IS TERRORISM INEVITABLE?: THE IMMORTALITY OF TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the “immortality” of terrorism - a looming, transnational threat geared towards the reconfiguration of governments and societies to produce an outcome desirable to those inflicting it. It is merely a “tool,” reflecting the norms and laws of the time, which reengineered and redefined the term from generation to generation. One of the primary issues with terrorism is defining it universally, but the more challenging aspect is how to combat a phenomenon that has yet to be defined. Definition comes by the ability to identify a phenomenon - thus, giving the individual, group or nation, the power to engage said phenomenon in the best manner possible. Nevertheless, the journey to defining a phenomenon is a trek in itself. This “trek” - addressed in this thesis - focuses on the arduous task of creating a universal definition that will strengthen counterterrorism efforts of countries and nation-states. More specifically, will a working, universalized definition of terrorism help to curtail terrorist attacks or will it make little to no difference?

I will argue that a working, universalized definition of terrorism will cooperatively boost the defenses of all nations threatened by terrorism, strengthen and advance counterterrorism efforts that will disrupt terror plots, and ultimately, the dismantling of terrorist groups. A universal definition may still be subject to the
perception of a people or a society, but its applicability will increase the effectiveness in combatting terrorism transnationally, even in how it is perceived relative to the nation.

Firstly, in order to establish historical context to this thesis, I will be reviewing scholarly material on terrorism regarding its early transformation into a permanent threat through generations and how the international community has been combatting it. Secondly, I will assess how terrorism is defined internationally (using select nations) in comparison to the United States, the organizations that are focused specifically on terrorism, and how it is engaged, using reports from the United States Government Accountability Office.

Thirdly, domestic terrorism within the United States will be highlighted to illustrate that every nation has vulnerabilities and thus, is a target - therefore, it is imperative to continuously improve homeland security. Lastly, to further support my hypothesis, I will utilize databases such as ProQuest Research Library, Academic Search Premier and LexisNexis in order to retrieve national foreign policies of select presidential administrations, examine success and failures of terror plots, and ultimately suggest a definition worth considering to be universalized. Conclusively, through extensive research, I have concluded that terrorism is best engaged by cooperative effort; however, contrasting assessments of how to engage the same issue can be as harmful as it is effective.
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CHAPTER 1

SETTING FORTH & EXPLORING THE BROAD CONTEXT OF TERRORISM

Terrorism, known as the systematic use of terror, primarily as a means of coercion, is a phenomenon that is merely described, rather than defined. In the efforts of the international community attempting to universalize a definition of terrorism to combat it more effectively, it is difficult to imagine the likelihood of reaching an internationally agreed-upon concept of terrorism in its entirety. Laws vary from country to country and the punishments that ensue vary as well. The diversity in motivations when it comes to terrorists’ attacks widens the field, which however, can often be viewed as foreshadowing elements of how these terrorist groups will meet their demise.

Nevertheless, there are four motivational factors generally associated with terrorism, which are described to be political, ideological, religious and financial - with the possibility of even a combination of two or more. In our own democratic system, the agencies that work directly on terrorism in the intelligence community have developed their own definitions of the term. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”1 The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit

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of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.”² It is advantageous to have several agencies develop their own definition of terrorism because the topic can be addressed in multiple ways simultaneously.

The principal question in this matter concerns the immortality of Terrorism. It is well documented that terrorism is a permanent threat transnationally³ and that the global community must cooperate to combat such an issue effectively, since it is a threat to all nations. Therefore, the principal question that will be examined is: Will a working, universalized definition of terrorism help to curtail terrorist attacks or will it make little to no difference? I propose that a working, universalized definition of terrorism will simultaneously bolster the defenses of all nations threatened by terrorism, which will significantly slow the rate at which it occurs. Thus, resulting in the dismantling of terrorist groups to blot out any future plans. In order to address a problem, one must first identify the issue, then define the overarching complexity of the issue - which brings forth understanding of the issue - in order to develop resolutions to combat the problem on all fronts. Although there is the possibility that a universalized working definition may still be subject to the perception of a nation, its applicability will increase the effectiveness in combating terrorism transnationally; even in how it is perceived relative to the nation.

² Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 31.

³ For example, the GAO (United States General Accounting Office) Report stated that in Section 129(a) of the Criminal Code, German law does not define terrorism, but there is a working definition provided by German government officials stating that terrorism is the permanent fight for political goals and change of the political system through assaults against persons and property.
Origination and Transformation

As the broad context of terrorism is explored in this paper, it is best to first venture into this topic historically to assess its transformation - closely - through time. Much research has shown that the first contemporary manifestation of the term ‘terrorism’ was coined during the French Revolution, where prominent figures and individuals attempted to establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed many uprisings in 1789. In Bruce Hoffman’s book, *Defining Terrorism*, terrorism illustrated transformation by evolving through a span of catastrophic events during the French Revolution. A French lawyer by the name of Maximilien Robespierre, the revolutionary leader and founder of the *régime de la terreur* (Reign of Terror), was a prominent figure during the revolution and a significant contributor to the state of the French government during the chaotic period of turmoil when the French went to war against Austria, following the many uprisings in 1789.

Terrorism happens when there are favorable conditions that allow it to exist - associated with widespread radicalism and the perception that all options are exhausted (by a minority group or cluster) in regards to a desirable, large-scale change in governance. For example, there was an absolute monarchy in France for centuries before the onset of the French Revolution; however, the deterioration of France’s economy due

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6 “France had an appearance of an absolute monarchy. The king created law by edicts and took executive actions by *Arrêts du Conseil*, although not all laws emanated from the king. There were also legal
to past wars and the incompetency of King Louis XVI of the fiscal crisis France faced in the 1780s fueled opposition towards the monarchy. Additionally, those aspiring to be *bourgeoisie* (the peasants, the working poor, and so forth) resented the regime because of heavy taxation that constantly placed them in a position of strain, especially financially. The taxes were burdensome to all except the wealthy and the elite, as one’s socioeconomic status also determined the amount of taxes that an individual would be responsible for paying. For example, Priya Karen explains in detail the disparity in how taxes were issued in order to support the wealthy monarchy:

Nobles and the clergy were virtually exempted from France’s taxation system, with the exception of a quit-rent, an ad valorem tax on land. Hence, internal tax revenue could only be raised from peasants, wage earners and the professional and business classes. This blocked Louis XVI from imposing a ‘just and proportioned tax’ throughout the classes of French society as nobles successfully defended their tax exemption privileges. According to Edmund Burke, the desire to do so led directly to the calling of the Estates General into session. The peasant class was grossly overtaxed. They were required to pay consumption taxes such as the salt tax (the *gabelle*), land tax to the state (the *taille*), a 5% property tax (the *vingtieme*), and a tax on the number of people in the family (capitation). Furthermore, peasants were required to pay 10% of their income or produce to the church (the tithe) as well as rent to their landlords in cash, a payment related to their annual amount of production, and taxes on the use of nobles’ mills, winepresses and bakeries. ‘Tax traditions, with forms of common law and written law varying from province to province that preexisted royal edicts.” Thomas J. Sargent and Francois R. Velde, “Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution,” *the Journal of Political Economy* 103, no. 3, (June 1995): 482.

7 “To insist on the presence of consent in ‘absolutist’ states is to say something new about a concept usually defined in terms of its absence. In France taxes the pockets of the lower orders, agreed. The clergy threatened to abandoned their churches and refused. The Twentieth was consequently paid by the laity, noble and commoner, and not by the clergy. Forty years later, the new tax package of Louis XVI’s Enlightened minister Brienne met a different fate. Its sabotage by the parliaments provoked the ministry to abolish their legislative powers and remodel their membership. The result was a ruling class strike and the collapse of the absolute monarchy.” Nicholas Henshaw, “The Myth of Absolutism,” *History Today* 42, no. 6, (June 1992): 44-45.
farmers’ were private collectors who were contracted to collect these taxes. However, they legitimately collected taxes grossly in excess of what was required by the government, allowing the tax farmers to remit the required tax to the State and retain the remainder for their personal wealth. Such a system resulted in arbitrary and unequal collection of consumption taxes, corruption and further discontent of the taxpaying classes.  

These “favorable” conditions for the wealthy and the elite set an atmosphere of unrest, as ideas advocated by philosophers during the emergence of the Enlightenment Period opposed justifications supporting a monarchical government. The Enlightenment Period, which purpose was to reform society by using reason, naturally challenged ideas based on tradition and faith - as the advancement of knowledge was done through analysis and scientific methods. As a cultural movement of intellectuals, the Age of Enlightenment introduced new perspectives of understanding the nature of man and his purpose, and ultimately overruling traditional beliefs. Considering some of the common

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9 “Contrary thus to the common charge, famously leveled by Edmund Burke, that the French Revolution was the outcome of an abstract universalism and an abstract concept of human equality, I am suggesting here an alternate genealogy for equality in the exemplary tradition. If anything it is because universal values remained grounded in the representation of lives – whether historically referential or not – that the negation of historical time became such a hallmark of revolutionary culture. For it is partly thanks to the synchronic framework of exemplary history that increasing moral freedom (which presupposes that different people make different moral choices and hence develop differently) was made compatible with a belief in equality (which presupposes a fundamental identity of human nature over time).” Sanja Perovic, “Other People's Lives: Exemplary History and the French Revolution,” Literature & History 27, no. 2 (Autumn 2012): 23.

10 “In our era of dialogue and heightened awareness of the other, theologians seem to be rediscovering a rather odd resource: the thought of the thirteenth century Dominican friar, Thomas Aquinas. This seems odd because of the picture of Thomas that still prevails in some quarters: the one who reconciled faith and reason so that dialogue becomes unnecessary because there is nothing new to learn, everything being dogmatically determined beforehand.” Frederick J. Bauerschmidt and Jim Fodor, “Aquinas in Dialogue: Thomas for the Twenty-First Century,” Modern Theology 20, no. 1 (January 2004): 1.
motivators behind terrorism of today’s world, such as ideology and religion, these influences have remained constant throughout history simply because humans naturally desire change - especially when basic needs are unmet. The French Revolution illustrated that humans possess the capacity to act on desires on a large scale when there is a shareable idea or thought. The way in which an individual or group of people utilize that capacity, combined with external drivers indicated earlier (political, ideological, religious and financial), can initiate the creation of a force large enough to be recognized as a threat to an established power or government. Lynn Hunt, a distinguished History professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, added that the French Revolution, as an event, “did perhaps more than any other [historical event] to challenge old paradigms—from the nature of sovereignty to the nature of the human being—and to create new ones.”

Interestingly enough, the emergence and transfiguration of the term ‘terrorism’ transpired from a series of events during the French Revolution - mostly attributed to the Reign of Terror (September 5th, 1793 – July 28th, 1794) or the régime de la terreur - which developed during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprisings of 1789. This event was a period of violence that occurred after the onset of the French Revolution, where conflicting rival political factions during the revolution - the Girondins and the Jacobins - combatted one another, while there were


12 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 3.
marked mass executions of those identified as individuals opposing the revolution during the Terror.\textsuperscript{13} The prominent figures involved in the revolution believed in a democratic way of life, and according to Robespierre, invoking \textit{terror} is merely an assertive form of virtue and when combined together effectively, results in the establishment of a free society:

\begin{quote}
The revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre firmly believed that virtue was the mainspring of popular government at peace, but that during the time of revolution virtue must be allied with terror in order for democracy to triumph. He appealed famously to “virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless” and proclaimed: “Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.”\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Therefore, the negative connotation that follows terrorism today was virtually nonexistent - as it was a means to a justifiable ends, which can ironically be said about today’s terrorism. The difference here is that the change that was sought was for the greater good (i.e. democracy), rather than the intentional targeting of civilians to force one’s will or demonstrate one’s capabilities.

\textsuperscript{13} “The number of death sentences in Paris was 2,639, while the total number during the Terror in the whole of France (including Paris) was 16,594. With the exception of Paris (where many of the more important prisoners were transferred to appear before the Revolutionary Tribunal) most of the executions were carried out in regions of revolt such as the Vendée, Lyon and Marseilles. There were wide regional variations. Because on the whole the Jacobins were meticulous in maintaining a legal structure for the Terror clear records exist for official death sentences. But many more people were murdered without formal sentences imposed in a court of law. Some died in overcrowded and unsanitary prisons awaiting trial, while others died in the civil wars and federalist revolts, their deaths unrecorded. The historian Jean-Clément Martin, suggests that up to 250,000 insurgents and 200,000 republicans met their deaths in the Vendée, a war which lasted from 1793-96 in which both sides suffered appalling atrocities.” Marisa Linton, “Robespierre and the Terror,” \textit{History Today} 56, no. 8 (August 2006).

\textsuperscript{14} Hoffman, \textit{Inside Terrorism}, 5.
The Common Denominators

As the French Revolution unraveled and began to deteriorate after some time, it led Robespierre to address the National Convention (which is comprised of a constitutional and legislative assembly, as well as possessing executive power during the French First Republic) with a new list of traitors opposing the revolution.\textsuperscript{15} The few extremists that feared their names would be called, joined forces with the moderates to avoid persecution and punishment by revoking loyalty to Robespierre and the régime de la terreur. These men eventually conspired against Robespierre, which resulted in his execution as well as those that followed him closely.\textsuperscript{16} Bruce Hoffman added that “the Terror was at an end; thereafter terrorism became a term associated with the abuse of office and power---with overt ‘criminal’ implications.”\textsuperscript{17} This is interesting because terror played a unique role in implementing democracy during the French Revolution,\textsuperscript{18} rather than being used merely as a coercive tool designed to gain selfish ambition or the satisfaction of a few.

Furthermore, the events in the French Revolution primarily illustrated a politically motivated form of terrorism since the régime de la terreur was not only a system “wielded by the recently established revolutionary state” during a time of uncertainty, but it was also created in a time of dissident opposition. Even though the intentions of the

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 5.
revolution were aimed to defend virtue and democracy,\textsuperscript{19} it was also designed to consolidate the new government's power by intimidating counterrevolutionaries, subversives, and all other dissidents whom the new regime regarded as “enemies of the people.”\textsuperscript{20} Political terror dominated as a means to maintain order - most importantly, to either secure order or to secure a \textit{change} in order. Interestingly enough, this “mode” of utilizing terror was recognized even prior to the time of the French Revolution. The use of terror was conducted as a tool of deterrence, rather than purely coercion, before the time of the Reign of Terror:

Although most scholars see Robespierre’s ‘reign of terror’ as the beginning of modern terror (and for many reasons rightly so) several qualifications need to be made. Firstly, Robespierre was not the first European politician to view political terror as a means of intimidating potential enemies. Two hundred and sixty years earlier Italian philosopher and political adviser Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) had recommended in The Prince (Il Principe) that what he called ‘a prestige of cruelty’ be used to maintain law and order and to terrorize potential political enemies. Machiavelli writes, for instance that: ‘The answer of course is that it would be best to be both loved and feared. But since the two rarely come together, anyone compelled to choose, will find greater security in being feared than in being loved.’\textsuperscript{21}

According to Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, the major political threat to the Greco-Roman world was tyranny.\textsuperscript{22} The Assyrian’s for example, once having an empire that was arguably the greatest nation on earth centuries ago, divulged a political

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Fine, “Political and Philological Origins of the Term ‘Terrorism’ from the Ancient Near East to Our Times,” 277.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 271.
understanding of terror that represents two significant interpretations of this concept (utilizing terror as a means to justify a desired end) that were to re-surface in modern times. Firstly, unlike the classic philosophers and forefathers of the Christian Church who were threatened by the Assyrian tyrant, King Shalmaneser III, and ultimately victims of the tyrannical regime, the Assyrian Kings - as perpetrators - viewed political terror as a tool that is both necessary and effective when implemented accordingly. For instance, several years later, Maximilien Robespierre justified the Reign of Terror as a service to their kingdom or state. Secondly, the Assyrians used terror much as modern nationalist terrorists did, reenacting what fifteenth century Italian political adviser Nicolo Machiavelli described as ‘the ruler’s need to acquire a prestige of cruelty’. Thus a prestige of cruelty was commonly achieved during the Renaissance period by initiating pre-emptive wars. Furthermore, as Charles L. Ruby states, “The only real difference between terrorism and conventional military action is one of strategy. Terrorists lack the necessary resources to wage war in furtherance of their political goals.”

