BEYOND ALLOCATION: 
THE POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY IN QATAR 

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By 

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This dissertation argues that in order to explain the political stability of Qatar amid the region-wide tumult of the Arab Spring, we must go beyond classic rentier state explanations of economic buyoff of the citizenry. Qatar, an extremely resource-rich country with no obvious characteristics of instability, should be a crucial case study for rentier state theory. Instead, however, we see clear evidence that a significant portion of the Qatari population is dissatisfied with the economic allocations offered by the state. Further, there appears to be little correlation between economic satisfaction and political acquiescence, with even those who are satisfied still desiring more say in government decisions and public life. Even more importantly, we see the state acting and reacting in ways that are antithetical to the classic theory—such as spending time, money, and energy promoting legitimacy in noneconomic ways, and reversing state-led policies in the face of societal backlash—which depicts a society with significantly more agency and influence on the state than previously theorized.

By using an in-depth study of Qatar, this dissertation shows that economic allocation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of a rentier state’s political legitimacy formula. Insights from the literatures on political legitimacy and the limited state point to the importance of looking at three components of state legitimacy: legality, justification, and consent. I expand the classic rentier explanation of stability to take into account noneconomic legitimization strategies of the state, which create a fuller picture of the justification aspect of Qatar’s political legitimacy,
as well as state tolerance of public debate and state response to issues of concern, which depict
the pursuit of societal consent to bolster the state’s legitimacy. This dissertation inserts Qatar into
the ongoing debate of how best to understand the domestic politics of rentier states in the twenty-
first century. Besides providing a fuller explanation of an understudied but crucially important
Gulf state, this dissertation also aims to improve our understanding of state-society relations in
the modern Arab Gulf.
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INTRODUCTION

The “Arab Spring” revolutions, which began in December 2010 and have continued to spread throughout the Arab world, have brought renewed attention to the question of the long-term stability and capacity of authoritarian political regimes (Bellin 2012). Overlooked in the excitement of the Arab Spring has been the peculiar case of Qatar, a small and relatively understudied country in the Persian Gulf. Qatar holds the distinction of being the only country in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to avoid any political unrest during the Arab Spring (“The Gulf” 2012), yet for many political observers and analysts, the country’s political stability is no puzzle. In April 2011, US President Barack Obama was caught on tape speaking off the record at a fundraiser event about the per capita income of Qatar and its relation to political stability: “There is no big move towards democracy in Qatar. You know part of the reason is that the per capita income of Qatar is $145,000 a year. That will dampen a lot of conflict—$145,000 a year!” (Khatri 2011). Obama’s words reflect the prevalence of a common assumption about the political stability of Qatar: the assumption that money equals political acquiescence.

In political science literature, the assumption that external wealth leads to political stability is at the root of classic rentier state theory, and Qatar appears to fit the mold of the typical rentier state.1 According to the theory, rentier states produce external wealth that is

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1 Rentier states derive a substantial amount of their revenues from external sources (more than 40 percent; Luciani 1987, 70), such as the sale of hydrocarbon resources. The primary difference between rentier states and productive states is that rentier states do not depend on taxation of their citizens to produce their wealth, a distinction that is often theorized to greatly affect state-society relations. In many ways, Qatar can be seen as a “crucial case” for rentier state theory. Eckstein (1975, 118) describes a crucial case as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed.” It is important to note here, however, that I am not seeking to invalidate rentier theory on the basis of a single case, but, rather, pointing out how it can be usefully revised. This is in line with Gerring’s (2007, 233) “pathway case” methodology, “in which the purpose of an intensive analysis of an individual case is to elucidate causal mechanisms
unrelated to local production and taxation, severing the connection between taxation and representation and allowing the state to pursue policies autonomously from citizen input or pressure. The only policy that matters for political stability is the allocation policy, which distributes the state’s vast reserves of wealth among its citizenry, keeping them politically apathetic and acquiescent. It is true that Qatar, now sitting atop the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita list (Hankir and Kolet 2011), allocates billions of its externally-derived wealth on welfare and economic benefits for its citizens. According to classic rentier state theory, this economic allocation should be sufficient to explain the political loyalty of the citizenry to a relatively autonomous and authoritarian government.

Rather than following the expected pattern of behavior as rentier state theory would describe, however, an in-depth look at Qatar’s state-society relationship reveals three fundamental challenges to the classic theory. First, we see that allocation policies have been creating dissatisfaction as well as satisfaction among the Qatari population, due to rising expectations and perceptions of unfair distribution (Herb 1999; Okruhlik 1999b), leading to the conclusion that economic allocations alone are not a sufficient explanation of Qatar’s political stability. Second, rather than relying solely on allocation and distribution policies, the Qatari state has invested tremendous effort—in time, money, and leadership—in strengthening its
legitimacy through state-led national, historical, cultural, and religious projects. These extensive efforts at legitimization, despite the classic theory’s dismissal of the need for noneconomic nation building, highlight the importance the state itself places on building legitimacy beyond economic benefits. Third, despite the classic theory’s assumption that a rentier state is autonomous from societal input in its pursuit of developmental goals, the state’s recent backtracking on its national education reforms depict both a vocal and disgruntled society and a more limited state that is attuned and responsive to societal backlash.

This dissertation argues that in order to explain the political stability of Qatar amid the region-wide tumult of the Arab Spring, we must go beyond classic rentier state explanations of economic buyoff of the citizenry. Qatar, an extremely resource-rich country with no obvious characteristics of instability, should be a crucial case study for rentier state theory. Instead, however, we see clear evidence that a significant portion of the Qatari population is dissatisfied with the economic allocations offered by the state. Further, there appears to be little correlation between economic satisfaction and political acquiescence, with even those who are satisfied still desiring more say in government decisions and public life. Even more importantly, we see the state acting and reacting in ways that are antithetical to the classic theory—such as spending time, money, and energy promoting legitimacy in noneconomic ways, and reversing state-led policies in the face of societal backlash—which depicts a society with significantly more agency and influence on the state than previously theorized.

4 Qatar has a small territory, a small and relatively homogeneous citizen population of Sunni Muslims (although see Chapter 4 for a more in-depth discussion of the citizenry), and a unified ruling family (Herb 1999) without a rival source of political power, such as an entrenched indigenous religious elite (Seznec 2004; Başkan and Wright 2011) or an independent business class (Crystal 1995; Luciani 2007). As well, Qatar’s large surplus of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is enabling the state to avoid the budget cuts and energy shortfalls that other Arab Gulf states are currently confronting (Krane 2013).
By using an in-depth study of Qatar, this dissertation shows that economic allocation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of a rentier state’s political legitimacy formula. Insights from the literatures on political legitimacy (Beetham 1991) and the limited state (Migdal 1997) point to the importance of looking at three components of state legitimacy: legality, justification, and consent. I expand the classic rentier explanation of stability to take into account noneconomic legitimization strategies of the state, which create a fuller picture of the justification aspect of Qatar’s political legitimacy, as well as state tolerance of public debate and state response to issues of concern, which depict the pursuit of societal consent to bolster the state’s legitimacy. This dissertation inserts Qatar into the ongoing debate of how best to understand the domestic politics of rentier states in the twenty-first century (Brynen et al. 2012; Davidson 2012; Gray 2011; Hertog 2010b; Moore 2004; Ross 2012; Tétreault 2000, 2013; Valeri 2009). Besides providing a fuller explanation of an understudied but crucially important Gulf state, this dissertation also aims to improve our understanding of state-society relations in the modern Arab Gulf.

Why Qatar?

By focusing on an in-depth case study, this dissertation revises rentier state theory through a contextual focus on the micropolitics of a modern rentier state, following in the footsteps of several recent contributions to the literature on the Arab Gulf—Davidson (2005, 2008, 2009) on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hertog (2010b) on Saudi Arabia, Valeri (2009) on Oman, and Gengler (2011) on Bahrain. Qatar has not yet been studied under the theoretical framework of a revised rentierism, although it is arguably the clearest example of the modern rentier model in the Arab Gulf region. In fact, Qatar is woefully understudied in political science.
literature as a whole; the most frequently cited major Western study remains Crystal’s (1995) work on oil and politics in Qatar and Kuwait. Many compendiums on the Middle East, and even the Arab Gulf region in particular, do not include a separate chapter on Qatar. Further, much work on Qatar focuses on its external relations and neglects the domestic dynamic. The Qatari people themselves are often overlooked as a source of political agency and influence, labeled as “relatively ethnically and religiously homogeneous” (Rosman-Stollman 2009, 188) and politically apathetic. There is an opportunity here for my work to fill a gap in the literature.

The observations from the case study will be supplemented with statistical data that corroborate and quantify the conclusions. These data will be drawn from my original survey, which was written specifically for the Qatari case and used an innovative methodology of context-specific vignettes to ensure understanding, both of the questions by the respondent and of the answers by the researcher (King et al. 2004). I follow George and Bennett (2004, xv) in

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5 For example, Abdelkarim’s (1999) Change and Development in the Gulf; Alsharekh and Springborg’s (2008) Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States, Davis and Gavrielides’s (1991) Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture, Diamond, Plattner, and Brumberg’s (2003) Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, Rubin’s (2002) Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf, and Schlumberger’s (2007) Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes are all compendiums that contain separate chapters devoted to other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries but not to Qatar. Despite the name, Zahlan’s (1998) The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman devotes individual chapters to all the GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia, but not Qatar. Hudson (1977) devotes only two pages of his chapter on the modernizing monarchies to Qatar, and Herb (1999) has only one page of his chapter on strategies of regime and opposition devoted to Qatar. Both of these are the smallest allocations relative to the other states described in the chapters. However, academic focus is slowly shifting toward recognizing the importance of Qatar. For example, during the two-part panel on the Political Economy of the Gulf, held during the Middle East Studies Association annual meeting in November 2012, three of the nine papers focused exclusively on Qatar (including my own), and two additional ones included Qatar prominently within a comparative study of the Gulf states. Further, the summer of 2013 (after this dissertation is defended, inshallah) will see two important books published about Qatar: Gray’s (2013) work is a sweeping (yet concise) look at the challenges of Qatar’s economic and political development, using a theoretical lens of “late rentierism” (Gray 2011); and Kamrava’s (2013) work examines the outsized influence Qatar exerts on the regional and international world through “subtle power.” These promising works will help to create deeper knowledge on a hitherto understudied country.

6 I am the lead investigator on this survey project, which is funded through a grant (UREP 12-016-5-007) from the Qatar National Research Fund and a supplementary grant from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. The survey questionnaire is included in the appendices to this dissertation (English in Appendix A, and Arabic in Appendix B). The survey was recently conducted (January 15–February 3, 2013) through Qatar University’s Social & Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), and preliminary data is now available.
their assertion that qualitative and quantitative methodology “should be regarded as complementary, rather than competitive.” As Tarrow (1995) notes, while quantitative analysis may be more powerful in demonstrating the strength of correlations and establishing the representativeness of observational data, qualitative analysis uncovers and explains the causal mechanisms that underlie quantitative correlations and provides the context behind the numbers. It is with an eye to increasing the generalizability and inferential strength of my research that I am combining the two methods in this dissertation. Chapter 2 discusses the case study justification and methodological choices of this dissertation in more detail.

**Fundamental Challenge #1: The Dynamic Allocation-Acquiescence Bargain**

In Chapter 1, I describe in detail classic rentier state theory: a political economy theory specific to states with significant amounts of exportable natural resources or other externally produced wealth (“rents”), which seeks to explain the political impact of these rents, specifically on state-society relations and overall governance trends (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Crystal 1986, 1995; Mahdavy 1970). Rentier state theory is still utilized today precisely because of the truism that the massive influx of externally produced wealth to the state must have some consequences for the political and social relationships between state and citizen. Beblawi and Luciani (1987) begin with the observation that the oil boom of the 1970s—what Beblawi (1987, 50) calls the “oil phenomenon”—was of such magnitude that it greatly impacted the state-society relationship and “the basic rules of political life” in the Arab oil states (Luciani 1987, 63) and thus deserves special recognition and analysis. This observation still holds true today; money matters.
Even those who criticize classic rentier state theory’s ahistorical deductions acknowledge the need for a rentier state theoretical framework. Herb (2005, 311) notes, “Rentierism is a distinct condition, and rent-induced development is a puzzle. The findings here call into question [aspects of] the rentier state but in no way call into question the need for a rentier state theory, that is, for a theoretical framework to explain the distinctive economic, political, and social consequences of rent wealth.” Likewise, Moore (2004) focuses on the need for more Middle East comparisons and microcase studies of rentierism, rather than a reliance on ahistorical economic perspectives, in his effort to reevaluate, rather than rebut, rentier theory. These authors’ aims are in line with my dissertation’s focus and goals, as described in the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 and the methodological discussion in Chapter 2. Ultimately, rentier state theory retains value for studying the politics of the Arab Gulf states, but it suffers from a fundamental misconception—that the economic relationship between ruler and ruled is the only interaction necessary to maintain political stability. This dissertation tackles this misconception, not to invalidate, but rather, to improve rentier state theory to better guide our understanding of state-society relations under a financially autonomous state.

Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on the political economy of allocation in Qatar. The extensive economic benefits offered by the state to its citizenry have grown in proportion to the skyrocketing profits of hydrocarbon production and exportation, particularly liquefied natural gas (LNG). The state provides employment, medical care, education, land, housing, marriage, retirement, and social services benefits for its citizens, without receiving any taxes in return. Yet despite the construction of this massive welfare apparatus, 75 percent of Qatari families are in
debt (Al-Merekhi 2009). Qualitative and quantitative evidence depict a society that does not view the economic allocations as gifts from a benevolent ruler that should be rewarded with political silence, but rather as a birthright due them as citizens and, increasingly, as inadequate in satisfying their desired standards of living, especially in comparison to other Qataris. This chapter depicts the dynamic evolution of the allocation-acquiescence rentier bargain, concluding that a people cannot be bought off indefinitely with economic allocation alone. The need to go beyond allocation in explaining Qatar’s political stability provides the foundation for the arguments of the following chapters.

**Fundamental Challenge #2: The Need for Nation Building**

Qatar’s emphasis on creating and maintaining legitimacy through noneconomic strategies—namely various forms of nation building that span national, historical, cultural, and religious projects—stands in direct contrast to classic rentier state theory’s emphasis on the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society. Luciani (1987, 76; 2009, 91–94) argued that the classic rentier state could buy its legitimacy—and thus regime stability—through economic allocation alone. Although productive states—those states that rely on taxation of its citizens for its revenues—needed to appear to represent the common good by promoting a national myth, “[a]n allocation state does not need to refer to a national myth and, as a matter of fact, will usually avoid doing so” (Luciani 1987, 76). Yet in Qatar, the state-led process of civic myth-building, as well as the reinvention of historical, cultural, and religious heritage (Hobsbawm and Ranger

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7 Al-Merekhi (2009, 1, 4) differentiates between Qatari families in debt (76.6 percent) and Qatari individuals in debt (29 percent). According to the debt study, one out of every four Qatari citizens is in debt. A family is considered to be in debt if one member of the household were in debt. However, as this member is usually the head of the household (or both of the parents), the debt burdens the entire family (Al-Merekhi 2009, 8), and as such, it is appropriate to use the larger figure when discussing the problem of debt in Qatari society.
1983), has been emphasized since Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani came to power shortly after independence in 1971 (Crystal 1995), and expanded greatly since his son, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, came to power in 1995.

If economic allocation were the only measure needed to ensure political stability, why would Qatar invest such effort in building its legitimacy in noneconomic ways? In order to investigate this puzzle, I explore the legitimization strategies of the state—in other words, the state’s active and purposeful creation, expansion, and maintenance of its domestic legitimacy through various top-down strategies. I revise rentier state theory with insights from the literatures on political legitimacy (Hudson 1977; Beetham 1991; Davis 1991; Wedeen 1999; Schlumberger 2010) and the limited state (Migdal 1988, 1997, 2001) to address the interactions of state and citizenry beyond economic allocation. The focus on the importance of the state’s pursuit of societal justification helps to provide a better explanation of state-society relations in modern rentier states.

Chapter 4 of this dissertation explores the noneconomic legitimization projects—otherwise known as nation building—into which the state of Qatar invests significant time, money, energy, and leadership. These projects are meant to supply its citizens with reasons to support the state beyond economic allocation. Examples of these legitimization strategies include focusing on Qatari nationalism and citizenship within the context of National Day celebrations and the upcoming (2014) new-and-improved Qatar National Museum. The state also has engaged in extensive rewriting of archaeological and political history, and reinvention of cultural significance, as seen in the new K–12 Qatari history lessons and the historical and cultural focus on the Al Zubarah archaeological site. Last, but certainly not least, the state also focuses on promoting itself as the preserver and protector of Islam by maintaining control over the Islamic
messages communicated to society by Qatar’s religious ulama (scholars and preachers) and building a national mosque that is dedicated to the founder of Wahhabi Islam while using architecture that symbolizes the Al Thani family.

In all of these legitimization strategies, Qatar’s deft ability to control the narrative that surrounds the reinterpretation and reinvention of several key cultural aspects successfully circumvents the danger that Luciani (1987, 75) foresaw with a rentier state referring to a national myth: that citizens could interpret this myth “as a basis to claim a say in the allocation process.” The state has ensured that all cultural reinvention occurs through state-led organizations in a public sphere purposefully devoid of nongovernmental civil society. By controlling the interpretation of the national myth and other culturally, historically, and religiously poignant symbols, the state of Qatar has been able to prevent alternative interpretations that could try to influence the economic (or political) process. This chapter is meant to depict the ways in which Qatar goes beyond allocation to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its people, by actively pursuing and guiding societal justification, far beyond basic pocketbook policies.

**Fundamental Challenge #3: Societal Consent and Constraint**

Traditional conceptions of policymaking in rentier states depict the state’s ability to act from a position of power and autonomy, with confidence in the loyalty and acquiescence of its citizens. Using the examples of the Bonapartist state, absolutist states (Anderson 1974), and revolutionary states (Skocpol 1979), Crystal (1986, 13) argues, “There are always moments when the state develops a high degree of autonomy from its social bases. . . . But oil-based states are unusual in that their higher degree of autonomy from other social groupings is part of a structurally determined, ongoing process.” Kamrava (2009, 409) argues that rentier state
autonomy signifies “the state’s independence from and its immunity to social resistance when it comes to its transformative and developmental agendas.” Classic rentier state theory viewed the state as fulfilling an economic function for its people, and “all [the state] needs is an expenditure policy” to receive the political loyalty of the people to pursue all other types of policies deemed preferable by the state (Luciani 1987, 74).

Of all of the state of Qatar’s transformative and developmental goals, reform of the national education system could be argued to top the priority list (QNV 2008, 13–18). Qatar places great emphasis on indigenizing its workforce, particularly at the higher levels, and has pursued education reforms that are meant to facilitate its citizens’ entry to the private sector and the knowledge economy (QNB 2012, 3–7). Especially key to the creation of a “capable and motivated workforce” (QNDS 2011, 148) is increased proficiency in English, noted as one of “the most required specialties by recruiters” in the labor market today (“Qatari Job Seekers” 2012), as well as increasing the state’s comparatively low scores in math and science.8 The state of Qatar has invested huge amounts of money into education, with education-related spending accounting for about 13 percent of total government expenditure, approximately 4 percent of the total GDP of the country (NHDR 2012, 31), not only on per-pupil expenditures at the K–12 level but also through lucrative stipends and other financial rewards for citizens who pursue higher education (discussed in Chapter 3). These actions demonstrate the commitment of the state of Qatar to actively pursuing their transformative and developmental vision of human development.

8 Qatar first began participating in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) testing in 2007. According to the 2011 scores, Qatar remains 87 points below the scale centerpoint of 500 in math, and 106 points below the scale centerpoint in science, ranking higher than only a handful of countries. Much more improvement in science and math must occur to allow Qatari citizens to participate fully in the knowledge economy. See the TIMSS reports in math and science from 2007 and 2011, available online at http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/isc/publications.html.
Chapter 5 highlights the sweeping national education reforms in Qatar of the past decade. These reforms, which spanned both the K–12 system as well as Qatar University, were initiated by the state in a top-down and unilateral manner quite in line with traditional conceptions of an unconstrained rentier state. In the early 2000s, the state of Qatar hired RAND–Qatar Policy Institute to design and implement major reforms in both the K–12 and Qatar University systems. The K–12 reforms included switching to standards-based curriculum and exams, reducing Arabic language and Islamic studies classes, and emphasizing English-language instruction. Qatar University reforms included standardizing admission and graduation standards, switching from Arabic to English-language instruction across all colleges, and reforming faculty employment and development. These reforms were in line with global and Qatari human development goals, as outlined in the UN Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR 2002, 2003), the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2008), and the Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016 (QNDS 2011, 122–145). The reforms were so far-reaching and implemented so quickly that one Qatari official was quoted as calling it (favorably) “a total earthquake” (Glasser 2003).

If the case of Qatar followed the theoretical conception of a traditional rentier state, the story would end here. Bought off by welfare benefits, society should be loyal, acquiescent, and passively supportive of the state’s policy agenda. However, the Qatari state-society relationship has deviated remarkably from the theoretical expectations of classic rentier state theory. A significant portion of the Qatari population did not accept important aspects of these education reforms. The growing negative reaction of Qatari citizens, particularly since the start of the Arab Spring, depicts a society that has not been bought off or silenced by welfare benefits. In a stunning reversal of its preferred policies, the state of Qatar has recently and suddenly backtracked on several key aspects of its reforms—most prominently switching back to Arabic
language instruction for both K–12 and Qatar University for the start of the 2012–2013 academic year—a result that we should not expect to see in a traditional rentier state environment of autonomy and lopsided power.

How can we understand these actions from the Qatar leadership? Considering the amount of time, money, and personal backing invested in the reforms, the sudden reversals, particularly with regard to English-language instruction, is a puzzle. If the Qatari state were truly autonomous from its citizens, this reversal would be difficult to explain. If we examine these actions through a limited state lens (Migdal 1997), however, it appears the sudden reversal of the reforms is a clear example of the state of Qatar taking societal discontent into account, and being responsive to, and even constrained by, its citizenry (e.g., Hobson 1997; Seabrooke 2002) in its pursuit of societal consent. Chapter 5 follows the national education reforms and reversals of the past decade in an effort to provide an in-depth and contextual analysis of a rentier state reversing its policies in response to societal backlash. The scope and depth of the dialogue between state and society, depicted through qualitative evidence from local media outlets (newspaper and radio) as well as quantitative survey evidence, demonstrate the state of Qatar’s very real interest and concern with garnering societal consent. This chapter contextualizes the state of Qatar’s reversals on several key reforms and highlights a rentier state behaving in a decidedly constrained and responsive manner more indicative of limitations than autonomy.

**Toward a Revised Theory of the Rentier State**

This dissertation argues that the political loyalty of the Qatari citizens cannot be explained by economic allocations alone. Only by taking into account the full scope of state actions—which span economic allocations, nation building, and responsiveness to citizen
concerns—can we come to a greater understanding of the reason why Qatar has, so far, avoided the political upheaval of the Arab Spring.

Ultimately, this dissertation uses an in-depth case study of the state of Qatar to provide a much-needed revision of classic rentier state theory. The example of a rentier state engaging with its society far beyond economic allocation and distribution policies allows us to usefully expand rentier theory to include the effect of noneconomic interactions on the legitimacy dimensions of justification and consent. Further, the insights gleaned in Qatar help contribute to a better understanding of the state-society relationship in the Arab Gulf today. By examining the state of Qatar’s full spectrum of efforts to promote its legitimacy and interact with its citizens, we see that rentier states may not be as exceptional as once perceived. Rentier states must interact with and respond to their societies in very similar ways as do “productive” states; the difference is in resources but not in scope (Herb 1999; Foley 2010).
CHAPTER ONE: RENTIER STATE THEORY

The goal of this chapter is to present a revised theoretical framework of the classic rentier state theory, which combines insights from the literatures on political legitimacy and the limited state to encompass both economic and noneconomic strategies taken by the state in the pursuit of political stability. After reviewing classic rentier state theory, I then demonstrate how insights related to political legitimacy and the limited state can usefully revise this theory to better explain modern state-society relations in rentier states today. My work fits into the larger comparative study of Arab Gulf rentierism and leads to insights relevant not only for Qatar but for the theoretical and empirical debate as a whole.

Rentier State Theory and State-Society Relations

Rentier state theory is a political economy theory specific to states with natural resources or other externally produced wealth (what is commonly called “rents”), which seeks to explain the political impact of this wealth. Mahdavy (1970, 428), who introduced rentier state theory to modern political science literature with his work on the effects of oil wealth in prerevolutionary Iran, defines rentier states as “those countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent”: wealth originating from external sources that is paid directly to the state. The Arab Gulf states, due to their control of, and access to, enormous hydrocarbon-based wealth,

9 Examples of these external rents include tolls on land or water pathways, hosting fees for pipelines or bases, or hydrocarbon exports. Mahdavy expresses doubt on whether foreign grants, which have a more temporary and uncertain quality, provide the same economic stability and confidence to the receiving states. However, the fluctuating price of oil and gas can provide similar uncertainty to hydrocarbon-based rentier states, as seen in the oil bust of the 1980s, and so perhaps this distinction is inaccurate. Not all exportable resources can be seen as “rents,” however. For example, Crystal (1986, 13) notes that a cotton crop, although it provides substantial wealth to the country, “involves some sort of accommodation between the rulers and the elite who control the workforce,” and thus does not provide the same sort of financial autonomy for the state.
have been used in the literature as distinctive cases of rentier state theory (Gause 1994, 42–44).\textsuperscript{10} The crucial aspect of externally received revenues is that they are almost completely disconnected from the local economy. In other words, these rents do not rely on the overall state of the domestic economic system, the skills and productivity of the local population, or the support of local economic elites, all of which are essential parts of the economy in a typical “production” state (Luciani 1987, 69–72). Rather, the state is financially independent from its citizens, able to focus only on “allocation” rather than production.

Why is the financial autonomy of the state from its citizens so important? The classic interpretation of the rentier state-society relationship is that of the “rentier bargain”—that the citizens, freed from the need to contribute material wealth to the state, will instead feel compelled to offer political loyalty and acquiescence to state policies and preferences, in exchange for the material benefits and welfare programs that are bestowed upon them.\textsuperscript{11} Mahdavy (1970, 466–67) argues, “A government that can expand its services without resorting to heavy taxation acquires an independence from the people seldom found in other countries.”

This independence, combined with the increasing welfare and prosperity of the population as a

\textsuperscript{10} For any early comparative look at rentierism in the Arab Gulf, see Al Kuwari (1978).

\textsuperscript{11} Mahdavy (1970, 432) calls this relationship a “fortuitous \textit{étatisme}.” Following the classic interpretation of an apathetic and bought-off population to the logical conclusion, we could expect to see a Tocquevillian “end of history” scenario in which benevolent tyranny rules undisputed over a population kept in perpetual childhood. At the end of history, Tocqueville warns ([1835] 2000, 692), “stands an immense, protective power which is alone responsible for securing [the people’s] enjoyment and watching over their fate. That power is absolute, thoughtful of detail, orderly, provident, and gentle. . . . It likes to see the citizens enjoy themselves, provided that they think of nothing but enjoyment. . . . Why should it not entirely relieve them from the trouble of thinking and all the cares of living?” The adverse impact of this type of “nanny state” has been noted in the literature from its outset (see Beblawi 1987, 52 on the “rentier mentality,” and Al Kuwari 1978, 188–93), including a recent description of the pathologies of rentierism in Dubai: “[A] weekday visit to any of Dubai’s major shopping malls [reveals] legions of able bodied young men drinking coffee and playing video games when one would expect most to be gainfully employed or attending a college or university. Incredibly, about 54 per cent of those nationals in receipt of social security benefits are believed to be of working age. Alarmingly, an early morning tour of any government department or other institutions that predominantly employs nationals will reveal many empty desks, with a worryingly high number turning up for work very late or taking long unexplained absences. . . . Most of these unprofessional employees are the products of this extreme nanny state in which every financial aspect of their life has been taken care of—jobs have therefore not been synonymous with economic livelihood” (Davidson 2008, 179).
whole, can preempt demands for changing the economic or political status quo. Beblawi and Luciani (1987) note that citizenship becomes a quantifiable financial benefit—including public goods and services, the ability to extract rents from foreign workers through the sponsorship system, and guaranteed employment—and it becomes a rational and logical reaction to choose loyalty over voice or exit (Hirschman 1970). The rentier bargain directly affects citizens’ desire for political voice, promoting political apathy and acquiescence over participation and representation. Beblawi (1987, 53) argues, “With virtually no taxes, citizens are far less demanding in terms of political participation”; likewise, Luciani (1987, 75) insists, “The fact is that there is ‘no representation without taxation’ and there are no exceptions to this version of the rule.”

The financial autonomy of the state also affects the relative power of the economic elite. An independent bourgeoisie is argued by many as crucial for the social and political development of the local population (e.g., Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Luciani 2007). Under normal economic conditions, the state is intertwined with the local economy and thus must engage in give-and-take with powerful economic elites over political decisions. However, because oil generates external rents paid directly to the rulers, the state is independent of its local economy and thus no longer needs to compromise with economic elites. The power imbalance inherent in rentier state situations is clearly depicted in Crystal’s (1986, 1995) in-depth comparative research in Kuwait and Qatar, which provided descriptions of merchant families withdrawing from political participation to ensure the continuation of their economic allocations. Mirroring Beblawi and Luciani’s (1987) assertions, Crystal (1986, 22) argues, “The merchants’ withdrawal from politics suggests that demands for participation are

12 Crystal (1986, 1995) notes that the influx of oil wealth to the state deprived the economic elite of its traditional tools of political influence, such as its control of a workforce and connections to a domestic constituency.
linked to extraction. . . . Since in the rentier economies of oil, extraction does not occur, neither
does the demand for political participation.”

More recent iterations of rentier state theory look beyond the extractive nature of the state
(the taxation-representation link) to focus on the increase of state spending on allocation and
other forms of patronage and how this affects state-society relations (Herb 2005, 298; Ross 2001,
2009, 2012). To examine the causal mechanism of increased allocation and patronage, a
combination of low taxes$^{13}$ and high government spending has been shown to have a statistical
correlation with dampened political demands (Ross 2001, 2009, 2012). However, despite Ross’s
(2012, 69) claim that “oil-rich countries can indefinitely provide more benefits than they collect
in taxes, allowing them to maintain popular support and avoid democratizing rebellions,” this
static snapshot does not take into account the dynamic change of citizens’ expectations over
time. Citizens of rentier states see the lack of extraction—unique as this situation may be in the
history of states—as the “new normal.” Davidson notes that in Dubai, “the complete abolition of
all taxes . . . has effectively created a population incapable of coming to terms with any form of
future demands from the state” (2008, 180), and likewise in Abu Dhabi, “a citizenry has been
cultivated over thirty-five years that is now wholly accustomed to material benefits and to no
forms of extraction” (2009, 149). Rather than being viewed as a “gift” (Herb 1999, 241) or
“benevolence” (Crystal 1995, 2), economic allocations from state to citizen are viewed as “an
irreversible birthright” (Davidson 2005, 97), an “entitlement” (Crystal 1995, 2), a “right of

$^{13}$ Although European history has been used in several political scientists’ arguments that taxation promotes
representation (e.g., Levi 1988; Tilly 1990), there are others who voice skepticism and show alternative historical
evidence that argues otherwise (Waterbury 1994, 29; Herb 2003). The danger with large-N studies is that correlation
is not causation, and we need deeper description of the causal mechanisms at work to determine whether, and how,
the absence of taxation is linked to political support and acquiescence.
citizenship” (Okruhlik 1999b, 301), and “something they think is theirs in the first place” (Herb 1999, 241).

It is useful here to recognize the dynamic quality of an allocative relationship, such as the one between rentier state and citizenry. The allocative benefits that boost a person’s interest in supporting the current system today may not carry the same weight in the future. Herb (1999, 242) usefully reminds us that “the price of support is not fixed: it is subject to inflation.” Already the citizens of the Gulf do not view the allocations of hydrocarbon wealth as a gift from a generous and benevolent government but rather as a natural right of citizenship. Further, by its very nature, patronage distribution is unequal and selective and thus has the potential to create enemies as well as supporters (Herb 1999; Okruhlik 1999b). Herb (1999, 242) argues, “The [ruling] family can selectively distribute rewards to its followers in an effort to build political loyalty, or to its opponents in an effort to buy out their opposition. Yet those who do not receive a substantial piece of the pie often know it and do not like it.” Okruhlik (1999b, 297–300) details how the Saudi state engendered opposition through its inequitable distribution of wealth. In fact, the increase of dissent among various salient groups in Saudi society—businessmen, women, religious scholars, Sunni and Shi’a groups, and exiles—perfectly captures Herb’s observation that if squeaky wheels get the grease, there is more incentive to squeak. Financial resources alone cannot “indefinitely” create political acquiescence.

The following cartoon from a Qatari cartoonist, Mohamed Abdulatif, published in the local Al Raya newspaper, gives an example of these expectations of entitlement. Figure 1 depicts a Qatari woman upset because she has to pay three riyals—approximately 80 cents—in parking fees at the local mall. This cartoon questions the ability of Qatari society to accept any forms of extraction, no matter how small. The dynamism of expectations over time must be taken into
account in order to garner a fuller picture of the ability of the rentier state to use its wealth to dampen political demands (Gause 1994, 81).

**Figure 1. “Parking Fees”**

“Hello, Watani Al Habeeb! [Qatar radio show, “My beloved country] Today I went to the shopping mall and I bought a bag for 20,000 riyals [$5,500] … shoes for 16,000 [$4,400] … glasses for 10,000 [$2,750] … and a hair band for 7,000 [$1,900]! And then I’m shocked to discover that when I leave the parking, they charge me three riyals instead of two [80 cents instead of 55 cents] because I stayed two minutes over the hour! Isn’t this unfair?”

*Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, February 4, 2012*

**Toward a Revised Theory of the Rentier State**

Classic rentier state theory provides important insights on the political consequences of a state that receives its financial stability from external sources rather than the domestic economy. In particular, the discussion of the uniqueness of hydrocarbon wealth, distinct from foreign grants or tariffs or other types of more labor-intensive agricultural production such as coffee or cotton, is an important contribution that demonstrated the increased financial autonomy of the state from society beyond that of a typical extractive state. It is clear that we need a theoretical framework of rentierism to address the specific consequences of rentier wealth on the political and social relationships between state and citizen.
It is the specifics of these consequences that form the ongoing debate today. Despite the seductive parsimony of the phrase “no taxation, no representation,” the narrow focus of classic rentier state theory on the economic relationship between state and society fails to capture the larger explanation of how states can wield their wealth to maintain political stability. There is more to the state-society relationship, even under conditions of extreme rentierism, than economics alone. Rentier state theory can be improved by expanding its narrow focus from the economic relationship between ruler and ruled toward an understanding of the rentier state’s drive for legitimacy—in other words, the interaction with society beyond material benefits. Inherent in classic rentier state theory is the assumption that the interests of the people can be reduced to economics alone, and that “allocation is the only relationship” that states need to cultivate with their populations (Luciani 1987, 70). Nevertheless, despite the general emphasis placed on extraction and allocation, Crystal (1995, 161–64) acknowledges the need for rentier states to engage in normative socialization of their citizens, including the development of legitimizing symbols and the creation of a founding civic myth. For example, shortly after independence in 1971, Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, the ruler from 1972–1995, gave high priority to the creation of the Qatar national museum, which managed to trace the history of Qatar back to the Stone Age. This state-directed project redefined Qatar’s history from an eighteenth-century migration from interior Arabia to a long and intimate history with the land, the resources, and, of course, the ruling family. Crystal depicts the museum as a crucial part of Qatar’s emphasis on normative socialization of the citizens, and thus demonstrates the need of rentier states to produce something beyond purely material benefits to provide their raison d’être.
This dissertation builds on Crystal’s observation of the need for normative as well as economic outreach to the citizenry, by utilizing relevant insights from the political legitimacy and limited state literatures. It is to these literatures that I now turn.

**Political Legitimacy**

Legitimacy has been a salient concept in political analysis for centuries, with political philosophers from ancient Greece, the Enlightenment, and modern social science concerned with the moral justifiability of power relations and the empirical consequences for a government’s capacity and stability (e.g., Plato 2000; Locke [1690] 1980; Weber [1920] 1947). Legitimacy is empirically important: The concept of legitimacy has important contributions to make to the political science literatures of political economy and rentierism, of state-society relations, and of state stability and capacity (Gilley 2009; Crick [1962] 1993; Jost and Major 2001). Legitimacy is also normatively important: A concern with the ethical uses of political power has been “arguably the crucial topic” in the field of political philosophy (White 2005, 1; see also Beetham 1991).

However, legitimacy as a concept has been neglected in contemporary political science literature (Gilley 2009, xiii), and recent efforts have called for “bringing legitimacy back in” to the study of political science (Seabrooke 2002, 1; see also Alagappa 1995; Gilley 2009; White 2005) and of authoritarian regimes in particular (Gerschewski 2013; Kailitz 2013). Further, legitimacy may be the key to understanding the politics of the Arab world today, as the Arab Spring uprisings remind us of the continuing relevance of Hudson’s (1977, 2) argument: “The central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy.” Yet conceptualizing and measuring legitimacy in authoritarian settings remains particularly
troublesome (Alagappa 1995, 6), which may have contributed to the dearth of any encompassing study of legitimacy in the nondemocratic Arab world over the past thirty years (Schlumberger 2010, 233; see also Hudson 2011). By including insights from the legitimacy literature into a revised theory of the rentier state, this dissertation directly addresses this gap in the literature.

Defining legitimacy

I begin from Beetham’s (1991, 16) tripartite definition of legitimacy as power that “conforms to established rules, the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate, and there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation.” Ideally, we could measure the level of legitimacy in a society by observing these three aspects of the state-society relationship: legality, justification, and consent. However, there are particular problems associated with authoritarian rule that affect our ability to observe and measure legitimacy.

Legality. It is perhaps inherent in the definition of an authoritarian regime that the government cannot cloak itself fully in a mantle of legitimate legality because the regime has a reserved domain of power (Schmitter and Karl 1991). A state that lacks checks and balances or an independent judiciary has no ultimate arbitrator to ensure adherence to its own rules. Sudden changes to the constitution, purposefully vague laws that allow for creative interpretation, continued reliance on emergency laws, or promulgation of unilateral “Emiri decrees” are all within the bounds of superficial legality—but in reality, they show a government that is not
constrained by current laws.\textsuperscript{14} An authoritarian regime with unconstrained rulers can be legally legitimate only if its people accept that the government can both make and break the rules.

\textit{Justification.} As Beetham (1991, 56–60, 126–150) notes, rules are justified through two main elements: a shared belief about the proper source of authority and a shared belief that these rules facilitate rather than obstruct the general good, as perceived by society. Although both of these elements must be present to confer legitimacy on the power structure, often political science research focuses only on the former, using attitudes on satisfaction with and evaluation of the current political system as a proxy for justification.\textsuperscript{15} To ensure proper operationalization of what could be considered the most crucial aspect of legitimacy, we must also examine whether the populace believes that the authorities are serving socially necessary and desirable ends. This determination is a subjective evaluation by the people that the current authority abides by the most widely accepted cultural norms, beliefs, and practices (Schwedler 2006, 126). Although scholars, such as Wedeen (1999) and Hudson (1977), call for understanding the resonant cultural symbols and the perception of history as seen by the people themselves in order

\textsuperscript{14} Beetham (1991, 123) asks, “If there is no higher rule-making power to validate and enforce the state’s own rules, what is there to ensure that in the struggle to acquire and exercise its sovereign power, the rules will be observed?” There are two institutional preconditions for ensuring that the laws will be enforced—effective independence of the judiciary to hold the executive and legislative branches accountable, and civilian control of the military—both of which are missing in the Qatari context. Crystal (2011, 122) notes that the Qatari Emir sometimes is above the law (or is the law), because “he can override legislation, rule by decree, and even dissolve elected bodies.” She argues that Qatar’s recent political reforms are “in keeping with US government public pronouncements about what Middle East democracy should look like”: educational reform, women’s suffrage, high-profile women, and holding elections (Crystal 2011, 125). Yet these reforms neglect the more important aspects that would create lasting systematic change, such as a free and critical press (e.g., Roth 2013), reform of police and security forces, a genuine legislative elected body, budget transparency, constitutional review of new laws, and moves toward constitutional monarchy. Issues of legality in Qatar include limits on political participation (e.g., continually delayed elections for the national legislature, the advisory role of the municipal council), limits on association, assembly, and speech (e.g., nongovernmental organizations require government permission that is often denied, public gatherings require permits, press censorship, both legal and self-imposed, remains), and limits on civilian control of the military, as state security forces remain under direct control of the emir.

\textsuperscript{15} Gilley (2009), for example, chose to operationalize justification in his 72-country data set by focusing on attitudes regarding satisfaction with democracy and an evaluation of the current political system, as well as a behavioral indicator of the use of violence in civil protests. This operationalization, which focuses only on the acceptance of the current source of authority, does not fully cover the extent of justification needed to confer legitimacy on the power structure.
to accurately measure the congruence between the populace’s views and the norms and performance of the state,\textsuperscript{16} I argue instead that it is more important to analyze how the state of Qatar has been able to control the dominant cultural narrative of society. Rather than viewing the state as subservient to the people’s perception of norms, beliefs, and practices, the state has instead purposefully and actively engaged in creating, editing, and utilizing these cultural, historical, and religious symbols to further its own political and social goals. The measure of societal justification in authoritarian regimes is reflective of the success of the state in controlling the dominant—even hegemonic—narrative of society.

\textit{Consent.} There are two main concerns regarding the operationalization and measurement of the concept of consent. First, scholars are divided on whether acquiescence can be considered consent (Skocpol 1979; Evans 1995), or whether more active levels of consent must be observed (Beetham 1991; Levi 1988). The second concern, particularly in authoritarian regimes, is that consent is often manufactured, manipulated, and mobilized from the top-down (as opposed to the bottom-up) to serve the regime’s ends (Linz 2000, 70–71). Measuring consent in an authoritarian setting is difficult when individuals have constraints on knowledge and communication (Kuran 1995; Wedeen 1999), fear prevents true expression of beliefs (Crystal 2011),\textsuperscript{17} and government-

\textsuperscript{16} Hudson (1977, 2) argues, “The governmental system and leadership that is genuinely national, that partakes of the nation’s history, that acts in accordance with the society’s values, and that protects its broadest concerns is likely to be regarded as legitimate, even though particular decisions and leaders may be unpopular or unwise.” Of course, this statement begs the question: What are society’s values, broadest concerns, and versions of history? Wedeen (1999) notes that it is tautological to identify a culturally resonant symbol as one invoked by the regime (10), and she criticizes investigations of cultural reinvention that focus on the state’s top-down strategy without taking into account the reception of the message by the people themselves (14). I agree that it is important to take into account the reaction of the people to the state-led strategies; nevertheless, I believe that the state is successful in its strategies to the extent that the population accepts its narrative, rather than that the narrative captures an objectively resonant symbol.

\textsuperscript{17} Crystal (2011, 122) argues for the need for healthy public debate to grasp the true level of consent in a society: “Although similar reform efforts elsewhere in the region (in Kuwait and even in Saudi Arabia), whether related to women’s rights, elections, or economic liberalization, have generated substantial public debate, Qatar’s reforms have been introduced without discussion. While silence may suggest consent, fear is also a possibility. The few who have questioned specific politics have been quickly silenced.”
controlled framing effects distort popular expressions toward support (Schlumberger 2010). It may be a true expression of legitimacy if the regime is able to mobilize people in support of its objectives—such as parades on National Day, participation in Sports Day, or voter registration and election turnout in municipal elections—and an indication of the lack of legitimacy if the regime fails to mobilize a significant part of its population in service of these ends. Yet because of the controlled, censored, and distorted nature of these mobilizations, the motivations of the people involved are unclear. It may be impossible, in authoritarian regimes, to determine whether people are mobilized because of belief in the legitimacy of the regime or because of fear or self-interest (or both), and whether people who remain at home are purposely showing dissent or merely displaying a rational apathy to participation that makes no real difference.

**Measuring legitimacy in an authoritarian regime**

This discussion of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes highlights the difficulty in directly measuring the three dimensions of legality, justification, and consent. Measuring political legitimacy is a “mushy” endeavor (Huntington 1991, 46) in the most transparent and accountable of power relationships, and attempts to measure legitimacy in authoritarian environments come with added difficulties. Yet, for the purposes of this project, it may be that it is not important to directly measure them. Wedeen’s (1999) work on the Syrian regime’s policy of public censorship (see also Kuran 1995) is quite relevant to this discussion. Wedeen, like myself, noted that political science literature on state capacity and power must go beyond the state’s ability to control material resources and construct coercive forces to focus on how the state manipulates and manages the symbolic world to its advantage. Yet she also criticized a solely culturalist approach to the study of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes, because of the inability in an
authoritarian context to distinguish between outward displays of loyalty and inward, or *real*, belief in the system. Wedeen (1999, 3) argued that Syria was capable of enforcing outward loyalty, even though, in the words of an independent member of parliament in 1996, “No one believes the things they say, and everyone knows that no one believes them.” Yet Syria continued to enforce this outward show of legitimacy because ultimately true legitimacy did not matter; what mattered was forcing the citizens to act publicly *as if* the regime has legitimacy. She elaborated:

> A politics of “as if,” while it may appear irrational or even foolish at first glance, actually proves politically effective. It produces guidelines for acceptable speech and behavior; it defines and generalizes a specific type of national membership; it occasions the enforcement of obedience; it induces complicity by creating practices in which citizens are themselves “accomplices,” upholding the norms constitutive of Asad’s domination; it isolates Syrians from one another; and it clutters public space with monotonous slogans and empty gestures, which tire the minds and bodies of producers and consumers alike. (Wedeen 1999, 6)

Thus, we may not need to attempt to measure the actual amount of domestic legitimacy for an authoritarian state; rather, we need to focus on whether the people are responding to the state *as if* it is legitimate.

Part of this response will be dependent on whether the state has been able to control the dominant cultural narrative of society (Schwedler 2006, 126; Geertz 1980, 19). Cultural narratives are “a set of dispositions or understandings about the world, including but not limited to perspectives of what is wrong, what is possible, and what is just” (Schwedler 2006, 119); in other words, cultural narratives are worldviews. A state that successfully controls the creation, maintenance, and usage of the most important cultural and historical symbols and understandings in society solidifies its legitimacy by removing the possibility of collectively organized, viable alternatives to the current power structure (Przeworski 1986, 1991). Syria’s politics of *as if* worked by forcing an outward show of acceptance to the regime’s narrative that ended up reinforcing obedience, reducing possibilities of coordination and communication among the
citizenry, and removing space for alternative narratives. Thus, consent—positive, public actions that convey acceptance of the power relationship—can be a useful and important measure, not of the true levels of legitimacy per se, but rather, of the ability of the state to control the narrative of society.

Yet as the bloody civil war now raging in Syria tells us, true legitimacy does have some place at the table. The Syrian regime lasted for a long time, but the façade of legitimacy has now crumbled. Despite the difficulties associated with measuring the subjective justification of the power relationship in the eyes of the subordinates, it is worthwhile to attempt to capture the level of congruence between the state and society’s visions of cultural and historical norms and values. This level of congruence between state and society can help us better pinpoint the actual levels of societal justification and overall political legitimacy in a country. When studying political legitimacy under authoritarianism, justification is particularly crucial, as both legality and consent can be—and frequently are—manufactured in the authoritarian regimes of the Arab world. Although legality—shared rules of conduct—is important to keep in mind, this dissertation focuses on the justification and consent dimensions in an attempt to pinpoint the extent of state control of the societal narratives, and how state goals are interpreted and modified by society.

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18 The importance of controlling the narrative of society helps to explain why a Qatari poet was originally imprisoned for life for a videotaped recording of a poem deemed offensive and revolutionary (Bollier and Dekker 2013). Although his sentence was reduced to fifteen years, and there is much speculation that he will be officially pardoned during the upcoming month of Ramadan, the relative harshness of his punishment shows that the state of Qatar takes alternative narratives very seriously. The Hans Christian Andersen tale, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” shows what can happen when people feel comfortable challenging a regime in public.
Combining Political Legitimacy and the Limited State to Revise Rentier State Theory

The concept of legitimacy informs our revision of rentier state theory by drawing attention to the ways that a state and a society interact beyond the economic rentier bargain. Classic rentier state theory argued that the state’s reliance on externally-produced wealth rather than on its local economy for financial stability allowed the state to isolate itself from society; although society would become dependent on the state for welfare benefits and economic opportunities, the state would remain autonomous from its people when making decisions and carrying out policies (Gause 1994, 42–44; Crystal 1995). In addition, the financial resources of the state allow for overdevelopment of a robust coercive apparatus that can be wielded against the population without fear of economic consequences (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Bellin 2004). Classic rentier state theory “reified the state and autonomy of the state from its society” (Okruhlik 1999b, 308).

In these veins of thought, we see the neo-Weberian argument that a strong state must be autonomous from society to pursue its policies effectively and efficiently, and explicitly rejects the need for subordinate consent to legitimate state policy (Weber [1918] 1958, 83; Skocpol 1979, 32). Even later iterations of the state-centered literature, which argued that the state can enhance its capacity by embedding itself within certain dominant economic groups (while still retaining institutional autonomy in most areas), still viewed society as fundamentally acquiescent, without an explicit need for demonstrations of consent to legitimate state actions (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Evans 1995).

This view of the state “rests on the mistaken assumption that the state apparatus is entirely self-contained, and can be immunized from the attitudes and actions of the surrounding population” (Beetham 1991, 118). Isolating the state from society prevents us from
understanding why authoritarian rentier regimes with a wide array of economic allocations and coercive power—such as Qatar—nevertheless “invest significant material and immaterial resources into efforts to generate legitimacy” (Hoffmann 2011, 5). Rather than view the state as stand-alone, “state and society penetrate one another. The ‘boundaries’ between state and society are permeable and fluid” (Okruhlik 1999b, 308; see also Mitchell 1991). The functional view of the state, in which policies are decreed from above to best serve the government’s ends, stands in direct contrast to a view of the state as contested between government and society, in which we acknowledge that “society has an input into the formation of state policy” (Seabrooke 2002, 1; see also Hobson 1997).

Perhaps the most well known literature on the limited state—or state-in-society—can be found in Migdal’s (1988, 1997, 2001) work. Migdal directly criticizes the neo-Weberian focus on state autonomy, arguing that its isolation of the state from society mystifies rather than clarifies the state’s capacity and its ability to garner obedience and conformity from its population. Migdal (1997, 208–09) suggests that political scientists need to approach the state as a “limited state” by “blending the largely ignored culturalist perspective with the more dominant institutionalist approach as well as shifting the analytic focus from the state as a freestanding organization to a process-oriented view of the state-in-society.” Blending historical institutionalism with culture requires a focus not only on the organizations and routines of the governing system but also on the narratives and shared areas of concern of society; “we cannot look at the bricks of the state without understanding the mortar” (Migdal 1997, 213). Equally important to emphasize is the state-society dialectic, as Migdal (1997, 211; see also Davis 1991) argues, “At the heart of the modern state’s successes and failures, especially its ability to gain obedience, is the nature of its relationship to those it claims to rule.”
Looking beyond institutions to the cultural frameworks of a state allows us to put the overdeveloped coercive capacities of rentier states into context. Coercion remains an important aspect of the rentier state toolkit (Bellin 2004). Yet no government can squelch dissent indefinitely, no matter how much money it has (e.g., Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 385). States that channeled their financial strength to ensure a firm grip on methods of coercion still collapsed, as shown in the historical examples of Iran in 1979, Greece in 1974, and Argentina in 1982 (Beetham 1991, 118–19) and the more recent state collapses of the Arab Spring (Sayigh 2011; Droz-Vincent 2011; Bellin 2012; Brynen et al. 2012). As Davis (1991, 12) points out, “While force, legislation, or law may all be employed . . . no state can persist and no group can rule without some effective bond with the ruled.” Migdal (1997, 223) agrees, noting, “[I]t is simply impossible for a state to achieve tractability by relying exclusively on its judges and jailers.” Wedeen (1999, 27) connects the discussion back to the importance of rhetoric and symbols to a state’s toolkit, noting, “Regimes depend not only on the capacity to eliminate would-be opponents but also on strategies that make such punishments unnecessary.”

Renewing our focus on the cultural processes of state building—in other words, nation building—also allows us to highlight the fundamental misconception of classic rentier state theory: that the economic interactions between state and society, both the taxation-representation assumption and the buying-off assumption, are the only important “points of concern” (Laitin 1986, 175) for the population. The case of Saudi Arabia, a powerful economy awash in both oil money and internal dissent, is instructive here (Crystal 2005, 6; Okruhlik 1999b). The overthrows of the Iraqi (1958), Libyan (1969), and Iranian (1979) monarchies also provide examples of rentier instability during times of economic expansion (Herb 1999, 242; Davis 1991, 10). Davis (1991, 10–11) argues,
Only when, more recently, regimes realized the need to use oil wealth to create a national ideology to which the bulk of the populace could feel some affinity has the state been able to institutionalize a degree of stable rule. In other words, it was not the state’s social and political distance from society but precisely its active involvement in mobilizing the masses around an ideology . . . that enabled it to begin to strengthen its power.

What all of this reminds us is that states cannot remain justifiably legitimate in the eyes of its people through economic relations alone. As Herb (1999, 243) argues, if rentier kings “rely on oil alone to keep their thrones, they will likely lose them.” Scholars have begun to demonstrate that “there are specific, not uncommon circumstances under which everyday citizens of rent-dependent nations will be motivated politically by something other than or in addition to their wallets” (Gengler 2011, 113; see also Foley 2010). Expectations of immaterial benefits—including the interaction between state and society on the historical, cultural, and religious narratives—matter to the state-society relationship, and inadequate attention to societal justification and consent can drastically affect state capacity and stability, regardless of economic strength.

Yet while political scientists know that the cultural narrative is important to state capacity, Migdal (1997, 215) acknowledges that we have not yet figured out how to study it comparatively: “We know that culture is important, that the state is more than a configuration of roles or an interchangeable structure; we just cannot quite figure out how to study it comparatively, how to make it much more than a giant residual category.” Further, Davis (1991, 25) notes that there is a gap in the literature, as “[t]he effort to promote state formation through the use of ideology and culture rather than coercion—that is, to create what Gramsci refers to as hegemony—is a process that still has not received adequate attention in Arab oil-producing countries or in other parts of the Third World.”

To return to the fundamental misconception of rentier state theory, this theoretical discussion posits that there is more to the state-society relationship, even under conditions of
extreme rentierism, than economic allocation alone. The literature on political legitimacy emphasizes the importance of societal justification and consent to the overall level of political legitimacy in a country, and the literature on the limited state argues that states are inextricably linked to their societies and, in fact, derive more power from successful interaction with, rather than distancing themselves from, these societies. By starting from a revised assumption that economic allocation is a necessary—but not sufficient—part of the overall political legitimacy formula of rentier states, we can expand our understanding of state-society relations by including social justification and consent within this framework.

A focus on the process of nation building through the use of cultural as well as economic resources provides a way of describing the dialectic of justification in a society and reminds us that a state derives strength from its perceived adherence to sociocultural norms and propagation of the greater good. Likewise, the importance of societal consent, depicted in the limited state approach as state and society engaging in contestation over policies and goals, demonstrates that society has input on the state as well as the state on society. This approach to rentier state capacity brings legitimacy back into the analysis by viewing state-society relations as contested rather than functional, with the state relying on congruence with—and control of—social norms and domestic acts of consent to pursue its goals. By looking beyond economic allocations to the noneconomic ways in which the state and society interact, a revised theoretical framework combining rentier state theory, political legitimacy, and the limited state helps us to better understand the relative strength of rentier states within the context of their societies.
Rentier State Theory Today

It is important to note that the debate surrounding rentier state theory has not ended with the classic iterations described previously. The incontrovertible observation that external wealth must affect the political system—although these effects are still under debate—has ensured that rentier state theory continues to be both relevant and contentious in the academic world today.\(^{19}\)

This final section of my literature review is meant to demonstrate that rentier state theory is still considered in need of refinement, and to describe the comparative research that is currently underway within the context of the Arab Gulf and how my research contributes to this work.

Recent additions to the literature include the use of rentier state theory to address natural resource wealth and distribution within democracies (Dunning 2008, 2010; Gervasoni 2010), showing the applicability of the theory beyond case studies of authoritarianism. There has been new research on state-run economic institutions and their relative success or failure, taking into account the common assumptions of inefficiency and corruption in rentier frameworks (Hertog 2010a; Losman 2010). A recent spate of research has been devoted to the question of whether an independent business class is appearing in the Arab Gulf (e.g., Luciani 2005, 2007; Wilson 2008; Tétreault 2000) or whether the rentier states are employing “patrimonial capitalism” to manipulate markets and maximize political gain rather than economic growth (Schlumberger 2004, 2008; Bremmer 2010). Investigations into the causal mechanisms of political stability in rentier states have explored the importation of foreign labor (Bearce and Laks Hutnick 2011), the dispersal and minimization of workers involved in production (Mitchell 2011), and the suppression of coordination goods without care for the economic consequences (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). A recent strand of literature has argued for the inclusion of water

\(^{19}\) See, for example, the special issue devoted to the topic of the politics of natural resources and globalization in *Comparative Political Studies* (2011), vol. 44, no. 6, [http://cps.sagepub.com/content/44/6.toc](http://cps.sagepub.com/content/44/6.toc).
resources in our understanding of natural resource wealth and rentier behavior (Jones 2010; Rudra 2011). And of course, there has been continued discussion of the “oil curse,” its definition and measurement, and how it can be avoided or mitigated (Haber and Menaldo 2011; Ross and Andersen 2012; Ross 2012; Kurtz and Brooks 2011).

Of particular note for my dissertation is the recent wave of in-depth case studies of the Arab Gulf, all of which have modified and refined classic rentier state theory regarding state-society relations. Rather than portraying Saudi Arabia as a static example of state autonomy, corruption, and rent-seeking behavior, Hertog (2010b) applies path dependency and process tracing to show that autonomous state decisions made at the beginning of the oil wealth years resulted in unanticipated restrictions on state autonomy in later years. Although he argues that, ultimately, the top levels of the Saudi state remain autonomous from the society regarding their decision-making capabilities, he adds to the literature by portraying the micro-level pushback that these decisions may receive. By focusing on the ground-level state bureaucrats, who are directly responsible for implementation of the top-down decisions, policies, and reforms, Hertog provides a fuller picture of a society that can modify, delay, or even completely obstruct the implementation of these decisions through various forms of passive resistance, reminiscent of Scott’s (1985) “weapons of the weak.”

20 Academics have argued that the unintended consequences of both the allocation and the diversification policies of the rentier state would empower various bureaucratic or citizen groups, which would allow these groups to stymie state policy or pressure the state to accede to their demands. Richards and Waterbury (2008, 17) describe this process succinctly: “Oil rents are politically centralizing. However, as the revenues are spent, new domestic actors emerge (as contractors, agents, recipients of subsidies) who, in turn, begin to limit the freedom of maneuver of the state. This is a very typical pattern; state autonomy may rise in a particular conjuncture but then typically will decline with its exercise over time.” Crystal (1986, 333–34) elaborates: “Oil revenues have allowed rulers to create new state institutions, but bureaucracies are never neutral. As these institutions grow in size and complexity, they are becoming less amenable to control through ruling kinship networks. The ruling houses and the state administrations, though they coexist and exercise jurisdiction over the same populations, are not identical. A semiautonomous state apparatus carries within it the potential for developing its own loci of power, social relationships, and political ideals and goals. An unintended ramification is a potential loss of control over the population by the rulers as this control is increasingly mediated by a possibly disloyal bureaucracy.”
the lower levels shows us that the citizenry of a rentier state can also carve out a separate autonomy for realization of its self-interests despite being encapsulated in a rentier framework of power imbalance overall, adding new insights to the rentier state-society relationship.

Valeri (2009) explores the crucial importance that Oman’s Sultan Qaboos placed on nation building and the creation and maintenance of political legitimacy since he came to power in 1970. Valeri (2009, 84) acknowledges the impact of the oil wealth on the state’s “sudden and practical breaking into Omanis’ daily life,” by implementing a welfare state process that directly increased the legitimacy of the Sultan’s authority and the state as a whole in concrete and appreciable ways. Yet he goes beyond economic allocations to discuss how the state used its resources to build a national identity through standardizing cultural references, rewriting modern history, creating symbols, reinventing customs and traditions, and reappropriating Islam, history, and heritage to better serve the new and improved image of the state. Furthermore, Valeri also discusses how the state used its oil wealth to reinvent political traditions, by taking over existing political infrastructures and tribal references and using them to its advantages, as well as creating new institutions and norms of political behavior. Yet unlike the solid façade of the top echelon of the Saudi state, Valeri (2009, 259) sees trouble on the horizon for Oman’s continued political stability in the face of dropping hydrocarbon revenues, an economically active and mobilized population, and a younger generation that “are reluctant to guarantee the perpetuation of a system in which they feel excluded from political and economic decisions.” Unlike my work, Valeri does not explicitly engage in revising rentier theory, despite the fact that his work clearly expands upon the state-society relationship under rentierism. However, as a whole, Valeri’s emphasis on the politics of legitimacy, far beyond basic economic allocation, is useful for showing how classic rentier state theory can benefit from the inclusion of this literature.
In his studies of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Davidson (2005, 2008, 2009) comes the closest to providing a road map of a revised rentier state theory that encompasses political legitimacy—although he does not explicitly attempt to do so. Davidson combines a rentier-specific dependency theory with Hudson’s (1977) insights on monarchical legitimacy under conditions of modernization to explain the political stability of the UAE, specifically how the rulers have created a “ruling bargain” with their citizens. This ruling bargain is comprised of Davidson’s “legitimacy formula”—including charisma, patrimonial networks, cultural, religious, and ideological resources, and the creation of a communal identity—and rentier allocation policies, in which the rulers carefully use and distribute material resources throughout society. Rather than looking to critique rentier theory, Davidson merely includes it as one aspect of his overall explanation of the UAE’s stability in a peripheral and rapidly modernizing context. In fact, Davidson (2005, 104) repeats the classic rentier state theory’s claim that “by providing the bulk of the population with a package of distributed wealth and a comprehensive welfare state, the rulers have been able to purchase political acquiescence and considerable popular support from both locals and expatriates.” However, despite this statement, Davidson highlights the noneconomic issues that loom as problems for the future stability of the UAE, particularly with regards to perceptions of cultural threat in Dubai and inadequate education and workforce preparation among nationals in Abu Dhabi. His work in Dubai highlights the very real demands for noneconomic benefits among the citizenry: “An increasing number of nationals are beginning to voice their concerns . . . that the national identity of Dubai and the former non-material privileges of the indigenous elite are now under threat” (Davidson 2009, 193–94). Although he does not explicitly make this connection, Davidson’s “legitimacy formula” framework
contributes to a better understanding of state-society relations under rentierism by pointing out
the importance of nonmaterial benefits to the citizenry and their link to political stability.\footnote{21}

In all three of these important contributions, classic rentier state theory is used as the
start, but not the end, of their explorations into the political and social impact of oil wealth on
their respective case studies. Qatar has not yet undergone a similar exploration, despite being
arguably the crucial case study for rentier state theory. Drawing inspiration from Hertog’s
(2010b, 266) assertion that he took “useful cues” from the classic theory to create “more specific,
distribution-based causal mechanisms . . . which, while allowing systematic comparison, are
more sensitive to causal impact of history and context,” this dissertation combines the insights
from rentierism, political legitimacy, and the limited state in a way that provides a clearer
explanation of the mechanisms by which Qatar goes beyond allocation to interact with its
population, and ultimately results in a revised theoretical framework for understanding state-
society relations in modern rentier states.

\footnote{21} This observation is echoed by Gengler’s (2011) dissertation, which highlights the priority of ethnicity and religion
over material benefits when understanding the nature of politics in Bahrain today.
CHAPTER TWO: CASE STUDY JUSTIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY

Now that I have introduced the puzzle and the theoretical debate surrounding classic rentier state theory in the modern world today, I turn to a justification of my case study and methodology. This chapter argues that an in-depth case study design is both theoretically and methodologically justifiable, as Qatar is the ideal polity on which to test classic rentier state theory (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007). If there were any place in the world where the rentier sociopolitical bargain should hold true—which political loyalty and acquiescence should be guaranteed to the state in return for satisfactory distribution of economic benefits—it should be Qatar, an extremely resource-rich country (Krane 2013) with a small territory, a small and relatively homogeneous citizen population, and a unified ruling family (Herb 1999) without a rival source of political power, such as an entrenched religious elite (Seznec 2004) or an independent business class (Crystal 1995; Luciani 2007). In fact, many analysts argue that Qatar’s political stability today is a direct result of the economic benefits that the state of Qatar allocates to its citizens.22

I begin this chapter by discussing the most pressing methodological question: How much can we learn from one case? Although comparative analysis of multiple cases has its methodological strengths, I argue that an in-depth case study of Qatar has relative advantages of its own. Qatar is the ideal case study for studying the processes and mechanisms of rentier state theory and therefore provides the most insight for revising the classic theory to fit modern

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22 One analyst attributed the absence of any provoked unrest during the recent Arab Spring to “Qatari exceptionalism,” fueled in part by the high levels of wealth in the country (Hamid 2011); another analyst attributed the “apathy” and “domestic quietism” of Qatari society to the maxim that Qatari are “too rich to care” (Roberts 2013, 9). In Davidson’s (2012, 237) otherwise quite bleak assessment of the prospects for future stability in the six Arab Gulf monarchies, he acknowledges that Qatar’s “future is a little rosier than that of the other Gulf monarchies: the state can actually sustain high spending and wealth distribution to its national population.” In sum, Qatar is often used to argue that the rentier allocation-acquiescence bargain still holds firm under the wealthiest of conditions.
reality. I show why Qatar should be seen as an ideal case study by setting the economic stage, providing the details of exactly how rich and how small Qatar is, and why the country should be best positioned to make the sociopolitical bargain of rentierism work. Then, I depict the history of the gradual expansion of the Qatari welfare state to the extensive system it is today. By describing the history of Qatar’s skyrocketing hydrocarbon wealth, and the state’s purposeful funneling of these rents into an ever-increasing welfare system for its citizens, it becomes clear that, in terms of population, wealth, and a historical legacy of rentierism, Qatar should be an ideal case in which to observe the allocation-acquiescence bargain between state and society. I end the chapter with a discussion of the qualitative and quantitative methods that I employ to study the interaction of the Qatari state and its society in the chapters that follow.

**One Case Study**

I will address, from the start, the most obvious methodological question pertaining to my research: How much can we learn from one case? A single case study, albeit comparatively oriented and theoretically informed, “can never establish general ‘truths’ or explanatory ‘laws’ about the social world” (Lim 2006, 51), and for some scholars, this limitation makes individual case studies of dubious value (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 208, 210–11).23 Rueschemeyer

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23 Other scholars argue against this interpretation of the limited value of a single case study. As one of the strongest proponents of the case study method, Rueschemeyer (2003, 310–18) notes that it is possible to have theory development, theory testing and revising, and explanatory use of theory all within the same single case. “Quite a few single-case studies rank among the most powerful and influential works in social and political analysis” (Rueschemeyer 2003, 307). Hall (2003, 396) draws a distinction between a case and an observation, noting that a single unit can “yield a diverse array of other observations pertinent to the testing of a theory, including ones bearing on the causal processes specified by the theory.” Particularly important for my criticism of classic rentier state theory’s claim that “all [the state] needs is an expenditure policy” to remain stable (Luciani 1987, 74), George and Bennett (2004, 220) note that “[p]rocess tracing in single cases . . . has the capacity for disproving claims that a single variable is necessary or sufficient for an outcome.”
(2003, 320), a strong supporter of the single case study, nevertheless notes the value of cross-case comparisons in identifying causally important variables and avoiding omitted variable bias:

Anybody who has ever engaged in macrocomparative research knows of the impressive gains that can be reaped when one moves across boundaries within which causally important but theoretically perhaps unrecognized factors are held constant. This is quite often the case when we move across societal, national, and/or cultural boundaries. . . . The critical point here is simple: only by going beyond the first case does the impact of factors on the outcomes of interest come into view that does not show up in within-case analyses because these factors are—completely or largely—held constant.

The comparative method of analyzing multiple cases, through use of various logics of similarity and difference (Mill [1843] 1974; Przeworski and Teune 1970; Lijphart 1975), allows the researcher to make claims based on larger degrees of freedom, improving the prospects of theory building and reducing the problems of selection bias and overdetermination of the dependent variable (Lim 2006, 55–56; see also George and Bennett 2004, 80). Comparing multiple cases allows the researcher to control for a number of variables, enhancing the ability to make causal claims by focusing on significant similarities and dissimilarities between the cases; as Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003, 13) note, “Systematic comparison is, of course, indispensable given the analytic interest in causal analysis.” Further, comparing whole cases to each other enables researchers to deal with causal complexity, “both multiple and conjectural” (Ragin 1987, 27). In sum, comparisons across cases have several distinct advantages to the single case study, including the ability to identify significant factors that are held constant within a single case, and the ability to make causal claims, even when confronted with causal complexity.

Despite these advantages of cross-comparison analysis, I stand behind my decision to focus on a single case study—a method that has strengths of its own. The advantages of the case study method—including the use of process tracing, a focus on conceptual validity, and in-depth understanding of a particular case—make it ideal for the study of state-society relations within rentier states. In-depth case studies allow researchers to model and assess complex causal relations, thereby illuminating the dynamic political processes at work (George and Bennett
These complex causal mechanisms are best identified and explicated through process tracing, a within-case methodological technique that “involves identifying the causal mechanisms that link explanatory variables with the outcome variable” (Mahoney 2003, 363; see also George and Bennett 2004, 206–23), and “can lead inductively to the explanation of deviant cases and the subsequent derivation of new hypotheses” (George and Bennett 2004, 223). Many of the fallacies of classic rentier state theory are due to deductive generalizations, which created an umbrella theory with which to encapsulate a group of cases, without first putting together the inductive observations that would give us the detailed empirical evidence to understand the underlying mechanisms. Process tracing illuminates “the chain of causal events” within the black box of explanation (Lim 2006, 27), allowing my research to identify previously omitted primary or intervening variables in the study of rentierism.

Further, there are particular nuances to rentierism in the Arab Gulf in particular that make this region worthy of more single case studies. Scholars as diverse as Moore (2004), Chaudhry (1994), and Ross (2001) have called for more qualitative research to unpack the mechanisms and nuances of rentier theory, the study of which has suffered from issues of conceptual validity. For example, including an Arab Gulf variable in Ross’s (2008) rentier effect models on gender inequality makes the effect of oil disappear (Gengler 2011, 21–22; Groh and Rothschild 2012, 74–75). The confusion between the effects of hydrocarbon wealth and the social and cultural peculiarities of the Arab Gulf draw attention to issues of conceptual validity in classic rentier state theory. An in-depth case study ensures that we are measuring what we seek to measure, which will allow my work to make a theoretical contribution to our current understanding of rentier state theory as well as political legitimacy.
It is also important to note that I place my single case study in comparative perspective by enmeshing it within the ongoing research literatures of political legitimacy, rentierism, and state-society relations. As George and Bennett (2004, 80) note,

Single case studies take place within the context of ongoing research programs, so that studies of single cases may draw comparisons to existing studies; thus, ‘the community of scientists,’ rather than the ‘individual researcher’ is the relevant context in which to judge case selection.

Rueschemeyer (2003, 317) makes a similar point:

[T]he [case] studies that have yielded the most analytic insight were informed by intensive advance theoretical reflection. . . . Such reflection not only shapes the questions and the premises of the case analysis, it also links them to earlier scholarship and thus to analytic work on other instances of the issue under investigation. It therefore increases—if indirectly—the number of cases on which conclusions are built.

As I noted in Chapter 1, my in-depth study of Qatar is part of a clearly defined universe of cases of modern rentierism in the Arab Gulf, following in the footsteps of recent work by scholars who have modified and refined classic rentier state theory through their case studies. My case study of Qatar should be seen as part of a large comparative study in which the works of Davidson (2005, 2008, 2009) on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hertog (2010b) on Saudi Arabia, Valeri (2009) on Oman, and Gengler (2011) on Bahrain combine to revise rentier state theory through a contextual focus on the micropolitics of the state.24

These advantages of the single case study—process-tracing, conceptual validity, and in-depth understanding—are further strengthened by the goal of my research: to test classic rentier state theory with the most-likely—arguably crucial—case study of Qatar. Eckstein (1975, 118) describes a crucial case as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed.”

