR 2.0 also includes a proposed new way to approach potential partner nations. CTR 1.0 had specific programs and U.S. program offices had established ways of implementing them. This implementation process was usually directed more at U.S. goals and did not always produce positive relationship-building or trust enhancement results. In CTR 2.0, it is proposed that engagements start by the two-way sharing of information. Using this information, the U.S. and its partner can work together to identify specific

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5 Ibid., 2.

6 Ibid., 14.

7 Ibid., 71.
areas of opportunity or risk. Then joint planning can take place to address these opportunities and risks.⁸

The plan’s first useful recommendation is that the White House should direct CTR 2.0. The recommendation is that the director be a senior official within the National Security Council. This suggestion specifies that actual implementation of activities would still occur within the various departments of the U.S. government (USG). It is carefully noted that even though CTR 2.0 should be directed by the White House and implemented by the various USG agencies, it should domestically engage and utilize a wide array of participants. Examples of these participants include academia, industry experts, and nongovernmental organizations.⁹

A separate recommendation builds on the White House’s directing of CTR 2.0. It states that, when opportunities to engage in global security activities emerge, the White House should be the determining authority for which U.S. entity or entities are most appropriate to execute the tasks surrounding the engagement.¹⁰ The inclusion of this language is meant to address past issues within CTR where Congress often instigated turf battles, primarily between Departments of State and Defense. In these instances, departments and Capitol Hill had to spend precious time and resources bickering over which agency was more qualified to implement programs.

The report explains another relevant CTR 2.0 recommendation that addresses grasping the full scope of nonproliferation activity underway throughout the government:

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⁸ Ibid., 58.
⁹ Ibid., 12.
¹⁰ Ibid., 14.
The secretary of defense should direct the review and reformulation of the DOD CTR program in support of CTR 2.0 and work with the White House, secretary of state, secretary of energy, and other cabinet and agency officers to ensure full coordination and effective implementation of DOD programs in CTR 2.0. The review should also include broader military components, including the Unified Combatant Commands, the full set of programs in the Defense Threat Reduction Program, DOD health and research programs, and other DOD assets.\footnote{11 Ibid., 15.}

It is important to point out that this recommendation speaks specifically to the DOD CTR program. It is not stating that the DOD should direct the reformulation of CTR as a whole, only the DOD CTR program. The report differentiates between DOD CTR, which refers to the formal tasks legally assigned to the DOD, and USG CTR, which is the broader set of programs developed over the years that are associated with CTR. USG CTR does not exist solely within the DOD.\footnote{12 Ibid., X.}

In addition to recommendations to reach CTR 2.0, the report also explains the committee’s findings. One finding was that the specific types of activities within an engaged nation did not always indicate awareness for the concerns of the particular country or region. The finding also said that activities with engaged nations were not done with the appropriate long-term concern for relevant U.S. strategic goals or plans.\footnote{13 Ibid., 33.}

Another finding in the report highlights the creativity of CTR 1.0 to meet the unique geopolitical environmental challenges and security concerns regarding the FSU during the 1990’s. The finding stresses that CTR 2.0 requires the same type of innovative
and out-of-the-box thinking. For the CTR 2.0 model to be successful, “a clear connection between the policy intent and program implementation” will be need to be established.14

The report notes that CTR 2.0 needs to be less cumbersome and less effected by USG bureaucracy. This helps ensure limited U.S. funds are spent efficiently. More importantly, it promotes flexible and rapid responses to extremely time sensitive opportunities that may only exist for a short window of time.15

The shifting global environment is detailed in a report finding. This component is important to understand when building a model to address global WMD threats:

The globalized environment will be characterized by the increasingly rapid spread of technology, major changes in how the traditional nation-state structure works or nongovernmental organizations engage, diffusion of threats, and changes in the nature of the threats (including the convergence of technology, new patterns of technologies, Internet-facilitated communications, and complex relationships).16

The Cold War and post-Cold War characteristics of clearly defined enemies, threats, and weapons systems are no longer the makeup of today’s global environment or the global environment for the foreseeable future. CTR 2.0’s structure needs to reflect understanding of that key shift. Because of this environment, the report also mentions a finding that explicitly states that a “diverse set of tools and approaches is needed” and to successfully meet this challenge, CTR 2.0 will have to involve “partners beyond the traditional government players and geostrategic allies.”17

The report stresses the national security advantages of developing sustained partnerships. If the U.S. collaborates with nations in wide variety of ways, such as

14 Ibid., 41.
15 Ibid., 44.
16 Ibid., 53.
17 Ibid., 55.
training opportunities and joint exercises, a strong relationship that produces mutually
beneficial outcomes can result. Oftentimes these relationships founded on a wide array of
activities important to both nations can weather difficult geopolitical or economic
disruptions.\textsuperscript{18}

The CTR 2.0 model calls for built-in flexibility with respect to financial
sustainability of engagements. Building on the report’s proposed means of initially
engaging with partner nations, the report defines specific ways to ensure funding
flexibility. One of the ways is to make sure the initial engagement terms allow for
changes in funding responsibilities. This applies mostly to nations that may not be
positioned to fund work in the early stages. Just because a nation cannot provide financial
support in the beginning stages of work does not mean that their support cannot be
engaged in other means or that they should be forever dismissed as a funding resource.