Therefore, terrorist attacks can elicit pre-emptive measures, which are ultimately designed to sustain a level of readiness [of a nation-state] in case of an offensive. More specifically, according to well-known scholar Abraham D. Sofaer, there are four major elements that are consistent in justifying pre-emption: (1) The nature and magnitude of

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 272.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.

the threat involved; (2) The likelihood that the threat will be realized unless preemptive action is taken; (3) The availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force; and (4) whether using preemptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the U.N. Charter and other applicable international agreements.\footnote{Abraham D. Sofaer, “On the Necessity of Pre-emption,” European Journal of International Law 14, no. 2 (April 2003): 220, http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=16698032&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed March 1st, 2013).}

One of the most notable preemptive measures taken in response to a terrorist attack is the United States invasion of Iraq in 2001, soon after the events of 9/11. Many of the arguments surrounding this action taken by the Commander-in-Chief stemmed from the initial intent of the invasion, the legalities regarding international interventions and ultimately the consequences following the inaction towards a threat that in all likelihood could prove to be catastrophic.

According to the Bush Administration after 9/11, the threat was identified as Saddam Hussein’s regime possibly possessing weapons of mass destruction and their readiness to deploy them;\footnote{“The UN inspectors revealed that Saddam was vigorously working on a stockpile of WMD - chemical, biological and nuclear, and by the mid-90s he began to deny them access to his supply. He already has used these weapons against his own people and waves of foot soldiers in his war with Iran. He has pledged on a number of occasions to bring destruction upon the United States, and even planned the assassination of its former president, George Bush.” Stephen Strehle, “Saddam, Islam, and Just-War Theory: The Case for a Pre-Emptive Strike,” Political Theology 5, no. 1 (January 2004): 77.} however, one must consider how well this threat was calculated due to the vulnerable state of the United States during this period and the immense desire to retaliate. Considering the “rules of engagement” in the United States military - in which the purpose of these rules is to indicate what measures are
acceptable and not to dictate how a result is to be achieved - it is very possible that this approach could have been utilized by the executive office at the time, or assertively, advance American interests. Nevertheless, Congress assessed this threat as imminent and eventually intervened in the dealings of Saddam Hussein’s regime, in which Congress passed a joint resolution in October of 2002, authorizing President Bush to use military force against Saddam Hussein's regime. The intervention seemed more reactionary than anything and based on suspicion (or even as a tactic to gain a strategic advantage in the event of an impending war, before the threat actually materializes), rather than a response motivated by humanitarian objectives; however, given the vulnerability of the United States at this time, the nation’s security could presumably have been at a great risk if WMD’s were very well in the possession of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Ultimately, weapons of mass destruction were never discovered, which placed a thick fog over the

28 “In order to identify whether some hostile action allows an affirmative response one has to know the triggering mechanism. ROE provides that guidance. In a situation where the elements for potential armed conflict exist, ROE is a tool to regulate the use of force. U.S. forces receive their directions from the President through their chain of command in the form of ROE. The legal factors which serve as a foundation for ROE, that is, customary and conventional law principles regarding the right of self-defense and the laws of war, are varied and complex. Although ROE can be complex, a workable framework for understanding it can be attained by dissecting it by purposes. ROE represents the intersection of political, military, and legal purposes.” Paul E. Jeter, “What Do Special Instructions Bring to the Rules of Engagement? Chaos or Clarity,” Air Force Law Review 55 (2004): 384.

29 “Enacted in 2002, the Joint Resolution granted authorization for the initial invasion of Iraq. It did so, however, in pursuit of two explicitly defined objectives. The Joint Resolution provided that "the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to: (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” Michael J. Glennon, “A Conveniently Unlawful War,” Policy Review 150 (August/September 2008): 70.
Bush Administration about their true intentions of invading Iraq and its legal justification.³⁰

**Ideology and Religion**

Ideology and religious motivations are challenging at times to distinguish from one another because they tend to work together and reflect similar, influential elements, that foster radicalism. Many of these groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah, are driven by their Islamic faith - yet, are radicalized not only by their belief system, but the idea and desire for a complete, islamic state in Israel.³¹ In addition to ideology and religion as drivers, there are additional elements that attribute to the process of radicalization because of the high level of susceptibility and influence due to a range of internal and external forces. One’s living conditions can greatly improve the chances of an individual joining a terrorist groups or militia of some sort, as these young men (and women) are directly recruited by these groups by being offered such things as compensation, food and shelter for one’s family or simply, the ‘discovery’ of oneself.³²

³⁰“Compared with other wars, there appears to be an especially radical cleavage between the justifications for war advanced by its proponents—Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—which proved to be hollow, and the actual motives and causes. Since the war, the deception practiced by the Bush administration has been exposed; but even before it was clear to ex-weapons inspectors and Iraq specialists that Saddam had no serious WMD capability and certainly not one capable of threatening the US.” Raymond Hinnebusch, “The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications.” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 209.


³² “For example, encouraging a youth to leave home and join a military or paramilitary organization can be (1) couched in patriotic terms if the youth’s family is a member of a privileged class, or (2) framed as a step in social advancement if the family is immigrant and struggling, or (3) characterized as a revolutionary act of self-discovery if the family is disapproving and must be circumvented.” Scott
Additionally, many of these individuals join because of a desire to belong as well as protection, since quite a few of these groups dwell in war-torn nation-states and shattering governments (i.e. Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, Iran, and so forth).

For instance, it has been reported heavily throughout the media over the years following the September eleventh attacks on the United States, that the motives behind Al Qaeda’s planning and execution of their terror plot at the time, were provoked by the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the United States support of Israel and the sanctions placed on Iraq. With that being said, there are political ramifications tied into that assessment as well; however, terrorist groups like the PIJ, ideally desired for a complete eradication of the Israeli people while establishing a complete Islamic state.


33 “The global Salafi jihadist recruiting movement within the United States seeks those who desire acceptance from society. Individuals such as Johnny Walker Lindh, “The American Taliban”, Timothy McVeigh, Adam “Pearlman” Gadahn “The American Azzam”, and Jose Padilla are but a few of the better known American’s who have sought out this social approval through the acceptance of extremist Islamic terrorist organizations. It’s with varying personality dispositions requiring social acceptance, complete communal acceptance, which draws individuals towards terrorist organizations and those who carry out these unpredictable acts of martyrdom against a peaceful society of innocent civilians.” Richard J. Hughbank and David L. Hughbank, “The Application of the Social Learning Theory to Domestic Terrorist Recruitment.” SWATdigest.com.

34 “In both forms of the defining Ladenese epistle of August 1996 (MW #3), the theme of two opposing camps came up again and again. One was the Zionist-American Crusaders. In varying forms, this phrase became a trope for everything that was unbalanced, oppressive and wrong between West and East, between the US and the Muslim world. It was they who are responsible for “the attacks and massacres committed against Muslims everywhere, the latest and most serious of which—the greatest disaster to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet Muhammad — is the occupation of the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, cornerstone of the Islamic world, place of revelation, source of the Prophetic mission, and home of the Noble Ka’ba where Muslims direct their prayers.” That occupation, of course, was the 1990–91 US-led intervention to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. . . .” Bruce B. Lawrence, “The Late Shaikh Osama bin Laden: A Religious Profile of al-Qaeda’s Deceased Poster Child.” Muslim World 101, no. 3, (July 2011): 384.
Osama Bin Laden - considering the high position he held in Al Qaeda and overall influence in the Muslim community - single-handedly established a deep disdain for the West, spreading the idea that the “War on Terror” was truly a war waged against the state of Islam. The presence of American troops in the Middle East and the intervening efforts of the United States in that region served as support for his message as well as an opportunistic alibi [for Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda] to initiate a series of attacks on the U.S. that would apparently preserve freedom for the Muslim people.

Examining this from an introversive perspective - the radical approach as it seems, is that an idea (or cause) worth dying for is an idea worth believing in. Manfred Sing, an academic journalist, said “the Jihadists’ acts are immunized to critique or failure insofar as they argue inside a different time frame and their individual experience is connected to, but also detached from collective providence. They have fulfilled their personal destination as soon as they have become a tool, a “catalyst” for victory; they do not have to “live to see their cause win” (al-’Azm). Radicalism is produced by a combination of things, but is ultimately a state of being that is developed over time.

35 “He became a tireless yet adaptive polemicist, first against the Saudis and then against their American allies and then finally against the Zio-Crusader alliance that fueled incessant warfare in the name of religion. He took his cue from a particular, but also a peculiar, reading of scripture. He believed that the end time was near because Islam was threatened with annihilation, and required all devout Muslims to fight in order to preserve its very existence. Islam could not, and would not, survive in the world of the 21st century unless Muslims united in defense of their faith. He reckoned that the present conflict was nothing less than the Third World War. It loomed as an ongoing war — at once necessary and ceaseless — between two combatants, the evil other, Western, and the good self, Muslim.” Ibid., “The Late Shaikh Osama bin Laden,” 384-385.

According to the New York Police Department Intelligence Division, radicalism generally has 4 stages that escalate from one level to the next, are unique on every level and individually carry a specific signature. A report prepared by two NYPD Intelligence Division Senior Intelligence Analysts, Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, referred to as “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat”, dissected jihadi-Salafi ideology (the most common ideology amongst Islamic radicals) in stages called Pre-Radicalization, Self-Identification, Indoctrination and Jihadization.\(^{37}\)

As mentioned before, each stage is unique according to the report, as they are forming parts of a broader or all-encompassing development. The first stage, Pre-Radicalization, is described as “an individual’s world - his or her pedigree, lifestyle, religion, social status, neighborhood, and education - just prior to the start of their journey down the path of radicalization.”\(^ {38}\) One’s environment can be extremely influential - particularly, adolescent males to nearly middle-age men are more vulnerable to radicalization, living in male-dominated societies.\(^ {39}\)


\(^{38}\) Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 22.

\(^{39}\) “Enclaves of ethnic populations that are largely Muslim often serve as ‘ideological sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought. Moreover, the greater the purity and isolation of these ethnic communities, the more vulnerable they are to be penetrated by extremism--under the guise that it represents a purer, more devout form of Islam. . . Living within and as part of a diaspora provides an increased sense of isolation and a desire to bond with others of the same culture and religion. Within diaspora Muslim communities in the West, there is a certain tolerance for the existence of the extremist subculture that enables radicalization. For the individual, radicalization generally takes place in an atmosphere where others are being radicalized as well.” Ibid.
The next stage, Self-Identification, is a phase that “is largely influenced by both internal and external factors, marks the point where the individual begins to explore Salafi Islam, while slowly migrating away from their former identity - an identity that now is re-defined by Salafi philosophy, ideology, and values. The catalyst for this ‘religious seeking’ is often a cognitive event, or crisis, which challenges one’s certitude inpreviously held beliefs, opening the individual’s mind to a new perception or view of the world.” Especially in times of political and personal crisis in addition to the dissemination of political messages, arguments, and associated atrocities that highlight some particular political grievance that Islam has with the West, or with one’s own government. The media has a great deal of influence, relaying messages that are usually multiplied rapidly through an array of media outlets such as websites, television, literature, speeches, chartrooms, and so forth.

Indoctrination is the third step towards complete radicalization of the jihadi-Salafi ideology, where “an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the Salafist cause. That action is militant jihad.” Additionally, according to the report, the prime source of information

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40 “Individuals most vulnerable to experiencing this phase are often those who are at a crossroad in life - those who are trying to establish an identity, or a direction, while seeking approval and validation for the path taken. Some of the crises that can jump-start this phase include: Economic (losing a job, blocked mobility); Social (alienation, discrimination, racism – real or perceived); Political (international conflicts involving Muslims); Personal (death in the close family).” Ibid., 30.

41 “The key aspect of this stage is the acceptance of a religious-political worldview that justifies, legitimizes, encourages, or supports violence against anything kufir, or un-Islamic, including the West, its citizens, its allies, or other Muslims whose opinions are contrary to the extremist agenda. In effect, as the individuals become indoctrinated, they re-define their direction in life....The individual’s sole objective centers around the Salafi aim of creating a pure fundamentalist Muslim community worldwide.” Ibid., 36.
regarding Islam and the jihadi-Salafi ideology in this phase is through the internet, where like-minded individuals share thoughts and reinforce individual beliefs, commitments to the ideology and further legitimizes its extremist cause. Additionally, prisons are suitable breeding grounds as well because of its isolated environment - with the absence of daily distractions and its large population of disgruntled young men, the influence of radicalization is much more potent.

Lastly, in the Jihadization stage, “members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or Mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for jihad or a terrorist attack. These ‘acts in furtherance’ will include planning, preparation and execution.” At this point of the radicalization process, individuality is but an illusion, as the overall group dynamic takes precedent over personal desires to fulfill jihadi obligations.

As far as radicalization in the United States, individuals move through the stages quite similarly with influences deriving from teachings abroad, cyber space, and the actual execution of terrorist attacks by foreign terrorists - however, many U.S. cases

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42 “... Individuals or the groups they are in are likely to begin proliferating jihadi-Salafist ideology online along with consuming it. The Internet becomes a virtual “echo chamber” – acting as a radicalization accelerant while creating the path for the ultimate stage of Jihadization.” Ibid., 37.

43 Ibid., 39.

44 “... Small group dynamics play a much more prominent role. While during the earlier stages, the group members may have been only acquaintances, meeting each other in Salafi chat rooms, at university or simply by being friends, by the jihadization phase the group has solidified and hardened. Individuals see themselves as part a movement and group loyalty becomes paramount above all other relationships.” Ibid., 43.

45 “The type of targets a group or cluster chooses and the modus operandi it employs might vary considerably between individual clusters. However, the ultimate objective for any attack is always the same - to punish the West, overthrow the democratic order, re-establish the Caliphate, and institute sharia.” Ibid.
(i.e. the Lackawana Six, the Portland Seven, the Northern Virginia Paintball) were disrupted at a relatively early stage, which ultimately hindered complete radicalization from occurring.46

With such potential of influence in regards to radicalization, one can imagine the strides a government or nation-state must take in order to sustain a calming peace amongst its people. Additionally, Michael J. Willis, an academic journalist at Oxford University, said containing radicalism is primarily the result of adhering to the concerns of a people and valuing their interests in regards to the management of their government:

The idea that radicalism can be contained through formal political processes is not a new one and can be found in theories of liberal democracy. It is argued that by including previously excluded political, social and even economic forces in political processes and the running of the state, these forces will feel that they have a say and a voice and that their interests and views are not neglected. They will therefore not seek to resort to radical or violent means to have their opinions heard or their interests considered.47

Nevertheless, the best way to target, dismantle and generally combat any transnational issue, particularly terrorism in this case, is to identifying the roots of the very elements radicalizing these disaffected individuals and understanding that these transformations are permanent - as terrorism is permanent, so is the potential for radicalism. Furthermore, Silber and Bhatt said it in their report, that “once we would have defined the initial indicator of the threat at the point where a terrorist or group of terrorists would actually

46 Ibid., 56.

plan an attack, we have now shifted our focus to a much earlier point - a point where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization. The culmination of this process is a terrorist attack.”