24 As Hudson (2011) argued, “A cultural, theoretical abstractions certainly have their value, but if they are emphasized at the expense of down and dirty fieldwork, combined with deep knowledge of specific regional conditions, they may be setting themselves up for more surprises of the kind we have recently observed [with the Arab Spring]. And studies with a regional focus, that have been widely denigrated as mere area studies, in today’s volatile climate should be given more respect.”
Van Evera (1997, 75–76) notes, “Strong tests are better than weak tests, and the results of strong
tests carry more weight than the results of weak tests. . . . When testing a theory, the investigator
should select cases that enable the most strong tests.” As I will make clear in the following
discussion, Qatar is the strongest case study test for classic rentier state theory.

It is important to note here, however, that I am not seeking to invalidate rentier theory on
the basis of a single case—the use that Eckstein proposed for his crucial case study method
(1975, 113–20)—but rather, I am seeking to usefully revise the theory through an in-depth study
of an ideal case. This goal is in line with Gerring’s (2007, 233) “pathway case” methodology, “in
which the purpose of an intensive analysis of an individual case is to elucidate causal
mechanisms (i.e., to clarify a theory) rather than to confirm or disconfirm a general theory.” If I
find significant inconsistencies between the theoretical expectations and the empirical
evidence—which I argue in this dissertation that I do—then this result highlights the need to
revise the theory (Lim 2006, 51–52; Dogan and Pelassy 1990; Rogowski 1995, 467). As George
and Bennett (2004, 80) argue,

> Single cases serve the purpose of theory testing particularly well if they are ‘most-likely,’ ‘least-likely,’ or
> ‘crucial’ cases. Prominent case studies by Arend Lijphart [1968], William Allen [1965], and Peter
> Gourevitch [1978], for example, have changed entire research programs by impugning theories that failed
to explain their most-likely cases.

The research objective of this dissertation is to show compelling evidence for why classic
rentier state theory needs to be refined to reflect the modern reality of state-society relations in
the world today. The single case study of Qatar is theoretically and methodologically justifiable
because of the ideal nature of the particular case study for the theory’s claims. An in-depth study
of Qatar illustrates how the state uses its rentier wealth to promote political stability beyond
allocation, better explaining the causal mechanisms and enabling us to usefully revise classic
rentier state theory. I am confident that my case study of Qatar will contribute valuable insights to the scholarly literature, both empirically and theoretically.

**Qatar as a Crucial Case for Rentier State Theory**

In this section, I elaborate on why Qatar is the ideal case study to illustrate the mechanisms of rentier state theory in the modern world today. This discussion of Qatar’s rentier wealth and welfare allocation shows that Qatar can be seen as a “crucial case” for rentier state theory, thus positioning an in-depth analysis of the country as a strong test for the theory’s claims.

**Qatar’s natural resource wealth**

Qatar made quite the media splash when it was officially listed atop the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita list in 2010.\(^{25}\) Yet the reality of Qatar’s wealth is even more staggering than it appears when we consider the relatively small number of Qatari citizens to whom the state provides welfare benefits. The state of Qatar does not release exact population figures for its citizens, and the Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA) only makes available population figures broken down by citizen/expatriate for ages 15 and up. I unofficially estimate the Qatari population, as of April 2010, as follows. The April 2010 census reported a total country population of 1,699,435 and a population of Qatars, age 15+, as 146,262.

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\(^{25}\) Qatar currently sits atop the IMF’s GDP per capita list, based on purchasing power parity (PPP). If the GDP per capita is measured nominally, Qatar is supplanted by Luxembourg, with other wealthy countries such as Liechtenstein and Norway not far behind. Nominal and PPP measurements both have their pros and cons. Nominal GDP does not take into account the differences in the cost of living and inflation rates in various countries, which determines the “purchasing power” of an individual’s wealth. GDP per capita, measured with PPP, requires more estimations and assumptions built into the model, and estimated results can differ, sometimes quite substantially, between organizations. However, the bottom line is that Qatar is prominent on both nominal and PPP measured lists, by the World Bank and the IMF, surrounded by very wealthy and exclusive company. See “Qatar Richest Country” (2013) for more detail.
In 2012, Qatar Foundation’s *Think Magazine* published estimates of the population percentage breakdown, describing Qataris as 15 percent of the population (Paschyn 2012, 18), gleaning the percentages from the US Department of State (2012), a figure corroborated by Qatar National Bank (QNB 2012, 2). Although the actual percentage may be even lower (“Glaring Inaccuracies” 2010), taking 15 percent of the total April 2010 population results in an estimate of 254,915 Qataris, quite in line with many unofficial estimates of the citizenry size.26

The small number of citizens compared to the overall population of the country27—over 1.9 million, according to the QSA April 2013 estimates28—puts the IMF measures of GDP into an even more impressive light. The IMF measures, of approximately $88,000 in 2010, $98,000

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26 It is important to note that Qatar, like many countries in the Arab world (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 84–85), has a disproportionate youth bulge in its native population, which places great strains on its employment opportunities and education structures in particular. Looking at statistics from the April 2010 census, more than 40 percent of the citizenry under 15 years old, and over 60 percent is college-age or younger (QSA 2012, 54, 76; Paschyn 2012, 18). We can put these numbers into perspective by comparing the percentages of the population by age category for Qatar and the US, using numbers from each country’s 2010 census (USCB 2011, 2). Qatar has approximately 62 percent of its population in the 0–24 age group, which is nearly double that of the US, which is reported at 34 percent. Both the US and Qatar are relatively equal in the 25–44 age group (27 percent to 25 percent, respectively), but Qatar’s population of older citizens is much smaller than the US. The 45–64 age group is only 11 percent in Qatar, versus 26 percent in the US; and the 65+ age group is only 3 percent in Qatar, versus 13 percent in the US.

27 Considering that expatriate residents in Qatar comprise 85 percent (or higher) of the total population of the country, an observer may ask why only Qatari citizens, and not all the residents of Qatar, are the targeted population for my study. Despite the numerical advantage, most expatriates are precariously embedded in society, usually here for just a few years under a strict sponsorship system and without rights to political participation, organized labor, or naturalization; they are “excluded essentials” (Okruhlik 1999a, 2011). All expatriates can be easily arrested and, if necessary, deported or jailed if they cause any issues, a point raised by Dr. Ali Khalifa Al Kuwari, a prominent Qatari intellectual and critic, in a recent interview in which he argued that “the great influx of immigrant workers, regardless of how necessary they are, is a benefit to the ruler, who is keen to treat people as temporary and readily disposable, rather than as citizens with all their attendant rights” (Amin 2012). Heeg (2010, 7) notes that foreigners are often depicted as scapegoats and security threats, but nevertheless, she concludes that “it seems highly unlikely that migrant labor—itself a group with little linguistic or social cohesiveness—will organize to present a threat to the Qatari state (or the military) itself.” All of this evidence points to the reality that Qatar’s stability depends on the acceptance and approval of its own citizens, regardless of their size vis-à-vis the overall population structure. Although the perception of 85 percent of the population on the state’s legitimacy is intrinsically important, it is the Qatari citizens and their perceptions that carry the political weight. Thus, this dissertation focuses specifically on the Qatari citizens and their perceptions of the state’s legitimacy.

28 See the Qatar Statistics Authority website, “Population Structure,”
in 2011, and $106,000 in 2012, include noncitizens when estimating the GDP per capita ("Qatar Richest Country" 2013). With approximately 250,000 Qatari citizens in the country as of April 2010, and a nominal GDP in 2011 of 630.9 billion Qatari riyals ($173.3 billion USD; EIU 2013, 8), we begin to see how unofficial estimates of GDP per citizen could be around $680,000 per year (e.g., Kinninmont 2013). A common misunderstanding of this measure is that each citizen has a personal income of this amount; this misperception of Qatari individual incomes is a particular frustration of many Qataris who feel burdened by debt and rising costs of living [see Figure 2]. Yet this measure does give a sense of how much economic largesse the state of Qatar would be able to bestow upon each citizen, without demanding any taxes in return.

Figure 2. “The Highest Individual Salary in the World”

(Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, May 15, 2011)

Hydrocarbon wealth infuses all areas of society—in massive projects in infrastructure, education, research and development, sports, media, and the like. Yet much of this development happened within the past decade or so, as the following picture of the Doha skyline shows,
recently enough for the sudden changes to be a frequent topic of discussion for expatriates who have been here only a few years, and a living memory for the current generations of Qataris (Althani 2012a). [See Figure 3.]

Figure 3. Doha Skyline, in 2005, 2010, and 2013

When I discussed my plan to move to Doha in the fall of 2008 with a colleague, he responded, “Why do you want to go to Qatar? It’s nothing but sand dunes and palaces. Nothing’s going on. You’re going to be bored.” Many, until quite recently in Qatar’s development, shared this opinion. Qatar, a small peninsula jutting out of the east coast of Saudi Arabia into the Persian Gulf, was long seen as a “sleepy pearling village” (Crystal 1995, 112) of little import for the international world. Qatar was referred to, briefly, in Palgrave’s (1868, 386) historical account of his journey through Arabia in 1862–63 as “bleak and sun-scorched . . . little clusters of wretched, most wretched, earth cottages and palm-leaf huts, narrow, ugly, and low.” These

29 Palgrave spends only ten days in “Katar,” including a cursory visit with the local leader of Bida, Sheikh Mohamed bin Thani, with most of this time spent arranging for a boat to take him to Muscat, Oman for “herbs and drugs” (1868, 388). Palgrave’s dismissive attitude is wryly noted in a recent book written by a former Qatari Minister of Economy and Trade: “[I]t must be said Palgrave seemed intent on disliking everything he found in Qatar, describing its towns as dingy, its coffee as unpalatable and its children as brats” (Althani 2012b, 24).
“little clusters” of “palm-leaf huts” seem a distant past when viewing the towering skyscrapers, world-class museums, and tree-lined seaside boulevards of the capital today. One observer wryly noted,

Fifty years ago, Qataris eked out livings diving for pearls and herding sheep. Today, the only pearls they encounter are the million-dollar ones wrapped around their necks, and the only sheep they come across are the sheepskin seat covers on their new Mercedeses. Rarely before in history has one nation grown so wealthy so quickly. (Weiner 2008, 101)

How did tiny Qatar get so rich, so fast?

To summarize this section for those who are uninterested in a mass of economic figures:

The state of Qatar receives a very large amount of wealth from hydrocarbon exports (364.5 billion Qatari riyals—over $100 billion US dollars—in 2011, which equaled 58 percent of its total nominal GDP for the year), in part because it has managed to dominate the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and export market (fulfilling over 30 percent of the world’s current demand for LNG) at a time when global demand and prices are skyrocketing. This section elaborates on the details of Qatar’s economic wealth, providing the foundation for the next section, which details how the state uses this wealth to fund an extensive welfare system for its citizens.

The story of Qatar’s massive hydrocarbon wealth started off slowly. Qatar’s hydrocarbon resources began to be explored as early as 1926 with the British-owned D’Arcy Exploration Company option and an official onshore concession in 1935, but it was not until October 1939 that the first evidence of oil was discovered near Zekreet (Zahlan 1979, 71, 77–78). World War II delayed operations, and Qatar’s petroleum resources finally began to be exported in 1949. An

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30 The D’Arcy Exploration Company was a subsidiary of the larger Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC). APOC, renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1935 when Persia officially changed its name to Iran, received the first onshore concession in Qatar in 1935 (Zahlan 1979, 77). In 1954, AIOC renamed itself British Petroleum. See “Our history” at BP.com, http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9039337&contentId=7036819.
offshore concession was granted to Shell Company Qatar in 1949, with offshore field production beginning in 1964. The State of Qatar nationalized the oil sector in 1974, and by 1976, both the onshore production and offshore production were combined into a government-owned entity called Qatar Petroleum, which is now responsible for all of the oil and gas industry in the country (“Qatar Petroleum” 2012). At a current level of 2.3 million barrels of production per day—a number that reflects the actual number of oil barrels combined with the energy equivalent in natural gas—Qatar Petroleum is #17 in production of the top 25 oil companies in the world today (Helman 2012).

The oil production is an important part of Qatar’s overall resource wealth. According to 2011 figures, Qatar produces 734,000 barrels of oil per day, making it the third smallest producer and exporter of oil in the twelve-member Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), surpassing Ecuador and Libya (EIU 2013, 7; USEIA 2013, 3–4; OPEC 2012, 11). Qatar’s proven reserves of oil were 13th largest in the world, estimated at around 25 billion barrels (BP 2012, 6; USEIA 2013, 3; OPEC 2012, 11). Qatar’s production levels and proven reserves of oil—which make up only 2 percent of the entire OPEC share—are dwarfed by the much larger reserves of Venezuela (297.6 billion barrels, 25 percent OPEC share), Saudi Arabia (265.4, 22 percent), Iran (154.6, 13 percent), and Iraq (141.4, 12 percent).31 Despite its status as one of the smallest members of OPEC, Qatar receives a significant amount of its GDP as well as its revenues from the sale of oil. With oil prices averaging over $90/barrel since 2008, even including the global recession of 2009–2010—and oil prices for 2011 exceeding $100 per barrel for the first time ever (BP 2012, 2)—Qatar’s daily hydrocarbon production contributes about 55

percent of the country’s overall GDP each year, with oil accounting for a significant portion of this production (IMF 2013, 27).

Nevertheless, with Qatar’s oil reserves alone, the country would not have its current economic weight. The story of Qatar’s hydrocarbon riches is wrapped up in its current domination of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and export market. For a tiny country, estimated at 11,000 square kilometers—smaller than the state of Connecticut—it has the third-largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world, behind Russia and Iran (OBG 2012, 12, 51). Qatar’s North Field, part of the world’s largest nonassociated natural gas field, is estimated as of January 1, 2013 to contain about 890 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, approximately 13 percent of the global total (USEIA 2013, 6; see also BP 2012, 20). More importantly, Qatar has managed to become the world’s leading exporter of LNG; in 2011, 30 percent of global LNG exports, or 102.6 billion cubic meters, came from Qatar (IMF 2013, 36; BP 2012, 28). With Qatar supplying almost a third of the world’s supply of LNG, the country dwarfs the other suppliers. The next largest supplier in 2011 was Malaysia at 33.3 billion cubic meters, then Indonesia (29.2), Australia (25.9), and Nigeria (25.9); all others were under 20 billion cubic meters (BP 2012, 28).

Qatar’s dominance of the LNG market is an example of the prescience of the Qatari leadership in seizing the opportunity to jump past Russia and Iran to the forefront of the global

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32 Qatar has recently discovered an additional 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in a new field called Block 4 North, the first gas discovery in 42 years (John 2013).

33 A possible caveat to Qatar’s current dominance of the LNG export market are the plans for increased LNG production in Australia as well as increased shale gas production in the US and China (OBG 2012, 111). However, Qatar’s current advantages over possible contenders—including the ability to produce and export associated gases, and its control over the transportation vessels through the Qatar Gas Transport Company, Nakilat—reduce the overall cost of LNG production as well as keep the transportation costs and risks low (IMF 2013, 39; EIU 2013, 22). In addition, although the US appears poised to begin shale gas exports in 2015 despite environmental concerns with the hydrofracking procedures (Dobb 2013), China has challenges to recovering its shale gas, and Australian increased production is uncertain in terms of staying on schedule (IMF 2013, 38). In sum, Qatar seems set to remain the lead producer and exporter of the world’s LNG.
LNG trade. In 2005, the *New York Times* highlighted the efforts of Qatar to develop its natural gas reserves:

> In a shift drawing historical comparisons to the takeoff of Saudi Arabia’s oil industry several decades ago, Qatar has moved swiftly in recent years to develop its huge offshore natural gas reserves. . . . That shift gave Qatar, long a marginal oil producer, a commodity to help it escape the Saudi orbit and the wealth to plot its own path to prosperity. (Romero 2005)

Qatar’s prescient efforts at LNG development culminated in the achievement, in late 2010, of 77 million tons per year of LNG capacity (OBG 2012, 12). According to recent numbers, Qatargas produces the largest share of this capacity at 42 million tons, and RasGas produces 36.3 million tons, placing current production capacity at approximately 78.3 million tons per year (OBG 2012, 32).

Besides investing in the development of its gas reserves, Qatar has also become a key player in the leadership of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), an organization begun in 2001 in Tehran and often referred to as the “gas OPEC.” Qatar was one of the founding members of the GECF and, in 2008, managed to get the organization to set up its headquarters in Doha. In 2009, Qatar’s Minister of Energy and Industry, Abdullah bin Hamad Al Attiyah, was elected as chairman (president) of the GECF, with an Algerian serving as vice-chairman and a Russian serving as secretary general. The first GECF summit was held in November 2011, in Doha, and the GECF issued a Doha Declaration that highlighted the main goals and concerns of the organization, particularly regarding the importance of finding a fair global price for gas and emphasizing the benefits of long-term gas contracts (GECF 2011, 3). In addition, Qatar also was the host country for the triannual meeting of the World Petroleum Congress in December 2011, giving the country another high-profile leadership moment in the world of global hydrocarbon trade (Lazell 2011).
Qatar’s increased production capacity has been perfectly placed to fulfill the large jump in global demand for LNG during the last few years—of the 10 percent growth in LNG trade in 2011, Qatari LNG shipments accounted for 88 percent (BP 2012, 4). Part of the increased demand for LNG stems from the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, which forced the country to close fifty-three of its fifty-four nuclear reactors, about 20 percent of the country’s energy generation capacity (OBG 2012, 125). Japan has been making up its energy shortfall almost entirely through increased reliance on imported LNG from Qatar. Qatari LNG imports to Japan rose 55 percent to 11.9 million tons in 2011, and it is estimated that Japan consumed more than quadruple this amount of LNG—over 53 million tons—in 2012. Demand worldwide is increasing, with the International Energy Agency projecting a “global demand increase of 17 percent during 2012 and 2017 for natural gas” (IMF 2013, 11), amid estimates of an LNG shortfall of 389 billion cubic feet in 2013 and 812 billion cubic feet by 2015 that may drive prices even higher (OBG 2012, 126). The CEO of Total Gas, Christophe de Margerie, was quoted as saying,

"Gas is expected to become the second-largest energy source after oil by 2030 . . . We also expect the growth of LNG to outpace that of the gas sector in general, as it remains the only viable technology to import gas into markets lacking domestic supplies or access to nearby reserves. (OBG 2012, 123)

In sum, the global demand for LNG seems likely to continue to fuel Qatar’s economy for the foreseeable future.

It is true that hydrocarbon trade can be disrupted due to changing political or economic conditions, and that exports of this nature are particularly subject to fluctuations in prices, all of which can lead to instability and uncertainty for state budgets and cash flow. However, Qatar seems particularly well diversified in terms of its export destinations, and the country has managed to lock in favorable pricing agreements with long-term contracts, while also inserting clauses that allow Qatar to divert supplies to other markets depending on certain circumstances.
Qatar exports to all regions of the world, although the majority of its LNG exports go to Asia (48 percent) and Europe (42 percent), with another 7 percent to the Americas, including the US (2 percent). Exports to the Middle East make up only 3 percent of Qatar’s global trade, for a very good reason—Qatar’s neighbors expect subsidized LNG at far-below market prices (Krane 2013, 18–19). Qatar’s long-term contracts to other regions of the world are linked to the global price of oil, resulting in much more lucrative profits.

The highest profits are currently coming from East Asia, in particular, Japan, which is paying up to $17 per million British thermal units (mBtu), far higher than the UK price of approximately $8 mBtu or the even lower US price of $3–4 mBtu (OBG 2012, 125). Although Japan is desperately seeking the creation of a global natural gas market that would delink gas from oil prices and lower the cost of its exports (Terazono 2012; Terazono and Chazan 2013) as well as seeking to find alternative sources of domestic energy (Tabuchi 2013), for the time being Japan is highly dependent on Qatari LNG exports, and has a 25-year contract between Qatargas and Chubu Electric for 6 million tons of LNG a year (lasting until 2022), with prices linked to the oil index (OBG 2012, 106). Qatar also supplies South Korea with over a quarter of its annual needs, and Qatar’s RasGas has two long-term contracts with the country, a 25-year contract lasting until 2024 for 4.8 million tons per year and a 20-year contract beginning in 2013 for an additional 2 million tons per year (OBG 2012, 17, 51, 107).

34 Krane (2013, 18–19) details the underpricing of natural gas exports to Qatar’s neighbors. The UAE paid Qatar around $1.50 per million British thermal units (mBtu) in 2012, based on a 1982 cross-border gas deal that set a benchmark of $1.25 for Qatari gas. By comparison, Qatar sells its natural gas to the US at $3–4 mBtu, to the UK at $9 mBtu, and to Japan at $16–17 mBtu (see OBG 2012, 125; Terazono 2012). Even worse for Qatar, the UAE has been buying the discounted Qatari gas and reexporting it to East Asia at the prevailing market price of $17 mBtu, according to an anonymous UAE official with knowledge of the sales. In response, Qatar has refused to fill the UAE–Qatar Dolphin Pipeline to full capacity and has actively sought to export the vast majority of its LNG outside of the Gulf.
Besides Japan and South Korea, many other countries are increasing their requests for long-term LNG contracts with Qatar’s gas supply. RasGas, the largest LNG supplier to India, is in current negotiations with the Indian government over an import price of $15.96 mBtu, which climbs to around $20 mBtu when factoring in the extra costs (OBG 2012, 126). To put the current price in perspective, RasGas began exports to India in 2004 at the price of $3.60 mBtu (“RasGas and Petronet” 2003). Yet despite this price jump, a spokesman for India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas was quoted as saying, “Our appetite for liquefied natural gas is insatiable” (“India Keen” 2012). Nor is the high price of LNG deterring other countries from pursuing long-term deals with Qatar. Turkey and Qatar are currently in negotiations on a 20-year contract set to begin in 2015 for 4 million tons per year (EIU 2013, 21). Croatia and Qatar have come to a preliminary deal on a 25-year contract, starting in 2016, for 0.74 million tons per year. Both Turkey and Croatia want to reduce their dependence on Russian gas supplies and view Qatar as a safer and more stable bet. New Asian customers interested in Qatari LNG include Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (EIU 2013, 21).

The ability to extract such high prices from the Asian market, as well as the flexibility built into the contracts that allows Qatar to divert supplies from one market to another depending on market conditions, have squeezed the UK energy market. With LNG accounting for over 25 percent of the UK gas supply in 2011, Qatar supplies virtually all of the country’s LNG—an estimated 95.5 percent—causing some observers to worry about undue Qatari influence over internal UK affairs (Fernandes 2012). However, the greater worry for the UK may be not receiving Qatari LNG imports. Approximately 30 percent of Qatari LNG is distributed in the spot market rather than through long-term contracts, which allows Qatar to divert to the most lucrative markets. Recently the UK has experienced a gas supply gap in the country that has
increased natural gas prices to a seven-year high in the country, and prices are expected to continue to rise (Chazan 2013). The Financial Times quoted one British analyst as conceding, “The UK is going to have to pay a premium price for LNG if it’s going to be able to attract it to our shores” (Chazan 2013). The UK does not appear to have much choice in the matter; March 2013, the coldest March in the UK in over half a century, saw the country’s stockpiles of gas reduced to 5 percent of capacity before three Qatari tankers came to the rescue (Fineren 2013). In sum, the great demand for LNG, the dramatic increase in prices, and the Qatari dominance of a third of the global LNG export trade all “suggest a dramatically altered market, in which operators such as Qatargas and RasGas hold the cards” (OBG 2012, 126).

For now it appears Qatar is content to maintain its export capacity at current levels, with further development reserved for domestic usage. Since 2005, there has been a state-issued moratorium on further development of the North Field, with the government signaling that it will continue to renew the moratorium for the foreseeable future (OBG 2012, 108; USEIA 2013, 8). The moratorium is meant to give Qatar “time to assess its production performance and carry out a comprehensive study of its North Field” in an effort to ensure that the state meets its target of one hundred years of production (IMF 2013, 4). However, this moratorium also signals that “Qatar is currently satisfied with its LNG export production and is now turning its attention to the domestic market” (OBG 2012, 134). The Barzan gas project was the last development approved before the moratorium, and it was created in order to meet long-term domestic gas needs (OBG 2012, 133–34). Barzan is expected to begin production in 2014 or 2015 and will supply 1.4 billion cubic feet of gas per day to the country (OBG 2012, 107; USEIA 2013, 8). Here, too, the Qatari leadership is showing prescience regarding the political need to maintain a cheap supply of energy for domestic use, both residential and productive (Krane 2013). Qatar’s
list of major infrastructure projects to complete over the next decade include the New Doha International Airport, the new Doha Port, the Doha Metro and railway system, various highways and expressways, sewage treatment plants, the Qatar-Bahrain causeway, and, of course, the stadiums and associated infrastructure for hosting the World Cup in 2022 (OBG 2012, 175; IMF 2013, 9). It appears that Qatar will seek to maintain its export levels at the current amount and devote increased attention to ensuring a steady and cheap supply of energy for domestic use in the future.

Qatar may feel comfortable remaining at its current levels of hydrocarbon exports simply because the impact on Qatari GDP and revenues has been so impressive. Despite the global recession, Qatar’s real GDP growth has been in the double-digits since 2006. With the moratorium on further developments in the hydrocarbon field, GDP growth slowed to approximately 6 percent in 2012 (IMF 2013, 27; EIU 2013, 7), which is still far above the world average of 3 percent and the advanced economies’ average of just over 1 percent (“Global Economic Outlook” 2013). The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that Qatar’s real GDP growth will average 5.4 percent between 2013 and 2017, signaling that Qatar will continue to have steady, albeit more modest, economic growth (EIU 2013, 2). Yet the boom years of 2006–2011 have left their mark. Qatar’s nominal GDP for 2012 is projected at 672.4 billion Qatari riyals ($184.7 billion USD), of which 57 percent of this—$105.6 billion USD—stemmed directly from hydrocarbons (IMF 2013, 27). The revenue from LNG has, in particular, increased over the past few years, from comprising 15 percent of total hydrocarbon revenues in the 2007–2008 fiscal year to almost 50 percent in 2011–2012 (IMF 2013, 28). In other words, LNG has become as important as crude oil output to Qatari GDP, and it is projected to maintain its equal standing in the near future.
Creating the Qatari welfare state

As the hydrocarbon revenue began to flow into the country, the state began to create what is now one of the most extensive welfare systems in the world. However, the idea that every Qatari has a “winning lottery ticket” (Weiner 2008, 97) misunderstands the exclusive nature of distribution under a rentier state. Part of the definition of a classic rentier state is that only very few are involved in the creation and subsequent distribution of state wealth, with the vast majority involved only as recipients of the largesse. Beblawi (1987, 51–52) explained the exclusivity of the rentier state in the following way:

A rentier economy is thus an economy where the creation of wealth is centred around a small fraction of the society; the rest of the society is only engaged in the distribution and utilisation of this wealth. . . . [I]n a rentier state the government is the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy. . . . A predominantly rentier state will accordingly play a central role in distributing this wealth to the population.

Qatar as a geopolitical entity may have won the hydrocarbon lottery, with staggering amounts of natural gas making the country very rich indeed, but these lottery winnings go directly to the state and are funneled to the citizens in very particular ways. The story of Qatar’s welfare state creation is a story of gradual expansion from the personal enrichment of the ruler and elites to the general public as a whole.

In tandem with the slow development of the hydrocarbon resources, Qatar’s infrastructure, administration, and social services also developed slowly (Crystal 1995, 128). The creation of a desalination plant in 1954 and a power plant in 1957 provided the country with subsidized electricity and local drinking water for the first time. Crystal (1995, 129) notes that the development spending of the time, albeit relatively small, “targeted the poorest Qataris. Education, health care, drinking water, these services were all progressive in effect. It was, perhaps inadvertently, the Shaikh’s first effort to develop allies in the popular sector.” However, the ruler at the time, Sheikh Ali bin Abdullah Al Thani, considered “all revenues to be his
personal treasury” (Kéchichian 2008, 191) and approximately 25–33 percent of all oil revenues went directly to his private accounts (Al Kuwari 1978, 116–17). Al Kuwari (1978, 116–17) notes that up to a third of the oil revenues ended up in Sheikh Ali’s privy purse, a third to the reserves, and a third to government expenditures, which included the direct allowances, loans, and gifts to other members of the ruling family to keep them placated and supportive (Crystal 1995, 147).

When Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani took over from his father in 1960, he originally seemed to follow in his footsteps, collecting all oil revenues on a personal basis. After Qatari demonstrations and strikes in 1963 caused, in part, by concern with government expenditures (Al Kuwari 1978, 118; see also “Petition Text” 1963), the Al Thani family came up with a more transparent and equitable distribution of oil revenues, which came to be known as the “quarter rule”:

According to this formula, a quarter of all revenues would flow straight to the ruler’s private purse, a second quarter would be distributed among senior family members, a third quarter would cover the interests of remaining Al Thani family members, and the fourth quarter would be allocated to the public treasury. (Kéchichian 2008, 192)

Incredibly enough, this distribution was seen as an improvement over the previous decades. Nevertheless, despite these new rules, Sheikh Ahmad’s continued personal enrichment, along with the increasing benefits for the ruling family in allowances, state jobs, and land distribution, became seen as an unacceptable obstacle for the country’s development (Crystal 1995, 147–49).

Shortly after Qatari independence in 1971, Heir Apparent Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani overthrew Sheikh Ahmad, with the support of senior Al Thani leaders as well as Saudi Arabia. One of the first issues the new Emir tackled was a more equitable distribution of the country’s oil wealth (Crystal 1995, 156). Emir Khalifa gave a 20 percent salary increase to most nationals, along with a 30 percent increase in social aid and a 25 percent increase in pensions; forgave housing loan debt and built 2500 free housing units within his first year; set price controls on
consumer goods and subsidized food; and ostensibly reduced his own salary to $250,000 a year—albeit while retaining the power to withdraw from the treasury as much as he wanted (Crystal 1995, 156–57; Kéchichian 2008, 199; see also Zahlan 1979, 137). The more equal distribution of the oil wealth toward national development and citizen welfare benefits set Qatar on the road to the extensive welfare system it is today.\(^{35}\)

The Provisional Constitution of April 2, 1970 promised basic welfare for the citizens of Qatar: curative and preventative medical care; social security in case of illness, old age, or disability; and education at all levels provided free of charge (Zahlan 1979, 111). Once Emir Khalifa came to power in 1972, the state’s development policy was divided into three sections—social, agricultural, and industrial—with a clear emphasis on social development (Nafi 1983, 44). For example, the 1976 government budget allocates approximately 68 percent of development expenditure on social development projects, such as health, education, public houses and buildings, labor and social affairs, water and sewers, communications and transport, and urban planning, while in 1981, social expenditures accounted for more than 90 percent of total development expenditures. Nafi (1983, 47), the Head of the Projects and Studies Division in the Economics Department of Qatar General Petroleum Corporation, argued that the spending “reflect[ed] the government’s decision to invest petroleum revenues for the purpose of expanding the productive base of the economy and improving the standard of living of the people.”

It is important to note here that the country of Qatar considered large-scale infrastructure development as part of the overall social development of the country. Massive projects, such as

\(^{35}\) Crystal (1995, 160–61) strikes a note of caution regarding the unintended consequences of the bureaucracy being used as a distribution mechanism, writing, “The unintended outcome of a decade of development and distribution had not been a tightly controlled state, but rather a larger machine for distributing revenues to Qataris. State employment itself is now one important form of welfare. The longer-term result may well be a loss in popular loyalty to the ruler. As welfare functions become the norm they are increasingly seen less as examples of the ruler’s largesse and more as arrangements that clients can claim from patrons or as rights that individuals, as citizens, can claim from the state. These are the direct, although unintended consequences of state policy.”
water desalination plants, sewage systems, and power generation; development of the roads, ports, and airports; and investments in telecommunications, were all important parts of the developing infrastructure that was meant to raise both the individual standard of living for citizens and the economic potential of the country (Nafi 1983, 42). The more personal welfare state we see in Qatar today, in which benefits are accrued to individual Qataris by virtue of citizenship alone, was not yet possible at the time, given the needs of the country and the limited resources of the state.

Nevertheless, specific welfare benefits mentioned in the constitution—medical care, social security, and education for all citizens—became entrenched in state practice and law during Emir Khalifa’s reign. All residents of Qatar (including the foreign work force) were eligible for free health services, either at the larger hospitals of Doha, including the new Hamad General Hospital inaugurated in 1982, or at smaller medical centers opened throughout the country (Nafi 1983, 41). If a patient needed specialized treatment that was unavailable in the country, the government would pay for the patient to be sent abroad for care (Nafi 1983, 104).

Public housing was also provided, originally only to those with limited incomes or other special needs, and often with financial obligations to repay the government’s loan over time (Zahlan 1979, 126). The 1964 Law No. 1 on housing, revised in the 1970s, was meant to provide reasonable accommodations to people with limited incomes.

The beneficiaries of the Popular Housing Scheme were to be Qatari citizens, married, aged 20 to 50 years, having no financial resources to build a residential house, and not having benefited from any other government housing project. Under this scheme the government provides the beneficiary, free land of about 6,400 to 10,000 square feet. It also provides an interest free loan to be paid back over 20 to 25 years, of which only 60 per cent is to be paid back to the government. The amount of each loan depends on the cost of the building. The cost of building a ‘Popular’ house of a floor area of 196 square meters increased from QR 38,000 in 1964 to QR 255,000 in 1981. In addition to this, the government provides QR 20,000 for furnishing. Disabled persons were provided houses free of charge by the government (Nafi 1983, 105). By 1983, the demand for “popular houses” was booming, with more than 1300 houses built and distributed in that year alone. Each house was estimated to cost the government approximately
one million Qatari riyals, when taking the land, building, and other facilities into consideration (Nafi 1983, 106).

In 1977, Emiri Decree No. 7 set the stage for the increased personalization of housing and land benefits for Qatari citizens. Rather than tying the benefit to a limited income or disability, the Emiri Decree provided housing and land to Qatari senior staff in government and semigovernment employment.

Under the Senior Staff Housing Scheme the government provides the beneficiary with free land and an interest free loan for construction of a residential house. The beneficiary is eligible to receive QR 500,000 as a loan, to be paid back in installments equivalent to 30 per cent of the basic salary, and in a way that the monthly payment would not be less than QR 1,000 and greater than QR 3,000. On 22nd February 1982, H.H. the Emir, increased the amount of the loan to QR 600,000. (Nafi 1983, 106)

With this additional benefit for the senior members of the government, the state of Qatar began to introduce the concept of welfare rewards based on social position rather than need, and perhaps also sowed the seeds of discontent between the haves and have-nots of Qatari society.

The right of Qatari citizens to free and equal education was enshrined in the constitution, although a lot of work had to be done to build the education system in the country. Public education in Qatar only began in 1952, with the opening of one school for male students in Doha, followed by the opening of the first female public school in 1955 (Nafi 1983, 96). A college of education for teacher training was established in 1973 and later incorporated into Qatar University, which was inaugurated in 1977 with colleges of education, humanities, Islamic shariah (law), science, and engineering, offering Bachelors of Arts or Science degrees. The Ministry of Education ran all public education institutions, with no fees charged by the state for tuition, transportation, books, accommodations, or food (Zahlan 1979, 131; Nafi 1983, 96). Centers for language and vocational training were established in the country as well. For those Qatari students who wished to pursue studies abroad, the government provided financial assistance and scholarships. It appears that there was no guiding government preference at the
time for certain majors for foreign study, perhaps because of the relatively small number of Qatari students choosing to study abroad. In the 1975–76 academic year, there were 952 Qatari students abroad, including 40 postgraduate students pursuing advanced degrees, in subjects as varied as music, history, psychology, fine arts, cinema, medicine, agriculture, and civil engineering (Zahlan 1979, 131).

Despite the government spending on these basic welfare benefits for the citizens, there was a general concern among the Qatari population that economic progress was not occurring fast enough and that the current economic development was disproportionately benefiting the wealthy and elite of Qatari society. In late 1991, spurred by a sense of insecurity brought on by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, over fifty prominent Qatari intellectuals submitted a petition to Emir Khalifa, which pointed out problems in citizen employment, underdevelopment of the education system, lack of media freedom, economic inflation, health care and housing concerns, and corruption in the public and private sectors. The petition then called for two steps to solve these problems:

First . . . the establishment of an elected Council for consultation and negotiation that has expanded legislative and supervisory powers and through which effective political participation is achieved. . . . Achievement of this requirement fulfills the pledge that the authority has sworn twenty years ago to abide by the principle of elections, to recognize the right of citizens in the management of the affairs of their country, and aligns with the principles of the Islamic religion that call for consultation and negotiation . . . .

Second: To give this Council the task to create a permanent constitution that endorses democracy and sets the foundations of the system of governance . . . and becomes the basis of legislation and a reference for all authorities in the community and ensures the fulfillment of rights and obligations. (“Petition Text” 1991)

This petition “seemed to have been an authentic reflection of the mood within an important sector of Qatari society that was anxious for a more open, less paternalistic form of government” (Rabi 1992, 665). However, although some economic changes were made, with the 1992–93 budget increasing the social services and health spending by 6 percent and the education and youth affairs spending by 2.6 percent, the petition itself was largely dismissed by Emir Khalifa, with several petitioners coming under harassment and duress by the state (Rabi
Kéchichian (2008, 204) speculates that Emir Khalifa’s dismissal of this petition may signify the exact moment in time that the Heir Apparent, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, decided to plan his coup:

The ruler may have found the petitioners’ call for the establishment of a legislative assembly, as well as sorely needed economic and education reforms, as overbearing, but Hamad understood how minimal and necessary these steps were. According to reliable sources, father and son discussed the matter, clashing over the pace that the younger Al Thani wished to follow.

Certainly, the economic situation of Qatar, in which a large share of Qatar’s hydrocarbon revenues was being transferred to the personal accounts of Emir Khalifa rather than enriching the country, was a large concern for the Heir Apparent, as well as many other influential Qataris (Jehl 1997).

Much is made of Emir Hamad’s political “reforms”—superficial or substantive—once he overthrew his father in a bloodless coup on June 27, 1995 (Jehl 1997; Kamrava 2009; Kéchichian 2008, 204–207; Lambert 2011). Yet much more importantly for the argument of this dissertation, Hamad undertook economic reforms that fostered a “new sociopolitical pact. At its core was a new political understanding that Al Thani rule could indeed prosper, as long as all Qataris shared in the country’s bounty” (Kéchichian 2008, 206). Part of this economic reform was to return the billions—estimates ranged from three to seven billion dollars—that had been transferred from the Qatari treasury to Khalifa’s personal accounts abroad, a process that was not fully complete until the mid-2000s (Jehl 1997, Kéchichian 2008, 213). Another large part of the economic reforms of the country was the continued increase of the social welfare system, far beyond the basic welfare benefits previously detailed in the constitution. Emir Hamad’s

36 This harassment led to a second petition, filed in 1992, protesting this treatment (“Petition Text” 1992).
37 Three of these petitioners—Ali Khalifa Al Kuwari, Issa Shaheen Al Ghanim, and Mohamed Halal Al-Khulaifi—are contributors to the recent book entitled, The People of Qatar Want Reform . . . Too (2012). This collection of essays, written by various Qatari intellectual elites, could be considered as a second wave of the 1991 petition, calling for a host of reforms in the economic, educational, social, and political sphere. It remains to be seen how the Qatari leadership will react.
generosity was viewed favorably by many Qataris and contributed to a high level of personal popularity (Kéchichian 2008, 208). Yet despite Qatari support for their ruler, the evidence presented in Chapter 3 on the level of satisfaction with the welfare benefits shows cracks in the sociopolitical bargain.

Mixed-Method Research

Now that I have established the history of Qatar as an ideal-type rentier state—justifying my single case study design—I will explain in more depth my research choices for this dissertation. I begin with a discussion of the limits of quantitative analysis when conceptualizing, measuring, and exploring the causal mechanisms of the rentier state and its political legitimacy. However, my criticisms of certain applications of quantitative methods do not mean that quantitative analysis has no place in my research. I supplement my qualitative research with results from my original survey, which was created specifically for the Qatari case to ensure context-sensitive understanding and interpretation of questions and answers. This quantitative data, although still limited due to the authoritarian context, helps to quantify and corroborate the qualitative evidence I present on the Qatari case. I am combining the two methods in this dissertation to increase the generalizability and inferential strength of my research.

The limits of quantitative analysis

Although both rentier state theory and political legitimacy have been studied quantitatively, very real concerns exist regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of

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38 This survey was made possible by a grant (UREP 12-016-5-007) from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation) and a supplementary grant from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. I thank these institutions for their support, and note: “The statements made herein are solely the responsibility of the author.”
the variables used in these studies. Quantitative analysis of rentier state theory often conceptualizes the state-society relationship as a question of democracy, showing a correlation between regime measures of political openness and hydrocarbon exports as a share of GDP. Yet when it comes to the causal mechanisms underlying this link, as I noted in Chapter 1, static snapshots of the correlation between taxation and representation cannot provide us with a dynamic account of change over time, or an explanation of the processes that may link low extraction and political acquiescence (e.g., Ross 2001, 2009, 2012). In addition, as Gengler (2011, 26) notes, the misplaced focus on rentier regimes’ “relative lack of democracy” rather than “their unforeseen longevity and the persistence of their supposedly obsolete modes of rulership and citizenship” may continue to obfuscate rather than elucidate the causal processes at work (see also Anderson 1991; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Posusney 2005; Schlumberger 2007; Brynen et al. 2012, 201).

In addition, large-\(N\) quantitative studies often face problems in their search for appropriate variables to use as indicators for regression analysis. Gengler (2011, 21–22), in his research on Bahrain’s sociopolitical rentier bargain, notes his concern with the overreliance on the Polity IV measure of regime type for many quantitative tests of the rentier effect:

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39 It is important to note that quantitative time-series analysis can test causal claims, if the measurements are conceptualized and operationalized correctly. However, this is easier said than done when it comes to the complex causal process of rentierism. Even Luciani (2013, 116), in a recent work, notes the problems associated with testing rentier state theory using quantitative methods: “The link between oil and authoritarian rule has been belaboured in the literature in numerous studies based on statistical analysis of panel data, which suffer from many predictable problems, including a limited number of observations, the arbitrary quantification of essentially qualitative variables, a low dispersion of values, the arbitrary specification of equations to explain variables that clearly are determined by complex, multifaceted societal processes, among other things. At the same time, this approach has a tendency to propose simplistic explanations of the nexus between oil and authoritarianism (because complex explanations cannot be tested statistically).”

40 Ross (2001, 347) himself notes that the indicator of one of his hypothesized rentier causal mechanisms—group formation—is at best a loose proxy in the absence of good quantitative data on civic institutions and social groups, admitting that “this hypothesis cannot be tested directly with regression analysis.”

41 The Polity IV dataset categorizes states on a 20-point scale, ranging from full autocracy (-10) to full democracy (10) from 1800 to 2008. See Polity IV Project, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
Beginning with Ross’s 2001 article Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, which provoked at least a dozen follow-up studies, quantitative tests of the link between resource rents and democracy have dominated the rentier literature. What is more, almost all of these have elected to utilize exactly the same operationalization for their dependent variable: the ubiquitous Polity IV -10 to 10 scale of regime type. The difficulty with this procedure is that, since there is understandably little within- or between-country variation in this measure among the rentier states . . . and because the fuel rents of the six Gulf states exceed the rest of the world by two orders of magnitude . . . nearly all of the variation in “democracy” attributed to “oil” should in truth be attributed to the Gulf only. In which case we find ourselves in the same position we began, namely with the question of how to understand the uniqueness of Arab Gulf politics.

Mitchell (2011, 146), in his investigation of the dispersal and minimization of production workers as a causal mechanism of political stability in rentier states, also raises serious concerns about the use of the Polity IV variable, as well as Ross’s (2001) inability to elucidate the causal mechanisms behind his correlations or to account for outliers. He writes,

[Ross] demonstrates a negative correlation between oil exports as a percentage of GDP and degree of democracy, as estimated in the Polity data set. The data are derived from an evaluation of the institutional procedures by which the candidate for chief executive is selected, elected and held accountable. The narrowness of this conception of democracy, the unreliability of its measurement, and the assumption that diverse institutional arrangements can be compared and ranked as embodying differing degrees of a universal principle of democracy, are among the many problems presented by the data. Ross is unable to establish reasons for the statistical relationship between oil exports and Polity data ranking, or to account for places, such as Venezuela and Indonesia, that experienced a different relationship between the development of oil and the emergence of more democratic forms of rule. (Mitchell 2011, 146)

A last concern relates to the level of analysis: Much quantitative research on rentier state theory analyzes country-level rather than individual-level differences. The causal mechanisms underlying rentier state theory suggest a relationship between the individual citizen and the state, while large-\(N\) analyses, such as Ross’s (2001), focus on country-level differences in rentierism and their connection to political outcomes (Gengler 2013). As Gengler (2011, 25) writes,

Simply stated, previous studies have failed to test the actual individual-level causal processes that the [rentier] theory posits. It is, after all, very explicit in claiming that the reason states with sizable external rents tend to be stable (and authoritarian) is because ordinary individual citizens, if satisfied economically, are content to remain deferential politically. Rather than evaluate this specific causal hypothesis, however, investigators have sought to link country-level economic variables such as resource rents, taxation rates, and government spending to country-level political outcomes like regime type or democratization. Yet such studies can, at best, only confirm the existence of these macro associations; absent a new theory that ties the latter together directly without recourse to the individual level of analysis, they bring us no closer to knowing whether the rentier model is correct in its account of what underlies these links. For the theory’s boldest statement is not what it says about rent-dependent states themselves but what it assumes about their citizens: that it understands the drivers of popular interest and participation in politics, what it is that inclines ordinary citizens to seek an active role in political life or, alternatively, to shrink from it. These are no small claims.
In sum, there are several serious concerns with the focus and level of analysis of large-\(N\) studies of rentier states, as well as a dearth of good data indicators that would allow us to test nuanced causal mechanisms across a wide variety of contexts.

When we turn to a discussion of conceptualizing and measuring political legitimacy in quantitative data, the picture does not improve. I follow Schlumberger (2010, 236) in his assertion that we currently lack the ability to measure legitimacy from a quantitative standpoint: “The range of unresolved theoretical and methodological challenges is too large for quantified measurements of legitimacy to make sense and provide reliable results today.” The failure of recent efforts to do so provides a pertinent example. For example, Gilley’s (2009) large-\(N\) quantitative study purporting to define a universal conceptualization of legitimacy relies heavily on global attitude surveys, such as the World Values Survey. By relying on these types of surveys for the bulk of his data, Gilley’s sample is constrained to only those countries that have participated in these surveys, which results in a biased sample of countries.\(^{42}\) His data set of 72 countries includes only 12 authoritarian regimes—an unrepresentative 17 percent of his sample, considering that by some estimations there are more authoritarian regimes in the world than democratic/totalitarian regimes combined (Linz and Stepan 1996). This unrepresentative sample may have had an effect on his analysis; one of Gilley’s main conclusions is that democratic rights are an important universal source of legitimacy, which leaves him at a loss to explain why

\(^{42}\) Many authoritarian states refuse to allow measures of public opinion, such as the World Values Survey, or allow them only on a limited basis, with questions removed and results censored. Qatar’s participation in the 2010 wave of the World Values Survey, for example, was conditional on the preemptive removal of several political questions from the questionnaire, including queries on types and frequency of political action (V85–V94), opinions on whether various types of political systems would be a good way of governing Qatar (V127–V130), and an assessment of how democratic Qatar is today (V141). Anderson (1999, 6–7) notes the issues involved in attempting to use modern analytical tools in the authoritarian Middle East in particular; see also Tessler (2011) and Harik (1987).
six of his authoritarian regimes are empirically legitimate under his measurement. Particularly with regards to understanding the process of legitimization in the Middle East and North Africa region, or in authoritarian regimes throughout the world, we need deeper and more contextual analysis.

A deeper criticism of overreliance on global attitude surveys points to issues of cultural understanding and translation that can make for incomparability across individuals, countries, and regions (Brady 1985; Sen 2002; Suchman and Jordan 1990). As Rueschemeyer (2003, 331) notes, “Any comparison of similar phenomena in two different societal, national, or cultural settings has to determine conceptual equivalences that cut across the two contexts.” Conceptual equivalence is especially important when dealing with complex social science concepts, where scale abstractness and individual differences of interpretation can result in highly incomparable responses. This incomparability, known as differential item functioning, is often ignored in quantitative social science research, leading to dangerous misunderstandings and misinterpretations. When looking specifically at political legitimacy in the Arab world, conceptual equivalence is particularly important to take into account.

With these criticisms in mind, I turn to a justification of qualitative research as my primary source of evidence for my dissertation. An in-depth study of Qatar illuminates the causal mechanisms of hydrocarbon wealth and political longevity; ensures conceptual validity; and

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43 With regards to the four Middle East and North Africa countries included in his analysis (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco), Gilley (2009, 26) explains their empirical legitimacy, despite authoritarian governance, by stating simply that “Middle Eastern states . . . were well-enough enmeshed in their societies to earn the right to rule through some judicious selection of universal and particularistic performance.”

44 Gilley’s (2009) comparison of 72 countries to create his quantitative measurement of legitimacy is an example of this type of error. His reliance on global attitude surveys, without inserting contextual and cultural understanding, leads him to some conclusions that, in hindsight, seem particularly dubious. For example, he argues that Egypt is an empirically legitimate state and brushes aside claims of discontent and instability. The collapse of the Mubarak regime in Egypt in the early days of the Arab Spring (January 2011) exemplifies the mistaken conclusions that arise from overreliance on global attitude surveys and underrepresentation of authoritarian regimes in the data set.
contributes to the larger research agenda of political legitimacy, rentierism, and state-society relations in the Arab Gulf today.

**Qualitative analysis**

In order to study the causal processes of rentierism and political legitimacy, my qualitative research analyzes local Arabic media, including Qatar’s four Arabic newspapers, political cartoons, online blogs and forums, and a local radio call-in show (Watani Al Habib Sabah Al Khair [WHSK]), with English-language sources as supplements. Individual interviews also contribute to the in-depth, contextual knowledge needed to produce theoretically valid research. As Tessler, Nachtwey, and Banda (1999, xix) argue,

> Neither the strategies and calculations of groups and governments nor the attitudes and behavior of ordinary citizens can be adequately understood without a knowledge of the context within which these actors reside. Indeed, key concepts cannot even be applied sensibly without such contextual knowledge.

Focusing on qualitative research methods is particularly helpful for bringing the study of political legitimacy back into the political science literature as a whole. My qualitative research on Qatar is meant to provide the contextual knowledge necessary to address the key concern of Schlumberger (2010, 237)—that we must first understand the content of legitimacy in authoritarian contexts before creating methodologically sound quantitative measurements.

**Survey context and methods**

The failure of quantitative research to fully explain rentierism and political legitimacy does not mean this type of investigation cannot contribute to explaining the puzzle of Qatar’s political stability beyond allocation. I follow George and Bennett (2004, xv) in their assertion that qualitative and quantitative methodology “should be regarded as complementary, rather than competitive”; and Hall (2003, 399), that “we need more, not fewer, weapons in our
methodological arsenal.” As Tarrow (1995) notes, while quantitative analysis may be more powerful in demonstrating the strength of correlations and establishing the representativeness of observational data, qualitative analysis uncovers and explains the causal mechanisms that underlie quantitative correlations and provides the context behind the numbers. Despite common problems affecting quantitative research, such as thin conceptualization and invalid comparability, the benefits include theoretical generalization and knowledge accumulation. Thus, I am pleased that my dissertation combines in-depth qualitative study with a professional survey (sample size of 798) of the Qatari population, conducted in Arabic through Qatar University’s Social & Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) from January 15 to February 3, 2013.45

Survey analysis can be a particularly useful tool for social scientists to operationalize and measure attitudes and opinions in a nonexperimental setting, as long as the subjects share a similar understanding of the concepts being tested. In my use of quantitative survey methods in the study of Qatar’s political legitimacy formula, I sought to ensure culturally sensitive questions and proper understanding of individual responses.46 I was able to accomplish this through the fortuitous funding of my survey through a Qatar National Research Fund Undergraduate Research Experience Program (UREP) grant. UREP grants fund research teams of faculty and students, with the aim of providing close mentoring for the students involved. Thus, I was able to lead a team of three other faculty members and twelve undergraduate students from

45 Qatar University’s SESRI administered the survey to a random sample of adult Qatari citizens via face-to-face interviews using SESRI’s Computer-Assisted Personal Interview system. The sampling frame came from the 2010 census administered by the Qatar Statistical Authority. Qatari households were selected randomly via proportionate stratified sampling, a process that ensures representativeness in the sample and increases the accuracy of resulting statistical estimates. The survey relied on Qatar’s administrative zones for sample stratification. In the first stage, the sample of households was randomly selected with proportionate stratification. That is, a stratum (zone) containing a given percentage of households in the population was represented by the same proportion of the total number of sampled households. In the second stage, a respondent, 18 years or older, within each household was randomly selected. At this stage, all adults in the household had the same chance of being selected.
46 See Appendices A and B for the English and Arabic survey questionnaires.
Northwestern University in Qatar, half of whom were Qatari, and all of whom had lived in the country for extended periods of time—for some, their entire lives. Working closely with these students in small, faculty-mentored groups, we were able to create a unique and distinctive survey instrument that spoke to the specific concerns of the Qatari population. Although we drew from some existing questions from the World Values Survey and the Arab Barometer, in order to allow for comparisons, most of our work involved the creation of new questions, which had never before been asked of the Qatari population. The ability to work with knowledgeable students and faculty from the country in question helped to ensure that these questions were contextually and culturally sensitive.

Although this may be a surprise to the outside observer, Qataris are no strangers to survey research. Previous to their inclusion in the 2010 World Values Survey wave, there had already been some survey research in the country by the QSA and Qatar University’s SESRI. However, in the few years since the World Values Survey and the 2010 Qatari government population census, the Qatari population has become inured to survey research and perhaps even oversampled.\textsuperscript{47} QSA and SESRI surveys now compete with multinational surveys, such as Harris Polling and Zogby’s, with the Arab Barometer set to include Qatar for the first time in its upcoming survey wave. In fact, when you consider the relatively small size of the citizen population in particular, it is not surprising that Qataris are beginning to experience respondent

\textsuperscript{47} Two anecdotes: One of the SESRI samplers was randomly selected to participate in a QSA survey. Five minutes after he began the interview with QSA, a SESRI interviewer knocked on his door; he had also been randomly selected to participate in the SESRI survey running at the same time. In addition, one of the Qatari students working on the UREP grant was thrilled that her household was randomly selected for a SESRI survey on marriage (currently being conducted). It’s truly a small world when it comes to sampling the Qatari population!
fatigue, with response rates to surveys, which used to be up to 60 percent, lowering to around 40 percent as a result.\(^{48}\)

A particularly important point of note is that Qataris are expressing skepticism and criticism about some of the survey research in their country, showing a high level of awareness and concern regarding the validity of the results. For example, people expressed frustration and disappointment with one of the latest government-sponsored surveys disseminated through the news media: For the International Day of Happiness on March 20, 2013, the QSA surveyed 5,000 people—Qatari and non-Qatari—and concluded that 96.8 percent of the population are “happy.” Al Ziyara (2013c) ridiculed the 97 percent statistic, noting that many people are overwhelmed by the fast pace of development in the country. A cartoon by Abdulatif responds to another government study that was released, claiming to show that Qataris prefer to live in apartments over houses. Abdulatif’s cartoon depicts the other preferences that must be true if this is also true. [See Figure 4.] The reaction to these statistics shows a population that wants to be informed by real research, not government propaganda.

**Figure 4. “Qatari Preferences”**

Top: “A Study: Qataris Prefer Living in Apartments”

\(^{48}\) Our survey sampled 1939 people, and completed 798 interviews, for a response rate of about 42 percent. However, our original plan was to sample only 1140 households, anticipating a response rate of about 70 percent.
However, the increase of survey research in the country and the high level of interest by the population do not mean that Qatar has opened its doors fully to all topics of social science research. We began the project armed with the knowledge that survey research in the Arab world has lagged beyond other regions because of the authoritarian nature of the regimes, in which “the free flow of information is viewed as inimical to the political interests of national leaders” (Harik 1987, 67; see also Tessler 2011, xiii). Yet when considering the amount of money that the state of Qatar is putting toward education in general, and toward research and development in particular—aiming to spend 2.8 percent of its total GDP toward research (QNDS 2011, 99)—it seems counterproductive to their goal of creating a knowledge economy that there would still be very real limits on the questions that we could ask. We were never formally censored by any government authority; the Qatar National Research Fund did not ask to see the survey questionnaire before it was distributed. Rather, I was witness to the process of self-censorship, in which, at various stages, questions and topics would be removed preemptively to avoid crossing any perceived (but vague) red lines.49 Several topics—ranging from questions inviting direct

49 Perhaps laughably, the Doha Centre for Media Freedom has an article about self-censorship in the Arab world, noting, “It is the most pervasive form of media control in the region, and possibly one of the most effective. Self-censorship is an essential skill for journalists working in the Arab world” (Al-Makhadhi 2011). Qatar is in the process of creating a new media law, a draft of which stipulates that criticism of friendly countries, the royal family, or the higher interests of the state is off-limits (“Separate Legal Authority” 2012; see also Duffy 2013, 46–55; Roth 2013). This draft media law appears to keep its stipulations vague on purpose, as noted by The Peninsula, one of Qatar’s English-language daily newspapers, which submitted a memo that asked for clarification on which countries Qatar considers “friendly,” who should be considered a member of the royal family, and what exactly are the “higher interests of the state.” The vagueness works in the regime’s favor, as it encourages journalists and other commentators to overestimate the red lines and self-censor more than may be necessary. See also Ottaway (2003, 17) on self-censorship in semiauthoritarian regimes.
criticism of the national education reforms, listing appropriate families for marriage prospects, or probing whether citizens whose families arrived after 1930 should be allowed to vote in the Shura Council elections—were removed at various points. Even something as seemingly innocuous as asking about serving pork or alcohol in public places was nixed. Various concerns of cultural or political sensitivity were brought up as the reasons behind the preemptive removal of the topics in question. Gradually, the boundaries of self-censorship were drawn around our survey; it is a natural progression from the inability to ask about bacon to the impossibility of asking anything too direct about the politics of Qatar.

We did our best to reformulate questions in a way that would allow for cultural sensitivity as well as political tact, and avoided using a government “frame” in our questions unless necessary or desired (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Asher 2011). A particularly interesting cultural question attempted to measure whether citizens would prioritize national, traditional, or modern symbols of the state. We originally asked, “Here is a list of some well-known symbols of Qatar, which different people would give different levels of importance. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself consider the most important? And which would be the next most important?”, with a list of three symbols—e.g., the city skyline, the Qatari flag, and pearl diving—from which to choose. A month before our survey went out in the field, Qatar passed a law prescribing strict new rules for respecting the national flag (“Law Prescribes Strict Terms”

50 Here, we suggested an open-ended question: “Many people feel that part of what makes a good marriage is a correct match between families of similar social standing. Can you list the family names that you would be happy to have your son or daughter marry into?” We were attempting to elicit responses that would allow us to create webs of tribal identity in Qatar, in a similar line to many children’s friendship studies, which ask questions such as, “Are there any kids in your class who hang around together a lot? Who are they?” or nominate up to three children who are “well liked by lots of kids in the class” (e.g., Cairns et al. 1995). This technique is called social cognitive mapping, and it provides “information on affiliation patterns for each participant, as well as the structure of the social network as a whole,” leading to “a measure of social status in the classroom: social network centrality” (Estell 2007, 58). Although this question seemed completely appropriate to the student researchers, it was instantly removed once the original survey instrument was submitted to SESRI for translation and programming.
SESRI immediately drew attention to our question, concerned that it could be seen as inviting someone to break the law by prioritizing a different symbol over the flag. We had to reword the question as follows: “Qataris agree that the Qatari flag and National anthem are the most important symbols of Qatar. However, different people might give different levels of importance to other symbols. Would you please say which one of these you yourself consider the most important? And which would be the next most important?”, with choices of dhow [traditional boat], pearl diving, oil, and the Doha skyline (CULT6–7). Incredibly enough, on our last day of surveying, a respondent took umbrage to even the reworded question, accusing the interviewer of insulting the Qatari flag and threatening to call the police on him, which shows that SESRI’s concern may have been justified.51

To tackle particularly sensitive political issues, such as evaluation of the government, we used priority questions.52 In our politics section, we first gave the respondent different lists of national priorities and asked him to note his top two preferences, in order of importance (POLT1–4). Then, we asked the respondent for his opinion on what are the current top two priorities of the state of Qatar (POLT5). Without forcing the respondent to say directly whether the government is following his preferred policies, we can nevertheless measure a degree of

51 This incident is why our sample size is 798 instead of 800; the interviewer removed himself quickly from this home and called it quits early.
52 Priority questions structure responses in order to reveal the true order of preferences. For example, the Qatar World Values Survey tried to measure Qatari support for democracy. When asked, “How important is it for you to live in a democratic country?”, 74 percent of Qataris said “very” important (SESRI 2011, 9). When these same individuals had to choose between a list of four individual priorities (maintaining order, lower prices, more democracy, and freedom of speech), 62 percent prioritized maintaining order, followed by 21 percent on lowering prices. Only 11 percent favored increased democracy as the top priority, and only 6 percent favored free speech as the top priority. In other words, 83 percent favored physical and material welfare, while only 17 percent prioritized measures that would increase democratic rights in their country. When discussing these results with a focus group made up of four Qataris, two expats who were born in Qatar, and two expats who have lived in Qatar for several years, guesses as to the percentage of Qataris who felt living in a democratic country was “very important” ranged from 5 percent to 20 percent and the result of 74 percent was met with disbelief. The focus group also correctly guessed the top two priorities. These results demonstrate that more accurate understandings of the true beliefs of individuals can be gleaned from forcing them to make priority judgments in their responses rather than allowing them to express unlimited support for each individual concept.
policy agreement between the individual and the state. Comparing these two priority lists indicates the congruence between the respondent and the government, and provides an indirect but valid way of measuring the level of societal justification in an authoritarian context (discussed further in Chapter 4).

We also employed a new statistical methodology called anchoring vignettes to help correct for cultural interpretations and understandings of general concepts, such as political efficacy and freedom of speech (King et al. 2004). Often different people—both individuals and groups—understand these variables in different ways, leading to concerns with conceptual validity and reliability of comparisons. By supplementing a general self-assessment question with follow-up anchoring vignettes, we can directly measure the incomparability of individual responses and then mathematically adjust the response to a more accurate and objective level, a technique highlighted by King and colleagues (2004, 195–96) with regards to the self-reported political efficacy scores of Chinese and Mexican respondents to a World Health Organization survey in June 2000. It is important to keep in mind the overall context of the two countries at this point in time. Mexico had just voted, in a free and fair election, to defeat the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the 2000 presidential elections, allowing a peaceful transition of power to the opposition party for the first time in 71 years. On the other hand, China, despite its experiments with local democracy, had experienced nothing comparable on a national electoral level. Common sense, as well as historical context, would lead us to expect that Mexicans would rate themselves higher on a scale of political efficacy. Yet when asked a self-assessment question, “How much say do you have in getting the government to address issues that interest you?” on a scale of (1) “No say at all” to (5) “Unlimited say,” the self-assessments of Mexican versus Chinese political efficacy were the opposite of what we would expect, with
over 50 percent of Mexicans reporting that they have “no say” versus less than 30 percent of Chinese. If we take their responses at face value, we would have to conclude that Chinese citizens feel a much closer relationship to their government and feel they have a much greater say in matters of importance.

Yet if we correct this raw comparison (as the survey went on to do) by asking both sets of respondents to self-assess themselves in relation to a vignette scale, we get a much different picture. After describing an individual in an anchoring vignette with no political efficacy (“[Moses] lacks clean drinking water. He would like to change this, but he can’t vote, and feels that no one in the government cares about this issue. So he suffers in silence, hoping something will be done in the future” (King et al. 2004, 193)), we discover that 40 percent of Chinese respondents would place themselves below this individual in terms of political efficacy. After correcting for the respondents’ subjective interpretation of the question, we can better understand their subjective views of their political efficacy—and see that Mexican citizens, in reality, have higher subjective views of political efficacy than the Chinese.

We used the same technique to ask questions in our survey about political efficacy—by first asking various self-assessment questions (such as POLT11) and then by describing a situation in which several individuals sought to get a street light installed in their neighborhood (POLT21)—and about freedom of speech—again, by first asking the self-assessment question (EDUM2) and then describing two different situations in which an unlucky Qatari needed to complain (EDUM4–7). All of these questions yielded richer data that allows me to make sure the general self-assessments are mathematically in line with the contextual situations.

As difficult as it was to write the survey, given the cultural and political restraints, it was equally tricky to ensure a proper translation. Translation issues in survey research are another
source of concern for Qataris, who fear that misunderstandings will result in incorrect knowledge accumulation. For example, a woman called the radio show to complain about the non-Qatari (or even non-Arab) pollsters showing up at her house (WHSK 10/22/12b). “They should send us Qataris who can understand our language,” she complained. “These pollsters, if they want true data and correct facts, they should send us people who can speak our language.” This complaint shows the importance of contextually sensitive questions and proper translation, a crucial, yet sometimes overlooked, aspect of survey research.

When creating our survey, we spent a month dealing with translation issues after the questions had been formulated. After providing SESRI with the English-language version of the survey, an Arabic translation service was employed to translate the document, which we then scrutinized and adjusted over a period of several weeks. Some translation issues bordered on the hilarious, such as the vignette of the two Qatari women who choose to remove their abaya (black robe) or hijab (head scarf) when traveling abroad (CULT20–21). The Arabic version originally used a verb that, while technically correct, in colloquial usage conjured up images of the two women “stripping” off the abaya and/or hijab; we changed this to a more neutral phrase of “she doesn’t wear” the clothing in question. A more interesting translation issue arose during the pretest, in which no respondent understood the term for “civil petition,” which was listed as one of the actions that our unlucky Qatari could take to make his concerns heard (EDUM4–7). We had to change the Arabic word to one that meant “complaint” or “grievance,” which does not give exactly the same original meaning and weight to the action. Besides specific words and phrases, we also found that entire sentences had to be rewritten to avoid awkwardness and to make the structure more natural for a Qatari audience. Translation issues in cross-cultural survey research must concern itself with “semantic equivalence across languages, conceptual
equivalence across cultures, and normative equivalence to the source survey” (“Guidelines for Translating” 2007). Our multistage translation process paid special attention to these issues in an attempt to create a truly equivalent bilingual survey.

Although I am relying on my qualitative evidence to unpack the causal mechanisms of Qatar’s political legitimacy, the survey data help to corroborate and quantify my observations. For the justification dimension, the survey captures citizen evaluation of the current political system and current leadership (POLT1–5; POLT6; POLT11; CULT5C), and the perception of congruence between religious-cultural values and idea of the “greater good” with current government structure and policies (POLT11C; ECON17; ECON19; CULT4; CULT10–12; CULT13; CULT16). For the consent dimension, the survey captures citizen perceptions of political efficacy (POLT8–9; POLT11A; POLT21), levels of voter registration and municipal election turnout (POLT14–16), incidents of popular mobilization (CULT14; CULT15A; CULT24–27), and freedom of speech (EDUM2; EDUM3; EDUM4–7). These indicators span both attitudinal and behavioral aspects and follow my theoretical conceptualization of legitimacy (Beetham 1991). Although I do not combine these indicators to form an overarching (and possibly conceptually confused) index to “measure” the current level of political legitimacy in Qatar, these data help inform an overall assessment of the success of Qatar’s legitimization strategies.

To summarize, in this chapter I discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the single case study compared to the cross-case comparative method. By establishing Qatar as an ideal case study for rentier state theory, I gave weight to my methodological decision to focus solely on Qatar when testing the classic theory. I then explained how I rely primarily on qualitative evidence to show how Qatar goes beyond allocation to bolster its political stability. My narrative
benefits from the quantitative research results from my original survey, which avoids the pitfalls of general survey research by being contextually sensitive and specific to the case of Qatar. By mixing methods in my dissertation, I increase the generalizability and inferential strength of my research, and help provide a more detailed explanation of the causal mechanisms underlying rentierism and political legitimacy in Qatar and beyond.
CHAPTER THREE: THE DYNAMIC ALLOCATION-ACQUIESCENCE BARGAIN

This chapter’s task is to go beyond generalizations to the specifics of the economic allocations: the distribution mechanisms, the financial amounts, and the reaction of the Qatari people. By discussing each major benefit in more detail, this chapter provides useful facts about the Qatari welfare system that have not yet been described in Western literature.\(^{53}\) An in-depth look at the economic benefits is eye-opening: Even a state as rich and as small and as generous as Qatar is far from being able to give all (or even most) of its citizens a life of luxury.

Further, the qualitative and quantitative evidence presents a startling fact: Between 20–30 percent of the Qatari population express dissatisfaction with each of the major economic benefits provided to them by the state. Instead of the state buying acquiescence through economic allocations, my research shows that a significant portion of the Qatari population is dissatisfied with these allocations, because of both rising individual expectations and perceptions of inequality in comparison to other recipients. Further, although economic allocation may be an important part of Qatar’s political legitimacy formula, there is little statistical evidence to show a correlation between economic satisfaction and various measures of silent political loyalty.

In sum, the evidence presented here depicts the dynamic—and ultimately insufficient—allocation-acquiescence rentier bargain. Chapter 3 demonstrates that despite an incredible amount of welfare and other allocations, Qataris are not fully satisfied. The logical conclusion is

\(^{53}\) The lack of clarity surrounding Qatari welfare benefits is not surprising given the lack of transparency by government institutions and officials on citizen entitlements. Qatari citizens themselves are often unclear about the exact benefits that are distributed and how to secure their shares. To this end, this chapter will provide a fuller overview of the welfare benefits of Qatari citizens, based on the relevant laws as well as interviews with Qataris. This overview seeks to provide evidence for the claims of several Gulf specialists (e.g., Herb 1999; Okruhlik 1999b) that economic distribution can create enemies as well as friends. It also seeks to introduce the background information necessary to explain why between 20–30 percent of the Qatari population express dissatisfaction with the various economic benefits given free of charge by the government.
that there must be more to the explanation of Qatar’s political stability than economic allocation alone, leading to the inclusion of state strategies of societal justification (through noneconomic nation building, Chapter 4) and societal consent (through state-society interaction on major policy issues, Chapter 5) within my revised theoretical framework of rentierism. This chapter provides the foundation for my overall argument—that we need to go beyond allocation when explaining state-society relations under rentierism in the modern Arab Gulf—and sets the stage for the chapters that follow.

**Qatari Social Welfare Benefits Today: Promises and Reality**

The supposed riches of the Qatari state have been extolled in Western media for decades. One of the earliest mentions of Qatar—“Elcatar”—can be found in the UK’s *Daily Express* in 1935, in which the life of the “pearl king with 84 wives” is described as follows:

The sheik has eighty-four women in his harem. . . . He has four thousand negroes, engaged in the pearl fisheries. . . . They man the 800 pearling vessels this Arabian magnate owns. He lives in a castle guarded night and day by negroes with drawn swords. His Court is composed of astrologers, jesters, dancing girls and dervishes alleged to be gifted with prophecy. Great piles of pearls are heaped before his throne each evening for his inspection. He can boil an egg by burying it in the sand outside his dining room for two minutes. (“Pearl King” 1935)

With the exception of the buried egg trick—which I plan on trying out on the next 50 degree Celsius day—these assertions had little truth to them. The “pearl king” at the time, Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani, had been described as “impecunious” throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Zahlan 1979, 63, 75), especially as a result of the Japanese cultured pearl market that devastated the pearl industry in the country (Crystal 1995, 116–118; Althani 2012b, 31–32). Money was such a concern to him that he refused to sign the 1935 preliminary oil concession agreement with the British before actually seeing the 400,000 rupees being paid to him upon his signature (Zahlan 1979, 76–77). The fictitious image portrayed of him in the Western media
portended the continued misunderstanding of Qatari wealth in outsider accounts that we see to this day.