Engagement frameworks need to be developed in such a way that partner nations
can incrementally step up financial support, provide support later in the project, or adjust
their support as needed throughout the engagement without enormous disruption to the
work. It is also important to note that there may be cases where a nation has plenty of
money to fund an activity, but is completely lacking in technology or manpower to
complete work. This type of situation must be accommodated in the new model.\textsuperscript{19}
Defining this framework is a delicate balance: the U.S. needs to protect itself and ensure,
to the greatest extent possible, that it is making sound investments. However, if
agreements are too rigid and cannot conform to inevitable yet unforeseen ebbs and flows

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 62.
of the relationship over the life of the engagement, the viability of the relationship and activities is at stake.

Another change from CTR 1.0 to CTR 2.0 will be metrics. CTR 1.0 was easy to justify because its accomplishments were, in most cases, very tangible: numbers of warheads dismantled and tons of chemical weapons destroyed, for example. Since CTR 2.0 is more heavily focused on building partnership capacity and constructing strong, long-term, cooperative engagements, it will be more difficult to tangibly document program successes and achievements. However, considering the steep competition for limited available funding, it will be important to develop a way to document CTR 2.0 successes in a reportable, comprehensible manner to justify the program and continued steady funding.\(^\text{20}\)

When it comes to taking into consideration other activities underway in a potential partner nation, it will be important for policy makers in the U.S. to have reliable and comprehensive data on these existing programs. This is absolutely required in order to develop a meaningful and relevant strategy. CTR’s original 1991 legislation mandated a position titled, “Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union.” During CTR’s early days, the budgets and implementation details for all CTR activities were tracked and maintained in a database. The database was not comprehensively maintained and is therefore useless for the purposes of identifying gaps or overlaps in activities, or opportunities for collaboration within similar programs.

Despite efforts by other nations and nongovernmental organizations to track CTR’s detailed information, there is not a place where all of this important programmatic

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 48.
and nation information is recorded and stored, either within or outside of the USG. This deficiency is eloquently summarized in the formal report finding: “The lack of a government-wide tracking program for USG CTR programs that cross agency budgets impedes the U.S. government’s ability to develop a strategic approach to CTR 2.0.”

The CTR 2.0 model will require a strong mechanism for interagency coordination. The report emphasizes the importance of this communication and coordination through a compelling story committee members were told during their study:

The committee was told by an officer in one of the Unified Combatant Commands about a set of visits during 2008 to a Central Asian country by two different programs; one providing border security assistance and the other providing counternarcotics trafficking assistance. Both programs were dealing with the same agencies in the partner government, but unfortunately neither knew about the other’s efforts.

The finding directly addressing this type of issue says that the new global challenges the U.S. faces with respect to WMDs and nonproliferation require a “new model of interagency leadership.” While the overall directing of CTR 2.0 should take place within the White House, productive interagency involvement will be crucial given the wide range of departments and agencies CTR 2.0 involves.

Another important CTR 2.0 model descriptor is that it will have to tailor its approach for each new engagement pursued and for each threat being mitigated. This is especially true, the report notes, for countries hesitant to engage with the U.S. It also

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21 Ibid., 71-72.
22 Ibid., 72.
23 Ibid., 74-75.
24 Ibid., 75.
applies to cases where the infrastructure does not exist to support the full level of technological solutions that would be ideal to implement. Additionally, this tailored approach will be important when working with nations that have hostile political conditions or environments.\textsuperscript{25}

Funding CTR 2.0 activities has been a highly ineffective process in a number of ways. As CTR activities expanded over the life of the program, some departments and agencies whose missions were not heavily focused on national security-related matters were sought out for their expertise. Examples include the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency. The Departments of State (DOS), Defense, and Energy are allowed more flexible spending options because of the legal authorities granted to them by being considered security-related agencies.

If HHS is providing expertise to a DOS CTR project, transferring funds to HHS is cumbersome and inefficient. DOS can spend their funds over the course of three years, but HHS is only allowed to develop budgets on an annual basis and their programs are only set up to manage money in one year increments. The committee was informed about the headache and confusion this has caused over the years, both internally and to the partner being engaged. In addition to the waste of time and manpower these types of issues cause, they prevent a responsive, prompt response to international engagement opportunities.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 77.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 87.
\end{itemize}
The CTR 2.0 preferred solution to this problem is to have the White House work with Congress to grant the necessary authorities for multiyear CTR funding, instead of single year funding. This authority would be granted to all entities that conduct work to support CTR. Additionally, these authorities would allow for direct appropriations to be made to the U.S. organizations providing assistance, instead of providing lump sums of funds to a few departments that are then responsible for transferring and disseminating the money.\(^{27}\)

To further address the funding issues, the report recommends the synchronization of strategic program planning and strategic, multiyear budgeting across all involved U.S. agencies and organizations. In its current form, each agency develops their own budget and submits it to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB looks at each budget independently and adjusts, without CTR-specific expertise, based on the total amount of funding available each fiscal year. No one is looking at all CTR funding to see that appropriate amounts are requested and allocated for each contributing entity. In other words, there is no “referee at the White House level looking across the many agencies and programs that could contribute to CTR 2.0 to determine if adequate resources are going to the programs best able to accomplish the priority tasks.”\(^{28}\)

Comingling authority is addressed as an additional way to mitigate CTR funding issues and promote more convenient, less bureaucratic relations with partner nations. Under the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, any money collected by the U.S. government has to be deposited into the Treasury Department’s General Fund. Congress has allowed what