In the Bible, there is a segment in the Gospel of Mark describing Jesus Christ cursing a fig tree because it lacked fruit (which is a parable in itself) in the season where the tree is suppose to have fruit (fig trees produce fruit before the leaves appear), since leaves were present on the tree itself, according to the Bible. 49 A little while later, as Jesus Christ and his disciples were traveling back in the morning to Jerusalem after departing the night before, 50 verses 20 and 21 of chapter 11 describes them passing the same fig tree, which had withered completely at the roots. The point being made here is this - whether one believes in the events of Jesus Christ or even in his existence is not the most important subject of the matter at hand but in the withering of the roots. The roots are not located at the stage where a terrorist plot is formulating but in the development of the components structuring the plot - the terrorists themselves. After identifying the roots, defining them is of greater importance because there is power in being able to resolve or contain a larger problem through understanding it from its very core, which in this case is transnational terrorism.

**Financial Gain**

Terrorist groups more concerned with financial gain seem to be more pathological in their reasoning for committing acts. Greed, combined with the pursuit of wealth and

48 Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West*, 5.

49 Mark 11:12-14 (NKJV).

50 Ibid.
power drives these particular organizations - as these groups depend on lucrative activities to sustain itself and expand, while resorting to horrendous methods to remain relevant to the public and ultimately influential in the politics of a government. Groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are committed heavily in the manufacturing and distributing of narcotics in and out of Columbia and as one could imagine - quite the rivalry. The Department of State’s *Country Reports on Terrorism 2011* describes the two organization as narcoterrorist groups:

The FARC has well-documented ties to the full range of narcotics trafficking activities, including taxation, cultivation, and distribution. In 2011, Colombian government investigators reported that the FARC controlled approximately 15 gold mines in the Bolivar Department, and was actively involved in the extortion of heavy equipment operators at the mines. According to the investigators, the FARC could be receiving approximately $850 million annually from these activities. The AUC has carried out political killings and kidnappings of human rights workers, journalists, teachers, and trade unionists, among others. As much as 70 percent of the AUC’s paramilitary operational costs were financed with drug-related earnings.\(^{51}\)

Two criminal enterprises identical to the rivalry between the FARC and the AUC are Mexico’s Sinaloa Gang (“The Federation”) and the Gulf Cartel’s Los Zetas. These groups are not labeled terrorist groups,\(^{52}\) although they conduct themselves similarly in many aspects and are seen but disregarded as such. The actions of these two cartels speak for themselves, as gunmen from the Zetas Cartel, in point-blank range, executed seventy-

\(^{51}\) United State Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2011*.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
two blindfolded immigrants for reasons that are unclear, on August 22nd through the 23rd in 2010.\textsuperscript{53}

Furthermore, as the aftermath unfolded, more terror tactics (by both cartels) were implemented by public demonstration of the dumping of unidentified corpses, signifying that everyone is a target:

Moreover, as the massacre era has deepened, clandestine burials have increasingly been supplemented by another flourish: the piling of corpses in public places for terroristic display. In September 2011, the state of Veracruz was shaken by a dump of thirty-five mutilated bodies on a downtown street. Surrounding incidents pushed the statewide total of such corpses toward one hundred. The September pile came with notes from the killers saying they were cleaning out the hated Zetas (in this case, the killers were linked to the Sinaloa Cartel). But some of the victims turned out to be luckless passersby, apparently killed to add bulk to the spectacle. On November 24th, a similar downtown dump, of twenty-six corpses, more victims of the Zetas, appeared far to the west in Guadalajara.\textsuperscript{54}

The tactics and the intent behind the actions of these cartels are quite similar to several groups that are identified and labeled as terrorist groups - by the United States in particular. The challenging dynamic to this matter is establishing a framework by which governments internationally can undoubtedly use to identify certain groups as terrorist and thus, identifying certain actions as terrorist because the cost of misplacing a label on a certain group of people are great and can consequently sever U.S. relations. Furthermore, considering these events - what will it take to identify groups such as the Zetas Cartel and the Sinaloa Gang as a terrorist group? The ramifications regarding this


\textsuperscript{54} Moore, \textit{Mexico's Massacre Era}, 62-63.
are increasingly complex because societies, laws and generally the value of life differ according to the region or territory; however, murder, stealing, and the like, are universally shameful. Nevertheless, this thesis will address these kinds of issues candidly and extensively.

Conclusion

All in all, terrorism is collectively a complex issue, with no signs of slowing down, as ideologies are formed daily and religion becomes even more distorted by a variety of internal and external factors. As humans, we choose to hear, accept, and apply what is heard or completely reject what is told. Interestingly enough, the vast majority of people fall into the grey area, where factors looming from everywhere influence one’s decision to accept what others have already or propelling an individual down a path that opposes the majority. The challenging thing is sometimes, people are born into situations that leave no “wiggle-room” to express one’s individual thoughts (i.e. Slavery). Nevertheless, everyone is driven by either good or evil, and even that is particularly relative to every individual. For example, a person may argue that one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist, yet freedom is an end while terror is a means to an end. Therefore, the same individual can employ terror (since these things are tactics) while attaining freedom (a relative term as well) in the end, which is a desired outcome for virtually every terrorist group.
CHAPTER 2
CRITICAL ANALYSIS: DOMESTIC & ABROAD INTERPRETATIONS

The definitive issue at the heart of this paper is the inevitability of terrorism - as it is a means to justify an ends regarding political change, ideological transformation, religious establishment, or simply financial gain to remain relatively influential in daily governmental processes of the host nation-state. As to whether a working, universalized definition of terrorism will have the potential to stop terrorist attacks or at least dramatically slow the rate at which it occurs, my hypothesis argues that this will very well be the case while helping to bolster the defenses of all nations highly threatened by terrorism. Furthermore, a working definition (receiving information about a subject, having understanding of it and its applicability) will - at the very minimum - significantly slow the rate at which it occurs and thus, result in the dismantling of many more terrorist groups and the blotting out any future plans. This is not to say that the solution to best contain terrorism is by merely creating a framework through intelligence and analysis in which a group or an act is assessed by “pre-set qualifiers” (which could run the risk of premature categorization), but rather by understanding a phenomenon from its very core in an effort to combat it on all fronts. Furthermore, as the world becomes more globalized and interconnected, these terrorists groups become more cunning in recruitment, since it is now much easier for people to be informed (due to information that is readily available and accessible on many platforms such cellular phones, laptops, tablets, etc.) or influenced.
Interestingly enough, transparency of the individual is becoming even more commonplace in the world with the ever-expansion of social media, in light of events of the recent past. Transparency is a desirable trait of a government because citizens value a sense of connection to political leaders that genuinely consider the interests of the people. A true government, relatively speaking, is obliged to reflect such a characteristic by duty to some degree. Nevertheless, when it comes to transparency, there are always concerns regarding the contents of information that is dispersed to the public, the amount that is released, the broad spectrum of varying audiences that will receive it, and so forth. One of the primary purposes for transparency is to create, establish and sustain a direct relationship between citizens and governments. This, in itself, demands much fostering and commitment.

President Obama has made it a point to create an administration that is committed to open government in an effort to give people more of an opportunity to participate in

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1 “Social media’s saturation is a result of their domestication, or the extent to which they are embedded in everyday life. The saturation of information technologies in the domestic sphere often manifests as tensions, for instance, between privacy and publicity, or the commercialization of the homestead when it becomes a site for market research... Domestication explains social media’s origins. Its expansion is best explained by the notion of surveillance creep. This refers to how surveillance technologies deemed appropriate in one context can spread to new contexts and applications.” Daniel Trottier, Policing Social Media, Canadian Review of Sociology 49, no. 4 (November 2012): 413.

2 “Transparency is often seen as a powerful tool to transform governments. It is supposed to be a panacea for all kinds of ‘diseases’ in the public realm, such as low citizen trust, corruption, bad performance, low accountability and power abuse by public officials. Barack Obama’s Open Government Initiative, for example, relies heavily on the use of new technologies to provide citizens with information about government agencies...Generally the pro-transparency argument is based on the following three premises: (1) transparency will have positive effects on government (2) therefore it should be encouraged preferably by using ICTs, (3) this will forge closer connections between citizens and governments.” Stephan Grimmelekhuijsen, A Good Man But a Bad Wizard: About the Limits and Future of Transparency of Democratic Governments, Information Polity: The International Journal of Government & Democracy in the Information Age 17, no. 3/4 (2012): 294.
governmental processes. For instance, the Open Government Initiative actually lists transparency at the forefront of its cause, along with participation and collaboration. Peter R. Orszag, the Director of the Open Government Initiative, describes the initiative’s three key prongs explicitly:

The three principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration form the cornerstone of an open government. Transparency promotes accountability by providing the public with information about what the Government is doing. Participation allows members of the public to contribute ideas and expertise so that their government can make policies with the benefit of information that is widely dispersed in society. Collaboration improves the effectiveness of Government by encouraging partnerships and cooperation within the Federal Government, across levels of government, and between the Government and private institutions.

However, considering the relativity of transparency in itself, it also creates a platform for terrorists to thrive in their advances soundly by utilizing information and communications technology (ICT’s) to assist in supporting their cause, especially in regards to dissemination tactics and the recruitment process. Furthermore, considering the “shadowy,” yet, attentive makeup of a terrorist group, the beckoning question here is how great of a risk is transparency in accordance to our national security? Naturally, that

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5 “The progress in information technologies has pushed concepts such as war, threat, and terrorism to be redefined; those who possess the sufficient - extremely little in comparison to the past - computer hardware and the necessary skills to operate it adequately attained a position from when they can bring unthinkable damage to the largest and most powerful militaries, economies and social institutions in the world.” Okan Tansu, September 11: Early Thoughts on the Imbrication of Security, ICT, and International Relations, Perspective on Global Development and Technology 2 no. 1, (2003): 78.
which is made readily accessible and transparent to the people by the government has surely gone through a series of screenings, but truly - how safe is it to ever give the public full disclosure about a subject or event (which could give terrorists momentum by learning the inner-workings of a specific government)? The answer has proven to be elusive - nevertheless, the ‘greatest good’ must be served, which unfortunately, is also relative. Thus, the output of readily accessible information and its regulation (its management, security, and so forth), in all likelihood, are key determinants to a terrorist group’s planning and formulation of future terror plots.

In an multi-faceted approach to combatting terrorism and generally national security issues, the United States’ international community - comprised of 17 members\(^6\) - uniquely define terrorism in a way that seemingly reflects the agency, their goals and responsibilities concerning threats to the homeland. It is beneficial to have numerous agencies and organizations develop their own definition of terrorism because this long-standing issue can be assessed from varying vantage points simultaneously. However, considering the valiant efforts from the collection of great minds in the IC, miscalculations in intelligence gathering and analysis can occur, resulting in devastating repercussions.\(^7\) Therefore, it is of great importance that as intelligence is gathered,

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\(^6\) Intelligence.gov. http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community/ (accessed March 11th, 2013). The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is a coalition of 17 agencies and organizations within the executive branch that work both independently and collaboratively to gather the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities. Our primary mission is to collect and convey the essential information the President and members of the policymaking, law enforcement, and military communities require to execute their appointed duties.

\(^7\) “As the comparison suggests, quantifying signals and noise tells part of the warning story, but not the most important part. In both cases [the Cuban Missile Crisis and 9/11] the crucial warning problem was not the precise number of signals; whether there were three or 30 or even 300 signals made little difference in the end. Instead, the crucial problem had to do with organizational deficiencies that ensured
collected, analyzed and presented to other agencies working on terrorism (or any threat to the homeland for that matter), thoughts must be shared and ideas compared in order to produce more accurate results. Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe and others, mentions some of the challenges associated with gathering intelligence:

The Intelligence Community's uneven performance on Iraq from 2002–4 raised significant questions concerning the condition of intelligence collection, analysis, and policy support. The discussion of shortcomings and failures that follows is not meant to imply that all surprises can be prevented by even good intelligence. There are too many targets and too many ways of attacking them for even the best intelligence agencies to discover all threats in time to prevent them from happening. Nonetheless, improving performance requires an acknowledgement of past mistakes and a willingness to change. 8

Nevertheless, as it seems, some of the commonalities that we find in assessing terrorism as a whole stem from the use of fear tactics and the desire for change, ideally motivated by political, ideological, religious, or financial goals; however, settling on the intricacies of terrorism such as the making of a terrorist, how targets or sites are chosen and so forth, has been a “slippery” task. To further engage this topic, several agencies within the United States, will be highlighted as their definition of terrorism is examined.

Defining Terrorism in the Intelligence Community

Bruce Hoffman, in his book Inside Terrorism, mentioned several departments and agencies varying in their interpretations of terrorism, which sheds light on the fact that

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even within the same government, it is not uncommon to have distinguishable vantage points about a given subject. One of the first organizations Hoffman mentioned is the United States Department of State, which is primarily concerned with advancing freedom for the American people and sustaining stable relationships internationally.\(^9\) Their definition of terrorism stems from a statute already set in place, located in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d), stating that terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”\(^10\) Immediately, notice that only political motivations are recognized in this definition, as it is the ultimate goal; however, it is quite accurate overall with the inclusion of preparation, vulnerable targets, the kinds of clusters one could expect to commit such acts, and so forth, as the desirable outcome [for many of these groups] is influence.

Another organization mentioned in Hoffman’s book is the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, which primarily functions as a federal criminal investigative entity as well as an internal intelligence agency.\(^11\) According to Hoffman, the Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population,


\(^10\) Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 30-31.

or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”¹² The FBI’s
definition widens the spectrum a bit by including property and the impact that societal
pressures have on individuals or a group of people. Interestingly enough, a specific kind
of cluster is not mentioned unlike the previous definition by the State Department (i.e.
subnational or clandestine agents) - which either lends the assumption that the agency is
cautious with labeling or identifies perpetrators as terrorists at a different point in the
commission of a terrorist attack. Also, there is a slight difference between the two
definitions in how terrorism is perceived. The State Department defines terrorism in a
way that reflects an initiated act while the FBI’s definition seems more responsive. It is
also emphasizes attention to the structure of things, whether political or societal.
Furthermore, the FBI is required to prioritize national security concerns (as all agencies
should be, especially regarding the recent emphasis on boosting cyber security) first and
foremost¹³ - therefore, it is understandable that religion and ideology is not at the
forefront of how the FBI defines terrorism, but you will not find any of the two on the
“back-burner” either.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is clearly geared towards securing
the nation, making it safer and more resilient against any and all threats to the homeland.
Terrorism, as it is defined by DHS goes as follows, according to Hoffman’s book:

“[Terrorism] is any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human
life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources. It
must also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian

¹² Ibid., 31.

¹³ Chelsea J. Carter, Pam Benson, and Mariano Castillo. “Official: Cyberattacks, N. Korea,
Jihadist Groups Top U.S. Threats.” CNN. Http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/12/us/threat-
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”

According to this statement, there are three components qualifying an offense as an act of terrorism, resulting in what is described in the first sentence of the above quote. This definition in particular is quite extensive, as it attempts to describe terrorism as a sum of components working together but ultimately reflecting the primary outlook of the department. Hoffman adds that “the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) definition clearly reflects its mission: concentrating on attacks to critical infrastructure and key national resources that could have grave societal consequences. In this respect, DHS cite specifically in its definition the threat of ‘mass destruction,’ the better to differentiate and distinguish its responsibilities from those of other agencies.” Nevertheless, the definition does not give attention to other potent motivations such as religion (much like the FBI) possibly because some of these motivations (i.e. political, religious, ideological, financial) are merely initiators that evolve into political desires. Thus, depending on the organization, department or agency, there will be an emphasis on either terrorism’ origination or the latter, meaning the end result.

The next department highlighted in Hoffman’s book is the United States Department of Defense, which according to the author, seems to be the most accurate in defining terrorism because “it highlights the terrorist threat as much as the act of violence

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15 Ibid., 33.
and focuses on terrorism’s targeting of whole societies as well as governments." The text stated that DOD defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.” This definition is well structured as it includes all the primary facets of terrorism except for a slight modification - in addition to the political, religious, or ideological objectives, one must add financial gain as an objective because virtually every terrorist organization seeks financial backing in order to continue spreading their influence. Furthermore, as a way of creating a positive image, Smith and Cooper said it best that “to promote a veil of legitimacy, large terrorist organizations must spend tens of millions on propaganda and ostensibly legitimate social or charitable activities such as hospitals, schools and other public works. They raise the money largely through fundraising efforts worldwide, including ‘witting and unwitting’ contributions from mosques, non-governmental organizations, wealthy donors, and charitable foundations.”