Today, outsiders describe the Qatari social welfare state in glowing, expansive, even disbelieving terms. A National Public Radio reporter touring the country in the mid-2000s described Qatar’s “oilngas” wealth distribution as follows:

The emir is, if nothing else, generous. He shares Qatar’s vast oilngas wealth among his subjects. In fact, this is the ultimate welfare state. Gasoline sells for fifty cents a gallon, cheaper than water. Well, that’s not quite true. Water in Qatar is free. So is electricity and health care and education. The government even pays a small salary to Qatari college students. When a Qatari man gets married, the government gives him a plot of land to build a house, an interest-free mortgage, and, to boot, a monthly allowance of roughly seven thousand dollars. And unlike in European welfare states, Qatars aren’t burdened with high taxes. In fact, they aren’t burdened with taxes at all. No income tax. No sales tax. Nothing. (Weiner 2008, 118)

A more academic treatment of the economic benefits doled out to the citizenry, and frequently cited in recent works on the Gulf,54 describes the system as comprehensively cradle-to-grave:

[T]hanks to substantial rent revenues, the Qatari state has instituted a comprehensive social welfare system through which it attends to most of the basic needs of its citizens from cradle to grave. In fact, the state goes far above and beyond merely providing for its citizens’ basic needs. For example, in addition to free healthcare and education—including at premier American universities that have set up campuses in Doha—Qatari citizens do not pay for utilities, including landline telephone service. A job in the civil service is guaranteed to all Qatari high school and university graduates. Moreover, all civil service positions come with a generous housing allowance, which is doubled if the employee is married. Also, Qatari men who marry Qatari women automatically become eligible for a regular government stipend. Additionally, all Qatari citizens are eligible to receive plots of land ranging from 700 to 1,500 square meters and an interest-free loan of up to QR85,000 (approximately $23,000 in 2008) toward its development. Significantly, in order to receive the land and the loan, Qataris need to apply directly to the Amiri Diwan, a process through which the Amir’s patronage is reinforced both symbolically and practically. (Kamrava 2009, 406)

54 Kamrava’s (2009) information has been cited to back up the claims that all Qatari citizens are eligible for extensive cradle-to-grave welfare benefits, usually with the accompanying follow-up that these benefits help ensure political acquiescence. For example, Heeg (2010, 47), Demmelhuber (2011, 8), and Commins (2012, 284) all rely on Kamrava’s brief description of the rentier benefits to describe a typical Qatari citizen’s entitlements. Commins (2012, 284), in particular, links the high standard of living and extensive economic benefits directly to the lack of general social unrest in the country. Most recently, Davidson (2012, 53, 60), in his six-country survey of the Arab Gulf, relies heavily on Kamrava’s account when discussing Qatar’s welfare state. However, Kamrava’s main point in his article was to describe the manoeuvrings of Emir Hamad to consolidate power—within the ruling family, throughout Qatari society, and among the international community—in the years following his 1995 coup. His paragraph describing the benefits of Qatari citizens is part of a larger argument that the emergence of an autonomous and politically independent Qatari civil society has been undermined by state-supplied welfare benefits. Being tangential to his main argument, the benefits themselves do not receive more than a cursory overview in his work. The literature would benefit from additional details on the Qatari welfare system.
In general, the state of Qatar appears to embody the generous, albeit slightly sinister, benevolent dictatorship\textsuperscript{55} envisioned by Tocqueville over 150 years ago, as

an immense, protective power which is alone responsible for securing [the people’s] enjoyment and watching over their fate. That power is absolute, thoughtful of detail, orderly, provident, and gentle. It would resemble parental authority if, father-like, it tried to prepare its charges for a man’s life, but on the contrary, it only tries to keep them in perpetual childhood. It likes to see the citizens enjoy themselves, provided that they think of nothing but enjoyment. It gladly works for their happiness but wants to be the sole agent and judge of it. It provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, makes rules for their testaments, and divides their inheritances. Why should it not entirely relieve them from the trouble of thinking and all the cares of living? (de Tocqueville [1835] 2000, 692)

Perhaps we should not be surprised when the director of the Qatar branch of the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) was quoted in 2011 as saying, “Qatar is one of the richest countries on earth. The Qatars are very well satisfied, the majority of people are perfectly happy. Qatar doesn’t need democracy” (Hobson 2011), and wrote in 2013 that Qatars are “too rich to care” about upsetting the political status quo (Roberts 2013). The extensive welfare system certainly seems to help make the case that the sociopolitical rentier bargain should be alive and well in the state of Qatar.

Before we chalk up the victory for classic rentier state theory, however, let’s take a look at the numbers from my recent survey on the self-reported levels of satisfaction with the various economic allocations by the state. [See Table 1.] In response to the question, “The State of Qatar provides many economic benefits to citizens. How satisfied are you with the following types of benefits?”, between 20 and 30 percent of Qatars noted that they were not very or not at all satisfied with most of the major allocations offered by the state. In addition, there were significant numbers, between 30 and 40 percent of Qatars, who reported that they were somewhat satisfied, which nevertheless indicates some level of dissatisfaction with the benefits

offered. Only two of the benefits received more than 50 percent of strong support from the population—medical care and college education—with the retirement benefits garnering the lowest levels of strong support, at under 34 percent of the population.

Table 1. Qatari Satisfaction with Economic Allocation from the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Not very</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment opportunities</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to medical care</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to K–12 education</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to college education &amp; scholarships</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land allotment</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement benefits</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage allowance</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

How do we explain these results? This chapter will now look at the various major benefits in more detail, explaining how each benefit is distributed (based on the laws as well as interviews with Qataris) and then depicting the Qatari dissatisfaction with these benefits, through qualitative and quantitative evidence.

**Employment Opportunities**

Public sector employment is one of the most prevalent and important benefits allocated to citizens in rentier states in the Arab Gulf (e.g., Valeri 2009; Davidson 2005; Hertog 2010b), and
Qatar is no exception. However, there are limits to even Qatar’s (bloated and redundant) state bureaucracy. Kamrava (2009, 406) writes, “A job in the civil service is guaranteed to all Qatari high school and university graduates.” This guarantee would be news to many Qataris, who complain vocally, in the newspapers, online, and through the radio, about their inability to find a job despite months or even years of searching (e.g., Al Ziyara 2013b). Further, although the country’s total unemployment rate is estimated at 0.6 percent (QSA 2011, 15), the unemployment rate for Qatari citizens is listed at 3.9 percent (QNB 2012, 9).

Nevertheless, although employment is not “guaranteed” in the absolute sense, the state of Qatar has clearly made it a top priority to encourage all Qataris to attain their desired level of employment, through provision of government sector jobs, a well-publicized push for increased Qatari employment in the private sector (known as “Qatarization”), and enhanced education and training to create more marketable skills among the national population. According to the Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Social Services website,

The Ministry of Labor provides job opportunities for citizens. . . . It participates in preparing the Qatarization policies and the programs regarding the participation of the national labor force and follows

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56 Unemployment rates for the country as a whole (estimated at 0.6 percent by QSA 2011, 15) are much lower than the unemployment rates of Qatari nationals in particular (3.9 percent, QNB 2012, 9), because expatriate workers’ residence permits are linked to their employment and are repatriated when their employment is over. My survey gives comparable numbers to the QSA data, showing that we can be confident in making estimates. Of 798 total respondents, 396 Qatari (50 percent) reported that they were currently employed, with a virtually equal number (401) reporting that they were unemployed. Of the unemployed Qatari, 27 percent indicated that they were retired, 22 percent were students, and 42 percent were housewives. Nine percent of the unemployed Qatari (n=36) indicated that they were actively looking for work, which equals 4.5 percent of the total sample. Of these, females (n=21) represented 58 percent of active searchers for work, mirroring the QSA finding that 72 percent of unemployed Qatari were female (QNB 2012, 9). In addition, only eight respondents reported that they had not completed their secondary education (22 percent), a similar finding to the QSA data that 75 percent of the unemployed had completed their secondary education (QSA 2011, 15). However, even these rates of unemployment for Qatari citizens may be lower than the actual numbers, as the official rates do not take into account those who have stopped looking for work. The perception among Qataris is that the unemployment rate is much higher than reported. For example, of the self-reported unemployed housewives, 59 percent of them (n=77) had completed their secondary education, making them possibly employable if they desired. In addition, of the self-reported retirees, 71 percent of them (n=77) were under the mandatory retirement age of 60 (31 of them under the age of 50). The issue of Qatari men leaving the labor force at a young age, in part because of the ability to access the pension plan as early as age 40, was noted as a significant future challenge for the Qatari labor market in the Qatar National Development Strategy (QNDS 2011, 147, 155).
their implementation. It registers Qataris searching for work and nominates them for jobs suitable for them.\textsuperscript{57}

The Qatar Statistics Authority’s (QSA 2011) survey on the labor force notes that 60.7 percent of unemployed Qataris were registered in various government bureaus (such as the manpower planning department or the labor department), which are meant to help them in their employment searches. An annual Qatar Career Fair is held every April, organized by Qatar Foundation, Qatar Petroleum, the Emiri Diwan, Qatar University, and the Ministry of Labor, to promote job opportunities for Qataris exclusively.\textsuperscript{58} The website notes,

This economic, cultural and social event . . . will offer Qatari students education, recruitment, training opportunities & development in order to enhance their abilities and strengthen their skills enabling them to meet the challenges in national development. Through effective participation in this fair, public and private institutions can provide the largest number of jobs to Qatari citizens, provide the right employment opportunities and meet the objectives of the Qatarization policy. This is done by selecting students that meet the criteria defined by companies and sponsoring their higher education depending on the needs of their jobs.\textsuperscript{59}

Public sector employment, by law, prioritizes hiring Qatari nationals over any other applicant,\textsuperscript{60} and various Qatarization policies have been put in place to encourage Qatari entrance


\textsuperscript{58} See the Qatar Career Fair, \url{http://www.qatarcareerfair.com.qa/en/Main.aspx} (accessed March 22, 2013). The Qatar Career Fair is entirely focused on Qatari-only employment, noting that their audience is “Qatari high school, institute and university students” and “Qatari graduates,” along with their parents and other “concerned parties,” such as professional recruiters (“Our Audience,” \url{http://www.qatarcareerfair.com.qa/en/AboutQCF/QCF_Our_Audience.aspx}). Expatriates, including the expatriate students in Qatar’s university system, are allowed into the career fair (although sometimes their CVs are not; see Khatri 2013), but the companies often refuse to take an expatriate’s CV or immediately throw it in the trash as soon as the student walks away (personal interview, April 2012; see also Andrews 2012). Some Qataris have called to forbid expatriates entrance altogether (WHSK 4/4/12).


\textsuperscript{60} Law No. 8 of 2009 on human resources management, Article 14, provides a descending list of preference for public sector employment: “Any person appointed in one of the jobs: (1) Shall be a Qatari national, and if not, priority shall be given to the offspring of a Qatari female married to a non-Qatari, the offspring of a non-Qatari male married to a Qatari, the nationals of the Gulf Cooperative Council, nationals of the Arab World and then to nationals of other countries.” This law is the latest in a long line of labor laws, beginning in 1962, that dictated that a Qatari received first priority in employment decisions, followed by Arab expatriates, and then other nationalities (Zahlan 1979, 124). See the full law at \url{www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=2644&language=en}. 
to the private sector workforce as well. Yet there is clearly a national preference for public sector (government) work. Recent statistics from the Qatar National Bank (QNB 2012) and the Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA 2011) survey on the labor force paint a stark picture of Qatari work patterns: 92 percent of the Qatari workforce is employed in government or semigovernment institutions, and 99 percent of the private sector workforce, which accounts for 75 percent of the country’s jobs and has ten times the job growth of the public sector, is comprised of expatriates (QNB 2012, 6–7).

A look through the salary and benefits of the public sector jobs makes it clear why so many citizens prefer to work within the state. There are thirteen pay grades of employees, along with the assistant deputy minister and the undersecretary of the ministry. All pay grades seventh level or higher receive higher amounts of extra “allowances”—social, housing, transport, phone, furniture, and travel—although all government employees receive these benefits. These benefits are increased (although not quite doubled) if the employee is married, although if both of the spouses are employed within the government, only one person receives the married rate of allowances, while the other receives the single rate (Article 26, Law 8/2009).

61 Qatar has scaled back its expectations and timelines for “Qatarization” of the private sector from its earlier efforts, such as the Strategic Qatarization Plan of June 2000, which called for 50 percent Qatarization of the energy and industry workforce by 2005. (See the plan’s website: http://www.qatarization.com.qa/qatarization/qat_web.nsf/web/plan_main?opendocument.) In contrast to these heady (and perhaps unrealistic) plans, the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2008) did not mention the word “Qatarization” once. Qatar’s emphasis now lies on “fostering a capable and motivated workforce” (see QNDS 2011, 146–60), with a target of 15 percent Qatari participation in the private sector by 2016 (QNDS 2011, 152).

62 Sometimes the additional allowances are divided between the lower (8–13) and the higher (1–7) pay grades, and sometimes they are divided into three segments: lower (8–13), middle (2–7), and higher (1, plus the assistant ministers and undersecretaries). Social allowances (Article 26) fall into the former category, and housing (Article 27), transport (Article 29), and the one-time furniture (Article 31) allowances fall into the latter category. Travel allowances, being particularly generous, are divided into higher daily allowances for grade 1 and above versus all other pay grades (Article 34), and flight tickets are divided into first class (for grades 3 and above), business class (4–7), and economy class (8–13) (Article 35). The monthly mobile allowance is based on the level of usage (Article 45); however, only employees grade 7 and above are entitled to an annual mobile phone allowance of 600 riyals (Article 44). Please note that the social allowances (Article 26) as well as the overall salaries (Article 21) were increased by 60 percent over the numbers listed in this law, as per Emiri Decree No. 50 of 2011.
The minimum salaries and various allowances are set up to ensure that even the lowest levels of Qatari employees receive a minimally adequate living salary.\textsuperscript{63} For the entry-level Qatari national, employed as a single worker at the lowest pay grade, he (or she) can expect a minimum take-home annual pay of over 100,000 Qatari riyals (almost $30,000), and being married increases his minimum total pay to almost 142,000 Qatari riyals (almost $40,000)—and keep in mind that these totals are tax-free. A single grade-7 government employee, the starting level of the higher positions of government, can expect a minimum take-home annual pay of almost 215,000 Qatari riyals (almost $60,000), which, if married, increases to over 260,000 QR (more than $70,000). The highest level of a regular government employee can expect a minimum annual pay of 444,000 QR (over $120,000) if single, and over 500,000 QR (almost $140,000) if married. Further, the annual performance evaluations allow for salary increases of 1–6 percent per year up to the maximum limits of the pay grade for all but the weakest performers (Article 23, Law 8/2009), and those with high reviews whose salaries have reached the end of the pay grade limit continue to receive the annual percentage bonus as a financial reward (Article 24, Law 8/2009). [See Table 2 and Table 3.]

\textsuperscript{63} Of course, the definition of “minimally adequate” is in a constant state of flux. The government commission in charge of the human resources laws recently proposed amendments that would further increase the housing, social, and transportation benefits for government employees (Salman 2013). As Herb (1999, 242) aptly noted, “[T]he price of support is not fixed: it is subject to inflation. At the beginning of the oil era rulers, perhaps, had enough money to meet what the people perceived to be their legitimate needs. The perceptions of Gulf citizens of their reasonable needs, however, rapidly caught up to the actual level of oil revenues, and then exceeded them.”
Table 2. Typical Salary and Allowances for a Qatari at Various Governmental Pay Grades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay grade</th>
<th>Minimum salary</th>
<th>Social allowance</th>
<th>Housing allowance</th>
<th>Transport allowance</th>
<th>Mobile* allowance</th>
<th>Single/married Total per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 13  (lowest)</td>
<td>3,520</td>
<td>2,560/4,000</td>
<td>1,500/3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>8,880/11,820 ($2,440/3,247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>2,560/4,000</td>
<td>1,500/3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>14,160/17,100 ($3,890/4,698)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>4,000/6,400</td>
<td>2,500/4,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>17,900/21,800 ($4,918/5,989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>4,000/6,400</td>
<td>2,500/4,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>24,300/28,200 ($6,676/7,747)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 1 (highest)</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>4,000/6,400</td>
<td>3,500/6,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>37,000/41,900 ($10,165/11,511)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on usage, not seniority; can range from 300–1,000 riyals a month (Article 45, Law 8/2009). Calculations (in Qatari riyals and USD) based on Law 8/2009 and Emiri Decree 50/2011.

Table 3. Annual Total Pay for a Regular Qatari Government Employee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay grade</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Married</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>Maximum*</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>Maximum*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 13 (lowest)</td>
<td>106,560 QR ($29,011)</td>
<td>121,920 QR ($33,495)</td>
<td>141,840 QR ($38,967)</td>
<td>157,200 QR ($43,187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>169,920 QR ($46,681)</td>
<td>208,320 QR ($57,231)</td>
<td>205,200 QR ($56,374)</td>
<td>243,600 QR ($66,923)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>214,800 QR ($59,010)</td>
<td>253,200 QR ($69,560)</td>
<td>261,600 QR ($71,868)</td>
<td>300,000 QR ($82,418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>291,600 QR ($80,110)</td>
<td>330,000 QR ($90,659)</td>
<td>338,400 QR ($92,967)</td>
<td>376,800 QR ($103,516)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 1 (highest)</td>
<td>444,000 QR ($121,978)</td>
<td>597,600 QR ($164,176)</td>
<td>502,800 QR ($138,132)</td>
<td>656,400 QR ($180,330)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on a maximum base salary of 4,800 for Grade 13; 12,000 for Grade 8; 12,800 for Grade 7; 19,200 for Grade 4; and 40,000 for Grade 1. Additional performance-based financial rewards can further increase the total annual amount (Article 24, Law 8/2009). Calculations (in Qatari riyals and USD) based on Law 8/2009 and Emiri Decree 50/2011.

It is important to note that these salaries, especially at the beginning levels, do not ensure luxurious living conditions to the extent that outsiders may believe. While it is true that salaries are not taxed, the government does take 5 percent of the salaries automatically for the pension...
fund (Law 24/2002), and the cost of housing in particular is seen as a major burden. I will discuss this further in the section on land allotment and housing provisions, but public housing is only provided for free to those who have demonstrated a particular level of need (financial, or because of old age or disability), with harsh punishments threatened for those who lie on their applications (Law 2/2007). The housing allowance of 1,500–6,000 riyals per month for regular government employees is not enough to cover most two-bedroom apartment rentals in Doha, never mind the traditional Arabic houses or villas, in which over 90 percent of Qataris live, according to my survey. Khalifa Saleh Al Haroon, the Qatari columnist (“Mr. Q”) and cofounder of the website “I Love Qatar,” describes the financial conundrum as follows:

It’s time to bust a few myths. I’m so sick and tired of expats assuming that Qataris are all rich clones. . . . Graduates start off with a salary of 15k depending on the job. Those without a degree have salaries as low as 5k. 15k sounds pretty good, right? Well, then you haven’t lived in Qatar. Half your salary goes straight to accommodation, a huge amount to support family, another huge amount to bills (Qtel comes to mind as a wallet sucker) and the list goes on.

Let’s put this all together now. Ok, I graduated and got a job. Let’s say that it’s 18k a month. I live in my family’s house to save some cash. I decide to get married finally. I go to my love’s family and I’m asked where I’m going to house her. Oh, um, well, I’ll get an apartment. It’s not the norm but let’s say they agree. I put her in a fully furnished apartment in ZigZag [Towers], which costs 8k. All right, got 10k left. Now I have to give my wife her monthly salary. It’s 2k. Ok, got 8k left. Now it’s time to pay bills. Phone, Internet, petrol, installments for a car, and a bit here and there. Let’s assume it’s 4k. Ok, I have 4k left to cover groceries, home insurance, some entertainment, general shopping, etc.

Do you see where I’m going here? In this scenario, life is pretty ok isn’t it? But have I demonstrated that I’m a rich Qatari? It’s all relative. (I’m still quite a lucky person in life to be born a Qatari of course. Something I definitely appreciate). . . . So at the end of the day, separate fact from fiction. I’m off to bed under my silk sheets. Oh! Need to brush my teeth with my diamond-encrusted toothbrush first, almost forgot. (Al Haroon 2010)


65 This financial conundrum often forces Qataris to take out loans from the bank to finance the building or purchasing of their own home. Qatar Development Bank, the largest financer of housing loans for nationals, provides up to 1.2 million riyal loans payable over a 35-year period in monthly installments of 2,857–3,365 riyals, depending on whether a 1 percent administrative fee is assessed on the loan. This monthly installment, nevertheless, is not fully covered or barely covered by the housing allowances provided by the public sector employment [see Table 1]. Of course, smaller loans would entail smaller monthly payments, but most Qataris I spoke with felt that any house nowadays would cost at least one million riyals to construct or purchase.
Al Haroon’s tongue-in-cheek rant helps put the following Abdulatif cartoon into perspective; many Qataris feel misunderstood and frustrated by external perceptions that they are all living a life of luxury. [See Figure 5.]

**Figure 5. “100 Percent of Qataris”**

(Right): “How are the poll results that are coming out in tomorrow’s newspaper?”
(Left): “100 percent of Qataris have a salary that is over 100,000 [riyals a month]! 100 percent of Qataris don’t have any loans! 100 percent of Qataris have nice cars that are the latest models! 100 percent of Qataris drink cappuccinos from the Sheraton or the Four Seasons! Oh . . . and I forgot to tell you! I didn’t find anyone to sample for the poll except for a minister I found standing in front of his palace!”

*Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, January 28, 2013*

The fact that the majority of Qataris have to pay for their housing out of their salaries is an underappreciated fact by many outsiders. One of the biggest impediments to Qatari motivation (as opposed to qualifications\(^66\)) to work in the private sector is that Qataris would be “local hires,” which means they do not need sponsorship by the company to live and work in Qatar. The sponsorship system, particularly for low-wage and low-skill workers, has been criticized by various human rights groups (e.g., HRW 2012, 69–77; see also Morin 2013); but for white-collar

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\(^{66}\) The skills and qualifications of Qatari workers can also be an impediment to Qatari entrance to the private sector workforce. QNDS (2011, 150) notes that 3 percent of the Qatari workforce is “semi-skilled” and 11 percent of the Qatari workforce is “unskilled.” These low-skilled workers are employed in the government, government corporation, or mixed sector, but none is employed in the private sector. (Three-fourths of Qataris employed in the private sector are considered “highly skilled” and the rest are “skilled.”) The private sector is not looking to hire Qataris at low-skilled positions, nor, necessarily, are Qataris looking to fill these positions, meaning that approximately 14 percent of the Qatari workforce is not qualified for work in the private sector.
expatriates in the private sector, sponsorship provides a host of benefits outside of the tax-free salary, such as a generous housing allowance or provided accommodation, education benefits for each school-aged child, private health insurance, and annual flights home for all family members.67 None of these benefits would be given to a Qatari who is hired on a local contract (Al-Nasr 2010).

For all these reasons, public sector employment is seen as much more desirable than private sector employment, a perception that was only increased after the well-publicized 60 percent salary increase for all public sector workers through Emiri Decree No. 50 of 2011.68 As well, the working hours (shorter) and the actual responsibilities (easier) are also seen as more desirable (QNB 2012, 6)—making “undemanding government jobs” part of the expectation of rentier citizens throughout the Arab Gulf (Tétreault 2013, 44). The citizen preference for government jobs in an already sprawling and inefficient state bureaucracy has created an economic conundrum for Qatar. Unpopular forced retirements69 can free up only so many jobs

67 To take my husband’s total salary and benefits package as an example, he is currently making a base monthly salary of approximately twenty thousand riyals a month (tax free). We live in a three-bedroom apartment in a compound (with playgrounds, gym, pool, tennis court) that costs his employer approximately thirteen thousand riyals a month; the employer also pays for the vast majority of the (already subsidized) electricity and water usage. My husband receives a stipend every year for annual flights home for the three members of our family, generous enough to fully cover three nonstop flights to the United States on five-star Qatar Airways. We are given global health insurance that can be used throughout the world and enables us to access the private health clinics and hospitals in Qatar and elsewhere for a $10 co-pay. Although his employer “only” provided an interest-free loan toward the purchase of a car, some private employers pay for an employee’s rental or purchase of a car, along with any additional transportation costs. All of these benefits add up to a much higher total package than a local hire who receives only a salary.
68 Emiri Decree No. 50 of 2011, issued in September 2011, raised salaries for virtually all Qatari employees and retirees of the public sector and the military. Military personnel received 50 percent salary raises, with military officers receiving 120 percent salary raises. All Qatari citizens in public sector jobs received 60 percent salary raises, and all retired Qatari employees of the public and military sector received the same raises in their pensions (“HH Heir Apparent” 2011). For an irreverent but informative local take on the salary increase, see Al Haroon (2011). See an English summary of the Emiri Decree and find the full Arabic text at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.details?p_lang=en&p_isn=91337.
69 Qatar’s Law No. 8 of 2009 on human resources management has several articles devoted to the mandatory retirement age. Article 159, which lists the reasons for employee terminations, begins its list with, “1. Reaching the age of sixty (60).” Exceptions to this policy can be made on an annual basis, but it becomes increasingly arduous, particularly after the age of 65. Article 160 states, “The employee, after reaching the age of sixty (60), may remain
per year. Unlike its counterparts in the Arab Gulf, Qatar has the economic resources to conceivably add and pay for yet more redundant bureaucratic positions for its citizens (Davidson 2012, 112–21); but the truth is, Qatar does not want to do this, for reasons beyond riyals and dirhams. The state-driven emphasis on private-sector employment for its citizens is motivated much more by the state’s human development goals than by economic considerations. Qatar wishes to avoid the grim economic future depicted by Davidson (2012, 117–18) as a natural extension of decades of citizen “cossetting” in the work sector of rentier states:

[T]he described cultivation of a national elite over the past four decades by these states has led to citizenries that are now not only accustomed to material benefits and to no forms of extraction, but are also—with all the various sponsorship systems, soft loans, and public sector employment opportunities—being deprived of any motivation to gain meaningful qualifications or enter into a more competitive job market, or even any form of private sector job. In other words, there is an increasingly significant drawback to the political benefits derived from cossetting the national population, and in many ways this is already leading to nationals in the Gulf monarchies’ largest cities becoming little more than bystanders on the sidelines of their countries’ development.

With this warning in mind, Qatar’s latest career fair slogan urging Qataris to “Write the Next Chapter in Qatar’s Success” takes on an even more significant meaning. The Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2008) describes four pillars that are essential to achieving the country’s future goals, and the first one listed is human development. In the government’s own words:

Hitherto, Qatar’s progress has depended primarily on the exploitation of its oil and gas resources. But the country’s hydrocarbon resource will eventually run out. Future economic success will increasingly depend on the job for public interest considerations. The authority concerned with appointment matters shall issue the extension decision, which shall be on a yearly basis with a limit of 5 years. The Prime Minister may issue a decision to extend the service of the employee after the age of sixty-five (65). The extension is carried out every year as may be required. The extension of the service of under-secretaries who are above 65 years old shall be done through an Emiri decree.” In other words, the Prime Minister or the Emir himself has to become personally involved for any Qatari citizen to remain in his or her post after age 65! See http://www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=2644&language=en.

In general, Qatar is doing very well in human development when compared to other countries in the Arab World as well as across the globe. The UN Human Development Index (UNDP 2013) ranks Qatar as #36 in the world, categorized in the highest group of human development. Tétreault (2013, 39) notes that, despite her “criticism of the distributive politics of oil-dependent states,” rentier states have made “solid investments . . . in health, education and services that improved the living conditions of citizens and built up their human capital.” Besides Qatar (#36) and the UAE (#41), the only other major oil exporter in the highest human development category is Brunei Darussalam (#30). See UN, “Human Development Index (HDI)—2012 Rankings” at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
on the ability of the Qatari people to deal with a new international order that is knowledge-based and extremely competitive. To meet the challenge, Qatar is establishing advanced educational and health systems, as well as increasing the effective participation of Qataris in the labor force. (QNV 2008, 13)

The Qatar National Vision makes it clear that the state of Qatar’s primary long-term economic goal is to enable its citizens to contribute to the diversification of its economy, on equal footing with expatriate workers in terms of education and motivation, so that the country will have a future when the hydrocarbon resources run out, ensuring economic and political stability. As Berrebi, Martorell, and Tanner (2009, 421) note, “The reliance on foreign laborers and the lack of skilled Qatari workers is widely seen by Qatar’s leaders as a serious threat to the nation’s economic autonomy and long-term economic viability”; and the state is prioritizing its human development goals to combat this threat.

How can Qatar motivate its citizens to compete in the private sector, when, as the Qatar National Bank (QNB 2012, 6) admits, “The government is a more stable and attractive employer as it tends to offer higher wages, more benefits and preferable working hours (shorter with more single rather than split shifts) than most private sector employers”? If it takes you a while to come up with the solution, you clearly aren’t a rentier dictator. Qatar has made it clear it is willing to pay its nationals an additional stipend for work in the private sector—in other words, to add its nationals to its state payroll as if they were still state employees—in order to equalize the salaries and benefits and make the private sector a more attractive option for its citizens. Akin to a baseball team seeking to unload an unwanted player from its payroll, the state of Qatar wants to pay its citizens not to work for it anymore (or rather, to put it more charitably, to work toward the larger goal of developing the skills and capabilities of the national workforce).

The plan is elaborated in the Qatar National Development Strategy (QNDS 2011, 148) as follows:
Increasing the participation of Qataris in the private sector and reducing their dependence on public sector employment will entail narrowing the gaps in social allowances and conditions of work. A critical question is how much the wage gaps between Qataris and expatriates and between public sector and private sector workers need to narrow to encourage substitution. Public sector (public administration, government companies and the mixed sectors) wage, salary and social allowance packages, including pension schemes, will be reviewed, with a view to identifying policies to encourage Qataris to remain in the labor market and increase their participation in the private sector.

Before one has time to entertain the possibility that Qatar is considering reducing the public sector salaries and benefits to make the private sector offers more attractive, the QNDS (2011, 151) hastens to clarify the preferred plan for “[r]educ[ing] differentials in compensation between the public and private sectors”:

Various options could be considered, such as increasing employment and benefit packages for Qatari employees in the private sector. The same social benefits, including land and housing entitlements, could be provided to Qataris in the public and private sectors. Costs would be low because few Qataris work in the private sector, and one major barrier to private sector employment would be removed.

In other words, the state of Qatar recognizes that it already employs virtually all Qataris in the labor force, so there would be little economic difference in subsidizing the flow of Qataris from the public to the private sector. This plan clearly shows that the priority of the state is not to cut down on social spending, but rather, to increase this spending if necessary to help promote its overall human development goals.

Sources of dissatisfaction with economic opportunities

So why are only 42 percent of Qataris very satisfied with the opportunities for employment in the country? Why do over 20 percent answer that they are not very or not at all satisfied? Overall, it appears that some Qataris react to unemployment or underemployment by seeing it as unfair discrimination rather than a fair assessment of their qualifications for the job. The inability (in reality, unwillingness) of the state of Qatar to accommodate every citizen who applies for a public sector job or promotion results in a perception that wasta, or connections, determines the ultimate success in government employment, evaluations, and promotions. Yet
the larger villain appears to be the Western expatriate. For many Qataris who feel dissatisfied with their employment opportunities, the explanation lies in an expatriate-dominated environment that discriminates against Qataris in terms of hiring, respect, and salary.

**Dissatisfaction with government efforts to address unemployment**

Dissatisfied locals take special aim at government-sponsored initiatives, such as the career fair or Qatarization, which they feel do not adequately solve their problems with unemployment (e.g., Al Suwaidi 2013; Al Kubaisi 2013a). The career fair is seen as a place for companies to show off or pretend they care about employing Qataris, without any real results (Al-Fadhly 2013a). [See Figure 6.]

**Figure 6. “Pens and Shirts for All”**

One unemployed Qatari had gone to the career fair for four years, submitting over 200 copies of his CV; yet he still couldn’t find a job. Concerned with debt and providing for his family, he said, “I am ready to work as a tea boy, even though I am a national, just get me a job” (WHSK 4/5/12). Qataris clogged the radio waves in the week after the career fair, complaining
that they have been applying to jobs for years without success (WHSK 4/9/12, 4/11/12). For the 2013 career fair, the government has gone on the offensive. A press conference for the Qatar Career Fair was held the day before its opening, in which the career fair leadership announced that “[m]ore than 9,250 Qataris were provided employment, training, education and development opportunities in various sectors through Qatar Career Fair 2012” (“Last Year’s Career Fair” 2013). Further, despite an English-language news source being assured that the career fair was open to all (Khatri 2013), the director of the national manpower department at the Ministry of Labor told the Arabic-language Al Raya that all the jobs offered at the fair are for Qataris only, and that if a non-Qatari receives a job, the Ministry will not approve it (Hafez 2013).

The perception that the scarce government jobs require *wasta* was described by a recent Qatar University graduate, who graduated with a 3.15 GPA and a major in history and social sciences. Describing his unsuccessful six-month search for employment in all the museums, the Emiri Diwan, and the foreign ministry, he notes that his friends were able to get jobs with the Qatar Museum Authority through *wasta*. “I am a man who doesn’t have a *wasta*. Besides, I believe *wasta* is *haram* [forbidden; against a moral code]. This is unfair” (WHSK 11/11/12).

Abdulatif has devoted many cartoons to the need for *wasta* to achieve various goals in life; for example, the following cartoon depicts the need for *wasta* at the career fair. [See Figure 7.]

**Figure 7. “No CV Necessary”**
The fact that annual salary raises in the public sector are linked to performance reviews (Article 23, Law 8/2009) is another source of concern for those worried about the need for *wasta* to succeed in society. The following cartoon depicts the “boss” in the middle, with the annual performance evaluations (written in red, and meant to be indicative of a family tree) dependent on how close (related or connected) the employee is to the boss. The two men closest to the boss receive “excellent” evaluations (6 percent raise), those in the middle receive “good” evaluations (3 percent raise), and those who are the least related or connected receive “acceptable” or “pass” evaluations (1 percent raise). Two online commenters on the cartoon said, “It’s 100 percent true!” [See Figure 8.]

**Figure 8. “Charity Begins at Home”**

“The perceived gap between the government’s emphasis on Qatariization and the unemployment or underemployment of the citizens is another source of complaint (e.g., Al-Kuwairi 2013). The emphasis is placed on the broken promise of Qatariization, which is expected
to prioritize nationality over merit. The radio waves are filled with citizens who did not complete
their secondary education, complaining that they have not received jobs (WHSK 3/15/12;
4/26/12), with one Qatari woman exclaiming, “I am a Qatari citizen—I have the right to work
anywhere!” (WHSK 3/26/12). A plaintive complaint, from a man whose brother and wife were
applying for employment through the ministry of labor for two years without success, sums up
the Qatari concern with being excluded from their own country’s workforce: “The ministry of
employment is not doing anything. These are the children of this country. If they can’t make a
living here, where do they go?” (WHSK 10/14/12a). A local newspaper columnist directly
attacked the “for Qataris only” mantra, which he claims is a symbol separated from reality. “We
always see this sentence [‘for Qatari only’] in our daily newspapers and on the Internet, as if all
Qataris have jobs and no Qatari man or woman is jobless. But this sentence is symbolic while the
reality is different. . . . Where is Qatarization?” (Al Jassim 2012).

When Qataris are told there are no available positions, especially in a company that
employs expatriates, it is hard for the citizens to see how Qataris have the priority. A Qatari
physical education teacher was assured by the Supreme Education Council that he would receive
a position in an independent school because “the priority is for Qataris,” yet when he applied to
the schools, he was told they were full (WHSK 6/3/12). A Qatari man complained that his wife’s
application was rejected by a government ministry because they didn’t need any new employees,
saying, “How do they say they are full when they have expats? She is Qatari, she should have the
priority!” (WHSK 5/30/12). Another man complained that his wife applied for an open position
at a ministry and was rejected, explaining, “They say the priority is for Qataris. This is wrong.
They are accepting expats” (WHSK 6/4/12). Abdulatif depicts two Qataris, one angry and one
depressed, discussing how they were told there were no available job positions while various
expats (Western, Asian, and African) get off the bus and go to work in front of them. [See Figure 9.] It is hard for citizens to reconcile the government’s message that they should be treated as an employment priority with the realities of the job market today.

Figure 9. “No Jobs Here”

“Unfortunately there are no available job positions!”
Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, December 2, 2012

Dissatisfaction with perceived favoritism toward expatriate workers

Often expatriates—Western expatriates in particular—are seen as the villains. There is a perception that expatriates are in charge of the hiring decisions in the private sector and consistently favor other expatriates over Qatari. In my survey, Qatari were asked to imagine that there was an open position at a major company in Qatar, and that a Qatari and a Western expatriate of equal qualifications were applying. Eighty-five percent of Qatari felt that the Qatari should be given preference over the expatriate, but over 53 percent felt that it was more likely that the Western expatriate would be hired (with 36 percent optimistically picking the Qatari and 11 percent saying the decision would be made fairly). These results show a general sense of pessimism regarding Qatari chances in the workplace. Mariam Al-Saad (2011c), a regular columnist at Al Arab, in an article titled “The Qatari Minority!!”, asks why the high-level
positions are given to foreign workers, when there are so many well-qualified, educated Qataris who should be given a chance. Amal Abdulmalik (2012), a columnist from Al Raya, claims that expats are always chosen over Qataris even though they aren’t necessarily better qualified for the job. One Qatari man accused the companies of preferring to hire expats because they can be fired more easily than Qataris (WHSK 9/26/12). Another Qatari man, who was told by a secretary at Qatar Foundation that “they don’t hire Qataris,”71 demanded, “Qatar Foundation is supposed to be ours. Some of us are really adequate and have enough experience to serve at QF. This is our country. Where do we go?” (WHSK 10/2/12c). The feeling that expatriates are keeping Qataris out of employment opportunities is seen in many of Abdulatif’s cartoons, such as the following cartoon about a Qatari who turns himself into the Sesame Street character “Bert” in order to get a job. [See Figure 10.]

**Figure 10. “Sunny Days”**

> “Congratulations! The plastic surgery worked . . . and now you look exactly like the Europeans! You can apply to any high-level job position . . . and 1000 different places in Qatar will want you!”

*Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, May 1, 2012*

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71 This allegation would be news to Qatar Foundation, which describes its employment policies as follows: “QF employs thousands of Qataris—it is one of the largest employers in the country—and Qatarization is a key component of how staff are hired, trained and employed” (“Qatar Foundation Builds” 2010, 13).
Major government or semigovernment corporations are targeted with complaints that they do not do enough to further Qatarization efforts (e.g., Qatar Petroleum: WHSK 3/5/12; or Barwa: Al Marzouqi 2013a). Qatar Airways, in particular, has been a frequent punching bag for the lack of Qatarization. Besides the various complaints about the economic monopoly of Qatar Airways and the inflated prices for travel originating in Doha, the company was also criticized for not having enough Qatari employees and for not being clear on what employment opportunities for nationals would be available in the new airport (WHSK 1/30/12; Al-Saad 2012). An Al Raya columnist, Ibrahim Ibrahim, interviewed on WHSK (6/7/12), asked, “Where are the Qatari experts? . . . Qatars are absent everywhere. Take a look at the airport—Qataris are not there.”

Shortly after this outbreak of discontent, Qatar Airways promoted its new employment opportunities for nationals on a massive billboard at the busy Al Waab–Al Bustan intersection [see Figure 11], and the first trial openings of the new airport facilities were reserved for Qataris only (Scott 2013). Likewise, for the 2013 career fair, Qatar Airways advertised that more than 100 new positions would be reserved specifically for nationals, with a large “Nationalization” (in Arabic: Qatarization) graphic in the Gulf Times (“Career Opportunities” 2013). [See Figure 12.]

Figure 11. National Opportunities at Qatar Airways Billboard, August 28, 2012

Source: Jocelyn Sage Mitchell, personal photograph
Last but certainly not least, the perceived pay differentials between Qatari and expatriates are also particularly rankling to the Qatari population. Part of this may have to do with qualifications, skills, and education levels, all of which may contribute to expatriates achieving higher positions and thus bigger salaries than Qatari. However, part of this surely has to do with the differences between a sponsored contract, with all the extra benefits, and a local hire contract, as discussed earlier. Again, in my survey, Qatari were asked to imagine that a Qatari and a Western expatriate, of equal qualifications, were both hired to work the same position at a major company in Qatar. Almost 58 percent of Qatari responded that the Qatari should earn a higher salary, yet only 33 percent believed this would actually happen. Almost 53 percent of Qatari believed that the expatriate would receive the higher salary instead, with only 15 percent believing that the salaries would be allocated evenly. [See Table 4.]
Table 4. Ideal versus Reality: Salary Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expat higher</th>
<th>Equal salary</th>
<th>Qatari higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Imagine that two individuals of equal qualifications, one Qatari and one Western expatriate, are hired to work the same position at a major company in Qatar. . . .”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“How do you think the salaries should be for the two individuals?”</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In reality, how do you think the salaries of the two individuals would compare?”</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

Complaints about the perceived higher salaries and better opportunities for expatriates are often heard on Qatar radio (e.g., WHSK 3/5/12; 3/18/12). A particularly disgruntled Qatari man called to complain that Western expatriates at his company were treated better, paid more, and promoted faster than Qatars (WHSK 11/13/12). “This is our country,” he exclaimed. “Yes, we welcome Westerners and other expats. But we should be treated better. We should have more privileges. Qatars are discriminated against. Expats come work here and within a few days they bring their whole families over. They get promoted as well. What is this?!” In a competition over which employee can count his salary the fastest, Abdulatif’s regular Qatari character, Saqnaqoor, sadly wins this competition by a landslide. [See Figure 13.]

Figure 13. “Salary Competition Winner”

(Top right box): “The competition over which employee can count his salary the fastest”
(Top left box): “Amer Alsumoona”
(Bottom left box, results): “Saqnaqoor comes in first, at in two minutes and fifty seconds; the guy with the blue eyes comes in second, at five days, four hours, and two seconds.”

Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, September 2, 2012
In sum, Qatar provides public sector employment to a vast majority (92 percent) of its working citizens. These jobs include social and housing allowances, which are increased if the employee is married, along with additional allowances, preferable working hours, and enviable job security. Providing this benefit does not come cheaply for Qatar. Government estimates for the 2012–2013 budget are that public sector salaries will account for 20 percent of the total government expenditure plan—about 37 billion riyals ($10 billion USD) of an estimated 178-billion-riyal budget (Doherty and Dokoupil 2012).72 Yet over 20 percent of Qataris report that they are not very or not at all satisfied with the employment opportunities provided by the state, expressing concerns that inadequate government services, the prevalence of *wasta*, and favoritism toward expatriates all contribute to the unemployment or underemployment of Qataris.

**Medical Care**

Just as medical care was enshrined in the provisional constitution of 1970 as one of the earliest benefits for Qatari citizens, the right to curative and preventative medical care retains its prominence in the Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar (2004). Article 23 reads, “The State shall foster public health; provide means of prevention from diseases and epidemics and their cure in accordance with the law.” Tétrault (2013, 39) notes that investments in health services in rentier states such as Qatar have drastically improved the living conditions of citizens, particularly the poor. Qatar ranks #36 out of 186 countries in the latest UN Human Development Index (UNDP 2013), one of only three major oil exporters to rank among the highest category of

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72 As a benchmark for comparison, Kettl (2011, 56) notes that the US federal budget in 2005 allocated roughly 14 percent for total personnel costs of civilian workers in all three branches of government, the postal service, and the armed services.
human development, in part because of its investments in the country’s health care system. Qataris enjoy access to free public health care within their country and can be sent abroad for treatment if necessary (QNHS 2011). Yet both of these benefits—although largely supported by the population, with over 50 percent of the citizens reporting that they are “very satisfied”—have their detractors as well.

**Free public health care**

To look first at the public health care system, the expatriate residents are also allowed to use the same free care as citizens, leading to massive overcrowding of the public hospitals. The strain on public healthcare resources is a subject of much concern for the Qatari population (e.g., Al Mutawaa 2013). [See Figure 14.]

**Figure 14. “Population Growth at Hamad Hospital”**

The man in blue is pushing the large man in yellow, with the words “population growth” written on his back, into a tiny box that represents “Hamad Hospital.”

*Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, September 26, 2012*

The overcrowding leads to concerns with long wait times for appointments, rushed doctors, and inadequate medical care and resources for health issues. Complaining about the care at Hamad Hospital (and the other public health facilities) is a frequent topic of discussion on
Qatar radio (e.g., WHSK 4/10/12; 4/23/12; 4/25/12; 9/23/12). One man recounts a “horror film” unfolding when he brought his wife to give birth at Hamad Hospital (WHK 5/2/12). While his wife was in the delivery room, accompanied by her mother (men are not allowed in the delivery rooms of the public hospitals in Qatar), the doctors informed her that she had cancer. The baby was delivered minutes later in the context of this news. It later turned out that the files had been mixed up, resulting in the false diagnosis. “What if my wife had died from the news?” the man asked. “Or the baby died? What if I had died or her mother had died from shock?” Another mother recounted a months-long struggle to receive a correct diagnosis for her four-year-old son, who was constantly being given over-the-counter pain medicines and sent home while experiencing pains in his lungs (WHK 6/6/12). Finally, the condition was diagnosed as a lung infection, and the child has been in the hospital for months of treatment, sharing a room with six others and one bathroom, and being treated by trainees and interns. She ended her story with, “We are in our country, yet we are treated as if we are foreigners.” Local newspapers such as Al Sharq have focused on the medical mistakes and citizen concerns of the public health system as well, with one writer concluding, “We are tired of seeking treatment outside Hamad Medical Corporation, and the application of medical insurance is taking long” (Al-Fadhly 2012; see also A. Al-Mohannadi 2012).

The overcrowding of the public health care system is a legitimate and urgent issue. Sixty-five percent of the healthcare facilities in the country are private clinics and hospitals that require insurance to avoid expensive hospital bills, yet only 10–20 percent of the country’s residents have insurance (Fenton 2012), largely the white-collar expatriates working in the private sector. This means that 80–90 percent of the population of Qatar, including the citizens themselves, are using 35 percent of the healthcare facilities. In an article titled, “Enough Is Enough, Minister of
Al Arab columnist Mariam Al-Saad (2011a) criticized Hamad Hospital for its lack of resources. She wrote,

Minister of Health, why can’t there be priority for locals in their country? We are supportive of giving free health care to foreigners because it is the humanitarian thing to do, and our country is one of the first countries to help others. Yet as a local we cannot find good health care if we are sick, and it affects us when we are forced to go to private clinics and we see that foreigners have insurance while we have to pay for our health care. (Al-Saad 2011a)

The Shura Council (the Emir’s appointed advisory council) also called for priority for Qataris over expatriates “in admission, diagnosis, treatment, and medical care in hospitals,” to be applicable even in emergency rooms, with exceptions for severe conditions (Zaid 2012). Two hospitals have been formally dedicated for Qataris only, and yet even here, expatriates are continuing to use the services, albeit for emergency purposes (WHSK 6/4/12). A particularly humorous cartoon by Abdulatif depicts one of his regular characters running into a version of himself from the 1800s, finally able to get an appointment at Hamad Hospital. [See Figure 15.]

**Figure 15. “Ferghali’s Grandfather”**

(Right, modern Ferghali): “Who? Grandpa Ferghali the 15th?! How did you get to this medical center? Haven’t you been dead for 240 years?”

(Left, Grandfather Ferghali): “It is a long story, my son! I had a sore throat at the time and they scheduled the appointment for me at this date.”

Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, March 11, 2012

The citizen complaints about overcrowding and the subsequent loss of quality in the public health care system are bolstered by the large debts that some Qatari citizens have accrued
paying for private health care, either in Qatar or abroad. A government-funded study on the problem of debt notes that loans covering health treatment average 256,000 riyals, showing the desire (or need) for Qataris to seek private health care treatment beyond what the government provides (Al-Merekhi 2009, 10; see also OBG 2012, 172). Further, the growing expatriate population places additional strain on the government’s healthcare expenses. Government expenditures on healthcare spending have been rising dramatically over the past decade with the rise of the expatriate worker population, as well as rising health costs of the local population—the Qatar National Health Strategy (QNHS 2011, 109) notes that healthcare spending went up from 6 percent of total government expenditures in 2001 to 15 percent in 2008.

Serendipitously, both government and citizens would benefit from switching Qatar’s current health care system to one based on a national health insurance scheme, and this is precisely what the government is seeking to implement within the next couple of years (QNHS 2011, 113–15, 280–84). Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani recently issued Law No. 7 of 2013 regulating the health insurance system, a compulsory national health insurance scheme that will include all public and private facilities in Qatar and cover all people in Qatar: citizens, residents, and visitors on tourist or business visas (Pandit 2013; see also “Shura Nod 2013; “National Health Insurance” 2011). In the original five-stage plan, all Qataris were to be fully covered and the provider network extended to public and private by May 2014, with expatriates and visitors covered by the end of 2014 (Gamser 2011), but the updated timeline is now “100 per cent insurance coverage of the Qataris and the resident population by Q4 2016” (QNHS 2011, 280). Basing its reform process on Abu Dhabi as a model of best practices, Qatar will create a national insurance firm that will provide a basic package of coverage to all people in Qatar, with government subsidies given as necessary if premiums do not cover the costs (QNHS 2011, 114;
The government will continue to pay the insurance premiums and co-pays for its citizens, but will be able to pass the burden of the expatriate costs to the employers, as the insurance premiums will be linked to the issuances of resident permits and visas (Gamser 2011). This measure should also help solve the problem of overcrowding as the citizens will be able to go to any hospital of their choice in Qatar.

**Medical care abroad**

The other major health benefit given to citizens by the state is paying for treatment abroad if needed specialist services are not available in the country. All citizens must apply to the Treatment Abroad Advisory Committee with the details of the health service to receive the approval and funds. According to the Qatar National Health Strategy (QNHS 2011, 112), “Every year, increasing sums are spent on treatment abroad. The current budget for treatment abroad for 2009 was in the range of 0.5 billion QAR for approximately 950 patients, and the cost per procedure was around 600,000 QAR.” Up to 70 percent of these costs are for nonmedical expenses, including flights and accommodation not only for the patient but also for the members of their family who are traveling along with them (QNHS 2011, 112). The following graphic shows that both emergency and elective treatments abroad have been increasing over time. [See Figure 16.]

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73 One of my favorite complaints on Qatar radio was from a man who was upset that the medical commission, which had agreed to send him abroad to get treated, gave a business class plane ticket to him but an economy class ticket to his brother, who was accompanying him (WHSK 6/20/12).
One of the major issues associated with this benefit is the lack of transparency regarding eligibility and the approval process. The ability to go abroad for treatment has a long history of favoritism and patronage. In the early years of Qatar’s independence, Sheikh Ahmed bin Abdullah Al Thani’s son Abdalaziz used his role as health minister to try to create support for his succession to the throne over the Heir Apparent Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani. Crystal (1995, 155–56) writes, “Over 5000 Qatari supporters of Ahmad, many in apparent good health, were sent abroad for luxurious, but not rigorous, health care by Abdalaziz. In 1970 his expenditures had grown so large that Ahmad was dipping into his personal allocation to cover the health budget.” Al Kuwari (1978, 119) notes that the unexpected doubling of expenditures by the Ministry of Health, from 26 million riyals in 1969 to 52 million riyals in 1970, forced Sheikh Ahmed to send approximately 34 million riyals of his own allocations to cover the extra expenses. Emir Khalifa exiled both Sheikh Ahmad and Abdalaziz after his coup in 1972, and moved quickly on reforming the health care system in Qatar to try to prevent this kind of patronage from threatening political stability again.

The vast improvements to health care under Emir Khalifa and now Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s reigns can be seen in the context of trying to provide within Qatar virtually
all necessary medical treatments so that the sensitive issue of medical treatment abroad can be avoided as much as possible. Nevertheless, the Supreme Council of Health notes that there are still improvements that can be made in the treatment abroad system. Sandwiched amid the various proposals to save costs, by contracting volume rates with preferred providers, negotiating group rates on airfare and hotels, and providing follow-up care in Qatar, is the recommendation that the government must “[d]efine the indications for eligibility to treatment abroad and for a transparent application and approval process,” which, surprisingly, had not already been done (QNHS 2011, 113). In the annex to this health strategy, the authors note that they “[n]eed political will to address a potentially sensitive issue” and also note that a possible risk is a “[l]ack of mandate from key decision makers to execute the project” (QNHS 2011, 275–76). Movement on this issue will indicate that the leadership of Qatar agrees with the Supreme Council of Health on creating greater transparency and moving away from a traditionally secretive and personalized benefit, but movement has yet to be seen.

Those members of the Qatari public who feel excluded from the medical treatment abroad make their issues known through the radio and the newspapers. A particularly depressing story, which elicited a large response from radio listeners, came from a Qatari woman who complained that her twenty-three-year-old brother, who was diabetic with kidney and heart problems, was wrongly diagnosed as epileptic at Hamad Hospital and entered a coma because of the medicines given him. She applied to the Treatment Abroad Advisory Committee, but was told to wait for seven months without explanation; during this time, her brother’s situation deteriorated and he passed away. Her mother was so distraught that she, too, passed away. The Qatari woman began to shout and cry, denouncing Hamad Hospital and the Committee and holding them responsible for the deaths of her family members. During the rest of the show,
Qataris kept calling in to urge the Qatari leadership and the government to investigate the deaths (WHSK 11/28/12). Another heart-wrenching story, about a fifteen-year-old Qatari boy whose doctors recommended treatment abroad, but was denied by the Committee, was told in detail on the pages of *Al Raya* (“Disabled Child Waiting” 2012). Many of the citizens’ complaints revolve around the perception that *wasta* is necessary to be approved by the Committee (e.g., WHSK 4/8/12; 6/11/12; 6/26/12; 10/21/12), a perception that is encapsulated by Abdulatif’s “genie” cartoon. [See Figure 17.] Representatives of the Committee have attempted to explain the eligibility and procedure processes on the radio, but people were not appeased (WHSK 6/6/12).

**Figure 17. “Even Three Genies Can’t Do It”**

![Cartoon](Qatari man, right): “I need permission for medical assistance abroad!”
(Third genie): “That’s impossible! You need a *wasta*!”
*Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, January 10, 2012*

Another concern is how the members of the Treatment Abroad Advisory Committee have been responding to the issues brought up in the media. Several detailed complaints discussed personal experiences with vindictive committee members who took away benefits after the citizen complained publicly (WHSK 5/1/12; 6/24/12; 6/28/12; 10/21/12). For example, one Qatari man claimed that the head of the Committee told him that she wouldn’t approve of his treatment abroad because he “complained about her on air” (WHSK 10/21/12). The radio
presenters themselves spent some time discussing how many people call in to them with complaints about the treatment abroad system who are too frightened to go on air with their concerns, and that the Committee has admitted to them that they seek to punish those who complain publicly about their services (WHSK 5/1/12; see also 6/28/12). These types of experiences only emphasize the personalized nature of the committee and the concern that *wasta* drives the medical decisions. In sum, while it is true that Qatar provides its citizens with the possibility of funding medical treatment abroad if deemed medically necessary, the lack of transparency within the system spurs concerns that favoritism, not medical need, is the primary determinant.

**Free Education at All Levels**

Beginning with the Provisional Constitution in 1970, Qatar’s laws have enshrined the right of all citizens to an education, free of charge at all levels (Zahlan 1979, 111). The Permanent Constitution (2004) contains several articles about the importance of education: “The State shall also create conducive circumstances for developing of [the youth’s] capabilities in all fields based on sound education” (Article 22); “The State shall foster, preserve and help disseminate sciences, arts, cultural and national heritage, and encourage scientific research” (Article 24); and “Education is one of the basic pillars of social progress. The state shall ensure, foster, and endeavor to spread it” (Article 25).

This idealism is shared by the citizens, whose responses in my survey showed that promoting education is seen as one of the top personal priorities of the country, with one out of every two people choosing it as their first or second priority, within a set of options that included a strong national defense, preserving Qatari identity and culture, equally distributing wealth, and
improving Qatar’s international image. The only priority that received more support (by a small margin) was providing for the national defense. [See Table 5.] Clearly, the idealism inherent in the state rhetoric regarding the importance of education has been noticed by the Qatari citizens themselves and enjoys significant support.

Table 5. Qatari Opinions on Top National Priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top two priorities</th>
<th>52.8%</th>
<th>#1: 28.2%</th>
<th>#2: 24.6%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providing a strong national defense</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>#1: 25.3%</td>
<td>#2: 25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting education</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>#1: 22.7%</td>
<td>#2: 26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserving Qatari identity and culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting a more equal distribution of wealth among all citizens</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>#1: 15.4%</td>
<td>#2: 14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving international image</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>#1: 8.4%</td>
<td>#2: 8.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

Yet despite the idealistic language of the state, the national goals of education have a decidedly economic bent to them. The Qatar National Vision 2030 emphasizes the human development of the Qatari people, through education, as the primary means to move past dependence on hydrocarbon wealth to a knowledge economy (QNV 2008, 13; QNDS 2011, 122–45). The quality of the education system in Qatar is of vital importance to the state goal of creating a “capable and motivated workforce” of citizens that can compete on a global level in a post-oil world (QNDS 2011, 148). To that end, Qatar has increased its expenditure on education by nine-fold between 2000 and 2010 (overall government expenditure has increased six-fold.
during this time period), with education accounting for 13 percent of total government expenditure in the 2009–2010 budget (NHDR 2012, 31).

**Free K–12 education**

Part of Qatar’s massive expenditures on education has been to implement a comprehensive reform plan of the national education system, both K–12 and Qatar University (Brewer et al. 2007; Moini et al. 2009). Chapter 5 goes into the story of the national education reforms in depth. Suffice to say, there is much evidence that, particularly regarding the reforms of the public K–12 system, Qataris are feeling dissatisfied with the quality of the new “independent” schools, and many are seeking to place their children in alternative private schools (e.g., Ahmed 2013). The concern then becomes paying for these schools out-of-pocket, as the Qatari right to free education is confined to the public school system. In fact, one of the major sources of debt for some Qataris are educational loans, averaging 167,000 riyals for those Qataris who utilize them (QNDS 2011, 172; Al-Merekhi 2009, 10).

To address the financial burden for those Qatari families who desire private education, the government began a voucher program in 2008 that allowed financially needy families to receive vouchers to help them pay for private schooling for their children (NHDR 2012, 33), and expanded this program to serve the entire Qatari community for the 2012–2013 academic year (“Introductory Meeting” 2012; “Doha Rolls Out” 2012). Thirty-two private schools in Qatar are eligible for the vouchers, including the American School of Doha, various British curriculum schools, and the M.E.S. Indian School. These vouchers cover costs up to 28,000 riyals ($7,700), prompting Abdulatif to joke that Qataris are looking to receive extra “coupons” to cash in for themselves. [See Figure 18.]
Figure 18. “Twenty Coupons Please”

(>Qatari man): “If you please, I would like a coupon for my son’s school . . . and a coupon for my daughter’s school . . . and 18 coupons for the private schools!”
Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, May 2, 2012

Some critics contended that allowing the voucher system to encompass private as well as public schools “is an admission by the state that its school education reform programme . . . has failed” (“Aid for Qatari Students” 2012). Yet the initial reform plan considered the voucher system from the start, with the leadership deciding to first ensure “a set of high-quality providers ready to expand capacity [as well as] the availability of good information about school quality” before transitioning toward the voucher system in the future (Brewer et al. 2007, 56). It appears that the Supreme Education Council is now ready to pursue a greater free-market approach to the education system in Qatar, devolving some government power over the education system in an effort to provide higher quality solutions and placate concerned parents. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Finance has delayed payments on some of these vouchers, forcing parents to pay out-of-pocket or risk their students being removed from school due to nonpayment, providing opportunities for further complaint (“Schools Threaten” 2012). In addition, some of the pricier private schools have higher tuition rates than the voucher can cover. For example, the American School of Doha, considered the top American K–12 school in the country, charges over 32,000 riyals ($8,800) per year for prekindergarten, with costs increasing to almost 54,000 riyals.
($15,000) per year for elementary and over 70,000 riyals ($19,000) per year for middle and high school. As the new voucher system continues to be ironed out, we will see how it affects the quality and reputation of the K–12 public school system in Qatar.

**Free university education**

Turning to the university-level education opportunities provided by the state of Qatar to its citizens, it is important to note, first and foremost, that more citizens report satisfaction with the university education opportunities than with the K–12 education system. In my survey, over 40 percent of Qataris report that they are *very* satisfied with the current college education system in the country, a number that is 15 percent higher than the responses for K–12 education; and while 18 percent report that they are *somewhat* or *very* dissatisfied with the university system, almost 30 percent say the same for K–12.

In general, for those Qataris who gain acceptance to an approved institute of higher learning, their financial needs are taken care of by a host of government- and private-sector scholarships. Qatar University offers scholarships for any Qatari national, requiring only copies of the ID card of the student’s mother or father as well as the student’s birth certificate and a letter of high school completion; however, these scholarships are for tuition fees only and there are no other benefits.

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75 Many private sector or semigovernment companies and organizations—such as Qatar Airways, RasGas, Qatar Petroleum, Shell, and Qatar National Bank—also offer scholarships to Qatari students in exchange for a commitment to work for the company after graduation. These scholarships come with monthly stipends that are often much larger than the ones offered by the government; Qatar Petroleum, for example, pays its students 9,000 riyals a month (about $2,500).

However, for those students who are accepted at high-quality academic institutions, both in Qatar and abroad, the state of Qatar makes available much more lucrative scholarship opportunities. The Supreme Education Council’s Higher Education Institute (HEI) is in charge of the country’s scholarship programs for citizens to pursue postsecondary education at an approved list of global academic institutions. These 675 schools, both in Qatar and abroad, are approved by the HEI for certain disciplines only. For example, Georgetown University is found on the list of approved universities in the United States, but only if the student chooses to major in business, economics, health, history, law, medicine, political science, psychology, or public affairs. (English majors can select from a list of thirty approved institutions, but Georgetown is not on this list.) Although it approves only certain programs within the institutions as a whole, the HEI list nevertheless allows for a wide range of majors, seemingly prioritizing the student’s academic interest over any state preferences regarding its goals of specialized human development in the country.

As long as a Qatari citizen is accepted to one of the schools on the HEI’s list, the student will receive full tuition scholarship, a monthly stipend of 3,500 riyals ($962) within the country of Qatar or more if abroad, health insurance, an annual allowance for textbooks, Eid Al-Fitr and

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77 In return for the scholarships, the state of Qatar asks the recipients to work in any governmental or semigovernmental position for three years after graduation. If the graduate does not fulfill this bargain, the state can demand a refund of all salaries and expenses paid. If a student does not finish his course of study, the same refund applies. See Law No. 9 of 1976 on education scholarships, http://www.almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=2662&language=ar [in Arabic], as well as the Supreme Education Council, “Academic and Financial Rules for Scholarship Students,” http://www.sec.gov.qa/ar/SECInstitutes/HigherEducationInstitute/Offices/Pages/AcademicRules.aspx [in Arabic].

78 See the Supreme Education Council, “Supported Universities,” http://www.sec.gov.qa/En/ServicesCenter/Pages/Supported-Universities.aspx. This website provides a list of 675 universities to which Qatar would provide full scholarships and additional stipends and other benefits for its accepted citizens. The supported universities in Qatar include the Western branch campuses at Education City, the College of the North Atlantic technical and vocational program, the University of Calgary nursing program, and the MA and PhD programs at Qatar University. The website also has comprehensive lists of all supported international schools.

Eid Al-Adha (Muslim holidays) allowances of 500 riyals ($137) for each, graduation allowances, and a new computer every other year.\textsuperscript{80} In the case of studying abroad, the student also receives annual economy class airfare (plus airfare and stipends for spouse and dependents if they are traveling and/or living with the student), allowances to prepare for traveling, an annual clothing allowance, a food allowance, and free housing in an apartment or dorm.\textsuperscript{81}

The financial incentives get even larger if the Qatari student is accepted to one of the elite fifty schools that make up the special scholarship programs, aptly titled the “Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani” scholarship and the “Tamim bin Hamad” scholarship.\textsuperscript{82} The Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani scholarship provides additional financial and social benefits to the Qatari citizen who gets accepted to the HEI’s list of the twenty top schools in the world, which include prestigious US schools such as Harvard, Stanford, and Yale, along with four UK schools and one Swiss school.\textsuperscript{83} The Tamim bin Hamad scholarship covers Qatari students at the next thirty top schools in the world, including Northwestern, Duke, and Brown University (but not Georgetown). No major-specific information is given, so it appears that these top fifty elite schools are considered so good that any major would be worthy of support. The undergraduate monthly stipends are slightly higher than those for the regular scholarship, and the student receives annual business class tickets, additional baggage allowance, and various other perks, including an annual meeting with the Emir or the Heir Apparent, depending on the level of the scholarship. There is also a financial incentive for those who excel in their studies: Every summer, Qatari students on these

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{80} Qatari students at Education City report that, at the beginning of the year, they were given 10,000 riyals ($2,750) as a combined annual textbook and computer allowance.  \\
\end{flushleft}
scholarships are eligible to receive extra financial bonuses depending on their GPA. A 4.0 GPA will result in a bonus of 40,000–50,000 riyals (almost $11,000–$14,000), which can be received on an annual basis. Annual financial bonuses for master and doctoral degrees are much higher than undergraduate; a high-achieving Qatari doctoral student with a Hamad bin Khalifa scholarship can receive up to 250,000 riyals (almost $70,000) a year, in addition to the regular monthly stipends!84

In general, the opportunities to study abroad for those qualified appear to be very well received by the Qatari population. In my qualitative research, I only found one instance of a complaint against the Supreme Education Council for the study abroad program. A man complained that after studying for four years abroad, including taking out a personal loan, his diploma was not recognized by the Council because it came from a school that was not on the approved list, and he could not gain employment because of this (WHSK 6/28/12). Although Qatari students have to pay attention to the bureaucratic rules and regulations, for those who do, it appears they are quite satisfied with the higher education opportunities.

Education City

There is one source of tension over higher education opportunities, however, that I do not discuss in Chapter 5: the well-publicized Education City, which contains branch campuses of several well-known US universities, including Georgetown, Northwestern, and Carnegie Mellon (Lewin 2008b; PBS 2008). Much has been made of the “educational gold rush” as Western

84 Notes of concern have been raised from outsiders regarding the unintended consequences of motivating students with financial incentives. A professor of psychology notes, “It is easy to get people to do things by paying them if you’ve got enough money and they’ve got the necessary skills. But they will keep doing it only as long as you keep paying them. And even if they were doing it before, when you stop paying them the behavior drops to a lower level than when you started paying them. We’ve done thousands of experiments on this over 40 years and the data is incredibly robust. There’s no evidence that paying people helps them learn—and a lot of evidence that it doesn’t” (Guttenplan 2011). Nevertheless, I haven’t noticed any Qatariis complaining.
universities compete to set up programs and partnerships in countries that are rich in cash but limited in their quality higher education institutions (Lewin 2008a). Qatar is a particularly interesting example because it provides the highest level of academic freedom to the imported Western universities through branch campus partnerships (e.g., Maher 2008). Willoughby (2008, 16–19) categorizes the multiple levels of freedom possible in these educational alliances, ranging from mere symbolic association, to intermediate levels of formal supervision, formal endorsement, and subcontracting partnerships, to the highest level of branch campuses. As he explains,

One way to think about these alternatives is to view them as representing trade offs between increasingly credible associations with Western universities in return for decreasing amounts of direct control by national elites over the university administration itself. (Willoughby 2008, 17)

By establishing a branch campus, the university is promising its students that the degree is equivalent to a degree earned on the home campus. To ensure this equivalence, the sponsoring country must eschew interference in administrative and academic decisions. This is a crucial distinction, as this means that Qatar has decided to privilege academic quality and prestige over its ability to control the content of classes and the freedom of discussion. So far, it has allowed the Education City campuses to bypass the problems of limited academic freedom that have plagued other institutions in the Middle East85 and the Gulf in particular.86

The problem currently facing Education City is the simple fact that the Qatari K–12 education system does not yet adequately prepare the majority of its citizens to immediately

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85 Richards and Waterbury (2008, 133) noted concerns with academic freedom in the Middle East, writing, “[T]he sanctity of academic freedom, as well as the campus itself, is frequently violated…. The freedom of teaching and research is highly circumscribed. There may be subjects that cannot be researched and questions that cannot be asked.” Ghabra and Arnold (2007, 14–16) discuss this topic, including a most important “limited academic freedom” paragraph (15); also see Coffman (1996, 17) for a historical look at the beginning of “the exporting of American higher education . . . to the Arab world” and its unresolved problems.

86 Academic freedom in the UAE seems particularly under attack in the last year or so, with examples of the recent firing of an American professor from Zayed University in Abu Dhabi (Duffy 2012), the self-censorship of the New York University–Abu Dhabi campus (Lindsey 2012b); and the government censoring of an academic conference and refusal of a well-known academic to enter the country (Ulrichsen 2013; Lynch 2013).
enter these elite institutions. This problem would perhaps be less of an issue if the Qatari leadership’s rhetoric surrounding Education City was not so nationalistic. Education City—recently renamed Hamad bin Khalifa University—began in 1995 under the auspices of the Qatar Foundation, an overarching institution with the motto, “Unlocking human potential.” Qatar Foundation’s main goal is to develop the human potential of Qataris themselves:

Qatar National Vision 2030 was published in July 2008 and outlines how the nation will use its vast revenues from hydrocarbon resources to transform itself into a modern knowledge-based economy. The people of Qatar are the key to achieving this aim, so the plan places developing human resources as the main priority for the next 20 years. . . . QF aims to unlock the human through its three pillars of Education, Science & Research and Community Development. . . . It is bringing world-class education, work experience and career opportunities to Qatar’s young people.87

The story of Qatar Foundation’s founding is told in a special issue of its Foundation Magazine, celebrating its fifteenth anniversary. The tale continually emphasizes the importance that the Qatari leadership placed on providing increased educational opportunities for its citizens:

The idea came into being in 1995, during a conversation between His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, the Amir of Qatar, and his wife, Her Highness Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, while they rested in a tent at their Umm Grayba farm. It revolved around questions such as, “How is it possible to give the people of a nation the best chances in life?” . . . As the talk ebbed and flowed, answers emerged: that a government has the responsibility to give its citizens choice—indeed the best possible quality of choice—in the areas of education, health and social development, because these are critical to the success of any modern society. In the advancement of these goals, their Highnesses decided to create a single, unified educational institution for their people, capable of providing the highest standards of learning in these areas. A simple idea, perhaps. But even then, they understood that this institution could be used as a springboard for the development of globally significant educational, scientific and social advancement. That idea is now called Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development—15 years in the making, but with hundreds of years of promise to come. (“How Qatar Foundation” 2010, 3)

The idea of the Emir of Qatar, sitting pensively in his traditional tent, pondering how to provide his citizens with the best possible educational choices, is a powerful and emotional image. [See Figure 19.] Unfortunately, it is precisely this image, conjured by the state of Qatar’s own rhetoric, which is clashing with the reality of difficult admissions standards and challenging curricula that relatively few Qataris can access.

The disjunction between the government’s rhetoric and the citizens’ experience with the Western institutions of Education City has become a major issue. Simply put, equivalent degrees necessitate equivalent admission standards, and the Qatari K–12 education system, as it currently stands, does not adequately prepare the majority of its students to attend high-caliber Western institutions. The open admissions process has begun to attract high-achieving students from China, India, Pakistan, and other countries looking at Education City as a way of gaining an American university diploma while remaining closer to home. As the pool of applicants becomes wider and more qualified every year, the average Qatari student is pushed further and further down the list.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{88} I wish to make clear that there are plenty of above-average Qatari students who compete with their peers on a more equal footing for the limited spots in the Education City campuses. For example, Georgetown in Qatar’s valedictorian in 2011 was a Qatari student (Hamdan 2013).
One problem is that many local high school students are not qualified to immediately enter elite institutions like Northwestern or Georgetown, highly competitive schools that typically admit less than one in five applicants in the United States. There are no formal quotas on the number of local students admitted to the Gulf campuses. To bridge the gap, overseas campuses have resorted to using conditional admissions, bridge programs or foundation years to help local students catch up. (Hamdan 2013)

Qatar Foundation has responded to this problem by creating the Academic Bridge Program, a one-year program meant to prepare students, primarily Qatari high school graduates, for an English-language university education. However, a research analyst who specializes in human development noted,

> These bridge programs are not a long-term solution, and many universities have noted that even an effective full-year program will not be able to address fully the gaps left by below-par K–12 education. (Hamdan 2013)

Mark Newmark, the assistant director of the Academic Bridge Program, discussed the inability of a one-year foundation program to achieve the necessary benchmarks of academic readiness in a recent presentation (Newmark 2013).

The spring of 2012 provided two flashpoints for simmering tensions about Education City to come to the forefront of Qatari discourse: receiving the acceptance (and rejection) letters in April 2012, and comparing the graduation ceremonies of Education City universities with Qatar University in May 2012. Unfortunately for many aspiring Qatari students, April’s mail brought rejection letters from the Education City institutions, leading to complaints on the radio about the “racist” selection process of Qatar Foundation (WHSK 4/9/12). A Qatari female student, enrolled in the Academic Bridge Program, called in to complain that none of the Education City universities accepted her or her friends (WHSK 4/12/12). Her litany of complaints kept returning to a common theme: Qatari students were being discriminated against by Qatar Foundation and that it was not fair that expatriates were using Qatar’s educational resources instead of citizens (see also Al-Khatir 2012a for similar complaints). “Just because we

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are Qatari, they are not accepting us!” she claimed. “Are we getting American universities just for the name? We want results.” Shortly after her story, another Qatari woman called in to complain that her daughter was rejected, crying on air as she said, “The Sudanese student, who has never been to the barber, comes on the day of his interview well groomed and in a suit, talking about how he got an interview in one of the six universities.” She continued by noting that the whole point of opening Education City was to provide a world class education at home so that Qatari, particularly young women, don’t have to study abroad. This concern was echoed by the radio presenters, who remarked, “The universities in Education City were brought in for Qatari to use, so female Qatari can enjoy a good education and do not have to leave Qatar, so how come they are not getting accepted?” (WHSK 4/15/12).

