CHURCH AND STATE:  
THE ROLE OF EACH IN FOSTERING CIVIC AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

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By

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This study looks at the relationship between religion, government and individuals’ tendencies to vote and otherwise participate in their communities. In order to understand the separate influences that religion and government each have on civic participation, I use a probit regression that includes demographic controls, measures of religiosity and religious participation and a measure of the level of state government effort to facilitate voting and voter registration. The dependent variable in this case is a measure of individuals’ voting behavior in the 2008 presidential election. To analyze the relationship between religion, government and community participation, which I define as organizational membership, I use an OLS regression with the same variables but with a new dependent variable that is a continuous measure of an individual’s organizational membership. I find the following: 1) that including measures of an individual’s attention to, knowledge of and interest in political campaigns positively affects one’s voting behavior; 2) that results vary depending on the particular type of religiosity measure used, and thus that researchers should pay attention to the distinctions between different measures in future research; and 3) that religion has a strong effect on both whether an individual voted in the 2008 election and the number of organizations of which that individual is a member.
For the guidance, expertise, patience and humor that I needed to complete this thesis, I thank Dr. Andrew Wise and Eric Gardner. For their encouragement and willingness to read this work in its various forms, I thank my fiancé and my parents.

With appreciation,
Christina Radossi
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Chapter 1. Introduction

The role of religion in government, politics and public life has become a topic of increased attention and controversy in recent years. While some believe that religion only serves as a force for evil and perpetuates dogma, thus creating stronger division in society, others believe that religion and faith can be forces for good, tearing down walls and building community instead of destroying it. Still another camp believes that religion will cease to exist as we know it, as evidenced by writings of the 1950s and 60s that discuss the death of God and a decline in religious participation. A fourth distinct view of scholars is the theory that the past two decades provide evidence for a global resurgence of religion and that religion and religious culture are deserving of increased academic study.

In this paper, I explore not the so-called resurgence of religion, but the role that religion continues to play in influencing individuals’ community life and civic experience. In particular, the main question of study is whether religious organizations are more effective than state government at encouraging civic engagement and a deeper sense of community in their participants. I hypothesize that the second argument mentioned above holds true, that religious and faith-based organizations serve the American public for good and that those groups that are grounded in a religious or faith tradition are more effective than the government is at inspiring individuals to carry out their civic duty and to participate in community life.

This question of study is of growing necessity. Though religiously-motivated politics has infiltrated a growing portion of the American conservative political landscape, little attention has been given to evaluating and understanding what may be the unique strengths of religious and faith-based organizations to foster a stronger sense of civic participation and stronger community
ties. Should there be such an effect of religious participation on civic and community engagement, policymakers, politicians and individual citizens alike will reap the benefit.

In particular, a potential positive effect of religious participation on citizens’ sense of community and civic participation will disrupt a trend that currently threatens the community and civic experience. A quickening pace of daily life, technological advancements that replace face-to-face interaction, a growing skepticism of an individual’s ability to affect change in the government system and a break-down in community bonds may combine to threaten the exercise of and full participation in our nation’s democracy. A positive relationship between religious participation and civic engagement may counteract the debilitating tendency away from traditional community. Such a potential relationship can also illuminate the positive contributions of religion and faith in the world today and may open the eyes of policymakers to the capacity of religious and faith-based organizations to affect social change.

In order to compare the effectiveness of religious and faith organizations for encouraging civic participation and a sense of community with the effectiveness of government in these areas, I first present background information and an extensive review of the relevant academic literature on the role of government, religion and faith in fostering a stronger sense of community and civic engagement. In the section that follows, I lay out the theoretical model that I will use to explore the relationship of study. I then explain the data I use in the study, as well as the methods I use for analyzing the data. In the fourth section, I introduce the empirical model and expand upon the model to highlight key empirical conclusions which the results support. Finally, I conclude with the policy implications of and recommendations from my findings.
I feel compelled to first make three important notes that readers should keep in mind while reading the discussion that follows. First, for the purpose of this discussion, I will make a distinction between two terms that are commonly used as interchangeable: the term “religion” will hereafter refer to organized institutions of people of faith, while the term “faith” is used to describe the individual values, beliefs and in some cases actions of participants of a given tradition. Religion therefore implies an institutional arrangement, while faith implies a personal experience of how one interprets his or her beliefs. Given these definitions, most variables in this study measure individuals’ religious participation, as they describe the degree to which individuals participate in their respective places of worship.

Second, I make a distinction in this discussion between civic participation and community participation. For the purposes of this study, I use the term “civic participation” to apply specifically to individuals’ voting behavior, or lack thereof. I use the term “community engagement” when referring to individuals’ action to volunteer or otherwise contribute to the community in which they live. Though these aspects of public life are related, I treat them as separate processes.

Finally, I note that in the writing of this thesis I do not seek to favor one religious opinion over another, nor do I maintain that prescribing to a religious or faith tradition is superior to not identifying with a religious tradition. The purpose of this exploration, rather, is to understand how religion and faith, or lack thereof, impacts an individual’s level of interaction with his or her community and democracy. Such an exploration is of increasing importance, for the growing presence of social media and technology in our everyday lives, as well as the quickening pace of
change, require that we intentionally study how our experience of and responsibility to community is influenced by two of the major institutions in our lives today: church and state.
Chapter 2. Background

Though the U.S. was the entrepreneur of the idea of a separation of church and state as well as the notion of religious liberty, it still remains one of the most religious nations in the Western world. According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, only three U.S. presidents in the history of the nation have been unaffiliated with a particular religion, a fact which highlights that it is not just the American public that possesses strong religious tradition; our nation’s leaders also do (Pew Religious Affiliations of U.S. Presidents 2009).

The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life’s recent Religious Landscape Survey provides detailed information on the changing trends in the U.S. religious environment. According to the survey, over three-quarters of U.S. adults belong to a Christian denomination. Though this fact may not surprise most readers, it is interesting that the second largest religious classification in the U.S. represents those unaffiliated with any religion: U.S. participation in this category is larger than that of Jews, Buddhist, Muslim and Hindus combined (Pew U.S. Religious Landscape 2007). An equally striking phenomenon is the changing composition of particular religious denominations. Catholics, for example, are experiencing the greatest decline in membership: according to the Pew U.S. Religious Landscape “While nearly one-in-three Americans were raised in the Catholic faith, today fewer than one-in-four describe themselves as Catholic.”

Religion was particularly important in determining the outcome of the 2008 election; two religious groups that are undergoing the most change, Catholics and the religious unaffiliated, significantly contributed to electing Obama for his first term. According to Pew, “Catholics supported Obama over McCain by a nine-point margin (54% vs. 45%). By contrast,
four years earlier, Catholics favored Republican incumbent George W. Bush over Kerry by a five-point margin (52% to 47%).” Protestants also increased their leaning toward the Democratic candidate in the 2008 election: “overall, 45% of Protestants voted for [Obama], an increase of five points since 2004” (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008). The Pew Forum also explored the effect of religious attendance on individuals’ voting choices, reporting that between 2004 and 2008, Democrats gained the vote of 5 percent more of those who attend some form of worship service. Appendices A and B contain valuable graphics on the breakdown of the influence of religion on voting in the 2008 election, as well as the effect of worship attendance on voting.

While the influence of religion on voting is perhaps more well-known, the government also contributes to the ease and likelihood of individual participation in elections. The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is the prime government body that works to facilitate and administer U.S. elections. Established in 2002 by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), EAC “is an independent, bipartisan commission charged with developing guidance to meet HAVA requirements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and serving as a national clearinghouse of information on election administration” (U.S. Election Administration Commission 2010).a

The 2002 HAVA requires states to implement several initiatives to more easily and systematically capture the vote of every American. According to the HAVA website, these programs include provisional voting, voting information databases, updated and upgraded voting equipment, statewide voter registration databases, voter identification procedures and

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a Public Law 107–252
administrative complaint procedures. Though these programs and procedures are now the minimum activities states must implement in the administration of elections, some states exceed these minimums. It is this variation in flexibility and convenience that I will explore in the study that follows and propose that it will not affect voting outcomes as positively as does religious organizational activity.
Chapter 3. Literature Review

My review of the literature builds on the facts discussed above and also gives light to the need for an exploration of the comparison of the effect of religious organizations and state governments on civic participation and community engagement. The literature I review that is relevant to this paper can be divided into three key strands: articles that discuss voluntary associational membership and civic engagement overall, those that analyze the effect of government on civic participation, and those that analyze the effect of religious organizations and beliefs on either civic participation or community engagement. This latter group is further thematically sub-divided in this review, as there is a vast literature available on the topic of religion, voting and volunteering. Following a discussion of the subdivisions of the religion literature, I identify what I see to be the gaps in the relevant literature and propose how my work brings an original contribution to the field.