Lastly, an agency that was not highlighted in Hoffman’s book in defining terrorism is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which did not formulate its own

\[16\] Ibid.
\[17\] Ibid.
definition of terrorism but adheres to a statute that is already in place. The statute, Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d), in more detail (previously mentioned), states:

(1) The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; (2) The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving the territory or the citizens of more than one country; (3) The term ‘terrorist group’ means any group that practices, or has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.\(^\text{19}\)

This statute simplifies terrorism to some extent but the act of terrorism is duly noted. Nevertheless, the commonalities regarding the definitions mentioned earlier unanimously agree that elements such as violence, force, political change, fear and terror operate as primary functions in terrorism as a whole, in more degrees than one, depending on the agency. Thus, the slight differences that appear in the definitions assessed earlier are reflective of the organizations and their functionality. Nevertheless, a multi-faceted approach will work the best in assessing a phenomenon, which in this case, is terrorism. Therefore, the more understanding there is of a given subject, the likelier it is to define it.

**Defining and Combatting Terrorism Abroad**

To begin exploring how Terrorism is defined outside the United States, Jeffrey Kaplan, a distinguished American academic, once said that “Terrorism is what it has always been: a tactic of desperation by the weak in defiance of the strong. The key is not the weak versus the strong, however. Rather, the key is understanding that terrorism is, in

fact, a tactic.”

This is especially true, as with propaganda - it is merely a tool at the mercy of its user. In addition to terrorism, society’s differ from region to region internationally, ranging from variations in norms, rules and regulations to even the value of life. Universally, there are certain things that are downright unacceptable such as murder, rape, stealing, and deception - ultimately, the swiftness, the severity and the style of punishment vary as well. Therefore, in regards to terrorism, identifying in act as terrorist or labeling a cluster of individuals as a terrorist group is subject to a nation-state’s understanding of terrorism and their ability to combat it successfully.

Nevertheless, Kaplan added that a new form of terrorism is emerging, where leaders of these clusters are becoming more “genocidal,” especially considering some tribal leaders in Southern Africa:

My own contribution to this expanding body of theory about terrorism concerns the emergence of a new form of tribalism in places like Africa, where increasingly vicious or outright genocidal conflicts are taking place in Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and for which Rapoport’s Four Waves theory fails to account. My Fifth Wave theory finds the ultimate goal of each of the movements to be nothing less than the creation of a new and perfected people, making all who do not belong to the respective group and the reconstituted “tribal Golden Age” subject to the intent of extermination.

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21 “Although rape was regularly prosecuted in criminal courts and convictions resulted in imprisonment and flogging, informal courts that favoured compensation continued to operate and some cases were heard in civil court.” Jocelyn Alexander and Gary Kynoch, “Introduction: Histories and Legacies of Punishment in Southern Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 37, no. 3 (September 2011): 396.

22 Kaplan, New/Old Terrorism, 6.
Some of the tribal conflicts resulting in genocide, such as the Rwandan Genocide of the Tutsi people by the Hutu in 1994, or the Darfur conflict in Sudan, which started in February of 2003. For the sake of widening the scope of how this phenomenon is perceived and managed, five countries have been selected from the international community to be further evaluated on how they define terrorism.

**Combatting Terrorism in Different Countries**

The five countries selected to further explore the realms of terrorism are Canada, France, Germany, Israel and the United Kingdom, using a report constructed by intelligence analysts in April of 2000 from the National Security and International Affairs Division, in the United States General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO in particular, often referred to as the “congressional watchdog,” investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars, to best ensure that Congress and the heads of executive agencies are efficient, effective and ethical in decision making processes as well as improving government operations through laws and acts. The report, *COMBATING TERRORISM: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism*, selected those five countries to examine based on a variety of qualifiers such as terrorism-related activities within their borders, the type of government, and how they

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23 “In 1994, extremist elements led the most intense genocide of the twentieth century, resulting in the deaths of close to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu in just a ninety-day period. The country was devastated and, seventeen years later, is still recovering.” Deborah Mayersen and Stephen McLoughlin, “Risk and Resilience to Mass Atrocities in Africa: A Comparison of Rwanda and Botswana,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 13. No 3 (September 2011): 247.

are poised to combat terrorism. These countries also have specific organizations exclusively focusing on terrorism (much like the IC in the United States) and designated as emergency response units to terrorist attacks (i.e. their national or local police). Additionally, each countries’ executive branches provide primary oversight of the organizations designed to combat terrorism, similarly to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence within the United States’ intelligence community. Thus, the structure of these countries, along with each countries’ experience with terrorism-related activities made them desirable places to examine.

Canada

According to the GAO Report, Canada’s Security Offenses Act (1984) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (1984) serves as principal terrorism-related statutes, but do not have an explicit definition of terrorism; however, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act does describe terrorism as “threats to the security of Canada.” These threats include “activities within or relating to Canada directed toward

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25 “The five countries we examined have similarities in how they are organized to combat terrorism. Specifically, each country places the majority of resources for combating terrorism under one ministry, but each recognizes that it must coordinate its efforts to develop national policy on combating terrorism so it has interagency coordination bodies. Each country also has clearly designated leadership at the scene of terrorist incidents. The five countries have policies and strategies that emphasize the prevention of terrorism using resources such as intelligence collection, police presence, and security measures. In addition, each country uses its general criminal laws (e.g., those for murder or arson) to prosecute terrorists. The countries also have special terrorism-related laws that allow for special investigation or prosecution mechanisms, and increased penalties. In each of the five countries, the executive branch provides the primary oversight of organizations involved in combating terrorism.” United States GAO, “Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism,” United States General Accounting Office: Report to Congressional Requesters, 6-7.

26 Ibid., 4.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 20.
or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political objective within Canada or foreign state.”

The major concerns in Canada’s assessment constituting an event as an act of terrorism is if the act greatly jeopardizes the security of the nation as a whole, the safety of its citizens and any property, which is expected. Interestingly enough, Canada is concerned with even threats related to the homeland - which lends to their willingness to support allies afflicted by terrorists.

**France**

In France, the GAO Report states that in Chapters I and II of title II (Terrorism) of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Penal Code ties a terrorist-related act - which is described as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order” - to the Code’s general criminal offenses as well. Furthermore, the authors of the report mentioned that French officials would not label an act as an act of terrorism unless it was linked to some political motive or cause. The premise here is that French officials are cautious about labeling events as terrorist unless the act is clearly linked to a political motive or identified as such. Furthermore, France designates several agencies to fully engage in counter-terrorism efforts, similarly to the United States. The report lists the Ministry of Interior as France’s national law enforcement organization, which houses the Anti-Terrorism Coordination Unit. This interagency includes the National Police (Direction Générale de la Police Nationale), the

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29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.
Central Headquarters for Surveillance of the Territory, and the General Intelligence Central Service.\(^{31}\)

**Germany**

The next nation mentioned in the report is northeast of France and across the border - Germany. The GAO Report stated that in Section 129(a) of the Criminal Code, German law does not explicitly define terrorism, but German government officials describes terrorism as a permanent fight for political goals and change of the political system through assaults against persons and property.\(^{32}\) This is interesting because out of the five countries being examined, Germany is the only country identifying terrorism as a permanent threat and as a struggle (referring to the “permanent fight” label within Germany’s description of terrorism) as well. The Red Army Faction, a left-wing militant group operating in Germany from 1970 to 1988 after WWII,\(^{33}\) may have contributed heavily to the level of seriousness in which Germany views terrorism because of identical tactics we see today in insurgent groups.\(^{34}\) Germany’s history of being dominated by

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 18.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 20.


\(^{34}\) “Especially in the seventies, the RAF’s principle interlocutors were news editors and producers. Meinhof, Baader, and Ensslin played to the media, prefacing their acts of subterfuge with telephone calls to news bureaus. When the second generation, still at large, resorted to kidnapping, they mobilized new technologies to pull off their plans. The RAF made media history in 1977 when they took the industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer hostage and videotaped his forced testimony in the so-called people’s prison. Turning their camera into a weapon, they opened a new aperture for terrorism, and we can trace the technologies of today’s Iraqi insurgents back to this foundational moment.” Ibid., 41.
ideologies (i.e. Nazism, Marxism, etc.) lends to a more compelling description of terrorism.

**Israel**

Southeast of Germany is Israel, a nation that has been plagued with acts of terrorism for many years. According to the GAO Report, the Defense and Emergency Act (1945) and the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (1948) says that “neither law specifically defines terrorism, but the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance contains criminal prohibitions regarding a person’s activities and association with a ‘terrorist organization.’ Such an organization is defined as a “body of persons resorting in its activities to acts of violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or to threats of such acts of violence.” According to the ordinance, which is a proclamation made to the public, it is strictly forbidden to aide any terrorist organization or even associate oneself with any. Terrorists groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Hamas, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) dwell in and around Israel. Nevertheless, it is very challenging to track and

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36 “Hamas has regularly attacked Israel with rockets from Gaza or allowed others to do so. It poses a strong and growing political threat to the more moderate Palestinian Authority, which is led by President Mahmoud Abbas and his technocratic prime minister, Salam Fayyad, and which governs the West Bank and used to run Gaza, too.” Daniel Byman, “How to Handle Hamas,” *Foreign Affairs* 89 no. 5 (September/October 2010).
monitor these groups, let alone associations with these groups because of the “shadowy” nature of terrorist organizations.

**United Kingdom**

Lastly, venturing back northward, we have the United Kingdom. The GAO report the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1998, both define terrorism as “the use of violence for political ends [including] any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear.”³⁷ As the GAO report states, the United Kingdom’s Official Committee on Terrorism coordinates interagency counter-terrorism policy development, through the gathering of intelligence from the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Association of Chief of Police Officers.³⁸ This interagency is equivalent to the Ministry of Interior in France where the UK’s Official Committee on Terrorism provides oversight and but ultimately utilizes a multi-faceted approach. Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s Home Office only manages domestic terrorism programs, with purview over law enforcement, domestic intelligence, and emergency management.³⁹ Thus, the United Kingdom is not overly concerned with terrorism outside its borders as the concern is more concentrated domestically.

**Conclusion**

All of the definitions examined throughout the chapter shared many of the same responsive commonalities deriving from political unrest, societal inequalities,

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³⁷ United States GAO, *Combatting Terrorism*, 20.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.
environmental influences, personal circumstances, and so forth. As mentioned before, individuals are either propelled by good or evil - desiring an end that is pleasing to that individual or group of people. Along the way, there are internal and external influences that accelerates the propulsion, slow it down, or completely reverses it. For example, globalization allows for the spreading of radicalism because of new advancements in technology regarding communication. Nevertheless, change is inevitable and therefore, as humans, we must acknowledge that and plan accordingly because a failure to plan is planning to fail. Thus, terrorism must be defined in a way that compels one to act upon it - not to react to a finished work.
CHAPTER 3
CATCHING THE STATES’ ATTENTION

In this chapter, I will recognize three specific administrations - the Reagan Administration, the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration - to distinguish differences in countering threats to the homeland and how the threat of terrorism influenced their national security policies. Each administration experienced a landmark event as a result of many things stemming from a lack of safety measures to ill-advised efforts to sustain healthy foreign relationships. Unfortunately, there are those rare times where unforeseen circumstances have occurred, even when all the best measures have been taken. Nevertheless, the best way to respond to any event is to learn from it and formulate better provisions to strengthen preventive efforts. Furthermore, to grasp how the evolving threat of terrorism greatly shaped the United States’ national security efforts, each administration will be thoroughly examined.

The Reagan Administration

Prior to former President Ronald Reagan’s term, the United States had been quarreling with the Soviet Union (USSR) - a communist state that sponsored terrorism - for an extended amount of time, which came to be known as the Cold War.¹ Ronald

¹ “The term ‘Cold War’, coined by George Orwell to name this particular era was heralded by President Truman in his address to Congress on March 12, 1947. During Cold War period, world was divided between those who hailed the U.S as a leader of the world forces of human freedom and those who saw it as an imperialist power.” Khawaja Alma and Rafida Nawaz, “U.S. Role in Bending Democracy during Cold War: A Case Study of Pakistan,” South Asian Studies (1026-678X) 25, no. 1 (January 2010): 7.

² “Insofar as ‘cold’ warfare implies a conflict of ideas and persuasion fought not on the battlefield but through propaganda, psychological warfare, and other ideological weapons, brainwashing is the essence of cold war. It is no accident that U.S. military leaders explicitly embraced the notion as both a metaphor for psychological warfare and a literal weapon in the U.S. arsenal.” Timothy Melley, Brain Warfare: The Covert Sphere, Terrorism, and the Legacy of the Cold War, Grey Room 45 (Fall 2011): 21.
Reagan, known as a peaceable and pragmatic individual, Alan P. Dobson said that Reagan assumed office [in 1981] under the pretext that the Soviet Union was collapsing economically and losing grip on its empire. Dobson added, “Reagan wanted to compete in the Cold War more vigorously, but he took it for granted that “the Russians . . . considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them.” This conviction created room for aggressive maneuvering, which involved combative rhetoric to arouse U.S. public opinion, more assertive leadership of the West, a cutback in the technology flow to the East, and increased defense spending and technological innovations such as SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), which were intended to challenge the Soviets to respond and thus place further pressure on their stretched economy. At the same time covert and counterintelligence activities were to be increased.”

The Cold War evolved into an environment fostering propaganda, where the battles were not fought on the field, but in the hearts and minds of Men. President

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3 “Reagan’s broad vision and clear direction made his political ideals appealing. But paradoxically, what made his policy victories possible was his willingness, when faced with political reality, to make pragmatic compromises without seeming to abandon his ideals. He is remembered as a tax cutter, but he signed some of the largest tax increases in U.S. history. He is remembered as standing firm against terrorism, yet he withdrew Marines from Lebanon after a terrorist bombing, and he traded arms for hostages. He championed huge increases in defense spending, yet he almost bargained away the U.S. nuclear stockpile. He believed in law and order, but he allowed his White House to break the law by selling arms to Iran and funding the Contras in Nicaragua. He was a staunch foe of communism, yet he led the country to a new understanding of Russia.” James P. Pfiffner, “The Paradox of President Reagan’s Leadership,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (March 2013): 82.


5 Ibid.
Reagan, earning the moniker the “Great Communicator” because of his skillfulness in rhetoric,\(^6\) often produced desirable results that sustained the safety of this nation:

For, despite the widespread belief among Reagan's admirers that his militarism was the key to his success in superpower relations, the Reagan revisionists insist upon Reagan's profound desire for peace and his alleged hatred of nuclear weapons. Reagan's vision of a nuclear-free world, they tell us, inspired his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a plan announced in 1983 whose intention was to make America invulnerable to incoming nuclear warheads with a system that could shoot missiles out of the sky, and also led to the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) between the United States and the USSR in 1987—the first agreement ever to eliminate a class of nuclear weapons.\(^7\)

This shows how significantly important effective diplomatic measures are in regards to terrorism; interestingly enough, virtually every presidential administration has shown paradoxical traits at some point in time apparently. Dobson added that “the Reagan administration’s Cold War strategy is fraught with difficulties of interpretation. Some see Reagan in terms of symbolism or as an agent in the politics of decline. Others see him as incompetent, wayward, and overly influenced by Nancy Reagan. There are those who celebrate his revival of American values and strength, and those who revile his politics as

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\(^6\) “A second—and much larger—literature on the presidency of Ronald Reagan has drawn upon the concept of civil religion to help explain Reagan’s reputation as the ‘Great Communicator.’ While some have attributed this reputation to Reagan’s acting experience (Auer 1992), his use of figurative rhetoric (Jasinski 1992), or key “rhetorical moments” that transformed him from actor to president (Blankenship and Muir 1992), a common theme is that Reagan was distinctive among recent American presidents in his use of civil religion rhetoric—and this is key to understanding his acquired reputation as the Great Communicator (Ritter and Henry 1992, 121). He is said to have turned civil religion rhetoric “into a formidable political weapon. In using it he rendered mute those who would oppose him (Weiler and Pearce 1992, 29).” Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Edward Yager, and Saadi Lahlou, “Yes, Ronald Reagan’s Rhetoric Was Unique—But Statistically, How Unique?” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (September 2012): 483.

chauvinism and his economics as exploitative capitalism.”