The graduation ceremonies at Education City in May 2012, broadcast for the first time on national television, were another source of tension for Qatari citizens. Maryam Al-Khatir, an outspoken regular columnist for Al Sharq, wrote a highly critical article entitled, “The Ugly Duckling’s Children” (2012a), highlighting the perceived favoritism and special treatment that Education City students received over Qatar University students. She wrote that Qatar University students are treated as “second class citizens,” due to the differences between the graduation ceremonies, continuing,

The students of ‘Hamad bin Khalifa University’ have been celebrated in a shining ceremony streamed live on TV, which we all gathered around our TV sets to watch as usual, due to the great prestige given to it through fancy decorations and an important audience. All students deserve to be celebrated for their great efforts and accomplishments, but the distinction in prestige between different universities and different foundations is completely unacceptable. It appears that Education City is placed on one planet, and Qatar University is placed on a different one, even though Qatar University has risen to the highest levels of excellence. (Al-Khatir 2012a)

Al-Khatir (2012a) also took aim directly at the perceived favoritism of the Qatari leadership toward Education City over Qatar University, writing,

Students of ‘Qatar’ [referring to Qatar University] haven’t been honored with a visit to their graduation ceremony by Her Highness [Sheikha Moza] for six years now, unlike those of ‘the City’ [referring to
Education City]. This has caused the students of Qatar University to feel that they haven’t received their full rights or the full rights of their university. By this I mean the right to be graced with Her Highness’s presence at the only public university that also holds the country’s name.

Many Qatar University students began using the Twitter hashtag #QUfail to discuss their concerns and demands for more equal treatment, including supporting Al-Khatir for her article (Ali 2012). Although the tension died down, it may start again as Education City universities ready the next round of acceptance and rejection letters.

It is important to note that Qatari society is not against the presence of Western universities in the country. To the contrary, an overwhelming majority of citizens believe that Qatari society benefits, at least to some extent, from the presence of these institutions. My survey asked respondents, “Can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: Qatari society benefits from the presence of Western universities in the country.” Forty-five percent of respondents strongly agreed, with another 45 percent agreeing, resulting in only 10 percent disagreement. It appears that the intensity of agreement to this statement is related to the perceptions of Qatari admittance chances. Our survey also asked respondents to imagine two students of equal qualifications, one Qatari and one Western expatriate, applying to a Western university in Qatar Foundation. A full 58 percent of Qatari respondents believed that it would be more likely that the Qatari would be admitted, while roughly 17 percent believed the decision would be made fairly. Yet 25 percent of respondents believed that the expatriate would have a better chance of being admitted. A regression on these two variables (with controls of gender, age, education, economic satisfaction, and religiosity) shows that there is a strongly statistically significant relationship between perceptions of Qatari admittance chances and the
overall agreement that Western universities benefit Qatari society. \(^{90}\) As the perception of Qatari admittance chances becomes more pessimistic, the respondents were less likely to feel that Qatari society benefits from Western universities in the country. [See Table 6.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Perceptions of Qatari Admittance and the Benefit of Western Universities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable: Qatari society benefits from Western universities in the country (strongly agree to strongly disagree)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age (18–82)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (lowest to highest)</td>
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<td>Religiosity (lowest to highest)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic satisfaction (highest to lowest)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perception of Qatari admittance chances (positive to negative)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798</td>
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</tbody>
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At this point, there is much room for speculation about how the state of Qatar will square the rising expectations of its people regarding their right to attend Education City with the realities of a highly competitive and autonomous admissions process. As university contracts come up for renewal, Qatar Foundation may attempt to assert some level of control over the admissions policies, such as setting a percentage cap on the number of students admitted from external versus internal applications, or by removing perceived barriers to admittance by substituting the Qatar Comprehensive Educational Assessment (QCEA) results for international tests like TOEFL, IELTS, or SAT, brushing aside concerns of equivalent measurements. Hints of

\(^{90}\) The coding for the regression is as follows. For gender, 1 = male and 2 = female. Age is a numerical scale variable, ranging from 18 to 82. For education, the extreme ends of the scale are 0 = no education and 5 = postgraduate education. Religiosity is based on the questions about whether and how frequently religious scholars are consulted about personal issues, ranging from 0 = never to 3 = often consult. Economic satisfaction ranges from 1 = very satisfied to 4 = not at all satisfied. Perception of Qatari admittance chances was recoded to range from 1 = the Qatari is more likely (positive), 2 = fair decision (neutral), and 3 = the expatriate is more likely (negative).
the latter policy could be seen in a recent talk given at Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar’s dean lecture series by Scott Hill, the Director of the Office of Program Review and Audit within the Supreme Education Council, who said,

Imagine if we have a [education] sector in which we are saving the State of Qatar millions a year because we no longer need to have separate and distinct placement and admissions exams institution by institution. . . . The idea here is that maybe, maybe, if you’re doing a QCEA exam in 11th and 12th grade English, what if your performance level is telling you that you could have the same exact standard of competency as an IELTS or as a TOEFL? At certain levels. I think that’s a very interesting conversation to have. Why do we require students to take more than one exam that is extracting the same level of information? (Hill 2012)

As Hamad bin Khalifa University continues to expand into graduate-level studies, I speculate that Qatar Foundation will move away from the highest level of academic autonomy—the branch campuses—and toward partnership-based models, which would allow for more centralized control of both academic content and administrative decisions, including admissions policies. David Prior (2012), the provost of Hamad bin Khalifa University, gave a presentation that described the four interdisciplinary graduate schools—Public Health; Business, Law, and Public Policy; Science, Engineering, and Technology; and Humanities and Social Sciences—that the university envisions developing in the future. [See Figure 20.] His presentation noted that these graduate schools should be “aligned with, and serving the objectives of Qatar National Vision 2030, Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016, and Qatar National Research Strategy 2012,” by “maintaining the degree granting autonomy of the branch campuses and seeking new partners and new partnering models at the graduate level.” Further discussion of Education City is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it would be a very fruitful avenue for future research.
In sum, Education City has the potential to be a very positive component of the educational opportunities for Qataris, especially Qatari women, who may not be able to study abroad for cultural reasons. Yet Qataris have to be able to participate in this opportunity to benefit from it. This may necessitate some type of affirmative action policy in terms of admittance until Qatar’s K–12 system catches up to the standards needed to prepare its students for admission to the elite universities of the world.

**Land Allocation and Housing**

Following the precedents of Law No. 1 of 1964 and Emiri Decree No. 7 of 1977, as discussed in Chapter 2, Law No. 2 of 2007 on the housing system clearly states that its aim is to “contribute to the provision of adequate housing for citizens” by the following methods:

1. Granting the beneficiary cash issued by the Council of Ministers, and the recommendation of the Minister of Civil Service Affairs and Housing, to purchase the land needed for building housing, and the Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing may, after coordination with the authorities, instead allocate the beneficiary the piece of land needed so that the area does not exceed 625 square meters within the city of Doha and 1000 square meters outside of Doha.
2. Granting a housing loan of 600,000 Qatari riyals to citizens who have the financial capacity to repay the loan, with the collection of administrative expenses of 1 percent annually that is reduced according to the value of the loan that is repaid, as long as it is funded through a bank, and the repayment of the loan is within the limits and procedures established by a decision issued by the Council of Ministers.
is permitted to modify the land and the value of the loan referred to in the previous two items by a
decision issued by the Council of Ministers.
3. Provide housing units through purchase or leasing. (Article 2, Law 2/2007)

The law goes on to explain that each beneficiary can receive this benefit only once (Article 4)
and that the beneficiary should be a Qatari national above the age of 22 (Article 6). Although the
law does not specifically state the beneficiary’s gender or marital status, all Qatari I spoke with
said that only Qatari men are eligible for the land allotments and housing loans, and many said
that the man must submit a marriage certificate in order to qualify.91

The Qatar Development Bank (QDB) is the main financial arm of the government
regarding the provision of housing loans to Qatari nationals in accordance with the housing
law.92 Since 2007, QDB has processed over 20,000 loan applications (“300 Free Housing Units”
2012), necessitating the creation of a Center for Housing Finance specifically for servicing
national housing loans; QDB’s website promises citizens that their visit will take no more than
thirty minutes and that their loan will be available within two working days. Various options are
clearly explained on the website, with loans up to 1.2 million Qatari riyals available for citizens
at a 1 percent compounding “administrative fee”—interest is forbidden in Islam—with monthly
installments of 3,365 riyals over a period of thirty-five years.93 Interestingly enough, the Qatari
I spoke with gave conflicting reports about how to secure the land grant and permission for the
housing loan. The QDB website notes that citizens should apply at the Housing Department at
the Ministry of Social Affairs to receive the permission for the housing loan, and the Land

91 One source mentioned a new law in the works, which is rumored to give the right to apply for land to a Qatari
woman married to a non-Qatari, a Qatari widow whose husband had not received his land, or a Qatari single woman
92 See Qatar Development Bank, “Housing Loans,”
http://www.qdb.qa/English/Products/Loans/HousingLoans/Pages/default.aspx (accessed March 26, 2013).
93 Loans for house construction or house purchasing are subject to the 1 percent fee, but a separate category loan for
demolition and reconstruction has the 1 percent “fully covered by the government,” lowering the monthly payments
to 2,857 riyals over thirty-five years. However, this loan, unlike the others, does not come with the 50,000-riyal
grant for a furniture allowance.
Department at the Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning to receive the required land, a process that was corroborated by some sources. However, other sources described the process of supplicating the Emiri Diwan directly (as described in Kamrava 2009, 406). It may be that initially, applications may be made at the appropriate ministries and then, if there is a problem regarding the size or location of the land, the recourse is to “beg” the Emir.

The beautifully transparent and customer-friendly website of the Qatar Development Bank belies the rather secretive and personalized process of the land distribution. Obvious issues include the fact that the Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing allocates a piece of land to the beneficiary without him having any say with regard to location, and that the process, whether carried out at the various ministries or at the Emiri Diwan, has a long waiting time and is unclear about the status of a citizen’s application and why some receive it far faster than others. Qatar’s National Human Rights Committee highlighted the problem of land distribution in their annual report, noting,

> There are some cases of slow procedures for the allocation and delivery of the territory of the housing and the existence of many cases, waiting lists, despite the availability of controls and conditions set against them, the allocation of land [without] ready facilities and services to some citizens, and the allocation of land to some in the areas against their will. (NHRC 2011, 39–40)

The issue was covered extensively in a recent *Al Raya* article, bluntly entitled, “*Wasta Controls Land Distribution*” (Hafez 2012). One citizen, Abdulhamid Al-Emadi, has given up on ever receiving the land he first applied for in the 1970s. The article quotes him as saying,

> There is not one person who applied to receive a piece of land who does not complain about the lack of a specific mechanism or a declared, transparent policy about land distribution. This is due to the presence of many exceptions and the interference of *wasta* and the favoritism in the distribution rules . . . . Why should one individual receive 1,300 square meters in a location he prefers and another receive 800 square meters in a location determined by the authorities? There should be a law and a clear strategy for the distribution of land among the beneficiaries. There should be an announcement for all these procedures in all media outlets, and the announcement of the number of applications submitted to receive a piece of land, along with the amount spent on these lands. Everyone should be able to see clear and accurate numbers to prevent

suspicions, if there is indeed, as they claim, justice in the distribution and transparency in the allocation. (Hafez 2012)

Another citizen, Mohamed Al Banna, also criticizes the allocation process:

These lands [should be] distributed objectively and with transparency to provide every citizen the right to a piece of land to build his house, without regard to their affiliation with a certain tribe or family . . . . There is no problem in exceptions for humanitarian cases in the distribution of land . . . but the exceptions for other reasons are rejected by everyone. It makes no sense that there are Qataris waiting in line to get their land for eight years while others receive it within two years at the most. Where is the justice in that? (Hafez 2012)

This article received much attention after publication, as it was picked up by the English-language media in Doha (e.g., “Make Land Distribution” 2012; Khatri 2012a) and discussed on the popular Qatari online forum, “Qatar Shares.”95 Land allocation is a frequent topic of discussion on Qatar radio as well, with one Qatari man complaining that he has yet to receive an answer from his 2009 application, yet he knows many people who received lands who applied after him (WHSK 3/1/12). The following Abdulatif cartoon addresses the waiting time that concerns many Qataris. [See Figure 21.]

Figure 21. “Not an Autograph”

95 See Qatar Shares, http://www.qatarshares.com/vb/archive/index.php/t-524060.html (accessed September 28, 2012). A particularly enigmatic comment from “qatarman8008” reads, “The only true power comes from God . . . we live in the richest country in the world . . . and the number of citizens is less than 300,000 . . . and yet citizens complain about the land distribution.”
“No, son . . . this is not an autograph for you to sign! This is a paper for you to apply for a land . . . and with the help of God, when you leave your mother’s stomach . . . and go to preschool . . . and graduate from university . . . and go work . . . and get married . . . and have kids . . . and your appointment at the Rumeilah dentist office comes . . . you will immediately get your land without any delays!!”

Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, May 9, 2011

Newlyweds seem to be particularly affected by the overwhelming problem of housing in the country. The Permanent Population Committee (PPC 2012, 16) reports that more than 95 percent of their survey respondents believe it is difficult for newlyweds to get independent housing, due to the increased cost of building a house and the delay in granting land and loans. A similar result was seen in my own survey, which asked respondents to imagine a newly-married Qatari couple that was looking to buy their own house separate from their parents: “Financially, how easy or difficult do you think that would be?” Only 20 percent responded that it would be very (7 percent) or somewhat (13 percent) easy for newlyweds to obtain separate housing, with 33 percent answering “somewhat difficult” and almost half the respondents—47 percent—saying that it would be very difficult. Transparency of the process, rising costs of housing, and length of waiting time are clearly salient issues for many Qatari citizens.

For those citizens who have insufficient income to gain approval for a loan, they cannot receive the land grant and housing loan and instead qualify for free or subsidized housing units (Article 13, Law 2/2007; see also Law 38/1995 on social services). Demand is high and housing unit construction is slow, with an Al Sharq article noting that there have been 300 rent-free houses constructed since 2007, but 1,777 need-based applications (“300 Free Housing Units” 2012). The Ministry of Social Affairs has been granting rents to those in need to seek out housing on their own until more houses can be produced. The rents are given based on family size: A family with three members is granted a 4,500-riyal allowance, a family of four to six is granted 5,500 riyals, and a family with seven or more members is granted 6,500 riyals.
Women are also allowed to apply for these grants, either as divorcees, widows, or orphans (as per Law 38/1995 on social services) or as single women above the age of thirty-five. Yet it seems that women have problems receiving their allocations of land, a particular challenge noted in the NHRC (2011, 41) report. Complaints from a disabled and widowed woman (WHSK 3/13/12), an orphaned woman (WHSK 2/28/12), and a divorced woman (WHSK 11/26/12) all echo the same concerns: that the government either refuses their requests or fails to give an answer—the orphan has been waiting since 2005 for a response! Another divorced woman ended her call with a plaintive cry for help: “I am on the streets with my daughters. Qatari women on the street! I just want my house back so I can live with my children under one roof again!” (WHSK 11/14/12). Unfortunately, with a government construction rate of approximately sixty rent-free houses a year (“300 Free Housing Units” 2012), it may be a long time before these women’s requests are answered.

**Marriage Gift**

Both the government and the people view the financial difficulties that newlyweds face in Qatar as a huge concern for the demographic imbalance of Qatar (PPC 2012, 15). The government encourages its citizens to get married and have large families as a way of combating the current demographics of the country, of which the Qatari citizens make up less than 15 percent. Yet the Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA 2011, 8) noted that citizen marriages reached a ten-year low in 2010, attributing this result, in part, to the “high cost of marriage,” which can reach an average of a million riyals ($275,000) (“Marriage Debt Trap” 2010). Although Islam forbids lavish spending on anything, including marriage . . . [t]he rush for riches has led to social values taking a back seat and the result is that people in the community are caught in a rat race—vying with one another and one-upmanship fueled by jealousy. The spirit of cooperation that was the hallmark of the tribal communities inhabiting the difficult terrain of the Arabian peninsular desert has vanished. It has been replaced by a spirit, so to say, of unhealthy competition—for wealth and showing off. (Pandit 2010)
Largely ascribed to the growing consumerist culture in Qatar (Pandit 2010; “Qatari Women Remain Single” 2012; Sardellis 2013), the process of getting married in Qatar quickly adds up—100,000 riyals on average for the meher (dowry); 5,000–12,000 riyals for an engagement ring; 60,000–120,000 riyals for gold jewelry and diamonds; and 80,000 riyals on average for a party for the two families to meet; and these are only the expenses leading up to the big day! The actual marriage celebration is basically doubled in cost, because parties for men and women must be held separately, with about three hundred guests on average for each event. The wedding hall rentals can range from 100,000–750,000 riyals, although special air-conditioned tents can be erected for an average cost of 80,000 riyals (although the bigger the tent, the bigger the expense). Banquet expenses for each party can range from 120,000–200,000 riyals, plus additional costs for stage decorations (5,000–45,000 riyals), tables and chairs, flowers, photography and videography, and separate male and female staffs for the two parties. For the men’s entertainment, a traditional Qatari dance can cost 25,000 riyals; the women’s DJ is an additional 7,000–10,000 riyals. Life immediately after marriage continues with the high expenses: The morning after the wedding, the groom must give the bride another set of gold jewelry, ranging in expense from 80,000–150,000 riyals. Adding up additional costs of a honeymoon, cars (rented or purchased), and moving out of their parents’ houses into a rented apartment or villa, including furnishing costs, lead Pandit (2010) to estimate, “A Qatari man, thus, ends up spending anything between QR750,000 and QR1m on marriage. This is the average spending since the richer nationals splurge much of their wealth on a wedding.”

96 It is interesting to note that, even in comparison to its Gulf neighbors, Qatar is seen as a particularly pricy place to have a wedding. Al Ziyara (2013a) notes that he recently attended a wedding in the UAE, in which the entire costs of the evening, including two hall rentals, the stage, the buffet, and all other necessities, were around 90,000 riyals ($25,000). Another article noted that wedding halls in Bahrain could be rented for as low as 45,000 riyals, and as low as 12,000 riyals in Saudi Arabia (“Qatari Women Remain Single” 2012).
The exorbitant expenses often necessitate taking out a bank loan and starting newly married life deep in debt (Al-Derham and Al-Buainain 2010; Pandit 2010; Fenton 2013). The increasing divorce rate in Qatar is often attributed, at least in part, to the financial strain on newlyweds. Community requests—by Qatari sociologists, the Central Municipal Council, and the newspapers—for the government to stop the “runaway weddings” (Al-Derham and Al-Buainain 2010) include creating and enforcing a law that specifies an upper limit for wedding expenses or subsidizing wedding halls, either by creating government-owned halls at minimal rental cost or subsidizing the hotels’ halls for citizen weddings (“Marriage Debt Trap” 2010; “Qatari Women Remain Single” 2012). In December 2012, the government finally responded, with Heir Apparent Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani commissioning five free wedding halls to be built across Qatar, and Qatar Foundation’s Social Development Center announcing the building of another eight multipurpose halls to be rented at reasonable cost (Khatri 2012b). The first government-built wedding hall, designed by the Emir’s Private Engineering Office and “inspired by Qatari heritage,” will have five interconnected halls that can be merged together as needed, each with a five-hundred-person capacity and equipped with the latest audio-visual technologies, and should be ready for use by 2014 (“Free Wedding Halls” 2012). Abdulatif’s cartoon depicts a shocked Qatari man reading the news, while the hotels immediately run advertisements about new uses for their large and expensive halls. [See Figure 22.]
While the increase in housing and social allowances, related to the public sector employment benefits, is the only stipend that married Qataris receive regularly from the government, all Qatari men are eligible for the Marriage Bonus, which is a sum of money—entirely up to the government’s discretion, but usually a minimum of twenty thousand riyals—that is given to any Qatari male upon his first marriage. The Qatari man applies directly to the Emiri Diwan, submitting copies of his marriage license, his ID, and his wife’s ID, and he usually receives his monetary gift six to twelve months after applying. Any married Qatari man can apply regardless of whether he marries a Qatari or a non-Qatari. However, as the amount of the gift is left up to the government, it often seems that Qatari couples receive more money than mixed couples (and that an Al Thani man will receive more money if he marries an Al Thani

97 The process of obtaining the Marriage Bonus mirrors Kamrava’s (2009, 406) observation about land distribution, that the “need to apply directly to the Amiri Diwan [is] a process through which the Amir’s patronage is reinforced both symbolically and practically.”
woman). However, unless the government is feeling particularly generous, this gift will not cover exorbitant wedding expenses of five hundred thousand riyals or more. Charities such as Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Al Thani’s Foundation for Humanitarian Services (RAF) tried to introduce a program called “Ifaf” that provided financial aid for five hundred Qatari couples to get married in a mass wedding (Al-Derham and Al-Buainain 2010), but these types of programs largely failed because of the consumerist culture in Doha. As one Qatari explained,  

The innate spirit of competitiveness and one-upmanship in our community is mainly to blame for the failure of group marriages. People would like to be burdened for life with debt rather than get involved in anything that is even slightly suggestive that they are accepting charity and are at a lower social rung. (Pandit 2010)  

Only time will tell whether government-supplied wedding halls will be embraced in the Qatari community or seen as a charity handout for those less fortunate.  

The Qatari government’s emphasis, in the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2008) and the Qatar National Development Strategy (QNDS 2011), on the importance of marriage and family for strengthening and developing Qatari society, has led to the creation of another way to transfer wealth to the citizens. A new fund, called the Marriage Fund, is in the process of being created by the government (QNDS 2011, 167, 171; “Calling for Founding” 2013). This fund would provide financial support for couples about to get married, provided that the couple attends a series of marriage counseling and educational programs. These mandatory training courses would result in certificates of passing that would be one of the basic documents needed to finalize the marriage. This additional source of funding, tied to larger goals of human development, may help ease the current vicious cycle of starting newly married life trapped in  

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98 In a particularly interesting quirk, the Qatari man will not know the exact amount of the gift until he cashes the check at the bank.
99 Qatar Charity, a nongovernmental organization, has recently launched its own marriage program called Zawaj, which also seeks to help Qataris with marriage expenses in exchange for participation in an awareness program about marriage and family responsibilities. Zawaj hopes to fund fifty wedding parties in its first year, following a previous initiative to provide free-of-charge wedding tents to Qatari youth (“Qatar Charity” 2013).
debt. Of course, it would also help if Qatari society began to scale down the extravagant wedding expenses and return to a simpler, more traditional wedding model (Al-Derham and Al-Buainain 2010). Although it is valiant of the government to try to ease the financial burden through government-funded wedding halls and a new Marriage Fund, the state’s financial largesse may still be unable to fully cover Qatars’ desire to “provide evidence of their wealth and status by engaging in excessive and luxurious patterns of consumption” (Sardellis 2013, 1). It remains to be seen whether Qatari weddings will continue to be fueled by a culture of consumption, and how far the government will enable this expense.

**Retirement Pension**

The amount of money guaranteed to Qatari citizens who retire from government service has always been an important concern of society, and raises have been seen as a way of creating increased societal support during touchy political situations. Emir Khalifa gave a 25 percent raise to retirement pensions immediately after his 1972 coup (Crystal 1995, 156–57), and Emir Hamad included retirement pensions in his 60 percent salary increase decree, given in September 2011 during the tense early months of the Arab Spring. In fact, all retirement pensions were set to a minimum floor of 8,000 riyals after this decree, by raising all pensions to a minimum of 5,000 riyals per month before applying the 60 percent salary increase (Al Marzouqi 2012b). Yet retirement pensions have been a constant source of societal tension, as the pensions are based on the last basic and social allowance of the Qatari employees, but do not provide housing.

100 A Qatari elder, Umm Khalaf (“Mother of Khalaf”), describes the weddings of the past in Al-Ansari’s (2011) “Qatar: The Future” video by the Qatari Students Association. “Weddings nowadays are different from the old days,” says Umm Khalaf. “In the old days, the girls get married in their own home and her father and her brother do not celebrate to show their sadness and how they are going to miss her. The ceremony is done within a week and all the neighbors and friends are helping. All the people are helping and the weddings were really simple.”
transportation, or other allowances, resulting in smaller monthly paychecks than while the
employees were working, a point illustrated by Abdulatif. [See Figure 23.]

Figure 23. “Memories”

Perhaps it is not surprising that retirement benefits were seen as garnering the lowest
levels of support in my survey, with 17 percent responding that they were “not very satisfied”
and 13 percent that they were “not at all satisfied.” I speculate that the particularly low levels of
support for the retirement benefits may have to do with the fact that they are the only benefit to
which Qataris must contribute financially. Beginning with the retirement and pension law,102
which is administered by the General Retirement and Social Insurance Authority, Article 5 notes
that all Qatari government and semigovernment employees must contribute 5 percent of their
monthly salaries toward the Retirement Fund, although the employers must contribute double
this amount to the Fund on the citizens’ behalf. Article 6 explains the eligibility requirements to

102 See Law No. 24 of 2002 on retirement and pensions,
http://www.almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=3972&language=ar [in Arabic], as well as the government description of
the retirement and pensions law at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Social Services,”
begin receiving the monthly pension, with an employee eligible to receive it with as little as fifteen years of work and as early as the age of forty, resulting in many early retirements (QNDS 2011, 155). Article 10 lays out the details of the monthly pension, which is 5 percent of the last salary multiplied by the number of years in service, up to twenty years so as not to exceed the total monthly salary amount.

One of the primary concerns is that the retirement pensions are too small to maintain an adequate standard of living, especially if the retiree has housing rents or other debts to pay. As one Qatari man exclaimed, “We served this country with all our hearts. What is taking the Shura Council so long to listen to our demands? I just wish they would realize that we exist one day. I just wish they would treat us like human beings” (WHSK 11/5/12a). The unpopularity of the forced retirement at age sixty (as per Law 8/2009, Article 159) is seen as particularly problematic for those who have debts (WHSK 10/2/12b), as Abdulatif portrays in another one of his hard-hitting cartoons. [See Figure 24.]

**Figure 24. “Post-Retirement”**

*Title: Post-Retirement*
*(On the right): “Retirement for them” (Westerners)*
*(On the left): “Retirement for us” (Qataris) with judges (from banks) chasing him*

*Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, April 26, 2012*
Responding to the citizen complaints, the government commission responsible for amending the human resources laws recently approved new amendments to the law that will give retirees housing and transportation benefits for the first time (Salman 2013). This increase is yet another example of the need for the government to continually offer more economic benefits to maintain the same level of satisfaction among the population, showing the inherent instability of a sociopolitical bargain built on financial benefits alone.

**Other Social Service Benefits**

It would be remiss not to mention, briefly, that Qatar provides a large welfare safety net for those citizens who are deemed particularly needy, as per Law No. 38 of 1995 on social services. The state currently recognizes twelve groups of needy persons who are eligible for monthly pensions from the Ministry of Social Affairs. These pensions were raised by 50 percent by Emiri Decree No. 7 of 1996, and raised by 100 percent by Council of Ministers Resolution No. 38 of 2006. [See Table 7.]

**Table 7. Social Services, Monthly Pension Amounts (in Riyals)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1997 Basic</th>
<th>1997 Additional</th>
<th>2006 Basic</th>
<th>2006 Additional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>270/child</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>540/child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorcée</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needy family</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>900/540/child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special needs (disabled)</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown father/parents, under age 17</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown father/parents, over age 17</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incapacitated, between the age of 18 and 60</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>450/540/child</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>900/540/child</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Incapacitated, over age 60 | 1,125 | 450/wife 270/child | 2,250 | 900/wife 540/child
---|---|---|---|---
Prisoner’s family | 1,125 (wife) | 270/child | 2,250 (wife) | 540/child
Abandoned wife | 1,125 | -- | 2,250 | 540/child
Family of a missing person | 1,125 (wife) | 270/child | 2,250 (wife) | 540/child

Sources: Law No. 38 of 1995; Emiri Decree No. 7 of 1996; Council of Ministers Resolution No. 8 of 1997; Council of Ministers Resolution No. 38 of 2006; Hukoomi, “Social Assistance”103

There has been particularly vocal complaint about the social services pension for divorced women, especially in light of the increasing divorce rate in Qatar, which has been highlighted as one of the most prominent trends threatening the goal of “family cohesion” for the Qatar National Vision (see QNDS 2011, 166–68). The latest data shows the Qatari divorce rate is especially increasing among younger couples, with 61 percent of divorces occurring within the first five years of marriage (QNDS 2011, 166). Many divorced women complain on Qatar radio about the inadequacy of the 2,250 riyals/month pension—it is the only pension that does not include an additional amount of assistance for each child—as well as the difficulties in obtaining independent land and housing for themselves and their children (WHSK 3/6/12; 11/14/12; 11/26/12). The government is aware of the problem, noting that the state is in the process of creating an alimony fund to increase the financial support of divorcées and their children, which

will help to shift the burden of child support considering the lack of child support currently built into the divorcée monthly stipend (QNDS 2011, 168). Several media commentators have echoed the concern of those living on social affairs pensions, arguing that the prices and life styles of Qatar have changed and the ministry must raise the pensions again (Safer 2012; Kabani 2013; Al Marzouqi 2013b). Safer (2012) writes, “Life has changed . . . the people, the circumstances, the conditions . . . Everything has changed except the social affairs pensions!”, a point illustrated by Abdulatif in one of his cartoons. [See Figure 25.] It is important to note here that the well-publicized salary raise by Emir Hamad in 2011 did not increase the social services pensions, and it appears the 100 percent raise in social service pensions in 2006 has already been forgotten.

Figure 25. “A Riddle”

(Female Qatari “game show host”): “I am going to ask you a riddle, and whoever answers it will win 2250 riyals! What is the one thing that stays in its place forever and never moves?”
(Answers, from right to left): “A mountain?” “The pyramids?” “A beauty mark?” “The social affairs pensions!”
Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, October 10, 2012

A Brief Note on Citizenship

A final note: For all of these economic allocations, Qatari citizenship is essential, making citizenship an exclusive and contested issue in Qatari society today. Citizenship is often
conflated with nationality (and, in fact, the relevant Qatari law, Law No. 38 of 2005, is named the Qatari Nationality Law), but the two are quite different concepts. National identity is an inclusive narrative that is applied broadly throughout the states in the Arab Gulf, but the laws governing citizenship itself often officially sanction inequalities between citizens (Partrick 2009, 20). There are two classes of citizenship in Qatar, native and naturalized, based on whether the family resided in Qatar before 1930.\textsuperscript{104} The naturalized Qatars make up an estimated one-third of the total Qatari citizens,\textsuperscript{105} and Al Kuwari (2012, 15) argues that the nationality law paves the way for this transformation of citizens into inhabitants who enjoy none of their rights of citizenship. It does this by permanently depriving citizens who have acquired Qatari citizenship (about one third of all citizens) and their descendants of all political rights.

Partrick (2009, 21) also speculates that these citizens’ relegation to a second-class citizenship is a political move meant to keep certain families from having full political rights. Although Emir Hamad promised in November 2011 that Shura Council elections would be held in the second half of 2013 (“HH the Emir” 2011; “Announcement of the Shura Council” 2011; Ahmed 2011), a voting law has not yet been circulated and so the actual political eligibility for voting and candidacy remains uncertain (Diwan 2011; Al-Sayed 2013).

An equally troubling phenomenon can be seen in the situation of the children of Qatari mothers and non-Qatari fathers. Despite the Qatari government’s professed concern for the demographic imbalance between expatriates and Qataris, and the encouragement of Qatari marriage and increased childbirth rates, children of Qatari women who are married to non-Qatari men are excluded from automatic citizenship; and this exclusion greatly impacts the types of economic benefits that these children can receive from the state (e.g., Pandit 2011). Further, 91 percent of respondents to our survey indicated that “it would be a good thing” to give citizenship


\textsuperscript{105}Partrick (2009, 20) estimates that naturalized citizens represent two-thirds of the Qatari citizenry. I follow Al Kuwari’s (2012, 15) lower estimate of one-third, which is still a highly significant percentage of the population.
to children of Qatari mothers, demonstrating that the weight of society is clearly on the side of these excluded children. Although the Qatari government has indicated that it wishes to review the laws associated with the status of these children (QNDS 2011, 171), as of now they remain without citizenship and many of the associated political (WHSK 10/2/12a; 11/29/12) and economic benefits that accompany it, such as land allocation (Al-Mahmoud 2012), medical care (WHSK 9/13/12; 10/22/12a), and employment (WHSK 9/10/12; 10/14/12b).  

106 Although the full extent of citizenship exclusion in Qatar is beyond the scope of this chapter, suffice to say that up to a third of Qatari citizens may feel they are treated in a second-class manner by the state regarding economic allocations and political rights. The manner in which the state deals with these second-class or excluded groups will greatly impact its future legitimacy.

Discussion

I have described what could be considered the most ideal real-world example of a rentier state: a society in which income is not taxed (in fact, nothing is taxed);  

107 in which the citizen unemployment rate is 3.9 percent (QNB 2012, 9); in which 92 percent of the citizen workforce is employed by the government, with particularly desirable work hours and responsibilities, salaries, and benefits (QNB 2012, 7); and in which medical care, public K–12 education and university education, and land are given free of charge to the citizens. Now I will discuss how

106 Demonstrating that there is some movement toward inclusion, children of Qatari mothers and non-Qatari fathers are eligible for the full tuition scholarships at Qatar University, and the recent health insurance law stipulates that the government will provide free medical coverage to these children as well (Pandit 2013).

107 Besides no income tax, there is also no sales tax, no restaurant tax, and no property or land tax. There is a corporate tax that the government levies on companies, but the taxation laws exclude Qataris from paying the corporate tax. For example, a prominent Syrian businessman owns 49 percent of his business, and his Qatari business partner owns 51 percent, so the Syrian pays a corporate tax of 49 percent of the total income of the business (personal communication, March 31, 2012). See Law No. 21 of 2009 on income tax, particularly Article 4, which exempts Qataris from personal or corporate taxes, http://www.almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=2553&language=ar [in Arabic].
despite all these allocations, they are insufficient to satisfy the rising expectations of the citizenry and, furthermore, they create tension because of perceptions of inequality in their distribution.

**Rising expectations**

Even with the large amount of economic benefits given for free to the citizenry, over 75 percent of this society is in debt (Al-Merekhi 2009), with many people complaining that their salaries do not cover their expenses from month to month. A surprising example of this was the particularly meager sales of the 2012 annual Doha International Book Fair, with booksellers blaming the timing of the fair as “it was scheduled in the middle of the month, when people do not have much money to spend” (Rivera 2012). Abdulatif depicts a desperate Qatari chasing his last riyal of salary halfway through the month, dreaming of shwarma (an ubiquitous and inexpensive pita wrap of roasted meat). [See Figure 26.] With the surprising number of indebted citizens, the fact that 20–30 percent of Qatari citizens report being somewhat or very dissatisfied with the economic benefits provided by the government makes more sense, but nevertheless remains shocking. Here we have, in a nutshell, the economic conundrum of Qatar: a rentier state that provides all basics (and more) to its citizens, yet the citizens cannot afford to buy a book (or a shwarma) halfway through the month. In other words, if Qatar cannot fulfill its citizens’ economic expectations, what country can?
The elaboration of each major economic benefit—the formal laws as well as the informal practices and the citizens’ reaction to them—demonstrates that the warnings given by Crystal (1995, 2), Herb (1999, 241), and others regarding the change in citizen perception from benevolence to entitlement have come true in the state of Qatar. It is not that the citizens are unappreciative of the perceived generosity of the Emir and the Heir Apparent, as shown in Abdulatif’s cartoon, which was published shortly after the 60 percent salary increase decree. [See Figure 27.] But rather, once Qataris receive these benefits, they begin to take them for granted and desire more.
As outsiders, our initial reaction to the dissatisfaction and complaints surrounding many of these economic benefits may be to shake our heads in disbelief. But the very real psychological ability of human beings to become used to their circumstances, no matter how objectively good or bad, is not unique to the Qatari experience. *Automatic habituation* is the fancy term for the basic human physiological response to repeated stimuli, in which the stimuli just fades into the background (Helson 1948, 1964; Brickman and Campbell 1971). Automatic habituation is similar to sensory adaptation as well, such as a smell that fades as the nose adapts to it. It is a normal physiological response to ignore constant physical stimuli and focus on

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108 After listening to a series of complaints on Qatar radio, a non-Qatari student exemplified the sort of frustrations that an outsider may feel: "I can fairly say that almost all the complaints I listen to are just ridiculous! Some people are complaining that they haven't gotten their monthly school salaries yet and they are quite angry about it! I mean REALLY? Your government pays for your schools fees, gives you a monthly salary, and grants you an immediate job right after graduation and you vent because of a delay in the payment? Others complain because their monthly salaries are not enough because they have a maid and a driver! Every time I hear someone saying that, I feel like smashing my laptop against the wall! Qatar's poor people are like the rich people in other 'normal' countries! It is like the government gives them sooooo many "gifts" and these gifts turn to rights!! I swear if our government gives us these things we would be the happiest nation on earth!" (personal communication, June 5, 2012).
something new, which is more likely to require immediate attention (Fredrick and Loewenstein 1999).

Much psychological research has been done showing that the exact same process occurs with stimuli that normally produce emotions, especially happiness and a feeling of subjective satisfaction, in what is known as hedonic adaptation; in other words, a person psychologically adapts to his or her circumstances very quickly (Gilbert 2006; Lyubomirsky 2013). Diener, Lucas, and Scollon (2006, 311) argue that adaptation is an important concept for psychological research:

[P]eople do adapt to many life events, and they often do within a relatively short period of time. Thus, adaptation processes can explain why many factors often have only small influences on happiness. People tend to adapt to these conditions over time.

Myers (1992, 53) elaborates: “The point cannot be overstated. Every desirable experience— passionate love, a spiritual high, the pleasure of a new possession, the exhilaration of success—is transitory.” Even more problematic is that even with “peak experiences”—the idea of a ten on a scale of ten—either people will constantly compare back to the “peak” example and the rest of life will fall short (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978), or, with continued “peaks,” people will become accustomed to this level of thrill and fail to receive as much satisfaction as previously (Dunn, Gilbert, and Wilson 2011). One of the most recent research findings notes that financial peak experiences have a logarithmic relationship to each other: A monetary peak experience of, for example, doubling one’s salary from thirty thousand to sixty thousand would produce a certain level of happiness that would only be equaled by another doubling (to one hundred and twenty thousand), not a simple addition of another thirty thousand (Sacks, Stevenson, and Wolfers 2012).

What is satisfactory and what is desired also has to do with subjective evaluations rather than objective levels. Easterlin (1995, 36) quotes Karl Marx: “A house may be large or small; as
long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace rises beside the little house, the little house shrinks into a hut.” Easterlin (1995) was exploring whether happiness rises in proportion to income on a societal scale—and his answer was no, because happiness is determined not only by one’s own “objective” level of income but by one’s “subjective” comparison with those around him (see also Frank 1999). Easterlin (1973, 4) argues, “Individuals assess their material well-being, not in terms of the absolute amount of goods they have, but relative to a social norm of what goods they ought to have.” This finding is also shown in the United States, as self-reported wellbeing has declined as income inequality has risen, even as the economy has grown overall (Sacks, Stevenson, and Wolfers 2012).

Thus, there is no “objective” level of circumstances that should make people feel happy, satisfied, and content forever; rather, all happiness is relative, as Emily Dickinson’s poem, “Had I Not Seen the Sun,” reminds us:

Had I not seen the Sun  
I could have borne the shade  
But Light a newer Wilderness  
My wilderness has made (quoted in Weisbuch 1998, 220)

Happiness “is thus hypothesized to reflect changes in circumstances rather than the overall desirability of the circumstances themselves” (Diener, Lucas, and Scollon 2006, 305).

Rentier state theory hinges on the idea that the loyalty of the citizens can be bought with various economic benefits. The economic benefits allocated to Qatari citizens may sound incredible to us as outsiders, making it difficult to justify the complaints. Yet it is human nature to adapt to our level of circumstances, whatever that may be. Qataris do not view their economic circumstances in an objective sense, in relation to the overall economic situation of individuals
and societies around the world. Rather, Qataris compare their economic circumstances to their own past experiences (real or imagined) as well as to their peers around them—fellow Qataris.

When comparing their current economic circumstances to their past, Qataris express very real concern with the financial stresses of rising prices and economic monopolies (e.g., Safer 2013; Hamdi 2013). There is a perception in Qatari society that there is a “Qatari” price for all goods and services that is higher than the expatriate price, and that there are economic monopolies in the country that limit competition and create higher prices within the country than in neighboring countries. The much-heralded 60 percent salary increase was accompanied by a perception that businesses were raising their prices by a comparable amount, despite government laws making this a crime.

Qataris in general seem relatively satisfied with the overall economic situation of their family, according to my survey; almost 57 percent answered “very satisfied” and 36 percent answered “somewhat satisfied,” leaving only 7 percent responding that they were somewhat or very dissatisfied. However, the difference between feeling very satisfied and somewhat satisfied is highly correlated with the perception of the rising cost of living. Almost 80 percent of Qatari society felt that it is now more difficult to afford the things they want (30 percent say much more, and 49 percent say somewhat more). Among these Qataris who feel the cost of living has made it more difficult for them to afford the things they want, subjective economic satisfaction is 15 percent lower than those who do not feel their purchasing ability has been negatively affected.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{109} This result was obtained through a compare-means test, with the test variable of ECON5 (economic satisfaction, from highest to lowest) paired with the grouping variable, a recoded version of ECON7 (cost of living) to reflect 1 = more difficult to afford the things we want, and 2 = not more difficult to afford the things we want. The difference between the two means was 0.441, resulting in a 15 percent lower evaluation of economic satisfaction for those who feel their purchasing ability has been negatively affected, with a high statistical significance of $t = 9.969$. 

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The perception of the increased costs of living has led to rising expectations regarding the benefits that Qataris would like to receive from their government. My survey had an open-ended question at the end, asking the respondents if there were any other comments they would like to make. A large number of respondents asked for various types of economic help, as if they were beseeching the government directly (an indication of how, ultimately, surveys are seen in authoritarian contexts). Eighteen people pleaded for help with employment, fifteen mentioned concerns with inflation, thirteen directly addressed the issue of land and housing, and thirty-six people brought up various concerns and requests regarding benefits in general, including additional services they would like to receive. One respondent asked for a car and another for a bigger house (“it’s urgent,” he clarified). One respondent asked for “a new residential area, with speed bumps, street lights, and shops and grocery stores near our home.” Another requested the government to “help citizens with their food supply, like meat, poultry, and children’s milk—a monthly supply is a good idea.” Three respondents asked for “salaries for housewives.” One of my personal favorites was: “Ask the Emir to fix our house—we have the right of maintenance.” These additional requests demonstrate that it is impossible to fully satisfy people with financial benefits alone, no matter how lucrative; expectations continue to rise.

Twelve respondents beseeched the government to forgive citizens’ debts, highlighting a particular point of tension in Qatari society today. The culture of consumption in Qatari society, coupled with the increased cost of living, has resulted in 75 percent of Qatari families finding themselves in debt (Al-Merekhi 2009, 1). Only 8 percent of the indebted families are in the low-income category, with 60 percent of the indebted families in the high-income category, inferring that debt has more to do with luxury than basic spending (Al-Merekhi 2009, 3). Over 46 percent of all loans are for car payments, for example, and the average loan for entertainment, traveling,
or touring purposes was 203,000 riyals (Al-Merekhi 2009, 8). One bank industry expert noted that the banks target Qataris with text messages and other advertisements about low-interest rates and relaxed repayment schedules, persuading people to take on debt that they cannot actually afford (Ajroudi and Khodr 2011). I have personally seen several billboards on the roads, targeting “dear Qataris” for special-rate bank loans, such as the following advertisement from B Ring Road in Doha [Figure 28]. Abdulatif also captures the banks’ doublespeak in one of his cartoons [Figure 29].

**Figure 28. “Dear Qataris” Loan Advertisement, Mashreq Bank**

![Advertisement](Source: Jocelyn Sage Mitchell, personal photograph, October 27, 2011)
The government recognizes the seriousness of the issue, and has promised to tackle the problem through emphasis on financial management training programs, providing a free financial advisory service for citizens, setting legislative limits on maximum allowable loans based on an individual’s salary, and beginning the education vouchers and national health insurance programs to avoid personal debt in these areas (QNDS 2011, 171–72). However, the government has not indicated an interest in forgiving citizens’ loans (a policy that has been done before, in Qatar and other Gulf countries). Yet many citizens continue to hope that the Qatari leadership will rescue them from the monetary trap they have fallen into (e.g., WHSK 3/12/12; 9/11/12b; 11/25/12). A particularly poignant moment on Qatar radio was when a Qatari woman called in to cry on air. She said nothing except, “I urge Sheikh Hamad and Sheikha Moza . . . I have debts . . .” and then burst into tears again. Eventually, the presenter had to ask her to hang up and call again when she calmed down (WHSK 11/5/12b). These types of financial burdens
put accounts that depict Qataris as “privileged” and “angry” into a different light (e.g., Slackman 2010). Qataris have very real concerns about their personal financial futures.

It is very difficult to combat the culture of consumption when the average Qatari finds himself trying to keep up with the Al-Joneses, so to speak. Although it is unclear how many of the almost fifty thousand millionaire households in Qatar are actual Qataris (de Jong 2012; Beardsley et al. 2013), there is a lot of money splashing around Qatar, with many high-profile and even laughable purchases making front-page headlines around the world, such as the Qatari businessman who bought the first bottle of Clive Christian perfume at $250,000 in order to gain entry to the Guinness Book of World Records (“Qatari Buys” 2012), a topic covered by Abdulatif. [See Figure 30.]

Figure 30. “Tabasco”

Qatari man (right): “This is very expensive!!!”
Indian shopkeeper (left): “Stop being pathetic! The other day I saw a report in the paper that a Qatari bought the most expensive water bottle in the world, costing him two million riyals. And before that, a Qatari man bought a special mobile number for ten million. Don’t try to convince me that you can’t afford to spend two thousand riyals for a bottle of Tabasco sauce, oh Greedy One!”
Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, January 25, 2012

The perception that “all Qataris are rich” affects citizens both at home and abroad, as one Qatari columnist recounts:

Yes, alhamdullah [thanks to God], we are doing well and we are living a good life, thanks to God and to the wisdom of our leader, and we do not deny this. But I believe there is an exaggeration . . . . As soon as they recognize our accent the price triples and the alibi is, “You have a lot of money.” I remember receiving a call from an Arab country from a guy asking me to sell my luxury car and give him the money
to help him get married. So I asked him, “What makes you think I own a luxury car?” He said it is known that every Qatari owns luxury cars, a tower, and a contracting company. So I smiled and said to myself, “And the people who get 2,250 riyals a month, did you see their luxury cars?” (Al Sai 2013)

It appears much more acceptable in this society to brag about the hundreds of thousands of riyals spent on a wedding than to complain about poverty, leaving the real issues of inequality in society hidden behind mountains of debt.

**Issues of fairness, inequality, and wasta**

In addition to the citizenry’s continually rising expectations, the lack of transparency in the system, the presence of inequalities in both formal laws and informal practices, and the concern that wasta is needed to achieve the best opportunities, also contribute to rising complaints and dissatisfaction. Comparing one’s own standard of living to someone else’s, and coming up short, stirs feelings of resentment and envy in all but the most charitable of individuals. An even deeper psychological problem occurs when comparing unequal gifts, as these gifts are often completely out of the control of the recipient. *Disadvantageous inequality aversion* is the psychological term for a person’s negative feelings associated with an unfair experience (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 1989). This psychological reaction can be seen in children as young as two or three years old, showing that we are attuned to concepts of fairness from an early age. As LoBue et al. (2011, 154) write,

> Children love to receive toys, candy, or other rewards. But sometimes, a gift can trigger disappointment or even anger when other children have been given more gifts or better ones. Becoming upset upon receiving a gift shows a concern for relative rather than absolute outcomes, which is an essential component of a sense of fairness.

A multitude of studies has shown that a rational and utilitarian mode of economic thinking—that any amount of reward, $1 for example, would be better than no amount of reward—is not the way the vast majority of people feel about unfair allocations. A popular experiment, the ultimatum game, has been shown to result in most recipients choosing to reject disadvantageous
offers, even if it meant that they would lose whatever reward they had been offered, whether it was money or Skittles (Blake and McAuliffe 2011; Camerer and Thaler 1995; van’t Wout et al. 2005). Occasionally, participants accepted some of the offers that were below their self-reported fairness thresholds, “suggest[ing] that although participants were influenced by fairness, they were sometimes able to overcome or disregard fairness considerations and make the economically normative decision” to accept the unfair reward (Tabibnia, Satpute, and Lieberman 2008, 342). However, the study concludes, “the automatic or default reaction in economic decision making is to prefer the fair and refuse the unfair” (Tabibnia, Satpute, and Lieberman 2008, 346).

All of this points to the conclusion that unequal comparisons between citizens will create tension in a society, and we have seen this result in the evidence presented here. Ultimately, there is an inherent flaw associated with the traditional patronage networks of a rentier state, in that they function, by default, in a nontransparent and personal manner, which results in perceptions of inequality (Herb 1999, 241–43; Okruhlik 1999b, 300, 309; Tétreault 2013, 39, 45–46). Many Qataris believe that wasta—personal connections, influence, and intermediaries—is essential for achieving success in many areas, a topic that Abdulatif tackles in the following cartoon depicting a father and son going to the “wasta-maker” (rather than the “matchmaker”) for help with the son’s future. [See Figure 31.]
Figure 31. “The Wasta-Maker”

![Image of a cartoon showing Ferghali and the wasta-maker. Ferghali (right, as the father): “Can you find us someone for our son Saqnaqoor . . . someone who smells like Cambodian incense . . . with a nice smile and a goatee?!” Wasta-maker (left): “Here, son, these are the pictures, find one that you like!!” (on her envelope is written “wastas”)

Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, July 23, 2011

Table 8 displays Qatari perceptions of the need for wasta in various contexts (the driver’s license was put in as a baseline test). It is heartening to note that a relatively low number of Qataris believe that wasta is absolutely necessary to get admitted to college, and that only an unlucky 10 percent in Qatari society believe that a driver’s license is accessible only through wasta. However, almost 60 percent of Qatari respondents believed that wasta was absolutely essential for gaining a good job position, getting medical care abroad, or getting a desirable piece of land from the government.

Table 8. Perceptions of Wasta in Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Absolutely</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Getting admitted to college/university</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting a good job position</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting medical care abroad</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting a good piece of land from the government</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting a driver’s license</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798
The perception of the pervasiveness of *wasta* in society—regardless of whether it is real or imagined—directly impacts a respondent’s satisfaction with the economic allocations distributed by the state.\(^{110}\) [See Table 9.] Among those who consider *wasta* essential for gaining a good job position, self-reported satisfaction with the employment opportunities offered by the state is 15 percent lower than those who consider *wasta* only somewhat or not at all essential. This pattern is seen across all benefits: 11 percent lower satisfaction with medical care; 10 percent lower satisfaction with access to university education and scholarships; and 16 percent lower satisfaction with land distribution. The perception that a nontransparent process allows some people to get more than others has a highly significant negative impact on feelings of satisfaction with the economic benefits offered. In other words, *wasta* is detrimental to the rentier state bargain.

\(^{110}\) In the following statistical tests, I compared means for an independent-sample t test. I recoded each of the ECON16 questions—“How essential do you think *wasta* is for Qataris in each of the following situations?”—to be 1 = not/somewhat essential, 2 = absolutely essential. This recoded variable was then compared with the respective ECON6 question—“How satisfied are you with the following types of benefits?”—to receive the mean difference and the t score significance. The substantive significance was then calculated by dividing the mean difference by the range of the test variable (three, in this case) to determine the relative percentage change of response.
Table 9. Exploring the Relationship between *Wasta* and Satisfaction with Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is there a relationship between considering wasta essential for a benefit, and satisfaction with that benefit?</th>
<th>Statistically significant?</th>
<th>Substantively significant?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Satisfaction with employment opportunities</td>
<td>Yes (t= -7.649)</td>
<td><em>Wasta</em> essential = 15.3% lower satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Satisfaction with medical care</td>
<td>Yes (t= -5.280)</td>
<td><em>Wasta</em> essential = 11% lower satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Satisfaction with access to university education and scholarships</td>
<td>Yes (t= -3.585)</td>
<td><em>Wasta</em> essential = 10% lower satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Satisfaction with land distribution</td>
<td>Yes (t= -7.095)</td>
<td><em>Wasta</em> essential = 16.4% lower satisfaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

Tétreault (2013, 39) notes the problems associated with allocation, which “aggravate social tensions linked to high levels of inequality” and “heighten perceptions of divisions.” She speculates that citizens of rentier states are interested in a government model that moves beyond “discrimination, deception, and a lack of transparency” and that “offers something better than disappointment, division, exclusion, and bitterness” (Tétreault 2013, 46). There are promising signs in the state of Qatar’s reactions to citizen complaints that point toward an increased transparency in some areas of allocation, such as the attempts to form a more official Marriage Fund for citizens and to reform the application process for medical treatment abroad. It remains to be seen how much the state will loosen its hold on the patronage networks for the sake of placating a public increasingly concerned with *wasta* and equal opportunities for all citizens.
Is there still a link between allocation and acquiescence?

The evidence presented here depicts a very rich and very small state that is nevertheless unable to maintain citizen satisfaction with the various economic allocations. It is hard to imagine a state that could exist in the modern world today with more rentier income and a smaller citizen population than Qatar. However, economic satisfaction of all is not the ultimate goal, but, rather, of enough of its population to maintain political stability. An observer could note that while 20–30 percent of the Qatari population is dissatisfied with the economic benefits, 70–80 percent of the population remains largely satisfied. It could be argued that ensuring the economic satisfaction of 70–80 percent of the population gives a regime plenty of support to withstand any revolution—as long as economic satisfaction causes political loyalty and ultimately political stability for the state.

However, my survey data casts doubt on the correlation (and thus the causation) between economic satisfaction and political acquiescence. Statistical tests between economic satisfaction and various dependent variables meant to capture political acquiescence and silent loyalty to the state fail to find any statistically or substantively significant relationships.111 [See Table 10.] These results tell us that Qataris are responding to these questions about freedom of speech and political support regardless of economic satisfaction.

111 Again, in the following statistical tests, I compared means for an independent-sample t test. The ECON5 question—“Taking all things together, how satisfied would you say you are with the overall economic situation of your family?”, with 1 = very satisfied and 4 = very dissatisfied—was compared with three different binary variables related to political loyalty and silence (ECON19, CULT15E, and EDUM3) to receive the mean difference and the t score significance. No substantive significance was calculated because no statistical significance was found. Further investigations on these three variables—by running a regression that controlled for age, gender, education levels, and religiosity, with economic satisfaction as the hypothesized independent variable of interest—also showed no statistical significance for economic satisfaction.
Table 10. Exploring the Allocation-Acquiescence Relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is there a relationship between economic satisfaction and . . . ?</th>
<th>Statistically significant?</th>
<th>Substantively significant?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Citizens should have a greater say in decisions about how the state uses money from natural resources (51.7% agree)</td>
<td>No (t= 1.450)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It is important for a citizen to always support the decisions of the state, even if he disagrees (79.1% agree)</td>
<td>No (t= -1.486)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. It is important to respect the country by containing our criticism on certain important or sensitive matters (49.3% agree)</td>
<td>No (t= -0.193)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that economic allocations may support political legitimacy in Qatar in a negative sense—in that, the removal of these allocations would negatively impact the legitimacy of the state—but not in a positive sense—in that, the presence of these allocations would actively trigger unquestioned loyalty and political support for the state.112 Writing her dissertation in 1986, Crystal (1995, 160–61; see also Crystal 1986, 314) warned, “As welfare functions become the norm they are increasingly seen less as examples of the ruler’s largesse and more as arrangements that clients can claim from patrons or as rights that individuals as citizens can claim from the state.” The unintended consequence of the comprehensive welfare state has been to reduce the link between economic allocation and political acquiescence. Citizens have become used to these benefits and no longer see them as part of a sociopolitical bargain that sews their mouths shut in exchange for filling their pockets,

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112 In Chapter 4, I discuss a regression result that shows that greater levels of economic satisfaction are strongly correlated with greater confidence in the government, demonstrating that there remains an important link between these two variables. However, level of agreement between personal and state priorities is also strongly significant within this same regression, demonstrating that societal justification of the state and its narrative is equally important to overall political legitimacy and stability.
but rather as rights to which they are entitled as citizens. Just as the economic allocations have become seen as rights, so too is the perceived right as citizens to say what they want.113

The removal of economic allocations from the citizenry would weaken Qatar’s political stability; in this respect, economic allocations are certainly a necessary part of Qatar’s political legitimacy formula. However, the economic allocations alone cannot explain Qatar’s political stability. I have demonstrated in this chapter that even with Qatar’s massive resources-to-citizens ratio, it cannot provide enough allocations to appease the rising expectations of the people or satisfy those who have concerns with favoritism or wasṭa. Rather, Qatar’s political stability should be explained through an analysis of state-society interaction beyond allocation: by focusing on societal justification through nation building (Chapter 4) and societal consent through a responsive and constrained state (Chapter 5). Onward!

113 It is important to remember that the desire to criticize one’s country does not automatically imply a lack of political support. As President Theodore Roosevelt said in 1918, “To announce that there must be no criticism of the President, or that we are to stand behind the President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but it is morally treasonable to the American public.” It may be that the Qatari citizens who wish to speak up do it out of patriotism, love, and respect for their country—an attitude clearly shown, for example, in the wording of the 1991 and 1992 petitions to Emir Khalifa, for example (“Petition Text” 1991; “Petition Text” 1992). Regardless of whether the citizens are interested in having more say in the state’s decision making for positive or negative reasons, the fact remains that these citizens appear to be making these choices without regard for their perceived economic situation. Perhaps it is time to sever the proposed link between economic allocation and political silence once and for all.
CHAPTER FOUR: BUILDING A NATION

This chapter begins with a simple question: If economic allocation were the only measure needed to ensure political stability, then why do we observe Qatar investing so much effort in nation building? The answer to this puzzle is crucial, for Qatar’s emphasis on creating and maintaining legitimacy through noneconomic strategies stands in direct contrast to classic rentier state theory’s emphasis on the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society. I argue that the actions of an ideal-type rentier state in the noneconomic nation-building realm demonstrate the importance of societal justification to the political legitimacy formula of even financially independent states. The state of Qatar has devoted immense resources and effort toward creating a unified sense of Qatari nationalism and citizenship, rewriting Qatar’s historical and cultural heritage, and coordinating the ideological message of Islam with the political narrative of the state. In all of these legitimization strategies, Qatar’s deft ability to control the narrative that surrounds the reinterpretation and reinvention of key cultural aspects has allowed the state to prevent alternative interpretations that could threaten political stability.

The evolution of Luciani’s thinking on this matter shows the importance of a reassessment of this fundamental assertion in classic rentier state theory to match the empirical reality of today. Luciani’s (1987, 76) original assertion argued that “[a]n allocation state does not need to refer to a national myth and, as a matter of fact, will usually avoid doing so.” As late as 2009, he repeated this maxim: “The authoritarian rentier state does not need to refer to a national myth, because it is supported by a rent accruing from the rest of the world and does not need to impose taxes on the domestic economy,” arguing instead that the use of transnational ideologies such as Islam or pan-Arabism sufficed to provide the Gulf rentier states with domestic legitimacy.
(Luciani 2009, 97; see also Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 377). However, a recently updated version of his work shows that his thinking has begun to evolve. Repeating the same line, but speaking now in the past tense, Luciani (2013, 119) stated, “The authoritarian rentier state has not needed to refer to a ‘national myth,’ because it is supported by a rent accruing from the rest of the world and does not need to impose taxes on the domestic economy” (emphasis mine), and added an important sentence:

Partly in reaction to the unwanted consequences of pursuing values transcending national boundaries, rentier states have, in the past decade, devoted greater attention to asserting their respective national consciousness and identities. (Luciani 2013, 120)

I argue here that, in the case of Qatar, the process of nation building has been going on for more than a decade—at least since formal independence in 1971 (Crystal 1995, 161–64)—but the fact that even classic rentier state theorists are noticing the nation-building efforts of the rentier states is telling of the immense importance placed on these strategies by the states themselves.

In this chapter, I begin to combine classic rentier state theory with a political legitimacy framework—focusing in particular on the need for societal justification—to expand our understanding of state-society relations in Qatar and the Gulf beyond economic allocation. Beetham (1991, 56–60, 126–50) noted that societal justification is comprised of two parts: a shared belief about the proper source of authority and a shared belief that this authority facilitates rather than obstructs the general good, as perceived by society. These shared beliefs about authority and the general good are ultimately subjective evaluations by the people that the current system abides by the most widely accepted cultural norms, beliefs, and practices (Schwedler 2006, 126). However, rather than see the state of Qatar as subservient to these cultural norms, beliefs, and practices, I instead argue that the state has purposefully and actively
engaged in creating, reshaping, and editing these cultural, historical, and religious symbols.\textsuperscript{114} By successfully controlling the creation, maintenance, and usage of the most resonant symbols and understandings in society, the state of Qatar has been able to solidify its legitimacy (and political stability) by removing the possibility of collectively organized, viable alternatives to the current power structure (Przeworski 1986, 1991).

This chapter informs our revision of rentier state theory by fusing historical institutionalism with cultural narratives, following Migdal’s (1997, 213) assertion that “we cannot look at the bricks of the state without understanding the mortar.” My work on Qatar is meant to fill a gap in the literature, as “[t]he effort to promote state formation through the use of ideology and culture rather than coercion—that is, to create what Gramsci refers to as hegemony—is a process that still has not received adequate attention in Arab oil-producing countries” (Davis 1991, 25). The evidence presented in this chapter builds on Gengler’s (2011, 113) observation that “there are specific, not uncommon circumstances under which everyday citizens of rent-dependent nations will be motivated politically by something other than or in addition to their wallets.”

This chapter depicts the ways in which Qatar goes beyond allocation to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its people, demonstrating that the Qatari state invests heavily in attempts to create real loyalty to and identification with the state among the citizenry. These efforts show that the state, rather than considering itself autonomous from society, is engaged in active pursuit of societal justification to enhance its legitimacy and political stability. Further, rather than assuming the state is attempting to tap into deeply rooted societal assessments of

\textsuperscript{114} This argument runs contrary to that of Wedeen (1999, 10–14) and Hudson (1977, 2), who argue that we must first understand the resonant cultural symbols and perception of history as seen by the people themselves. I argue that a successful legitimacy strategy ensures that the state is controlling the dominant cultural narrative of the society (Schwedler 2006, 126; Geertz 1980, 19).
important historical, cultural, or religious narratives, this chapter argues that Qatar has been actively shaping and promoting its preferred hegemonic narrative within society, in an attempt to remove viable alternatives to the power structure. Qatar’s extensive efforts at legitimization, despite the classic theory’s dismissal of the need for noneconomic nation building, highlight the importance of building legitimacy beyond allocation, and connect the state’s political stability in the face of the Arab Spring to a more complex causal mechanism than simply buying off the population.

**Setting the Stage: The Need for a Nation**

As of April 30, 2013, the total population within the state of Qatar was 1,944,953 persons. To put this number into perspective, the current population is quadruple the population from the 1986 official census, and two and a half times the population from the 2004 official census, the result of a growth rate of 5.9 percent between 1997 and 2004, and a staggering 16.1 percent from 2004 to 2008 (PPC 2009, 7–8). Berrebi, Martorell, and Tanner (2009) note that the economic boom, particularly associated with the increased prominence of liquefied natural gas in the country’s economy (see Chapter 2), created a demand for labor far beyond what the domestic workforce could provide, necessitating the importation of expatriate workers to the point where Qataris were outnumbered almost seven-to-one (currently, it is now eight-to-one). What is even more striking about this population increase is that official estimates seem continually surprised by the pace of growth. For example, the United States Census Bureau expected the population to exceed 1.1 million people by 2020 (Berrebi, Martorell, and Tanner 2009, 429), a mark that was passed in January 2007 (Mathew 2013); and the Qatari government

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projected that the population would not reach 1.9 million until 2016, a mark that was passed in March 2013 (QNDS 2011, 5).

The combination of rapid population growth and the impression that official sources are unable to control it has sowed concern in the local population for the “population defect,” as the following cartoon by Abdulatif poignantly depicts. [See Figure 32.]

**Figure 32. “A Defect in the Population”**

![Cartoon of people with one person in the middle of the crowd]  
*Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, January 9, 2012*

In response to a 2012 survey, more than 82 percent of the Qatari respondents agreed that Qatar suffers from a demographic problem, and about 84 percent of the respondents would prefer to see a reduction in expatriate worker numbers (PPC 2012, 14–15). The “aggravated population defect” (Al Kuwari 2012, 209) is one of the most frequently discussed issues in need of reform in *The People of Qatar Want Reform . . . Too*. An entire chapter of the book is devoted solely to this issue (Al-Khulaifi 2012), and the chapters on political reform and the national development strategy are peppered with dire warnings about the impact of a national population that represents only 12 percent of the total population and only 6 percent of the total labor force (Al Kuwari 2012, 21–23), with Al Ghanim (2012, 110) writing, “This population disproportion is the biggest threat to the future of the country.”
Corroborating evidence from my survey also depicts a population that is highly concerned with the increased expatriate population, viewing it not only as an economic but also as a cultural threat. When asked if the expatriate population increase of the past five years has been generally positive or generally negative, almost 64 percent of respondents answered that it has been generally negative. Of these people, over 47 percent chose the expatriate population increase as the most important negative change of the past five years (17.3 percent) or the second most important negative change (29.9 percent). Although there is a strong current of concern regarding the expatriate competition for skilled employment (see Chapter 3), there is also a strong concern that the demographic imbalance represents a threat to the culture of Qatar (e.g., PPC 2012). Al Kuwari (2012, 209) writes that the population defect is the most critical of the four “chronic deficiencies” of the state of Qatar, as it threatens to uproot the Qatari society and obscures its identity and culture and their Arabic language, and undermines the role of the citizens considering that the role of citizens in any stable nation should be the main role in the state, and those in leadership and administration cadres in general and public administration in particular. (Al Kuwari 2012, 218)

However, we should be careful not to fall into essentialism or advanced journalism when discussing the “cultural threat.” No matter how loudly the voices complain, there may be hidden agendas behind these concerns; and the definition of Qatari culture, like all cultures of the world, is fluid, dynamic, and contested. It is sometimes assumed in anthropological or cultural studies that there is an objective culture in existence, separate from political or societal influences, which can then be said to be under threat. By arguing that the state of Qatar is actively appropriating, shaping, and interpreting Qatari culture, history, and religion, I do not mean to say that there is no objective Qatari narrative. Rather, the state is heavily invested in promoting its preferred version of the Qatari narrative to the population at large, with the goal being the creation of the dominant—even hegemonic—cultural narrative of the country, which will ensure that the state’s
political and social goals are supported, rather than hindered, by this narrative. It is not the objective but, rather, the subjective interpretation that matters.

Rather than view “Qatari culture” as under threat, it may be more useful to contrast the perceptions of how much attention is given in Qatari society today to various important Qatari cultural aspects versus Western cultural aspects. If we look at the perception of relative attention given to Qatari culture in particular, Islam, and the Arabic language, we see that a fairly large majority of the population believes that sufficient attention is paid to Qatari culture (whatever their subjective definition is) and to Islam, with minorities believing that there is both too much or too little attention to these topics [see Table 11]. It is the Arabic language in particular that appears to be seen as suffering from a lack of sufficient attention, with almost 50 percent of the respondents believing that the language receives only a little attention, or none at all. The feeling that the Arabic language is under threat may be greatly intertwined with the recent emphasis on English-language instruction in the schools (discussed further in Chapter 5). For now, it is interesting to contrast the perceptions of the attention paid to Qatari culture and Islam versus the attention paid to Western culture. Almost 50 percent of respondents believe that too much attention is given to Western culture in the country today. This result highlights a population that, on the whole, believes that Qatari culture and Islam are receiving sufficient attention—in other words, that there is not necessarily an impending cultural doom—but that Western culture is receiving an undue amount. Thus, the complaints may be born more of annoyance and resentment than of existential threat.116

116 The responses to the categories of Qatari citizens and expatriates are strikingly similar—between 68 and 70 percent of respondents feel that sufficient attention is paid to both categories, with similar responses to “too much” and “little/none” as well—showing that the sense of cultural threat may not have to do with the presence of expatriates in general, but rather with Western expatriates, and their pervasive globalized culture in particular.
This feeling of annoyance and resentment can be seen in another survey question, in which the respondents were asked if they have ever felt out of place (the exact Arabic phrase means to feel like a foreigner) or uncomfortable in various public places in Qatar. [See Table 12.] This question was meant to probe the feeling that a foreign cultural presence—particularly a Western culture, complete with immodest dress and behavior, mixing of genders, Christian holidays, and, in the case of the hotels, the presence of alcohol—may make Qataris feel like foreigners in their own country. The results show that a significant number of Qataris—between 20 and 45 percent—have experienced a feeling of alienation in various public places in Qatar, even in Souq Waqif (one of the state’s most important cultural projects: a re-creation of an old Qatari marketplace; e.g., Cooke 2012) and the shopping malls (often joked to be one of the most popular pastimes in Qatar (e.g., Van Marsh 2008)). Only their own neighborhoods appear to be an oasis of relative comfort, which makes sense considering that neighborhoods in Doha are highly segregated by nationality (Nagy 2006, 124–26). It appears from this information that the influx of expatriates and particularly Western culture and behavior—with expatriates outnumbering Qataris eight-to-one—may lead to a feeling among many Qataris that they are strangers in their own country (e.g., Al-Fadhly 2013b).

Table 11. Relative Attention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“How much attention is given to ——— nowadays in this country? Do you feel there is . . .”</th>
<th>Too much</th>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qatari culture</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic language</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western culture</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798
Table 12. Feeling Out of Place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Never been</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your neighborhood</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corniche</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souq Waqif</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>74.8%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education City</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malls</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

The feeling of discomfort with the demographic imbalance—whatever the reason—could lead to deeper societal discontent and tension, especially if the concerns are wrapped within a discourse of cultural or religious threat. It is essential for the state of Qatar to be seen as the bastion, protector, and preserver of these cultural and religious elements, rather than the destroyer—through a single-minded focus on economic development—of these elements. The focus on nation building—or as Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002, 10) call it, “the level of state formation”—is essential for Qatar to avoid the trap of focusing on rentier allocation alone, which would create a citizenry devoid of intrinsic loyalty and support (Tétreault 2013, 35; Chaudhry 1997; Foley 2010). As Tétreault (2013, 35) argues,

[A] critical problem of governance by Middle Eastern states that are resource-rich is that their modern state-building exercises are embedded in rentierisme. In consequence, sovereignty for these states is shaped primarily by distributive politics. The magnitude of their riches lets them put off envisioning and carrying out policies designed to create loyalty and support for a regime that embodies institutions authorized to define and mediate obligations of each member, including the governing classes, to the others. Such states lack positive sovereignty.