General voluntary associational membership

The topic of voluntary associational membership and civic engagement overall has been an area of dialogue and debate since Alexis de Tocqueville published his many observations of American culture and democracy in the 19th century. In his chapter on political associations from Democracy in America, de Tocqueville (2008) discusses the applications and importance of such groups on the exercise of American democracy. According to de Tocqueville, a group that expresses a view on a topic gives legitimacy to that issue by the mere act of holding an opinion. The political scientist also famously discusses the “power of meeting” within political associations, writing that “when an association is allowed to establish centres of action at certain important points in the county, its activity is increased and its influence extended.” Finally, de
Tocqueville discusses the ways in which groups’ opinions directly impact democracy through electoral politics. Throughout his writing, de Tocqueville makes clear that the power of American democracy lies in the duty and desire Americans have to contribute to political society and to have their voices heard.

Galston (2001), though not denying the importance of making a civic contribution to society, has a less optimistically-charged account of the reality of civic engagement when he writes a century and a half later. According to Galston, apathy is a growing threat to the operation of the U.S. democracy; he laments that though college graduation rates have skyrocketed over the past several decades, political knowledge has stayed the same. A shining light in this trend, however, is the growing prominence of service learning communities and other civic education initiatives, which are all geared to providing a civic education to those who otherwise may remain unengaged.

Putnam (1993), known for a similar hypothesis of the decline of the traditional community and the impact it has on civic life, discusses the role of social capital in bolstering civic participation. According to Putnam, strong communities, and thus robust civic and community participation, are not strong because they are simply materially wealthy but rather because their social capital is rich. Putnam argues that Italian regional governments, for example, vary as much as they do from each other because of differing traditions and strength of civic engagement and that it is social capital that lies at the heart of a strong, civically engaged community.

The role of voluntary associations and volunteerism in building social capital and bolstering civic engagement is widely discussed and even debated in the literature. Olsen (1972)
finds that individuals who participate in voluntary associations are more likely to turnout to vote as well and that participation in voluntary associations is a better predictor of whether an individual votes than is political orientation. According to Olsen, “political orientations [are] seen as providing a vehicle through which other phenomena – especially one’s social participation and political contacts – affect one’s decision to vote.”

Though Olsen’s main conclusion lies in the importance of social participation and voluntary associational membership, Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) to some degree argue the opposite. According to the authors, voluntary associational membership does not lead to “good citizenship” for a variety of reasons. First, Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) assert that individuals have a tendency to join groups that are homogeneous, which may weaken “participation directed towards bettering the community as a whole.” Second, the authors distinguish between civic and political participation and argue that participating civically, through volunteering and service learning programs, may leave individuals so frustrated with the vastness of social problems and thus the political process that they refrain from voting and otherwise participating politically.

**The influence of government on civic participation**

Relevant literature on the government’s role in encouraging civic engagement contains similar discourse. Nagler (1991), Highton and Wolfington (1998), King (1994), Merriland (1993), Kenney and Rice (1985) and Copeland and LaBand (2002) all differ on their analyses of how government action, particularly voter registration laws, affect voting and other forms of civic engagement. Nagler (1991), for example, disputes the idea that individuals with lower levels of education are more sensitive to registration laws than individuals with higher levels of
education prior to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993, while Highton and Wolfington (1998) analyze the effects of the NVRA on different social groups once it passed. The authors find that the effects of the NVRA do not necessarily pertain to individuals of higher or lower education levels, a conclusion similar to Nagler’s (1991) finding, but to individuals with higher or lower levels of voter interest and engagement. According to the authors, “the turnout of those who take little or no interest in the political system will mostly be unaffected by attempts such as the NVRA to reduce costs of voting.” The groups that are most affected, write the authors, are those who possess moderate levels of motivation and who value the change in cost associated with more convenient voter registration locations.

While Highton and Wolfington (1998) explore the effects of a major change in states’ administration of elections and voter registration, King (1994) seeks to answer why states vary in the restrictiveness of their registration laws, differences that go beyond the national legislation of the NVRA. The results of both studies show that it is what the authors term “political culture” that impacts the restrictiveness of voter-registration laws, and thus voter turnout. The authors emphasize the importance of political efficacy and sense of citizen duty at the micro-level, asserting that the aggregate of these two factors may explain state differences in voter registration laws. Merrifield (1993) similarly emphasizes the role political efficacy plays in determining voter turnout and argues that the factor is often under-represented in traditional econometric models that measure turnout.

Kenney and Patrick (1985) analyze the characteristics of presidential primary elections that push voters to the polls and find that it is not campaign spending nor the closeness of a given

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b Public Law 103-31
race that results in higher-than-normal turnout. Constructing a variable for voter turnout using the ratio of the number of votes cast to “the voting-age population size,” the authors find that it is the longer-term factor of partisan balance that influences voter turnout more than the short-term factors of campaign spending and the closeness of an election.

Like King (1994), Merrifield (1993) and Kenney and Patrick (1985), Copeland and LaBand (2002) explore the micro-level qualities and characteristics that lead individuals to vote. According to Copeland and LaBand the particular mechanism through which voters choose to vote is not their desire to have an impact on a given election but rather to express their own ideals and opinions. Copeland and LaBand liken voting to sending a “get well soon” greeting card: the authors argue that individuals are aware that a vote will not tangibly affect either an election but decide to vote anyway, much like sending a friend a greeting card will not impact the speed of their recovery.

**The influence of religion on volunteerism**

After reviewing literature on overall civic engagement and the effect of government efforts on civic engagement, I now review works on the influence of religion and faith on civic participation and community engagement. I first look at the influence of religion on volunteerism. Ruiter and De Graaf (2006) are but one pair of authors in a large group of scholars to conclude that individuals who attend a religious service regularly are more likely to be involved in voluntary associations than either nonmembers or members who do not actively attend services. The key insight here, according to Ruiter and De Graaf, is that it is not membership in a place of worship that matters in predicting volunteerism, but rather whether a member attends worship services regularly.
Borgonovi (2008) takes Ruiter and De Graaf’s (2006) analysis one step further, arguing that it is more than religious service attendance that affects volunteerism and philanthropic giving; it is also the type of, intensity of and acceptance of others’ religious beliefs that matters. She asserts that there is no association between such religious context and church attendance but that there is a statistically significant relationship between context and religiously-based volunteering. In other words, though an individual who is accepting of others’ religious beliefs is no more likely to attend church than someone who is less accepting, that individual is more likely to participate in a religiously affiliated volunteer opportunity than the less accepting individual. Borgonovi’s finding ends up refuting that of Ruiter and De Graaf; she argues that church attendance does not drive religious volunteering and rather that it is an individual’s religious specific beliefs and degree of acceptance of others that drives such volunteering.

Taniguchi and Thomas (2011), Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) and Lam (2002) all delve into more specific religious and congregational practices that lead to increased volunteerism. Taniguchi and Thomas (2011) do not simply explore whether or not individuals are part of or attend regularly a place of worship; they further analyze the specific features of being a part of a religious group, particularly feelings of exclusiveness and inclusiveness, that lead to increased civic engagement. The authors first contend that participation in religious groups helps individuals build skills that help in becoming civically engaged. They also find that religious exclusiveness corresponds with higher levels of volunteering only within a religious group, while feelings of religious inclusiveness correspond to volunteering in both religious and secular arenas.
Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) similarly recommend avoiding the use of a measure of church attendance to study religion’s impact on civic engagement. The scholars find that though there is no relationship between religious service attendance and civic participation, there is a significant one between other types of congregational activity (such as letter-writing campaigns, speakers’ bureaus and service opportunities) and members’ civic participation. Lam (2002) takes an approach similar to Beyerlein and Hipp, focusing not on the particular activities of a congregation but on the “devotional and theological dimensions of religiosity.” Lam finds that the frequency of prayer, for example, increases the likelihood of participation in voluntary associations and emphasizes the importance of considering other measures of religiosity beyond membership and attendance.