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union collapsed on its own due to poor economic management, the emergence of Westernization, and the failure to adjust to globalization:

From yet another perspective, while U.S. policies were ‘hard-headed’ and disruptive for the Soviets, radical change appears to erupt not primarily because of anything that Reagan did, but because of the longstanding structural flaws in the Soviet economy and the corrosive influence of Western ideas in an ever more interdependent world with permeable state borders. Seductive Western ideas began to take hold because of enhanced communications, the aggressive propaganda of the Roman Catholic Church, and the fora established by the Helsinki Accords for economic, political, and human rights reforms. Some even see the military strength Reagan developed as just another symptom of terminal superpower overstretch.

**Iran-Contra Affair**

On November 13th, 1986, President Ronald Reagan gave a nationally televised address on what he called “an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy.”

Reagan revealed that the United States had been secretly selling arms to Iran, opposing Reagan’s policy on neutrality concerning the Iran–Iraq War and his “tacit policy of supporting Iraq.”

Reagan’s nationally televised address sparked immediate, widespread controversy, which gathered even more strength with the revelation of administrative officials illegally diverting profits from the sale of arms to

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9 Ibid., 533.


11 Ibid., 95.
provide support for the Nicaraguan resistance.\textsuperscript{12} Christopher L. Hinson provides a detailed description of the Iran-Contra Affair, including several law violations against U.S. foreign policy:

The Iran-Contra scandal was the end result of the exposure of two secret Reagan administration policies, the Iran Initiative and the Nicaragua Operation, coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC). The Iran initiative consisted of efforts to obtain the release of American hostages held in Iran by unlawfully selling weapons to Iran. The Contra operation consisted of efforts to unlawfully support paramilitary activities in Nicaragua in violation of the Boland II Amendment. They were intertwined because the profits made from the missile sales to Iran were used to provide arms to the Contra effort. The secret programs were also against U.S. foreign policy. These unlawful programs were exposed in 1986 when a U.S. cargo plane was shot down while delivering military supplies to the Contras in October, and again in November when a Lebanese newspaper reported the sale of arms to Iran (Walsh, 1993). After the investigation, Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh concluded that in addition to other policy and law violations, government officials had systematically and willfully withheld large volumes of relevant documents from investigators and had deliberately deceived Congress and the public about the government’s knowledge of and support for the alleged activities.\textsuperscript{13}

The purpose of the Nicaraguan Resistance (the Contra groups as a whole) was a final effort to remove the dictatorship of the Sandinista Government, “acquired” by General Anastasio Somoza García.\textsuperscript{14} Ultimately, the United States became involved in Nicaragua’s affairs regarding this civil war to protect economic interests.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Christopher L. Hinson, “Negative Information Action: Danger for Democracy,” \textit{American Behavioral Scientist} 53 no. 6 (February 2010): 830-831.

\textsuperscript{14} “The efforts of the Nicaraguan Contra organizations to unseat the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua spanned much of the 1980s but had their roots in earlier events. A 1911 treaty between the United States and Nicaragua gave the United States the right to intervene in Nicaraguan affairs, and U.S. Marines were dispatched to Nicaragua in 1912 to protect U.S. economic interests. The two-decade military
Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes that “Reagan was spared the embassy hostage drama - which ended as he was inaugurated - only to be ensnared in another hostage ordeal in Lebanon. Iranian-directed terrorists from Hezbollah had seized Americans in Beirut to trade for the relatives of Hezbollah members held in Kuwait. The organizer of the hostage ordeal was Imad Mughniyah, whose cousin was held for trying to assassinate the Kuwaiti Emir.”\(^{15}\) The Hezbollah (also known as Hizballah) terrorist organization is inspired by the radical, revolutionary teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, \(^{16}\) who was an Iranian religious leader and politician.\(^{17}\)

These events tailored the Reagan administration’s national security policies in a number of ways. The biggest threat to the United States at the time of Reagan’s occupation that followed helped foster the development of a guerrilla opposition, led by Augusto Cesar Sandino, that sought to rid Nicaragua of U.S. influence. The U.S. Marines left Nicaragua in 1933, but opposition to Nicaraguan National Guard Commander Anastasio Somoza Garcia, who had then assumed power, continued thereafter.”\(^{16}\) Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/cocaine/report/background.html#chron (accessed March 16th, 2013).

\(^{15}\) “Reagan was obsessed with freeing the hostages, and another task force was created in the CIA by Director Bill Casey. My job was to understand the group holding the captors, Islamic Jihad, a shadowy cover for Hezbollah. The Reagan White House was approached by a combination of Iranian exiles and Israelis, both in government and out, who argued that they could open a line of communication to Tehran, strengthen ‘moderates’ there, and get the hostages home if U.S. and Israeli weapons were offered. They seemed never to have understood that they were only increasing the value of the hostages; for every hostage released for an arms shipment, another prisoner was taken. As Casey’s biographer has noted, “What Casey and the rest of the supporting Reagan cast were all guilty of was monumental gullibility.”” Bruce Riedel, “America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 15, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2008): 104.

\(^{16}\) “Formed in 1982, in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanese-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of Khomeini’s successor, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and often acts at its behest, although it also acts independently.” Department of State, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm#FARC (accessed March 16th, 2013).

\(^{17}\) Asghar Seyed-Gohrab, “Khomeini the Poet Mystic,” Welt des Islams 51, 3/4 (December 2011): 438. “Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989), the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is commonly known in the West for his political reading of Islam.”
administration was a Soviet nuclear threat, which became quite volatile at times with rising political and military tensions. In addition, the Soviets were also applying an expansionist foreign policy in places like Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua - places where U.S. interests were being threatened. The primary focus of national security shifted to combatting a USSR offensive, with increases applied to the defense budget from 1980 to 1989 because of growing concerns. As a nation-state that sponsored terrorism, their practices of expansion raised red flags as well. The Iran-Contra Affair taught us to never negotiate with terrorists because it is like negotiating with the devil - regardless of the circumstances, your utter destruction is all that is truly desired.

The Bush Administration

Five days after the events of 9/11, former President George W. Bush was questioned [at the White House] about a statement that former Vice President Dick Cheney said previously, in regards to the length of time the United States will be engaged in the “War on Terrorism.” Bush replied in support of Cheney’s remarks by strangely

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19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
using the term ‘crusade’ to describe the United States War on Terrorism.\textsuperscript{21} Reverting back to history, the Crusades were a series of Holy Wars between Christians and Muslims, concerning the ownership of holy places in and around Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{22} The author added that “the preservation or the recovery of Jerusalem was undoubtedly the most important and prestigious of these endeavours and, while certain expeditions (such as the crusade in southern France) were controversial, crusading as a whole took place with the broad approval of European society. As the range of targets shows, crusading was not a static concept. Other developments in medieval society intertwined with and influenced the idea, most particularly chivalry. Crusading offered a platform for knights to show bravery and integrity. The idea of fighting for God, the ultimate lord, gave service in crusading armies a special attraction, although at times knights' determination to win

\textsuperscript{21} Vice President Dick Cheney, speaking on NBC's Meet the Press, echoed Rumsfeld's comments about the length of the effort at hand. "I think this is going to be a struggle that the United States is going to be involved in for the foreseeable future," he said. "There's not going to be an end date when we're going to say, 'There, it's all over with.' It's going to require constant vigilance on our part to avoid problems in the future, but it's also going to require a major effort and obviously quite possibly the use of military force," he said. Bush made the same point during his remarks at the White House. "This crusade, this war on terrorism is gonna take awhile. And the American people must be patient. I'm gonna be patient," Bush said. Manuel Perez-Rivas, “Bush Vows to Rid the World of ‘Evil-Doers’,” CNN Washington Bureau. Http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism/ (accessed March 15th, 2013).

\textsuperscript{22} “In November 1095 Pope Urban II called upon the knights of France to journey to the Holy Land and liberate the city of Jerusalem and the Christians of the east from Muslim power. In return they would be granted an unprecedented spiritual reward — the remission of all their sins — and thereby escape the torments of Hell, their likely destination after lives of violence and greed. The response to Urban's appeal was astounding; over 60,000 people set out to recover the Holy Land and secure this reward and, in some cases, take the chance to set up new territories. Almost four years later, in July 1099, the survivors conquered Jerusalem in an orgy of killing. While most of the knights returned home, the creation of the Crusader States formed a permanent Christian (or 'Frankish') presence in the Levant. In 1187, however, Saladin defeated their forces at the Battle of Hattin and brought Jerusalem back under Muslim control. The Franks held onto other lands until 1291 when they were finally driven out by the Mamluks of Egypt to end Christian rule in the Holy Land.” Jonathan Philips, “The Call of Crusades,” History Today 59, no. 11 (November 2009): 10.
fame for themselves could cause them to put notions of honour ahead of the greater Christian cause.”

More recently, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in particular, was undoubtedly one of the greatest tragedies ever faced by this nation. Conducted by a jihadi-extremist group referred to as Al Qaeda, the deliberate murder of nearly 3,000 people in a matter of hours is unquestionably horrific and devastating. There has been much sorrow and pity since that September morning, however, the execution of such a wide-scale terror plot is intriguing. As mentioned earlier, to understand terrorism, we must understand the components that make up and carry out the plots - the terrorists themselves. Terrorists are not deranged individuals according to Charles L. Ruby, but merely people driven by an end. For example, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), “the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks,” planned for 9/11 three years before its onset. Interestingly enough, Ruby

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23 Ibid.

24 “Kaplan (1981) used the pathology model in an attempt to differentiate between the ‘reasons’ and ‘causes’ of terrorism by proposing that reasons are the social variables that facilitate terrorism or help rationalize terrorist behavior. On the other hand, the causes lie within the terrorist himself/herself. The reasons may include things like poverty, an unjust government, and the principles of dialectical materialism; however, the causes of terrorist behavior “must be sought in the psychopathology of the assassin” (p. 36). According to Kaplan, terrorists have a pathological need to pursue absolute ends.” Charles L. Ruby, Are Terrorists Mentally Deranged?, 16.

25 GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ksm.htm (accessed March 16th, 2013). According to KSM, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam marked a watershed in the evolution of the 9/11 plot. KSM claims these bombings convinced him that Bin Ladin was truly committed to attacking the United States. He continued to make himself useful, collecting news articles and helping other al Qaeda members with their out-dated computer equipment. Bin Ladin, apparently at Atef's urging, finally decided to give KSM the green light for the 9/11 operation sometime in late 1998 or early 1999. KSM then accepted Bin Ladin's standing invitation to move to Kandahar and work directly with al Qaeda. In addition to supervising the planning and preparations for the 9/11 operation, KSM worked with and eventually led al Qaeda's media committee. But KSM states he refused to swear a formal oath of allegiance to Bin Ladin, thereby retaining a last vestige of his cherished autonomy. At this point, late 1998 to early 1999, planning for the 9/11 operation began in earnest.
goes on to explain possible “abnormalities” (due to external influences) in the personality structure of a terrorist:

The personality defect model of terrorism is based on the premise that terrorists have fundamental and pathological defects in their personality structure, usually related to a damaged sense of self. These defects are said to result from unconscious forces in the terrorist’s psyche. Terrorist’s hostile focus is so great during childhood and adolescence that it continues into adulthood and becomes very narrow and extreme, ostensibly explaining the terrorist’s absolutist mindset and dedication.\textsuperscript{26}

Therefore, with the evolution of the terrorist, those threatened must evolve as well. In response to the terrorist attacks, Former President George W. Bush created a new agency that focused exclusively on threats or possible threats to the homeland. The author of \textit{The Department of Homeland Security}, under the Bush Administration, mentioned in the text that “the changing nature of the threats facing America requires a new government structure to protect against invisible enemies that can strike with a wide variety of weapons. Today no one single government agency has homeland security as its primary mission. In fact, responsibilities for homeland security are dispersed among more than 100 different government organizations. America needs a single, unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today’s threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future. The President proposes to create a new Department of Homeland Security, the most significant transformation of the U.S. government in over a half-century by largely transforming and realigning the current confusing patchwork of government activities into a single department whose primary

\textsuperscript{26} Ruby, \textit{Are Terrorist Mentally Deranged?}, 16-17.
mission is to protect our homeland. The creation of a Department of Homeland Security is one more key step in the President’s national strategy for homeland security."

Reagan and Bush furthered their national security policy by first boosting homeland defenses through the formation of programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or the creation of an agency - the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).\textsuperscript{28} Both administrations modified their national security policy as a response to an act and the state of the international community at that time; with President Reagan, it was a Soviet nuclear threat and with President Bush, the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Therefore, terrorism is inexplicably influential, in that it can change the attitude of an entire nation abruptly. Nonetheless, to add further reference to former President Bush’s interesting word choice, “crusade”, how do we merit the U.S. invasion of Iraq? Andrew A. Lantham says “in their own ways, both realist and historical materialist accounts of the crusades rely on a materialist conception of ‘interests.’ On the one hand, while there are important differences among its classical, structural, and neoclassical variants, realism is to a great extent premised on the assumption that states’ primary interests—survival, power, security, wealth—are material and objective, analytically separable from

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\textsuperscript{28} “The discourse during the George W. Bush Administration focused on ‘security’, even though it perpetually made mention of democratic principles. What it revealed was a continuity of certain Cold War policies that aimed to fuse realism and liberalism in such a way as to legitimize the imperialist maneuvers of unilateral and aggressive intervention abroad and the persecution and stepped-up surveillance at home.” Silvina Romano, “Liberal Democracy and National Security: Continuities in the Bush and Obama Administrations,” \textit{Critical Sociology (Sage Publications, Ltd.)} 38, no. 2 (March 2012): 168.
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(inter)subjective ideas, norms, and institutions.”

In other words, the intent matters the most, much like the essence of terrorism.

**Obama Administration**

The current administration is historical at the least, as it is led by the first African American president currently in his second term, President Barack Obama. Silvina M. Romano adds that “the victory of Barack Obama, the first African-American president of the United States, seemed to indicate a change in the course of the United States homeland policy and at the same time was widely viewed as a change in orientation at the world level. Most countries in the world received this news with pleasure and the hope was that this change would lead to important modifications in the participation of the United States in the international order. Some compared this victory to John F. Kennedy’s at the beginning of the 1960s (the New York Times, 2008).” Furthermore, the Obama Administration has accomplished many of the feats that were deemed unlikely in his time in office, such as establishing healthcare reform through the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (2010), ending the war in Iraq, eliminating Osama Bin Laden, and so forth.

President Obama’s national security strategy is much like his predecessors, but his concerns are more closely identical to the issues Ronald Reagan were concerned about.