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 88.
is referred to as comingling authority in specific cases, such as DOE’s Second Line of Defense program. Comingling authority, the report argues, should be granted to all agencies involved in CTR-related work, only for the CTR-related programs. This authority would allow agencies to collect money from partner nations and let the money comeingle with other CTR funds. By granting this, partner nations would not need their own umbrella agreements with the U.S. and it would be significantly easier for nations to contribute financially to the work being done in their country. This authority would especially entice smaller nations that might otherwise not bother engaging in CTR-related activities due to the bureaucratic nightmare of establishing a payment relationship with the U.S. 29

Another provision discussed in the report is called notwithstanding authority. This provision, referred to as an authority, says that certain actions can be taken despite sanctions or legal provisions that might normally slow down engagements or activities. Obtaining this authority would help the U.S. quickly and effectively respond to emerging nonproliferation opportunities around the world. DOS’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), discussed in Chapter II, has been granted notwithstanding authority and as a direct result is able to promptly and dynamically respond to international events. 30

The committee explains their understanding that to be granted full notwithstanding authority is a tall order. Their recommendation is that Congress grant limited notwithstanding authority to CTR. Their suggested way to control the authority is

29 Ibid., 88-89.
30 Ibid., 94.
to approve a percentage of an agency’s overall budget to be put to use under notwithstanding authority, provided notification is given to Congress. The specific recommendation in this report is for a maximum of 10% of an agency’s budget to be used for activities that require notwithstanding authority. This approval, even at only 10%, exponentially enhances the flexibility of the U.S.’s response options.\footnote{Ibid., 95.}

Finally, the report notes an important overarching finding that the transition from CTR 1.0 to CTR 2.0 needs to be defined within the boundaries of a detailed transition plan. This finding is important because it shows an understanding that simply listing numerous ideas for improvement does not get the U.S. from its current CTR state to the goal of CTR 2.0. The transition needs to be thoughtful, documented, and tracked closely by senior leadership until completed.\footnote{Ibid., 65.} The report also highlights the need for a CTR 2.0 strategic plan. It is clearly articulated that without a concise strategic plan and reliable support from senior leaders, CTR 2.0 will be virtually impossible to ever develop and implement.\footnote{Ibid., 69.}

While the Global Security Engagement report is the most comprehensive set of findings and recommendations to make CTR a more coordinated and synchronized USG tool, there are other sources that have strongly argued for the expansion of CTR and for a more organized approach to nonproliferation engagements around the world.

Even before the events of September 11, 2001, Congress was aware of the need for better management of nonproliferation activities. In the spring of 2001, a bill was introduced in the Senate titled the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001.
The bill’s purpose was to “establish within the executive branch of the Government an interagency committee to review and coordinate United States nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union.” As early as 2001, there were so many nonproliferation activities underway just within the domain of CTR in the FSU that Congress found the need to pass a law to help organize and coordinate these activities. Nonproliferation initiatives, both within and outside the confines of CTR, have experienced exponential growth in the years since 9/11, so the need for this type of coordination beyond merely CTR programs is even more pressing than at the time of this legislation.

The bill recommends the coordination committee be comprised of a representative from five departments: DOD, DOS, DOE, Department of Commerce, and the office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Each representative cannot be below the level of Assistant Secretary to that department. The representative for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs chairs the committee and can invite any other department or agency to send a representative to participate in committee activities as needed.

The specific duties of the committee are laid out in the bill:

(1) Arrange for...analyses on the issues and problems relating to coordination within and among United States departments and agencies on nonproliferation efforts...(2) arrange for ...analyses on the issues and problems relating to coordination between the United States public and private sectors on nonproliferation efforts...including coordination between public and private spending on nonproliferation programs...and coordination between public spending and private investment in defense conversion activities...(3) provide guidance on arrangements that will...maximize the utility of United States public

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35 Ibid., 4-5.
spending on nonproliferation programs...to ensure efficiency and further United States national security interests; (4) encourage companies and nongovernmental organizations involved in nonproliferation efforts...to voluntarily report these efforts to the Committee; (5) (A) arrange for the preparation of analyses on the issues and problems relating to the coordination between the United States and other countries with respect to nonproliferation efforts in the [FSU]...and (B)...maximize the utility of United States public spending on nonproliferation programs of the [FSU]...to ensure efficiency (6)...and make recommendations to the President and Congress...relating to United States nonproliferation efforts....

The idea of this committee never fully took off, but there remained pressure to establish some sort of effective coordinating mechanism for the work being done in the FSU. The Bush Administration did not see the need for the committee because there was already a Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee whose function was somewhat similar to that proposed in the bill. It is evident that the Committee did not fully fulfill the duties outlined in the proposed bill or there would not have been insistence from so many to pass the law. Testimony given during hearings on Capitol Hill reflected the White House’s sentiment at that time: the functions detailed in the bill were not distinguishable enough from functions already taking place via other modes, including the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, to legitimize the effort to enact the bill.37

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in December 2010 that, among numerous other things, identified the need for a nonproliferation activity coordinating entity as prescribed by the 2001 bill. The study, titled “Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide,” was conducted by GAO in response to

36 Ibid., 5-7.

President Barack Obama’s announcement in 2009 that he was launching an initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. Some of the activities enveloped in the initiative are CTR programs, while other efforts are not CTR-related.\textsuperscript{38}

The report makes a number of important recommendations for ways to better organize, manage, and understand the wide array of activities underway. As with the CTR 2.0 report, the GAO report hones in on a topic more specific than the big-picture nonproliferation umbrella that is the focus of this thesis. However, the models and approaches recommended have been thoughtfully developed and vetted by a number of government officials. This means that the methods have a significant level of credibility and could feasibly be implemented.