**The influence of religion on voting and political activity**

Another branch of the literature on religiosity centers on the impact it has not on membership in voluntary associations but on political activity, including voting behavior. Greenberg (2000) hypothesizes that religious institutions’ influence on political activity works through two mechanisms: (1) promotion of the importance of community engagement and (2) community outreach. Greenberg’s analysis is a qualitative one and she attempts to prove her hypothesis through in-depth interviews and studies of individual congregations. She finds that religious institutions serve to provide their members the “information, resources and opportunities” they need to participate in the political process but in many instances avoid making explicit statements about which issues and individuals to support.

Martinson and Wilkening (1987) provide quantitative findings that offer further insights into Greenberg’s later study. In particular, Martinson and Wilkening conclude that though
church attendance is related to voting in national and primary elections, it is not related to
political advocacy, which the authors define as dialoguing with local political officials. While
Greenberg explains that churches provide invaluable resources for members to engage
politically, Martinson and Wilkening clarify that such investment only impacts voting, not
political advocacy.

Macaluso and Wanat (1979) offer another explanation for the connection between
religious participation and voting. The authors conclude that a sense of duty at the micro-level is
supported and upheld by religious institutions and that religiosity fosters a unique type of citizen
duty, one that is incompletely measured by traditional scales.

Beyerlein and Chaves (2003) take a slightly different approach to understanding the
relationship between religious organizations and civic participation; the authors look specifically
at congregations’ efforts to engage institutionally in political activity, instead of congregations’
efforts to encourage individuals to do so. They find that to partake in the political process,
congregations most frequently “[offer] opportunities for political activity – such as petitioning
campaigns, lobbying and demonstrating – at worship services and distributing voter guides” and
that congregations are the strongest of nonpolitical groups at encouraging political activity.

The influence of particular denominations or locations

and Jamal (2005) all examine religion’s effect on either voting in a particular geographic location
or within a particular religious denomination. Uslaner (2002), for example, finds that across the
U.S. and Canada, Christians with more conservative values are “much more likely to give their
time to their churches” than those who have more mainline beliefs and values. Such
conservative individuals are also 74 percent less likely than those with liberal views to participate in a secular cause, according to Uslaner. Smidt (1999) also compares religious and civic phenomena between the U.S. and Canada, asserting that both religious tradition and religious attendance are related to participating in U.S. and Canadian civil society. “Social analysts who choose to focus on civil society and associational activity,” Smidt concludes, “need to take religion seriously and incorporate religious variables within their analysis.”

Campbell (2004) analyzes the effect of evangelical Protestants on political engagement and finds that the more time evangelical Protestants spend in worship, the less time they dedicate to political activity. This finding goes against those of previous scholars, who make a connection between church attendance and increased political participation. Iannaccone (1994) similarly discusses evangelical Protestants as well as other individuals who belong to “strict churches.” Iannaccone’s general conclusion is that members of strict denominations are less likely to be involved with secular organizations and are more likely to associate with members of their own faith. Schwadel (2005) backs up this finding as well, but focuses less on strict churches as institutions and more on the beliefs of individuals within strict churches, namely those who adhere to biblical literalism. “At the congregational level,” writes Schwadel, “biblical literalism is strongly negatively related to civic activity.” Thus, individuals who belong to stricter denominations and believe literally in the words of the Bible are less likely to engage in civic activity outside of their own church.

Jamal (2005) brings a unique contribution to the academic work on religious denominations and civic engagement, focusing solely on Muslim Americans, a group that is normally classified as “other” in many religious surveys. Jamal reaches two conclusions in her
discussion. The first is that the relationship between mosque participation and civic engagement varies within Muslim communities, a phenomenon she attributes to “each group’s ethnic experience in the United States.” Second, Jamal finds that attendance at mosques is “directly linked to political activity, civic participation, and group consciousness” for Arab Muslims, but not necessarily for African Muslims. This finding is especially relevant given the changing composition of the U.S. religious landscape.

Original contribution to the literature

The literature I summarize here presents valuable insights into work that has already been done surrounding religion, government, civic participation and community engagement. What is clear throughout my review is that while extensive work exists on both religion’s and government’s effects on a variety of civic and community participation factors, there has been no effort made to study the relationship between the two. It is in the combination of religious and governmental efforts where my contribution lies. I capture religious organizations’ and governmental efforts in one model and attempt to draw a conclusion about whether religious organizations encourage individuals to engage in civic and community life more than government efforts do.
Chapter 4. Theoretical Models

I outline here the two theoretical models I propose to explore the effectiveness of religious organizations in encouraging civic participation and community engagement compared to the effectiveness of government in doing the same. I use the first model to analyze the difference between the effects of government effort and of religious participation on voting behavior. The main dependent variable of study in this model, labeled as vote_08, is an indicator variable for whether a respondent voted in the November 2008 election. The main hypothesis in this analysis is that civic participation, as measured by voting behavior, relates to key independent variables in the following way:

\[ Vote_08 = f(\text{demographic factors; attention to, knowledge of, and interest in political campaigns; religious values and participation; state government effort}) \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

I use a second model to analyze the difference between the effects of government effort and religious participation on community organizational membership, a proxy for overall community engagement. The main dependent variable in this model, labeled as numorgs, is a continuous measure of the number of organizations of which a respondent is a member. Again, my hypothesis is that community engagement, in particular the degree of one’s organizational membership, relates to key independent variables in the following way:

\[ Numorgs = f(\text{demographic factors; attention to, knowledge of, and interest in political campaigns; religious values and participation; state government effort}) \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

I go on to empirically estimate the relationships laid out in these two theoretical sections after I first thoroughly describe the data used in the analysis.
Chapter 5. Data and Methods

To analyze the relationship above, I combined the American National Election Survey (ANES) 2008 Time Series Study and the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) to create a cross-sectional dataset with 2,322 observations of individuals. The unit of analysis for the dataset is an American adult eligible to vote in the 2008 election.

The ANES measures respondents’ political views, religious views and voting behavior before and after the 2008 presidential election. The specific 2008 ANES I use in this analysis is part of a broader series of American National Election Studies, which have been conducted every two years since 1948. The 2008 ANES Time Series Study includes the responses of 2,322 pre-election interviews and of 2,102 post-election interviews. The pre-election survey was conducted between September 2 and November 3, 2008, and the post-election survey was conducted between November 5 and December 30, 2008.

Though the 2008 ANES contained nearly 2,000 separate variables, for the purpose of this study, I created a subset of 50 variables. A second adjustment I made to the data pertains to the treatment of individuals’ pre- and post-election responses. I pooled individuals’ responses from the two studies because I found necessary information for this study in both the pre-and post-election surveys; survey questions pertaining to community involvement were primarily found in the post-election survey, while questions pertaining to demographic indicators were found in the pre-election survey. Another necessary adjustment I made relates to the conversion of survey question responses into indicator variables: many of the variables necessary to this study were coded in ordinal form so I first had to recode them as indicator variables to be able to include them in my analysis.
The second dataset I used in this analysis is the 2008 EAVS, which contains information on counties’ efforts to register voters prior to Election Day and to administer elections on Election Day. In order to match the ANES dataset, the county-level information in the EAVS was collapsed into state-level information. Tables of summary statistics for the key variables I use from a combination of the two respective datasets are below:

**Table 1: Summary statistics – demographic variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as white</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as black</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asian</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as Asian</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hispanic</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as Hispanic</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent having a college degree</td>
<td>2311</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent having income over $100K/year</td>
<td>2139</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as male</td>
<td>2306</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>Age (in years) of respondent</td>
<td>2277</td>
<td>47.369</td>
<td>17.38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marital</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent being married</td>
<td>2308</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>christian</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as Christian</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>otherreligion</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as a member of another religion</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noreligion</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as having no religion</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Summary statistics – other controls**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>liberal</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as liberal</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as moderate</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent identifying as conservative</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newsattn</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent paying moderate to a lot of attention to news about a Presidential campaign</td>
<td>2102</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polacumen</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent correctly answering a question testing his/her knowledge of politics and current events</td>
<td>2094</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest</td>
<td>Indicator for respondent having some to a lot of interest in Presidential campaigns</td>
<td>2321</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I note here one particular obstacle the data present: the measurement of efforts of religious organizations to encourage civic participation and those of state government. There are two related effects of religious participation on civic participation. First, it is possible that participation in religious organizations and the possession of strong religious beliefs leads to some stronger sense of civic duty than that for an individual who does not associate with or participate in any religious belief system. Second, it is also possible that the religious institution a religious individual frequents encourages its members to vote, particularly on those issues that
matter to its belief structure. Though the analysis described in this paper directly accounts for the former effect, it is not possible to distinguish the former effect from the latter. I propose instead that the two move together, that the sense of civic duty that a religious person may inherently possess reinforces any religious institution’s attempt to encourage civic participation. And, with the same logic, a religious institution’s attempt to encourage civic participation reinforces its members’ inherent sense of civic duty. Even though I do not possess the data to measure these two effects separately, it is safe to assume that a proxy measure of the effect of religious values and behavior is sufficient for use in this analysis.