I argue in this chapter that the state of Qatar has long been well aware of the need for noneconomic legitimacy strategies. Zahlan’s (1979, 132) history of the creation of Qatar as a modern state noted that Qatar had been continuously confronting the “contradictions between the maintenance of tradition and the reality of the space age.” She continued:

Qatar is eager to maintain links with both these forces, the past and the present. The best way to safeguard tradition is to imbibe [the youth] with an acute sense of social and historic consciousness. . . . This entails a
continuous examination and re-examination of Qatar’s place in history, past and present. (Zahlan 1979, 132–33)

Crystal’s (1995, 161) examination of Qatar statehood argued that Emir Khalifa, shortly after taking power in 1972, emphasized “normative socialization” in his quest to develop the Qatari civic myth. She elaborated:

Qatar was sadly lacking a civic myth: it was a polity suffering from a severe shortage of symbols. The only solution was to create them. In the next few years the amir gave high priority to developing symbols that would clarify and legitimize his claim to rule. (Crystal 1995, 162)

It is telling that the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2008, 3) lists “modernization and preservation of traditions” as the first of the five major challenges facing Qatar’s future. Although the Vision notes the “intense strains” that accompany rapid economic and population growth, it argues that it is possible to combine “deep-rooted social values” with “economic and social progress,” writing:

Preservation of cultural traditions is a major challenge that confronts many societies in a rapidly globalizing and increasingly interconnected world. Qatar’s very rapid economic and population growth have created intense strains between the old and new in almost every aspect of life. . . . Yet it is possible to combine modern life with values and culture. Other societies have successfully molded modernization around local cultures and traditions. Qatar’s National Vision responds to this challenge and seeks to connect and balance the old and the new. (QNV 2008, 4)

In the final sentence of the preceding excerpt from the Qatar National Vision, we see that Qatar goes further than simply being “aware” of the need for nation building, in that the state is actively responding to this challenge by connecting and balancing “the old and the new” (QNV 2008, 4). In this response, the state is purposefully reshaping a contested and ill-defined view of Qatari culture, history, and religion to fit its preferred narrative. In this goal, Qatar joins the ranks of all other successful nation-states in the world in “inventing traditions” in order to establish group cohesion, legitimize institutions and authority, and inculcate particular values and behaviors in society (Hobsbawm 1983, 1–9). The French revolutionaries (Bell 2001) and the British monarchy (Hobsbawm 1983) are just two of many examples of states that sought to
enhance their political legitimacy by inventing traditions “to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition” in “deliberate and always innovative” ways (Hobsbawm 1983, 1, 13). The Gulf states have engaged heavily in this process as well (e.g., Davis and Gavrielides 1991; Davidson 2005, 2012; Valeri 2009). Qatar’s investment in the cultural, historical, and religious narratives is not because these facets are intrinsically important, but rather because the state wants to shape these narratives in ways that promote its social and political goals.117

In this chapter, I demonstrate how the state of Qatar has sought to tap a key base of regime legitimacy—“tradition and maintenance of values” (Nonneman 2005, 320)—by gently guiding its citizens toward a unified and state-led definition of Qatari nationalism and citizenship, historical and cultural heritage, and Islamic ideology. The attention paid to nation building is not the only legitimization strategy that Qatar pursues beyond allocation. As Nonneman (2005, 320) argues, “effective dealing with the outside world” through regional and global foreign policies are also useful tools for enhancing regime legitimacy in the Gulf today, and this subject has been explored extensively in the literature.118 However, I follow Tétreault (2013, 46) in her assertion that, global politics aside, citizens in rentier states are “far more

117 Qatar devotes much effort to appropriating Gulf and/or Arab culture as Qatari specific, mirroring other countries in the Gulf as well (e.g., Khalaf 2000, 2002). Space constraints prevent me from discussing in more depth many of Qatar’s endeavors, such as the story of the reinvented “old” Souq Waqif (Alraouf 2012; Cooke 2012; “Extensive Research” 2009); the use of the Museum of Islamic Art and the Arab Museum of Modern Art (Mathaf) to promote Qatari-specific narratives, such as pearling (“Natural History” 2009) and Qatari art and collectibles (“Mal Lawal” 2012); the downtown architectural project of Musheireb (Scudder 2010a, 2010b); the use of Katara Cultural Village to highlight Qatari traditions of dhows (Jilani 2013) and halal (meat prepared according to Islamic law) livestock (“Halal Qatar” 2013); and promotion of Qatari cultural nights at Education City (“Students of Georgetown” 2012). The balancing act of the state between a globalized business world and sensitivity to local culture and religion can also be seen in the Pearl’s alcohol ban, which has prohibited alcohol on the “island” since December 2011, despite repeated rumors that it would be lifted (Delmar-Morgan 2012; Barthe 2012). All of these endeavors would make fascinating future research projects.

118 See, for example, Cooper and Momani (2011), Kamrava (2011), Peterson (2006), Rabi (2009), and Wright (2011) for analyses of how Qatar uses foreign policy to build its legitimacy at home and abroad. See also the particular emphasis in the literature on Qatar’s use of (or, at least, symbiotic relationship with) the satellite television station Al Jazeera to enhance its foreign policy goals (Anzawa 2011; Da Lage 2005; El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002; Miles 2005).
focused on the quality of [domestic] governance and think their leaders should be as well.”

Further, I focus on domestic-oriented state strategies because of the theoretical importance of demonstrating a rentier state heavily engaged with and embedded in its society. The remainder of this chapter will give examples for each of the following strategies: creating a unified Qatari sense of citizenship and nationalism, reinventing a historical and cultural Qatari narrative, and coordinating the ideological message of Islam with state goals and heritage narratives.

Creating a Unified Qatari Citizenry

It is easy for the outside observer to view Qatari society as a homogeneous unit. Nagy (2006, 120) argues, “Given the large numbers of foreign residents and the striking distinctions based on nationality, diversity amongst Qatari citizens is easy to overlook . . . . [and] the small Qatari population appears to be rather homogeneous.” However, Qatari society, in reality, contains salient distinctions based on geographic origin, cultural traditions, religious sectarianism, and even economic class (Nagy 2006, 127–31; Gardner 2012, 8; Heeg 2010, 90–93; Longva 2006, 171; Partrick 2009, 20–23; Althani 2012b, 46–50). Geographically, Qataris are separated by whether they are considered originally from the Arabian Peninsula (arab), originally from the Arabian Peninsula but with migratory ties to and from Iran (huwala), originally from Iran (ajam), or originally from Africa (abd). Culturally, Qataris are separated, in the tradition of Ibn Khaldoun’s “dichotomy of sedentary and nomadic life” (Althani 2012b, 47), based on whether their families were desert nomads (bedu) or settled townsfolk (hadar).

119 It is important to note that all countries in the Gulf contain these distinctions to varying extents (Partrick 2009).
120 The Qatari short film, Bader, which won the Doha Tribeca Film Festival 2012 “Made in Qatar” award, ostensibly documents a young boy who misbehaves in school, yet the underlying message attributes this troubling behavior to the boy’s feelings of discrimination and alienation at school due to bedu-hadar tensions (Al-Saadi, Assami, and Darwish 2012). One of Bader’s friends confides candidly to the camera: “I was the first one to meet and greet Bader
Religiously, Qatari citizens are separated by the Islamic sects of sunni (the majority sect within most of the Arabian Peninsula, exemplified by Saudi Arabia) and shi’a (the majority sect within Iran).

Economically, despite the flashy wealth of some Qatari families, “that visible wealth should not mask the fact that there is also a significant middle class, and even lower middle class, in the Qatari citizenry” (Gardner 2012, 8; see also Al-Saad 2011b). My survey showed clear class distinctions in economic self-evaluations. While only 3.3 percent of Qataris considered themselves to be “upper class” and the majority—62.4 percent—chose “upper middle class,” a quarter of the respondents (25.6 percent) defined themselves as “lower middle class,” while the remaining 8 percent chose “working class” or “lower class.” The discussion in Chapter 3 clearly showed that not all Qataris are wearing million-dollar pearls and cruising around town on sheepskin seat covers, despite what outsiders may believe (Weiner 2008, 101).

Further, it is also important to note that these distinctions can become compounded within society. For example, both bedu and hadar families can both be considered original arab, but they are still seen as distinctive and separate social labels (Heeg 2010, 90; see also Al-Maria 2012, 180–86); conversely, some hadar are sunni and some are shi’a (Nagy 2006, 129–30). As well, the ajam from Iran can be either shi’a or sunni. Adding a further layer of complexity is the fact that not all families within each distinction are considered equal, in terms of residential neighbor preference, arranged marriages, or even the agreed-upon history of the family within

when he first came to the school. I thought he was a modern person who doesn’t know the difference between his elbow and his knuckles. Then I noticed that his face is black. So, I thought he must be a Bedouin. I asked, ‘How are you?’ He answered, ‘God bless you.’ I asked, ‘Are you Bedouin or from the city?’ He said he was Bedouin. That is when I knew him and asked for his name. He said, ‘Bader Lamy Al-Marri.’ Later on, Bader is shown insulting his friends by calling them a “modern person” (as in, hadar) or a “black guy” (as in, bedu), but in private, the boy bemoans the tensions at his school: “There are some kids who say, ‘Oh, you’re modern. You’re Bedouin.’ Why do they do that? We’re all God’s equal creatures.” In a particularly interesting twist of events, when the student filmmakers were invited onto a popular Qatar TV show, Al Dar, to discuss their film, they were told just before going on air that the trailer had been censored and that no discussion of bedu-hadar tensions would take place on the show; rather, it would focus solely on the misbehavior of the children as an example of the poor quality of Qatar’s independent school system reforms (personal communication, December 9, 2012).
the narrative of Qatar (e.g., Fromherz 2012, 3–4, 6–8). This last point is considered a particularly sensitive topic in Qatar. In sum, as Nagy (2006, 120) argues, “Distinctions based on geographical origins, cultural traditions, religion and class are all important axes of differentiation amongst Qatari citizens and provide the basis for important residual processes of differentiation.”

This separated notion of Qatari identity—as a divided community with myriad social tensions—is the antithesis of the state’s major nation-building goal: to create a unified Qatari citizenry. The Permanent Constitution (2004) emphasizes the equality of citizens (Articles 18, 19, 34, 35) and notes that “[t]he State shall strive to strengthen the spirit of national unity, cooperation, and fraternity among all citizens” (Article 20). In this policy of strengthening national feeling, seen throughout the Gulf region, a major stumbling block is that the “selective re-imagining of the past cannot avoid tribal identity” (Partrick 2009, 16). In some Gulf states, such as Kuwait, government policy has actively encouraged the pervasiveness of the hadar-bedu dichotomy in a, perhaps ultimately misguided, attempt to utilize “tribal symbolism to elicit loyalty and devotion to the nation-state and the state’s leadership” (Longva 2006, 181; see also Longva 2000, 184–88; Tétreault 2000, 33–58). However, when it comes to the societal divisions within Qatar and its history of tribal conflict, the Qatari state has chosen an opposite path.

I argue that the state of Qatar has been actively promoting narratives, symbols, and imagery in an attempt to downplay the societal distinctions in favor of an inclusive national identity. Other scholars have speculated that it appears to be state policy in Qatar to promote a homogeneous version of national identity (e.g., Gardner 2012, 8; Nagy 2006, 128). In this section, I show specific examples of how the state is actively promoting a unified citizenry, by discussing the creation of National Day and the narrative of the new Qatar National Museum (currently under construction, with a planned opening of early 2014).
The creation of National Day

Until 2007, Qatar’s Independence Day was celebrated on September 3, 1971—the date that Qatar declared independence from British protection. This date marked the formal independence of the country, but it was nevertheless a rather lackluster (and far too recent) historical story, with neither a violent struggle with Britain nor a bold civil disobedience movement to use as a symbol of a new nation. Rather, Qatar was forced to declare independence, only after Britain suddenly announced in 1968 that it would unilaterally withdraw from all defense contracts by the end of 1971 (Zahlan 1979, 103). Concerned with the loss of British military protection, Qatar attempted to create a federation with Bahrain and the seven states that would become the United Arab Emirates, before internal conflicts over power balances spurred Qatar to create its own provisional constitution in 1970 in preparation for full independence a year later (Zahlan 1979, 104–07)—hardly the sort of stuff that gets the heart racing and the history books selling.

In June 2007, the Qatari government decreed that Independence Day would be renamed “National Day” and would switch to December 18 of every year to commemorate when “Sheikh Jassim bin Mohamed bin Thani, the founder of the state of Qatar, took over the government on December 18, 1878” (Article 1, Law 11/2007). The focus on Sheikh Jassim, rather than his father, Sheikh Mohamed bin Thani, is of particular interest. Sheikh Mohamed was the first Al Thani to be recognized by an outside force—in this case, the British—as the legitimate representative of Qatar, by signing the 1868 truce between Bahrain and Qatar (Zahlan 1979, 42–

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Various history texts refer to this moment as the turning point for the Al Thani family in Qatar and the first time that outside powers recognized the autonomous nature of Qatar as separate from either Bahraini or Saudi control (e.g., Rahman 2005, 61–82). Yet this date could be considered sullied by the ignominious nature of the treaty (in which Qatar was forced to pay tribute to Bahrain and the Qatar-based Naim tribe) and, ultimately, the same flaw as the original Independence Day—placing Qatari nationhood as controlled by and subordinate to the whims of the British.

Sheikh Jassim, unlike his father, had a tumultuous relationship with the British in which he never accepted their sovereignty over the country (Althani 2012b 101–09; Zahlan 1979, 46–47), and despite forming alliances for a time with the Ottoman Empire, also asserted his independence from that power as well, most famously in the Wajba battle of 1893 (Althani 2012b, 134–40; Rahman 2005, 99–112; Zahlan 1979, 51–55). As well, despite general violence and lawlessness in the region at the time, Sheikh Jassim was able to create a cohesive enough group of tribes to assert Qatari sovereignty over the northwest of the country, particularly with regards to fending off Bahraini influence on and claims to Zubarah (which I will discuss below as an important component of the reinvention of Qatari history). The official line, seen from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a former Minister of Economy and Trade (Althani 2012b), and the official K–12 Qatari history textbooks, is that Sheikh Jassim was the “founder of Qatar” and that “Qatar emerged from his reign a united and independent country” (QHC Grade 9 2012, 20).

The move from Independence Day in 1971 to National Day in 1878 serendipitously combines

123 Previous to the 1868 treaty, Sheikh Mohamed had been mentioned in British correspondence in 1851, when he became the chief of Doha (Rahman 2005, 62–69). Althani (2012b, 59) traces correspondence back to 1841, when Sheikh Mohamed was still the chief of Fuwairat.

several facets that help the Qatari state create the image of a unified country and citizenry: It lengthens the time that Qatar can be seen as an independent and unified country (from a mere forty or so years to a much more respectable one hundred and thirty years), it firmly implants the Al Thani family as integral to the founding of Qatar, and it portrays an image of tribal unity, underneath the leadership of Sheikh Jassim, that successfully prevented the outside powers of Britain, the Ottoman Empire, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and even Abu Dhabi from encroaching on Qatar’s territory and sovereignty.

Qataris take great pride in their National Day celebrations, which are attended by citizens and expatriates alike. A huge number of events are offered, by public and private organizations, in the days leading up to the December 18 main events of a public parade, fireworks, and, of course, the Corniche car shows that last with bumper-to-bumper traffic all night long (Chatriwala 2012). The December 18 morning parade displays a massive military and cultural parade down the streets of the Corniche. The morning parade can be considered the most official part of the National Day celebrations as the watchers include the Emir and his entourage, who sit on a special podium as the parade goes by. Figure 33 shows a particularly striking picture taken from the 2012 National Day parade, in which three layers of symbols—traditional symbols of the dhow boats, modern symbols of the downtown skyline, and national symbols of military might—are combined into one unified motif of Qatari nationalism—precisely the message the state seeks to promote!
A further message may be gleaned by the surprising actions of the Emir at the close of the 2012 National Day parade. When the official parade came to a close, Emir Hamad stood up and began walking down the parade path himself, waving to the people in attendance and stopping to shake hands with both citizens and expatriates. This type of outreach had not previously occurred during National Day, and it overwhelmed the people in the crowd as well as the media commentators. A Pakistani expatriate was quoted in *The Peninsula* as saying,

I couldn’t believe my eyes when I saw the Emir just two feet away from me. I was emotionally overwhelmed, so much so that my eyes were wet. The Emir began shaking hands with people and embracing children. He didn’t differentiate between nationals and expatriates. He shook hands with whoever could reach up to him. I will never ever forget this gesture of the Emir. (“Emir Greets People” 2012)

The fact that the Emir reached out to both citizens and expatriates should be seen as particularly powerful in light of the major unifying strategy that has been followed by Qatar in the past: unifying the citizenry through differentiating them from the perceived threat of the expatriate workers (Heeg 2010). Just a few years ago, Nagy (2006, 128) speculated that “the clear and formalised distinction between Qatari and non-Qatari enhances the image of a singular ‘Qatari.’” The distinction is still seen clearly in the media treatment (by Qatari newspapers, radio
and television shows, and even Al Jazeera) of local events, which always differentiates between “citizens” and “residents,” regardless of the congruence of the two for the subject at hand. Yet, beginning formally with the Qatar National Vision 2030, the Qatari government has sought to emphasize that the expatriate workforce is a permanent and essential part of the country and should be treated as such:

In order to realize Qatar’s future ambitions, it will be necessary to make up for the shortages of local labor with expatriate workers. Attracting and retaining the right mix of skills will require appropriate incentives, as well as institutional arrangements for ensuring the rights and safety of expatriate labor. (QNV 2008, 14)

The following cartoon from Abdulatif depicts the great pride that Qataris took in their Emir walking among all the people of Qatar. It may herald a more inclusive nationalist strategy in the future, which gently pushes the Qatari citizenry to accept and appreciate the expatriate contributions to the country. [See Figure 34.]

Figure 34. “Qatari Pride on National Day”

The outstretched hands symbolize the different sectors of society that the Emir interacted with, including the green-sleeved hand (symbolizing Westerners), the brown hand (symbolizing the Southeast Asian workforce), the light blue-sleeved hand (symbolizing a Qatari man in a thobe), the black-sleeved hand (symbolizing a Qatari woman in an abaya), and the small pink-sleeved hand (symbolizing a child, of any nationality).

Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, December 19, 2012

The new Qatar national museum

When Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani came to power on February 22, 1972, the newly independent Qatari nation had multiple pressing needs: formalizing the distribution of oil wealth;
reorganizing the bureaucracy; rapidly industrializing the country; nationalizing the oil industry; and investing in large-scale infrastructure development of a country lacking in basic services such as roads, sewage systems, and water desalination plants (Crystal 1995, 155–61; Nafi 1983, 39–47). He could have been forgiven if he had avoided the creation of a national identity, as classic rentier theorists would hypothesize (Luciani 1987, 76). Yet instead, Emir Khalifa quickly placed high priority on the creation of a national museum, almost immediately assigning the project to the Minister of Information, Issa Ghanim Al Kuwari, who was in talks with the project’s main architect, Michael Rice, by May 1972—less than three months after Emir Khalifa’s ascension (Aga Khan 1980, 30).125

Crystal (1995, 161–64) devotes an important section of her work to Qatar’s “development of a civic myth.” She argues that Emir Khalifa “gave high priority to developing symbols that would clarify and legitimize his claim to rule” (Crystal 1995, 162), such as promoting the Qatari flag, coins and money, the national anthem, the country’s international status, and various trappings of the state. Yet the most important symbol would be that of a “founding myth,” which Emir Khalifa would illustrate through the Qatar National Museum. This myth would not only present the history of Qatar, which, through archaeological findings, would link back to the Stone Age, but it would also pay special attention to explaining the journey between pre- and post-oil life in Qatar, and how the Al Thani family was integral to this process. Crystal (1995, 162–63) elaborates:

Qataris already knew to trace themselves back to Arabia through migrations in the eighteenth century, a connection firmly implanted in official history. This defined the people and tied them to their land. As a myth it was adequate but not illustrious. It was not an ancient myth, nor was it an inspiring myth, forged from revolutionary or anticolonial struggle, full of heroes or heroic acts. . . . The most pressing problem with the myth was that it left a gap between the desert past and the present. It did not explain how the

125 The fact that a British archaeological team was on the ground in Qatar by November 1973, explicitly “to meet the requirements of the new National Museum of Qatar,” is another testament to the high priority placed on this project (de Cardi 1978, 1).
Qataris’ life today, a life of oil and money, was tied to the lives of those in the desert myth. . . . If the myth could not make sense of oil, it also did not explain why the al-Thanis, let alone Khalifa, should rule. That link would have to be forged through a new myth.

The architecture of the museum highlighted the Al Thani family by centering the museum around a renovation of the Old Emiri Palace: the old residence of Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani and his sons, Sheikh Hamad and Sheikh Ali (Wright 1975). This decision was made by Emir Khalifa himself, through “a specific request . . . that the main Museum building be ‘within’ or a ‘part of’ the walled area of the old Palace” (Aga Khan 1980, 39). As Figure 35 shows, the palace, unused for decades, had fallen into disrepair, and the renovations were quite intensive and difficult (Aga Khan 1980, 5–6, 39–41). Yet the use of the palace “linked the ruling family within all these ages” (Crystal 1995, 163), and it is clear that Emir Khalifa considered this to be an essential component of the national identity he was seeking to construct. In total, the Qatar National Museum cost $15 million to complete, which would equal approximately $64 million today (Aga Khan 1980, 9). At a time when Qatar had so many developmental needs to consider, the financial commitment to developing a national identity is an important early reminder that the government did not rely on allocation alone to ensure political support and stability.\footnote{Qatar is obviously not the only nation to rely on museums to help construct a sense of nationhood. As Levitt (2012, 29) argues, “Ever since the leaders of the new French Republic opened the doors of the Louvre to the general public, cultural institutions have played starring roles in the drama of nation building.”}
The content of the Qatar National Museum was divided between the old palace and the new building. The old palace showcased the residences of Sheikh Abdullah, Sheikh Hamad, and Sheikh Ali; depictions of a wedding room and of “the simple life before oil”; and displays of Arabic perfumes, traditional herbal medicine, pottery and stoneware, and traditional costumes.\(^{127}\) The new building contained various exhibits, including archaeological sites in Qatar, Qatar’s Stone Age, desert fauna, traditional weapons, desert life and the Bedouin people, Qatar in the Islamic period, oil and gas in Qatar, as well as sections on geology and Arab astronomy. All of these artifacts, from the Stone Age to the oil age, sought to illustrate the founding myth of Qatar from ancient times to the present.

The Qatar National Museum was opened in 1975 (with the lagoon and aquarium phase opening in 1977) to wide acclaim, both domestically and internationally, winning the Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1980 (Aga Khan 1980).\(^{128}\) In fact, Qatar was one of the first in the

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\(^{127}\) I garnered this information from screenshots that I took of the old national museum website on November 19, 2011. The webpages have since been erased.

\(^{128}\) Of course, you can’t please everybody. Kelly (1980, 191) wrote dismissively, “[T]he Qatars have of late been equipping themselves with a history and an indigenous culture, both of noble proportions. The showpiece of this particular enterprise is a ‘national museum’, housed in the former (c. 1920) palace of the ruler in Dauhah. Largely the inspiration of a public relations firm in London, the museum has been equipped and adorned at a cost of several
Gulf region to create a national museum\textsuperscript{129} and the first to use the technique of architectural renovation, rather than recreation, on historic buildings (Wright 1975, 32–33; Aga Khan 1980, 31). Figure 36 shows the impressive reconstructed exterior of the building. The Aga Khan report (1980, 9) notes that the museum “is a source of pride to Qatar and a contribution to the development of a national identity. It is visited by Qatars of all sorts, native born and immigrant, and is used by them as the accepted means of introducing their country to foreign visitors.”

**Figure 36. The Qatar National Museum, 1980**

![The Qatar National Museum, 1980](image)

*Source: Aga Khan (1980, 14), photographer Christopher Little*

I remind readers of the museum’s initial popularity and importance, because modern-day perspectives on this museum no longer give the same level of prestige to the project. The ventilation towers, a form of traditional architecture meant to provide naturally cooling waves of millions, despite—or perhaps because of—the fundamental limitation of having very little to put into it. For this reason the museum accords great prominence in its exhibits to the neolithic artefacts [sic] unearthed in Qatar by European archaeologists. Since nothing of any note has occurred in Qatar in the intervening millennia, the museum has had to attach profound significance to fishing nets, Bedouin tents, camel halters and saddles in its re-creation of the Qatari past. It is not the fault of the Qatars that they have no history, nor can it be held against them that they would like to invent one.”

\textsuperscript{129} Al Ain National Museum (within Abu Dhabi) and Dubai Museum both opened in 1971; however, both had more of a state focus than a national one, which has necessitated the United Arab Emirates’ current construction of Zayed National Museum (in Abu Dhabi). Kuwait opened its national museum in 1983, which is also currently being renovated. Oman was next in 1978; it, too, is currently undergoing renovations. Bahrain did not create a national museum until 1988, and Saudi Arabia did not create a national museum until 1999. Qatar was truly ahead of the curve.
air, were seen as a particularly important facet of the original construction (Wright 1975, 24), and the decision was made that the “Old Amiri Palace would lose in authenticity if its component buildings were to be air-conditioned” (Aga Khan 1980, 38). The lack of air-conditioning became a major deterrence as the country became used to ever-present blasts of cool air, particularly with the rising oil and gas wealth of the 2000s. As Weiner (2008, 115), the unimpressed National Public Radio reporter, noted upon his visit,

The first thing that strikes me about this squat concrete building is that it must be the only unair-conditioned building in the entire country. Is this, I wonder, an effort to simulate the hardship of Qatari life before the days of air-conditioning? The heat inside the concrete rooms is unbearable. Within seconds, rivulets of sweat form on my forehead and drip into my eyes, stinging.

The second thing he noted was the “pathetic” exhibits, such as a “glass case that houses a collection of what looks like camel toenail clippings” (Weiner 2008, 115). An expatriate resident visited the collection in 2006, also noting the disrepair of many exhibits and rooms:

[W]e found wallpaper peeling off the walls, and skulls and stuffed sea creatures . . . lying abandoned on the floor next to paint pots and brushes. In the spirit of adventure we descended into a dark cellar, only to find ourselves up to our knees in salt water. (“Slightly Surreal Trip” 2006)

Unfortunately, as early as 1980, concerns were raised about the maintenance and layout of the National Museum, with the Aga Khan report (1980, 8) noting,

The interior layout of the Museum is, perhaps, unduly complicated. It leaves a number of ‘dead’ (and inaccessible) spaces which attract vermin, and the path which the visitor must follow is not always clear. Maintenance of the displays has been somewhat neglected.

Particularly with the advent of I. M. Pei’s Museum of Islamic Art in 2008 (Ouroussoff 2008a, 2008b), it appears that Qatar’s leadership realized it was time for the Qatar National Museum to undergo further renovations—in reality, an almost complete reconstruction and reimagining of the national identity, far beyond the early decisions in 1972 of a nation still in its infancy.

Although the new Qatar National Museum is scheduled for a 2014 opening, I conducted several interviews with members of the project, including with the Project Director, Dr. Emin Mahir Balcioğlu, which enabled me to access official and internal documents related to the
galleries as well as receive insider perspective on the overall vision. As Dr. Balcioğlu noted, the new museum stands out for two reasons: content and architecture. The famous architect Jean Nouvel was commissioned to create the architecture, which is a sprawling complex of interlocking discs meant to resemble a Qatari desert rose, a crystalline formation of calcium sulphate that is found slightly under the surface of inland salt flats (Hidayat 2009). Figure 37 shows the interesting similarities between an actual desert rose (on the left) and the concept art for the new museum structure (on the right).

Figure 37. Qatar’s Desert Roses

Leaving aside the impressive architectural feat of constructing the interlocking discs using the most modern building information modeling (BIM) three-dimensional computer imaging technology available, the image of the desert rose is a powerful symbol of the way Qatar seeks to portray itself, to both the outside world and its own people. As another member of the project explained, “The desert rose gives beauty to the desert. Qatar is that desert rose—that
from this supposedly barren space, here is something beautiful that nature created. The desert rose is both a metaphor for and a celebration of Qatar.”

Beneath the interlocking petals of the desert rose, the museum will consist of thirteen galleries, twelve of which encircle the Old Emiri Palace, the final stop on the circuit (“Gallery Descriptions” 2013). Three major and interrelated themes are presented in the eleven permanent collection galleries: emerging territory (Galleries 1–3), life in Qatar (Galleries 4–7), and founding and transforming the nation (Galleries 8–11) (“National Museum” 2012). Galleries 1, 2, and 3 progress from an introduction to the roots of Qatari civilization; an in-depth look at the geology, environment, and ecosystem of Qatar; and a 15,000-year history of the earliest people of Qatar (dating back to the end of the last Ice Age) to the most recent findings at Al Zubarah. Galleries 4, 5, 6, and 7 showcase the people of Qatar, describing cultural practices, traditions, and celebrations, and paying particular attention to life in the desert (the bedu story) and life on the coast (the hadar story). Gallery 8, aptly titled, “Building the Nation,” tells the history of Qatar’s formation and independence, including the political history of the Al Thani family, and Gallery 9 depicts the history of oil and gas in the country and the economic growth that accompanied it. Galleries 10 and 11 delve into the transformation of Qatar, culturally, economically, and politically, after the advent of oil and gas, including an interview with the Emir, a timelapse map of Doha from the nineteenth century to today, and a focus on

132 Personal interview, April 22, 2013, Doha, Qatar.
133 All of these galleries will display approximately 1,000 artifacts from the museum collection of more than 10,000 objects (“National Museum” 2012). However, in my interviews, project members admitted that Qatar’s heritage is largely intangible. Displayed alongside the traditional objects will be new media, including commissioned art films, evocative soundscapes, and oral history videos. The Oral History and Intangible Cultural History Project—which has now switched its name to simply the Oral History Project—has collected more than 200 interviews with Qataris and non-Qataris, of two to three hours each, meant to capture the stories, knowledge, and narratives of Qatar before it is too late. This project has been deemed of such importance that it has been moved outside of the National Museum umbrella to its own entity under the Qatar Museums Authority, and it expects to continue to collect oral history even after the opening of the museum (personal interviews, March 17 and April 22, 2013, Doha, Qatar).
contemporary history, including media—perhaps incorporating a live stream of Al Jazeera (Eakin 2011)—and Qatar’s regional role. After Gallery 12—which combines a temporary exhibition gallery with the credits for the permanent galleries—the museum deposits visitors in the final gallery, the “historic Fariq Al Salatah Palace” (“National Museum” 2012, 2), where visitors can take an audio-guided walk through the Old Emiri Palace and take part in storytelling circles or majlis discussion.

Although all of these galleries are fascinating messages about the updated civic myth that Qatar seeks to portray, I would like to focus on two sets of galleries in particular: the interrelations between “life in the desert” and “life on the coast,” seen in Galleries 5 and 6, and the crucial “building the nation” theme of Gallery 8. First, the combination of the land and sea narratives can be seen as braiding together the bedu and hadar storylines into a unified Qatari narrative—what Miriam Cooke describes as “the tribal modern brand” (Cooke 2010, 2014). Cooke (2012, 2, 4) emphasizes that the new museum—one of the “most fantastic examples of the architectural braiding of the tribal modern brand”—“will be located on the shore of the Gulf to bring together desert tribal symbol with the sea that provided pre-oil hadari Arabs with sustenance.” The importance of bringing together the dichotomy of the desert nomads and the settled urbanites to Qatar’s goal of a unified citizenry cannot be overstated.134 The Al Thani are

134 The historical tensions between the settled hadar and the nomadic bedu should not be seen as irrelevant for the present concerns of the citizenry. Bibby’s (1970, 125–26) observations while on a brief visit to Qatar in the mid-1950s remind us of the historical security needs of the coastal state vis-à-vis the mainland grounds of the Bedouin tribes. He writes, “[T]he armoured vehicles only served to emphasize the fact that Qatar was part of mainland Arabia and had very different police aims from Bahrain. Here was no problem of checking petty theft or keeping an eye on political hotheads. Here was the age-old question of the relative strength of the townsfolk and of the desert nomads. The desert of Qatar, to within sight of the coastal villages, formed part, and merely part, of the grazing grounds of powerful Bedouin tribes, the Na’im, the Manasir, and above all the Murra, whose range went deep into Saudi Arabia, as far as the oasis of Jabrin, 200 miles from the coast. These nomad tribes had never given more than nominal allegiance to the sheikhs of the coastal towns.” Al-Maria (2012, 12–13, 127–28) describes the fluidity of the Bedouin tribal loyalty to modern Gulf states, including a poignant anecdote in which a bedu man, who became a Qatari citizen to receive an educational scholarship to the US, nonetheless describes himself as an Arab from “Only. Just. Arabia” (23).
hadar arabs, part of a conglomerate of merchants and chieftains who symbolize modernity, sophistication, urbanization, and individualism (Cooke 2010; Nagy 2006, 131). Although, as Longva (2006, 171) notes, there is a “growing lack of consonance” between the original meaning of the term Bedouin and the reality of settled Bedouin families today, it is nevertheless the case that the idealized cultural values of the Bedouins of the past—such as nobility, hospitality, morality, and generosity—are “upheld as ideals put out of reach by urban conditions” (Nagy 2006, 131; see also Montigny 2013). It would be detrimental for a society that is changing as rapidly as Qatar to have the ruling family seen as part of an overly urbanized group, divorced from traditional values, which explains the “emphasis on a bedouin-style cultural past even as nationals are overwhelmingly part of settled communities” (Partrick 2009, 17). Cooke (2010) argued that, in order to achieve a unified nationalism, the terms hadar and bedu, currently “deployed to designate cultural differences,” should instead be brought together “in such a way that they complement and enhance each other and strengthen the modernization efforts underway.”

Braiding together the two strands—hadar and bedu—has been the state of Qatar’s major emphasis in its nation-building efforts at least since formal independence. The 1975 description of the Old Emiri Palace emphasizes on numerous occasions how Sheikh Abdullah and his sons (members of the hadar) combined bedu elements in their architecture and daily life:

Their social background [of the Al Thani family] was a mixed one of bedouin and commercial life, which have always accorded one with the other in Arabia. For considerable periods the members of the Al Thani family would take advantage of favorable weather conditions to tent about the open country of the interior and in some senses this assemblage of individual dwellings (buyut) was an immobilized bedouin encampment (menzil). Thus in addition to the family dwellings there are appointments which reflect the public aspects of tribal life—e.g. a place for deliberation and a place for hospitable refreshment.

. . . The private family life of the several dwellers within the complex was an unrestricted and agreeable one. Apart from the separation of the public quarters to the east of the compound, there was little in the nature of segregation. This again accords with bedouin practice and indeed travellers remarked that compared with the towns of the Nejd under Wahabi control, the womenfolk entered freely into the life of the community.
Of more interest perhaps is the arrangement of the ensemble of units in the Old Amiri Palace. No compulsion was felt to unify this ensemble either in the mode of a fort or of a large town house—and examples of both of these categories are to hand in and about Qatar. On the contrary the assemblage of separate dwelling places make it seem a petrified reflection of a bedouin encampment (menzil) with a surrounding wall to ensure privacy. (Wright 1975, 19–20)

A similar emphasis on interweaving the two concepts can be seen in the new national museum. The “life in the desert” gallery juxtaposes the traditional Bedouin tent with the modern-day majlis (a reclining sitting area that is found in virtually all Qatari homes today), aiming to find similarities between the two as a means of connecting the past with the present. The “life on the coast” gallery tells the story of a pearl diving community that would settle on the coast for the summer months, and then go to the desert and live off the land in the winter months—again, interweaving the two narratives of nomadic and settled life. The two galleries then join together in the “celebrating life” gallery, which creates positive and unifying feelings through an emphasis on the traditional cultural celebrations of Qataris, many of which are shared experiences regardless of hadar-bedu distinctions.

Progressing from the intertwined hadar-bedu narrative to the “building the nation” gallery, the national museum takes this shared cultural heritage and spins it into the larger narrative of the founding and transformation of Qatar into a unified, independent, and strong nation. Following in the tradition of many national museums, in the Gulf and throughout the world (e.g., Al Qassemi 2013), tribal tensions and divisive social history are glossed over in this room. Bringing up problematic, albeit historically factual, issues, such as the political positions of Qatari families over history and the historical conflicts between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors, would be antithetical to the goal of creating a unified concept of Qatar within the region around which all can rally. One project member explained this decision as follows:

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135 Personal interview, March 17, 2013, Doha, Qatar.
It’s about GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] unity and national unity, about bringing people together, rather than giving them points of conflict. And that’s why this museum is so important, because it represents the focal point, the pinnacle, of Qatari civilization, and the message that they want to present to the world.\textsuperscript{136}

Dr. Balcioğlu noted that the content presented in the new museum galleries is “very important, but very controversial,” because “there may be conflicting ideas within Qatari society about what Qatar is,” particularly with regards to the interpretation of tribal history. “The museum will try to address this,” he added, “but the extent to which it will satisfy every visitor remains to be seen.”\textsuperscript{137} Although the national reaction to the new Qatar National Museum will be worthy of study, for now it appears that the state of Qatar is both cognizant of and eager to avoid potential conflicts in the historical narrative.

The placement of the Al Thani palace at the center of the desert rose structure is another crucial part of the “building the nation” civic myth. Crystal (1995) noted that the original national museum emphasized the role of the ruling family in Qatar’s history:

> The heart of the museum was the old Shaikh’s palace, first occupied by Shaikh Abdalla early in the century. The selection of the palace as a centerpiece linked the ruling family to all the other pasts displayed within: the stone age, the nomadic days, the Islamic era, the pearling days, the oil boom, the state projects. Lest the lesson be lost, exhibits included poems by the founder of the dynasty, Shaikh Qasim [Jassim], as well as later ruling family photographs. (Crystal 1995, 163–64)

The new national museum of Qatar follows in these footsteps by enclosing the Old Emiri Palace within the circular layout of the desert rose structure, as Figure 38 makes clear. It is also important to note that Figure 38 is the main image displayed on the front of the Qatar National Museum media package, which I received from Dr. Balcioğlu.

\textsuperscript{136} Personal interview, April 22, 2013, Doha, Qatar. However, it is important to note that others view this “glossing over of history” in a more negative and detrimental light (e.g., Montigny 2013). For example, Kelly (1980, 191) writes, “What is objectionable about these public-relations exercises on behalf of the Qatari regime is that they involve the falsification of the historical record over the past two centuries, notably concerning the nature and length of Bahrain’s connexion with Qatar, the relationship between the Al Thani and the Ottoman Turks, and the character and exploits of the best-known member of the line, Jasim ibn Muhammad Al Thani, who was far from being the heroic paragon that modern hagiography has made him out to be.”

\textsuperscript{137} Personal interview, April 23, 2013, Doha, Qatar.
However, in all of my interviews, the general consensus was that the attention paid to the ruling family, even in the “building the nation” gallery, was “balanced” and the majority of the content “centers on the people,” as Dr. Balcioğlu put it. Another project member notes,

> There is no attempt to coopt [the formation and transformation galleries] into some propaganda for the ruling family. They are not changing the narrative—they’re just not including some things. . . . Part of the ruling family’s objective is not to portray the country as their own property, but rather to portray Qatar as a brand, international and relevant.138

The overall narrative is directed by the Qatar Museum Authority’s steering committee, which combines several important entities and a diverse group of prominent Qatari families, and is seen as a collaborative process, intent on steering away from controversial topics. The “building a nation” gallery, while seeking to remind visitors of the important place of the Al Thani in Qatari history, through a wall of touchscreen portraits and biographies, also highlights the contributions of other important families, including prominent (and historically controversial) tribes such as the Al Murra and the Al Naim. There remain some concerns about the lack of regionally integrative narratives—as one project member stated, “The Qatar-centric nature of the museum is one of its greatest shortcomings.”139 Nevertheless, the main message of Qatar’s new national

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138 Personal interview, March 17, 2013, Doha, Qatar.
139 Personal interview, March 17, 2013, Doha, Qatar. See also Montigny’s (2013) talk on museums in the Gulf, in which she recommended broadening the scope and narrative of national museum to better embrace the historical reality of cross-regional influences.
museum seems to be a unified citizenry throughout its history. As Dr. Balcioğlu asserts, “We are witnessing a historic moment of nation building at its best.”

**Reinventing a Historical and Cultural Qatari Narrative**

As I have already inferred when discussing the way in which the historical narrative of Qatar’s founding has been portrayed in the new Qatar National Museum, Qatari history is in the process of being rewritten—one could even say reinvented. The drive to re-create Qatari history can be seen as a direct attack on the Western historical scholarship of the country, typified by Zahlan’s (1979, 28) brief assessment that Qatar “had played a minor and obscure role throughout the turmoil of the centuries, having had little to attract the various conquerors in the way of natural resources.”

Through extensive archaeological efforts to unearth evidence of a distant past, a mandatory course of study in Qatari history for all K–12 students (public and private) in the country, and a particular emphasis on rewriting a preferred historical and cultural narrative of Al Zubarah, the state of Qatar is combating the external world’s dismissive attitude of the country’s historical place in the region. The urgency displayed by the state in its process of enhancing the historical and cultural narrative of Qatar reflects the state’s belief in the old adage, “If you don’t have a past, you don’t have a future” (Al-Ansari 2011, minute 10).

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140 As an interesting side note, Qatar’s alternative narrative can also be seen as a direct attack on the attitudes of its fellow Gulf neighbors, some of whom are dismissive and even condescending toward Qatar’s place in history. Bahrain, in its scathing counter-memorial to Qatar’s version of history, presented to the International Court of Justice, characterized Qatari political history as follows: “Qatar’s desire to modify the human geography and history of the Qatar peninsula is understandable. As a political entity, ‘Qatar’ emerged only in the 20th century when a confederation of merchants living in or near Doha, led by the Al-Thani family, slowly expanded and solidified its influence. But even then, the ‘Doha confederation,’ as such, had had only a very short prior history” (ICJ 1997, 13).
A brief historical background

The oldest archaeological history of the Gulf region depicts stone tools and remnants of agricultural and maritime trade from 6000 to 5000 BCE, some remnants of pearling from 5000 BCE, ceramic and sculpture fragments from Mesopotamia and Indus from 4000 to 3000 BCE, and evidence of the Dilmun long-distance trading center from around 3000 to 2500 BCE (Commins 2012, 13–14; Vine and Casey 1992, 11–17). After the Dilmun civilization’s decline, various empires—the Kassites and Elamites, the Persians (Achaemenids), the Greeks (Seleucids), the Parthinians, and the Persians again (Sasanians)—had influence over the Gulf before the advent of Islam in 610 CE. The Islamic era saw the empires of the Umayyads, the Abbasids, the Ibadis, and the Carmathians leave their marks on the Gulf, before the trading powers of the Portuguese, the Persians (Safavids), the Dutch, and the British, along with the Ottoman Empire, began various periods of control in the region (Commins 2012, 13–31, 34–46; Vine and Casey 1992, 17–23).

Yet of Qatar in particular, little is mentioned. Crystal (1995, 15) notes that archaeological evidence in the form of stone implements have been found in Qatar from 4000 BCE.141 Yet compared to the other Arab states of the Gulf, Qatar has left relatively little archaeological or historical marks on the world stage—perhaps owing to its unique lack of any permanent inland settlements (Zahlan 1979, 13), with evidence for significant settlements only appearing after the ninth century CE (ICOMOS 2012, 99). When describing the Gulf region, from ancient Mesopotamia (7,000–8,000 years ago) to the rise of Islam (610 CE), Commins (2012, 13–17)

141 Some sources date these finds almost back to lower Paleolithic times (Bibby 1970, 121, 129; Kapel 1967), approximately 50,000 years ago (de Cardi 1978, 1). However, “[d]espite the findings of pioneering Danish archaeologists in the 1960’s, it is now generally accepted that the oldest flint tools—key indestructible indicators of a human presence—found by the French Archaeological Mission on the edge of an island depression in west Qatar, are characteristic of the later Stone Age or Neolithic period,” approximately 8000 BCE (Vine and Casey 1992, 11).
mentions Oman nine times, Bahrain seven times, Al Hasa (in modern-day Saudi Arabia) four times, Kuwait three times, and the United Arab Emirates (specifically, Sharjah and Abu Dhabi) two times. Qatar is mentioned only once, in a passing reference to a Christian Nestorian monastery constructed in Qatar during the Sasanian Empire of 224–642 CE. Historical veracity of even this claim aside,142 it is a rather unimpressive history for a state that wishes to be seen as internationally recognized and relevant.

The state has welcomed various international archaeological teams to carry out excavations: the Danish from 1956 to 1964 (Kapel 1967; Bibby 1970); the British in 1973–1974, meant to complement the collection of the original national museum (de Cardi 1974, 1978); the French in 1976 (Tixier 1977), and, now, the Danish again, with the University of Copenhagen–Qatar Museum Authority partnership in the excavations of Al Zubarah, 2009–present (which I will discuss in more detail later). Just as the earlier British excavation was purposefully meant to unearth artifacts for display in the original national museum (Crystal 1995, 163; de Cardi 1978, 1), the current Danish archaeological project—besides pursuing UNESCO World Heritage Site status, as I will discuss later—is also meant to find artifacts for display in the updated national museum. The Qatar Museum Authority has already taken hundreds of artifacts from the Al Zubarah project for possible insertion in the new national museum, despite the still-ongoing analysis of the project and its findings.143 In addition to the museum exhibits, the state of Qatar has gone a step further toward increased dissemination of its “new and improved” archaeological history by creating a state-approved historical narrative to be taught in all K–12 schools, public and private, in Qatar.

142 Kennet (2007) casts doubt on whether these archaeological finds were remnants from the Sasanians, although Hellyer (2001, 88) does make a brief reference to an ancient Christian community in Qatar.
143 Personal interview, March 12, 2013, Al Zubarah, Qatar.
Qatari history for schoolchildren

The Supreme Education Council (SEC) received a boost in stature from Emiri Decree No. 14 of 2009, in which it was given the power to set the standards for all educational facilities and providers, public and private (Article 4), including the development of curriculum standards (Article 6). Soon after this decree, the SEC mandated that “[a]ll international schools must commit to teaching Arabic, Islamic studies and Qatari history beginning with the 2010/2011 school year” (“Private Schools” 2010). However, many schools (particularly the international private ones) delayed implementation due to the lack of English-language sources for Qatari history that were appropriate for the K–12 level (Iqbal 2012). The SEC took matters into its own hands and commissioned the production of “authentic learning materials” that would conform to “clear guidelines about the cultural and religious aspects” and the content of which would “comply with the Qatari standards” (“SEC Soon” 2012). Beginning with the 2012–2013 academic year, the trial editions of the SEC’s Qatar History and Citizenship (QHC) pedagogical materials were disseminated to virtually all public and private schools in Qatar. Regardless of implementation issues, the message is clear: The Qatari leadership considers the teaching of Qatari history such a high priority that it is being enforced even if the lessons are still in trial versions.

145 The process has not been without wrinkles. At least one major private school has not received these materials despite repeatedly asking for them (personal communication, February 13, 2013). Some private schools have received the materials, but the high cost of the books has delayed implementation as parents balk at buying the approximately 200-riyal ($55) textbooks (Iqbal 2012; Olayiwola 2013b). All basic and secondary learning resources in these subjects must be approved by the SEC to ensure they do not go against the culture and traditions of the country, which has also created problems with implementation (“Teaching Qatar History” 2012). One major private school asked the SEC for additional approved learning materials, having completed the lesson plans before the end of the school year, and was told to start again from the beginning of the book and repeat the lessons with the students (personal interview, April 26, 2013, Doha, Qatar).
146 Fran Gillespie, known for her previous work on the flora and fauna of Qatar, is publishing a book in June 2013 on Qatar’s archaeological past, specifically designed to assist in teaching Qatari history in the K–12 school system.
With difficulty, I was able to obtain copies of the seventh, eighth, and ninth grade trial edition textbooks for the 2012–2013 year.\textsuperscript{147} The tables of content for the three grades give a useful overview of the materials covered:

**QHC Grade 7**
Unit 1 (history): History of the Ancient Civilizations in Qatar and the Arabian Gulf Region
- Lesson 1: Qatar’s Civilization in Ancient Times
- Lesson 2: Ancient Civilizations in the Arabian Gulf Region
Unit 2 (history): History of Qatar and the Arabian Gulf Region in the Islamic Era
- Lesson 1: How Islam Spread in Qatar and the Arabian Gulf Region
- Lesson 2: The Role of Qatari and Arabian Gulf People in Spreading and Defending Islam
Unit 3 (citizenship): The Family in the Qatari Society and the Social and Political Features of the Qatari Society
- Lesson 1: Family Health in the Qatari Society
- Lesson 2: The Social Features of the Qatari Society
- Lesson 3: The Political Features of the Qatari Society

**QHC Grade 8**
Unit 1 (history): Qatar and the Arabian Peninsula in the Modern Age
- Lesson 1: European Colonial Conflict in Qatar and the Arabian Gulf Region from the 16\textsuperscript{th} to the 20\textsuperscript{th} Centuries
- Lesson 2: The Ottoman Caliphate in Qatar and the Arabian Gulf Region
- Lesson 3: The British Protection over Qatar and Its Treaties
Unit 2 (citizenship): Qatar’s Role in Protecting Humanitarian Principles
- Lesson 1: Qatar’s Role in the Human Rights Field
- Lesson 2: Qatar’s Role in World Peace and Voluntary Work Fields
Unit 3 (citizenship): Arab-Islamic Culture
- Lesson 1: The Concept of Culture, Its Resources and the Factors Affecting Arab-Islamic Culture Development
- Lesson 2: Qatar’s Role in Preserving Arab-Islamic Culture

**QHC Grade 9**
Unit 1 (history): Modern and Contemporary Qatari History
- Lesson 1: Evolution of the Emirate
- Lesson 2: Succession of Al Thani Family Rulers
- Lesson 3: Modern Revival in Qatar
Unit 2 (citizenship): Political and Economic Concepts and Phenomena in Qatar
- Lesson 1: Political Concepts and Phenomena in Qatar
- Lesson 2: Economic Concepts and Institutions in Qatar
Unit 3 (citizenship): Health Concepts and Institutions in Qatar
- Lesson 1: Public Health: Preventative Health
- Lesson 2: Health-Related Institutions
- Lesson 3: Qatar and Health Organizations

\textsuperscript{147}Qatars who worked within the SEC (albeit in different departments from the curriculum office) were unable to access these books, and some private schools felt uncomfortable sharing them due to concerns about political sensitivity. Luckily for me, other private schools were happy to help by sharing extra copies of the material with me.

First of all, it is important to note that the books, despite being described in the media as “Qatari history,” are in reality an intriguing mix of history and citizenship lessons. The first page of every book displays a large color picture of the Emir flanked by two Qatari flags, followed by the national anthem, and then a further discussion of the symbolism of the flag: “White represents peace which is sought by all Qatari rulers. Maroon represents the combined blood of martyrs who lost their lives while fighting for Qatar’s unity, particularly during the second half of the 19th century” (QHC Grade 7 2012, 3). The second page of every book is devoted to the Qatar National Vision 2030, including a detailed summary of the first pillar of the vision, human development, highlighting in particular the goal of an educated population. The combination of Qatari history with civic education emphasizes the importance of the unified citizenry that the state is seeking to create.

I would like to focus on the first unit of each of the three QHC books, which seek to trace Qatari history in ancient times, the modern age (sixteenth to twentieth centuries), and the contemporary era. First, with regards to placing Qatar within the narrative of ancient history, QHC Grade 7 (2012, 17) states bluntly, in the first of several points to “remember”: “Qatar is one of the most important archaeological sites in the Arabian Gulf region.” The lesson elaborates on this by showing the stone tools that the “ancient Qataris” utilized (QHC Grade 7 2012, 10).148 [See Figure 39.] After leaving the Stone Age and entering the Bronze Age, “Qatar had the role as trade mediator, particularly during the era of the Delmon civilization” (17), during which time “a lot of people settled in the Qatari Peninsula to work in the field of trade” (12). The

148 Describing the stone-age lifestyle of the “ancient Qataris” seems a bit overdone, akin to discussing how “ancient Canadians” managed to first learn to use the wheel. As of May 4, 2013, a Google search for “ancient Qatari” retrieves 987 results, and “ancient Qatar” retrieves 1,200 results, with some of the images being photographs from the 1960s. Similarly, “ancient Canadian” retrieves 2,090 results. By contrast, “ancient Roman” retrieves 5,360,000 results and “ancient Greek” retrieves 16,000,000 results.
“essential goods” Qatar produced—“dried fish, purple dye and precious pearls”—gave the country “major influence” on the trade with the Sassanids and ancient Phoenicians (12–13).

Figure 39. Evidence of the Ancient Qatari People

Source: QHC Grade 7 (2012, 10)

Moving on to the sixteenth to twentieth centuries and the influence of outside powers on the Gulf countries, we begin with a description of the fearless Qatari tribes leading an attack on Portuguese ships to defend their territory in 1627 (QHC Grade 8 2012, 12). In 1820, Qatar refused to join Britain’s “so-called ‘peace treaty’,” although it was nevertheless forced to obey it by the British (15). The Ottomans arrived in Qatar “at the request of Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Thani, the founder of Qatar” (22). During the Ottoman period, “Doha became an important pearl trade center in the region” (22). Once the Ottomans left in 1915, Britain took on

\[149\] In asserting a long and storied history intertwined with ancient civilizational centers, Qatar joins the ranks of its fellow neighbors. In Dubai’s Heritage Village, its archaeological museum describes the history of the emirate in this way: “Five thousand years ago the Emirate of Dubai witnessed the emergence of civilization. . . . [A]rchaeological excavations and field surveys . . . proved that the Emirate of Dubai . . . participated since pre-historic times in establishing human civilization in the Gulf, and proved that the old inhabitants of Dubai were not isolated from other centers of civilization. Dubai achieved good progress in the fields of arts, construction, agriculture, and industry. It had trade and intellectual relations with Mesopotamia, Iran, Bahrain, Baluchistan and the Indus Valley” (Khalaf 2002, 34).
the role of protector, a position that became “unnecessary” and led to Britain announcing a planned withdrawal of its forces by the end of 1971 (24-31).

Finally, the contemporary history focuses on the Qatari state-building efforts in particular, beginning by reminding the reader that, “[s]ince the early 18th century, [the] Al Thani family have had a leading position in the Qatar Peninsula. They played a key role in uniting the Arab tribes living in Qatar and establishing the modern state” (QHC Grade 9 2012, 12). The 1868 treaty signed between Britain and Qatar “recognized Qatar as an independent Emirate” (13). Nevertheless, “[w]hen Sheikh Jassim bin Mohamed assumed responsibility as a ruler on December 18, 1878, it was a historical day for Qatar and marked a real beginning for the establishment of the State of Qatar. . . . Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed bin Thani is the real founder of the independent Emirate of Qatar” (15–16). When Sheikh Jassim passed away in 1913, “Qatar emerged from his reign a united and independent country” (20). Of the elements listed as contributing to the improvement of Qatar during the Al Thani family reign, the first element is that “Qatar developed unity, stability, and trust in their rulers” (30).

In the progression of these lessons, there is a repeated emphasis on inserting Qatar’s missing history into the larger historical narrative, sometimes in surprisingly assertive ways that contradict the Western scholarship on the established history of the country (e.g., Zahlan 1979; Crystal 1995; Commins 2012). However, it is important to remember that Western scholarship relied on historical sources with particular points of view as well. Zahlan (1979), for example, based her work on historical records, most of which were written by the British (most

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150 It is difficult to evaluate the historical veracity of the presented information, as there are few citations.
prominently Lorimer’s five-volume Gazetteer)\textsuperscript{151} and clearly influenced by British policy at the time, including the instrumental value, to Britain, of considering Qatar to be a dependent part of already established powers.

Rather than questioning the veracity of competing historical narratives, I am more interested in noting the messages inherent in the alternative version of history that Qatar is promoting in the public sphere. Throughout these lessons, the messages of historical relevance (particularly with regards to trade networks), independent action, and tribal unity are stressed repeatedly. In sum, the state of Qatar is devoting a massive amount of effort to promoting their preferred version of Qatari history, in an attempt to insert additional details into the larger narrative and raise the historical stature of a country that has been overlooked in the history books for centuries. One of the greatest efforts focuses on the reinterpretation of the historical and cultural significance of Al Zubarah—an effort that is key to the state of Qatar’s entire nation building narrative.

**Rewriting the historical narrative of Al Zubarah**

When describing Sheikh Jassim’s quest in the 1870s to achieve the territorial integrity of the peninsula of Qatar, Althani (2012b, 109) writes that “the town of Zubara was absolutely key to his plan.” The same could be said of the state of Qatar’s modern-day efforts to emphasize the relevant, independent, and unified history of Qatar within the larger historical record: Zubarah is absolutely key to the state of Qatar’s plan.

\textsuperscript{151} Althani (2012b, 161) notes that “the great weakness of [the Gazetteer’s] ‘historical section’ is that there is no attempt at viewing things other than through British official eyes. There is a bland assumption of the eternal wisdom and benevolence of imperial policy.”
Zahlan’s (1979, 28) full quote about the obscurity of Qatar throughout history—and how it finally became a part of the annals—illustrates a historical narrative that is antithetical to the one Qatar wishes to portray:

Of Qatar at this time [the middle of the 1700s], very little is known. It had played a minor and obscure role throughout the turmoil of the centuries, having had little to attract the various conquerors in the way of natural resources. It was sparsely inhabited by people who had taken refuge there from the neighboring islands and mainland.

Its initial importance in the modern era began around 1760 when some members of the Utub from Kuwait migrated to Zubarah. Their principal branch there, the Al-Khalifa, was later followed to the town by another branch, the Jalahimah. With time, they developed Zubarah, and it became an important pearling and trade center.

Western scholarship—and archaeological and historical evidence—attributes the rise of Al Zubarah, which was unarguably the most important city on the Qatari peninsula during the 1700s and early 1800s—to the Utub clan, primarily made up of the Al-Khalifah and Al-Jalahimah families, which later used Al Zubarah as a launching pad for their successful conquering of Bahrain from the Persians. Even Althani (2012b, 111), who wrote a quite nationalist history of Qatar, admits that, in the 1860s, Sheikh Mohamed bin Thani “probably wouldn’t have considered Zubara as part of Al Thani territory.” The origins of Zubarah and the ties between the Al-Khalifahs of Bahrain and the Naim of Qatar created an issue of territorial sovereignty that was not fully resolved until the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled against Bahrain’s claims to Zubarah in 2001 (ICJ 2001, 80–81).

The competing historical narratives of Bahrain and Qatar, as described in the ICJ’s 2001 decision, are useful when analyzing the state of Qatar’s preferred version of Al Zubarah’s history. The origins of Al Zubarah, in Bahrain’s perspective, are as follows:

Bahrain states that in the 1760s the Al-Khalifah came from present-day Kuwait and established themselves in Zubarah, which quickly flourished, rich in trade and pearl fishing; and that, some decades later, the Al-Khalifah moved their seat of government to the islands of Bahrain. According to Bahrain, the Al-Khalifah Sheikhs resided in the islands of Bahrain during summers and in Zubarah during winters; towards the end of the eighteenth century, they decided to establish their court on the main island of Bahrain and subsequently on al-Muharraq, and they appointed a governor to rule the province of Zubarah.
Zubarah then entered into decline: it was destroyed in 1878 by the Al-Thani and was entirely vacated in 1895 following a military intervention by the British. (ICJ 2001, 29)

Qatar, on the other hand, insisted that Zubarah existed before the advent of the Al-Khalifahs, stating:

Qatar claims that a town existed in the area of Zubarah well before the two sections of the Al-Utub tribe—the Bin Khalifah and the Al-Jalahma—left present-day Kuwait for Bahrain and thence for Zubarah. In Zubarah, the local sheikhs laid down a condition for their settlement: payment of the usual taxes in exchange for the right to trade in the area. The Al-Utub refused this condition and in 1768 built the fort known as Murair at some distance outside the outer wall of Zubarah. According to Qatar, the Al-Utub left Murair in 1783 to settle in Bahrain. The town of Zubarah was destroyed in 1878 after Sheikh Jassim bin Thani of Qatar had taken steps to punish acts of piracy and attacks on other tribes by its inhabitants. (ICJ 2001, 29)

To prove its claims that Zubarah existed prior to and independently of the Al Khalifah, Qatar cited two key documents from the Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar: a “Letter from Sheikh Sultan bin Ali Al-Muraikhi Al-Zubari Al-Qatari to the Guard of the Gate of Zubarah dated April 1612” and a “Declaration by Hamed bin Nayem bin Sultan Al-Muraikhi Al-Zubari Al-Qatari dated April 1638” (ICJ 1996, 325). Both of these documents depicted the leaders of the already thriving and walled town of Al Zubarah refusing entry to the Utub tribe, which was forced to live outside of the city in Qal’at Murair. In Qatar’s words,

These two documents are of great interest in that they show that by the beginning of the 17th century, Zubarah was a settled and prosperous walled town, and thus that, contrary to what has been written by western and Bahraini authors, it was not settled and developed only after 1766 by the Al-Utub tribe, but that the Al-Utub were regarded as strangers by the original Qatari tribes who had settled it. (ICJ 1996, 191)

Bahrain agreed that these documents were of great interest—so great, in fact, that it immediately commissioned “12 experts in the relevant areas of historical scholarship and forensic analysis of documents” to conduct “thorough and extensive research in eight countries on four continents” regarding the veracity of the documents (Al Arayed 1997, 2). The examination of all submitted documents from the Diwan Amiri Archives “led to the compelling conclusion that all of the 81 documents are forgeries” (Al Arayed 1997, 2). After several months of correspondence between the two countries via the ICJ, Qatar noted,
In the light of the conflicting forensic reports, Qatar formally declares to the Court that it will disregard all the challenged documents for the purposes of the present case so as to enable the Court to address the merits of the case without further procedural complications. (ICJ 1998, 4)

However, Qatar consistently refused to accept Bahrain’s terminology of “forged documents” (Al-Muslemani 1999, 1), and argued instead that the documents could nevertheless have some historical relevance, noting in its interim report that “the content of the challenged documents is consistent with the historical facts as recorded in other unchallenged documents and publications” (ICJ 1998, 16).

Qatar’s refusal to fully discount the “challenged documents” perhaps explains why the content of the 1612 and 1638 letters remains a prominent part of the Qatar Tourism web page description on the history of Al Zubarah,\(^{152}\) and why the 1638 letter was included in the information submitted to the World Heritage Council for World Heritage Site consideration (UNESCO 2011, 79). As quoted in the ICOMOS (2012, 100) report, Qatar’s nomination file argued, “While there is a preliminary theory about the chronology of Al Zubarah, a full history of Al Zubarah is still ‘open to conjecture’.” This assertion of conjecture allows Qatar the space to deal with the second tricky part of Al Zubarah’s legacy—the fact that it was the site of particularly violent conflicts, not only between Qataris and external forces, but also between Qataris themselves.

For all of the praise heaped on Zubarah for its prime positioning and central importance to the pearling trade, no one seemed too concerned about the frequency with which the poor town kept getting burned down. The first major blow to Zubarah came in 1811 after a series of attacks on Bahrain from Omani forces and the disgruntled leader of the disenfranchised Al-Jalahimah family, Rahmah bin Jabir (Zahlan 1979, 30; Althani 2012, 21–24). In 1809–1810,

Bahrain temporarily relinquished its sovereignty in exchange for protection by the Wahhabis (modern-day Saudi Arabia) from Omani incursions. Yet once the Ottoman Empire began attacking the Wahhabis in the Hijaz region, Oman, under the leadership of Sayyid bin Sultan (who was just as anti-Wahhabi as he was anti-Bahraini), “seized the opportunity to hit out against his weakened enemies. He attacked them with a strong force in Qatar, destroying Zubarah by fire” and forcing the Wahhabis from Bahrain and Qatar (Zahlan 1979, 31).

Archaeological evidence from the current excavations at Al Zubarah confirm that the town was never the same after this destruction, with the rebuilt town, signified by the inner town wall, encompassing only about a third of the original size of the settlement.  

Yet there were still enough inhabitants of Al Zubarah—primarily the Naim family—that the British 1868 treaty forced Sheikh Mohamed bin Thani to pay part of Qatar’s Bahraini tribute directly to the Naim, a stipulation that infuriated him (Althani 2012b, 93–94). The continued intransigence of the Naim inhabitants to accept Al Thani dominance led to Sheikh Jassim, in 1878, to lead

2,000 men to the north, ostensibly to deal with reported acts of piracy. Jassim took the opportunity to sack and destroy Zubara. He had subdued the remaining Khalifa remnants of the Naim. . . . Zubara as a town ceased to exist. Its fort was destroyed. (Althani 2012b, 111–12)

Yet the pummeling of Zubarah was not over yet. In 1895, about 1,500 members of the Qatari Al bin Ali tribe, led by Sultan bin Mohamed, repatriated to Al Zubarah from Bahrain after a dispute with the Bahraini Sheikh. This repatriation, combined with rising tensions between the Ottomans and the British over whether Qatar was threatening war with Bahrain led to the burning of all of Sheikh Jassim’s ships and the desertion, once more, of Al Zubarah (Althani 2012b, 140–46; ICJ 2001, 29; ICOMOS 2012, 100).

153 Personal interview, March 12, 2013, Al Zubarah, Qatar.
Although Althani (2012b, 147) notes that Sheikh Jassim was able to convince “those members of the Naim tribe who still lived near Zubarah to move in and transfer their allegiance from the Al Khalifa to the Al Thani,” tensions between the Naim and the Al Thani culminated in violence yet again in 1937, as described in the ICJ (2001, 23) judgment:

In 1937, Qatar attempted to impose taxation on the Naim inhabiting the Zubarah region: Bahrain opposed this as it claimed rights over this region. Relations between Qatar and Bahrain deteriorated. Negotiations started between the two States in spring of 1937 and were broken off in July of that year. According to Bahrain Qatar illegally took Zubarah by force and illegally destroyed the community of the Bahraini subjects living there. Qatar contends that the steps taken by its Ruler in 1937 were only designed to exercise his authority by force on his own territory over certain members of the Naim tribe, and to put an end to their smuggling and other unlawful activities.

In 1938, Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani built the Al Zubarah Fort, most probably in order to impose taxation on the surrounding population as well as to guard against any Bahraini encroachment on the peninsula in the future. This fort was built on a separate location from the “crumbling ruin of weathered stone” that must have been the remains of Qal’at Murair (Bibby 1970, 120). At this point, Al Zubarah as a town was finally completely abandoned. Bibby (1970, 119–22), on a visit to Qatar in the mid-1950s, notes that, after the “last armed clash,” the inhabitants of Zubarah had found it impossible to remain in a “chronic state of war, and the city “lay now deserted,” although the Naim tribe maintained the Bedouin lifestyle in the region. Nevertheless, the final abandonment of Al Zubarah did not prevent Qatar from bulldozing the Qal’at Murair site, at some point between the 1960s and 1980s, ordering the construction worker to remove all traces of the Al-Khalifah fort.154

154 Personal interview, March 12, 2013, Al Zubarah, Qatar. Apparently, the construction worker was lazy and only destroyed the above-ground structure of the building, leaving the foundations and cisterns intact. These archaeological remnants were studied by the University of Copenhagen team after it began work in 2009. However, the only surface marker of the old fort today is a lone acacia tree that is growing out of one of the rectangular cisterns.
The official history of Al Zubarah’s decline, as propagated by Qatar, is much more concise and much less violent. The Qatar Tourism Authority website states that, after “the Al-Khalifa invaded Bahrain in 1783,”

Little by little, the Al-Khalifa migrated to Bahrain where they established a sheikhdom that endures still today. Unfortunately, this migration caused the gradual decline of Al-Zubarah and Al-Murair. When the region was fully abandoned in 1937, it became an archaeological site.\footnote{Qatar Tourism Authority, “Ancient Villages,” \url{http://www.qatartourism.gov.qa/pillars/index/1/culture/238} (accessed May 5, 2013).}

The violent history of Al Zubarah, and in particular, the tribal disunity between the Al Thani and the Naim, did not fit with Qatar’s preferred narrative of peninsular unity since the 1860s and 1870s. The rewriting of the history removes all traces of tribal conflict and questions over Qatar’s independence and sovereignty—in line with the overall emphasis on nation building in the country.

Bahrain’s territorial claims on Al Zubarah were not relinquished for good until the ICJ gave its decision in 2001—a process that took ten years, with the two countries submitting their case to the ICJ when a fifteen-year period of Saudi mediation finally collapsed with no results. Although not all of the territories in question were ruled in Qatar’s favor (such as the Hawar Islands), the ICJ unanimously determined that Qatar had sovereignty over Zubarah (ICJ 2001, 80–81). In the decade since the ICJ ensured that Zubarah would be considered a part of Qatari territory, Qatar has tried its hardest to erase the narrative of the tribal conflict and violence that led to the town’s complete destruction. Al Zubarah can be seen as a two-part narrative, both political and cultural. Politically, Al Zubarah represents the narrative of early sovereignty of the Al Thanis over a territorially contiguous state. Culturally, Al Zubarah represents the ability of Qatar to insert itself into the larger cultural heritage of the region, which I will now discuss.
Appropriating the cultural heritage of Al Zubarah

Once the ICJ had legally asserted Qatar’s historical claim to Al Zubarah, allowing the state to remove the specter of Bahraini influence (both physical remnants and historical narratives) from the town, the state could now turn its attention to the promotion of its preferred cultural narrative for the area. Let me explain how the latest archaeological efforts in Al Zubarah, currently underway, are being used to rewrite Qatar’s place in the larger cultural heritage of the region.

What defines cultural heritage today? How can a country receive international acceptance of its cultural heritage? One of the most important ways for a country to assert its cultural heritage is to receive World Heritage Site status by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention defines cultural heritage as:

works of man or the combined works of nature and of man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of Outstanding Universal Value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of view. (World Heritage Centre 2012, 13)

Further:

Outstanding Universal Value means cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity. (World Heritage Centre 2012, 14)

To be considered a site of outstanding universal value, the property must meet at least one of ten outlined criteria, which include exhibiting an important exchange of human values (Criteria 2), bearing unique testimony to a tradition or civilization (Criteria 3), and being representative of a traditional settlement (land- or sea-based) especially when it is vulnerable to irreversible change (Criteria 5) (World Heritage Centre 2012, 20–21).

As of September 2012, 962 properties have been officially inscribed with World Heritage Site status, spread out over 157 “state parties” (government entities that have ratified the World
Heritage Convention). In total, 190 state parties have ratified the Convention, meaning that there are thirty-three state parties that have not yet received the distinction of hosting a World Heritage Site within its borders.\textsuperscript{156} Qatar is one of them. All of its immediate Gulf neighbors have World Heritage Sites, including Oman with four, Saudi Arabia with two, Bahrain with two, and the United Arab Emirates with one (UNESCO 2011).\textsuperscript{157} The state of Qatar considers it essential to insert itself into the cultural historical narrative by obtaining a World Heritage Site inscription of its own, judging from the immense efforts that have been put forward over the past decade to accomplish this goal.

Qatar has been preparing the nomination file for Al Zubarah for a decade, first submitting an incomplete nomination in January 2003 (UNESCO 2003), then submitting the information for the tentative list in March 2008 (Supreme Council for the Environment of Natural Resources 2008), and finally submitting the actual nomination file in January 2011. Concurrently, a 2011 film, produced jointly by UNESCO, the Qatar Museums Authority, the Qatar Marine Festival Organizing Committee, the Katara Cultural Village, and the Ministry of Culture, Arts, and Heritage (Stössel and Al-Huthi 2011), “catalyzed interest and raised awareness” about the “cultural heritage of the Al Zubara pearling village” (UNESCO 2012, 89). The nomination was based on the assertion that “[t]he walled coastal town of Al Zubarah . . . is seen as one of the most important centers of pearl diving and pearl trading in the Arabian Gulf” (ICOMOS 2012, 98).

The narrative linking Al Zubarah to a central place in the pearl industry of the Gulf is emphasized continually in the 2011 film, which is, after all, unsubtly titled, “Al Zubarah: Pearl of the Past.” Benno Böer, the UNESCO Programme Specialist from the Doha office, argues:

From what I know, the pearling village of Al Zubarah is the largest remaining complete pearling settlement that exists worldwide. The other pearling settlements that have existed have been covered by large and modern settlements, so that they are irreversibly lost and this makes the Al Zubarah pearling village unique. There are various researchers working in Al Zubarah. They have plans, they have archaeological excavations, and this shows that the area is of outstanding global value. (Stössel and Al-Huthi 2011)

The narration of the film clearly links the archaeological remains of Al Zubarah to the pearl diving and trading tradition of the Gulf, stating that, “before long, Al Zubarah became Qatar’s largest town and the region’s pearl trading center.” The film then switches to six and a half minutes of interviews, video images, and descriptions of pearl diving in Qatar, quite an emphasis considering that this section is a third of the total film length.

The reaction of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)\(^{158}\) proves the old adage, “Just because you say it doesn’t make it true.” Regarding the nomination’s comparative analysis claim, which elevated Al Zubarah above all other archaeological pearling sites in the Gulf region, ICOMOS stated,

ICOMOS notes that, as presented in the nomination dossier, compared to other pearling sites in the Gulf, Al Zubarah does present a more complete ensemble of urban archaeological remains in its totality. However, it should also be noted that some of the other Middle Eastern pearling sites have actually more intact and integrated “still standing” architecture as compared to Al Zubarah. More fundamental, however, is the issue that so far no direct and substantial link between the remains of Al Zubarah and the pearling industry has been established. . . . ICOMOS considers that the comparative analysis does not justify consideration of the property, as currently nominated, for the World Heritage List. (ICOMOS 2012, 101)

Further, with regard to the justification of outstanding universal value, which rest on specific claims related to the centrality of the pearling industry, the evidence was found wanting.