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For instance, Ronald Reagan proudly advocated a nuclear-free world. Obama took the initiative early in the years of his current two-term presidency to address the proliferation of nuclear weapons in a January 2010 State of the Union address:

Even as we prosecute two wars (Iraq and Afghanistan), we are also confronting perhaps the greatest danger to the American people – the threat of nuclear weapons. I have embraced the vision of John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan through a strategy that reverses the spread of these weapons, and seeks a world without them. To reduce our stockpiles and launchers, while ensuring our deterrent, the United States and Russia are completing negotiations on the farthest-reaching arms control treaty in nearly two decades. And at April’s Nuclear Security Summit, we will bring forty-four nations together behind a clear goal: securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years, so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists. These diplomatic efforts have also strengthened our hand in dealing with those nations that insist on violating international agreements in pursuit of these weapons. That is why North Korea now faces increased isolation, and stronger sanctions – sanctions that are being vigorously enforced. That is why the international community is more united, and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more isolated. And as Iran’s leaders continue to ignore their obligations, there should be no doubt: they, too, will face growing consequences.

The relationship between Iran and the United States have been well-documented as a severed relationship, gradually strained by constant policy disagreements, Iran’s lack of transparency and the opposition of U.S. national interests in and around the Middle

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31 “Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of “all nuclear weapons,” which he considered to be “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents. Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.” George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” The Wall Street Journal. http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/A_WORLD_FREE.pdf (accessed March 16th, 2013).

East. The danger that Iran poses to the United States is its unpredictability - Thus, a nuclear Iran can influence neighboring countries to develop nuclear weapons as well in defense of an Iran equipped to deploy such weaponry. Considering the proximity of the surrounding nation-states to one another, Iran’s volatility and the overall hostility embedded in the Middle East, the possibility of a nuclear war can easily become a reality.

The Benghazi Incident

On September 11th, 2012, a United States consulate (housed by a U.S. Diplomatic compound) in Benghazi, Syria, came under attack by a heavily armed militant group in an effort to disrupt an American diplomatic mission there. The Obama administration has come under fire from Republicans because of inconsistent reports describing the attack, the perpetrators involved, their affiliations, and possible security failures that may

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33 “After the revolution in 1979, Iran's history has entered a new phase of evolution. The concept of the Islamic republic and the Islamic government was a new notion which had an anti-western policy orientation. Discrepancies between Iran and the U.S. had been expanded with time and clashed together with political discords. The Islamic Republic of Iran's policy was/is in contrast with the U.S.'s regional and national interests. The peak of the quarrel between the two countries occurred with the Iran's hostage crises (which gave yield to the starting point of the U.S.'s sanctions against Iran) and with the tragic events of September 11th, 2001.” Mahdieh Aghazadeh, “A Historical Overview of Sanctions on Iran and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Journal of Academic Studies 14, no. 56 (February 2013 - April 2013): 138.

34 “In the Middle Eastern circumstances the geographic spacing needed to sustain retaliation may not always exist, e.g., between Iran and Saudi Arabia (at least from the aspect of the attacker's proximity to the attacked state's command and control centers and launching a retaliatory strike from the territory of the attacked country). First Strike need not necessarily be carried out from the territory of the attacking country but can be carried out from a failed state bordering the country to be attacked, e.g., an Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia launched from post-withdrawal Iraq, from the Sudan against Egypt, or an Iranian attack from Lebanon against Israel.” Ron Tira, “Can Iran Be Deterred?,” Policy Review 169 (October/November 2011): 41-42.

35 “In a dramatic new account, two State Department officials described a relentless attack in which dozens of armed men invaded the US consulate in Benghazi, setting it on fire and hunting through the building for staff. There had been no warning that an attack was planned, and in the hours before the streets outside the compound had been calm, they said on a conference call with reporters, asking to remain anonymous. The new account contradicted initial reports by State Department officials which said it was a “spontaneous” attack sparked by a protest against an anti-Islam film.” LIBYA - US: Embassy Attack Rethink, African Research Bulletin: Political, Social & Cultural Studies 49, no. 10 (November 2012): 19470B-19470C.
have led to the death of Ambassador John Christopher Stevens, along with three other Americans.\(^{36}\) A day after the attack, President Obama issued his remarks about the situation in the Rose Garden saying “No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation.”\(^{37}\) There is reason to believe that the Benghazi attack is an act of terror because the event possesses terroristic qualities. Firstly, many reports have mentioned that the perpetrators were militant and heavily armed with RPG’s (Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers) - it is unlikely that mere protestors would be equipped with such weaponry.\(^{38}\) Secondly, reports have stated that the initial attack was a “spontaneous” attack sparked by a protest against an anti-Islam film,\(^{39}\) which seemingly offended a group of individuals eventually gathering outside the consulate before the rioting;\(^{40}\) however, there was mortar fire, which actually killed two of the four Americans who regrettably perished in the event in the latter half of the siege.\(^{41}\) Interestingly enough, the protesters that gathered outside of the consulate may have possibly been diversions for an impending attack, in which mortars were readily available for use. Thirdly, the militants knew to set fire to the main building where the U.S. Ambassador was located at the time.

\(^{36}\) LIBYA - US: Embassy Attack Rethink.


\(^{39}\) Ibid., LIBYA-US, 19470B-19470C.

\(^{40}\) Aarthun, 4 Hours of Fire and Chaos, 1.

of the event. Ultimately, the U.S. consulate is symbolic for U.S. Diplomacy. Almost two months later, in an interview on 60 Minutes, President Obama slightly changed his position about the intent behind the incident saying that it's too early to know exactly how the attack came about, or the group claiming responsibility, but Americans were clearly targets of choice. These kinds of inconsistencies foster backlash, especially from opposing parties, but surely, this incident has emphasized to the Obama Administration the unpredictability of terrorism.

**Conclusion**

Thus far, the challenges faced by the Obama Administration have not ceased since President Barack Obama became this nation’s leader, as he was given the reigns to the Oval Office with an abundance of issues attached to the seat. In regards to terrorism, the Obama has taken several measures to bolster defenses such as the utilization of unmanned drones, bolstering missile defenses to counteract threats abroad, applying more effort on cyber security, since many terrorist groups utilize the internet to disseminate messages to followers internationally, and so forth. With stronger sanctions on Iran, the task of containing the nation-state is much more feasible. Nevertheless, rarities such as the Benghazi incident can happen and therefore, every safety measure must be followed and applied because it could mean a life or lives. Ultimately, evolving faster than terrorists and thus terrorism should always be the standard.

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42 Aarthun, *4 Hours of Fire and Chaos*, 1.

CHAPTER 4

SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN TERRORIST ACTS

The successes and failures of terrorist operations are highly dependent upon advantages and opportunities, but ultimately, the deciding factor is generally determined by the level of preparedness of either group - the terrorists or the opposition. There are those anomalies that cannot be accounted for, but Jackson and Freelinger said that “the probability of success of terrorist operations is usually not driven by the absolute value of particular factors but rather by how those levels compare with what the terrorist group needs to bring its plans to fruition.”

Therefore, terrorist groups generally seek either deficiencies in security or a lack thereof, in order to bolster their chances of complete success regarding every step of a terror plot (location, targets, possible opposition, etc.). Jackson and Freelinger explain their claim in simpler context:

Put more concretely, it does not matter if a terrorist cell possesses the level of operational skills that would allow it to carry out precision sniper operations if the attack it is planning is simply to walk into an airport and open fire with automatic weapons; it does not matter if a terrorist cell’s operational security skills are terrible if the security services it faces lack the capability to detect the terrorists under any circumstances; and it does not matter if the defenses around the terrorists’ intended target are exceedingly tight if the terrorists can render those protections irrelevant by selecting an appropriate attack mode or simply by their level of skill and professionalism.


2 “To remedy this shortcoming, we constructed a simplified framework that relates the types of factors that have been proposed in the literature to one another—and to how they act in concert to shape the likely success or failure of a terrorist operation. The framework is structured around three sets of characteristics: (1) Terrorist group capabilities and resources; (2) requirements of the operation it attempted or is planning to attempt; (3) relevance and reliability of security countermeasures....it is not the absolute values of any of the characteristics that fall into these classes that are important for understanding...
Furthermore, the success of any kind of terrorist attack is a product of impeccable timing (whether intentional or not), location, resources, financial backing, discipline and so forth. Additionally, the attacks that are longer-term require more resources and are intended to cause the most damage, barring successful execution. Lastly, successful attacks increase an organization’s size as well - thus, emulating a natural growth rate.³

One may ask, “How often do terrorist attacks fail?” Although many “terror-like” (and actual terrorist attacks) events have been reported in the past decade or so, Dr. Max Abrahms explains that the success rate in which terrorist attacks produce desired political objectives is significantly small.⁴ He adds that “If target countries systematically resist rewarding terrorism, the international community is armed with a powerful message to deter groups from terrorizing civilians. The prevailing view within the field of political science, however, is that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy. The implications of this perspective are grim; as target countries are routinely coerced into making important strategic and ideological concessions to terrorists, their victories will reinforce the

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¹ Jackson and Frelinger, Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail, 5.
³ This study analyzes the political plights of twenty-eight terrorist groups—the complete list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) as designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001. The data yield two unexpected findings. First, the groups accomplished their forty-two policy objectives only 7% of the time. Second, although the groups achieved certain types of policy objectives more than others, the key variable for terrorist success was a tactical one: target selection. Groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. These findings suggest that (1) terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and (2) the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. Together, the data challenge the dominant scholarly opinion that terrorism is strategically rational behavior. The bulk of the article develops a theory to explain why terrorist groups are unable to achieve their policy objectives by targeting civilians.” Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 43-44.
strategic logic for groups to attack civilians, spawning even more terrorist attacks.”

Therefore, attacks fail simply because of poor execution or counter-terror prohibitions. Furthermore, in regards to “rewarding” terrorism, Dr. Abrahms is referring to countries recognizing terrorists and submitting oneself to the influence of these kinds of groups societally, politically and governmentally.

**Domestic Terrorism**

Homegrown terrorism within the United States has been fostered primarily by radicalization. The United States is quite familiar with domestic terror, considering events such as the Fort Hood shootings, the foiled Christmas Day Bomb Plot of Umar Farouk AbdulMuttalab or the attempted Times Square bombing by Faisal Shahzad.  

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6 “Even the US homeland was not immune to violence. In May 1886, an anarchist threw a bomb at Haymarket in Chicago, killing eight police officers and an unknown number of civilians. US President William McKinley was assassinated in September 1901 by another anarchist, Leon Czolgosz. The attacks were linked to a global ideology, and they struck significant political and civilian targets both in the United States and across the world, including former French President Marie-Francois Sadi Carnot in 1894. Throughout the 20 century, US citizens continued to provide material support for terrorists, including arms for the Irish Revolutionary Army (IRA), even when it was abundantly clear they would be supporting a mainland bombing campaign aimed at civilian targets. Americans have also actively participated in supporting international terrorist groups, including Tupac Amaru in Peru.....The domestic attacks disprove the idea that the United States, as a nation, is immune from radicalization at home. Even more disturbing has been the concept that this is driven by so called ‘lone wolf’ attacks, of people self-radicalizing through the internet and without the support of a much wider terrorist infrastructure or radical community.” Geneve Mantri, “Homegrown Terrorism: Is There an Islamic Wave?” *Harvard International Review* 33, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 88, 91.

7 “While these recruits [referring to early al Qaeda affiliates, before 9/11, who changed allegiances to the U.S., such as Ali Mohammed Abdelsoud Muhammed] were luckily few in number, it does belie the notion that the latest outbreak reflects a new tactic which has emerged from nowhere. There are conflicting opinions about the actual role and motivations of John Walker Lindh (the "American Taliban"), but no one contests he was in Afghanistan training with the Taliban while they were supporting Al-Qaeda, three years after the US Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998. While there are important differences, it is also worth noting that, apart from radical Islam, there are other major threats to the United States which have resulted in major acts of terror—most notably Oklahoma City, and the 1996 Atlanta Olympic bombing by Eric Rudolph. All this indicates that the United States is facing multidimensional threats which ought to be seen in the context of a much more varied and longstanding threat picture.” Geneve Mantri, *Homegrown Terrorism*, 88-89.
From a sociological perspective, Dipak K. Gupta describes these events as part of a larger, worldwide “wave” of violence:

While social scientists became interested in the analyses of social violence, a change in the political landscape was afoot. The passage of civil rights legislation and the end of the Vietnam War considerably lowered tension in the United States. Consequently, late 1980s interest in conflict waned and with it, public funding for data collection. As the leftist conflicts, which grabbed the most public attention, ebbed, a new wave of worldwide violence was about to strike, and it caught the nation largely unprepared. These right wing movements were based on religious and racist identities. The conflict that engulfed the nation in the 1990s did not come from outside. The homegrown movements, often broadly referred to as the ‘militia’ or ‘Christian Identity’ movement targeted abortion clinics, symbols of state authority, or members of minority communities. From Waco, Texas, to Ruby Ridge, Montana, spectacular clashes with these groups became increasingly commonplace. However, the most devastating attack from right-wing violence came in 1995, when Timothy McVeigh blew up a building housing a number [of] federal agencies in Oklahoma City. With that attack, public attention quickly changed to the threats of terrorism as opposed to urban riots and mass movements.  

Additionally, as technology evolves, creating an increasingly interconnected world, some of the changes in society subsequently foster and give ground to the exposure of radicalism. Globalization, the inevitable force of technological change, either advances a nation or not, depending on a nation’s ability to adjust well to global changes.

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9 “Tim O’Reilly coined the term “Web 2.0” to explain the technology-enabled, peer-to-peer network shape that the Internet began to take after the bursting of the dot-com bubble (a rapid growth in the internet sector of the stock market) in 2001. Among the many manifestations of Web 2.0’s characteristics was the emergence of new media, a nebulous conceptualization that encompasses a growing array of interactive communications systems facilitated by a rapidly expanding set of platforms. Blogs, Web forums, Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube, all linked together in innovative ways—these form the new media landscape, a direct result of the Web 2.0 revolution.” John Curtis Amble, “Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35, no. 5 (May 2012): 339.

10 “Understood roughly as an increasing trend of greater connectivity among disparate regions of the globe (e.g., Baylis & Smith, 2006), globalization has presented unprecedented opportunities and
Nevertheless, regarding domestic terrorism in relation to transnational terrorism, the next segment of the chapter will examine extensively the Oklahoma City Bombing, the Christmas Day Bomb Plot, and the Fort Hood Shootings to explore how terrorists succeed and fail in their plots, which is primarily due to the level of preparedness by either the perpetrator or those opposing him.

**Oklahoma City Bombing: Timothy McVeigh**

Briefly describing the horrific event that took place in Oklahoma City, Timothy McVeigh had been found guilty of bombing (with the aid of two co-conspirators) the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19th, 1995 (Patriot’s Day). 11 “It was an act that killed 168 people, including nineteen children, fifteen of whom were in the America’s Kids Day Care Center housed within the Murrah Building. It was the deadliest act of terrorism within the United States prior to 9/11. After his conviction, McVeigh argued that his attack was a justifiable response to the US government, citing deadly sieges caused by federal agents at Waco, Texas, in 1993, and Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992. McVeigh was tried in a federal court for the murder of eight federal officers and subsequently became the first convicted criminal to be executed by the US federal

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government since 1963.”\textsuperscript{12} As with virtually any terrorist attack, there is always an underlying motive giving the perpetrator or cluster enough justification to take life in the wake of completing an objective.

McVeigh’s reasoning for bombing the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building stemmed from the government’s handling of the siege in Waco, Texas, which resulted in the deaths of 76 people approximately two years prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, in addition to a deadly confrontation at Ruby Ridge\textsuperscript{13} in 1992. McVeigh’s ultimate desire was to inspire a revolt against what he considered to be a tyrannical federal government.\textsuperscript{14} Lone-wolf terrorists are the most difficult to assess because it is simply easier to track the movement and patterns of a group than an individual. Lone-wolf terrorists are slightly more unpredictable because decisions are made independently and from one’s own research; however, in a group, individuals are radicalized by the group’s message, while autonomy is absent and one’s own desires are superseded by the group’s objectives. Chermak adds that “Scholars and law enforcement officers have long been concerned with the ‘lone-wolf’ threat. This tactic is thought to be more difficult to counter, than the danger posed by organized, top-down entities. Lone-wolf attacks are illegal incidents that are committed by a single political extremist. This type of attack

\textsuperscript{12}David McCooey, \textit{Poetry, Terrorism and the Uncanny}, 482.