I also note here that for simplification purposes, the term “church” is used in the empirical model and findings section to represent all houses of religious worship – temples, synagogues, mosques, etc. I choose to use the term “church” because the majority of religious individuals in the U.S. are Christians.
Chapter 6. Empirical Models

The empirical model I use to estimate the relationship I laid out in Equation (1), that between religious organizational effort, governmental effort and civic participation, is expressed below. For the duration of this paper it is referred to as Model one. Descriptions of the variables can be found in the tables of summary statistics in the previous section. Since the dependent variable in the model below is an indicator variable, I use a probit regression to estimate the model.

\[ Vote_{08} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(white) + \beta_2(black) + \beta_3(education) + \beta_4(incomeover) + \beta_5(male) + \]
\[ \beta_6(marital) + \beta_7(noreligion) + \beta_8(newsattn) + \beta_9(polacumen) + \beta_{10}(interest) + \]
\[ \beta_{11}(religindailylife) + \beta_{12}(attendance) + \beta_{13}(participation) + \beta_{14}(goveffort) + e \]  

Because it is important to understand thoroughly what each variable measures and make predictions on the nature of the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable, I spend the next three subsections detailing this information for each variable included in Equation (3).

Model one: demographic variables

The first seven variables in Equation (3) are demographic ones and are necessary to better understand the effects of the variables with policy implications on voting behavior; all are controls conventional in policy-related regression analyses.\(^c\)

It is difficult to predict the effect of being white on whether an individual votes; prior to the 2008 election, one could assume that being white would mean that an individual would be

\(^c\) I note here that a demographic control for political ideology is not included in the model to make the model as efficient as possible. The inclusion of a control for political ideology did not change any results significantly and thus was omitted from the final model.
more likely to vote in an election. In the 2008 election, however, the presence of the first black presidential candidate on the ballot means that one may be less able to assume that whites are more likely to vote than members of other races. I therefore have no expectation for how white, an indicator for an individual self-reporting as white, will be related to vote_08. Using the same logic, I have no expectation for how the variable black, an indicator for an individual self-reporting as black, will relate to vote_08. Though blacks were perhaps more likely to vote in 2008 than they were in previous elections, one cannot assume that blacks were more likely than members of other races to vote in the 2008 election.

As scholarship has shown that an individual with higher education is more likely to participate in one’s community, I predict that the coefficient on education, an indicator for whether a respondent holds at least a Bachelor’s degree, will be positive (e.g., Ruiter and De Graaf (2006)). A positive coefficient on this variable means that an individual who holds a Bachelor’s degree or a more advanced degree will be more likely to vote than an individual who has not earned a Bachelor’s degree.

Household income is another conventional demographic control. In this analysis, household income is measured with an indicator variable for whether an individual’s household income is above $100,000 a year. It is not immediately clear what the sign of the coefficient on a variable measuring household income would be. On one hand, a family with a relatively high household income may have more to lose should a candidate who favors higher taxes become President, yet, on the other hand, a family with a relatively low household income can potentially

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\[d\] In creating the variable to measure household income, I tried several iterations of household income. Using the $100,000 a year benchmark, however, was the most statistically significant of the different measures, and other measures did not appreciably change results.
prosper from more favorable entitlements and tax relief as well. In both scenarios, an individual would be more likely to vote in order to elect a President who would protect his/her income or ensure he/she would see an increase in income and entitlements.

A coefficient on male, an indicator for whether a respondent is male, is fairly easy to predict. As Taniguchi and Thomas (2011) state, religiosity levels as well as tendencies to volunteer, are higher for women than men. Applying this logic to voting, I predict that women will similarly be more likely to vote than men, making the coefficient on male negative.

Taniguchi and Thomas’s (2011) findings also apply to the behavior of the coefficient on a variable that indicates whether an individual is married, marital. According to the authors, marriage is positively associated with both volunteerism and with religiosity. If one is to carry this logic to voting, it is safe to predict that individuals who are married will be more likely to vote than individuals who are not married, making the coefficient on marital positive.

Religious identity is the final demographic control. For the purposes of this analysis, I consider an individual’s religious identity a demographic control rather than a relevant policy variable because I am interested not in which religious traditions, if any, are positively associated with voting but rather if individuals who are religious overall, despite religious denomination, are more likely to vote than individuals who are not religious. I predict then that an indicator for whether an individual self-reports having no religious identity, noreligion, will be negative; individuals who do not identify with a religion will be less likely to vote than individuals who possess a religious identity.
Model one: other controls

In this analysis, I use three variables to keep constant individuals’ levels of attention to, knowledge of and interest in political campaigns. I expect that the indicator variable that measures whether an individual reports paying moderate to a lot of attention to news about a presidential campaign, newsattn, will be positive; an individual who pays attention to news about a campaign will be more likely to vote in the respective election. In addition to the amount of attention an individual pays to campaigns, I presume that the individual’s knowledge of current events and politics will also relate to whether that individual votes. To measure this variable, I use polacumen, an indicator for whether an individual correctly answered a political intelligence question. I predict that the relationship between political acumen and voting will also be positive; I predict that an individual who understands more about the political system and current events will be more likely to vote in a given election. Lastly, I include in my analysis a measure for an individual’s interest level in presidential campaigns, labeled interest. I predict that the sign on interest will also be positive, as an individual will be more compelled to vote if he or she finds Presidential campaigns interesting.

Model one: variables with potential policy implications

The most important policy variables in Model one include whether a respondent’s belief in religion as a guide for day-to-day life (religindailylife), the frequency with which the individual attends religious services (attendance), the degree to which the individual participates in a church outside of attending services (participation) and the proportion of the state population registered to vote through means that go beyond state registration requirements stipulated in the Help America Vote Act (goveffort).
The first of three relevant religious variables, religindailylife, the degree to which an individual claims that religion guides his/her daily life, helps to indicate whether that individual is likely to act on his or her religion as well. If religion provides guidance in an individual’s life, I assume that he or she is more likely to consider religion when making decisions on whether to vote. I therefore predict that the sign on the coefficient for religindailylife will be positive: an individual who claims that religion provides guidance in daily life will be more likely to vote.

Also important in understanding the role of religion and religious organizations on civic participation is the frequency with which an individual attends some form of religious service. In this analysis, I use the variable attendance as an indicator for whether an individual attends church at least once a week. I assume that the more frequently an individual attends religious service, the greater the chance that he or she will act on his or her religion by voting; therefore, I predict that the sign on the coefficient for attendance will be positive.

Similarly, I include a variable that measures whether an individual participates in his or her place of worship as an active member. My intention in including this variable is to capture the individuals who truly internalize their faith: those who don’t just frequently attend religious services but also seek active involvement in their religious community. I hypothesize that the coefficient on participation will also be positive: active involvement in one’s church will be positively correlated to whether that individual will become civically involved also.

To measure the relationship between an individual’s propensity to vote and his or her state government’s efforts to encourage such participation, I include a policy variable, goveffort, which represents the ratio of voters who registered for the 2008 election through means beyond those required in the Help America Vote Act to total state population. The logic here is that one
will see government effort to encourage voting in the preparation for and administration of elections. Since there is universal legislation mandating certain election administration procedures, I must look at whether states go above and beyond what is required of them to administer elections in order to determine the desire of states to make voting easy for its citizens. It is safe to predict that the coefficient on goveffort will be positive: the more effort an individual’s state exerts to make voter registration and voting easier, the more likely that individual will be to vote.