The President’s initiative to lockdown vulnerable nuclear materials in a four-year timeframe required significant interagency planning. The National Security Council (NSC) produced a 7-page document that NSC officials said serves as the government-wide strategy for the President's initiative. Additionally, each individual department developed their own plans, at varying degrees of detail, for achieving the initiative’s objectives.\textsuperscript{39}

We found that the interagency strategy for the 4-year global nuclear material security initiative lacks specific details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the identity of and details regarding vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. NSC officials told us that they believed developing such a single, integrated cross-agency plan could take years. However, we found that absent such an implementation plan, essential details associated with the 4-year


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 14.
initiative remain unclear, including the initiative’s overall estimated costs, time frames, and scope of work.\textsuperscript{40}

GAO’s assertion that this single initiative, introduced and supported by the highest ranking leadership in the country, is unlikely to succeed without a detailed interagency plan is a powerful proclamation. Certainly if this individual goal requires strong interagency coordination then the overarching set of U.S. nonproliferation activities would require strong coordination in the form of some type of strategic interagency plan.

The plan recommends that leadership for the effort to synchronize and detail this initiative’s activity comes from the White House, specifically the NSC. NSC should work with DOS, DOD, DOE, and other agencies to complete a comprehensive plan on how to successfully shift from the big-picture idea phase to the detailed implementation phase.\textsuperscript{41} The need being addressed by GAO in this recommendation is for definitive, senior-level, White House guidance and leadership.

Strong leadership from the White House is not the only component lacking in the U.S.’s arena of nonproliferation work. On Capitol Hill, there are no equivalents to Senators Nunn and Lugar and the leadership, expertise, and resolve they demonstrated in the 1990’s as the Soviet Union collapsed. Because events garner attention and Congress is often reactive, Capitol Hill has not taken a strong interest in nonproliferation like it did around the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse. For nonproliferation work to get the

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 35.
attention and funding it deserves, part of the comprehensive strategy will have to include what could be called a marketing component.\footnote{42}{Stanley Foundation, \textit{Strengthening WMD Security: A “Whole of Society” Approach} (Muscatine, IA: Stanley Foundation, 2011), \url{http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/SPC_WMD122011.pdf} (accessed March 5, 2013), 3.}

A Stanley Foundation policy dialogue brief discusses the need for this type of communications strategy for nonproliferation efforts. Unfortunately, it is hard to measure nonproliferation successes because they are essentially the absence of event: a nuclear device not detonating, biological weapons not being dispersed at a major event, or WMDs not falling into the hands of terrorist groups. Nonproliferation work needs strategic communications to ensure meaningful messages and metrics are communicated to stakeholders. The policy brief recommends that communications take new and modernized approach to relaying nonproliferation threats and strategies.\footnote{43}{Ibid., 4.}

The analysis also makes important recommendations to establish a coordinating task force, which they named Task Force 2020. The proposed duties of this group would be to develop a long-term nonproliferation strategy for the U.S. and “build a CTR collective.”\footnote{44}{Ibid., 5.} By collaborating on nonproliferation efforts via the task force, a unified and consistent message would emanate from all of USG involved in nonproliferation. This message could then be conveyed to Congress when appropriate to solicit funding and legislative support.\footnote{45}{Ibid.}

Task Force 2020 would promote the free flowing of information, which makes synchronization and coordination a more feasible feat. The publication specifically
recommends developing a global mapping of international nonproliferation programs and engagements. The U.S. should also develop a “regularized electronic system...to share and track pertinent programmatic information.” These electronic mechanisms would help store data and ensure that one location was a repository of all historical and current nonproliferation activity information.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has also done extensive research on ways to better organize both CTR activities and general nonproliferation initiatives. One 2012 CRS report titled “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union” provides unique insight into various policymakers’ thoughts on the need for better synchronization of U.S. nonproliferation activities. The report combines information from numerous sources, to include Members of Congress and analysts throughout the government, and reached the conclusion that two major efforts would greatly enhance coordination: development of a strategic plan and designating a single point of contact to coordinate programs.

Regarding the creation of a strategic plan, the report eloquently summarizes the current U.S. need for such a thoughtful document:

Many analysts, both inside and outside the U.S. government, believe that U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs would benefit from the development of a government-wide strategic plan...According to one analyst who has participated in both DOD and DOE programs, the growth in U.S. programs “has been by and large, organic, with each agency pursuing its own contacts and relationships in recipient countries, assembling and justifying its own budget, implementing programs based on its own culture and approaches, and interacting with its own Congressional oversight committees.” Most analysts agree that a comprehensive strategic plan would allow for the development of an overall set of

46 Ibid.

goals for U.S. assistance, better coordination among programs, a more consistent method to set priorities and measure progress, and a coordinated way to determine when and how the United States had achieved its goals and could complete a program.\footnote{48}{Ibid.}

The CRS report provides similar concise detail on the need for a coordinating individual or committee:

Many analysts have also called for the creation of a high-level program coordinator or a high-level interagency committee chaired by a representative of the National Security Council. This program coordinator would set a consistent direction by setting priorities, resolving competing demands for budgetary resources, eliminating overlap and redundancy, and coordinating implementation across agencies. This individual would also raise the political profile of the programs, bringing consistent political leadership that many analysts believe is lacking. They argue that continued, coordinated success for the programs requires ‘active political engagement at the White House, cabinet, and sub-cabinet political appointee levels in the U.S. government.’\footnote{49}{Ibid., 54.}

Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations rejected proposals for this type of coordinating body. Resistant officials have argued that establishing this type of entity would confuse the interagency coordinating processes already in place. Based on legislation offered by then Senator Hillary Clinton and Representative Ellen Tauscher titled the “Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act of 2006,” President Obama eventually ended up filling an NSC position to coordinate USG nonproliferation and terrorism activities. Under this NSC individual is an individual responsible for coordinating DOS, DOD, and Department of Energy (DOE) nonproliferation and threat reduction activities.\footnote{50}{Ibid., 54-55.}

Although giving enough attention to this matter to create a few new positions within the NSC is certainly a step in the right direction, most analysts that provided

\footnote{48}{Ibid.}\footnote{49}{Ibid., 54.}\footnote{50}{Ibid., 54-55.}
comments to CRS were skeptical of the power a single individual can yield on certain key aspects that need to be addressed. For example, this appointee can work to raise awareness and perhaps secure political commitment for USG nonproliferation needs. However, it seems very unlikely that a single person will be able to exert control over the enormous budgets of involved departments and their varied programs. Without the ability to increase and decrease funding as necessary to match USG priorities, the position ends up being merely creating priorities without the authority to ensure their fulfillment. The CRS report notes that a high-level committee comprised of agency representatives would fare much better at the task of reaching informed agreement on priorities, but still could struggle to set aside their own agency’s budgetary priorities to align budgets with agreed upon goals.\(^\text{51}\)

The CRS report and other studies detailed throughout this section indicate a clear momentum to expand the reach of existing programs, both CTR and non-CTR. The research also shows strong support for improving organizational mechanisms and enhancing interagency communications. While expanding CTR has been heavily researched and recommendations are free-flowing on best practices to consider, there is less material available on how to get a better grasp of all USG’s nonproliferation activities.

This chapter discussed the growing sentiment within various U.S. arenas that CTR needs to be revamped to more appropriately and flexibly meet emerging nonproliferation challenges, activities need to be better coordinated within the USG, and engagements must be planned with more strategic foresight. To support these assertions,

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 55.
this section examined a wide array of research from government and non-government entities. Many recommendations came from the National Academy of Sciences report required by Congress that detailed a proposal for CTR 2.0, but relevant recommendations and thoughtfully-developed ideas to synchronize CTR and nonproliferation activities from other sources were also introduced. The next and final chapter will develop and expand concepts from this and previous chapters. These concepts will be applied to a discussion on a proposal for a strong and viable solution to the USG’s need for a more coordinated approach to nonproliferation engagements around the world.
CHAPTER IV
THE WMD ACTIVITIES COORDINATION OFFICE

After examining a wide array of commentary on the need for better coordination and synchronization of CTR-related activities, it is evident that there is broad support for the idea of expanding and organizing these programs. If there is pressure to improve efficiency and U.S. responsiveness by better coordinating a single, large program like CTR, then that logic can surely be applied on the next larger scale: the United States Government’s (USG) nonproliferation programs. This thesis’s analysis of nonproliferation activities outside the realm of CTR sheds light on the highly impressive number of engagements underway around the world and the potential for serious programmatic redundancies and gaps across the USG’s domain.

The consequences of overlaps and gaps are more substantial in the WMD arena than in other spheres of USG work. Under difficult economic circumstances, all USG programs face analysis and monitoring of spending by accountability offices. WMD-related programs face the same scrutiny, but concerns of program mismanagement have a far greater impact than just reckless use of taxpayer money. When nonproliferation programs are not aware of each other’s activities or not able to quickly respond to emerging threats, opportunities for risk mitigation are lost and dangerous threats are not properly reduced. This leaves the U.S. and world as a whole unnecessarily vulnerable.

To address this growing vulnerability, the U.S. needs to develop a coordinating entity responsible for overseeing the U.S.’s various nonproliferation programs and threat reduction activities around the world. The office should be named “WMD Activities Coordination Office” (WACO). This office will monitor program funding, mission areas,
and engagements with foreign nations. By establishing an office with the authority and responsibility to evaluate activities across different departments and agencies, the U.S. would be taking a precedent-setting step to start addressing the need for synchronization and coordination of WMD-related activities around the world.

To ensure informed assertions are made, useful lessons learned can be gleaned from this paper’s review of CTR’s original creation and the tactics used by lawmakers that helped them both succeed and fail in overcoming roadblocks. Additionally, by reviewing the current USG nonproliferation programs and activities underway, the scope of activity to be coordinated is well understood. Finally, the analysis of proposed features in CTR-specific coordination recommendations also enables the recommendation of feasible and realistic characteristics for a USG-wide WMD coordination office.

One of the main lessons learned from studying CTR’s origins is that it took well known and respected politicians from each side of the aisle working together to continually champion the effort to build the necessary momentum. Senators Nunn and Lugar, a Democrat and a Republican, achieved this for CTR. They were the effort’s constant warriors, regardless of whether the issue was considered a hot topic at the moment. The two served as the steadfast voice for CTR and regularly travelled to the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to monitor progress and bring updates back to the White House and their colleagues.