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ICOMOS considers that this justification for Al Zubarah being outstanding for its associations with the pearling industry cannot be said to be rooted in evidence either from archaeological investigations or from archival sources. (ICOMOS 2012, 102)

Adding insult to injury, in the same year, Bahrain officially received World Heritage Site status for its site, “Pearling, Testimony of an Island Economy.” Bahrain, already well ensconced in cultural history for its previous World Heritage Site status as the capital of the Dilmun civilization, now also owned the “last remaining complete example of the cultural tradition of pearling and the wealth it generated.” Qatar had tried to assert an essential role in the larger pearling narrative of the Gulf region, but had come up short.

All was not lost, however. ICOMOS (2012, 107) did not reject the nomination, but rather, deferred it, while strongly encouraging Qatar to change its historical emphasis to focus on “a very specific interaction between nomadic herders, pearl divers, fishermen and traders that once characterized the way of life in the Gulf.” The recommendation continued:

ICOMOS recommends that the examination of the nomination of Al Zubarah Archaeological Site, State of Qatar, to the World Heritage List be deferred in order to allow the State Party, with the advice of ICOMOS and the World Heritage Centre, if requested, to: Achieve a clearer understanding of how the fabric of Al Zubarah and its desert hinterland might be seen as an exceptional testimony to a specific interaction between nomadic herders, pearl divers, fishermen and traders that once characterized the way of life in the Gulf. (ICOMOS 2012, 107)

This emphasis on Al Zubarah as “an exceptional example of [a] small Gulf City State” (ICOMOS 2012, 102) fits in well with the archaeological narrative that Dr. Alan Walmsley, the director of archaeology at the Al Zubarah site, has been expounding for years. Dr. Walmsley

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160 The brief description of Bahrain’s property has clear similarities to Qatar’s nomination file of Al Zubarah. According to UNESCO, “The site is the last remaining complete example of the cultural tradition of pearling and the wealth it generated at a time when the trade dominated the Gulf economy (2nd century to the 1930s, when Japan developed cultured pearls). It also constitutes an outstanding example of traditional utilization of the sea’s resources and human interaction with the environment, which shaped both the economy and the cultural identity of the island’s society.” See UNESCO, “Pearling, Testimony of an Island Economy,” http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1364/ (accessed May 2, 2013).
hosted me for a day-long personal tour of Al Zubarah in March 2013, in which I was able to see various excavations and finds. [See Figure 40.]

**Figure 40. Images of the Al Zubarah Archaeological Site**

The left picture depicts a date press in the market and storage area of the town; the center picture shows Dr. Walmsley pointing to a porcelain shard with a Persian design; the right picture shows the ongoing excavations at the palace area, where uncovered walls are encased in gypsum for protection

*Source: Jocelyn Sage Mitchell, personal photographs, March 12, 2013*

In the 2011 film, Dr. Walmsley was quoted as saying, “Zubara was an organized town, a very organized town, revolving around streets, built on very much a square grid system” (Stössel and Al-Huthi 2011), and the evidence of strong central planning and clear leadership was continually emphasized during my visit. In particular, the hand-cut canal, which brought fresh water from Qal’at Murair (the inland fort) to the town of Al Zubarah, demonstrated a huge amount of effort and planning regarding the construction. The creation of Al Zubarah, separate from the external influences of the Ottomans, the British, and the Persians, allows the Gulf Arab states—particularly, in this case, Qatar—to take ownership of and pride in its example. When asked about the most important findings of the Al Zubarah project for the state of Qatar, Dr. Walmsley noted,

> What will be most valuable for the Qatar state is that many of the social and economic practices being uncovered here are reflected in contemporary life in Qatar. . . . Zubarah is representative of the rise of the Gulf Arab state.

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161 Personal interview, March 12, 2013, Al Zubarah, Qatar.
162 Personal interview, March 12, 2013, Al Zubarah, Qatar.
From the continued importance of the Al Zubarah archaeological project—Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani visited the site personally, just three days after my visit—and the emphasis on the site as an exemplar of a Gulf city-state, it appears that Qatar has pragmatically changed tack. Although it would have been culturally and historically evocative to claim that the center of the pearling trade in the region was located at Al Zubarah (and quite in line with Qatar’s clear goal of producing an alternative cultural narrative that creates relevance for the country), the exclusive emphasis on a pearling narrative has been dropped in favor of a larger look at the interactions of a Gulf city-state that characterize a past way of life in the Gulf. Dr. Walmsley confirmed this change in narrative, explaining:

There was a shift in emphasis away from a solely pearling narrative to perceiving Al Zubarah as an emergent Arab “city-state” that forged a post-imperial path to the emirates of the Gulf today. Al Zubarah was not unique, but it is an exceptionally well-preserved example of this later seventeenth- to eighteenth-century transition that was of both cultural and social significance. Also within this reconceptualization was stressed the close tie between Al Zubarah and its densely populated hinterland . . . . That rethinking is not only appropriate but also more representative of what was happening as revealed in the archaeology of the two years prior to the submission of the supplementary volume.  

Qatar continued to pursue World Heritage Site status by resubmitting the application for Al Zubarah with additional supplementary information that reframed the focus from pearling to a larger narrative of the Gulf city-state, uniquely preserved beneath the sands. The draft recommendation of the World Heritage Committee, released in advance of the upcoming official meeting, now recommends that Al Zubarah Archaeological Site be inscribed on the World Heritage List because it can be seen [as] an outstanding testimony to an urban trading and pearl-diving tradition which sustained the major coastal towns of the region from the early Islamic period or earlier to the 20th century, and to exemplify the string of urban foundations which rewrote the political and demographic map of the Gulf during the 18th and early 19th centuries and led to the development of small independent states that

163 Personal communication, May 18, 2013.
flourished outside the control of the Ottoman, European, and Persian empires and which eventually led to
the emergence of modern day Gulf States. (UNESCO 2013, 1)

With its new angle of outstanding global value, Qatar has managed to extend its historical
relevance to “early Islamic period or earlier” and assert its independence from larger powers by
laying claim to the exemplary town that symbolizes the independent statehood of the Gulf. The
ability of Qatar to so easily replace one narrative with another shows that, ultimately, what
mattered most to the state was the inscription, not the reason behind it. Yet it is fitting that the
World Heritage Committee will inscribe Al Zubarah with precisely the message Qatar has been
propagating about its past: historical relevance, territorial unity, and independent action.

Harnessing the Ideological Power of Islam

In the previous two sections, I have described how Qatar, the quintessential rentier state,
expends a huge amount of effort toward promotion of its national, historical, and cultural
identity. However, as Luciani (2013, 120) notes, assertions of legitimacy at national concerns are
not the only strategies available to a rentier state, which often “assert[s] its legitimacy by
reference to a constituency that is larger than its own population. . . . [T]he strength of shared
identities (Arab, Islamic, Shia, Sunni, and more) remains very strong.” In this section, I
demonstrate how Qatar has been able to coordinate its preferred Islamic messages with its
religious authorities and society at large in a way that, so far, has successfully avoided
competition and conflict domestically and regionally. In this way, Qatar taps into a source of
legitimacy that transcends national boundaries (e.g., Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 376–77;
2005, 320) while maintaining ultimate control over the content and message.
Outsiders (including Westerners living within Qatar) may be surprised at the level of religiousness of the average Qatari. Relative to its neighbors, such as Kuwait or Sharjah (UAE), which ban alcohol, or Saudi Arabia, which enforces a mandatory dress code and behavioral conduct for all women in the country, Qatar appears relatively tolerant and open to the Western world. However, this tolerance should not be seen as linked with low levels of religiosity. Qualitative and quantitative evidence show that religion is a crucial part of the lives of most Qataris today.

Ascertaining the level of religiosity in survey data is notoriously difficult. Asking a Qatari Muslim if religion is important to them is akin to asking an American if he or she voted in the last election; it is very hard to push through the social desirability bias—the tendency of a respondent to answer in a way that portrays a more positive image in the eyes of the interviewer or that confirms to widely held social norms—in order to receive a truthful response (Erikson and Tedin 2011, 45–46). My survey asked about religiosity in a new way, by asking the respondent if he or she consulted religious scholars on personal issues, and then asking a follow-up question on the frequency of consultation. The results give us a useful variance that largely avoids the normative connotations associated with more direct questioning of religious beliefs. As displayed in the table below, 43 percent of Qataris report not consulting religious scholars, meaning that 57 percent do consult religious scholars on personal issues—with the majority of these (34 percent) reporting that they “sometimes” consult these scholars. These results let us know that more than half of the Qatari population turn to religious scholars for advice on personal issues, and that approximately 42 percent of Qataris consult these scholars with some degree of regularity. [See Table 13.]

165 I would like to give credit to Birol Başkan for crafting the set of questions on use of religious scholars.
Table 13. A Measure of Religiosity in the Qatari Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Do you consult religious scholars for your personal issues?”</th>
<th>“How often do you consult them?”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

The emphasis on Islam as a way of life can be seen throughout the survey. When asked which of several factors—lack of religiosity, incompatible social status, low education, poverty, or disreputable personal character—would constitute the greatest obstacle to the respondent’s acceptance of a close family member’s marriage, 59 percent of respondents chose the lack of prayer or fasting as the greatest concern, with a questionable personal character coming in second at 32 percent. When asked to pick an identity category that “best describes you,” 84 percent of respondents chose “above all I am a Muslim,” rather than Qatari, Arab, or a member of religious and cultural traditions and religiosity are often entwined, particularly when it comes to interactions between men and women, and regarding women’s dress and behavior, as seen in further survey data. When asked to evaluate a list of societal changes that have occurred over the past five years—a list that included highly charged issues such as the expatriate population increase and the K–12 education system changes—the highest frequency of negative evaluations (73 percent) was given to “mixed gender interactions.” Further, of the people who chose mixed gender interactions as one of their negative changes, 59 percent chose it as the most important negative change over the past five years; to put this into context, the next highest negative change, the expatriate population increase, received 18 percent. Over 90 percent of the respondents agreed that it would be a good thing to enforce the wearing of the abaya (black robe) and the shayla/hijab (the head scarf) for Qatari women. Almost a quarter of the respondents (24 percent) agreed that it would be a good thing if women were forbidden to drive. When asked to judge whether Noora, an imaginary forty-year-old Qatari woman, was behaving acceptably on a family trip to London in which she removed her abaya but retained the hijab, over 40 percent of the respondents considered this completely unacceptable. (Her fictional daughter, twenty-year-old Jawaher, who took off both her abaya and her hijab, was considered by 88 percent of the respondents to be completely unacceptable.) However, it is also important to note that not all of these opinions on male-female relations and women’s behavior and dress have statistically significant correlations with degree of religiosity. When running a regression with control variables of age, education level, economic satisfaction, and gender, those who were more religious were more likely to agree with the idea of forbidding women to drive or that Noora’s behavior was unacceptable, but the other data points showed no statistical significance. These results show that we cannot always assume a connection between cultural traditions and religiosity. On a more amusing note, gender issues were seen in an April 2013 government ministry initiative that visited all nurseries in order to examine the children’s dolls. Apparently the dolls’ clothing was removed during this investigation, with the government representatives confiscating those dolls deemed inappropriate due to the presence of anatomically correct parts (personal communication, April 4, 2013).
of their family or tribe. When asked their top personal priority of the country for the next ten
years out of a set of options that also contained promoting economic development, improving
foreign relations, and promoting free speech and individual rights, 48 percent of respondents
chose “preserving Islam,” while the second place choice, “preserving safety and security,”
received 30 percent. Further, when asked for their assessment of the top priority of the state of
Qatar using an expanded list of options [see Table 14], 35 percent chose “preserving Islamic
values,” the clear favorite over all other choices.

Table 14. Assessment of the Top Priority of the State of Qatar

| “States in the modern world have many duties and must sometimes make choices about which
to focus on. In your opinion, which of these goals is the top priority of the state of Qatar?” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preserving Islamic values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing safety and national defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving international relations and image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserving Qatari identity and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributing wealth among all citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting free speech and individual rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

Particularly with this last result, we see that the Qatari population does not consider the
practice of Islam to be constrained to the cultural or social realms, but, rather, should permeate
the political realm as well (Al Kubaisi 2013b). All of these data emphasize that the state of Qatar
must be seen as aligned with Islam by its people in order to avoid a destabilizing loss of
legitimacy.

Of course, the definition of Qatari Islam is just as nebulous as the definition of Qatari
culture. Likewise, the state of Qatar has chosen to be just as proactive in guiding the official
interpretation of Qatari Islam as it has been with Qatari culture. Qatar adheres to Wahhabi Islam,
a doctrine established in the 1700s and associated with the rise of the Al Saud family, with modern-day Saudi Arabia seen as “the champion of the doctrine” (Bahry 2013, 254; Hourani 1983, 37–38). However, Qatar has managed to harness Wahhabi Islam to further its political and social goals for the country, rather than allow it to capture a significant reserved domain of power within the state, as can be seen in neighboring Saudi Arabia (e.g., Seznec 2004). In this section, I first describe how Qatar has been both pragmatic and political in its use of Wahhabi Islam. In this pursuit, Qatar has followed a two-part strategy: first, by ensuring that the religious ulama (scholars and preachers) in the country coordinate their Islamic messages with the state to ensure congruence with the state’s political and social goals; and second, by creating large state-led projects that combine powerful Islamic symbols with Qatari heritage content. I then demonstrate this two-part strategy through an examination of the relationship between the state of Qatar and its most prominent religious scholar, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, and an analysis of the State Mosque project.

Wahhabi Islam in Qatar

Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1787) was the founder of Wahhabi Islam in central Arabia in the mid-1700s. Abdul Wahhab stated that “[t]he true Islam . . . was that of the first generation, the pious forerunners” (Hourani 1983, 37).167 Thus, Abdul Wahhab was against what he viewed as impurities in Islamic practice, such as the use of any ritual, custom, or practice that was not found in the Quran or that could have been from external religious influence, including influences from jahaliyya (ignorance of true Islam), shirk (idolatry), or excessive worshipping of the Prophet. Hourani (1983, 37–38) notes that Abdul Wahhab’s call for

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167 The Arabic word for the Islamic founding fathers is salaf, and the followers of Al-Wahhab today prefer the term Salafi to describe their religious adherence (Althani 2012b, 155; see also Esposito and Kalin 2009, 17).
reform was radical in its opposition to the dominant social and political forces at the time, writing,

[In the circumstances of his time, his preaching was not only a call to repent, it was a challenge to dominant social forces: on the one side to the revived strength of the Arab tribes, still living in ignorance of religion and Shari’a [Islamic law, literally “the path”], and on the other to the Ottoman Empire, which stood for Islamic orthodoxy not as the salaf [the first generation of Islamic followers] were supposed to have conceived it, but as it had developed over the centuries. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was really saying that the Islam the sultan protected was not the true Islam, and he was therefore implying that the sultan was not the true leader of the umma [Islamic community].]

The Al Saud dynasty joined forces with Abdul Wahhab, and together they founded a state, based purely on shariah law, which quickly gained political and territorial power, controlling central Arabia and the Persian Gulf and spreading toward Iraq and Syria by the end of the eighteenth century.

We have seen the political power of the Wahhabis in the history, already recounted, of the Gulf, in which the Wahhabis gained power over Qatar and Bahrain by 1809–1810, before they were attacked on two sides, by the Ottomans in the Hijaz and the Omanis in the sacking of Zubarah in 1811, forcing them to retreat. Yet the Wahhabis did not fade into the background of history. When the Al Sauds retook Riyadh in 1902, Sheikh Jassim, in yet another of his politically prescient moves, sent his congratulations in the form of converting to Wahhabi Islam. As Kéchichian (2008, 184) notes, “This was a dramatic reversal, because members of the Al Thani tribes were somewhat settled and lived contented under Maliki Sunni laws and traditions.” In fact, Sheikh Jassim’s decision appeared to have created a rift between himself and his brother Ahmad, who “had no such ideological convictions” and who preferred a closer relationship with the Ottomans than with the Wahhabis (Althani 2012b, 156). When taking the Wahhabis’ harsh assessment of the Ottoman sultan’s right to rule the Islamic community, it was clear that Sheikh Jassim’s embrace of Wahhabi Islam would rankle the Ottomans—and it did. As speculated by Zahlan (1979, 54) and Kéchichian (2008, 184), Sheikh Jassim correctly assessed the lessening
strength of the Ottoman Empire, and sought a closer relationship with the Wahhabis (not only through the conversion, but also through an annual tribute) to cultivate a new ally for Qatar and to protect against enemies such as the Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi. The adoption of Wahhabi Islam for *pragmatically political* reasons should be seen as a herald of the flexible approach the state of Qatar takes when dealing with religion.

A brief comparison between Qatar and Saudi Arabia today shows the social consequences of the differences in interpretation of Islam, despite both countries nominally adhering to the same Wahhabi strand. As Bahry (2013, 254) notes,

> Today the extreme teachings of Wahhabism have been considerably moderated in Qatar, particularly when compared to Saudi Arabia, which is the champion of the doctrine. Differences in lifestyles between Saudi Arabia and Qatar are noticeable, although both are officially ‘Wahhabi’. For example, women in Qatar enjoy much more freedom than they do in Saudi Arabia. They are allowed to work in public spaces; they can vote and run in elections, and have the right to drive. In contrast to their sisters in Saudi Arabia, they can follow a more relaxed dress code if they wish. Qatar is adopting modern, Western-style education and encouraging foreign tourism, albeit with some limits. This more relaxed attitude has made the introduction of reforms easier, although Qatar is still a conservative society by Western standards. Under pressure from some of the 1.4 million foreign workers in Qatar, many of them Christians, the Qatari government allowed the opening of churches in Qatar. The first church was opened in 2008 and a second one followed in 2009. Saudi Arabia still does not allow churches to open.

Further on, he also notes that Qatari women can take solo driving lessons with a male teacher in a driving school, that foreign women in Qatar have no formally enforced dress code, and that there is no *mutawa’a* (morality police) enforcing public dress and behavior laws (Bahry 2013, 271; see also Başkan and Wright 2011). The state’s focus on interpreting Wahhabi Islam in a more tolerant and flexible way can be seen in a short and seemingly innocuous reference in the Grade 8 citizenship unit on Arab-Islamic culture, in which it states:

> One of the main factors that influenced the development of Arab-Islamic culture is the acceptance of eastern and western cultures while preserving its own deep roots. Therefore, the Arab-Islamic culture became rich in content without any contradiction to the important basics of Islam. (QHC 2012 Grade 8, 56)

On the whole, life for Qataris and non-Qataris alike is clearly more relaxed and flexible than that of Saudi Arabia.
At the same time, there is space in society for stricter interpretations and messages as well, as can be seen in the state response to the current of concern among Qataris regarding foreign women’s public dress,\textsuperscript{168} as well as the creation of a citizen hotline in which Qataris can call a security officer to deal with an inappropriate or immodest public situation.\textsuperscript{169} This balancing act between flexibility and conservatism is intentional on the part of the state of Qatar. Qatar has devoted immense effort to ensure that the dominant narrative of Islam in society aligns with its own social and political goals. In order to ensure this interpretation, Qatar has carefully managed its religious \textit{ulama} and has focused on building mosques that straddle the line between religious fealty and nation-building goals.

\textbf{Qatar’s religious \textit{ulama}}

The religious \textit{ulama} are important to understanding how religion permeates politics and society in Qatar, because “this group of people . . . should be seen as the force behind the adoption of Islamic principles within public policy and by society in general” (Başkan and Wright 2011, 97). Thus, the composition and role of the \textit{ulama} will explain a great deal about state-religion relations within a country. Qatar has traditionally relied on non-Qatari religious

\textsuperscript{168} Although this issue is a perennial source of complaint in the Arabic newspaper pages and radio waves, a particularly interesting grassroots initiative, started by Najla Al-Mahmoud and entitled “One of Us,” calls for a formal law of ethics based on Article 57 of the Qatar constitution. This particular article mandates “abiding by public order and morality, observing national traditions and established customs,” which One of Us interprets as prohibiting the wearing of indecent clothing in public. See the “One of Us” Twitter account, \url{https://twitter.com/OneOfUs_qa} (accessed June 18, 2012). This initiative has received the backing of the Qatar Tourism Authority, with a spokesman for the organization quoted as saying, “Qatar has rapidly become an important destination on the international stage and the number of visitors has considerably increased over the years. It is thus even more important for us to welcome those arriving from abroad and share with them dress code guidelines that will ensure they feel welcome” (“Qatar Tourism Authority” 2012).

\textsuperscript{169} The Al Adeid service, run by the Qatar Ministry of Interior, provides a hotline (phone, e-mail, text, or fax) for witnesses to report any unacceptable or unusual behaviors or inappropriate dress. The Al Adeid agents will shortly arrive on the scene to deal with the offending person. So, although Qatar does not have an ever-present morality police, the Al Adeid service can be seen as “morality police on call.” I thank a Qatari student of mine for alerting me to this service and for assuring me that she has seen it in action. See Qatar Ministry of Interior, “Al Adeid,” \url{http://www.moi.gov.qa/aladeid/Arabic/index.html} (accessed May 8, 2013).
ulama, primarily from Saudi Arabia—such as Abdullah bin Zeyd bin Mahmoud and Abdullah Al Ansari (Başkan and Wright 2011, 97). This reliance on Saudi ulama, as both mosque preachers and judges for Qatar’s shariah courts, kept Qatar in line with stricter, more conservative interpretations of Wahhabi Islam (Kamrava 2009, 410). However, it appears that Emir Hamad, upon coming to power in 1995, made the decision to move the country away from its reliance on Saudi ulama toward religious elites from Egypt and elsewhere. It may have been that the political tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia regarding the Emir’s succession to power provided the space and opportunity for the Emir to reshape how Islam was interpreted and utilized in Qatar.

As both Kamrava (2009, 409) and Başkan and Wright (2011, 96) clearly state, an indigenous religious ulama has never existed in Qatar. Kamrava (2009, 410), citing a Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs annual report from 2006–2007, notes that 73 percent of its total employees, which includes imams (prayer leaders), preachers, and civil servants, are non-Qatari—primarily from Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Since the Ministry’s civil service, and in particular the more senior levels of the Ministry bureaucracy, are largely staffed by Qatari citizens, Kamrava argues that the percentage of non-Qatari preachers actually exceeds the overall average of 73 percent, although the report does not provide the exact demographic breakdown.170

The overwhelming number of expatriates in the religious ulama of Qatar has important political and social repercussions. First, the ulama are non-Qatari and therefore here on a visa sponsorship system or as naturalized (second-class) citizens. This relatively more precarious position in society reduces their ability to develop a viable “street following” independent of the state, which in turn means that they have been unable to exert autonomous influence over matters

170 Fromherz (2012, 150) apparently misreads Kamrava’s work, as he uses the same ministry report to argue that “Qatar’s more senior religious clerics are Qatari citizens.” This is incorrect.
of political and social importance. Başkan and Wright (2011, 97–100, 109) note that the religious ulama are not institutionalized in the educational or political spheres in Qatar. Neither the religious ulama nor the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs have any formal input on the textbooks, curriculum, or administrative decisions in Qatar’s religious educational institutes, such as the Religious Institute, run by the Ministry of Education, and the College of Sharia and Islamic Studies at Qatar University. Unlike in Saudi Arabia, which has the office of the Grand Mufti ensconced within the political decision-making process, there is no similar religious office in Qatar, and the role of the religious ulama “is relegated to one of personal contacts or informal influence” (Başkan and Wright 2011, 99). Even the fairly late establishment of the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs—in 1993—shows the weakness of the religious ulama to push for institutionalization of their interests in the Qatari government. To summarize this first important political and social repercussion, “the historical reliance on non-nationals for religious guidance has allowed for a great deal more autonomy on behalf of the government, and ruling tribe in particular, in regard to state-religion relations” (Başkan and Wright 2011, 100).

Second, Qatar has used its autonomy from the religious ulama to gain Islamic legitimacy through hosting influential religious figures without fear that they will undermine state goals. Rather, the support and leeway given to these religious figures—in particular, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi—should be seen as a way for the state to carefully manage and control controversial topics while seemingly staying above the fray. I focus on Qaradawi in particular because he is widely acknowledged as the most important religious scholar in Qatar (Başkan and Wright 2011, 100) and one of the most important the world (Esposito and Kalin 2009).

Qaradawi, originally from Egypt, is one of the most well-known and influential Islamic religious figures in the modern world, coming in at #9 on a 2009 list of the five hundred most
influential Muslims today (Esposito and Kalim 2009). Qaradawi is one of the intellectual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (having twice turned down the offer to be the group’s leader), the current head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, and the host of a monthly TV program on Al Jazeera entitled “Shariah and Life,” a popular show that is estimated to reach forty million people worldwide (Esposito and Kalin 2009, 38). Qaradawi founded the popular website Islam Online in 1997 and serves as its chief religious scholar, and he has written over eighty books. Within Qatar, he founded the Ministry of Education’s Religious Institute in 1961 and, after moving to Qatar permanently when his Egyptian citizenship was revoked in the 1970s, became the first dean of Qatar University’s College of Sharia and Islamic Studies in 1977.

Part of Qaradawi’s popularity is due to his controversial and strong stances on issues of importance, such as “the maligning of Islam in the West, the rights of the Palestinians, the need to support Hamas and to wage holy war against Israel, and the ‘crimes’ of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Kamrava 2009, 411). However, it is important to note that the Qatar Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs provides a list of approved topics for Friday sermons (Kamrava 2009, 411)—so all of these controversial subjects have prior approval from the state of Qatar. Thus, although “Qaradawi is incredibly influential as a vociferous voice of criticism of the West and of Israel” (Esposito and Kalin 2009, 38), he should not be seen as acting outside of the boundaries of Qatar’s preferred policies, but rather working in tandem with the state to achieve its political and social goals. For example, the state of Qatar’s coordination with Qaradawi can be seen in Qaradawi’s refusal to attend the 10th annual Doha International Center for Interfaith Dialogue conference, held in April 2013 (Sabra 2013). As in previous years,

Qaradawi publicly refused to attend the conference, citing the Jewish presence and the continued plight of the Palestinians. However, analysis from the *Middle East Online* noted,

> Observers believe that Qaradawi’s boycott of the conference denotes a ‘sharing of roles with Doha’ and ‘an agreed manoeuvre’ in an attempt to show the existence of a disagreement between him and the official position of Qatar concerning the hosting of rabbis, in a move that is expected to unleash widespread criticism. The views of Qaradawi, an Egypt-born cleric who holds the Qatari nationality, have always been in strict conformity with the positions of the Qatari government. His religious edicts represent an extension of Qatar’s foreign and national policies. (“Qaradawi ‘Shares Roles’” 2013)

As Qatar has relations with Israel far beyond most of the other states in the region (e.g., Rabi 2009), Qaradawi’s public refusal to meet with the rabbis allowed a state-sanctioned alternative message to be broadcast to those citizens who prefer a harsher stance against the state of Israel.

An important moment of state-sanctioned protest occurred in September 2012, during the furor over the *Innocence of Muslims* movie trailer, which ignited protests throughout the Muslim world (Kirkpatrick 2012). Many of these protests were violent—tear gas canisters thrown at the US Embassy in Cairo, an American school burned and looted in Tunis, tire burning and stone throwing in Kabul, and armed clashes in front of the US Consulates in Lahore and Karachi (e.g., Rosenberg and Rahimi 2012)—and fueled by the perception of blasphemy. Although Qatar is not known for its protest culture (Roberts 2013, 9), a protest needed to be held to allow people to express their outrage, and Qaradawi was the natural leader. The extensive coordination between the state of Qatar and Qaradawi regarding this protest provides an important example of how Qatar allows “alternative” interpretations of Islam, within state-sanctioned and tightly controlled boundaries.

Sheshtawy (2012) recounts how Qaradawi’s Friday sermon on the day of the protest, while acknowledging the defamation of Islam, urged the congregants not to blame the US as a whole. Qaradawi is quoted as saying, “[I]t’s unfair to put all the guilt on a full nation, they [those involved in the movie] are a few Americans, including the same priest who wanted to burn the Quran before and some Christian Egyptians who live in the US” (Sheshtawy 2012). Qaradawi
went on to counsel that violence against the US embassy was not the solution, but, rather, that the US should be pressured to take an official stand against religious blasphemy. With this goal in mind, Qaradawi then called for the march to begin after the service, in which the people would walk 1.2 kilometers from the Omar bin al Khattab mosque to the US embassy. As can be seen from the Google map [Figure 41], the mosque was located fairly close by the embassy, yet separated from it by one crucial detail—D Ring Road, otherwise known as the six-lane Doha Expressway.

**Figure 41. The Protest March to the US Embassy, September 14, 2012**

The green arrow indicates the Omar bin al Khattab mosque and the red pin indicates the US embassy. The orange road is the six-lane Doha Expressway (D Ring).

Source: Google Maps (accessed May 8, 2013)

The scale of the protest is impressive, as seen in Sheshtawy’s photographs, and the signs were many and varied. In the following pictures, the minaret of the Omar bin al Khattab mosque can be seen prominently in the background as the people wave their signs, calling for the

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172 Qaradawi, along with one other sheikh, called for the march, yet none of the sheikhs joined the people in their protest (personal communication with Mostafa Sheshtawy, March 8, 2013).
expulsion of the US ambassador from Qatar and the shutting down of a US military base. [See Figure 42.]

Figure 42. Signs from the September 14, 2012 Protest

The state of Qatar had clearly coordinated with Qaradawi ahead of time on this planned protest. Qatari police were on hand to “guide and protect” the protesters on their march down the side street with flags and signs, and there were additional police stationed prominently across the expressway in front of the US embassy. Essentially the protests were preplanned in coordination with state authorities and perfectly placed so as to ensure that there would be no physical contact between the protestors and the embassy, thus avoiding any potential violence. [See Figure 43.]
In coordination with its most prominent religious figure, the state of Qatar thus allowed people to feel that their concerns were heard and that they had a space for their anger, within an acceptable boundary of maintaining positive relations with the US and avoiding violence. After this protest, little more was heard about the film in Qatar, and life returned to normal.

**Mosques with religious and historical impact**

The quest to “tame” Islam so that it is subordinate to state authority is an important aspect of the Gulf countries’ legitimacy formulas (Gause 1994, 25; Belaid 1988). For example, Davidson (2005, 78) notes that, in the UAE, Islam is “an important legitimizing bridge between the traditional polity and contemporary Emirati society.” In Oman, too, Valeri (2009, 127) argues that religion “is used to strengthen a feeling of national unity and hence of the authorities’ legitimacy” by “promot[ing] a consensual and ‘generic’ Islam that is peculiar to Oman and neglects both controversial past influences and foreign ones.” How should Qatar be seen as respecting, protecting, and preserving Islam, while at the same time interpreting the ideology to
match with state goals? One of the easiest and most obvious ways to accomplish this goal is to build mosques. Kamrava (2009, 410–11) received an estimate from Yousuf bin Ahmad Al-Kuwari, manager of the minister’s office in the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, that in June 2008 Qatar had about 1,300 mosques and 2,300 preachers, which Kamrava calculates to equal about 920 people per mosque. Although he notes that Saudi Arabia had a lower ratio of about 570 people per mosque, Qatar’s mosque count is not too shabby, especially if you estimate the number of actual citizens per mosque, as Davidson does for the UAE. Davidson’s (2005, 109) estimation notes that the UAE has put so much effort into mosque construction that there now are roughly 150 citizens per mosque (comparatively, Qatar would be roughly two hundred citizens per mosque).

The splashiest mosque project in recent years has been the state mosque, which was under construction for several years before being unveiled in December 2011. The mosque, which had been known simply as the State Mosque, was renamed, on the eve of opening, the Imam Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab mosque after the founder of Wahhabi Islam; a statement from the Emiri Diwan noted that this decision was “in recognition of the outstanding reformer and zealous preacher Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and in reflection of the State of Qatar’s intention to revive the Nation’s symbols and its cultural values” (“Qatar’s Biggest Mosque” 2011). The Emir, the Heir Apparent, the Prime Minister, and many other sheikhs, ministers, and dignitaries attended the inauguration ceremony, speaking to the importance of this mosque, with the Emir himself calling Abdul Wahhab “the renowned figure, great reformist, and pioneer” and asking, “Is there a greater and higher act of worship than the remembrance under the roof of a new house of Allah’s house?” (Shoeb 2011).
In terms of sheer size, it is the largest mosque in Qatar, allowing as many as eleven thousand men (in the central hall) and twelve hundred women (in a special enclosure) to pray at the same time, with a total capacity of thirty thousand when including the courtyard areas (“State Mosque” 2011). The mosque has a particularly beautiful multi-domed ceiling, with twenty-eight large domes over the central hall and sixty-five domes covering the outer quadrangle. Perching prominently on a hill overlooking the Corniche, the building looks particularly impressive at night. [See Figure 44.]

**Figure 44. Imam Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab Mosque at Night**

[Image: Source: Castelino (2011)]

The Qatari people greeted the opening of the mosque with pride and happiness. In my survey, 79 percent of respondents said that the Abdul Wahhab mosque represented Qatari culture, values, and traditions “a great deal”—the most strongly positive response for any of the state-led projects mentioned, including Souq Waqif and the Museum of Islamic Art—and 17 percent answered “somewhat,” leaving only 3.6 percent of respondents in the “little bit” or “not at all” category. In contrast, 12.6 percent of respondents said that Katara Cultural Village did “not at all” represent Qatari culture, values, or traditions, and 14.7 percent said the same about Education City.
Although the significance of naming the largest mosque in the country after the founder of Wahhabi Islam is obvious (e.g., Al Kubaisi 2013b), there is a deeper nation-building message here, which helped to create a sense of Qatari heritage intertwined with the religious ideology. The multi-domed mosque design of the Abdul Wahhab mosque was based on the Bu Al-Qabib mosque (“the one with many domes”), a smaller multi-domed mosque that has been upheld by the state as an important symbol of Sheikh Jassim and the Al Thani family. Sheikh Jassim originally built the Bu Al-Qabib mosque in 1878 in honor of his recently deceased father. Although the mosque was rebuilt in the 1950s, and completely demolished and rebuilt once more in the late 2000s (“Faithful Welcome” 2012; Lockerbie n.d.), it retains a lore of its own—Mohemmad Ali Abdulla, the architect of Souq Waqif and various reconstructed fortress palaces, recounted how there was a massive rainstorm and flood in Doha many years ago, and all of the people took refuge in the Bu Al-Qabib mosque as the only dry and stable spot in the city. It would have been clear to all Qatari observers, when the Abdul Wahhab mosque was unveiled, that the model had been the multi-domed design of the Bu Al-Qabib mosque. [See Figure 45.]

Figure 45. The Original Bu Al-Qabib Mosque

This photograph was taken by Herman Borchardt, a German traveler in the Gulf from winter 1903 to spring 1904, displayed in Lockerbie (n.d.)

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173 Personal interview, February 18, 2013, Doha, Qatar. For more on his work, see Cooke (2012, 2014).
Tying the magnificent Abdul Wahhab mosque to the architectural design of the Bu Al-Qabib mosque reinforces the Al Thani family heritage as part of the Islamic narrative. Yet what is truly interesting about this narrative is how the state has sought to avoid reference to the origin of the multi-domed mosque design—the Qal’at Murair fort of the Al Khalifas in Al Zubarah.

To understand the context, we need to go back in time, once again, to Al Zubarah and Sheikh Jassim’s 1878 campaign against rebelling tribes in the city. This story was recounted to me by Mohammad Ali Abdulla—I have not found it in any official history books. Sheikh Jassim rode north to Al Zubarah with two thousand men to put down a revolt by members of the Naim tribe, who barricaded themselves in Qal’at Murair. He laid siege to the fort for about forty days until the tribe surrendered, at which time he was finally able to enter the fort. Once inside, he beheld a beautiful mosque with a unique domed roof—twenty-one domes laid out in a 7x3 grid. On his way back home, Sheikh Jassim was met by a messenger just outside of Doha and told that his father, Sheikh Mohamed bin Thani, had passed away, and that he was now the leader of the Al Thanis (and Qatar). The date was December 18, 1878 (now celebrated as National Day). Sheikh Jassim immediately sent a master builder named Al-Humaili to Al Zubarah to view the mosque and take notes on how to recreate it in Doha in memory of his father. The new mosque was purposefully created to be more than double the size of the Al Zubarah mosque, with forty-four domes laid out in an 11x4 grid. Yet the inspiration for the Bu Al-Qabib mosque was the original multi-domed structure in Al Zubarah.

The original multi-domed mosque had survived in Al Zubarah as late as the mid-1950s, as described by Bibby (1970, 122–23) in his brief archaeological visit to the site:

Not a roof remained standing in Zubara—except for the mosque. It was a multiple-domed building, resting solidly on a forest of pillars, and it illustrated to us as archaeologists the lesson taught already by the

174 Personal interview, February 18, 2013, Doha, Qatar.
This mosque had been built as early as 1768—a truly remarkable feat of construction. Dr. Walmsley provided me with the following photograph, taken in 1960, which he feels must depict the Qal’at Murair fort, as the structure is too large for the mosque foundations that were found within the coastal town. As well, it matches Bibby’s (1970, 122–23) description extremely well. This photograph [Figure 46] may be the last photographic evidence of the original multi-domed mosque at Al Zubarah, the historical inspiration for Sheikh Jassim’s memorial to his father.

Figure 46. The Multi-Domed Mosque in Qal’at Murair, 1960

Source: Alan Walmsley

However, when Lockerbie arrived at Al Zubarah in 1975, there was no longer any trace of this building. As mentioned in the previous section on rewriting the historical narrative of Al Zubarah, Qatar bulldozed the Qal’at Murair site in the 1960s or 1970s during a time of

175 Personal communication, May 8, 2013.
increased political tension with Bahrain over the territorial integrity of Qatar, possibly in an attempt to erase physical remnants of Bahraini claims to Al Zubarah. Bibby’s (1970, 123) description of the domed building now seems sadly prophetic, that “only the hand of man can pull it down.”

The loss of the archaeological link between Al Zubarah and Sheikh Jassim’s original mosque, as well as the lack of any mention of this story in the history books, indicates that the state of Qatar is actively rewriting one last chapter of the Al Zubarah legacy. Without archaeological evidence to depict the original Al Zubarah multi-domed mosque that so impressed Sheikh Jassim in 1878, the design becomes more firmly a Qatari-only invention (Matramkot 2011). El-Ghanem (2012) writes that the Abdul Wahhab mosque, “the largest in Qatar, is a testament to new architecture built with historical features, since it was built last year in the same style of mosques Qatar has known for centuries.” This statement aligns with the goal of the state of Qatar, shown throughout this chapter: to appropriate a cultural, historical, and religious identity separate from external influence, an identity that strengthens its own political legitimacy and stability. Further, by combining the powerful Islamic theology of Abdul Wahhab with an architectural symbol that has become firmly associated with the Al Thani family and Qatari heritage, the Abdul Wahhab mosque sends a powerful message to its people that Al Thani rule is intertwined with and supported by Islamic ideology.

Discussion

I now return to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: If economic allocation were the only measure needed to ensure political stability, then why do we observe Qatar investing so much effort in nation-building? In this chapter, I argued that we must expand rentier
state theory to take into account noneconomic legitimacy strategies actively pursued by the state. The use of a political legitimacy framework, focusing in particular on the need for societal justification, allows us to explain why the state of Qatar devotes so much energy to propagating its preferred version of Qatari nationalism, heritage, and religion. Through the examples of the creation of National Day and the new National Museum, the rewriting of the historical and cultural legacy of Al Zubarah, and the harnessing of Wahhabi Islam to further state-led political and social goals, we have seen that the state of Qatar goes far beyond allocation in its interactions with society.

Further, the evidence suggests that these efforts are working. As the previous Table 14 highlighted, when asked to assess the top priority of the state, only 15 percent of survey respondents chose an economic priority, such as promoting development or distributing wealth. The most popular response by far was preserving Islamic values, a very positive sign for the relatively progressive Qatari leadership, and proof of a societal perception that the state is engaged in active pursuit of noneconomic goals.

Additionally, the extent to which the respondents agree with the state-led narrative and agenda on top priorities also correlates highly with increased confidence in the state. To measure evaluation of the government, which is a particularly sensitive political issue in authoritarian contexts such as Qatar, I compared responses to personal priority questions with the assessment of state priorities. Without forcing the respondent to say directly whether the government is following his preferred policies, comparing these responses allowed me to measure the degree of
policy agreement between the individual and the state (see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of this methodology). I then used this variable in the following regression.\textsuperscript{176} [See Table 15.]

### Table 15. Comparing the Rentier State and Political Legitimacy Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Confidence in government institutions (lowest to highest)</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>20.864</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>-1.844</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (18–82)</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (lowest to highest)</td>
<td>-0.198</td>
<td>-5.447</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (lowest to highest)</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>0.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic satisfaction (lowest to highest)</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>3.160</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority agreement (lowest to highest)</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>2.715</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

The dependent variable is the level of confidence in government institutions in Qatar (the closest proxy we could insert in the survey for assessing citizens’ overall level of political support). Of the control variables—gender, age, education, and religiosity—only education levels have a statistically significant negative impact on the level of confidence in government institutions. The classic rentier state hypothesis—that pocketbook concerns matter—is shown to be statistically significant, with greater levels of economic satisfaction leading to greater likelihood of confidence in the government. Yet virtually just as significant is the political

\textsuperscript{176} The coding for the regression is as follows. For gender, 1 = male and 2 = female. Age is a numerical scale variable, ranging from 18 to 82. For education, the extreme ends of the scale are 0 = no education and 5 = postgraduate education. Religiosity is based on the questions about whether and how frequently religious scholars are consulted about personal issues, ranging from 0 = never to 3 = often consult. Economic satisfaction, which represents classic rentier state theory’s hypothesis, ranges from 1 = not at all satisfied to 4 = very satisfied. The agreement variable, which represents a political legitimacy hypothesis, compares the respondents’ answers to questions of personal priorities for the state with their assessments of actual state priorities to create a scale variable from 0 = no agreement between personal and state priorities to 2 = both of the chosen state priorities overlap with the personal priorities. As for the dependent variable, the level of confidence in government institutions, 1 = no confidence at all and 4 = a great deal of confidence. Some of these variables were recoded from their originals so that the positive or negative relationships would become more intuitive and clearer. My thanks to Justin Gengler, who assisted with the agreement variable (see also Gengler 2013).
legitimacy hypothesis—represented by agreement between personal and state priorities, which ranged far beyond economic considerations to capture social, cultural, and religious goals\textsuperscript{177}—with greater levels of congruence leading to greater likelihood of confidence in the government. These results suggest that societal justification of the state’s narrative and agenda is just as important as economic satisfaction to the overall levels of political legitimacy and stability. We are beginning to see that rentier states may not be as exceptional as once perceived; rather, they must interact with their societies in much the same way as taxation-based states, the only difference being in resources, but not in scope.

However, this investigation has, so far, emphasized the power of the state vis-à-vis society regarding the creation, maintenance, and usage of national, cultural, historical, and religious narratives. In this respect, although Qatar has gone beyond an “allocation policy,” it still appears to retain the ability to act relatively independently of its society when pursuing its goals. Although the state of Qatar has, so far, been domestically unchallenged in its efforts toward propagating a hegemonic nation-building narrative, its autonomy has been severely challenged by its attempt to reform the national education system, the subject of the next, and final, chapter of my dissertation. Arguably the most transformative and developmental of all of the state of Qatar’s agendas, the state has nevertheless been forced to retract some of its most preferred policies in the face of societal discontent—showing the importance of societal consent to the political legitimacy puzzle. It is to this part of the story that we now turn.

\textsuperscript{177} POLT1–4 gave the respondents the opportunity to pick their personal first and second priorities from two different sets of options, and then POLT5 gave the same list of options, in full, for the respondents to choose what they perceived as the state’s first and second priorities. See Table 14 for the full list of POLT5, and see Appendices A and B for the complete questionnaire.
CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIETAL CONSENT AND CONSTRAINT

This chapter, the final component of the dissertation, directly tackles the puzzle of a vocally discontented society and a responsive, even limited, state, despite the financial autonomy of rentier wealth. Now that it has been demonstrated that economic allocation is an insufficient explanation of political legitimacy in Qatar, and that a quintessential rentier state has been engaging in noneconomic nation building efforts far beyond what classic rentier state theory would expect, I tackle the third fundamental misconception: that society has no input on the policy preferences and implementation of the “autonomous” rentier state. To demonstrate that the state of Qatar is much more limited in its ability to pursue its preferred policy agenda than classic rentier state theory would predict, I present the case study of Qatar’s national education reforms and their reversals. After briefly describing the previous attempts of the state to reform its national education system, I discuss the reforms of the early 2000s, the societal reaction, and the state of Qatar’s response. I conclude by emphasizing that, contrary to classic rentier state theory, Qatari state and society demonstrate a give-and-take that is indicative of a responsive, even constrained state that gains, rather than loses, strength and legitimacy through interaction with its society.

Theoretically Autonomous but Empirically Embedded

Classic rentier state theory depicts the state as an unconstrained political actor. Crystal (1986, 13) argues, “There are always moments when the state develops a high degree of autonomy from its social bases. . . . But oil-based states are unusual in that their higher degree of autonomy from other social groupings is part of a structurally determined, ongoing process.”
Classic rentier state theory viewed the state as fulfilling an economic function for its people, and “all [the state] needs is an expenditure policy” to receive the political loyalty of the people to pursue all other types of policies deemed preferable by the state (Luciani 1987, 74).

Even for those analysts who admit that there is some state engagement with society, rentier states nevertheless are argued to have an enhanced capacity for pursuing its policy agendas: “Autonomy . . . connote[s] the state’s independence from and its immunity to social resistance when it comes to its transformative and developmental agendas” (Kamrava 2009, 409). As described in Chapter 3, the state of Qatar has a transformative and developmental agenda when it comes to its human development goals (QNV 2008, 13–18). In fact, it could be argued that the most transformative and developmental goal of the state of Qatar is that of education reform. The state of Qatar views improved education outcomes as the key to creating a “capable and motivated workforce” (QNDS 2011, 148) and enabling its citizens to contribute to a knowledge-based economy (QNB 2012, 3–7). The huge government expenditures in education—including the lucrative stipends and other financial rewards for citizens who pursue higher education, and the fact that education accounts for around 13 percent of total government expenditure, approximately 4 percent of the total GDP (NHDR 2012, 31)—show that the state of Qatar is actively pursuing its vision of human development. Especially essential to facilitating the citizens’ entry to the private sector and the new knowledge economy is increased proficiency in English, noted as one of “the most required specialties by recruiters” in the labor market today (“Qatari Job Seekers” 2012). It is clear, through words and actions, how important improved education outcomes are to Qatar’s transformational human development agenda.

The sweeping national education reforms in Qatar, which spanned both the kindergarten through grade 12 (K–12) system (beginning in 2001) as well as Qatar University (beginning in
were initiated by the state in a top-down and unilateral manner quite in line with traditional conceptions of an unconstrained rentier state. If the case of Qatar followed the theoretical conception of a traditional rentier state, the story would end here. Bought off by welfare benefits, society should be loyal, acquiescent, and passively supportive of the state’s developmental agenda.

However, the Qatari state-society relationship has deviated remarkably from the theoretical expectations of classic rentier state theory. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence show that a significant portion of the Qatari population did not accept important aspects of these reforms. The growing negative reaction of Qatari citizens, particularly since the start of the Arab Spring, depicts a society that has not been bought off or silenced by welfare benefits. In fact, in a stunning reversal of its preferred transformative policies, the state of Qatar has recently and suddenly backtracked on several key aspects of its reforms—most prominently switching back to Arabic-language instruction for both K–12 and Qatar University for the start of the 2012–2013 academic year—a result that we should not expect to see in a traditional rentier state environment of autonomy and lopsided power.

How can we understand these actions from the Qatar leadership? Considering the amount of time, money, and personal backing invested in the reforms, the sudden reversals, particularly with regard to English-language instruction, is a puzzle. If the Qatari state were truly autonomous from its citizens, this reversal would be difficult to explain. If we examine these actions through a limited state lens (Migdal 1997), however, it appears the sudden reversal of the reforms is a clear example of the Qatari state taking societal discontent into account, and being

178 And, in fact, the Qatari government does not appear to want to explain its actions to the wider public. As noted in a New York Times article about the sudden shift back to Arabic-language instruction at Qatar University, “The Education Ministry of Qatar did not respond to queries” (Guttenplan 2012).
responsive to, and even constrained by, its citizenry. Further, this reaction by the state should be seen as a source of strength rather than weakness. By challenging “the mistaken assumption that the state apparatus is entirely self-contained, and can be immunized from the attitudes and actions of the surrounding population” (Beetham 1991, 118), we instead see that “it [is] not the state’s social and political distance from society but precisely its active involvement . . . that enable[s] it to begin to strengthen its power” (Davis 1991, 10–11). This chapter demonstrates the responsive attitude of the Qatari state to its citizens, which ultimately enhances its political legitimacy through an emphasis on consent and an acknowledgment that the state is embedded within its society, regardless of the source of its wealth.

Society’s Discontents

As I will describe in this chapter, a significant portion of the Qatari population has made its concerns about the national education reforms known, quite vocally and publicly, to the government and the public at large. Although, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the authoritarian environment of Qatar makes any public displays of disagreement worthy of note, it is still important to keep in mind that disgruntled voices, although loud and impassioned, are not necessarily representative of the majority opinion.

My original survey data presents some numbers on the discontented segment of Qatari society regarding the national education reforms, which are separated into K–12 public school reforms and university-level reforms. It is important to note that the K–12 education reforms receive less support overall than the university-level reforms [see Table 16]. When asked an assessment of change question (“Here is a list of changes in Qatari society that some people have noticed over the past five years. For each change, would you say it has been generally positive or
generally negative?”) about the K–12 education system, we see a sharply divided Qatari society, with 51 percent answering that K–12 education changes have been positive, and 49 percent answering that they have been negative. Of those who answered that the K–12 education changes have been negative, 10 percent chose it as the most important negative change, with another 15 percent choosing it as the second most important—in other words, approximately 25 percent of those who view the K–12 education system changes as negative believe that it is one of the most negative changes to occur in Qatari society in the recent past. Increased mixed gender interaction and the expatriate population increase were the only two changes that were seen as more negative overall by the respondents. The K–12 reforms had their supporters as well, with 3 percent choosing it as the most important positive change, and another 10 percent choosing it as the second most important positive change. Nevertheless, the difference in intensity—with only 13 percent viewing it as an extremely positive change versus 25 percent viewing it as extremely negative—shows that, on balance, the K–12 education system reforms have a significant number of detractors, who demonstrate a greater intensity than do the supporters.

### Table 16. Evaluation of Changes to National Education System, Including Intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Item</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>High priority?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K–12 education system</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University-level education system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798
When it comes to the university-level reforms, the picture becomes a bit brighter, yet there is still a significant number of people who view these reforms in a negative light. When asked the assessment of change question for the university-level education system, 71 percent of Qataris responded positively, and 29 percent responded negatively. The intensity of the opposition is much lower, however, as only 4 percent of Qataris listed it as their first or second most important negative change, and the discontents are surpassed by 9 percent of Qataris who listed it as their first or second most important positive change. These results tell us that although there is also a significant number of Qataris who are unsupportive of the university-level reforms, these vocal Qataris are nevertheless in the minority in terms of assessment and intensity.

Besides an overall assessment of whether the changes have been positive or negative, the survey also depicts the levels of satisfaction with the current education systems in the country. Again, we see that there is a significant minority of Qataris who are dissatisfied with the current system—approximately 29 percent dissatisfaction for K–12 and 18 percent for the college system [see Table 17].

**Table 17. Overall Satisfaction with the Current National Education Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Satisfied: 71.2%</th>
<th>Dissatisfied: 28.8%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Overall, how satisfied are you with the current K–12 education system?”</td>
<td>Very: 28.5%</td>
<td>Somewhat: 42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some: 17%</td>
<td>Very: 11.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Satisfied: 81.8%</th>
<th>Dissatisfied: 18.2%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Overall, how satisfied are you with the current college education system?”</td>
<td>Very: 40.1%</td>
<td>Somewhat: 41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some: 10.8%</td>
<td>Very: 7.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798
In general, these results show us that there are plenty of Qatari citizens who are supportive of the education reforms and satisfied with the current system. The discontented minority, although perhaps not numerically significant, should still be seen as politically significant. First, in an authoritarian environment that depends on outward displays of “as if” legitimacy, any voices raised in public disagreement can destabilize the system by allowing for information cascades and snowball effects (Wedeen 1999; Kuran 1995). Second, Qatar’s political stability is dependent on the continued consensus of the ruling family in support of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Herb 1999). The 1995 coup that deposed the more conservative Emir Khalifa in favor of his more progressive son nevertheless retained the former Emir’s supporters within the dynasty (Kamrava 2009; Kéchichian 2008). Attempted countercoups since then—the well-publicized one in 1996, and the rumored ones of 2002, 2009, and 2011—have revolved around the conservative members of the ruling family and their allies in the Qatari military as well as sympathetic rulers in Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE and Bahrain (Cordesman 1997, 223–24, 230–31; Teitelbaum [1998] 2001, 514–15; [1999] 2001, 500; [2000] 2002, 483–85; “Qatar Coup Plot” 2002; Kéchichian 2008, 211–13; Dunn 2009; “Report: Qatar Emir” 2011). Members of Qatari society, who are dissatisfied with perceived Western acculturation, therefore, have powerful allies within the Qatari ruling family and national security forces, as well as with Qatar’s more conservative neighbors. Emir Hamad does not want to ignore societal opposition voices that align so closely with disgruntled members of his own family—a wise move considering the lessons of past transitions from authoritarian rule that began with elite splits and built on societal mobilization (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Kaufman 1986; Przeworski 1986). Thus, although the opposition to the state’s national education
reforms may not be representative of the majority, it nevertheless carries political weight, and the reaction of the state to this dissent is indicative of its significance.

A History of Education Reform Attempts

The sudden changes to the national education system in 2001 were not the first attempt of the state to reform its public education offerings. Shortly after independence in 1971, the Qatari Ministry of Education came under pressure from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Arab League Education, Cultural, and Scientific Organization (ALESCO), as well as from “some educated Qataris,” to establish a comprehensive education strategy, which had been lacking since the inception of the Ministry in the 1950s (Al-Kobaisi 1979, 145–51, quote 148). Al-Kobaisi notes that the Ministry of Education, “without showing reasonable justification,” refused to participate in a UNESCO training course on educational planning, and informed the ALESCO committee that it had “no written educational strategy except the general educational aims which were indicated in the provisional constitution,” which led to “sharp criticism” from the organization (1979, 147–48). Demonstrating that the state realized the importance of a more centralized and defined educational policy, a sixteen-member committee, comprising representatives of various ministries as well as Qatar University, was formed to draft a policy for educational development in 1981 (Ministry of Education and Qatar National Commission for Education, Culture, and Science 1992, 26). The education strategy’s key principles included:

Education, being a life necessity and a significant factor for the development of good citizens, is the right for every Qatari citizen. . . . Education is free in all stages including higher stages inside Qatar or abroad. . . . The State finances education in order to maintain its continuation, growth, and flourishing. (Ministry of Education and Qatar National Commission for Education, Culture, and Science 1992, 26)
Although the Ministry now had a written policy for education, along with a written set of educational objectives, it was noted that the “strategy of development”—in other words, the plan to implement these goals—“is still under study” (Ministry of Education and Qatar National Commission for Education, Culture, and Science 1992, 27), heralding the problem of implementation that would haunt the Qatari educational system for the next twenty years.

Throughout the 1990s, the state of Qatar continued to commission official reports and recommendations, yet ultimately none were implemented. The state began to push for a clearer education development strategy in 1990, when a series of official reports was created to address the shortcomings in the national system (Al-Kobaisi 2012, 62–65; Brewer et al. 2007, 28–30). In October 1990, the Ministry of Education worked with UNESCO to create a 232-page evaluation report on the current state of education in Qatar (Ministry of Education and UNESCO 1990). The report, presented to Emir Khalifa and Heir Apparent Hamad, requested financial and practical support to improve the administrative structures, financial management, teaching facilities, and the overall educational environment. Yet despite Emir Khalifa and the Minister of Education expressing their intention to follow the recommendations of the plan, the national education system instead experienced a reduction of salaries and a halting of construction projects, perhaps stymied by the global drop in oil prices. A similar report, published in 1996, was created by a committee of nine Qatari, who relied on a seventy-member team of experts and researchers from Qatar University and the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education Higher Committee for Oversight of the Politics of Education, 1996). The major issues that were highlighted included the need for professional development of skills and qualifications among the teacher cadre, the need to improve the quantity and quality of schools and scientific labs, and the problems associated with the education budget decreases in the 1980s and 1990s. A follow-up
report introduced several initiatives to attempt to address some of these problems (Ministry of Education 1996). In 1998, the state hired the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNESCO to find a solution to solve the inefficiencies of the Qatari education system. UNESCO’s team of researchers—from the US and the Middle East, but no one from Qatar—created a five-volume report that addressed all the issues of the education system, and the UNDP suggested a plan to reform the educational structure. Despite all of these reports, Al-Kobaisi (2012, 65) argues that they did not lead to any discernible reform results, suggesting that the common thread linking the failure of these reform attempts was that each plan depended on the Ministry of Education itself to execute the reforms.179

The RAND Reforms of 2001 and 2003

With this historical context in mind, the decision of the state to bypass the Ministry of Education in its latest reform attempt makes more sense. In 2001, the state of Qatar invited the RAND Corporation, a US think tank, to examine the national education system in Qatar, beginning with the K–12 public school system (Zellman et al. 2009, 1). This collaboration led to the establishment of the RAND–Qatar Policy Institute, which recommended a set of reforms called “Education for a New Era” (Brewer et al. 2007). To carry out the recommended reforms, the plan created new institutions that were meant to eventually replace the Ministry of Education180—the Supreme Education Council (SEC), tasked with setting national education

179 The failed attempts to reform the Ministry of Education demonstrate the ability of bureaucratic institutions to resist change, showing yet another similarity between the politics of rentier states and productive states (Wilson 1989; Pierson 1993, 2000, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2009).
180 To paraphrase Mark Twain, “The reports of the Ministry of Education’s death have been greatly exaggerated.” The fact that the Ministry of Education still exists (as of May 2013) is another indicator of the obduracy of this bureaucratic institution. It is worthy of note that the current Higher Education Secretary General of the Supreme Education Council, H.E. Saad bin Ibrahim Al Mahmoud, also serves as the Minister of Education, indicating some fusion of the two institutions at the higher levels. Guarino and Tanner (2012, 243) argue that the autonomy of the
policy, and its subsidiaries: the Education Institute, tasked with developing curriculum standards, leading professional development, and allocating resources; and the Evaluation Institute, tasked with monitoring student, teacher, and school performance.\textsuperscript{181} [See Figure 47.]

**Figure 47. New National Education Institutions**

Some of the most important recommendations of the “Education for a New Era” plan included switching to a standards-based system in Arabic, English, math, and science, reforming the existing public school system into an independent school model,\textsuperscript{182} reducing Arabic language

\textsuperscript{181} The Education Institute is divided into four offices: Independent Schools, Private Schools, Curriculum Standards, and Professional Development. The Evaluation Institute is also divided into four offices: Student Assessment, School Evaluation, Data Collection and Management, and the Qatar Office of Registration, Licensing, and Accreditation. Other institutions under the umbrella of the SEC are the Higher Education Institute, the Shared Services Department (including Human Relations), the Office of Information Technology, the Office of Communications, the Legal Affairs Department, and the Office of Research and Policy Analysis. See the Supreme Education Council, “SEC Institutes,” \url{http://www.sec.gov.qa/En/SECInstitutes/Pages/default.aspx} (accessed March 18, 2013).

\textsuperscript{182} The initial report gave three different options for reforming the existing public school system. Besides the independent school model, there was a second plan for modifying the existing centralized school model under the Ministry of Education, and a third plan that involved a voucher system. As for the modified centralized model, the RAND report noted that “past experience suggested that any design in which the Ministry retained authority was not likely to bring about large changes” (Brewer et al. 2007, 53). Regarding the voucher system, Al-Kobaisi (2012, 64)
and Islamic studies classes, and emphasizing English-language instruction. [See Table 18.] The reforms were so far-reaching and implemented so quickly that one Qatari official was quoted as calling it (favorably) “a total earthquake” (Glasser 2003).

Table 18. Reforms of the Qatari K–12 Public School System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reforms</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standards-based system in Arabic, English, math, and science subjects</td>
<td>→ All new curriculum, assessments, and professional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforming existing public school system through an emphasis on autonomy, accountability, variety, and choice</td>
<td>→ All public schools changed to the independent school model, overseen by the SEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of Arabic language and Islamic studies classes from twenty-six classes a week</td>
<td>→ Seven classes a week (five Arabic classes, two Islamic Studies classes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on English-language instruction in all subjects</td>
<td>→ All new curriculum, assessments, and professional development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In August 2003, Dr. Sheikha bint Abdulla Al-Misnad\(^{183}\) was appointed as the new President of Qatar University, devolving power from the Emir of Qatar as the traditional head of the university. She was given a broad mandate from the Qatari leadership to reform the university. Within a few months, RAND–Qatar Policy Institute was hired to assist the new Qatar University leadership in designing and implementing major reforms (Moini et al. 2009). Some of the major recommendations included the switch from Arabic to English instruction for the Colleges of Education; Humanities and Social Sciences; Media; and Sharia, Law, and Islamic

\(^{183}\) Dr. Sheikha bint Abdulla Al-Misnad’s first name is Sheikha. To avoid calling her “Sheikha Sheikha Al-Misnad,” this dissertation will instead refer to her as Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad.
Studies (Engineering; Science; and Business and Economics were already in English);
standardizing admissions standards across all colleges and removing the pay-for-admission Parallel Program; reforms in faculty pay, contracts, recruitment, and development; and the expansion of the Foundation Program for students who needed work on English and other admissions standards before being formally admitted. [See Table 19.]

Table 19. Reforms of Qatar University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reforms</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Emphasis on English-language instruction for all colleges             | → Engineering; Science; and Business and Economics Colleges remained in English  
                                            → Education; Humanities and Social Sciences; Media; and Sharia, Law, and Islamic Studies Colleges switched to English instruction  
                                            → Changed curriculum, assessments, professional development of teachers, and admissions standards for students |
| Standardizing admissions standards across all colleges                 | → Removed the Parallel Program (admission/graduation for below-standard paying students)  
                                            → Became more difficult for Qataris to gain entrance to Qatar University |
| Reforms in faculty pay, contracts, recruitment, and development        | → An increase in English-language faculty, staff, students, and expatriates in general  
                                            → Higher salaries to be competitive in international recruitment efforts |
| Expansion of the Foundation Program for students who did not gain admission | → Expanded the program from the colleges of Engineering and Science to all colleges  
                                            → Provided Qataris with additional help on English and other admissions standards  
                                            → Some Qataris were not able to pass |

The Transformative and Developmental Agenda of Qatar

Why did Qatar initiate such sweeping and rapid education policy changes? There is the obvious idealism concerning the right of all citizens to an education, first declared in the 1970
Provisional Constitution, supported in the 1981 educational policy and enshrined in several articles of the Permanent Constitution for the State of Qatar (2004). This idealism is shared by the citizens, whose responses in my survey demonstrated that promoting education is seen as one of the top priorities of society. When asked to choose their personal priorities from a list of aims for the country, which included a strong national defense, preserving Qatari identity and culture, more equally distributing wealth among citizens, and improving international image, over 50 percent of the respondents named “promoting education” as their first or second top priority. Citizens also view the state as emphasizing the importance of education; when given a longer list of aims of the country, which also included preserving Islam, promoting economic development, and promoting free speech and individual rights, over 28 percent of the respondents answered that “promoting education” was the first or second top priority of the State of Qatar. Clearly, the idealism inherent in the state constitution regarding the importance of education has been noticed by the Qatari citizens themselves and enjoys significant support.

Yet despite this idealistic language, the national goals of education have a decidedly economic bent to them. As discussed in Chapter 3, the state of Qatar has been clear in recent policy statements and actions that one of its top economic priorities is to create a competitive knowledge-based economy, with one of the prerequisites being a society of skilled, flexible, and creative people (Government of Qatar Planning Council 2007, 3). Even before the Qatar National Vision 2030 was officially published in 2008—placing human development as one of the four pillars of the national development strategy—the Government of Qatar Planning Council (2007, 20) created the Qatar Knowledge Economy Project, noting,

Education is a fundamental enabler of the knowledge economy. A well-educated workforce is essential for creating, sharing, disseminating, and using knowledge effectively. Improving the quality at every level of the education system from early childhood to adult training is a strong prerequisite for turning Qatar into a knowledge-based economy.
The next year, Qatar National Vision 2030 defined human development as an educated and healthy population capable of joining the workforce (QNV 2008, 15). Specifically with regard to the educational advancements, the Qatar National Vision (QNV 2008, 13) noted,

Qatar aims to build a modern world-class educational system that provides students with a first-rate education, comparable to that offered anywhere in the world. The system will provide citizens with excellent training and opportunities to develop to their full potential, preparing them for success in a changing world with increasingly complex technical requirements. The system will also encourage analytical and critical thinking, as well as creativity and innovation. It will promote social cohesion and respect for Qatari society’s values and heritage, and will advocate for constructive interaction with other nations.

The Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016, the first of several detailed five-year plans meant to guide the country toward the 2030 Vision, devotes over twenty pages to detailing the precise plans for building knowledge and skills in the Qatari population through improving K–12 general education and higher education opportunities (QNDS 2011, 122–45). All of this is in line with the overall Qatarization policies of the country, which are to better prepare their own citizens to join the workforce and take over the professional positions held currently by expatriates (see the previous discussion in Chapter 3 for more detail).

Although we have seen from this discussion that Qatar had been slowly attempting to reform its educational system for several decades, the sudden implementation of the RAND recommendations may also have had something to do with the global educational reform zeitgeist of the early 2000s. First published by the UNDP in 2002, the annual Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) bluntly described the main challenges to the Arab region’s development—including poverty, autocracy, and the need for better education and more female participation in public life—and the first strategy listed as a solution was to build a knowledge

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184 In the late 1990s, Cordesman (1997, 235–36) noted, “The Qatari government also recognizes that its combination of welfare payments, cultural traditions, and a weak educational system have failed to develop a strong work ethic. . . . It is seeking to reform its educational system, and focus on job-related skills and a more demanding curriculum.”
society. The AHDR (2002, 6) writes, “Knowledge is a cornerstone of development. . . . It is a public good that underpins economies, polities and societies, permeating all aspects of human activity.” The second annual AHDR, published in 2003, was titled, “Building a Knowledge Society,” and devoted the entirety of its 210 pages to assessing the current state of knowledge acquisition, dissemination, and production in the Arab region, along with a five-part strategic vision for how to achieve a better knowledge society. Rather than see the state of Qatar’s actions on national education reform in a vacuum, we should view it as a part of a sudden and urgent global conversation on how to improve the state of knowledge in the Arab world.

In general, Qatar’s transformative and developmental agenda of human development—for both practical and idealistic reasons—had the means to be implemented at the precise moment that the global conversation turned to reforming education in the Arab world. According to classic rentier state theory, the state should have been able to proceed with the reforms without much concern for the reaction of the population. In fact, the lack of initial communication with the public regarding the K–12 reforms is indicative of the state acting from a position of autonomy and power. Despite paying lip service to the idea that “communication with the public and with the education system’s participants would be important to the reform’s success,” the SEC did not hire a Communications Coordinator and a communications strategy contractor until the implementation of the K–12 reforms had already begun (Brewer et al. 2007, 145–46). The SEC Communications Office launched its website in March 2004 and held its first public event, three years after the reform planning began, and just months before the first wave of public schools was changed to the independent model.

However, the RAND–Qatar Policy Institute’s report warned that this lackadaisical approach to public outreach could have negative consequences to the success of the reforms. The
report’s section on “engaging stakeholders through communication” ends with a note of caution: “Public engagement is needed because the reform is so challenging to Qatari education traditions. . . . Concern among the public might be ongoing, so an increase in public communication will likely serve the reform well now and in the future” (Brewer et al. 2007, 146–47).

An early hint that the state of Qatar does not feel divorced from public reaction regarding the education reforms can be seen in the SEC Evaluation Institute’s intense data collection, which included public opinion surveys. Beginning with the 2004–2005 school year, the Evaluation Institute has conducted annual surveys of parents, students, teachers, and principals each year, supplemented with data from school records, standardized tests, and an annual school visit, in order to assess the quality of education in the different types of K–12 schools in Qatar: Ministry of Education (traditional “public”) schools, independent (“reformed” public) schools, private Arabic schools, and, beginning in the 2008–2009 year, international schools. The Evaluation Institute compiles this data in an annual statistical overview entitled, “Schools and Schooling in Qatar.” The published reports—all over one hundred pages—present the material from hundreds of questions, including assessments of school governance structures, school leadership, student-teacher-administrator relationships, facilities and materials, and student and parent overall satisfaction. Although there are issues with the transparency of the data, the fact

186 Despite the glut of information, the data are far from transparent. No numbers of respondents are reported, making it impossible to judge statistically significant differences between response options. Responses are aggregated—for example, lumping “very satisfied” and “satisfied” together—which results in data that does not exhibit any significant movement over the years, despite the real possibility that significant movement is occurring within the aggregated responses. All raw data are stored on the Qatar National Education Data System, which states in its FAQs that only certain stakeholders may access data “as per their user privileges and security restrictions,” and the data itself will be restricted to allow only limited and aggregated comparisons. See http://www.qneds.sec.gov.qa/ for more frustration. As a side note, I have been personally introduced to three different SEC officials, from the
that so much information is being collected every year demonstrates that the SEC and, by
extension, the state of Qatar are deeply interested in the opinion of society regarding the quality
of and satisfaction with the reformed education system.187

Societal Response to the K–12 Education Reforms

Evidence shows that significant parts of the Qatari community are dissatisfied with the
current system and have felt excluded from the reform discussions. My survey shows that 29
percent of the respondents are dissatisfied with the current K–12 education system, and a
majority—58 percent—state that they would like a greater say in the reform process. When
given a chance at the end of the survey to give an open-ended response with regard to any other
comments the respondent would like to make, forty-three respondents (over 5 percent of the total
sample) specifically mentioned problems with the education system in the country, giving
comments such as:

- The curriculum of the educational system is not of the level that the government had hoped for. I
  am not satisfied with the educational system in the country, and the curriculum that comes from
  abroad is not thoroughly inspected, and it includes many violations
- A special mention of the educational system, as I really wish it was in a better situation than now
- There is inefficiency in the educational system, and there must be a unified curriculum, and the
  Arabic language should be given the priority in education, and there must be more attention to
  religion in public education
- The issue of education and independent schools, where we demand the return of the educational
  system to the way it used to be in the past
- Work on the educational system and bring back the old curriculum
- Education here is becoming worse than before
- Give more attention to the education and the Arabic language and religious studies
- The Supreme Education Council has led to the deterioration of education
- Focus on education in independent schools and national exams
- Please improve the education

187 These surveys are also an improvement from the earlier government emphasis on elite-only interviews (e.g., Al-
Horr 1998).
The national education reforms of the K–12 system are clearly a pressing issue for many Qataris.

Even the state of Qatar (QNDS 2011, 132) noted that

[teachers and students are overwhelmed by reform initiatives. The concurrent implementation of
curriculum standards that need to be detailed by teachers, a student-centred teaching approach and the use
of English as the instructional language may be burdening teachers with so many new responsibilities that
classroom learning has suffered.

Teacher reaction

The teachers at the independent schools may be feeling particularly disillusioned and
excluded from the reform process. Although the SEC surveys generally show high satisfaction
rates for the independent-school teachers, with the exception of an 18 percent satisfaction
regarding salaries (“Schools and Schooling” 2011–2012, 28), the lack of specific questions about
controversial topics, such as the scope of the curriculum or the language of instruction, may
mask dissatisfaction.

A survey conducted by a student at Qatar University of 290 teachers in the independent
school system found disturbing evidence of problems and concerns regarding the new curriculum
(“91.8 Percent” 2012). This independent survey found that almost three out of every four
teachers (73.5 percent) felt that the new curriculum was too broad, making it very difficult both
for the teachers and the students. Teacher quotes included: “We want to focus on quality rather
than quantity”; “The very intense curriculum is exhausting the students with too much
information;” and “The approach of the new curriculum is weak compared to the former public
school system . . . . And the continuing confusion of the Supreme Education Council is the
reason for the deterioration of education, especially with regards to the emphasis on English and
bilingualism.” The difficulties and frustrations associated with being an independent-school
teacher were the subject of a cartoon by Abdulatif, depicting Superman hanging from a noose after he attempted to be a teacher in the independent-school system. [See Figure 48.]