Model two

In addition to predicting the relationships between the described independent variables and voting behavior from my first model, I also consider the variables and relationships of a second model, which uses organizational membership as a dependent variable. In order to draw more comparable conclusions between the two models, I use the same independent variables in the second model as in the first. The empirical model I test for the second model, hereafter called Model two, is below and is based on the theoretical model in Equation (2). I use standard OLS regression to estimate this model.

\[
\text{Numorgs} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{white}) + \beta_2(\text{black}) + \beta_3(\text{education}) + \beta_4(\text{income}) + \beta_5(\text{male}) + \\
\beta_6(\text{marital}) + \beta_7(\text{noreligion}) + \beta_8(\text{newsattn}) + \beta_9(\text{polacumen}) + \beta_{10}(\text{interest}) + \\
\beta_{11}(\text{religindailylife}) + \beta_{12}(\text{attendance}) + \beta_{13}(\text{participation}) + \beta_{14}(\text{goveffort}) + \epsilon. \tag{4}
\]

I hypothesize that the signs of the coefficients in Equation (3) will be consistent with those in Equation (4), primarily because I associate positively the tendency to participate civically with the tendency to engage with one’s community. It is important to note that at first
glance it seems that the variables relating to political campaigns and the administration of elections (*newsattn, polacumen, interest* and *staterегистration*) should not be included in this model. I argue that these variables do belong. First, the variables portraying an individual’s attention to, knowledge of and interest in campaigns are all factors that can feasibly affect an individual’s propensity to participate in one’s community. Just like in the model predicting voting behavior, the inclusion of the three variables related to the popularity of political campaigns separates out the effect that someone is a more active part of their community because they value staying up-to-date with current events and politics. Second, the variable that captures government effort to go above and beyond legislative requirements in administering elections can be a proxy for whatever, if any, other government effort there may be to encourage individuals’ community engagement; if a state government surpasses the minimum requirements to facilitate registration and voting, it too may value encouraging its citizens to participate in their communities in other ways. Of course, this variable as a proxy will measure the effect less precisely than in Equation (3).

**Empirical method**

In order to compare the effect of religious values and behavior with the effect of government effort on voting in Equation (3) and the effect of religious values and behavior with the effect of government effort on organizational membership in Equation (4), I compare the coefficients on the religion variables in the models to the coefficients for state government effort to see which has the larger effect on civic participation and community engagement. A comparison between results from the empirical models in Equations (3) and (4) provides a

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cursory look into how similarly the independent variables I have identified affect both voting behavior and organizational membership.
Chapter 7. Empirical Results

My discussion of the empirical findings from my probit model of Equation (3) and my OLS model of Equation (4) follows the same format as the discussion of my predictions for the coefficients of each variable. In the paragraphs that follow, I describe the sign, magnitude and significance of the relevant controls, as well as of the policy relevant variables. Table 6 serves as a summary of the empirical findings from Model one, that from Equation (3).

Table 6: Summary of regression results – Model one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Marginal effect</th>
<th>Std. error</th>
<th>z-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>0.2982**</td>
<td>0.0833</td>
<td>0.1308</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td>0.4819***</td>
<td>0.1070</td>
<td>0.1300</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.5875***</td>
<td>0.1330</td>
<td>0.1416</td>
<td>4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>0.3045**</td>
<td>0.0721</td>
<td>0.1427</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>-0.2345***</td>
<td>-0.0622</td>
<td>0.0811</td>
<td>-2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marital</td>
<td>0.1902**</td>
<td>0.0494</td>
<td>0.0871</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noreligion</td>
<td>-0.2485*</td>
<td>-0.0697</td>
<td>0.1426</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newsattn</td>
<td>0.5824***</td>
<td>0.1799</td>
<td>0.1044</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polacumen</td>
<td>0.3619***</td>
<td>0.0914</td>
<td>0.1043</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest</td>
<td>0.6958***</td>
<td>0.2184</td>
<td>0.1055</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religindailylife</td>
<td>-0.2091*</td>
<td>-0.0541</td>
<td>0.1176</td>
<td>-1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>0.3008*</td>
<td>0.0731</td>
<td>0.1591</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>0.0524</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
<td>0.1577</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goveffort</td>
<td>1.1577**</td>
<td>0.3034</td>
<td>0.4560</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-0.7172</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1927</td>
<td>-3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi-squared</td>
<td>395***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psuedo R-Squared</td>
<td>0.1842</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level, *** = significant at the 99% level
Overall performance of Model one

Model one returns sounds results and, as the output above shows, is a reliable model with which to examine the relationship between religion, government and civic participation. First, the Wald chi-squared statistic is highly significant, indicating that together the independent variables in the model are statistically significant. Second, the model performed well in a test for model specification and omitted variables. Though it is inevitable that there will be some omitted variable bias in the model, a “linktest” revealed that my independent variables are good predictors of the dependent variable and that the specification of my model is correct. Appendix C reports the results of the linktest.

Model one: demographic controls

The estimated coefficients of the white and black variables suggest that those identifying as either race were more likely to vote in the 2008 election than those who do not identify with these racial groups. Though I did not predict that such would be the case, both white and black coefficients are positive and significant at the 95 percent and 99 percent levels, respectively. Not only, then, are whites more likely to vote than non-whites (blacks, Hispanics, Asians and individuals who do not identify with any of the above), but blacks are more likely to vote in the 2008 election than non-blacks (whites, Hispanics, Asians and individuals who do not identify with any of the above). In particular, whites are 8 percent more likely to vote than non-whites, and blacks are nearly 11 percent more likely to vote than non-blacks. These percentages are the calculated marginal effects from the probit model.

As predicted, the estimated coefficient for an indicator measuring whether an individual holds at least a college diploma is positive and significant at the highest level. In particular,
individuals who at least hold a college diploma are 13 percent more likely to vote than those who do not have a college degree. This finding supports previous assertions that individuals with higher levels of education, in this case with a Bachelor’s degree, are more likely to show signs of civic engagement than those with low levels of education (see Smidt 1999).

Despite the potentially ambiguous effect of an indicator for household income over $100,000 a year, the coefficient for the variable indicates that individuals with annual household income over the said threshold are 7 percent more likely to vote than individuals with annual household income below $100,000 a year. This finding supports the notion that high-income households have more to lose than do low-income households, which may spur individuals from such households to vote at a higher rate than individuals from low-income households.

The coefficient on an indicator for whether an individual is male also behaves as expected. According to the findings summarized in table 6, males were less likely than females to vote in the 2008 election, consistent with my prediction that females’ greater tendency to engage in community work will carry over to voting behavior as well. In particular, males are 6 percent less likely than females to vote. It is worth noting that the effect of gender is statistically significant at the highest levels of confidence as well.

The empirical findings similarly support my prediction for the relationship between marital status and voting tendencies. In particular, an individual who is married is nearly 5 percent more likely to vote in the 2008 elections than an unmarried individual. This finding, along with the previous finding on gender, both support Taniguchi and Thomas’s (2011) finding that women, particularly married women, are more likely than unmarried individuals or men to participate in their communities.
Finally, the coefficient on \textit{noreligion}, an indicator representing individuals who do not identify with any religion, is negative and slightly statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. In particular, individuals who claim no religious identity are about 7 percent less likely to vote than individuals who claim to have a religious identity. This finding indirectly supports my hypothesis that individuals who actively affiliate with a religious tradition or faith background are more likely to vote than those who do not. However, because I am more interested in the degree of an individual’s participation in a religious tradition instead of solely his or her creed, the coefficient on \textit{noreligion} does not on its own provide full support to my hypothesis.

\textbf{Model one: other controls}

There are no surprises in the findings of the three variables (\textit{newsattn}, \textit{polacumen} and \textit{interest}) to control for attention to, knowledge of, and interest in political campaigns; all three are positive and statistically significant at the highest levels. My prediction then that each control directly relates to an individual’s tendency to vote is correct. Individuals who pay modest to a lot of attention to news about political campaigns are about 18 percent more likely to participate in elections, while individuals who show proficiency in current events are 9 percent more likely to vote. Lastly, those who are interested in campaigns are 21 percent more likely to vote than individuals who are not interested in political campaigns.
Model one: variables with potential policy implications

Findings from the relevant policy variables are interesting and at times surprising. The first of three measures of an individual’s religiosity and religious behavior, religindailylife, does not behave as I would expect, although it is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. The negative coefficient on the variable indicates that individuals who claim that their religion provides guidance in day-to-day life are 5 percent less likely to vote in the 2008 election than individuals who do not claim their religion provides such guidance. This finding somewhat contradicts the hypothesis that individuals who apply their religious beliefs to everyday life would be more likely to act on such beliefs in civic life.