This type of Congressional support will certainly be needed for the initial passing of legislation to establish WACO. The President should seek out assistance from Senator Lugar to identify lawmakers that are particularly in tune with proliferation threats and WMD-related matters. It would be especially helpful if these lawmakers were high-
ranking within the intelligence, foreign relations, or homeland security committees. Once these lawmakers are identified, the President needs to engage them and solicit their support for sponsoring WACO. The identified lawmakers will be the ones responsible for ensuring the measure passes. If WACO is properly established at its inception, it will not require the recurring Congressional rallying that CTR supporters had to orchestrate.

The intent of establishing WACO is very different than what CTR was chartered to achieve. While CTR was proposing ground-breaking work to be done in former enemy’s territories, the creation of WACO is fairly straightforward: the current WMD-related activities supported by the USG need oversight and coordination.

Once these Congressional leaders are identified and onboard with the initiative, they need to begin drafting formal legislation. They should begin petitioning for support at this point and openly discuss the intent of their work. Various mechanisms of communication can be used at this point to inform academia, the public sector, the media, and other governmental entities about WACO: press releases, op-eds in Congressional media (Roll Call, The Hill) and mainstream press (New York Times, Washington Post), and strategically mentioning the measure being worked on during commentary to press or related Congressional hearings.

The Congressional champions and White House should also work closely with a group referred to as the “Four Horseman,” known for their expertise in the nonproliferation arena and support of arms control treaties and CTR. This group includes: former Secretary of States Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Sam Nunn.¹ This incredibly respected and reputable group will come together and draft opinion pieces on proliferation-related topics they support. For example, they were key advocates of the New START Treaty with Russia and voiced their support, as well as offered formal Congressional testimony, during the Senate’s consideration of the treaty. The foursome published a key op-ed detailing the need for the treaty and why, according to their unmatched experience and expertise, the measure should be supported on Capitol Hill.²

It is also important that the President publicly supports the measure from the very beginning. The President should stress his awareness that the legislation is being developed, his support for its intent, and that he looks forward to signing it into law as soon as possible. The bipartisan nature of the measure should also be noted by the White House. If properly implemented, WACO will extend far beyond any single administration; the office will become an engrained component of the U.S.’s national security repertoire.

The legislation to create WACO needs to establish the office for a five-year period of time. This will give the initiative enough time to get set up and start producing strong results. At the end of the five-year period, the law should have a built-in clause for permanent establishment of the office, provided Congress approves of the entity’s results since its inception. Although there will be hearings to provide updates on the office’s activities throughout its first five years, as well as hearings to help justify the Office’s


budget, the law should state that there will be decisive hearings at the end of the probationary period of time. The purpose of these hearings would be to receive testimony from WACO leadership, as well as leadership of the departments and agencies whose activities are coordinated by WACO. Assuming the hearings went smoothly and the office was functioning properly to achieve its mission, WACO would become a permanent establishment.

The structure of WACO would be a key unique characteristic to help it fulfill its mission. WACO would be a new entity within the Executive Office of the President, the same level as the National Security Council.\(^3\) This placement at the executive level is essential; it speaks to the significance of the office’s responsibilities and avoids any favoritism that may result from having a single agency or department under the White House be in charge of the initiative. It would be counterproductive to have any other entity such as the Department of Defense or Department of State run WACO when the entire purpose behind the office is to coordinate from a level both above and removed from the activity. That higher level view, not immediately immersed in the day-to-day dealings of particular programs, is essential to WACO’s success.

The director of WACO should be added as a Cabinet member. Since the legal purpose of the Cabinet “is to advise the President on any subject he may require relating to the duties of each member's respective office,” it is perfectly appropriate and absolutely necessary for the director of WACO to be a part of Cabinet discussions.\(^4\) Moreover, much of the Cabinet’s work relates to national security. There are few national


security topics that do not either definitely or potentially have a WMD or nonproliferation aspect. WACO’s director, with unprecedented focus and awareness of the USG’s nonproliferation active engagements around the world, is best suited to advise the President on matters relating to WMD capabilities.

WACO should be run by a director with extensive experience in the WMD arena, but not coming directly from an appointment to any particular department or agency. This person would have typical director responsibilities: overseeing the office’s operations, serving as the office’s public face responsible for testifying on Capitol Hill and other representative duties, and strategically guiding the office towards achievement of its mission. Upon appointment, the director would also be responsible for fine-tuning the mission of the office, which should be something like the following: To enhance national security by providing oversight and guidance to the U.S.’s WMD activities and ensure appropriate funding, coordinating, and inter-program communication.

Specific offices within WACO should include: Office of Liaisons, Office of Budget and Performance, Office of Strategic Planning, Office of Technological Solutions, Office of International Agreements, and the Office of Public Affairs. The Office of Liaisons will be comprised of a high-level representative from every department or agency that has a program under WACO’s watch. At a minimum, this will include liaisons from the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Homeland Security. Depending on the programs coordinated by WACO, examples of other organizations to be represented within WACO could include: Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The director will also have the

authority to determine if there needs to be more than one representative for a department. For example, it may make sense to have a CTR representative from each department that operates CTR programs. There could be a need for a representative of non-CTR programs from those departments. Alternatively, the director can decide that one liaison from each department is enough representation for CTR and non-CTR programs.

These liaisons need to be high-level, senior personnel that have experience working closely with their entity’s leadership. They will be responsible for communicating the programmatic details of their organization’s WMD activities to WACO. Although stationed at WACO, they will remain personnel of their home organization. While working at WACO, they will report directly to the director and their performance reviews will be completed within WACO. This will ensure that they focus on the immediate mission of the new organization and are not unnecessarily distracted with appeasing their department’s leadership.