Figure 48. “Even Superman Can’t Do It”

“Superman is actually not that powerful . . . I challenged him to work as a teacher in an independent school until the spring vacation, but by Allah, he could not handle two weeks!! He wrote his will and committed suicide!!”

Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, October 2, 2012

It is also possible that the difficulties and challenges associated with the new curriculum have created a student behavior problem in the independent school system. Over 90 percent of the teacher respondents to the independent survey felt that the Higher Education Institute (HEI) student behavior constitution was ineffectual and allowed students to disrespect their teachers, an issue that is poignantly displayed in the recent Qatari short film, *Bader*, which depicts the physical and emotional misbehavior of fourth-grade students in a typical independent school (Al-Saadi, Assami, and Darwish 2012). Some evidence of the behavioral problems can be seen in the SEC official surveys, as the 58 percent of independent-school teachers who reported satisfaction with “my students’ behavior and discipline” were relatively lower than the 67 percent and 70 percent for private Arabic and international schools, respectively (“Schools and Schooling” 2011–2012, 92). Nevertheless, 81 percent of the independent-school teachers reported officially that “the school’s staff and students respect each other,” sending a confusing message overall (“Schools and Schooling” 2011–2012, 30). There is clearly a disaffected segment of the
independent school teachers who feel their opinions and experiences are not being taken into account, as seen in the following quote from one disaffected teacher:

The lack of cooperation between the schools and the Supreme Education Council, and the long work days for teachers and students are some of the main reasons for the failure of education. In addition, the HEI’s unstudied demands come from people who have nothing to do with education. The independent schools system is very, very, very unsuccessful. (“91.8 Percent” 2012)

These opinions may not be clearly expressed and/or reported in the SEC official surveys, due to the wording of questioning and possible concerns with anonymity.

Attempts to monitor and influence the quality of teachers at the independent schools have also provoked criticism. A principal of an independent school complained about the lack of qualified teachers available for employment as well as the varying quality of hiring decisions at different schools (Al-Khulafi 2012). The attempts by the SEC Evaluation Institute to monitor teacher performance on the curriculum standards have also been met with hostility by both teachers and owners of independent schools. The SEC announced new tests for independent-school teachers on the standards, with a three-strikes-and-you’re-out policy (“Tests for Teachers” 2012). The Al Arab article noted that the majority of independent school owners were unhappy with this development, with one rising up during the meeting to complain, “This test is a conspiracy against the country.” Abdulatif wasted no time in creating a cartoon that addressed the confusion associated with the tests of teachers and other independent school reforms. [See Figure 49.]
Parental and community concerns

Although the Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016 recommended improvements in parental, community, and sectoral participation in K–12 education (QNDS 2011, 136–37), parents and community members have felt excluded from the reform discussions. A particular point of concern was the switch from Arabic to English-language instruction, for both cultural and academic reasons. A Qatari mother of seven children discussed her cultural concerns:

I just don’t understand why they did not ask us. It happened so fast and no one said anything so I did not do anything. Now my children learn Arabic better from home. It was not like this when I went to school, we were taught to be proud of our language. We are a country that should make decisions together. (Alhafidh 2011, 3)

An elementary school teacher in an independent school explained the academic issues:

The new policy was that we were supposed to pass the students regardless if they did their homework, studied, or even passed an exam. We all knew that it was impossible to teach first graders the fundamentals of science and math in English, but since all the testing was done internally, it was almost impossible for the SEC to see the short or long term effects of moving from Arabic to English. (Alhafidh 2011, 4)

A prominent Qatari intellectual, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on the problems of education reform in Qatar in 1979, asked plaintively:
How did the education system transform from one with patriotism and nationalism, which enhances the pride among learners of their Arabic language, national heritage, and Islamic culture, to a system so weak in those principles and educational values? . . . How is it that our country, which is an independent sovereign state and part of the Arab world, with its official language of Arabic as provided by the Constitution, is situated in such a contradiction? (Al-Kobaisi 2012, 65, 68)

The removal of Arabic from school instruction contributed to the growing “feeling that Arabic is fast becoming a second language in the Gulf” (Guttenplan 2012). A hard-hitting cartoon by Abdulatif depicts the Arabic language getting “kicked out” of important aspects of daily life in Qatar. Note that the square depicting Arabic getting kicked out of education is the only one to feature a woman’s high heel. [See Figure 50.]

Figure 50. “Giving Arabic the Boot”

Clockwise from the top left: The Arabic language being kicked out of... emergency medical services; education; employment; restaurants; the souq; and drivers.
Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, January 23, 2012

These cultural concerns were amplified by concerns over the academic quality of the new schools and curricula. The SEC’s own student performance assessments, the Qatar Comprehensive Educational Assessment (QCEA), paint a grim tale. The QCEA measures student overall performance based on the students’ proficiency in the Qatar National Curriculum Standards. From the 2005–2006 to the 2009–2010 academic year, the number of Grade 11 students meeting the national standards, according to the QCEA, was discouragingly low. Even
with an unexplained jump in the percentages starting with the 2010–2011 academic year, the majority of students in the independent school system are not meeting the standards in English, Arabic, math, and science. [See Table 20.] The cultural and academic concerns of parents and the community contribute to the overall societal disapproval of the independent school reforms (see also Ahmed 2013).

Table 20. Percentage of Grade 11 Independent-School Students Meeting the Qatar National Curriculum Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Math</th>
<th>Science</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005–2006</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–2010</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–2011</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–2012</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Societal Responses to the Qatar University Education Reforms

The reforms of Qatar University also created a set of vocal detractors in society. In my survey, 18 percent of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the current college education system, and a majority—54 percent—expressed a desire to have a “greater say” in the reform process. The dissatisfaction with the university-level reforms may stem primarily from a clash between increased academic standards and social norms and expectations. Moini et al. (2009, 59–62) notes that the new Qatar University administration, in order to strengthen the value of a Qatar University degree, decided to go against the previous status quo that any Qatari could (and would) be admitted to Qatar University. The authors of the RAND report write:
In the years before the reforms, many members of Qatari society viewed admission to and graduation from the national university as a privilege routinely available to all nationals. Academic standards—for both admission and graduation—were not rigorous. . . . [T]here were few alternatives to QU for less qualified students. . . . In these circumstances, QU faced considerable social pressure to be all things to all students, providing opportunities for continuing education for large numbers of young Qataris who might not be well prepared for university studies. . . . For many civil service positions, the only meaningful requirement was a university degree—in any field and with any grades. . . . QU faced strong social pressure to allow large numbers of less-than-motivated students to graduate. . . .

QU could not be expected to meet all of Qatar’s needs for post-secondary education. QU would aim to serve average and above-average Qataris who seek academically oriented university education. . . . Scores on the school-leaving examination required for admission to QU had been raised shortly before the formal beginning of the reform process. Although this action encountered significant resistance from the larger community, the University persevered. . . .

Improved academic achievement by students who were admitted to QU was a major objective of the reform. Early in the reform process, the GPA required for continuing enrollment and graduation was raised from 1.5 to 2.0. This action, too, faced considerable community opposition. The University also began work on other endeavors that were intended to generate and support a more rigorous academic experience for its undergraduates. . . . In making these decisions, the University leadership accepted that graduation rates might drop, at least temporarily, but felt that establishment of meaningful standards was essential to the University’s academic integrity. (Moini et al. 2009, 59–62, emphasis mine)

The Qatar University reforms, by increasing admissions and graduation standards, challenged societal norms and expectations regarding the right of a Qatari citizen to receive a diploma from his or her national university if that person so chooses. Societal concern highlighted the problems associated with a “more rigorous academic experience” in admittance, continued enrollment, and graduation requirements. The concern over admission policies can be seen in some of the open-ended responses to my survey, in which the respondents complained about the acceptance rates to their national university:

- The educational system needs more development and should become more like before, and the university should return to its previous ways
- Solve the problems of Qatar University students with the university professors, students are complaining about the university management and administration
- I wasn't able to join Qatar University because of just one grade in a subject
- I demand more attention to education and giving Qatars priority in universities
- The changes that are taking place in the education sector led to the disqualification of students
- The grades that are given by the (female) professors to their (female) students are really bad because giving more than two students excellent grades would lead the administration to question them; please consider better grading in universities
- Alleviate the regulations of the University of Qatar because not many Qatari students are accepted
- I hope for more attention to citizens and education, and giving better opportunities to get accepted to the university
Many students remained stuck in the Foundation program, eventually giving up because they couldn’t make the correct scores on the various English-language exams. One Qatari official noted,

Many students here are not able to study because of IELTS and TOEFL and SAT exams. My family friend was not able to pass these tests and is now in CNA-Q [College of the North Atlantic in Qatar, a vocational school]. Many go abroad because of this. There are few students who need Arabic and some need English. I know of a person in my family who got 94 percent in high school but was not able to pass TOEFL, so she gave up on education. English is better, I accept, but not everyone can do it. (Zahan 2012, 9)

Further, almost 2,000 Qatari students were not able to succeed in the English-language requirements once enrolled and thus had to drop out of the university over the course of several years (Al-Kuwairi 2012a; “University Expels” 2012). Maryam Al-Khatir (2012b) placed the blame for these students’ failures on Qatar University:

One thousand eight hundred Qatari students were dismissed from QU in the past years, but where are they now? How are they? What is the reason to dismiss these outstanding, or at least dedicated, students? Did anyone care to ask them how the university failed them? How it failed to guide them and provide for them? . . . Why isn’t the university held accountable for wasting Qatari youth and crushing their families’ hearts? Why isn’t the university held accountable for creating defeat in the hearts of Qatari youth and their parents? Why isn’t the university held accountable for the results of this defeat, whether they are psychological illnesses and depressions, or turning to reckless actions and crazy driving and deviations? . . . QU has left its eggs in a nest unguarded from unemployment and marginalization, and gave the eggs of others wings by which they can fly.

Additionally, the pain of the stringent admissions requirements was compounded by the introduction of admissions caps, which prevented some qualified Qatari students from entering Qatar University. Al-Khatir (2012b) depicted the failure of Qatar University to provide for the current generation of Qatari students, and portrayed the tension between Qatari and expatriate students as well:

At least 1,500 male and female students are on the waiting list for the Literature major alone in the Arts and Science College at QU, as well as others in different colleges in the university waiting for majors that have been cancelled, frozen, or have reached their student limit. That and the number of Qatars—in what we call the State of Qatar—is very limited in the “The Millions Era” of workers and laborers whose numbers have continued to spiral upwards. The condition of our children—we Indian Americans who add up to a population of 300,000 or less—in QU reminds us of bread cues; not even socialist bread where everyone receives a loaf, all equal to each other. . . . Bkh! Bkh! State of Qatar, there is no room for your own children anymore. I mean those who have lived up to your standards of TOEFL and IELTS and have successfully completed the Foundation and Academic Bridge Program. There is no room for them neither here nor there, except those who might be chosen in the lottery for who makes it in the 2012–2013 rosters.
The more stringent admissions requirements and caps on class sizes led to enrollment ratios for higher education that were lower for Qatars than for other benchmark countries, spurring the state to note the need to increase the number of its citizens attending university (QNDS 2011, 139). The idea that a university education would be available to all citizens was an important social norm, and the stringent admissions requirements since the 2003 reforms, the emphasis on English over Arabic-language skills, the increased requirements for continued enrollment, and the caps on admissions were seen as unfair and against cultural and societal norms. There were voices raised in support of the more stringent admissions requirements and classes, such as the head of the Islamic Studies department at Qatar University, who wrote that the increased difficulty of Qatar University should be seen within the context of improving the level of its graduates overall, and that it was not meant to be cruel toward individuals but rather to serve the ultimate goals of the state of Qatar (Sediqi 2012). However, Sediqi’s opinion was in the minority.

The increase in English-language instruction also led to an influx of expatriate faculty and staff to teach classes in English and administer new programs, another point of contention for Qatars who felt that this influx clashed with the social expectation of Qatarization. Al-Kobaisi (2012, 71) noted that the number of Qatari professors was reduced by almost eighty from 2001 to 2008. Al-Khatir (2012b) complained about the expatriate hiring and perceived favoritism at Qatar University, writing,

[The competition over admissions] has brought about war between the children of this country over the limited number of seats in the university, and war, of course, with the children of the Millions who receive the university seats before our own in aims of collecting money from their tuition. Needless to say that their fathers, who have become our lords and masters through heading all our companies and institutions, have also participated in giving those students priority over our children. . . . Everything in the university has become Westernized, as we discovered that green-eyed people were replacing nationals and taking their jobs, with higher salaries, and without any external monitoring by the Ministry or any other official entity.
Perceived favoritism and wasted resources on expatriates were concerns of a Qatari media professor at Qatar University, who submitted an outspoken and detailed twenty-point opinion piece to the local *Al Sharq* newspaper (Al-Kuwairi 2012a). At least four of his twenty recommended improvements directly targeted the presence of expatriate students, professors, and staff at Qatar University. He called for putting an end to “wasting public funds” by cutting programs that have only a small percentage of Qatari students, such as the pharmacy school. He questioned the qualifications of non-Qatari faculty and staff, arguing that they “don’t know anything” and “have zero teaching and educational skills.” He criticized the high salaries of expatriates at Qatar University, especially within the ranks of associate deans, and called for the replacement of all non-Qatari deans with Qatari counterparts. In fact, Al-Kuwairi (2012a) argued that all the leaders in all the national education institutions should be Qatari, starting with Qatar University, “because this is Qatar’s national university, not the United Nations University.” His missive to *Al Sharq* led to nineteen members of Qatar University’s faculty sending a signed letter to the newspaper in support of his statements, highlighting in particular their conviction that the university is currently being controlled by non-Qatars (“Demands for Administrative Reform” 2012). The faculty wrote, “The decision-making process in the university has become controlled by foreigners as a result of a depressing and unwelcoming atmosphere to Qataris, an atmosphere that fights Qatarization.” The faculty called for creating a national committee to investigate the “mistakes” made since the shift to English-language instruction, including increased supervision of expatriate employment. The faculty also called for accountability in three areas—“when it comes to expelling any Qatari student without a real reason, and to firing a Qatari employee to be replaced by a foreigner for no good reason, and when any Qatari employee is belittled and
disrespected”—demands that clearly demonstrate the high tensions between some of the Qatari and non-Qatari employees at Qatar University.

The influx of expatriate faculty, staff, and students that accompanied the shift to English-language instruction also resulted in concerns with inappropriate behavior and dress on the Qatar University campus. An opinion piece in Al Sharq complained about the “problem of modesty” in Qatar University, with many women wearing clothes that were inappropriate and unsuitable for a religious community with values of modesty (Al-Hajri 2012). The author suggested preventing students who are inappropriately dressed from entering the university, and called for encouragement of those who are modest. This issue is explored in more depth in an article in the local Al Raya newspaper, which described an ongoing debate within the female student body of Qatar University over whether a dress code should be enforced through written regulations and a special oversight committee, or whether students should be allowed to wear what they want as long as they do not offend Qatari culture (“Inappropriate Clothing” 2012). The article then continued by listing quotes from fifteen different female students, some of whom specifically blamed the expatriates for flaunting the cultural dress code and wearing too much makeup, while others noted that there were also issues with Qatari students and their interpretations of how to wear the abaya (black robe). It is important to note that Qatari society overwhelmingly favors the enforcement of the wearing of the abaya for Qatari women—right now it is a societal custom but not enshrined in law—by 92 percent to 8 percent, according to my survey. The concerns about modesty, especially with regard to Qatari females, are prevalent and salient.

The debate over modesty demonstrates that cultural concerns were salient in the societal debate over the education reforms as well. The emphasis on English and the perceived
downgrading of Arabic was also a topic of debate, similar to the concerns expressed regarding the K–12 reforms. A Qatari student at Education City expressed her concerns:

I think that culture is a big part of a Qatari’s identity. The most important part is the language, if the language is not being used, then the culture is distilled down and is not being preserved. It’s hard to just speak in Arabic in Qatar Foundation because a lot of people don’t understand it. So this means it’s fading away. (Ramadan 2011, 3)

The Qatari media professor at Qatar University criticized the original shift to English as an individual decision that erred in not consulting more decision makers in the country (Al-Kuwairi 2012a). The professor also questioned why a foreign language was “imposed” on Qatar’s national university, considering that this shift had not occurred in other national universities in the Gulf region, and noted that it was important to foster nationalism by enforcing Arabic in all levels and programs of Qatar University, including class rosters, course lists, and all e-mail transactions. The editor-in-chief of Al Watan echoed the unfavorable comparison to other Arab countries by calling Qataris “victims in their own country,” forced to go abroad to pursue their education in Arabic because their own national university was designed for expatriates rather than locals (Al Sulaiti 2012). A non-Qatari social science professor at Qatar University described the cultural debate that she witnessed:

[T]here is debate going on for a long time about Arabic versus English. Those who are for Arabic feel English is pushed upon them. Arabic is particularly important for cultures with a Bedawi background because of Islam, Quran, and poetry. So the feeling is: Why is America the model? (Zahan 2012, 8)

Al-Kobaisi (2012), a Qatari education expert, expressed deep concern with the impact of the language shift on students’ pride toward their national and Arabic culture, blaming the university officials for not taking a stand against the “Westernization” of the national university. He wrote, “It is obvious that the heart of this trend is a humiliating push toward Western culture

188 As discussed in Chapter 3 on education benefits, Education City is a group of Western branch campuses, funded by Qatar Foundation, in which English instruction is the norm and admissions standards are the same as the home campuses. Although outside the scope of the national education reforms narrative of this chapter, Education City is another powerful example of the state of Qatar reaching far beyond basic economic allocation to interact with and respond to its populace.
State Response to Societal Discontent

In the face of these concerns, the state of Qatar has recently and suddenly backtracked on several of its key reforms of the K–12 system and Qatar University over the past year, depicting a state that is more concerned with assuaging public concern than with pursuing its preferred policies. While the K–12 reversals, albeit abrupt, dealt solely with the language of instruction (reintroducing Arabic-language instruction in key areas),¹⁸⁹ the Qatar University reversals were more complex and will be explored in the following discussion [see Table 21]. The state of Qatar addressed the societal concerns that resulted from the inability of many Qatari students to gain admission and successfully graduate from their national university by returning to Arabic-language instruction, removing enrollment caps and the need for English for admission, and emphasizing Qatarization and new etiquette rules for the campus. However, there were also limits to the state’s tolerance for dissent, showing that the state did not give in to all complaints.

¹⁸⁹ The K–12 independent school system was told in May 2012 to switch back to Arabic for classes starting in September (personal interview with former SEC official, September 16, 2012, Doha, Qatar). Although this abrupt move may have caused further logistical nightmares for the independent-school teachers, an outpouring of societal support for this move was heard on Qatar radio, with one commentator noting, “They should teach the language of the Quran. I understand that English is the international language but Arabic is more important” (WHSK 9/16/12). Ghraiba (2012) reported favorably on the increased emphasis on Arabic by the SEC, quoting several teachers’ and experts’ opinions on how to further encourage the youth to embrace Arabic language, identity, and culture. Some concerns were expressed about the sudden change back to Arabic, particularly the impact on future college admissions chances, especially to the Western universities of Education City (WHSK 9/11/12a; 9/16/12). For these concerned parents, the expansion of the voucher system to private schools may allow them to place their children in a school that emphasizes English-language instruction instead.
Table 21. State-Society Interaction over the Qatar University Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal criticism</th>
<th>State response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Cultural and logistical concerns with English language in all colleges | → Abrupt return of several colleges to Arabic instruction  
→ Removal of English-language requirement for admissions |
| Concern with Qatari students “stuck” in the Foundation Program | → Changed admissions requirements  
→ Downsized the Foundation Program (with the intent to remove it completely within a few years) |
| Concern with inadequate number of seats for qualified Qatari students | → Removed the admissions caps |
| Cultural concern that Arabic was being disrespected and forgotten | → Meeting at QU with Sheikha Mozah emphasizing the importance of Arabic |
| Cultural concern that expatriate students, and some Qatari students, were behaving and dressing in inappropriate ways | → Distribution and enforcement of Qatar University etiquette rules |
| Concerns that non-Qatari faculty, staff, and students were taking over the university and taking away resources | → Public statement by Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad supporting the expatriate faculty and staff |
| Concerns over the consent process and calls for increased consensual decision-making and punishment of the leaders who made these “mistakes” | → Firing of an outspoken Qatari professor  
→ Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad remains as head of QU, also becomes Vice President of the Executive Committee of the SEC |

Return to Arabic-language instruction

The SEC issued a decision in late January 2012 that switched several Qatar University programs back to Arabic-language instruction for the upcoming academic year (Haroon 2012; Lindsey 2012a; “Arabic to Be the Language” 2012; “Arabic Is the Official” 2012). This decision affected the programs of Business, Law, Media, and International Affairs, and also removed the need for students to attend the Foundation Program when entering these programs because English was no longer considered an admissions requirement (Mohammed 2012b).

Besides the logistical concern regarding the English-language admission requirements and instruction, the state of Qatar also sought to address the cultural concern that Arabic was
being disrespected and forgotten. During Sheikha Mozah’s visit to Qatar University, she praised Arabic as “our mother tongue, which we must work to revive,” stressing that it was a language of science and research (“HH Sheikha Moza” 2012). In addition, she strongly emphasized Qatar University as the “national” university, with high significance as a major player in the country’s national strategy of Qatarization in the workforce. Al-Kuwairi (2012a), the outspoken media professor, described the meeting in a positive manner, noting that Sheikha Mozah’s visit showed how much she valued Qatar University and that she was interested in “fixing the mistakes made in the past” as well as ensuring that the return to Arabic happened smoothly.

The decision to switch back to Arabic-language instruction for Qatar University was largely met with societal approval. Qatar University students and teachers noted the importance of Arabic to Qatari culture, and expressed support for the new policy. Qatar University’s Al-Kuwairi was quoted in *The Peninsula* praising the decision to make Arabic the priority, saying, “Arabic is the language of the Holy Quran. According to our Constitution too, it is the first language of the country” (Haroon 2012). A Qatari student at Qatar University felt similarly:

> It is an Arabic state; it should be taught in Arabic. There should be a standard of education. We understand the need for English, but the problem is we studied in English before for three years, and I am continuously speaking in English, and that is not good in the Qatari society. English is good for work but what about home and family. The level of sensitivity of the language is different in Arabic and English. It is important; we should have our foundation too. The Quran was sent in Arabic. It is an important language for our identity, our culture, and Qatar. (Zahan 2012, 9)

Media commentators noted that the return to Arabic-language instruction removed barriers to Qatari students who want to enroll in the university (Mohammed 2012a; Arafat 2012). Al-Khatir (2012b) applauded the move, writing, “Today, we are happy with QU’s new race to ‘Arabize’ education again, which returns the glory to Arabic as we had hoped for long.”

There were some Qataris, as well as expat students and faculty, who were not in favor of the return to Arabic-language instruction. Some Qatar University faculty and students expressed dismay that they had not been consulted or even notified ahead of time—with many faculty
members finding out about the change in the newspapers, 190 and students looking for answers and finding only “I don’t know” from their professors. 191 A non-Qatari social science professor at Qatar University had this to say:

I learned about it from an e-mail from a colleague, who e-mailed asking, “Did you see the newspapers?” and it was late at night and I had not. They sent me a copy and I said, “This can’t be true, this has to be theater, political theater.” . . . I really did not understand it because the newspapers did not give all the information. That’s how I learned about it, and later I found out that’s how everybody else learned about it, through the newspapers. But to me this was unusual, because such things, according to me, should be done in coordination with the state and university, with some sort of a committee or something. But if this is how it really happened, that there was no talk about it, then it means that the political leadership decided and did not want a discussion about it. . . . My first reaction was this is political theater, that this is a response to the Arab spring, the real Arab spring, response to the political discontent among the people of the Arab world. (Zahan 2012, 7–8)

A Qatari student at Qatar University was also uncomfortable with the lack of community input and transparency regarding the change, which kept his professors from confirming whether he would study in Arabic or English for his senior year and left staff members hearing about the changes from the news media. He complained, “We were kept in the dark during the whole thing. We want to know why the decision was made, and by whom, and how” (S. Al-Mohannadi 2012, 3).

Other Qataris were concerned about a negative impact on employment opportunities by returning to Arabic-language instruction. Qatari university students felt that English was an important language to master for professional development and the job market and expressed concern about the value of their QU diplomas.

Although the issues of inclusion and transparency were not addressed, the Qatari leadership attempted to address the concerns of those who wanted to ensure professional English

190 The SEC decision was originally reported by the Gulf Times in a late-night edition of news “in brief,” with a paragraph on the language switch sandwiched between snippets on the Heir Apparent’s attendance at a camel race, the first lady of Ghana’s visit to Qatar Foundation, and the opening of the Rezidor Hotel Group’s first property (“In Brief” 2012).

191 The Peninsula, one of Qatar’s main English-language newspapers, found it difficult to get any English-language professors on the record in the immediate aftermath of the decision: “Incidentally, none of the professors who taught courses in English was immediately available for comment” (Haroon 2012).
competency among the graduates. Sheikha Mozah emphasized the importance of continuing to develop student skills in English, “provided that English is a prerequisite for graduation from the university and not an obstacle hampering acceptance in it” (“HH Sheikha Moza” 2012). This goal was echoed by Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad, who noted, “Qatar University has ensured that sufficient English courses are integrated into curricula to ensure our graduates are competent in both the languages” (James 2012a). In this way, the state of Qatar is attempting to retain its human development goals while at the same time responding to the societal concerns associated with a sole emphasis on English-language instruction.

**Removal of enrollment caps and emphasis on Qatarization**

In addition, Qatar University removed enrollment caps for the 2012–2013 academic year, with Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad announcing that “there is no ceiling for intake” (James 2012b). The university saw record enrollment of over four thousand students this year (James 2012b), due to the removal of enrollment caps and the fact that English was no longer “an obstacle hampering acceptance” (“HH Sheikha Moza” 2012). The facilities expanded accordingly, with Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad reporting, “There are twelve new undergraduate programs, a total of twenty-four Masters and three PhD programs, and new faculty, both regular and part-time, have been recruited” (James 2012a).

Emphasizing that Qatar University is committed to Qatarization, Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad also noted that Qataris now represent 40 percent of the total faculty members, a dramatic increase from last year’s 21 percent (James 2012b). Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad also noted that the student body was at least 70 percent Qatari. Clearly, Qatar University sought to regain public
confidence in the inclusiveness of the national university for its citizens, both students and faculty, through these measures.

**Etiquette rules**

The university also addressed the cultural concerns that had been discussed regarding female dress and behavior on the campus. In early September 2012, all Qatar University faculty, staff, and students were informed that there were new etiquette rules that they were expected to model and enforce. The guidelines were distributed in both English and Arabic, however, and the two versions did not say the same thing. This discrepancy shows that they were aimed at two different audiences: the English for the expatriates, and the Arabic for the Qatari women. The English version, for expatriates, focused only on dress code, containing details such as:

> Clothing that reveals too much cleavage, your back, your chest, your feet, your stomach, or your intimate clothes is not appropriate for Universities and educational settings. . . . Perfumes and make-up should be in good taste, and the rule is to wear them with restraint. Fad hair styles including, but not limited to, unnatural coloring of hair, dreadlocks, or unconventional cuts are not permitted. Visible tattoos must be completely covered. ("University Etiquette" 2012)

The Arabic version, for Qatari women, focused on both dress and behavior:

> Wear clothes that are loose/decent. . . . Wearing an *abaya* does not justify abuse of these rules on the occasion that [your clothes] are visible from under the *abaya*. . . . The observance of moderation and temperance when sitting down and in actions when in public places. ("University Etiquette" 2012)

The Vice President of the Student Affairs Office noted in an e-mail to faculty and staff,

> In light of our mission to prepare competent graduates and in light of our core values of preserving the tradition of our culture, the university introduced the new students during orientation to the appropriate behavior in Higher Education institutions in terms of dress and public behavior. In an attempt to align our preaching with our behaviors, I kindly ask you to share the enclosed flyer with your staff and enforce the application of those guidelines. The enclosed guidelines apply to all QU stakeholders, staff, faculty members and students. We are counting on faculty members to enforce those guidelines in addition to be a role model by practicing them. 192

Clearly, the Qatar leadership responded to concerns of inappropriate dress and behavior on the university campus and sought to reassure society that cultural norms would be respected.

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192 E-mail message, September 9, 2012.
**Limits to the state’s tolerance for dissent**

However, concerns that called for the removal of expatriate faculty and staff were not met with the same conciliation. Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad wrote a response article in *Al Sharq* that defended the university’s policies regarding expatriate faculty and staff (Al-Misnad 2012). She noted that Qatari students must be equipped with certain skills to successfully join the job market, in order to serve the country and fulfill the expectation that are clearly laid out in the 2030 Vision, and that the expatriate faculty and staff contribute to this larger goal. She argued, “Our role when it comes to Qatarization is to enable society to institute it [in the job market], not to Qatarize the entire university staff.”

Although Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad came under direct criticism by university faculty (Al-Kuwairi 2012a; “Demands for Administrative Reform” 2012) and media commentators (Al-Marzouqi 2012a), she has remained the president of Qatar University. Further, during a restructuring of the Executive Committee of the SEC, Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad was promoted to vice president of the Committee (“Reconfiguration of the Executive Committee” 2012). These moves indicate that she still has the strong support of the Qatari leadership and is in a strong enough position to weather the discontent.

One additional move showed the limits to the state’s tolerance for dissent. In June 2012, Dr. Al-Kuwairi, the outspoken media professor who had directly criticized the university leadership and called for increased participation of Qataris in education reforms in the future, announced his “resignation” from his professorship at Qatar University (Al-Kuwairi 2012b). Al-Kuwairi stated that the “absence of Qatarization” was the reason he resigned from the university. However, the media buzz was that he had been fired due to his direct criticism of the leadership,
particularly Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad (WHSK 6/25/12; “Al Watan Fires Up” 2012; Al-Muftah 2012). A poignant cartoon by Abdulatif depicts a tree of knowledge with Western ties decorating it and the *aqaal* (Qatari male headdress accessory) falling to the ground, symbolizing the overtaking of the Qatari education system by expatriates.\(^{193}\) The title of his Twitter post, linking to this cartoon, reads, “We are all Dr. Rabia Al-Kuwairi,” and the comments on his Facebook page express unhappiness with the decision. Nevertheless, this move shows the limits of the Qatari state regarding dissent. [See Figure 51.]

**Figure 51. “The Tree of Knowledge”**

![Image](image-url)  
*Source: Mohamed Abdulatif, Al Raya, June 16, 2012*

In sum, the state responded to societal concerns regarding the reforms of Qatar University, by returning to Arabic-language instruction, removing barriers to admission, emphasizing Qatariization of faculty and staff, and promoting new etiquette rules for the campus. Yet the state of Qatar did not give in on all policies; it maintained its support for the recruitment and development of expatriate faculty and staff, retained Dr. Sheikha Al-Misnad as the head of...

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\(^{193}\) This image can also be interpreted to have a larger meaning: that Qatari identity and culture in general is being displaced by Western identity and culture. Foley (2010, 175) describes how the white thobe of Saudi bureaucrats became a symbol of national identity in the Gulf and is used in these types of symbolic discussions.
Qatar University, and fired one of the most outspoken Qatari critics of the reforms. What we see from this interaction is a give-and-take that is much more indicative of a limited state that is embedded within and responsive to its society than an autonomous state that does not need to compromise with society on any policy decisions.

**Discussion**

This chapter presents evidence that directly responds to the argument that a financially autonomous rentier state has “immunity to social resistance when it comes to its transformative and developmental agendas” (Kamrava 2009, 409). I argue in this chapter that none of Qatar’s policies could be seen as more transformative and developmental than the national education reforms. The state of Qatar has prioritized the need for an educated population in all of its policy outreach—education is the first part of the first pillar (human development) of the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2008, 16); the second page of all of the SEC’s mandatory Qatari history and citizenship books is devoted to the Qatar National Vision’s education and human development goals; and the economic goals of Qatarization in the private sector and the knowledge economy demand improved educational outcomes. The massive amount of money spent on education, including the K–12 and Qatar University public school system, the funding of the Education City campuses, and the lucrative stipends and other benefits given to Qatari students who go abroad to study at the undergraduate or postgraduate level, demonstrate that Qatar is serious about developing an educated population, no matter what the cost. We should not have seen reversals in the pursuit of this goal; and yet, we did.

This chapter calls into question not only the supposed autonomy of the rentier state but also the supposed acquiescence of a rentier society. Societal outcry about the national education
reforms was vocal, critical, and persistent. Critics of the K–12 reforms expressed concern with the cultural loss of Arabic and with the poor academic performance of the students. Critics of the Qatar University reforms focused on concerns of expatriate takeover of the national university (including problems of modesty, economic competition, and the downgrading of the Arabic language) and wrestled with the removal of the societal “right” to admission. Both reforms also garnered criticism precisely because of the unilateral policy moves of the state, without allowing space for societal consent and participation in the process.

The decision of the state to reverse itself on key policies is crucial for understanding the causal mechanism of political legitimacy in Qatar today. Rather than being seen as a sign of weakness, the flexibility of the Qatari leadership gives the state a strengthened position in society (Davis 1991, 10–11). For all of the concern regarding the restrictions and limitations on the media (e.g., Roth 2013; Duffy 2013), there is still very real space in Qatar for public discussion and debate, some of it quite harsh and pointed. The state of Qatar allows this space for a reason: to keep its finger on the pulse of society, for the express purpose of knowing when it has to be flexible and when it can hold firm. Contrary to classic rentier state theory, the case study of the national education reforms depicted societal backlash on a noneconomic policy and a state that reversed its preferred policies due to this outcry. In this example (and throughout this dissertation), Qatar behaved contrary to theoretical expectations. And yet Qatar has remained the only state in the entire Middle East and North Africa region to avoid the protests of the Arab Spring. The causal mechanism linking Qatar’s wealth to the political stability of the country is only understood by including the noneconomic interactions between state and society on issues of societal justification and consent.
Looking back on the national education reforms, it is clear that Qatar erred by not fully engaging with society on crucial aspects of these reforms, including something as simple as communication and outreach. Education is closely interlinked with cultural values, norms of behavior, and societal expectations (Kane 2009, 2011; Earnest and Treagust 2006), and successful education reforms come from a combination of top-down and bottom-up initiatives, as both levels work together to design and implement these reforms, while ensuring space for feedback from the stakeholders: school administrators and teachers, parents and students, and society at large (Guarino and Tanner 2012, 235). The AHDR’s (2003, 163) strategic vision on creating a knowledge society—which it clarifies “does not rise to the level of a ‘strategy’”—begins with an emphasis on the importance of dialogue within societies on the proper priorities, policies, and implementation, rather than a top-down reform process:

Building human development calls for social innovation, a process that can only be led and undertaken by the people of each Arab society themselves, for themselves. The Report therefore stops at delineating the main features of what could be considered a strategic vision for the task of building human development. This vision needs to be taken up, nurtured and debated by human development advocates within Arab society, recognising and paying attention to dissenting views. Where the vision is adopted, a consensus on priorities needs to be accompanied by decisions for implementing the strategic vision under the specific conditions of that society.

The structure of the reforms in Qatar, however, followed the classic pattern of policy-making in rentier states—all reform came from the top down, very rapidly, and with very little time to solicit the opinions of stakeholders on the ground, who would be most affected by these sudden changes. The exclusion of societal voices contributed to the discontent, and specific concerns regarding the lack of active participation depict a society that wants to actively contribute to its community rather than remain passively acquiescent. It is not only our conception of rentier states that must be revised; our conception of rentier societies must be revised too.

A particular flashpoint in the national education reforms was the emphasis on English-language instruction, which resulted in a perceived downgrade of importance for the Arabic
language. The AHDR (2003, 122) notes in particular the crucial importance of the Arabic language to Arab culture and notions of identity and sacredness, yet spends very little time explaining how a globalized emphasis on English-language instruction will avoid exacerbating what it calls “the crisis of the Arabic language.”

The Qatari people themselves appear quite concerned with a “crisis” of Arabic language. As discussed in Chapter 4, when asked to rate their perceptions of how much attention is given to various aspects of society today, clear concern was expressed regarding the relative attention paid to the Arabic language. [See Table 22.] A majority of citizens—between 64 and 68 percent—felt that the Qatari citizenry, Qatari culture, and Islam were given sufficient attention in the country today. However, for the Arabic language, only 44 percent of respondents felt it received sufficient attention, with 42 percent responding that it received only a “little” attention and 6 percent responding “none at all.”

### Table 22. Perception of Societal Attention to Cultural Aspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“How much attention is given to — nowadays in this country? Do you feel there is . . .”</th>
<th>Too much</th>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qatari citizens</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari culture</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic language</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

However, it is important to note that the Qatari respondents were not opposed to the presence of English language in the K–12 and the university-level systems. Perhaps in recognition of the importance of the English language to future career prospects, particularly at the college level, a clear majority of Qataris—between 76 and 80 percent—agreed with the survey statement that the English language should receive greater priority in all levels of public
education. However, virtually all Qatari respondents—between 97 and 99 percent—agreed with the statement that the Arabic language should also receive greater priority, at much higher levels of intensity. [See Table 23.] Thus, it is not that Qatars are opposed to learning English, but, rather, that they strongly believe that Arabic needs increased emphasis in the national education system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 23. Greater Priority of English and Arabic in K–12 and Higher Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The Arabic language should receive greater priority in . . .”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The English language should receive greater priority in…”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

The survey data clearly show that the status of Arabic is an important and divisive issue for Qatari society, and the national education reforms, with their emphasis on English, did not seem to take this concern into account. However, the discussion of the “Arabic language under threat” is reminiscent of the previous discussion about “Qatari culture under threat.” The idea of cultural threat is nebulous and subjective. Although very real concerns may exist about the Qatari students’ lack of fluency in their native language (e.g., Guttenplan 2012), it may be that Arabic is a convenient rallying point for those who did not like the changes to the QU admissions and graduation requirements as a whole.

Perhaps even more than the concern over Arabic, one of the major flashpoints of the reform process was simply that it challenged societal norms and expectations regarding the right of a Qatari citizen to receive a diploma from his or her national university if that person so
chooses. One of the initial reforms removed the Parallel Program, which was a program designed to encompass the Qatari nationals who did not meet the standards for admission. The Parallel Program allowed these below-standard Qatari nationals to nevertheless be admitted to and graduate from QU, provided that they paid their own way rather than get the “scholarship” from the government. This program allowed virtually any Qatari national to receive a QU diploma if desired. The removal of the Parallel Program as well as the increased admissions and graduation standards created an uproar among a society not used to the exclusion of Qatari nationals in a realm previously wide open to any citizen.

Interestingly enough, this uproar can be seen as a reaction to the removal of an allocation—in this case, the societal norm that any citizen has the “right” to attend the national university. The negative reaction to this removal supports the suggestion, from Chapter 3, that allocations may support political legitimacy in Qatar in a negative sense, in that the removal of an allocation would negatively impact the legitimacy of the state. As Crystal (1995, 161) warned, welfare benefits in Qatar have become seen “as rights that individuals as citizens can claim from the state.” Part of the uproar surrounding the national education reforms on the university level was that these reforms threatened to take away a welfare benefit that society now sees as a right of citizenship. The retreat of the state of Qatar from its attempt to make the national university a “more rigorous academic experience” (Moini et al. 2009, 62)—even more so than its retreat from the English-language emphasis, which, as Sheikha Mozah noted, would still be part of the curriculum—shows that the battle over a societal norm was not worth the potential loss of legitimacy.

In sum, the interaction of state and society regarding national education policy contributes to the idea that the Qatari state is not shielded from critical public opinion of its
citizens simply by virtue of the amount of money it can throw around. It puts into perspective the fact that although Qatar has been untouched by the Arab Spring in terms of political reform and revolution, the citizens are not being silent about issues that concern them—even when this criticism is in direct disagreement with the government—and that these concerns can impact, and even reverse, government policy. In fact, Qatar’s political stability during the Arab Spring may be in large part due to the flexibility of the government on issues of societal concern. It calls attention to the fact that political legitimacy is an important part of the stability of any country, and that even rentier states must be responsive to, and constrained by, the wishes of their citizenry on salient issues if they wish to remain in power.
CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

Alone among the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Qatar is the only polity that has avoided any political unrest during the Arab Spring, which began in December 2010. Classic rentier state theory—repeated today in academic and policy circles alike—would attribute this stability to the economic allocations bestowed from state to citizenry, a product of Qatar’s massive amounts of hydrocarbon wealth. Yet if this is true—that Qatar’s political stability can be explained solely in terms of economics—then how do we explain why 20–30 percent of Qatari citizens express dissatisfaction with the economic allocations given by the state? If an allocation policy were the only interaction between state and society necessary to maintain political stability, then why do we see the state investing so heavily in creating, maintaining, and utilizing its preferred narratives of Qatari nationalism, history, culture, and religion? And if its citizens care only about their economic interests, allowing the state to pursue its preferred policy goals in other domains, why do we see the state of Qatar backtracking on key aspects of its crucial education reforms in the face of societal discontent? How do we make sense of a quintessential rentier state—the richest and smallest state in the world—actively pursuing societal justification through noneconomic strategies and responding to (and being constrained by) citizen preferences in the noneconomic realm?

This dissertation has argued that classic rentier state theory is in need of revision to better understand the state-society relations of modern rentier states today, and that Qatar is the ideal case study on which to test and refine the causal mechanisms of this theory. If there were ever a place in the modern world today where this sociopolitical rentier bargain should still hold true—
trading political loyalty and acquiescence for economic allocations—it should be Qatar. Yet Chapter 3 demonstrated that economic allocations, while a necessary aspect of Qatar’s political legitimacy formula, were nevertheless insufficient to fully explain political loyalty and stability. Chapter 4 illustrated that the state of Qatar has been investing huge effort—in time, money, and leadership—going beyond allocation to actively create and promote its preferred narratives of nation building. Finally, Chapter 5 argued that classic rentier state theory’s expectation of the citizenry—as silent and supportive on noneconomic policy matters—needs as much revision as its expectation of the autonomy of the state regarding its transformative and developmental agendas. Throughout this dissertation, Qatar behaved contrary to theoretical expectations, and yet has remained the only state in the region to avoid the protests of the Arab Spring. By including the key political legitimacy concepts of societal justification and societal consent to the overall bargain between state and citizen, we now have a better explanation of the causal mechanisms that link external wealth to political stability, and a richer understanding of state-society relations in the Arab Gulf today.

The theoretical contributions of this dissertation center on the explicit engagement with revising rentier state theory to meet the modern reality of the Arab Gulf. I tackled three fundamental misconceptions of classic rentier state theory: that economic allocations are sufficient for political stability, that a rentier state will avoid noneconomic legitimacy building, and that a rentier state is autonomous from society regarding its transformative and developmental goals. Each of these investigations was aided by the use of a revised theoretical framework that included insights from political legitimacy and limited state literatures, specifically on the need for societal justification, consent, and the strength that the state—even a rentier one—derives from direct engagement with rather than distance from its society. The
combination of literatures into a revised theoretical lens helped to address Migdal’s (1997, 215) concern with how to study the cultural aspects of the state-society relationship.

Empirically, this dissertation has presented an in-depth case study of Qatar, an understudied but crucially important Arab Gulf state. A full explication of the economic allocations of this ideal-type rentier state had not yet been carried out, and this dissertation aimed to dismiss some of the rather vague myths about the allocations while at the same time showing their impressive breadth and depth—and the fact that they were still insufficient to satisfy up to a third of the population. One of the primary criticisms of classic rentier state theory was its ahistorical underpinnings, as scholars called for more microcase studies to better explicate the causal mechanisms of how rentier wealth intersects with societal loyalty and support (Moore 2004; Chaudhry 1994; Ross 2001; Herb 2005). This dissertation adds the case of Qatar to a rapidly growing body of work on modern rentierism in the Arab Gulf today. The empirical findings of my dissertation mesh with each of these major works. Hertog’s (2010b) study of the Saudi bureaucracy is relevant because he highlights the need, as do I, for societal consent to fully implement state policies and goals. There are clear parallels between the patterns of behavior depicted in Valeri’s (2009) work on Oman’s nation-building efforts and the state of Qatar’s own efforts. Davidson’s (2005, 2008, 2009) explanation of the ruling bargain of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) combines economic rentierism with the use of charisma, patrimonial networks, culture, religion, and ideology—mirroring my emphasis on the importance of including political legitimacy within our understanding of state-society relations under rentierism. My case study of Qatar, as part of this comparative context, further contributes to a richer and more nuanced understanding of the state-society relationship in the Arab Gulf.
Implications and Speculation

One of the most important revisions I propose to the classic rentier state theory’s assumptions is the idea that a rentier citizenry should no longer be seen as passive, silent, and acquiescent. The link between economic allocations and indicators of political buyoff and silence has lessened, if it still exists at all; Chapter 3’s discussion demonstrated that various measures of a silent and loyal citizenry had no correlation with levels of economic satisfaction. This is not to say that economic satisfaction has no impact on levels of political support. Chapter 4 argued that congruence between individual priorities and perceived state priorities was just as statistically (and substantively) significant as economic satisfaction to explaining the level of confidence in government institutions. Economic allocations affect political stability, perhaps not through silencing the citizenry but rather through supplying what citizens now view as birthrights rather than generosity from their rulers (e.g., Crystal 1995, 2; Davidson 2005, 97; Herb 1999, 241; Okruhlik 1999b, 301). The negative societal reaction to the national education reforms of Qatar University, which were seen as taking away the “right” as citizens to attend their national university, depicts a rentier state that is now forced to maintain economic allocations or risk a loss of political legitimacy (e.g., Krane 2012, 3–4; Gray 2011, 23). My investigation suggests that the rentier state bargain has moved past Ayubi’s (1995, 323) description that the citizen taxes the state “in return for staying quiet . . . and for not challenging the ruling family’s position (i.e., acquiescence or support).” Rather, Qatar’s vocal, passionate, and critical citizenry has instead demonstrated that the citizens expect allocations from the state—without guaranteeing political silence in return.

What is even more impressive is the space allowed to these critical voices by Qatar’s media environment. Although I do not argue that the press is “free” by global standards (e.g.,
Duffy 2013, 46–55), there have been particularly striking criticisms of state policies that have been published in the Arabic newspapers with no apparent censorship of the material or punishment of the author. In particular, I recall the Al Raya article, unsubtly entitled “Wasta Controls Land Distribution” (Hafez 2012), and the chiding of Qatar University policies by Al Sharq’s Al-Khatir (2012b), who wrote, “Bkh! Bkh! State of Qatar, there is no room for your own children anymore.” The lack of state censorship, harassment, or punishment regarding Al Kuwari, the editor and main author of The People of Qatar Want Reform . . . Too (2012), is also impressive. Although Al Kuwari’s book was published outside of the country and is unlikely to appear on Qatar’s shelves any time soon, Al Kuwari himself remains in the country, his website remains uncensored, and he has continued to hold his Monday Meetings and publish critical papers online.\textsuperscript{194} I argued in Chapter 5 that the Qatari government may allow this space in order to keep tabs on the level of societal discontent, so that it can respond if deemed necessary. In fact, government ministries and private companies alike assign a special public relations representative to monitor the citizen complaints broadcasted on Qatar radio, again showing the interest of the higher-ups to be aware of and respond to the citizenry (e.g., Al-Dowsari 2012; WHSK 1/30/12).

The impact on the Qatari citizens of this freedom of speech—in particular, the “freedom of complaint”—is worthy of some further speculation. My survey employed King et al.’s (2004) anchoring vignettes methodology to try to ascertain the “real” level of freedom of speech in Qatari society, beyond that of a simple self-assessment. We began by asking how much freedom of speech the respondent had, and only 4 percent of respondents said that they had “not very

\textsuperscript{194} Al Kuwari’s website can be found at http://dr-alkuwari.net/, where he publishes summaries of his meetings as well as the papers presented (including critical looks at the Qatar Museums Authority, the education system, the state of democracy in Qatar, and other controversial topics).
much” or “none at all.” In Qatar—an authoritarian, albeit benevolent, state—more than 96 percent of respondents felt that they had at least “some” freedom of speech, with 38 percent answering that they had “unlimited” amounts. [See Table 24.]

Table 24. Self-Assessment of Freedom of Speech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unlimited</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

When designing the survey questions, we had expected that the self-assessment question may not give an objective level of freedom of speech, comparable across contexts, which is why we added a series of anchoring vignettes to follow this question. In our vignettes, we described the plight of Abdullah, an unlucky Qatari who first had a complaint about the traffic in the country, and who then had a complaint about land distribution. Regarding the traffic complaint, it is important to note that there is nothing that unites a resident of Doha more—whether citizen or expatriate—than the dislike of the traffic. The US State Department’s “Country Specific Information” on Qatar contains a section devoted to “Traffic Safety and Road Conditions,” which includes the following warnings:

While in Qatar, you may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in the United States. . . . Traffic accidents are among Qatar’s leading causes of death. . . . [I]nformal rules of the road and the combination of local and third-country-national driving customs often prove frustrating for first-time drivers in Qatar. The combination of Qatar’s extensive use of roundabouts, many road construction projects and the high speeds at which drivers may travel can prove challenging. . . . Despite the aggressive driving on Qatar’s roads, drivers should avoid altercations or arguments over traffic incidents, particularly with
Qatari citizens who, if insulted, have filed complaints with local police that resulted in the arrest and overnight detention of U.S. citizens.\textsuperscript{195}

The point is that complaints about traffic are universal and should not be seen as politically sensitive and censurable. We wanted to contrast this vignette to one about a clearly politically sensitive issue: the lack of transparency and sense of unfairness associated with land distribution.

For each vignette, we gave a series of options for outlets of complaint, as well as asking a general assessment question at the end about the freedom of speech that Abdullah had on this issue. We expected that we would see higher levels of appropriate outlets for the traffic complaint, as well as higher levels of overall freedom of speech. Instead, our results showed virtually identical perceived levels of freedom of speech. [See Table 25 and Table 26.]

Table 25. Acceptable Ways of Expressing Criticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outlet of Complaint</th>
<th>Traffic</th>
<th>Land Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organize a group of family and friends to try to solve the problem</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use social networks\textsuperscript{196}</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss in a majlis</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish an article in the local newspaper</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call in to Watani Al Habib Sabah Al Khair</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start a citizen complaint\textsuperscript{197} addressed to the Traffic Department / Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798


\textsuperscript{196} The “social networks” option was added by SESRI after the organization removed one of our original options—“gather publicly in front of the Ministry”—due to concerns with political sensitivity. I am unsure of whether the meaning of the phrase “social networks”—as an online expression of complaint—was clear to all of the respondents.

\textsuperscript{197} As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the translation issues that arose during the pretest was that the respondents did not understand our original Arabic wording for “civil petition.” We had to change the Arabic word to one that meant “complaint,” which did not give exactly the same original meaning and weight to the action. However, it is important to note that citizens overwhelmingly supported the submission of complaints directly to the respective government departments, demonstrating again the societal norm of “freedom of complaint.”
Table 26. Freedom of Complaint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“In this situation, how much freedom of speech does Abdullah have to criticize this issue, in your opinion?”</th>
<th>Traffic</th>
<th>Land distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unlimited</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

The results were unexpected but clear: Qataris did not differentiate between acceptable means of complaining about the traffic versus acceptable means of complaining about the land distribution. As long as certain red lines are not crossed—such as direct criticism of the Emir or any sort of revolutionary comment that could be destabilizing to the state—it appears that Qataris really do have the “freedom to complain” about virtually any topic. This freedom, I argue, is a useful and perhaps even essential component of the state of Qatar’s overall political strength. It allows the citizens to blow off steam and it enables the state to respond appropriately when necessary.

However, this freedom of complaint is not associated with increased feelings of political efficacy. The survey first asked a self-assessment question about political efficacy. [See Table 27.] These responses show that, on the whole, a majority of Qataris agree that ordinary citizens have enough power to influence the policies and activities of the state—but a sizeable portion of the respondents disagreed with this statement as well.
Table 27. Self-Assessment of Citizen Influence on the State

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly agree</strong></td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agree</strong></td>
<td>44.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disagree</strong></td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly disagree</strong></td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agree: 62.4%
Disagree: 37.6%

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

Similar to the self-assessment question on freedom of speech, we expected that a generalized question on political efficacy may not give us objective and comparable results, necessitating the use of another set of anchoring vignettes. We presented a vignette about three Qatari men who gathered in a majlis to discuss how to solve a neighborhood problem of installing a streetlight (again, this example was chosen to avoid political sensitivity). These three men represented varying levels of political efficacy. The first man, Jassim, represented someone with no political efficacy, simply saying “inshallah [God willing] it will occur.” The second man, Saad, noted that he did not know his local municipal council representative, but that he would call him anyway to discuss the problem. The third man, Nasser, represented a high level of political efficacy, in that he decided to call Qatar radio to complain and organize everyone in the community to go to the relevant ministry department to make sure the problem was resolved. The respondents were first asked to rate themselves as higher or lower than each man in terms of “ability to solve the problem”; and then they were asked to speculate on how likely this man was to get the streetlights installed. [See Table 28 and Table 29.]
Table 28. Perceived Levels of Political Efficacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Do you feel you have more or less ability to solve the problem than . . .”</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than Jassim: no political efficacy</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Saad: low political efficacy</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Nasser: some political efficacy</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than Nasser: high political efficacy</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

Table 29. The Link between Citizen Input and State Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“How likely do you think it is that ——— will get the streetlights installed?”</th>
<th>Jassim</th>
<th>Saad</th>
<th>Nasser</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat likely</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very likely</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

There are two striking results here that deserve greater discussion. First, the perceived levels of political efficacy demonstrate that the majority of Qatari respondents do not feel they have any political efficacy at all. Over 56 percent of respondents categorized themselves as below Jassim in terms of the ability to solve the problem—and all Jassim did was sit there saying “inshallah”! Eleven percent of respondents categorized themselves as having some degree of political efficacy beyond that of either Jassim or Saad. However, 33 percent of respondents considered themselves to have more ability to solve the problem than Nasser, showing a fairly high assessment of political efficacy for roughly a third of the population. In these vignettes, we had purposefully avoided mention of wasta. It may be that these 33 percent feel they have wasta that would help them with this situation or in dealing with the government in general. The clear dichotomy between the 56 percent who lack any political efficacy and the 33 percent who feel

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198 This result is similar to King et al.’s (2004, 193) survey experiment in which 40 percent of Chinese respondents placed themselves below an individual with no political efficacy.
empowered is an important reminder that not all Qatari citizens feel they have equal influence on the government.

Second, the data also provide insight into the perceived link between citizen input and state response. It is important to note that, in general, the perceived likelihood that the problem would be solved did increase, as expected, as the level of political efficacy increased. However, what is more important is that Qatari respondents started from a very high and positive baseline of expectation of state response. Over 50 percent of respondents believed that Jassim was “very likely” to get the streetlights installed, despite taking no personal action to push for this change. In general, between 80 and 90 percent of respondents stated that it was “very” or “somewhat” likely that the streetlights would be installed for each of the vignettes. This result demonstrates that Qataris appear to have a high level of trust that their government will do the right thing—in this case, install the streetlights—regardless of whether the citizens push for this outcome. In fact, this result may also suggest that Qataris do not believe that citizen effort changes government policy; rather, the government will do what it chooses, but usually it chooses to do the right thing for its citizens. This discussion shows the disconnect between the perceived high levels of freedom of speech and the perceived low levels of political efficacy, as well as the disconnect between levels of political efficacy and their influence on state decisions. Qatar is still an authoritarian state, despite its carving out of space for citizen complaints and its flexibility in responding to high levels of societal discontent.

This authoritarianism is difficult to square with the expressed desire of many citizens to have an increased say in government decisions. A slim majority of respondents—52 percent—agreed that citizens should have a greater say in decisions about how the state uses money from natural resources. Another slim majority—51 percent—agreed that it is helpful for the country to
say one’s opinion, even if it is critical, on important or sensitive topics. Statistical analysis on these two questions, through cross-tabulation and compare means, shows that Qatari society is highly divided on these issues, with fairly equal percentages (roughly 30 percent) of respondents consistently choosing opposite ends of the scale, and roughly 40 percent of respondents placing themselves in the middle. [See Table 30.]

Table 30. Gradations of Dissent

Comparison of two questions: “Some people feel that citizens should have a greater say in decisions about how the state uses money from natural resources. Others feel that it’s something that should be left up to the state to decide. Which comes closer to your view?” and “Some people say it is important to respect the country by containing our criticism on certain important or sensitive matters. Other people say that it is helpful for the country to say our opinion, even if it is critical, on important or sensitive topics. Which side comes closer to your view?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political silence:</strong> Leave up to the state to decide + contain criticism</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle ground:</strong> Greater say + contain criticism; OR leave up to the state to decide + say our opinion</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political say:</strong> Greater say + say our opinion</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar World Values Survey Follow-Up (2013), January 15–February 3, n=798

Although Qatari society is highly divided over whether increased citizen say on important matters is helpful and appropriate, it is striking how undivided the citizenry is over the proposed upcoming Shura Council (national legislative advisory council) elections—with over 90 percent of the survey respondents agreeing that it would be a good thing to elect the Shura Council. As briefly discussed in Chapter 3, elections for the Shura Council—which have been promised since the amended provisional constitution of 1972 and again clearly stipulated in the Permanent Constitution of 2004—have been continually delayed by extension of the existing appointed council’s term “in the public’s best interest” (Al-Sayed 2013). In November 2011, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani announced that the long-awaited Shura Council elections would occur in the second half of 2013 (“HH the Emir” 2011; “Announcement of the Shura Council” 2011;
Ahmed 2011), a move seen by some analysts as preempting any political dissent during the tumult of the Arab Spring (e.g., Hamid 2011). However, since this announcement, no law on eligibility for voting and contestation has been circulated nor have any preparations begun for campaigning or mobilizing the population, despite the current Shura Council term expiring in June 2013 (Al-Sayed 2013).

I speculate that there is currently a debate raging behind the scenes in the upper echelons of the Qatari leadership regarding the eligibility of participation and contestation in the upcoming elections. At issue is the interpretation of the Qatari Nationality Law (38/2005) with regards to political rights of the “naturalized” Qatari citizens, who are estimated to make up between one-third (Al Kuwari 2012, 15) and two-thirds (Partrick 2009, 20) of the citizenry. In my survey, our question that directly addressed this issue was preemptively removed. However, we were able to ask whether the respondent felt it would be a good or bad thing to elect the Shura Council, and the results were impressive: 91% of Qataris responded that electing the council would be a positive development, compared with only 9% who responded negatively. Qatari society is united on the desire to elect two-thirds of the Shura Council, as stipulated in the Permanent Constitution, as can be seen in the following cartoon by Abdulatif. [See Figure 52.]

199 A behind-the-scenes succession process may also be causing the delay, as Emir Hamad is rumored to be preparing to step down in the summer of 2013 to allow the Heir Apparent Sheikh Tamim to assume power (McElroy 2013). It may be that the Emir wishes to allow the Heir Apparent to lead the country toward its first legislative council elections, but some observers are skeptical (“Democracy?” 2013).

200 The original question (POLT17) asked, “The Shura Council elections are scheduled to happen in the second half of 2013. Some people feel that all Qatari citizens should be allowed to vote and run for office regardless of when their families arrived in this country. Other people feel that only Qatari citizens whose families were here before 1930 should be allowed to vote and run for office. Which comes closer to your view?” Although of course I would have preferred to be able to ask all questions regardless of political sensitivity, the questions that were preemptively self-censored also provided insight into the particularly sensitive topics of Qatari society. See also Diwan (2011), Partrick (2009, 21), and Al Kuwari (2012, 15).
The promise of the Shura Council election to be held by the end of 2013 is one that has been taken seriously by the Qatari citizenry. If the Shura Council elections are once again postponed, or if they occur but with between one-third and two-thirds of the Qatari citizenry disenfranchised from voting or running for office, the state of Qatar may suffer from a loss of legitimacy among its population. Citizenship, particularly as it relates to political rights, is an important flashpoint for political legitimacy of any state, and how the state of Qatar chooses to handle these upcoming elections will greatly impact the state-society relationship.

**Future Research**

This dissertation is the first step toward a larger goal: a broader comparative study of rentierism and political legitimacy in the Arab Gulf and beyond. My in-depth case study of Qatar was a much-needed empirical analysis of an understudied country. As a crucial case for classic rentier state theory, my analysis of Qatar allowed me to trace the chain of causal events within the rentier bargain to show how wealth intersects with political loyalty in this particular context.
The next step is to broaden the findings of this dissertation by applying them to a larger comparative study of the modern Arab Gulf.

In particular, a comparative analysis between Qatar, the UAE (particularly Abu Dhabi), Bahrain, and Oman would be useful for teasing out the specifics of natural resource wealth and state-society relations. These four polities have relative differences between them regarding level of rentier wealth and political stability (possibly measured by frequency of protests and freedom of media). [See Table 31.] A comparison between these four countries would be useful for dealing with the causal complexity of rentierism and political legitimacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political stability</th>
<th>Natural resource wealth</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qatar</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>Oman</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UAE (Abu Dhabi)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Several findings of this dissertation would be of particular interest for a larger cross-comparison analysis. A further investigation of the dynamic (and ultimately insufficient) allocation-acquiescence bargain would be useful to see if the link between economic satisfaction and political silence and loyalty is broken in other countries as well. In addition, the concerns with lack of transparency, unfair allocations, and the presence of *wasta* have led to citizen demands in Qatar for the government to begin to move away from personalized and secretive distribution networks toward increased transparency and openness. This movement would be antithetical to the state capitalism and patronage network literatures (e.g., Bremmer 2010; Schlumberger 2008) and may increase the space for an independent bourgeoisie to thrive (e.g., Luciani 2007). Looking beyond Qatar to see how other Arab Gulf countries are tackling citizen concerns with transparency and *wasta* would provide further insight into these important—and
destabilizing—concerns regarding economic allocations (Herb 1999, 241–43; Okruhlik 1999b, 300, 309; Têtreault 2013, 39, 45–46).

The statistically and substantively significant link between congruence of personal and state priorities and levels of confidence in the government is another important area worthy of further comparative study. The development and use of priority questions, in which the respondent was asked to make priority judgments on a series of personal and then state goals, was an important methodological tactic for pinpointing an otherwise particularly tricky subject of study for authoritarian contexts: evaluation of the current regime. By combining individual responses, I was able to create an agreement variable that showed a strongly positive relationship with confidence in the government. Considering this variable was shown to be just as important as economic satisfaction for determining confidence in the government, the next step is to use this measure more broadly to see if the pattern holds true across the Arab Gulf.

Further research on the causal mechanisms of rentierism may also be possible with an increased selection of cases. Ross (2001, 2009, 2012; see also Herb 2005, 298) has suggested another causal mechanism of rentierism that focuses on the impact of the state’s resources on civil society and class formation. Various case studies (e.g., Moore 1976 and Entelis 1995 on Algeria, Vandewalle 1998 on Libya, Shambayati 1994 and Kazemi 1995 on Iran, Chaudhry 1994 on Iraq and Saudi Arabia) have provided evidence showing that oil-rich states can—and do—use their wealth to block the creation of independent civil society groups, including an independent bourgeoisie, and impede the formation of social capital. Rentier states—eerily akin to Linz’s (2000, 70–71) discussion of mobilizational regimes—develop state-run programs and organizations that crowd out nongovernmental institutions and herd people into groups with
politically sanctioned end goals and messages. Chaudhry (1994, 19) notes that rentier late-developers in the Middle East have used their revenues to develop programs that were “[e]xplicitly designed to depoliticize the population” and that “deliberately destroyed independent civil institutions while generating others designed to facilitate the political aims of the state.” However, so far it has been difficult to correctly assess this process through quantitative analysis. Ross’s indicator of the group formation effect—the share of GDP accounted for by government activity—is at best a loose proxy of this mechanism. Ross (2001, 347) himself admits, “Without good indicators for civic institutions or social groups, this hypothesis cannot be tested directly with regression analysis.” Further case study analysis is necessary to understand the actual processes at work in modern rentier states. This causal mechanism, in particular, would benefit from the insights of the political legitimacy and limited state literatures, in terms of the ways in which states interact with their citizens in both economic and noneconomic ways. We have already seen this mechanism at work throughout this analysis, in the way the state of Qatar is controlling the Qatari historical, religious, and cultural narratives; now we must turn to a larger comparative study to see how this mechanism works across contexts, and how these narratives are perceived and accepted by the citizens.

201 Linz’s (2000) definition of citizen participation in totalitarian regimes contains eerie similarities to Qatar’s mobilization strategy, including complete control of participation outlets, goals, and messages. Although Qatar is not totalitarian, it must also be separated from “many authoritarian regimes” that desire “passive obedience and apathy” (Linz 2000, 70). Qatar encourages its citizens to turn out for national celebrations (such as National Day and Sports Day) that are centralized and ritualized from above in predetermined public spaces accompanied by frequent displays of citizen devotion. Alternative organizational voices are discouraged through legal requirements (frequently denied) for permits for public gatherings and permissions for nongovernmental organizations, and even those organizations that receive permission to form often become defunct due to lack of funds or organizational space—e.g., the Qatari Lawyers’ Association (“Lawyers’ Body Defunct” 2013). These restrictions and obstacles allow the state to maintain dominance over civil society, mirroring Linz’s (2000, 70–71) “mobilizational regime” in that “in each realm of life for each purpose there is only one possible channel for participation and the overall purpose and direction is set by one center, which defines the legitimate goals of those organizations and ultimately controls them.”
The in-depth case study of Qatar has demonstrated the state’s flexibility on preferred policies in the face of societal discontent, bringing up questions of how other rentier states have succeeded (or failed) in their transformative and developmental goals of national education reforms. The Qatari citizenry’s high perceived levels of freedom of speech, the sharply split levels of political efficacy, and the positive overall belief that the government can be counted on to solve problems are all important indicators of political legitimacy in the country and are worth comparing in a broader context. Last but not least, the controversial citizenship laws, which exclude segments of the population from political or economic benefits, are not unique to Qatar. The particular flashpoint of citizenship in the Arab Gulf state today, studied in a comparative context, would give us great insight into the strength (or weakness) of the state-society relationships in the region.

In all of these future explorations, I am looking broadly and comparatively at how the state of Qatar opens up a research agenda into rentierism and state-society relations in the modern Arab Gulf. Once we move beyond allocation, the study of state and society is no longer a monochromatic view of pocketbook policies but rather a kaleidoscope of rich and complex interactions. I look forward to exploring these facets in future research.
Good morning/afternoon/evening,

I am ..... from the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University. We are conducting this national survey on behalf of Qatar University to learn about Qatari opinions on subjects of interest to the Qatari public. You have been selected at random to be part of our sample. The information obtained here will be treated strictly confidentially, and your name will not be printed or used in any documents. The results from the analysis of these data will be presented in an aggregate format.

ECONOMICS

Part I: Overall and Household Economic Situation

[Interviewer: “This section of the survey deals with economics. First, we would like to know how citizens view the overall state of Qatar’s economy as well as the economic situations of their own families.”]

Overall, how would you rate the current economic condition of Qatar today?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Very Poor
8. DK
9. REF

Overall, how would you evaluate the economic situation of your family today?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Moderate
4. Weak
5. Very weak
8. DK
9. REF

Consider the following situation. A Qatari family with three children has a total monthly income of around 30,000 Qatari riyals, and lives in a house in Medinat Al Khalifa. Their primary vehicle is a Landcruiser. During summer, they vacation in Europe but do not own a house there. How would you rate the economic situation of this family?

1. Very good
2. Good
Consider the following situation. A Qatari family with three children has a total monthly income of around 60,000 Qatari riyals, and lives in West Bay. Their primary vehicle is a Lexus. During summer, they spend two months in London in an apartment that they own. How would you rate the economic situation of this family?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Moderate
4. Weak
5. Very weak
8. DK
9. REF

Taking all things together, how satisfied would you say you are with the overall economic situation of your family?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
8. DK
9. REF

The State of Qatar provides many economic benefits to citizens. How satisfied are you with the following types of benefits?

(Options: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied, DK, REF)

A. Opportunities for employment
B. Access to quality medical care
C. Access to quality primary, preparatory and secondary education
D. Access to quality university education and scholarships
E. Land allotment
F. Retirement benefits
G. Marriage allowance
Part II: Cost of Living

[Interviewer: “Now I would like to ask you a few questions about the cost of living in Qatar.”]

Overall, how would you describe the change in the cost of living in Qatar over the past five years?

1. It’s much more difficult to afford the things we want
2. It’s somewhat more difficult to afford the things we want
3. It hasn’t affected our ability to afford the things we want
4. It’s somewhat easier to afford the things we want
5. It’s much easier to afford the things we want
8. DK
9. REF

To what extent has last year’s salary increase for Qatari citizens helped your family’s economic situation?

1. It’s really helped us
2. It’s helped us to some extent
3. It hasn’t helped all that much
4. It hasn’t helped at all
5. WE DID NOT GET THE INCREASE [INTERVIEWER: DON’T READ]
8. DK
9. REF

Imagine that a newly-married Qatari couple is looking to buy their own house that is separated from their in-laws. Financially, how easy or difficult do you think that would be?

1. Very easy
2. Somewhat easy
3. Somewhat difficult
4. Very difficult
8. DK
9. REF
Part III: Business Environment

Have you ever had a reason to appeal to the Consumer Protection Department?

1. YES
2. NO [skip to ECON12]
8. DK
9. REF

To what extent did you feel your issue was addressed in this case?

1. Fully addressed
2. Partially addressed
3. Not addressed
4. I didn’t bother to file a complaint [do not read]
8. DK
9. REF

Part IV: Perceptions about Inequality

[Interviewer: “Next I would like to ask you a few questions about the status of citizens and Western expatriates in the Qatari economy.”]

Imagine there is an open position at a major company in Qatar. In your view, if a Qatari and a Western expatriate of equal qualifications were to apply for the position, do you think the Qatari should be given preference over the expatriate?

1. YES
2. NO
8. DK
9. REF

In reality, do you think it’s more likely that the Qatari or the Western expatriate would be hired for the position?

1. It’s more likely that the Qatari would be hired
2. The decision would be made fairly [don’t read]
3. It’s more likely that the expatriate would be hired
8. DK
Imagine that two individuals of equivalent qualifications, one Qatari and one Western expatriate, are hired to work the same position at a major company in Qatar. How do you think the salaries should be for the two individuals?

1. The expatriate should earn a higher salary  
2. The salaries should be equal  
3. The Qatari should earn a higher salary  
8. DK  
9. REF

In reality, how do you think the salaries of the two individuals would compare?

1. The expatriate would be given a higher salary  
2. Both would get similar salaries  
3. The Qatari would be given a higher salary  
8. DK  
9. REF

How essential do you think *wasta* is for Qataris in each of the following situations?:

(Options: Absolutely essential, somewhat essential, not essential, DK, REF)

1. Getting admitted to college/university  
2. Getting a good job position  
3. Getting a driver’s license  
4. Getting medical care abroad  
5. Getting a good piece of land from the government

Part V: Attitudes toward State Spending

[Interviewer: “Now I would like to ask you a few questions about Qatar’s economic activities domestically and internationally. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?”]

Which of the following statements about Qatar’s economic spending is closer to your view?
1. Qatar should spend more resources on international affairs and investments
2. Qatar should spend more resources inside the country
3. Qatar’s current allocation of domestic and international investment is appropriate [do not read]
8. DK
9. REF

Some people feel that citizens should have a greater say in decisions about how the state uses money from natural resources. Others feel that it’s something that should be left up to the state to decide. Which comes closer to your view?

1. Citizens should have a greater say
2. The matter should be left up to the state
8. DK
9. REF

Overall, do you think Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup will have a positive or negative effect on the local economy?

1. Negative
2. Positive
8. DK
9. REF
CULTURE

Part I: Globalization

[Interviewer: “The next section of the survey deals with culture. We would like to know how you feel about important changes that have occurred or may occur in Qatari society.”]

Here is a list of changes in Qatari society that some people have noticed over the past five years. For each change, would you say it has been generally positive or generally negative?

(Options: Positive, Negative, DK, REF)

- a. Mixed gender interaction
- b. Following of Islamic teaching
- c. Expat population increase
- d. K-12 education system changes
- e. University-level education system changes
- f. Urban development
- g. Community interaction
- h. Standard of living
- i. Marriage relations
- j. Public health
- k. Increased women’s participation in political, social, and economic life

Among the changes that you think are positive, which two are the most important positive changes?

[Programmer: Should only be asked of those who selected more than 2 positive changes]

First most important positive change
Second most important positive change
8. DK
9. REF

Among the changes that you think are negative, which two are the most important negative changes?

[Programmer: Should only be asked of those who selected more than 2 negative changes]

First most important negative change
Second most important negative change
8. DK
9. REF
Taking all the changes together, in your opinion, do the positive changes outweigh the negatives or do the negative changes outweigh the positives?