\textsuperscript{13}“On August 21st, 1992, events unfolded on a remote ridge in Northern Idaho, involving a white separatist family and the FBI, investigating an outstanding warrant for Randy Weaver’s arrest for a firearms offense. There was standoff - eleven days after it had begun, Randy Weaver’s son, 14 year old Sammy Weaver, Randy’s wife, a federal marshal, and one yellow Labrador retriever had all been shot dead. Tim Lynch, “Remember Ruby Ridge.” \textit{CATO Institute}. Http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/remember-ruby-ridge (accessed March 19th, 2013).

encompasses both planned attacks committed by a single suspect (like the killing of the abortion provider in Kansas during the spring of 2009) as well as presented opportunities, such as a routine call for service that brings a lone suspect in contact with a target s/he ideologically loathes (for example, the domestic violence dispute in the home of a racist skinhead in Pittsburgh in April 2009 that led to the murder of 3 police officers who responded to the call). Moskalenko argues that lone-wolf terrorists are largely concerned with acknowledgment, recognition of the act and ultimately a following:

One answer is called strong reciprocity. Among animals that live in groups, including humans, there are advantages to cooperation. A hunter who gets lucky today will benefit from sharing meat with the rest of the group – if he can expect to receive a share in the group’s food supply on a less successful day. Sadly, the advantages of reciprocity can be reaped by cheaters – those who defect from cooperation, contributing no resources yet profiting by those who do. Over time, pure altruists in the group will lose out as more and more and more members take the easy route of doing less and getting more. . . . We turned then to two possible explanations of individual acts of self-sacrifice. The more distal explanation comes from evolutionary psychology, where the group benefits of altruism are made possible to the extent that individuals are motivated to punish those who violate group norms. The benefits of altruism require that occasionally even individuals who have not themselves suffered from a violation should be willing to accept the costs of punishing the violator. The more proximate explanation is the human capacity for group identification. Given positive identification with a group


16 “Terrorism committed by lone individuals has gained heightened attention at the start of the twenty-first century. Law enforcement officials and analysts have suggested that lone wolf terrorists, defined as terrorists who carry out attacks individually and independently from established terrorist organizations, are particularly hard to identify before they strike and therefore pose a major security threat. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), lone extremists represent an ongoing threat to the United States, both domestically and overseas. FBI director Robert S. Mueller III stated in 2003 that “the threat from single individuals sympathetic or affiliated with al-Qaeda, acting without external support or surrounding conspiracies, is increasing.” Ramon Spain, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 9 (September 2010): 855.
perceived as victimized, an individual feels anger and outrage toward those responsible for the victimization.\textsuperscript{17}

Furthermore, Timothy McVeigh’s terror plot was successful to a degree because of the unfortunate casualties left in the wake of the bombing at the target location (Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building); yet, it was ultimately unsuccessful because the revolt that he desired, did not happen. Additionally, two other more powerful bombs planted around the building, were diffused as well, which stopped McVeigh’s plans from complete fruition. Interestingly enough, McVeigh planned this terror plot precisely two years prior to its commencement to ensure accuracy, to gather resources, for recruitment purposes, and so forth. As to support a point made earlier, longer-term objectives are the most costly but the most effective.

\textbf{Christmas Day Bomb Plot: Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab}

Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab, a 26-year-old Nigerian man informally known as the “Underwear Bomber (who was 23 years old at the time),” tried to blow up a U.S. passenger plane four Christmases ago. He boarded Northwest Flight 253 in Amsterdam on Dec. 25th, 2009, with a massive bomb hidden in his underwear. As the plane approached Detroit, carrying 289 passengers, he tried to detonate the explosives but the device malfunctioned and failed to respond correctly.\textsuperscript{18} As it was occurring, he apparently

\textsuperscript{17} Sophia Moskalenko, Clark McCauley, “The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism,” \textit{Counseling Psychology Quarterly} 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 121, 123.

“became enveloped in a fireball that spread to the wall and carpeting of the plane.”

Actually, AbdulMutallab’s seat on the airliner was right next to the airliner’s main fuel tank, which held 11,000 gallons of fuel. Fortunately enough, the evil act of one individual failed, salvaging the lives of 289 passengers.

The radicalization process of Umar Farouk AbdulMuttallab came about in his travels to Yemen, leading up to the attempted bombing. He said in a statement that he was greatly inspired by the plot constructed by Anwar al-Awlaki, a United States-born militant cleric (often referred to as priests or bishops) that was terminated by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen on September 30th, 2011. Lastly, AbdulMuttallab mentioned that his motivation to follow through with carrying the explosive device (or any kind of weapon for that matter) is to avenge the killing of innocent Muslims and to retaliate for “U.S. tyranny and oppression of Muslims.” Nevertheless, the message is clearly the same or the complaint rather - as leaders of extremist groups and terrorist organizations continue to create and sustain islamic opposition towards the West, when reprehensible jihadist ideologies are really at play here. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that character

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19 Ariosto and Feyerick, “Christmas Day Bomber Sentence to Life in Prison,” CNN.


21 Ariosto and Feyerick, Christmas Day Bomber, op. cit.


23 Ibid.
reconstruction, societal re-integration and rehabilitation are emphasized more to younger adults and individuals vulnerable to radicalism, shallow religions and violent ideologies.

Fortunately, the Christmas Day bomb plot failed because of a device malfunction; however, does a blunder on the part of the terrorist, constitute an attack as successful thwarted? The first element of this event that is disconcerting is the breach of security at the airport in Amsterdam, where AbdulMutallab was able to pass thru security gates and successfully board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 without compromise. 24 Secondly, continuous improvement in detection is extremely vital - many of these militant bomb makers working for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, 25 are becoming more innovative in the design of explosives, especially with the use of a virtually undetectable powdery substance called Pentaerythritol Tetrani trate, or PETN. 26 This is a reminder that as counterterrorism efforts improve in the United States and internationally for that matter, leaders of insurgent groups are attempting to stay ahead of the curve as well. Thus, it is imperative that counterterrorism efforts exceed that of insurgent groups daily.

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25 “Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, who once provided the bomb for a suicide mission by his younger brother, a fellow militant, is described by security officials as one of the most dangerous and innovative explosives experts ever to serve al Qaeda. Believed to be in his early 30s, Yemen-based Asiri became an urgent priority for Western counter-terrorism officials following his alleged role in planning strikes on the United States in 2009 and 2010, plots that included the failed bombing of an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day in 2009.” William McLean, “Al Qaeda Bomber Adept at Breaching Aviation Security.” Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/09/uk-security-plot-asiri-idUSLNE84800Y20120509 (accessed March 20th, 2013).

Mass Shooting at Fort Hood: Nadil Malik Hasan

On November 5th, 2009, Nadal Malik Hasan opened fire inside of Fort Hood, the most populated U.S. military base, located right outside Killeen, Texas. A report from the Washington Post said that “More than a dozen of the 56 witnesses identified Hasan as the man in a combat uniform who rose in front of a crowded waiting area and opened fire. Just before the shooting began, many of the witnesses recounted, the gunman yelled Allahu Akbar!, the Arabic exhortation meaning ‘God is great.’ By the time the attack ended, more than 200 rounds had been fired, killing 13 people and wounding 32.”

Anwar al-Awalaki supported the heinous act, by martyring his [Nidal Malik Hasan] offense, which MacEion explained vehemently:

However, whatever cover he [Anwar al-Awlaki] may have sought there came to an end late in 2009 following the massacre at Fort Hood when it was revealed that the gunman, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, had been in close contact with him. At least eighteen emails passed between the pair from December 2008 to June 2009. After the massacre, Awlaki justified Hasan's actions, saying, “Because the goal was targeted by him [Nidal Hasan], and it was a military target inside the United States, there is no dispute about it [being right].” He went on record praising Hasan at length: “Nidal Hassan is a hero. He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people. . . .Any decent Muslim cannot live, understanding properly his duties towards his Creator and his fellow Muslims, and yet serve as a U.S. soldier. The U.S. is leading the war against terrorism, which in reality is a war against Islam. Its army is

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directly invading two Muslim countries and indirectly occupying the rest through its stooges. . . 29

Anwar al-Awlaki twists the United States’ intervention efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and surrounding areas as a scapegoat to justify extremist actions, purporting the reality of the civil turmoil in the Middle East. Hasan’s lone-wolf terrorist act is only successful to a degree because as mentioned earlier, organizations grow depending on the amount of successes (preferably, large-scale efforts) and success rate. Nevertheless, Hasan’s attack, in addition to al-Awalaki’s sponsorship, creates an influence that can quite possibly bolster domestic terrorism in the United States - therefore, the impediment of influence is key. Overall, terrorism has gradually shifted platforms to the cyber world and therefore demands continual enhancement in cyber security, considering the increasingly interconnected environment of the international community in this generation.

Conclusion

The successes and failures of terrorist operations are determined by an array of factors, from the very beginning of its commencement to the execution. The three examples mentioned earlier, the Oklahoma City Bombing, the failed Christmas Day Bomb plot, and the Fort Hood Shooting, all were conducted by lone individuals believing in their cause, hoping to send a message. The influx of domestic terrorism in the United States lends to the power of influence, which makes the cyber realm all the more enticing to insurgent groups. During the Cold War, propaganda was as fearsome (if not, more) as

29 Denis MacEoin, “Anwar al-Awlaki: “I Pray that Allah Destroys America.” Middle East Quarterly 17, no. 2 (Spring 2010).
physical battles in the field in prior wars. Nonetheless, the commonalities in all three cases reflected political, religious and ideological motivation that were not initiated - in each case, the act was in response to a condition or an unsettling situation. Therefore, terrorism, in itself, is the result of extremist justification.

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30 “It was a war that was waged in several arenas as the role of armed forces diminished and the battlefields moved elsewhere: to the United Nations, to the economic sphere, to sports events and concert halls, and to a great extent to international media. Indeed, the media played a decisive role in the development of the Cold War, and they significantly affected policies. The media also played an important role in bringing the Cold War to a relatively peaceful end. With the help of Western radio and television broadcasts, people under communist rule developed a certain image of the West, which arguably contributed to the fact that they did not defend their regimes at crucial moments in 1989-91.” Simo Mikkonen, “Stealing the Monopoly of Knowledge?: Soviet Reactions to U.S. Cold War Broadcasting,” Kritika: Explorations in Russia & Eurasian History 11, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 771.
CHAPTER 5
CLOSING REMARKS; DEFINING TERRORISM

“By looking at acts alone, one cannot distinguish between the workings of a repressive state, a dissident political group, a crazed religious cult, or the intimidations of organized crime syndicates. The only way out of this conundrum is to recognize that ‘terrorism’ is a political act by non-state actors, where the participants, in contrast to common criminals, see their acts as a way of achieving public good, such as national independence, social justice, or the establishment of a theocratic state. Terrorists are, thus, at least in their own minds, altruists.”

The essence of altruism is to serve others or have concern for the welfare of others and the less fortunate. Religious terrorist groups justify their acts by interpreting them as “the Will of God,” which also says that God Himself “commissioned” them to punish others (through religious texts such as the Qu’Ran) not an agreement with the cause and ultimately as as service to their deity. Therefore, they are cultic in their views, as Amritha Venkatraman suggests:

Religious terrorism occurs when the use of terrorism is systematized by an ideological and fanatical interpretation of a religious text. Religious terrorist groups functioning in the absence of this pretext, create ‘junk terrorism.’ A few examples of religious terrorist groups are the: Aum Shinrikyo, Kach and Kahane Chai, Al-Jihad, and Dal Khalsa. According to Charles Kimball, religious terrorism functions on the basis of five essential principles. These are: means justify the end, holy war, blind obedience, absolute truth claims, and the ideal times. Kimball explains


168 “In fact, the link is so ubiquitous that altruism has been likened to self transcendence, a key component of spirituality in general and spiritual experience in particular (Krebs, 1991; Kristeller & Johnson, 2005; Post, 2003; Post, Underwood, Schloss, & Hurlbut, 2002), and at least one contemporary model of spirituality developed from a content analysis of the available psychological literature explicitly incorporates altruism as a core dimension of the construct (Elkins, Hedstrom, Hughes, Leaf, & Saunders, 1988).” John Thomas Huber, Douglas A. MacDonald, “An Investigation of the Relations Between Altruism, Empathy, and Spirituality,” Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 52 no. 2 (April 2012): 207.
that “truth claims” are essential points in a religion “at which divergent interpretations arise.” Extreme interpretations of ‘truth claims’ provoke the ideology upon which religious terrorism is based. However the “authentic religious truth claims are never as inflexible and exclusive as zealous adherents insist.” The staunch ‘truth claims’ professed by religious terrorists allow them to use “religious structures and doctrines....almost like weapons” for their movement. In the process, ‘religious convictions that become locked into absolute truths can easily lead people to see themselves as God’s agents’.  

Therefore, terrorism as a whole is a tool of choice, systematized and structured by the motivation and the intent of an individual or group, in an effort to create a desired end solely beneficial to the individual and the like-mined - based entirely on one’s own extreme interpretation of the *truth*. Any idea, opinion, action or perceived threat opposing the very foundation of an individual’s belief in these extremist societies, promotes violent measures in defending the belief system.  

The King James Version of the Bible says in Matthew 11:12, “And from the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force.” The Bible is meant to be taken literally, likewise of the Qu’Ran, but the most important information that one’s mind must ascertain is revelation knowledge *within* the text. An extremist would contort the meaning of the Bible verse mentioned earlier, to use violence, if necessary, as a way of “admonishing” people to accept the Gospel, which is not the case here.


170 “The Quran permits violence as an act of defense waged to protect the Shariat in an Islamic community. The Shariat can be explained as a system of ordinances outlined in the Quran and Hadis through which “God lays down for mankind the rules of conduct.” The Shariat is the “guidance for all walks of life—individual and social, material and moral, economic and political, legal and cultural, national and international.” Muslims are advised to closely follow the Shariat to acquire the well being that God has envisioned for the Islamic community. Preservation of the Shariat is an “obligation of every able-bodied individual.” “Oppression, despotism, injustice, and criminal abuse of power” of the Shariat by Muslims or non-Muslims, must be punished.” Ibid., 232.


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The verse alludes to energetic, aggressive people claiming (“take it by force”) what they desire out of life through faith, self-motivation, desire and will to better one’s life and circumstances. Additionally, the verse highlights the importance of utilizing influence for the good of *mankind*, not a specific group. Influence is everything, which is understandably, the driver of terrorism. Nevertheless, the point being made here is this - the murder of innocent people is completely unacceptable on every level, regardless of the motive. In an effort to further understand how terrorists justify killing in the wake of an objective, Asal and Rethemeyer explains the reasoning behind the logic that terrorists generally use in the commission of an act:

We argue that another ideological component is the “othering” of the general population. If members of the general population are viewed as potential converts to the cause—as is true in many leftist and some religious ideologies—then the organization will have an incentive to be discriminate in its killing. If there is a clear dividing line between members and “others”—as there is in ethnic and some religious conflict - then ideologically there is no reason to discriminate when killing (Juellensmeyer, 2003). This boundary with the “other” (Tilly 2003, 21) allows for viewing all “on the other side” as legitimate targets. Killing more of the other is usually better. Killing generates publicity for the cause, which may facilitate recruiting and resource generation; it highlights organizational effectiveness; and it puts the government on notice that the organization is serious about its demands.173

172 “So when Jesus said that the kingdom of heaven suffers (‘suffereth’) violence, it’s likely that He was referencing Micah 2:13. He was saying, in essence, “Ever since John started preaching, God’s dominion has been breaking forth and gaining momentum. God’s influence over people’s lives is increasing.” Jesus went on to say, “The violent take it by force.” The term “the violent” is the Greek word *biastes* (the noun form of *biazo*), which means one who is forceful or energetic. In this verse, it refers to the ones who are breaking forth under the influence of God’s kingdom. Jesus is saying, “The kingdom is breaking forth and the breach is getting wider and wider by the energy of those who are coming under its influence.” The phrase “take it by force” is the Greek word *harpazo* (which is the same word translated “caught away” when talking about the Rapture). This word means to seize, to catch, or to take by force.” The Glorious Church, *Apostolic Reformation Conference*. Http://www.gloriouschurch.com/Questions-Answers-Details.asp?QuestID=3395 (accessed March 21st, 2013).