The legislators charged with championing the effort need to work closely and transparently with the appropriations committees from both chambers. The bill to establish the coordinating entity should explicitly call for funding to be appropriated directly for WACO and not provided via discretionary, optional funding mechanisms. Time is of the essence, so it is important to not get bogged down in budgetary arguments over which agency is going to hand over funds to cover WACO’s expenses. The office needs its own line in the annual budget.

Each department or agency is accustomed to proposing their own budget and going through their own budgetary process. For the most part, this can and should stay the same. However, it would be helpful if a segment of WACO’s budget, 10 or 15%,
could be used to respond to unforeseen engagement opportunities. This portion of WACO’s budget should have notwithstanding authority, which would allow for WACO to dynamically and expeditiously respond to global developments.\(^6\) Since WACO itself will not be executing WMD work, the office needs to have the authority to quickly determine which program is most appropriate to respond to the opportunity and transfer funds from this segment of their budget to the organization that will be executing the work.\(^7\)

WACO should have input into any program’s budget that falls under its oversight.\(^8\) Departments and agencies should continue their normal budgetary request processes. Prior to budget submissions, WACO needs to develop a comprehensive document that addresses each program, WACO’s recommended funding for the program, and an explanation of why that level of funding is being recommended. This document should be distributed to departments and agencies with enough time for them to make their budgets mirror WACO’s proposal. The process of determining budget level recommendations for each program will be a task that takes an enormous amount of the office’s time. This is acceptable because WACO will be most appropriately equipped, given its overarching view of all nonproliferation work underway, to make recommendations on funding amounts.

The process to determine WACO’s budget proposals should be transparent within the office. All staff members should be present and participate in the meetings to prepare the budget recommendations. Liaisons will be critical to this process; each liaison should

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\(^7\) Ibid., 14.

\(^8\) Ibid., 88.
work with their department or agency to obtain their leadership’s proposals for the individual program’s budgets. Those ideas can be shared and presented by the liaison during preparatory sessions. Ultimately, the director would make the final decision on funding levels. For this process to have meaning and for WACO to actually accomplish its mission, the program-level decisions made by WACO must be reflected in the budgets submitted to Congress by departments and agencies.

The Office of Budget and Performance will also be responsible for developing an understanding of all WMD-related activities underway and the scope of each program or activity. In the beginning, this task will be herculean. However, the need for this understanding is one of the main motivating factors to create WACO. To document the activities and determine overlaps or gaps, this office will work closely with the Office of Technological Solutions.

To help transition into this new WACO approach, a transition plan will need to be developed. This responsibility will fall to the Office of Strategic Planning. The director should kick-off work on the transition plan as soon as possible, as the plan will discuss standing up WACO and transitioning certain roles and responsibilities to the new office. New channels and communications modes for information to flow from departments to WACO will need to be established. The transition plan should set up the infrastructure for entities to work and communicate with WACO as efficiently and manageable as possible. Program management is already burdened with various reporting requirements, so it is important that whatever mechanisms set up to convey information to WACO are

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9 Ibid., 65.
smooth and as easy to use as possible. This level of detail needs to be established in the transition plan.

There is also a dire need for a government-wide strategic plan, coordinating nonproliferation activities and outlining USG’s WMD-related goals.\textsuperscript{10} The plan needs to contain an interagency component that discusses how various entities work together to achieve these common nonproliferation goals.\textsuperscript{11} Communications are also extremely important and should be mapped out in the strategic plan. The plan should provide a unified nonproliferation message both domestically and internationally.\textsuperscript{12} Once the plan is developed, there should no longer be complaints about the lack of a coordinated WMD strategy.

The Office of Strategic Planning, in its development of a strategic plan for USG’s nonproliferation activities, also needs to establish metrics. These metrics should measure and track WACO’s progress as a new institution, as well as accomplishments of the entire USG nonproliferation portfolio. Developing these metrics will be a difficult but necessary exercise. WACO needs to be able to justify its existence and show tangible results. Furthermore, the office needs to show that it is strong and capable enough to report programmatic successes and failures of the activities within its jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{13}

To help document these measures, the Office of Technological Solutions will be charged with developing a database to track all activities, their details, and locations. This

\textsuperscript{10} Woolf, \textit{Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance}, 53.


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 4.
information does not currently exist anywhere in the USG. Developing the technological solution for this information to be collected, stored, accessed, and analyzed is a foundational concept behind the establishment of WACO. Users should be able to pull data and compile reports by activity, nation, or region. As the U.S. prepares to engage with a country, access to this meaningful compilation of information will be essential. Without a framework to maintain programmatic data and access it in meaningful ways through advanced queries, WACO will struggle to achieve its mission.

The Office of International Agreements will be responsible for developing agreements to engage with countries. These agreements need to be flexible, as specific or broad as required by the engagement, and involve as little U.S. bureaucracy as possible. Because of WACO’s set of responsibilities, programs and activities can come to WACO for assistance when engaging with a new country or on a new project. WACO should have Congressional authorities to help it bypass traditional means of bilateral and multilateral international engagements. These authorities will enable WACO to help the sponsoring agency or department expedite the desired engagement with minimal cumbersome issues to work through. Because the activity will be monitored by WACO, unaffiliated with any department or agency, Congress can rest assured the agreement is receiving proper oversight. It is imperative that WACO be able to promptly and effectively respond to dynamic opportunities for engagement around the world. This office will see to it that WACO is as legally prepared as possible to capitalize on prospective threat reduction engagements.