Though the variable representing the amount of religious guidance in individuals’ daily life does not behave as expected, the coefficient on the variable measuring church attendance, attendance, does. The statistically significant and positive coefficient on attendance indicates that individuals who attend church at least once a week are 7 percent more likely to vote in the 2008 election than individuals who did not attend church at least once a week. This variable is significant at the 90 percent level of confidence as well. Thus, though the coefficient on religindailylife indicates otherwise, it is still possible that there is some positive effect of active worship on civic participation. I note here, however, that religion in daily life measures an individual’s faith more than it necessarily does their religion. Thus these surprising findings may be a result of this distinction. It is also important to note that religindailylife may be biased by measurement error, as individuals may not accurately respond to a question as intangible as whether or not religion guides their day-to-day lives. This question is much different from

\[ \text{A collinearity diagnostic test indicates there is low collinearity between religindailylife and attendance, hence the inclusion of both variables in the model.} \]
asking how often an individual goes to church: a response to the latter question would likely have less measurement error than a response to the former.

The coefficient on *participation*, the indicator representing whether an individual actively participates in his or her place of worship beyond attending religious services, presents an interesting finding. Though I would expect that whether an individual participates in a place of worship would positively impact civic participation more than whether an individual simply attends that place of worship, the low statistical significance of the coefficient on *participation* indicates otherwise. Only slightly positive, the insignificant coefficient indicates that individuals who report actively participating in their place of worship were no more likely to vote in the 2008 election than individuals who do not report active church participation.

A variable with the most direct policy relevance, *goveffort*, presents interesting results as well. The coefficient on the variable that measures the degree to which states go above the minimum required election procedure is positive as well as significant at the 95 percent level of confidence. This finding indicates that the more individuals in a state were permitted to register to vote through more flexible and convenient means, the more likely a person from that state was to vote in the 2008 election. This finding not only validates my sub-hypothesis that there is some statistically significant mechanism through which a state can encourage civic participation and voter turnout; it also proves that the relationship between a given state’s effort to encourage civic participation and individual’s participation is a positive one.

It is important to note, however, that the substantive significance of this finding is more important than the statistical significance and the substantive significance is unclear. The

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*A collinearity diagnostic test indicates there is low collinearity between participation and attendance, hence the inclusion of both variables in the model.*
coefficient on the variable indicates that should a state register 1% more people through flexible and convenient means, an individual in that state will be 30% more likely to vote. This finding reflects a very large effect of government effort on voting behavior, which although possible, is likely an overestimation. The large result may represent the fact that when states go from not having flexible voter registration options to having them there is a big initial effect, but that effect will not necessarily sustain over time. The large effect may also reflect the imprecision that comes from collapsing county-level data to the state level. Thus, though I cannot necessarily say that an individual will be 30 percent likely to vote should his or her state provide flexible registration procedure to 1 percent of the population, I can say that flexible voter registration is an effective policy and has statistically significant effects on individuals’ propensity to vote.

**Model one: comparison of coefficients**

Though the relationships discussed above are interesting and worth understanding, it is the comparison of the effects of religious participation and government effort that ultimately disproves my hypothesis that faith organizations have a unique, and stronger, effect on encouraging civic participation. Because there are multiple religious participation variables, I choose to compare the variable that measures church attendance with government effort as it is the most statistically significant religious participation variable. Should one then compare the 7 percent effect on voting of attending church at least once a week to the 30 percent effect on voting of a state government that registers 1 percent more of its population through

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I will note here that I attempted to run a post-estimation Wald test for the inequality of coefficients, but doing so required that *attendance* and *goveffort* be measured on the same scale. When I transformed *attendance* to match the same scale as *goveffort*, the variable was highly insignificant, indicating that any results of the Wald test would be meaningless.
unconventional means, she can clearly see that the effort of state government has a stronger
effect on voting than does church attendance. This comparison, however, only holds provided
that the effect of state government effort on an individual’s likelihood to vote is in fact 30
percent. Should the actual effect be lower than the estimate, it may be possible that religious
participation does have a stronger effect on voting than does government effort, but I do not see
this in my estimation.

**Model two results**

Table 7 presents the results from an OLS regression with the same independent variables
and a continuous dependent variable that measures an individual’s organizational membership.
The empirical model I use in Model two is written in Equation (4). For easy comparison, I
present Tables 6 and 7 side-by-side in Appendix D.
Table 7: Summary of regression results – Model two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. error</th>
<th>t-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>0.3597***</td>
<td>0.1255</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td>0.4147</td>
<td>0.1081</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.7621***</td>
<td>0.0838</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>0.1831</td>
<td>0.1539</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>0.0236</td>
<td>0.0584</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marital</td>
<td>-0.0637</td>
<td>0.0715</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noreligion</td>
<td>-0.0460</td>
<td>0.1452</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newsattn</td>
<td>0.2284**</td>
<td>0.1040</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polacumen</td>
<td>0.1796**</td>
<td>0.0818</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest</td>
<td>0.1833**</td>
<td>0.0902</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religindailylife</td>
<td>-0.0606</td>
<td>0.0776</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>0.3329***</td>
<td>0.1080</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>0.4669***</td>
<td>0.1013</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goveffort</td>
<td>-0.4714*</td>
<td>0.2587</td>
<td>-1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-0.1040</td>
<td>0.1038</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations: 1884
F-statistic: 25.72***
R-Squared: 0.1508

* = significant at the 90% level, ** = significant at the 95% level, *** = significant at the 99% level

Overall performance of Model two

Just as Model one exhibited strong overall results, so too does Model two. First, the F-statistic is significant at the 99 percent level, indicating that the independent variables are together statistically significant. Second, the R-Squared of 0.1508 indicates that the model explains just over 15 percent of the variation between the dependent and independent variables. This value is consistent with that of similar statistical studies of religious attitudes, volunteerism and civic engagement that I reference throughout this paper.
Model two: demographic controls

The coefficients of Model two’s demographic controls present somewhat of a contrast to the findings from Model one. Though the indicator variable for white in the OLS regression from Model two is still significant, and highly so, the coefficient on the indicator for black is no longer significant in Model two. These two findings can be interpreted to mean that although whites will on average belong to 0.36 more organizations than non-whites, the model does not give a statistically significant prediction for the behavior of blacks. Model one findings indicate that being black or white significantly increase an individual’s likelihood of voting when compared to individuals of other races, but Model two findings indicate that only being white increases an individual’s likelihood of community involvement. This inconsistency may be attributed to the unique nature of the 2008 elections, where blacks who may previously have never voted turned out to the polls, but may not have continued their civic behavior to include involvement in their communities.

It is important here to note that there is a distinct difference between the number of organizations to which an individual belongs and the intensity of their involvement; an individual who belongs to 10 organization but only spends 1 hour a year actively participating is not as active in his/her community as an individual who spends 20 hours a year with one organization. Thus, it could be that even though whites belong to 0.36 more organizations than non-whites, non-whites may in fact demonstrate stronger community involvement by way of their intense membership in a smaller number of organizations. My data, however, do not allow me to account for the intensity of organizational involvement.
Not surprising is that there is little change between the coefficient on the indicator for a respondent having a college degree from Model one to Model two. Just as education is positively associated with civic participation in Model one, Model two shows that education is highly statistically significant and positively correlated with community engagement. In particular, individuals who have at least a college degree will on average be a member in 0.76 more organizations than individuals without a college degree. This finding supports the literature that cite the large role education plays in encouraging both civic and community participation.

The coefficient on the indicator for a respondent reporting household income over $100,000 a year provides an unexpected result. Because the coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels, I conclude that household income does not serve to predict an individual’s level of engagement in his or her community. This finding is understandable, although not foreseen by the author. Though wealthy individuals may have more disposable time and funds with which to participate in their community, they may also be more removed from the needs of their community especially if they live in a high-income neighborhood. Or, it is possible that wealthy individuals have demanding jobs and little leisure time and therefore less opportunity to participate in their communities. Thus, it is understandable that there is no clear effect of household income on community engagement.

The effect of gender similarly differs when predicting level of community engagement instead of civic participation. Though the negative effect of being male on voting is highly significant in the model that predicts civic participation, there is no significant effect of gender when predicting community engagement. This is surprising, as the literature suggest that women
should not only be more likely to vote than men, but they should also be more likely than men to participate in their community; see Stijn and De Graaf (2006). One explanation for this discrepancy is that other variables that are associated with gender (those related to marital status, church attendance and religious participation) may consume some of the gender effect on community engagement.