Thus, all that occurs in the commission of an act is collateral to the goal at hand, which must take precedent, according to “divine” ordination. Therefore, a terrorist or insurgent group symbolically present themselves as vessels - merely carrying along the cause; however, that is a moot point in justifying any extremist action.

Assessing 9/11 More Deeply

The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, are a constant reminder of how a cluster of radicals were able to expose a vulnerability in security of the most powerful nation in world - contentment. Nonetheless, it also reminds us of how important communication, preparedness, and overall intelligence is for the sake of a nation’s security. After evaluating the 9/11 Commission Report, Rover and Long concluded that there were two major meltdowns in the handling of 9/11 - institutional imagination and a failure in management and coordination. Their article stated that “the 9/11 Commission found that the intelligence community suffered from a lack of institutional imagination before the September 11 attacks. This made it impossible for most analysts and policymakers to gauge the terrorist threat accurately. Had they better understood the danger of al Qaeda, they could have taken steps to improve warning intelligence. More imagination also might have helped analysts reveal the crucial network of terrorists that planned and executed the attacks. In other words, the intelligence community could not ‘connect the dots,’ because it was not sufficiently imaginative.”

One important reality to consider and understand in intelligence gathering and utilization is that only intelligence that is available, could be gathered. As one can

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imagine, the United States intelligence community was scrambling around during the commission of the attacks - however, in the case of such an event, there is preparatory training. Unfortunately, there is no simulation like the actual event as it takes place because one has to be mindful of the possibility of anomalies occurring, increased emotional and psychological pressure, knowledge retention of emergency training and so forth. Interestingly enough, to say that the intelligence community lacked “institutional imagination” to perceive al Qaeda possibly attacking the United States directly is perplexing for several reasons. Firstly, although the 1998 United States Embassy bombings were not on U.S. soil, the lead assailant was identified as al Qaeda’s former leader, the late Osama bin Laden. Secondly, the Department of State recognized al Qaeda as a terrorist group on October 8th, 1999, which says that the United States was aware of their activity prior to 9/11. Thirdly, there is no such thing as an invincible nation - the September 11 attacks has shown that “American Exceptionalism” can be beneficial, but detrimental as well. Surely, it is a complicated process to designate a group as a terrorist organization or even a threat for that matter, however, it is clear that some signs are far more significant than would be perceived.

In all fairness, al Qaeda at the time, was a newly emerging threat that was shadowy in it ways. It always difficult to track an individual or group that is dedicated to being untraceable because the idea is to be seen or recognized as a looming threat, not as an overt one. Nigel Inkster said that “Al-Qaeda represented a new terrorist phenomenon, a genuinely transnational organization with tentacles around the planet and safe havens


first in Sudan and then in Afghanistan. Within the US intelligence community, a small band of CIA case officers and analysts dedicated enormous effort to tracking and attempting to neutralize this emerging threat, as documented in Steve Coll’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Ghost Wars. But prior to 9/11, the signals were still too weak and disaggregated to command sustained top level policy attention.”

Inkster added that even in 1995, “Sudanese President Hassan Turabi, whose regime had come under sustained diplomatic pressure for harboring bin Laden, offered to send him to the United States. The reply he received, after many weeks, was that Washington had no legal basis on which to hold or prosecute bin Laden. Within the US body politic as a whole there was insufficient appreciation of the strategic global shifts that were enabling al-Qaeda, nor the will to take the steps that would have been needed to nip it in the bud. As the 9/11 Commission Report put it, “before the catastrophic scale of the potential threat was manifest, massive action to counter it seemed so disproportionate as to be inconceivable.” The signs were there, but the intelligence did not provide enough “foreshadowing data” reflecting the increasing threat that was to come, according to assessments within the intelligence community.

These insufficiencies do support the need for institutionalizing imagination, as it would have bolstered our defenses, but how so? Rover and Long added in their evaluation of the 9/11 Commission Report, that “according to the Commission, more imagination could have stimulated more aggressive counter-terror policies and more vigilant homeland security. The halting of efforts to combat terrorists abroad during the

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Clinton and Bush administrations suggests that the threat was never fully understood. In
terms of homeland security, wider distribution of CIA threat reporting on terrorist
operatives ‘might have brought much more attention to the need for permanent changes
in domestic airport and airline security procedures.’ Although some agencies were
concerned about a possible hijacking before September 11, they did not undertake
standard procedures developed over the years to guard against a surprise attack.
Specifically, they did not analyze how terrorists might use an aircraft as a weapon, or
describe the telltale indicators that would have revealed planning for such an
operation.”

It is one thing to detect the likelihood of a terrorist attack from an insurgent
group, but an even more daunting task determining the way, shape and form that the
attack is intended to be executed.

Rover and Long continues to explain that the theories, imagination and the failure
of coordination, for the debacle on 9/11, need more construction and therefore revision.
There are many variables that are not taken into account (especially regarding
imagination), but at the same time, overanalyzing faults may gloss over simple mistakes
that can lead to catastrophic results:

The 9/11 Commission detailed a second theory of intelligence failure:
failure of management, or more precisely, failure of coordination. The
Commission’s report notes that “information was not shared, sometimes
inadvertently or because of legal misunderstandings. Analysis was not
pooled. Effective operations were not launched.” The report goes on to
make an analogy of the intelligence community as a hospital full of
specialists with no attending physician to ensure unity of effort. The
intelligence community was therefore unable to “connect the dots” not
only due to a failure of imagination, but also a failure of
coordination”....In addition to failures of operational management, the
9/11 Commission identifies failures of “institutional management.”

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179 Rover and Long, Intelligence Failure and Reform,” Joshua Rover and Austin Long,
“Intelligence Failure and Reform: Evaluating the 9/11 Commission Report,” BREAKTHROUGHS 14, no. 1
(Spring 2005): 14.
In contrast to operational management, which deals with day-to-day issues of coordination and tactics, institutional management is strategic. The Commission defines institutional management as dealing with the “broader management issues pertaining to how the top leaders of the government set priorities and allocate resources.....The theory of insufficient imagination is especially vague. It seems to refer only to the ability to anticipate spectacular attacks by transnational terrorist organizations. But individuals and intelligence agencies can imagine any number of possible scenarios. In this light, it becomes clear that the 9/11 Commission left important questions unasked: Is there such a thing as too much imagination? How much is enough? And how can we evaluate institutional imagination before something actually happens? In other words, how can the intelligence community ensure that it is being appropriately imaginative? Imagination comes at a cost, because unchecked scenario building gets in the way of setting priorities.\(^{180}\)

Therefore, in analyzing a situation, questions must be raised, asked and insight must be shared and gathered; however, coordinated efforts within the intelligence community seems to have been unstable for some time now. Rover and Long mentioned that “Many of the agencies comprising the intelligence community have historically not interacted well. The derogatory rendering of the acronym DIA as ‘Da Idiot Agency,’ has been used at CIA’s Langley campus, while DIA analysts at Bolling Air Force Base respond with ‘Clowns In Action.’”\(^{181}\) Nigel Inkster added:

> Could the United States and its intelligence allies have done more to counter the threat from al-Qaeda prior to 9/11? It is unlikely that significant additional manpower and resources alone would have made the difference. But by 2001 both the CIA and the other Anglo-Saxon services (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK) which form an intelligence club – the Five Eyes – had undergone significant down-sizing from Cold War levels, a process which caused some of them to come close to falling below critical mass. They were neither resourced nor equipped to deal with a transnational threat with the potential to manifest itself anywhere on the planet; and in particular they lacked sufficient language skills and area knowledge to deal with a problem whose epicentre lay within the Islamic world. It has been a besetting sin especially of Anglo-Saxon political culture to invest heavily in intelligence in times of national


\(^{181}\) Ibid., 16.
emergency and then to disinvest equally heavily the moment the coast seems clear. Over the past decade, intelligence budgets within the Five Eyes community have in some cases doubled; in the case of the United States from $26 billion to $52bn ($80bn if the military intelligence component is included) and in the case of the UK from £1bn to £2bn. As a percentage of GDP (0.3% in the case of the United States and 0.14% for the UK), this level of expenditure seems far from excessive in a world of multiple threats and risks.\textsuperscript{182}

Inkster raised an interested point here, detailing the capabilities of al Qaeda at the time as a transnational threat. Their far reaching influence provides them the luxury of manifesting a large-scale attack anywhere in the world. Therefore, in terms of 9/11, its understandable to think that al Qaeda would not dare attack the strongest nation on the planet directly - yet, that was the exact intention of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. 19 hijackers overtook 4 passenger planes, hitting three of the four targets, symbolically representing the United States as a nation: Commerce (both towers of the World Trade Center), a strong military (Pentagon), and a failed attempt at attacking our democracy (the United States Capitol Building) - which still stands unavering.

**Intelligence: It Can Make or Break You**

The use of intelligence is inevitably evolving, especially since it creates opportunities throughout the international community to coordinate efforts to combat transnational issues such as terrorism, proliferation, and the drug trade. Intelligence is extremely valuable to a nation, as it can either grant an advantage over the enemy or expose one’s weaknesses. Adam Svendsen explains how the globalization of intelligence is increasing due to growing transnational issues:

A form of global intelligence coverage is emerging. But, the results are mixed, like globalization itself, creating a patchwork of varying arrangements, which often overlap in key metropolitan centres, notably London and Washington. Simultaneously, the depth and complexity of

\textsuperscript{182} Inkster, 9/11/11, 10-11.
these new relationships also expose their limitations....The globalization of intelligence is multi-causal, with diverse factors driving its processes. In part these factors are structural, stemming from the globalized nature of contemporary threats and issues, which are in many cases transnational, networked and asymmetric. These issues include: ‘new’ terrorism, proliferation, narcotics, human trafficking and other forms of organized crime, together with the demands of stabilization (peace) and humanitarian operations, as well as tackling anti-globalization movements (Adamson 2006; Weber et al. 2007; Scholte 2005). In part, the globalization of intelligence is evolving in response to these concerns, but arguably it also reflects a commitment by many countries to a doctrine of pre-emption, which involves applying intelligence, law enforcement and security services’ actions a priori instead of post facto.\footnote{Adam Svendsen, “The Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11: Frameworks and Operational Parameters,” \textit{Cambridge Review of International Affairs} 21, no. 1 (March 2008): 132.}

In order to stop the growth process of anything, the roots must be targeted. Svendsen mentions that intelligence is now mostly applied beforehand in transnational threats, primarily focusing on preventive measures rather than responding to the result of an attack. Michael D. Intriligator said that “According to Sun Tzu’s classic treatise \textit{The Art of War}, from the fifth century, B.C. “Know thy enemy and know thyself” is a basic precept of warfare, and terrorism is warfare, although a case of asymmetric warfare. There is a need for in-depth intelligence on terrorists’ motivations and goals as well as their means.”\footnote{Michael D. Intriligator, “The Economics of Terrorism,” \textit{Economic Inquiry} 48, no. 1 (January 2010): 4.} Additionally, excellent intelligence makes excellent policy whether foreign or domestically. Thus, striving for excellence should always be the standard.

\textbf{Conclusion: Defining Terrorism}

Now we come to the conclusion of the matter explored in this thesis, which is whether a working, universalized definition of terrorism will have the potential to stop terrorist attacks or at least dramatically slow the rate at which it occurs - or will it make little to no difference? I propose that creating a universalized, working definition of
terrorism will provide the edge that afflicted countries need in order to resist terrorist
groups, dismantle terrorists organizations, thwart terror plots and impede the expansion
of extremist ideology, for several reasons. Firstly, a phenomenon is identified and defined
based on various factors such as traits, habits, interactions, responses, and so forth.
However, phenomenons are subject to singular perceptions (which is based on oneself,
experiences, societal norms, etc.), that in turn, diversifies the meaning of that
phenomenon. Yes, it is fascinating to venture into the different realms of ideas about a
phenomenon constantly evolving to reflect the generation that it affects, but there must be
a baseline that every nation can follow if the phenomenon itself threatens the preservation
of life. Secondly, a universalized definition will encourage nations to be on one accord in
assessing the threat of terrorism. International cooperation will be encouraged, as
increased, coordinated efforts drastically reduce safe havens worldwide at a faster rate.
Lastly, terrorist groups and insurgents will be easier to identify, by their behavior,
interactions with others, activities and dealings within a given area. One of the most
effective ways to dismantle a terrorist group is to deprive them of their sources, as well as
disrupting the means to how those sources are gained.\textsuperscript{185} Furthermore, a potentially
universal definition of terrorism would go as follows:

\begin{quote}
Terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful force or threat of unlawful
force to promote fear; it is intended to coerce or to intimidate governments
or societies in the pursuit of various objectives, which are political,
religious, ideological, financial or a combination of two or more.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{185}”Perhaps, the most valuable approach to defeating terrorism is that of denying resources to the
terrorists: As emphasized by Sandler, it is much more effective to deny terrorists resources of financing,
recruits, weapons, intelligence, support groups, propaganda, etc. than to attempt to protect assets at risk,
which is extremely difficult or impossible in view of the extremely large number of targets and the
possibility of substitution.” Michael D. Intriligator, \textit{The Economics of Terrorism}, 5.
Therefore, a coordinated, international effort is ultimately the best option when combating transnational terrorism. Furthermore, a universalized, working definition of terrorism will also deepen the understanding of terrorist operations, which goes back to denying resources that were once readily accessible and fund their heinous activities.

As mentioned earlier, terrorism can only exists or be effective in environments that fostering radicalism, extremist attitudes and simply ignorance towards societies that do not illustrate the exact same beliefs and desires of an individual or cluster of people. People have always desired change from generation to generation and change never ceases to occur. Change has never been mandatory, as there are societies that have virtually remained the same since the onset of their civilization (i.e. the Amish). A great lesson learned in response to change that is virtually unavoidable to face is responsibility. Former President James K. Polk once said “may the boldest fear and the wisest tremble when incurring responsibilities on which may depend [on] our country’s peace and prosperity, and in some degree the hopes and happiness of the whole human family.” It is the world’s responsibility to combat any kind of force that is a detrimental to human life. Furthermore, the root of an issue such as terrorism, targeted at its earliest level, should be the preferable approach.
The issues that are examined in this thesis are well related to the notion of human values because the thesis addresses a problem that is an imminent threat to the lives of millions of people, primarily non-combatants. Not only is the threat of terrorism an immediate concern, it is a permanent threat where the efforts that oppose it cannot relax for a second. When one speaks of human values, one refers to the morals or fundamental principles that distinguish right from wrong, separating truth from lies, proper conduct and so forth. Nevertheless, what is deemed appropriate and liberating (i.e. Freedom of religion, speech, women’s rights, etc.) domestically is outlawed in other nations—there is no separation of church and state in many countries abroad. The conditions and constraints at which many people live by in developing nation-states are motivators that can lure young individuals into militias, contras and terrorists groups because many of these groups have the resources to provide basic living essentials, education, a sense of belonging, and so forth, where there is lack of opportunity elsewhere. These recruitment tactics in turning one’s circumstances into lures are at the heart of human values.

Additionally, state-sponsored terrorism challenges human values as well---how does a nation-state allow safe havens for groups that can in turn, kill your people as well? Terrorism is at the very core of human values, as it challenges morality deeply.
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