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14 National Academies of Science, Global Security Engagement, 71-72.
Lastly, the Office of Public Affairs will be responsible for communicating WACO’s work. The contents of the transition and strategic plans need to be appropriately marketed to stakeholders. While the Office of Strategic Planning will develop these products, once they are completed and being implemented, it is up to Public Affairs to really communicate their contents to the necessary audiences. The office will respond to public and Congressional inquiries, as well as assist WACO leadership in preparing for testimony on Capitol Hill.

All of the offices within WACO will have to work closely to support the director and work towards achieving WACO’s mission. There will certainly be growing pains in standing up the office, but by the end of its five-year probationary period WACO should be producing prodigious results. This one-of-a-kind solution should be adopted as soon as feasibly possible to begin reaping benefits and preparing for the next unforeseen opportunity.

This chapter discussed establishing WACO and the components that would be necessary for the office to succeed. Establishing WACO in the detailed manner described would be an enormous positive step forward for the U.S. It would greatly enhance the U.S.’s ability to promptly, appropriately, and efficiently respond to emerging WMD threats around the world. WACO’s creation would also address the growing need for coordination and synchronization within the nonproliferation activities arena. Most importantly, its establishment would position U.S. programs to more effectively mitigate WMD threats and reduce U.S. vulnerabilities.
CONCLUSION

The threats posed by WMDs and their proliferation are overwhelmingly grave. The consequences and second order effects from an attack involving a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon are hard to fathom. Realistic effects could include: massive loss of life by entire populations wiped out, emergency systems crippled by unmanageable numbers of sick and dying citizens, collapse of government operations, and complete chaos on a global level.

The spectrum of proliferation risks is very real and known around the world. Examples include non-state actors acquiring WMDs, an accidental launch or detonation of a weapon, and rogue nations developing WMDs for their own use or to sell on the black market. There is an incredibly high demand for the massive amounts of WMD weapons, materials, technologies, and knowledgeable scientists dispersed around the world. Armed with all of this knowledge, it is easy to get discouraged and start to give in to the sense of impending doom. This is when the “it is not a matter of if, it is a matter of when” mindset starts to become prevalent.

Fortunately U.S. leadership, for the most part, has not surrendered to this mindset. There is another way to handle the realm of WMD-related threats: understand them, determine what can be done to mitigate them, and take action to reduce vulnerabilities. To a large extent, the U.S. has done this. Over 20 years ago, CTR was launched in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Weapons, warheads, stockpiles, launchers, and human scientists themselves were dealt with in ground-breaking, Earth-shattering ways. The U.S. worked side-by-side with its not-too-former Cold War nemesis to reduce the threat of those materials being proliferated or mistakenly used. CTR’s establishment,
development, and accomplishments over the course of more than two decades is truly an inspiring case study.

Although CTR set the stage for unique bilateral and multilateral engagements to reduce the threats posed by WMDs, U.S. innovation in this arena has not stopped with CTR. This thesis reviewed a multitude of programs outside the confines of CTR that are experiencing remarkable successes engaging with countries around the world to reduce the threats posed by WMDs. The programs reviewed address specific threats, hone in on the most viable partners for collaboration, and produce both measurable and immeasurable results.

This abundance of U.S. activity in the nonproliferation arena is certainly encouraging. It shows that the U.S. has the hope to fight against proliferation threats and the expertise to actually do so. However, as CTR expanded and each department or agency continued to develop their own stove-piped solutions to specific problem areas, other problems began to surface. It became clear that a key component to make all of these programs effective was missing. There was no organization in charge of tracking all of this activity. If two programs from two departments were planning a trip to the same country in the same timeframe, there was no communication mechanism to determine this and provide the opportunity for collaboration. Redundancies, gaps, and other types of problem areas could not be identified on a scale larger than the individual program level. The enormous investment being made in nonproliferation capabilities is not being put to best use from a financial or logistical standpoint.

This paper reviewed a number of sources that highlighted this issue. Many of these sources were centered on CTR and the need to better communicate and coordinate
activities within that program alone. The final chapter of this thesis utilized aspects of the
various recommendations and proposals made regarding the need for synchronization of
activity. In the thesis’s utilization of these ideas, an original proposal was described.

By following the recommendations to develop the WMD Activities Coordination
Office, the U.S would put its money, manpower, and materials to much better use. The
office would ensure that nonproliferation activities were operating within a government-
wide strategic plan. It would also be the entity responsible for understanding all of the
specific activities that programs were conducting around the world and the nations being
engaged. This awareness enables priceless collaboration to ensure the U.S. meets WMD
threats in a professional, efficient, unified manner no matter where the engagement takes
place.

Although an administrative-type recommendation, establishing the WMD
Activities Coordination Office would be a huge step forward in protecting mankind from
a WMD attack. Beyond the need to be fiscally and programmatically responsible with
funds for WMD-related purposes, establishing this office would make sure each program
can best achieve its mission to reduce the threats posed by proliferation of WMDs. It also
shows the U.S. government still has a vested interest in fighting the threats that pose the
greatest risk to Americans and the American way of life.

There is great cause for fear, but there is greater cause for hope. With the passage
of legislation to establish the WMD Activities Coordination Office, the U.S. can get a
better grasp on the capabilities and progress already underway internationally. By doing
this, the nation can continue to be a beacon of innovation and inspiration around the
world, working to prevent the greatest atrocities imaginable.
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