I find another discrepancy between the findings from Model one and those from Model two in the coefficient for the indicator for an individual being married. Though the coefficient for this variable in Model one is positive and statistically significant, the coefficient for the variable in Model two is negative and not statistically significant at conventional levels. This finding from Model two means that individuals who are married will not be more likely to participate in their community than individuals who are not married. In fact, the slightly negative coefficient on the variable indicates that if anything, being married means individuals may be 6 percent less likely than non-married individuals to participate in their community. This phenomenon may be a result of married individuals, especially those with children, having less time with which to maintain an active presence in their communities.

The final demographic control variable is that of religion, which presents only slightly different findings from Model one. In Model two, the negative and statistically insignificant coefficient on the indicator for an individual possessing no religious identity means that there is no statistical difference in organizational membership between individuals who identify with a religion and those who do not. This finding slightly differs from the finding in Model one, which indicates that individuals without a religious identity are slightly less likely to vote than individuals with a religious identity.
Model two: other controls

Just as in Model one, Model two includes variables that account for individuals’ attention to, knowledge of, and interest in political campaigns. Though Model two does not measure individuals’ civic behavior, I believe it is still important to control for these variables because whether or not an individual follows or finds interesting political campaigns likely means he or she is also in tune to broader social issues and current events. Should an individual have a deeper understanding of social issues and current events, he or she will likely show signs of higher levels of community participation, as well as higher levels of organizational membership. The first control for individuals’ relationships to political campaigns is *newsattn*, which measures whether or not an individual pays moderate to a lot of attention to news about campaigns. The coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant and indicates that individuals who pay a moderate to a lot of attention to campaign news will belong to 0.23 more organizations, on average, than individuals who do not pay significant attention to political campaign news. Similarly, the coefficients on *polacumen* and *interest*, which respectively measure whether an individual has a firm grasp of current political events and whether an individual finds political campaigns interesting, are positive and statistically significant. These findings indicate that an individual’s attention to, knowledge of and interest in political campaigns are important predictors not only of whether an individual votes, but also the number of organizations of which the individual is a member.
Model two: variables with potential policy implications

Perhaps the starkest difference between the results from Model one and those from Model two pertain to the policy-relevant variables. For one, the coefficient on the variable religindailylife, which measures whether an individual claims that religion provides guidance in his or her daily life, is no longer statistically significant in Model two. The finding does not align with Lam’s (2002) conclusion that including variables to measure religiosity beyond membership and participation is important; in this case, the only religiosity measure beyond membership and participation is insignificant. The finding also means that though the degree to which individuals act on their religion in daily life matters in predicting voting behavior, it is not significant in understanding an individual’s organizational memberships.

Another interesting finding is that frequent church attendance in Model two becomes a predictor of organizational membership that is of higher statistical significance than in Model one. In particular, individuals who attend church at least once a week will on average become members of 0.33 more organizations than individuals who do not attend church as frequently. Furthermore, though the degree of an individual’s participation in church outside of worship service did not matter in predicting voting behavior, it becomes a highly statistically significant predictor of an individual’s organizational membership. This finding makes intuitive sense: an individual who pursues opportunities to involve oneself in a place of worship will also likely find opportunities to do the same in a community setting. In particular, an individual who reports active involvement in a religious group outside of church service in the past 12 months will on average be a member of 0.47 more organizations than an individual who does not report active involvement.
Finally, the variable with the most direct policy application, that which measures the degree to which states provide flexible options for citizens to register to vote, dramatically changes from the first model to the second. In the first model, as I already discussed, the coefficient on goveffort is statistically significant and positive, indicating that there is a positive association between states that provide more options for their citizens to register to vote and actual voting turnout. In the second model, however, the expected relationship does not hold: the negative coefficient on goveffort means that an individual who lives in a state with a higher proportion of citizens who register to vote through additional means will on average participate in half an organization fewer than individuals who do not live in more accommodating states. This finding is particularly surprising because of the change in the sign of the coefficient from Model one to Model two; I would have thought that the effect of a state’s effort to encourage civic and community engagement would be a positive one, both in Model one and in Model two.

Model two: comparison of coefficients

In order to determine whether there is a difference between the effect of religious participation and government effort on encouraging community engagement, in this case measured by the number of organizations in which an individual is a member, I again compare the coefficients of the state government effort variable and the church attendance variable. I make a slightly different comparison between state and religion variables in Model two; instead of using church attendance as the key religious variable, I choose to use the measure of church participation beyond religious service, as this is the most statistically significant religion variable in Model two. When one compares the coefficients of participation with goveffort, she sees that there is a significant difference between the two. Though the efforts of state government to
encourage civic behavior end up causing decreases in organizational membership, church participation and church attendance both positively affect organizational membership and thus what I call an individual’s level of community engagement. One can see, then, that though religious organizational involvement does not have a stronger effect than government effort on encouraging voting, it does have a significantly stronger positive effect on organizational membership.
Chapter 8. Discussion of Study Implications

The two regressions I ran, one to model civic participation and one to model community engagement, both lead to interesting and substantive conclusions. First, the results from both models show the importance of including measures of individuals’ attention to, knowledge of and interest in political campaigns when modeling civic and community participation. Second, the models both show that there are differences in reactions to a variety of traditional measures of religiosity and that to properly understand the impact of religion on civic and community participation, religiosity measures must be properly defined and well-understood. For example, in Model one, the frequency of an individual’s church attendance was the most statistically significant measure of religiosity, yet in Model two, an individual’s level of participation in church outside of worship became the religiosity measure of the highest statistical significance. Furthermore, whereas in Model one, the model’s only measure of an individual’s faith experience, the degree to which religion guides his or her daily life, was significant at the 90 percent level, it no longer was significant in Model two. This suggests that faith may be a useful indicator of voting but that it may not significantly impact organizational membership and broader community involvement.

A third finding from my two regressions directly relates to my original hypothesis. In my first model, I find that though religion has a strong effect on whether an individual voted in the 2008 election, the effect was not as strong as the measure of state government effort to encourage voting. This disproves my hypothesis, as I expected that individuals who actively participate in a religion to possess a stronger sense of civic duty and that the effect of religion on civic participation would be stronger than the effect of government effort. Model two, however,
does uphold my hypothesis; Model two findings indicate that the effect of religious participation on community engagement is much stronger than the effect of government effort and, in fact, that the effect of government effort on community engagement is negative. My analysis thus reveals a combination of effects that I did not expect to see. It is quite possible that the effect of religion and faith varies from one aspect of community life to the next, although I did not predict this would be the case.

**Policy recommendations**

Based on my results, I conclude that the Help America Vote Act is playing an important role in maintaining the ability of citizens to exercise their right and responsibility to vote. As we can see from Model one, the two societal institutions that will likely play the largest role in fostering an individual’s sense of civic duty both have significantly positive effects on voting but that the effect of government is larger than that of religious organizations. Thus, if policymakers are looking to continue to bolster the government’s ability to encourage individuals to vote and participate in the nation’s democracy, I recommend that they take several steps to further streamline the voter registration and voting processes.

First, because there is a positive correlation between state government flexibility in election administration and voting behavior in the 2008 election, I recommend state policymakers work to overturn voter ID laws that currently require citizens to present photo ID at the voting booth. Should the results of this study be accurate, eliminating the stricter voter ID laws and thereby making voting more convenient to certain populations will mean that individuals will be more likely to vote in future elections. It is important to note that the policy implication of strict voter ID laws do not solely apply to the low-income and elderly populations
that are most affected by ID laws. Rather, all citizens of a given state are affected by strict voter ID laws, as strict laws likely signal that a state does not create a favorable and convenient voting environment overall, which translates to decreased voting not just because of voter ID laws, but because of other potential barriers to easy and convenient registration and voting procedure. It is therefore in every citizen’s interest that voter laws be lax, for as we see in this analysis it is not necessarily an individual’s direct experience with the voting procedure that impacts whether or not he or she votes but rather the overall voting environment in his or her state.

Related to this recommendation is the increased funding of the Election Administration Commission, the government body responsible for the oversight and administration of federal elections. Increased funding to the EAC will have three direct effects on facilitating voter registration and voting. First, increased funding will improve the administration of elections at the state level, where the actual voting takes place. Because part of the EAC’s role in administering elections involves distributing federal funds to state governments for the implementation of the Help America Vote Act, increased funding to the EAC will ensure that states are better equipped to adhere to the Help America Vote Act and offer more convenient and technologically-advanced options for registering to vote and voting. The second effect of increased EAC funding will be seen in the EAC’s grants to programs such as the Help America Vote College Program and the EAC Mock Election Program, both of which are designed to encourage student participation in elections. Because my results show that government has a strong effect on an individual’s decision to vote, by intentionally including students in the electoral process, we can encourage a younger generation of youth to vote, the same generation that Putnam (2003) fears is becoming disengaged from community life. A third effect of
providing additional funding to the EAC relates to the benefits that come from the EAC’s audit and research initiatives. The Election Administration and Voting Survey, as well as the National Voter Registration Act Studies both fall under the direct domain of the EAC and help researchers like myself analyze the effects of religious changes in society on the exercise of democracy. The responsibility of auditing state electoral commissions to make sure they fall in line with HAVA requirements is also a responsibility of the EAC that increased funding can help fulfill.

The recommendation to increase funding to the EAC relates to President Obama’s announcement of a bipartisan commission to improve the voting experience for voters around the country. This study shows that such funding to such a commission will not be a waste of resources, as there is a direct link between the extent to which government makes the voting process easier and the likelihood that individuals will vote.

Another policy implication of this discussion pertains to the government’s encouragement of community engagement. Should the results of this study be accurate, the findings imply that efforts such as the National Day of Service or the National Day of Prayer are not as effective in encouraging community involvement as an individual’s local church or religious organization. Though there is undeniable intangible value in an entire nation coming together to volunteer or pray, my findings suggest that this does not positively affect an individual’s decision to sustain their participation in their community. I am not recommending an end to the National Day of Service, I am rather highlighting that according to the results, such national events do not necessarily have their intended effect. Furthermore, it is likely that at the local level, governments also encourage community participation in some way, whether by state government running a public service announcement on the importance of volunteering or by a
local town council encouraging its constituents to join their school board. Again, the empirical evidence shows that in these situations, the government’s encouragement of community activity does not have the intended effect of bolstering organizational membership in particular and community engagement more broadly.

Acknowledging the potential of religious organizations to positively impact the exercise of our nation’s democracy is a final, albeit indirect, policy application of this analysis. If nothing else, this study proves that religion, a force that is often regarded as insignificant or even harmful, directly relates to the strength of an individual’s inclination to vote and to participate in his or her community and should be considered as such by policymakers and academics. Furthermore, this study is evidence that religious participation encourages individuals’ engagement with the rest of society, not just with groups and individuals within their own churches and denominations.

**Suggestions for future research**

My suggestions for future academic research on the intersection of religion, government and community life stem from the shortcomings of my own work. First, because I used data from the 2008 election, I call upon academics to investigate if my findings hold when studying other elections. Because the ’08 elections may have been an anomaly in the degree to which previously under-represented individuals showed up at the polls, further research can provide insight to how strong of an indicator of voting certain demographic and religious indicators really are.

A second shortcoming of this study, and another opportunity for future research, relates to the difference between organizational membership and an individual’s sense of bond to and
with his or her community. Though I am most interested in the latter, the data I used did not permit me to measure individuals’ perceived level of community cohesion and their role in fostering a sense of community. Because I did not have this data, I was forced to use a related, albeit arguably inferior, measure of an individual’s community engagement: the number of organizations in which they are members. As I would imagine an investigation of the phenomenon of an individual’s sense of community would help academics and local policymakers better understand the mechanisms of building strong communities at the micro-level, I hope other researchers will take up this task.

I also recommend that future research takes into account the intensity of individuals’ organizational membership. In this analysis I make conclusions based on the assumption that all individuals will participate in the organizations to which they belong with the same level of commitment and intensity. This assumption, however, likely does not hold. Individuals who belong to only one organization may have stronger commitment to community than individuals who join five organizations yet truly participate in none of them. For this reason, my results could be made stronger by better measuring individuals’ intensity of participation in their community instead of some nominal amount of participation.

A final recommendation for future research lies in a clearer understanding of the exact mechanisms that bring individuals to vote. In the data that I use for this analysis, I make the assumption that religious involvement of various kinds, as well as certain types of government effort, influence individuals to vote when they otherwise may not have. A more precise way to understand the influence of religion and government on voting, however, is to gather information on individuals’ motivations for voting. Thus, a new survey could ask individuals to report why
they vote; this information would then be more effective at determining whether the institution of religion or government is more effective at encouraging civic participation and community engagement.

**Overall conclusion**

Despite this study’s shortcomings, my model and findings offer new insight into how church, state and citizens interact in the public sphere. In particular, the study begins to tease out the distinction between individuals who identify with a religious tradition and those for whom it plays an important part of civic and community life. By continuing to explore differences in individuals’ level of involvement with religion and faith, instead of simply the differences in their beliefs, policymakers and academics can gain a greater understanding of how important, and positive, a force religion and faith can be in public life.
Appendices

Appendix A

Table 8: Presidential vote by religion affiliation and race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Dem change 04-08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gore</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>Kerry</td>
<td>Bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant/Other Christian</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Prot/Other Christian</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical/Born-again</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-evangelical</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Catholic</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other faiths</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Throughout the report, "Protestant" refers to people who described themselves as "Protestant," "Mormon" or "other Christian" in exit polls.

Throughout the report, figures may not add to 100, and nested figures may not add to the subtotal indicated, due to rounding.


From “How the Religious Voted,” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life
Appendix B

Table 9: Presidential vote by worship attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000 Gore</th>
<th>2004 Kerry</th>
<th>2008 Obama</th>
<th>2008 McCain</th>
<th>Dem change 04-08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend worship services ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly or more</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than weekly</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly/yearly</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few times a month</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few times a year</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From “How the Religious Voted,” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life

Appendix C

Table 10: Summary of regression results, hat-squared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. error</th>
<th>z-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>_hat</td>
<td>1.0541***</td>
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<td>9.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_hatsq</td>
<td>-0.0446</td>
<td>0.0865</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.0658</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi-squared</td>
<td>210.15***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Squared</td>
<td>0.1844</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results illustrate that though the model as it currently used (_hat) is highly statistically significant, the square of the model (_hatsq) is insignificant (z=-0.52). This finding confirms that the model I use is an appropriate specification.
## Table 12: Summary of regression results - Model one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Marginal effect</th>
<th>Std. error</th>
<th>z-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>0.2982**</td>
<td>0.0833</td>
<td>0.1308</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td>0.4819***</td>
<td>0.1070</td>
<td>0.1300</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.5875***</td>
<td>0.1330</td>
<td>0.1416</td>
<td>4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>0.3045**</td>
<td>0.0721</td>
<td>0.1427</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>-0.2345***</td>
<td>-0.0622</td>
<td>0.0811</td>
<td>-2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marital</td>
<td>0.1902**</td>
<td>0.0494</td>
<td>0.0871</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noreligion</td>
<td>-0.2485*</td>
<td>-0.0697</td>
<td>0.1426</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
</tr>
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<td>newsattn</td>
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<td>0.1799</td>
<td>0.1044</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polacumen</td>
<td>0.3619***</td>
<td>0.0914</td>
<td>0.1043</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest</td>
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<td>0.1055</td>
<td>6.60</td>
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<td>religindailylife</td>
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<td>-0.0541</td>
<td>0.1176</td>
<td>-1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>0.3008*</td>
<td>0.0731</td>
<td>0.1591</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>0.0524</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
<td>0.1577</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goveffort</td>
<td>1.1577**</td>
<td>0.3034</td>
<td>0.4560</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-0.7172</td>
<td>0.1927</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations: 1887

Wald chi-squared: 395***

Psuedo R-Squared: 0.1842

---

## Table 11: Summary of regression results - Model two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. error</th>
<th>t-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>0.3597***</td>
<td>0.1255</td>
<td>2.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td>0.4147</td>
<td>0.1081</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.7621***</td>
<td>0.0838</td>
<td>9.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>0.1831</td>
<td>0.1539</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>0.0236</td>
<td>0.0584</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marital</td>
<td>-0.0637</td>
<td>0.0715</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noreligion</td>
<td>-0.0460</td>
<td>0.1452</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>newsattn</td>
<td>0.2284**</td>
<td>0.1040</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>polacumen</td>
<td>0.1796**</td>
<td>0.0818</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest</td>
<td>0.1833**</td>
<td>0.0902</td>
<td>2.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>religindailylife</td>
<td>-0.0606</td>
<td>-0.0776</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>0.3329***</td>
<td>0.1080</td>
<td>3.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>0.4669***</td>
<td>0.1013</td>
<td>4.61</td>
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<td>goveffort</td>
<td>-0.4714*</td>
<td>0.2587</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.1038</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations: 1884

F-statistic: 25.72***

R-Squared: 0.1508


**Works Cited**