1. The positives outweigh the negatives 
2. The negatives outweigh the positives 
8. DK 
9. REF

I’m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that could happen in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing or a bad thing?

(Options: It would be a good thing, it would be a bad thing; NOTE: RANDOMIZE THE ORDER OF THESE SUB-QUESTIONS)

a. Opening additional worship places for non-Muslims in the country 
b. Enforcing the wearing of the ‘abaya and shayla for Qatari women 
c. Electing the Shura Council 
d. Giving Qatari citizenship to children of Qatari mothers 
e. Making public education classes with mixed genders 
f. Making higher/university education lectures with mixed genders 
g. Forbidding women to drive

8. DK 
9. REF

Part II: Perceptions of Culture

Qataris agree that the Qatari flag and National anthem are the most important symbols of Qatar. However, different people might give different levels of importance to other symbols. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself consider the most important?

[NOTE: code only ONE answer under “first choice”]

1. Dhow 
2. Pearl diving 
3. Oil (البترول) 
4. Doha skyline (منطقة الإبراج) 
8. DK 
9. REF
And which would be the next most important?

[NOTE: code only ONE answer under “second choice”]

1. Dhow
2. Pearl diving
3. Oil (البترول)
4. Doha skyline (منطقة الابراج)
8. DK
9. REF

What are the first words that come to mind when you think of Souq Waqif?

[NOTE: Open-ended; record response verbatim]
8. DK
9. REF

What are the first words that come to mind when you think of National Day?

[NOTE: Open-ended; record response verbatim]
8. DK
9. REF

What are the first words that come to mind when you think of World Cup 2022?

[NOTE: Open-ended; record response verbatim]
8. DK
9. REF

In your opinion, to what extent do the following projects represent Qatari culture, values, or traditions?

(Options: A great deal, somewhat, a little bit, not at all; NOTE: RANDOMIZE ORDER OF THE SUB-QUESTIONS)

a. Suq Waqif
b. Museum of Islamic Art
c. Imam Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab Mosque
d. Katara Cultural Village
e. Education City
Many people like to participate in national celebrations, although sometimes they don’t have the ability to do as much as they want. For National Day this year, did you get a chance to participate in the celebrations?

1. No
2. Yes
8. DK
9. REF

For a person to be considered a good citizen, would you say that it’s important for him to do the following?:
(Options: No, Yes; NOTE: RANDOMIZE ORDER OF SUB-QUESTIONS)

a. Participate in Sports Day?
b. Pay a speeding ticket?
c. Vote in the Municipal Council elections?
d. Support people who are worse off than themselves?
e. Always support the decisions of the state, even if he disagrees with those decisions?

8. DK
9. REF

Part III: Balance and priorities

How much attention (اهتمام) is given to ______ nowadays in this country? Do you feel there is:
(Options: Too much attention (اهتمام مبالغ فيه), sufficient attention (اهتمام كافٍ), little attention (gunakan من الأهمية), no attention (لا أهمية على الإطلاق))

a. Islam
b. Arabic language
c. Western culture
d. Qatari culture
e. Expatriates
f. Qatari citizens

8. DK
9. REF
Have you ever felt out of place (شعور بالغربة أو بعد الارتياح) in the following places in Qatar? (Options: No, Yes, I’ve never been there [do not read this option])

a. Malls in Qatar
b. Souq Waqif
c. Hotels in Qatar such as Intercontinental, Ritz Carlton…etc.
d. Your neighborhood
e. Corniche
f. Education City

Part IV: Qatari society

Which of the following best describes you?

1. Above all I am a Qatari
2. Above all I am a Muslim
3. Above all I am an Arab
4. Above all I am a member of my tribe/family (قبيلة/عائلة)
5. Other [record response]

Which is the second most important to you?

1. Qatari
2. Muslim
3. Arab
4. Member of my tribe/family (قبيلة/عائلة)
5. Other [record response]

Noora is a 40-year old Qatari woman. Every summer, Noora travels to London for leisure with her family. She wears an ‘abaya and veil inside Qatar, but in London, she wears the veil but takes off the ‘abaya. Is Noora’s behavior acceptable?

1. Perfectly acceptable
2. Somewhat acceptable
3. Not acceptable
8. DK
9. REF
Noora’s daughter, Jawaher is 20 years old, takes off her veil and her ‘abaya when she is in London. Is Jawaher’s behavior acceptable?

1. Perfectly acceptable
2. Somewhat acceptable
3. Not acceptable
8. DK
9. REF

Which of the following factors would constitute the greatest obstacle to your acceptance of the marriage of your son, daughter, sister, or brother?:

(NOTE: RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS)

1. Lack of prayer/fasting
2. Incompatible social status of the family
3. Education differences
4. Poverty
5. Bad manners/ethics
8. DK
9. REF

In your opinion, how important should the following be as requirements for somebody seeking citizenship of Qatar?

(Options: Very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important)

a. Having Qatari father
b. Having Qatari mother
c. Having a Qatari spouse
d. Being born in Qatar
e. Family residence in Qatar before 1930
f. Being a Muslim
g. Being an Arab
h. Being a GCC resident
8. DK
9. REF

In the past few months, did you attend any majlis or Jam’at Hareem?

1. YES
2. NO [skip to CULT26]
8. DK
9. REF

What kinds of *majalis* or *Jam’at Hareem* do you attend? (NOTE: Respondent chooses all that apply)

1. Family (جمعة عائلية)
2. Social (زيارة)
3. Neighborhood (جماعة الفريج)
4. Other (specify)
5. DK
6. REF

Do you organize a *majlis* or *Jam’at Hareem* on a regular basis?

1. YES
2. NO [skip to CULT28]
3. DK
4. REF

What kind of *majlis* or *Jam’at Hareem* do you organize?

1. Family (جمعة عائلية)
2. Social (زيارة)
3. Neighborhood (جماعة الفريج)
4. Other (specify)
5. DK
6. REF

Do you consult religious scholars for your personal issues?

1. YES
2. NO [go to EDUM1]
3. DK
4. REF

How often do you consult them?

1. Very often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely [skip to EDUM1]
4. DK
5. REF
On which topics in particular do you consult?
[Open-ended answer]

8. DK
9. REF
EDUCATION and MEDIA

Part I: Trust in Media

[Interviewer: “The next section of the survey deals specifically with issues related to media in the country.”]

Imagine that you heard a rumour about an important local event that affects you personally. Which source of information would you trust the most to discover the true details of the case?

(NOTE: RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS)

1. Facebook, Twitter, or BBM broadcast
2. Qatar TV
3. Local newspapers
4. Qatar radio
5. Word of mouth from a majlis or Jam’at Hareem
8. DK
9. REF

Part II: Freedom of Speech

In your opinion, how much freedom of speech do you have to voice your point of view about issues that are important to you?

1. Unlimited
2. A lot
3. Some
4. Not very much
5. None at all
8. DK
9. REF

Some people say that it is important to respect the country by containing our criticism on certain important or sensitive matters. Other people say that it is helpful for the country to say our opinion, even if it is critical, on important or sensitive topics. Which side comes closer to your view?

1. People should limit their criticism
2. People should say their opinion
8. DK
9. REF
Abdullah is a Qatari citizen who was born in Qatar and has lived all his life in the country. Abdullah is unhappy with the traffic (الازدحام) in the country. There are several ways that Abdullah could choose to express his criticism. In your opinion, which of the following are acceptable ways to express his criticism of the traffic? (Options: Acceptable, Not acceptable; NOTE: Randomize order of sub-questions)

a. Discuss in a majlis
b. Call in to Watani al-Habib Sabah al-Khair
c. Use Social Networks
d. Publish an article in the local newspaper
e. Organize a group of family and friends to try to solve the problem
f. Start a citizen petition addressed to the Traffic Department

8. DK
9. REF

In this situation, how much freedom of speech does Abdullah have to criticize this issue, in your opinion?

1. Unlimited
2. A lot
3. Some
4. Not very much
5. None at all
8. DK
9. REF

Abdullah has a bad experience with his application for a land distribution. In your opinion, which of the following are acceptable ways to express his criticism of the land distribution? (Options: Acceptable, Not acceptable; NOTE: Randomize order of sub-questions)

a. Discuss in a majlis
b. Call in to Watani al-Habib Sabah al-Khair
c. Use Social Networks
d. Publish an article in the local newspaper
e. Organize a group of family and friends to try to fix the problem
f. Start a citizen petition addressed to the Ministry of Municipality and Urban Planning

8. DK
9. REF
In this situation, how much freedom of speech does Abdullah have to criticize this issue, in your opinion?

1. Unlimited  
2. A lot  
3. Some  
4. Not very much  
5. None at all  
8. DK  
9. REF

Part III: Satisfaction with Education

Interviewer: “This section of the survey deals with education. First, we would like to know how citizens view the overall state of Qatar’s education system as well as the satisfaction with the education of their own families.”

Overall, how satisfied are you with the current education system from K-12 to secondary?

1. Very satisfied  
2. Somewhat satisfied  
3. Somewhat dissatisfied  
4. Very dissatisfied  
8. DK  
9. REF

Overall, how satisfied are you with the current college education system?

1. Very satisfied  
2. Somewhat satisfied  
3. Somewhat dissatisfied  
4. Very dissatisfied  
8. DK  
9. REF

Part IV: Changes in Education
There have been a lot of changes in the K-12 education system in the past few years. Some people feel that they would like greater say in the process. Others feel that it is something that should be left up to the concerned authorities. Which comes closer to your view?

1. I would like a greater say
2. It should be left up to the concerned authorities
8. DK
9. REF

There have also been a lot of developments in Qatar University in the past few years. Some people feel that they would like greater say in the process. Others feel that it is something that should be left up to the responsible authorities. Which comes closer to your view?

1. I would like a greater say
2. It should be left up to the concerned authorities
8. DK
9. REF

Now I am going to read to you a list of statements that describe how some people feel about education in Qatar. For each of the following statements, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each?
(Options: Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree; NOTE: RANDOMIZE ORDER OF SUBQUESTIONS)

a. Qatari society benefits from the presence of Western universities in the country.
b. The Arabic language should receive greater priority in public education
c. The Arabic language should receive greater priority in higher/university education
d. Qatari students benefit from interaction with expatriates at the college level.
e. The English language should receive greater priority in public education
f. The English language should receive greater priority in higher/university education
g. Coed college classes are not in line with Qatari culture and traditions.

8. DK
9. REF
If you had to give a rough estimate, what percentage of the current students at the universities of Education City would you say are Qataris?

[PROGRAMMER: NUMERIC VALUES SHOULD BE BETWEEN 0 TO 100]

Enter the percentage________________________
998. DK
999. REF

Part V: Perceptions about Inequality

Interviewer: “Next I would like to ask you a few questions about the status of citizens and expatriates in the Qatari education system.”

Imagine that it is college admission season, and a Western university in Qatar Foundation is accepting applications. In your view, if a Qatari and a Western expatriate of equal qualifications were to apply for admission, do you think they should be given equal chances in the admission process?

1. YES
2. NO
8. DK
9. REF

In your view, do you think it’s more likely that the Qatari or the Western expatriate will receive admission in this case?

1. It’s more likely that the Qatari would be admitted
2. It’s more likely that the expatriate would be admitted
3. The decision would be made fairly [do not read]
8. DK
9. REF

Now imagine that a Qatari and an Arab expatriate of equal qualifications were to apply for admission, do you think it’s more likely that the Qatari or the Arab expatriate will receive admission in this case?

1. It’s more likely that the Qatari would be admitted
2. It’s more likely that the expatriate would be admitted
4. The decision would be made fairly [do not read]
8. DK
9. REF
[Interviewer: “In the final section of the survey we would like to ask your view about important issues relating to local and regional politics.”]

**Part I: Political System Evaluation**

People sometimes talk about what the aims of the country should be for the next ten years. Here is a list of some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which of these goals are your top two priorities, in order of importance?

(NOTE: Randomize order of response options)

a) Preserving safety and security
b) Preserving Islam
c) Promoting economic development
d) Improving foreign relations
e) Promoting free speech and individual rights

8. DK
9. REF

First priority: {POLT1}

Second priority: {POLT2}

Here is another list of aims of the country. If you had to choose, which of these goals are your top two priorities, in order of importance?

(NOTE: Randomize order of response options)

a) Providing a strong national defence
b) Preserving Qatari identity and culture
c) Promoting a more equal distribution of wealth among all citizens
d) Improving international image
e) Promoting education

8. DK
9. REF

First priority: {POLT3}

Second priority: {POLT4}
States in the modern world have many duties and must sometimes make choices about which to focus on. In your opinion, which two of these goals are the top priorities of the state of Qatar?

(NOTE: Randomize order of response options)

a) Providing safety and national defence  
b) Preserving Islamic values  
c) Preserving Qatari identity and culture  
d) Promoting economic development  
e) Distributing wealth among all citizens  
f) Improving international relations and image  
g) Promoting free speech and individual rights  
h) Promoting education

8. DK  
9. REF

First choice: {POLT5a}
Second choice: {POLT5b}

There are many ways that a country can be governed. I’m going to describe various types of political systems that exist in the Middle East region and ask what you think about each as a way of governing a country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing a country?

(Options: Very good, fairly good, fairly bad, very bad)

a) A leader (حاكم) assisted by his chosen advisors and experts  
b) A leader (حاكم) advised by an elected council  
c) An elected council that approves major state decisions  
d) A council of religious leaders that approves major state decisions  
e) A leader and a parliament elected by the people

8. DK  
9. REF

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?

(Options: A great deal, a fair amount, not very much, none at all)

a) The armed forces  
b) The police
c) The courts
d) The Municipal Council
e) The Shura Council
f) Government institutions (مؤسسات حكومية)
g) The GCC
h) The Arab League

8. DK
9. REF

**Part II: Political interest, activity, and efficacy**

How interested would you say you are in local politics? Are you…

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Not very interested
4. Not at all interested
8. DK
9. REF

How often do you discuss local politics?

1. Every day
2. Often
3. Not very often
4. Almost never
8. DK
9. REF

In your opinion, which country is the most threatening to the stability of Qatar?
(Note: Open-ended, record verbatim – DO NOT SELECT FROM LIST)

8. DK
9. REF

Now I am going to read to you a list of statements that describe how some people feel about the state of affairs in Qatar. For each of the following statements, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each?
(Options: Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

a) Ordinary citizens have enough power to influence the policies and activities of the state.
b) The state of Qatar cares about what people like me think.
c) The state represents my values.
During the past three years, have you ever worked with a state organization to resolve an important problem related to you personally, or your family, or your neighbourhood?

1. YES
2. NO [skip to POLT14]
8. DK
9. REF

With respect to the most important issue that you faced, how satisfied were you with the way the issue was dealt with?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Not very satisfied
4. Not satisfied at all
8. DK
9. REF

The Municipal Council elections have been held every four years since 1999. It takes time and effort for a citizen to register to vote, and not all Qataris are registered yet. Did you get a chance to register to vote for the Municipal Council elections?

1. YES
2. NO [skip to POLT16]
8. DK
9. REF

Many people like to participate in elections, although sometimes people don’t participate as often as they might like because they are sick, working, or have other obligations. For the most recent Municipal Council elections in 2011, did you get a chance to vote?

1. YES
2. NO
8. DK
9. REF
When voting for candidates in the Municipal Council election, how important is each of the following factors in influencing your choice?
(Options: very, important, not very important, not important at all)

a. His family/tribe
b. His level of education
c. His degree of religiosity
d. The degree of his agreement with you on important issues

8. DK
9. REF

Here are some statements describing the prevalence of corruption and bribe-taking across sectors in Qatar. Which of the following statements reflects your own opinion the best?

1. Hardly anyone is involved
2. A moderate number of people are involved
3. A lot of people are involved
4. Almost everyone is involved
8. DK
9. REF

Do you think corruption and bribe-taking in Qatar is more widespread than it was five years ago, less widespread, or about the same?

1. More
2. Less
3. About the same
8. DK
9. REF

In your opinion, to what extent is the state working to crack down on corruption and root out bribes?

1. To a large extent
2. To a moderate extent
3. To a small extent
4. Not at all
8. DK
9. REF
Imagine there are three Qatari men who live in a neighborhood. They all want streetlights to be installed so their children can play outside at night. They go to their weekly majlis and talk about how they might solve the problem.

Jassim says: “I don’t know anybody in al-baladiya, so there is nothing I can do. Inshallah someone will fix it.”

Do you feel you have more or less ability to solve the problem than Jassim?

1. Less ability
2. More ability
8. DK
9. REF

How likely do you think it is that Jassim will get the streetlights installed?

1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Not very likely
4. Very unlikely
8. DK
9. REF

Next, Sa’ad says: “I don’t know our local municipal council representative, but I will call him anyway. Maybe he can get the lights installed.”

Do you feel you have more or less ability to solve the problem than Saad?

1. Less ability
2. More ability
8. DK
9. REF

How likely do you think it is that Saad will get the streetlights installed?

1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Not very likely
4. Very unlikely
8. DK
9. REF
Finally, Nasr says: “I will call Watani Al Habib Sabah Al Khair to complain, and organize everyone in the community to go together to Al Baladiya and make sure this is resolved.”

Do you feel you have more or less ability to solve the problem than Nasr?

1. Less ability
2. More ability
8. DK
9. REF

How likely do you think it is that Nasr will get the streetlights installed?

1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Not very likely
4. Very unlikely
8. DK
9. REF

Part III: Foreign policy

To what extent do you support the following ways that Qatar could try to influence the politics of other Arab countries:
(Options: strongly support, somewhat support, not a lot of support, don’t support at all)

a) Charity and humanitarian aid
b) Financial support
c) Political support or involvement
d) Military support or involvement
8. DK
9. REF

In your opinion, do you think Qatar’s growing international and regional role will cause other countries to view Qatar more positively, more negatively, or there won’t be much change?

1. More positive
2. More negative
3. WON’T BE MUCH CHANGE [DO NOT READ]
8. DK
9. REF
To what extent do you support or oppose the following initiatives of the GCC?

a. Increasing membership to other countries
b. Creating a single currency among member states
c. Pursuing greater political union among member states
d. Pursuing greater military cooperation among member states

8. DK
9. REF
DEMOGRAPHICS

Gender
[INTERVIEWER: enter the gender of the respondent. Don’t ask for it]

I would like to know how many family members usually live in this household. Do not consider any domestic workers/drivers or any employee in counting the number of family members living in this household?
How many family members [ ] live in this household?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. In total</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Aged 11 or younger</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Aged 18 or older</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-98: DON’T KNOW
-99: REFUSED

How many [ ]s are currently employed in this household?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Maid</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nanny</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Cook</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Driver</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-98: DON’T KNOW
-99: REFUSED

Does any member of this household currently own a { } inside or outside Qatar?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Vacation home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-8: DON’T KNOW
-9: REFUSED

INTERVIEWER: determine the type of this house. take the help of the respondent if needed. If this house is not a palace or farm, ask if this is a public house or not and then select one below

1. Palace
2. Villa
3. Flat
4. Arabic house
Now I would like to ask you about your total household income for all members in your household, including you. Please consider all sources of monetary income (salary, profit, rental income, interest income, income from share market, pension, national allowance, divorce allowance, etc.). Do not include home allowance, car allowance, medical allowance and other benefits from employer and unearned income such as donation, Zakat, lottery in calculating income.

What is the current total monthly income of all household members? Is it less than or greater than QR 30,000?

1. Less than 30,000
2. 30,000 or more
8. DON’T KNOW
9. REFUSE

DEMO6a. You said the total household monthly income is less than 30,000, is it...

1. Less than 10,000
2. 10,000 to less than 15,000
3. 15,000 to less than 20,000
4. 20,000 to less than 25,000
5. 25,000 to less than 30,000
8. DK
9. REF

DEMO6b. You said the total household monthly income is 30,000 or more, is it...

1. Less than 35,000
2. 35,000 to less than 40,000
3. 40,000 to less than 50,000
4. 50,000 to less than 60,000
5. 60,000 or more
8. DK
9. REF

In what year were you born?
Have you ever had any formal schooling?
1. Yes
2. No
8. DK
9. REF

DEMO9a. Have you completed 12 years of schooling?
1. YES
2. NO
8. DON’T KNOW
9. REFUSED

DEMO9b. What is the highest year of schooling you have completed?
DEMO9c. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
1. High school or higher secondary school degree (12 years of education)
2. Less than 2 years long vocational/certificate/diploma program after high school
3. 2 to 3 year long degree/diploma program after high school
4. Bachelor’s degree (4 year university program)
5. Master’s degree or professional degree (J.D., M.D., etc)
6. Doctoral degree
7. Other (specify)
8. DON’T KNOW
9. REFUSED

What was your biggest motivation to continue your education beyond high school? Was it:

(NOTE: Only asked of respondents who answer greater than 1 to Question DEMO9c; RANDOMIZE ORDER OF RESPONSE OPTIONS)

A. To avoid boredom
B. To get a better career
C. To be with friends
D. Pressure from family
E. Academic interest
8. DK
9. REF
Including yourself, how many members of your immediate family (اسرتك) have attended or are currently attending the following types of schools in Qatar?
(Note: record number for each)

i. Independent school
ii. Private Arabic school
iii. International school
8. DK
9. REF

Including yourself, how many members of your immediate family (اسرتك) have attended the following types of universities and colleges?
(Note: record number for each)

a. Qatar University
b. A university at Education City
c. College of the North Atlantic
d. Stenden University
e. A university outside Qatar
8. DK
9. REF

Are you currently employed?
1. Yes
2. No
8. DK
9. REF

DEMO13aa. Are you?:
1. Retired
2. Housewife
3. Student
4. Looking for work

DEMO13a. What is your current occupation?

1. Legislator, senior officer, manager, director, head
2. Professional (engineer, doctor, lawyer, teacher, accountant computer programmer, pilot, journalist, clergy)
3. Technician
4. Clerk (secretary, cashier, office assistant)
5. Service or sales worker
6. Agricultural or fish worker
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Craft or trade worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Plant/machine operator or assembler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Armed forces/police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>REF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEMO13b.** What is the type of your current employer?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Semi-government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>REF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEMO13c.** Is your monthly income from work less than or greater than QR 20,000?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Income Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Less than 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>20,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>REF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEMO13d.** You said your monthly income is less than 20,000, is it …

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Income Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Less than 5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5000 to less than 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,000 to less than 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>15,000 to less than 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>REF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEMO13e.** You said your monthly income is 20,000 or more, is it …

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Income Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Less than 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25,000 to less than 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>30,000 to less than 35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>35,000 to less than 45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>45,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>REF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the (read out and code one answer):

1. Upper class
2. Upper middle class
3. Lower middle class
4. Working class
5. Lower class
8. DK
9. REF

NOTE: The following questions are to be completed by the interviewer only

How interested in the survey was the respondent?

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Somewhat disinterested
4. Very disinterested

Apart from the respondent, was there any other person or persons present during the interview?

1. Yes
2. No [go to THANKYOU]

As far as you could tell, who was the person/s present? (Note: indicate all that apply)

1. Spouse of respondent
2. Father or mother of respondent
3. Son or daughter of respondent
4. Sister or brother of respondent
5. Other family of respondent
6. Friends or colleague of respondent

In your view, to what extent did the presence of the person/s influence the answers of the respondent?
1. It was a big influence throughout the survey
2. It influenced the answers to some questions
3. It influenced the answers to one or two questions only
4. It didn’t seem to influence the respondent at all

{Q: THANKYOU}
Are there any other comments you would like to make? [OPEN-END]

Thank you very much for your participation. We appreciate the time you have taken to complete this Interview.

[READ IF NECESSARY:] If you have any questions on the purpose of this study, kindly contact The Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at 4403 3020, or you can call my supervisor at SESRI using this number xxx-xxx. --just mention the follow up study of the World Value Survey in Qatar.

Again, thank you and goodbye.
APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (ARABIC)

متابعة لمسح القيم العالمي في قطر

2012-2013
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله، أنا... 

الباحث الميداني المكلف من قبل معهد البحوث الاجتماعية والاقتصادية المسحية بجامعة قطر. نحن نقوم بإجراء مسح وطنيًا باليبَة عن جامعة قطر لمعرفة آراء القاطنين حول مواضيعهم الفكريَّة. وقد تم اختياركم عشوائيَّا لتكون جزءًا من عينة الدراسة. ستكون كافة المعلومات التي تم الحصول عليها هنا في غاية السرية، ولن يتم طباعة اسمك أو استخدامه في أي وثيقة من الوثائق أو اقتراحات أي إجابة من إجاباتكم على الأسئلة المطروحة وسيتم عرض نتائج تحليل هذه البيانات بصيغة إحصائية فقط.

القسم I: الوضع الاقتصادي العام وال منزلين

[الباحث: "يتناول هذا القسم من المسح الشؤون الاقتصادية. ونرغب أولاً بمعرفة وجهة نظر المواطنين تجاه اقتصاد دولة قطر بالإضافة إلى الوضع الاقتصادي الخاص بأسرهم"]

{ECON1}

في الوقت الحالي، كيف تقيم الوضع الاقتصادي العام قطر؟

1. جيد جداً
2. جيد
3. متوسط
4. ضعيف
5. ضعيف جداً
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON2}

كيف تقيم الوضع الاقتصادي لأسرتك في الوقت الحالي؟

1. جيد جداً
2. جيد
3. متوسط
4. ضعيف
5. ضعيف جداً
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON3}

تصور الوضع التالي: أسرة قطرية لديها ثلاثة أطفال، ودخلها الشهري الكلي يبلغ حوالي 30,000 ريال قطري، وتعيش هذه الأسرة في منزل في مدينة خليفة، وتملك سيارة لاندكروزر. تقضي هذه الأسرة إجازة الصيف في أوروبا، ولكن ليس لديها منزل خاص بها هناك. كيف تقيم الوضع الاقتصادي لهذه الأسرة؟

1. جيد جداً
2. جيد
3. متوسط
4. ضعيف
5. ضعيف جداً
{ECON4}
تصور الوضع التالي: أسرة قطرية لديها ثلاثة أطفال، ودخلها الشهر يبلغ حوالي 60,000 ريال قطري، وتعيش هذه الأسرة في الخليج العربي، وتمتلك سيارة لكس. تقضى هذه الأسرة خلال الصيف في فندق مملوكة في لندن. فكيف تقيم الوضع الاقتصادي لهذه الأسرة؟
1. جيد جداً
2. جيد
3. متوسط
4. ضعيف
5. ضعيف جداً
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON5}
بشكل عام، ما مدى رضائك عن الوضع الاقتصادي لسرتك حاليًا؟ هل أنت راضٍ جداً، أو راضٍ نوعاً ما، أو غير راضٍ نوعاً ما، أو غير راضٍ على الإطلاق؟
1. راضٍ جداً
2. راضٍ نوعاً ما
3. غير راضٍ نوعاً ما
4. غير راضٍ على الإطلاق
5. لا أعرف
6. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON6}
توفر دولة قطر العديد من المزايا الاقتصادية للمواطنين. فما مدى رضاك عن هذه المزايا التالية؟ هل أنت راضٍ جداً، راضٍ نوعاً ما، غير راضٍ نوعاً ما، أو غير راضٍ على الإطلاق؟
(الخيارات: راضٍ جداً، راضٍ نوعاً ما، غير راضٍ نوعاً ما، غير راضٍ على الإطلاق، لا أعرف، أرفض الإجابة)
- فرص التوظيف
  . A الحصول على رعاية صحية بجودة عالية
  . B الحصول على تعليم ابتدائي واعدادي وثانوي بجودة عالية
  . C الحصول على تعليم جامعي وبحثات بجودة عالية
  . D تخصصات الأراضي
  . E مزايا التقاعد
  . F علاوة الزواج
  . G

القسم II: تكاليف المعيشة

[الباحث: "والآن أود توجيه بعض الأسئلة حول تكاليف المعيشة في قطر.

{ECON7}
بشكل عام، كيف تصرف التغيير في تكاليف المعيشة في قطر خلال السنوات الخمس الماضية؟
1. من الصعب جداً تحمل تكاليف الأشياء التي نريدها من الصعب نوعاً ما تحمل تكاليف الأشياء التي نريدها
2. لم يؤثر على استطاعتنا في تحمل تكاليف الأشياء التي نريدها من الأسهل نوعاً ما تحمل تكاليف الأشياء التي نريدها
3. من الأسهل جداً تحمل تكاليف الأشياء التي نريدها لأعمالك?
4. لا أعرف

{ECON8}

تتم في العام الماضي زيادة عامة لرواتب المواطنين القطريين الذين يشغلون في القطاع العام، إلى أي مدى تعتقد بأن هذه الزيادة ساعدت الوضع الاقتصادي لأعمالك؟
1. لقد ساعدتنا بالفعل
2. ساعدتنا إلى حد ما
3. لم نساعدنا كثيراً
4. لم نساعدنا على الإطلاق
5. لم تحصل على الزيادة [لمحور: لا تقرأ]
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON9}

تصور أن هناك زوجين قطريين حديثي الزواج ويجتمعان عن منزل منفصل عن أهلهما ليشتريه. فما مدى سهولة أو صعوبة هذا الأمر بالنسبة من الناحية المالية؟
1. سهل جداً
2. سهل نوعاً ما
3. صعب نوعاً ما
4. صعب جداً
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON10}

القسم: بيئة الأعمال

هل سبق وأن كان لديك أسباب دعتك للجوء إلى إدارة حماية المستهلك؟
1. نعم
2. لا أختيت إلى السواعل [ECON12]
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON11}

إلى أي مدى شعرت بأن هذا الأمر تم توليه في هذه الحالة؟
القسم IV: منظور عدم المساواة

[الباحث: "وفيما يلي أود توجيه بعض الأسئلة حول وضع المواطن وهم المقيمين الغربيين في الاقتصاد القطري."]

{ECON12}
تصور بأن هناك وظيفة شاغرة في شركة كبيرة في قطر. فإذا تقدم قطري وهم مقيم غربي إلى هذه الوظيفة وكل منهما يحمل مؤهلات متكافئة، فهل تعتقد أن القطري يجب أن يعطى الأولوية على الغربي؟

1. نعم
2. لا
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON13}
هل تعتقد أنه على أرض الواقع سيكون هناك ميل لتوظيف القطري أم لتوظيف المقيم الغربي في هذه الوظيفة؟

1. سيكون هناك ميل أكثر لتوظيف القطري
2. سيتم إتخاذ القرار بشكل منصف [لا تقرأ هذا الخيار]
3. سيكون هناك ميل أكثر لتوظيف المقيم الغربي
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON14}
تصور بأن هناك شخصين لديهما مؤهلات متكافئة، أحدهما قطري والأخر مقيم غربي، وثم تم توظيفهما للعمل في نفس الوظيفة في شركة كبرى في قطر. فكيف ببعتقلك يجب أن تكون رواتب هذين الشخصين؟

1. يجب أن ينال المقيم راتباً أعلى
2. يجب أن تكون الرواتب متساوية
3. يجب أن ينال القطري راتباً أعلى
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON15}
كيف تعتقد أن رواتب هذين الشخصين سيتم مقارنتها على أرض الواقع؟

1. سيتم منح المقيم راتباً أعلى
2. سيتم منح الشخصين رواتباً متساوية
3. سيتم منح القتري راتباً أعلى
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن الواسطة ضرورية بالنسبة للقاتريين في كل من المواقف التالية؟

[الخيارات: ضرورية بالتأكيد، ضرورية نوعاً ما، غير ضرورية]

1. الحصول على قبول في الكلية/ الجامعة
2. الحصول على منصب وظيفي جيد
3. الحصول على رخصة قيادة
4. الحصول على الرعاية الطبية في الخارج
5. الحصول على قطعة أرض جيدة من الحكومة
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

القسم 7: الآراء تجاه إنفاق الدولة

[الباحثة: "والآن أود توجيه بعض الأسئلة حول فعاليات قطر الاقتصادية محلياً ودولياً. إلى أي مدى أنت توافق على العبارات التالية؟"]

{ECON16}
أي عبارة من العبارات التالية حول إنفاق الاقتصاد القطري هي الأقرب إلى وجهة نظرك؟

1. يجب أن تنفق قطر موارد أكثر على العلاقات الدولية والاستثمارات
2. يجب أن تنفق قطر موارد أكثر داخل البلاد
3. التخصص الحالي لمواد الاستثمار المحلي والدولي مناسب [لا تقرأ هذا الخيار]
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON17}
يشعر بعض الناس بأنه يجب أن يكون للمواطنين دور أكبر في إبداء الرأي في القرارات التي تتعلق بكيفية استغادة الدولة من المال القادم من المصادر الطبيعية. بينما يشعر الآخرون بأنه أمر يجب أن يتم تركه إلى الدولة كل تقرير.

أي منهما الأقرب إلى وجهة نظرك؟

1. يجب أن يكون للمواطنين دور أكبر في إبداء الرأي
2. يجب أن يترك الأمر إلى الدولة لتقرر
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{ECON19}
 Sicherheit, da Sie ein Wirtschaftswachstum von globaler Bedeutung wirklich benötigen. Fragen Sie, ob Sie denken, dass die Zahl von Arbeitslosigkeit in der Welt rückläufig sein wird?

8. Ich weiß es nicht.
9. Ich lehne die Antwort ab.

{ECON20}
Shape, wie Sie eine zukünftige Perspektive über Wirtschaftswachstum und Arbeitslosigkeit in der Welt 2022 denken Sie, dass es ein negativer Effekt auf die Arbeitslosigkeit?

8. Ich weiß es nicht.
9. Ich lehne die Antwort ab.

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1. إيجابي
2. سلبي
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة
الثقافة
القسم I: العولمة

{CULT1}

{CULT2_1}

{CULT2_2}

{CULT3_1}

{CULT3_2}
{CULT4}
أخذا جميع التغييرات المذكورة بعين الاعتبار، برأيك هل ترجح كفة التغييرات الإيجابية على السلبية أم أن كفة التغييرات السلبية ترجح على الإيجابية؟

1. ترجح كفة التغييرات الإيجابية على السلبية
2. ترجح كفة التغييرات السلبية على الإيجابية
3. لا أعرف
4. أرفض الإجابة

{CULT5}
سابقا بقراءة قائمة من عدة تغييرات التي قد تطرأ على حياتنا في المدى القريب. برجح إخباري عند كل تغيير ما إذا كنت تعتقد أنه أمر جيد أم أمر سيء لو حصل هذا التغيير؟

[الخيارات: سيكون أمرًا جيدًا، سيكون أمرًا سيئًا؛ ملاحظة: قم بذكر هذه الأسئلة الفرعية بشكل عشوائي دون ترتيب]

(لا يوجد استمارة)

{CULT6}
يتفق التطورون على أن العلم القطري والتشيد الوطني من أهم الرموز المعروفة لدولة قطر، ولكن يختلف الناس في أهمية رموز أخرى لدولة قطر. أرجو أن تخبرني أي من هذه الرموز التالية تعتقد بأنها الأهم بالنسبة لك؟

[ملاحظة: قم باختيار إجابة واحدة فقط على أنها "الخيار الأول”]

1. القارب الشراعي التقليدي (المحامل)
2. الغوص على الؤلؤ
3. البترول
4. منطقة الأبراج في الدوحة
5. لا أعرف
6. أرفض الإجابة

القسم II: منظور الثقافة

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وأي رمز يأتي في المرتبة الثانية من حيث الأهمية؟

[ملاحظة: قم باختيار إجابة واحدة فقط على أنها "الخيار الثاني"]

1. القارب الشراعي التقليدي (المحامم)
2. الغوص على اللؤلؤ
3. البترول
4. منطقة الأبراج في الدوحة
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

ما هي أول كلمات تخطر على بالك عندما تفكر بسوق واقف؟

[ملاحظة: نهاية مفتوحة; سجل الإجابة حرفيا]
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

ما هي أول كلمات تخطر على بالك عندما تفكر في اليوم الوطني؟

[ملاحظة: نهاية مفتوحة; سجل الإجابة حرفيا]
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

ما هي أول كلمات تخطر على بالك عندما تفكر في بطولة كأس العالم 2022؟

[ملاحظة: نهاية مفتوحة; سجل الإجابة حرفيا]
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

إلى أي مدى برأيك تمثل المشاريع التالية الثقافة أو القيم أو العادات القطرية؟

(الخيارات: إلى حد بعيد، نوعا ما، بعض الشيء، لا تمثل على الإطلاق؛ ملاحظة: اذكر الأسئلة الفرعية بشكل عشوائي بدون ترتيب)

سوق واقف
a. متحف الفن الإسلامي
b. مسجد الإمام محمد بن عبد الوهاب
c. ً
الحي الثقافي (كتارا)
. d
. e
. المدينة التعليمية
. لا أعرف
. 9 أرفض الإجابة

{CULT14}
هناك الكثير من الناس ممن يرغبون بحضور فعاليات اليوم الوطني، ولكن في بعض الأحيان قد لا يحضر البعض الفعاليات بسبب ظروف مختلفة. فهل أتيحت لك الفرصة للمشاركة في احتفالات اليوم الوطني لهذا العام؟
. نعم
. 1
. لا
. 2
. لا أعرف
. 8 أرفض الإجابة

{CULT15}
لكي يُعتبر الشخص مواطنا صالحا، برايك هل من المهم أن يقوم بالممارسات التالية:
(الخيارات: نعم، لا؛ ملاحظة: اذكر الأسئلة الفرعية بشكل عشوائي بدون ترتيب)
. المشاركة في اليوم الرياضي
. a
. دفع المخالفات المرورية
. b
. التصويت في انتخابات المجلس البلدي
. c
. تقديم الدعم للناس الذين هم أسوأ حالاً منه
. d
. دعم قرارات الدولة حتى لو اختلف مع هذه القرارات
. e
. لا أعرف
. 8 أرفض الإجابة
. 9 أرفض الإجابة
القسم III: التوازن والأولويات

{CULT16}
فيما يلي مجموعة من المواضيع. برأيك، ما مدى الاهتمام الذي حصل عليه كل موضوع في الوقت الراهن في قطر؟
هل تشعر بأنه بحصل على اهتمام مبالغ فيه، اهتمام كافي، اهتمام قليل، أو لا اهتمام على الإطلاق؟

(الخيارات: اهتمام مبالغ فيه، اهتمام كافي، اهتمام قليل، لا اهتمام على الإطلاق)

. الإسلام
. اللغة العربية
. الثقافة الغربية
. الثقافة القطرية
. المقيمين
. المواطنين القطريين
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{CULT17}
هل سبق لك وأن شعرت باللغة أوبعد الارتياح في الأماكن التالية في قطر؟
(الخيارات: لا، نعم، لم يسبق لي الذهاب إلى هناك [لا تقرأ هذا الخيار])

. المجمع التجاري في قطر
. سوق واقف
. فندق في قطر مثل فندق الانتركونتيننتال، ريتز كارلتون...
. متحف السكسي (فريجاك)
. المكتبة العامة
. المدينة التعليمية
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

القسم IV: المجتمع القطري

{CULT18}
أي من الخيارات التالية تصفك بشكل أدق؟

. فوق كل شيء أنا قطر
. فوق كل شيء أنا مسلم
. فوق كل شيء أنا عربي
. فوق كل شيء أنا فرد من أفراد قبيلتي أو عائلتي
. غير ذلك (سجل الإجابة)
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

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ما هو الأمر الثاني من حيث الأهمية بالنسبة لك؟

1. قطري
2. مسلم
3. عربي
4. فرد من أفراد قبيلتي أو عائلتي
5. غير ذلك (سجل الإجابة)
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

تصور الموضوع التالي: نورة هي سيدة قطرية تبلغ من العمر 40 عاماً. في كل صيف تزور نورة إلى لندن بغرض الترفيه مع عائلتها. وهي ترتدي العباءة والحجاب داخل قطر إلا أنها في لندن ترتدي الحجاب ولكنها لا ترتدي العباءة. في رأيك، هل تجد سلوك نورة مقبولًا؟

1. مقبول تماماً
2. مقبول نوعاً ما
3. غير مقبول على الإطلاق
4. لا أعرف
5. أرفض الإجابة

جواهر ابنة نورة تبلغ من العمر 20 عاماً، لا ترتدي الحجاب ولا العباءة عندما تكون في لندن. في رأيك، هل تجد سلوك جواهر مقبولًا؟

1. مقبول تماماً
2. مقبول نوعاً ما
3. غير مقبول على الإطلاق
4. لا أعرف
5. أرفض الإجابة

أي من العوامل التالية تشكل العائق الأكبر امام موافقتك على زواج ابنك أو ابنتك، أو أختك أو أخيك؟ (ملاحظة: اذكر خيارات الإجابة بشكل عشوائي)

1. عدم الصلاة والصوم
2. عدم التكافؤ في المستوى الاجتماعي للعائلة
3. الفارق في المستوى التعليمي
4. الفقر
5. سوء الأخلاق
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة
{CULT23}
برأيك، إلى أي مدى يجب أن تكون المتطلبات التالية مهمة لدى الشخص الذي يسعى للحصول على الجنسية القطرية؟
(الخيارات: مهم جداً، مهم نوعاً ما، غير مهم جداً، ليس مهماً على الإطلاق)

· a. أن يكون والده قطرياً
· b. أن تكون أمه قطرية
· c. أن يكون الزوجة/الزوجة قطرياً
· d. أن يكون مولود في قطر
· e. أن تكون العائلة مقيدة في قطر قبل عام 1930
· f. أن يكون مسلماً
· g. أن يكون عرضاً
· h. أن يكون مقيماً من إحدى دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي

1. نعم.
2. لا (تخطي إلى السؤال {CULT26}).
8. لا أعرف.
9. أرفض الإجابة.

{CULT24}
خلال الأشهر القليلة الماضية، هل ذهبت إلى مجالس أو جمعات الحريم؟

1. نعم.
2. (تخطي إلى السؤال {CULT26}).
8. لا أعرف.
9. أرفض الإجابة.

{CULT25}
ما نوع المجالس أو جمعات الحريم التي تحضرينها؟
(ملاحظة: يختار المستجيب كل ما ينطبق)

1. جمعة عائلية
2. زبيرة
3. جمعة الفريج
4. غير ذلك (حدد)
8. لا أعرف.
9. أرفض الإجابة.

{CULT26}
هل تقوم بتنظيم عقد مجالس أو جمعات حريم عندك بانتظام؟

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1. نعم
(CULT28)
2. لا (تخطى إلى 28)
3. لا أعرف
4. أرفض الإجابة

(CULT27)
ما نوع المجالس أو جمعات الحريم التي تتقدّب بها؟
1. جمعة عائلية
2. زياره
3. جمعة الفريج
4. غير ذلك (حدد)
5. لا أعرف
6. أرفض الإجابة

(CULT28)
هل تستشير علماء الدين في قضاياك الشخصية؟
1. نعم
(EDUM1)
2. لا (تخطى إلى السؤال 1)
3. لا أعرف
4. أرفض الإجابة

(CULT29)
هل تستشيرهم بشكل كثير، أو في بعض الأحيان، أو نادراً؟
1. كثيراً
2. أحياناً
(EDUM1)
3. نادراً (تخطى إلى السؤال 1)
4. لا أعرف
5. أرفض الإجابة

(CULT30)
ما هي أهم المواضيع التي تستشيرهم بها؟
(ملاحظة: نهاية مفتوحة، سجل حرفياً)
1. لا أعرف
2. أرفض الإجابة
التعليم ووسائل الإعلام

القسم I: النقطة بوسائل الإعلام

[الباحث: "يتناول الاسم التالي من المسح القضايا المتعلقة بوسائل الإعلام في البلد."]

{EDUM1}

التصور بأنك سمعت إشاعة عن حدث محلي مهم يؤثر عليك شخصياً، فأي مصدر للمعلومات ستثق به أكثر من غيره لمعرفة التفاصيل الحقيقية للقضية؟

ملاحظة: ذكر خيارات الإجابة عشوائياً بدون ترتيب]

1. الفيس بوك، أو تويتر، أو مسنجر بلكي بيري للرسائل
2. تلفزيون قطر
3. الصحف المحلية
4. إذاعة قطر
5. الكلام المتناقل في المجالس أو جمعات الحريم
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

القسم II: حرية الرأي

{EDUM2}

برأيك ما مدى الحرية التي تحصل عليها للتعبير عن وجهة نظرك حول القضايا التي تهمك؟

1. حرية مطلقة
2. كثير من الحرية
3. بعض الحرية
4. لا يوجد الكثير من الحرية
5. لا يوجد حرية على الإطلاق
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

{EDUM3}

يقول البعض أنه من المهم احترام البلد من خلال كبح انتقادنا لأمور مهمة أو حساسة، بينما يقول الآخرون بأنه من المهم تأييد حقنا في إبداء رأينا حتى ولو كان الأمر حرجاً ويتصل بالمواضيع المهمة أو الحساسة. فأي طرف من الطرفين أقرب إلى وجهة نظرك؟

1. يجب على الناس أن يحدوا من انتقادهم
2. يجب على الناس أن يعبروا عن رأيهم، حتى ولو كان الموضوع حرجاً
3. لا أعرف
4. أرفض الإجابة
{EDUM4}

عبد الله مواطن قطرى، ولد وعاش في قطر طوال حياته وعبد الله منزعج من الازدحام المروري في البلد. هناك عدة طرق يستطيع من خلالها عبد الله أن يعبر عن انتقاده لهذا الأمر. برايك، أي من الطرق التالية مقبولة للتعبير عن انتقاده لازدحام المرور؟

الخيارات: مقبولة غير مقبولة; ملاحظة: تذكر الإجابات الفرعية بشكل عشوائي بدون ترتيب

1. مناقشة الموضوع في المجلس
2. الاتصال بوطني الحبيب صباح الخير
3. استخدام مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي
4. نشر مقالة في الجريدة المحلية
5. تنظيم مجموعة مكونة من أفراد الأسرة والأصدقاء لمحاولة حل المشكلة
6. تقديم شكوى إلى إدارة المرور
7. لا أعرف
8. أرفض الإجابة

{EDUM5}

بغض النظر عن الوسيلة، برايك ما مدى حرية التي يمتلكها عبد الله لانتقاد هذا الأمر؟

1. حرية مطلقة
2. أكبر من الحرية
3. بعض الحرية
4. لا يوجد الكثير من الحرية
5. لا يوجد حرية على الإطلاق
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

{EDUM6}

مر عبد الله بتجربة مريرة في طние الذي قدمه للمحاربين على قطعة أرض. برايك، أي من الطرق التالية مقبولة للتعبير عن انتقاده للتوزيع الأراضي؟

الخيارات: مقبولة غير مقبولة; ملاحظة: تذكر الإجابات الفرعية بشكل عشوائي بدون ترتيب

1. مناقشة الموضوع في المجلس
2. الاتصال بوطني الحبيب صباح الخير
3. استخدام مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي
4. نشر مقالة في الجريدة المحلية
5. تنظيم مجموعة مكونة من أفراد الأسرة والأصدقاء لمحاولة حل المشكلة
6. تقديم شكوى إلى وزارة البلدية والتخطيط العمراني
7. لا أعرف
8. أرفض الإجابة

{EDUM7}
بغض النظر عن الوسيلة، برأيك ما مدى الحرية التي يمتلكها عبدالله لانتقاد هذا الأمر؟

1. حرية مطلقة
2. كثير من الحرية
3. بعض الحرية
4. لا يوجد الكثير من الحرية
5. لا يوجد حرية على الإطلاق
8. أرفض الإجابة

القسم III: الراضي عن التعليم

الباحث: "يتناول هذا القسم من المسح موضوع التعليم، نود أولاً أن نعرف كيف ينظر المواطنين إلى النظام التعليمي في دولة قطر إجمالاً إضافة إلى مدى الراضي عن تعليم أسرهم".

{EDUM8}

بشكل عام، ما مدى رضائك عن النظام التعليمي الحالي من مرحلة الحضانة إلى الثانوية؟

1. راض جداً
2. راضٍ نواعاً ما
3. غير راضٍ نواعاً ما
4. غير راضٍ جداً
8. أرفض الإجابة

القسم IV: تغييرات في نظام التعليم

{EDUM9}

بشكل عام، ما مدى رضائك عن نظام التعليم الجامعي الحالي؟

1. راض جداً
2. راضٍ نواعاً ما
3. غير راضٍ نواعاً ما
4. غير راضٍ جداً
8. أرفض الإجابة

{EDUM10}

طراز تغييرات كثيرة على النظام التعليمي من مرحلة الحضانة إلى المرحلة الثانوية خلال السنوات القليلة الماضية. يفضل البعض أن يكون له رأي أكبر في هذه العملية. بينما يعتقد الآخرون بأن هذا الأمر يجب أن يترك إلى الجهات المختصة. فأي منهمما أقرب إلى وجهة نظرك؟

1. أفضل أن يكون لي رأي أكبر في الموضوع
2. يجب أن يترك الأمر إلى الجهات المختصة
8. أرفض الإجابة

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9. أرفض الإجابة

{EDUM11}
حصلت الكثير من التطورات في جامعة قطر خلال السنوات القليلة الماضية. يفضل البعض أن يكون لهم رأي أكبر في هذه العملية. بينما يعتقد الآخرون بأن هذا الأمر يجب أن يترك إلى الجهات المختصة. فأي منهما أقرب إلى وجهة نظركم؟

1. أفضل أن يكون لي رأي أكبر في الموضوع
2. يجب أن يترك الأمر إلى الجهات المختصة
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{EDUM12}
والآن سوف أقرأ عليك بعض الverbs التي تصف ما هو شعور الناس حول التعليم في قطر. أرجو أن تخبرني عن مدى مواقفك أو عدم مواقفك على كل من الverbs التالية:

الverbs: أوافق بشدة، أوافق، أعارض، أعارض بشدة؛ ملاحظة: اذكر الأسئلة الفرعية بشكل عشوائي بدون ترتيب

a. يتفق المجتمع القطري على وجود الجامعات الغربية في البلد.
b. يجب أن تعطي اللغة العربية أولوية أكبر في التعليم العام.
c. يجب أن تعطي اللغة العربية أولوية أكبر في التعليم العالي/الجامعي.
d. يستفيد الطلاب القطريون من الاختلافات الفردية والمقيمين على مستوى الجامعة.
e. يجب أن تعطي اللغة الإنجليزية أولوية أكبر في التعليم العام.
f. يجب أن تعطي اللغة الإنجليزية أولوية أكبر في التعليم العالي/الجامعي.
g. صفوف الجامعات المختلطة لا تتماشى مع الثقافة والعادات القطرية.

8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{EDUM13}
إذا طلب منك إعطاء نسب تقريبية، فما هي رأيك نسبة الطلاب القطريين حالياً في جامعات المدينة التعليمية؟

المبرمجة: القيم المقبولة ما بين 0 إلى 100
998. لا أعرف
999. أرفض الإجابة

القسم 7: منظر عدم المساواة

{EDUM14}
تصور الوضع التالي: بدأت فترة التسجيل في جامعة في المدينة التعليمية. فإذا تقدم قطري مقيم غربي بموهلوت مكافحة للحصول على قبول في هذه الجامعة، من وجهة نظركم، هل يجب أن تعطي للقطري والمقيم فرص متساوية في عملية القبول؟

1. نعم
من وجهة نظرك، هل تعتقد أن فرصة القبول ستكون لصالح القطري أم لصالح المقيم العربي في هذه الحالة؟

1. من المرجح أكثر أن يتم قبول القطري
2. من المرجح أكثر أن يتم قبول المقيم
3. سيتم اتخاذ القرار بشكل عادل [لا تقرأ هذا الخيار]
4. لا أعرف
5. أرفض الإجابة

والآن تصور بأن هناك قطري ومقيم عربي بمؤهلات متكافئة تقدم كل منهما للحصول على القبول في جامعة قطر، فهل تعتقد أن فرصة القبول ستكون لصالح القطري أم لصالح المقيم العربي في هذه الحالة؟

1. من المرجح أكثر أن يتم قبول القطري
2. من المرجح أكثر أن يتم قبول المقيم
3. سيتم اتخاذ القرار بشكل عادل [لا تقرأ هذا الخيار]
4. لا أعرف
5. أرفض الإجابة
السياسة

[الباحث: "في القسم الأخير من المسح نوذ أن نسألكم عن وجهة نظركم حول قضايا مهمة تتعلق بالسياسة الإقليمية والمحليه.

القسم I: تقييم النظام السياسي

يتحدث الناس أحيانًا عن الأهداف التي ينبغي على قطر أن تحددها لل السنوات العشر القادمة. أنا الآن بقصد قراءة قائمة بالأهداف، فأرجو أن تخبرني عن أي من تلك الأهداف يحتل المرتبة الأولى بالنسبة لك الثانية؟ (ملاحظة: اذكر خيارات الإجابة بشكل عشوائي بدون ترتيب)

. a. الحفاظ على الأمن والسلامة
. b. الحفاظ على القيم الإسلامية
. c. تعزيز التنمية الاقتصادية
. d. تحسين العلاقات الخارجية
. e. تعزيز حرية الرأي والحقوق الشخصية

{POLT1} الاختيار الأول: 

{POLT2} الاختيار الثاني: 

8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

أنا الآن بقصد قراءة قائمة بالأمور التي تُعد مهمة بالنسبة لقطر، رتبها من حيث الأولوية (الأول ثم الثاني) من وجهة نظركم؟ أي من هذه الأمور أكثر أهمية من وجهة نظركم؟ (ملاحظة: اذكر خيارات الإجابة بشكل عشوائي بدون ترتيب)

. a. توفير دفاع وطني قوي
. b. الحفاظ على الهوية والثقافة القطرية
. c. تعزيز المزيد من التوزيع المتكافئ للثروة بين كافة المواطنين
. d. تحسين الصورة الدولية
. e. تعزيز التعليم

{POLT3} الأمر الأول هو: 

{POLT4} الأمر الثاني من حيث الأهمية هو: 

8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة
هناك مسؤوليات كثيرة على عاتق الدول في عالمنا الحديث، ويجب علينا في بعض الأحيان أن تختار المسؤوليات التي تتطلب التركيز عليها. فمن بين الأولويات التي ذكرت بها، أي منها برأيك هي في قمة أولويات دولة قطر في الوقت الراهن؟

(ملاحظة: اذكر خيارات الإجابة بشكل عشوائي بدون ترتيب)

{POLT5a}

الأمر الأولي هو: 

{POLT5b}

الأمر الثاني الأولي هو: 

{POLT6}

سأذكر عدة أنواع من الأنظمة السياسية الموجودة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، وسأسألك عن رأيك حول كل نظام منها. عند ذكر كل نظام من هذه الأنظمة، هل تعتقد بأنه جيد جداً، أم جيد نوعاً ما، أم سيء نوعاً ما، أم سيء جداً في حكمه للبلاد؟

{POLT7}

{POLT5a}

{POLT5b}

{POLT6}

{POLT7}
القسم II: الاهتمامات والنشاطات والفعاليات السياسية

{POLT8}
ما مدى اهتمامك بالسياسة المحلية؟ هل أنت مهتم جدًا بها، أو مهتم إلى حد ما، أو غير مهتم جدًا بها، أو غير مهتم على الإطلاق؟

1. مهتم جداً 2. مهتم إلى حد ما 3. ليست مهتماً جداً 4. ليست مهتماً على الإطلاق 8. لا أعرف 9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT9}
هل تناقش الأخبار السياسية المحلية في قطر، سواء مع الأصدقاء أو أفراد عائلتك أو غيرها بشكل يومي، أحيانًا، أو نادراً، أو لا تناقشها على الإطلاق؟

1. كل يوم تقريبًا 2. أحيانًا 3. نادراً 4. لا تناقش على الإطلاق 8. لا أعرف 9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT10}
في رأيك، ما هي الدولة التي تمتلك خطرًا أكبر على استقرار قطر؟ (ملحوظة: نهاية مفتوحة، سجل حرفيًا لا تختار من القائمة)

8. لا أعرف 9. أرفض الإجابة
{POLT11}
والآن سأذكر قائمة من العبارات التي تصف كيف يشعر بعض الناس حول وضع قطر الحالي. هل توافق أو لا توافق
على كل من العبارات التالية:
(الخيارات: أوافق بشدة، أوافق، أعارض، أعارض بشدة)

1. لدى المواطنين العاديين ما يكفي من القوة للتأثير على سياسات ونشاطات الدولة
   a. تهتم الدولة بالأراء المماثلة لرأيي
   b. تمتلِّل الدولة القِيم التي أمنها
   c. لا أعرف
2. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT12}
خلال السنوات الثلاث الماضية، هل سبق وأن تعاملت مع مؤسسة من مؤسسات الدولة لحل مشكلة مهمة تتعلق بك
شخصيًا، أو عائلتك، أو بجيرانك؟
1. نعم
2. لا [POLT14]
3. لا أعرف
4. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT13}
فيما يتعلق بأهم القضايا التي واجهتها، ما مدى رضاك عن الطريقة التي تم التعامل بها مع تلك القضية؟
1. راضٍ جداً
2. راضٍ نوعاً ما
3. غير راضٍ جداً
4. غير راضٍ على الإطلاق
5. لا أعرف
6. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT14}
يتم إجراء انتخابات المجلس البلدي كل أربع سنوات منذ عام 1999. ويتطلب الأمر بعضاً من الوقت والجهد كي يقوم
المواطن بالتسجيل للتصويت. يوجد عدد من القتريين من من لم يسجلوا بعد. هل أتيحت لك الفرصة للتسجيل من أجل
التصويت في انتخابات المجلس البلدي؟
1. نعم
2. لا [POLT16]
3. لا أعرف
4. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT15}
يرغب الكثير من الناس في المشاركة في الانتخابات، ولكن في بعض الأحيان قد لا يشارك البعض بسبب ظروف مختلفة. فهل أنتعتلك الفرصة للتصويت في انتخابات المجلس البلدي التي اجريت في عام 2011؟

1. نعم
2. لا
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT16}
عندما تقوم بالتصويت للمرشحين في انتخابات المجلس البلدي، ما مدى أهمية كل عامل من العوامل التالية في التأثير على اختيارك؟

(الخيارات: مهم جداً، مهم، ليس مهماً جداً، ليس مهماً على الإطلاق)

- عائلته/قيلته
- مستوى في التعليم
- درجة التزامه الديني
- درجة اتفاقه معك حول القضايا المهمة
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT18}
هذه مجموعة من العبارات التي تصف مدى انتشار الفساد والرشوة من عدمه في قطر في كافة القطاعات. أي من العبارات التالية أقرب إلى وجهة نظرك؟

1. نادراً ما يكون هناك فساد ورشوة
2. ليس أكثر الموظفين مرتين وفاسدين
3. أغليحة الموظفين مرتين وفاسدين
4. تقريباً كل موظف مرتشي وفاسد
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT19}
هل تعتقد أن الفساد وأخذ الرشاوى قد انتشر في قطر بشكل أكبر مما كان عليه قبل خمس سنوات، أم أقل انتشاراً، أم بنفس الانتشار تقريباً؟

1. أكثر
2. أقل
3. نفس الانتشار تقريباً
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT20}

برأيك، إلى أي حد تقوم الدولة بالعمل على القضاء على الفساد والرشوة في قطر؟

1. إلى حد كبير.
2. إلى حد متوسط.
3. إلى حد ضعيف.
4. لا تعمل على ذلك على الإطلاق.
8. لا أعرف.
9. أرفض الإجابة.

{POLT21a}

تصور بأن هناك ثلاثة رجال قطريين يعيشون بجوارك. وكل منهم يرغب بأن يتم تركيب إشارة لشارعه حتى يتمكن
أبناؤه من اللعب في الخارج ليلا. يذهب الثلاثة إلى مجلسهم الأسبوعي ويتحدثون عن كيفية حل هذه المشكلة.

يقول حاسم: "لا أعرف أي شخص في البلدية، لذلك لا يمكنني فعل شيء. إن شاء الله سيتمكن شخص ما من حل هذه
المشكلة.

هل تشعر بأن لك قدرة أكبر أم قدرة أقل من حاسم على حل هذه المشكلة؟

1. قدرة أقل.
2. قدرة أكبر.
8. لا أعرف.
9. أرفض الإجابة.

{POLT21b}

برأيك، هل ترجح أن يتم تركيب إشارة الشارع لحاسم؟ هل من المرجح جداً، من المرجح نوعاً ما، ليس من المرجح
كثيراً، أو من غير المرجح جداً.

1. من المرجح جدا.
2. من المرجح نوعاً ما.
3. ليس من المرجح كثيراً.
4. من غير المرجح جداً.
8. لا أعرف.
9. أرفض الإجابة.

{POLT21c}

يقول سعد: "لا أعرف ممثلنا المحلي في المجلس البلدي، ولكنني سأتصل به على أية حال. فقد يتمكن من العمل على
تركيب الإشارة.

هل تشعر بأن لك قدرة أكبر أم قدرة أقل من سعد على حل هذه المشكلة؟

367
1. قدرة أقل
2. قدرة أكبر
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT21d}

برأيك، هل ترجح أن يتم تركيب إشارة الشارع لسعد؟

1. من المرجح جداً
2. من المرجح نوعاً ما
3. ليس من المرجح كثيراً
4. من غير المرجح جداً
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT21e}

أخيراً، يقول ناصر: "سوف أصل ببرنامج وطني الحبيب صباح الخير لأنقذ بشكوى، وسوف أعمل على جمع كل شخص في حينا لنذهب معاً إلى البلدية ونحرص على أن يتم حل هذه المشكلة".

هل تشعر بأن لك قدرة أكبر أم قدرة أقل من ناصر على حل هذه المشكلة؟

1. قدرة أقل
2. قدرة أكبر
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT21f}

برأيك، هل ترجح أن يتم تركيب إشارة الشارع لناصر؟

1. من المرجح جداً
2. من المرجح نوعاً ما
3. ليس من المرجح كثيراً
4. من غير المرجح جداً
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

القسم: السياسة الخارجية

{POLT23}

إلى أي مدى تؤيد الطرق التالية التي يمكن أن تقوم بها قطر للتأثير على سياسات الدول العربية الأخرى:

(الخيارات: أريد بشدة، أريد نوعاً ما، لا أريد كثيراً، لا أريد على الإطلاق)

تقديم المساعدة الخيرية الإنسانية a

368
{POLT24}
برأيك، هل تعتقد أن بروز دور قطر على المستوى الإقليمي والدولي سيجعل الدول الأخرى تنظيم إلى قطر بإيجابية أكثر أم بسلبية أكثر؟
1. بإيجابية أكثر
2. بسلبية أكثر
3. لن يكون هناك الكثير من التغيير (لا تقرأ)
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{POLT25}
إلى أي مدى توؤم أو تعرض المبادرات التالية لمجلس التعاون الخليجي؟
a. زيادة الأعضاء بضم دول أخرى
b. إنشاء عملة موحدة بين الدول الأعضاء
c. السعي لوحدة سياسية أكبر بين الدول الأعضاء
d. السعي لتعاون عسكري أكبر بين الدول الأعضاء
8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة
إحصائيات الأسر والأفراد

{DEMO1}
الجنس
المبرم: أدخل الجنس المشترك. لا تسأل عن ذلك.

{DEMO2}
كم عدد أفراد الأسرة الذين يعيشون بشكل دائم في هذا المنزل. لا تذكر أي خدم أو ساكنين أو أي عامل في المنزل عند احتساب عدد أفراد الأسرة الذين يعيشون في المنزل؟
كم هو عدد أفراد العائلة [ ] الذين يعيشون في هذا المنزل؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>العدد</th>
<th>الإجمالي</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(98) لا أعرف
(99) أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO3}
كم [ ] يعمل في هذا المنزل؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>العدد</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(98) لا أعرف
(99) أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO4}
هل يمتلك أي فرد من أفراد هذا المنزل حالياً داخل أو خارج قطر بيت لقضاء العطلة؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>نعم</th>
<th>لا</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بيت لقضاء العطلة</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8) لا أعرف
(9) أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO5}
المبرمج: حدّد نوع هذا المنزل. وبإمكانك طلب المساعدة من المستجيب عند الحاجة. فإذا كان هذا المنزل ليس قصراً أو مزرعة، اسأل فيما إذا كان هذا المنزل بيئةً شعبية أم لا. وبعد ذلك اختر إجابة واحدة مما يلي:

1. قصر
2. فيلا
3. شقة
4. بيت عربي/شعبي
5. مزرعة
6. غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد)
7. لا أعرف
8. أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO6}
والآن أود أن أسألك عن الدخل الكلي لكافة أفراد منزلك، فمن فيهم أنت. يرجى أن تأخذ بالاعتبار كافة مصادر الدخل المالي (الراتب، المرتب التحسيسي، الدخل الناتج عن التأجير، الدخل الناتج عن الدراسة، الدخل الوارد من الورقة، المعاشات التقاعدية، المعاشات الاجتماعية، نسبة الطلق.. الخ). لا تذكر عند حساب الدخل بدل السكن، أو بدل السيارة، أو التأمين الصحي، وغيرها من البدلات التي تقدمها لك جهة العمل وكذلك الدخل غير المكتسب مثل التبرعات، وأموال الزكاة.

كم يبلغ إجمالي الدخل الشهري لكل أفراد الأسرة حاليًا، هل هو أقل من أو أكثر من 30,000 ريال قطري؟
1. أقل من 30,000 ريال قطري
2. 30,000 ريال قطري أو أكثر
3. لا أعرف
4. أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO6a}
ذكرت أن إجمالي الدخل الشهري لأفراد المنزل أقل من 30,000 ريال قطري...
1. أقل من 10,000 ريال قطري
2. من 10,000 إلى أقل من 15,000 ريال قطري
3. من 15,000 إلى أقل من 20,000 ريال قطري
4. من 20,000 إلى أقل من 25,000 ريال قطري
5. من 25,000 إلى أقل من 30,000 ريال قطري
6. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO6b}
ذكرت أن إجمالي الدخل الشهري لأفراد المنزل هو 30,000 ريال قطري أو أكثر، فهل هو...
1. أقل من 35,000 ريال قطري
2. من 35,000 إلى أقل من 40,000 ريال قطري
3. من 40,000 إلى أقل من 50,000 ريال قطري
4. من 50,000 إلى أقل من 60,000 ريال قطري
5. من 60,000 ريال قطري فأكثر
6. لا أعرف

371
{DEMO8}
في أي سنة ولدت؟
سجل السنة
1998. لا أعرف
1999. أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO9}
هل سبق وأن درست في التعليم الرسمي؟
(1) نعم
(2) لا
(8) لا أعرف
(9) أرفض الإجابة

هل استكملت 12 سنة من التعليم الرسمي؟

{DEMO9a}
(1) نعم
(2) لا
(8) لا أعرف
(9) أرفض الإجابة

ما أعلى مرحلة من التعليم وصلت إليها؟

{DEMO9b}
ما أعلى مستوى من التعليم وصلت إليه؟

{DEMO9c}

المرحلة الثانوية (12 سنة من التعليم)
1 أقل من مدة ستين في برنامج مهني أو شهادة أو دبلوم بعد الثانوية
2 أقل من ستين إلى ثلاث سنوات دراسة في الجامعة
3 من ستين إلى ثلاث سنوات دراسة في الجامعة
4 شهادة البكالوريوس (4 سنوات دراسة في الجامعة)
5 شهادة الماجستير أو الدرجة الاحترافية (ماجستير في القانون، ماجستير في الطب... الخ)
6 شهادة الدكتوراه
7 غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد)
8 لا أعرف
9 أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO10}
إذا كانت الإجابة فوق "1" (من 2 إلى 6)، اسأل:
ماذا كان المحفز الأكبر لكي تتبع التعليم إلى ما بعد المرحلة الثانوية؟ هل كان ذلك:
(ملاحظة: اذكر خيارات الإجابة بشكل عشوائي دون ترتيب)
A. لتجنب الملل
B. للحصول على وظيفة أفضل
C. لتكوين مع الأصدقاء
D. الضغط من العائلة
E. الاهتمام الأكاديمي

8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO11}

كم فرداً من أفراد أسرتك داوم أو يداوم حالياً في أحد أنواع المدارس التالية في قطر؟

(ملاحظة: سجل عدد الأفراد عند كل نوع)

المدارس المستقلة
A. المدارس العربية الخاصة
B. المدارس الدولية

8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO12}

كم فرداً من أفراد أسرتك داوم أو يداوم حالياً في أحد أنواع الجامعات والكليات التالية؟

(ملاحظة: سجل عدد الأفراد عند كل نوع)

جامعة قطر
A. أحد جامعات المدينة التعليمية
B. كلية شمال الأطلسي
C. جامعة ستندن
D. في جامعة خارج قطر
E. 

8. لا أعرف
9. أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO13}

هل تعمل حالياً؟
1. نعم
2. لا
9. أرفض الإجابة

سلسلة السؤال
1. [DEMO14]
2. [DEMO14]
3. [DEMO14]
4 بابًا عن العمل [تخلي إلى السؤال 14]
8 لا أعرف
9 أرفض الإجابة

ما مهنتك الحالية؟

1 عضو في هيئة تشريعية، مسؤول كبير، مدير، مدير إدارة، رئيس
2 وظيفة تخصصية (مهندس، طبيب، محامي، مدرس، محاسب، مبرمج كمبيوتر، طيار، صحفي)
3 قبلي
4 وظيفة إدارية (سكرتير، أمين صندوق (كاشير)، مساعد إداري)
5 موظف خدمات أو مبيعات
6 عامل في قطاع الزراعة أو المواد السمكية
7 عامل مدني أو تجاري
8 عامل تشغيل أو تركيب مصانع/آلات
9 القوات المسلحة / الشرطة
10 رجل أعمال
11 غير ذلك
98 لا أعرف
99 أرفض الإجابة

هل الجهة التي تعمل لديها حكومية أم شبه حكومية أم خاصة أم غير ذلك؟

1 جهة حكومية
2 جهة شبه حكومية
3 جهة خاصة
4 غير ذلك (يرجى التحديد)
8 لا أعرف
9 أرفض الإجابة

هل دخلك الشهري من عملك أقل من أو أكثر من 20,000 ريال قطري؟

1 أقل من 20,000
2 20,000 أو أكثر
8 لا أعرف
9 أرفض الإجابة

ذكرت أن دخلك الشهري أقل من 20,000 ريال، فهل هو...
375

1. 4 من 15,000 إلى أقل من 20,000
2. إ. لا أعرف
3. أرفض الإجابة

ذكرت أن دخلك الشهري 20,000 ريال فأكثر، فهل هو...

DEMO13e
1. أقل من 25,000
2. من 25,000 إلى أقل من 30,000
3. من 30,000 إلى أقل من 35,000
4. من 35,000 إلى أقل من 45,000
5. 45,000 أو أكثر
6. إ. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

{DEMO14}

يصف الناس انفسهم احيانا بالانتماء لطائفة اجتماعية ما. الى اي من هذه الطبقات تنتمي أنت؟

1. الطبقة العليا
2. الطبقة الوسطى العليا
3. الطبقة الوسطى الدنيا
4. الطبقة العاملة
5. الطبقة الدنيا
6. إ. لا أعرف
7. أرفض الإجابة

{Q: INTEREST}

(المبرمج والباحث: يجب البحث على الأسئلة التالية عند انتهاء المقابلة.)

ما مدى اهتمام المستجيب بالمقابلة؟ هل كان مهتم جداً، أو مهتم نوعاً ما، أو غير مهتم نوعاً ما، أو غير مهتم على الإطلاق؟

1. مهتم جداً
2. مهتم نوعاً ما
3. غير مهتم نوعاً ما
4. غير مهتم على الإطلاق

{Q: PRIVACY1}

باستثناء المستجيب، هل كان هناك شخص أو أشخاص متواجدين خلال المقابلة؟

1. نعم
2. لا
حسب علملك، من كان الموجودين؟
(لمبهرم والباحث: اختير كل ما ينطبق).
1. زوج أو زوجة المستجيب
2. والد أو والدة المستجيب
3. ابن أو ابنة المستجيب
4. أخ أو أخت المستجيب
5. شخص آخر من عائلة المستجيب
6. من أصحاب أو زملاء المستجيب

في رأيك، إلى أي مدى أثر وجود هذا الشخص أو الأشخاص بإجابات المستجيب؟
1. أثر بشكل كبير خلال المقابلة
2. أثر في بعض الأسئلة
3. أثر في سؤال أو سوالين فقط
4. يبدو أنه لم يؤثر على الإطلاق

هل هناك أي ملاحظات أخرى تود أن تضيفها؟ [نهاية مفتوحة].

شكرًا جزيلاً على مشاركتك، ونثمن الوقت الذي أمضيته لإجراء هذه المقابلة. [إقرأ عند الضرورة] إذا كان لديك أي أسئلة حول الغرض من هذه الدراسة، يمكنك الاتصال بمعهد البحوث الاجتماعية والاقتصادية المسحية على الرقم (203033020/44033020)، أو بإمكانات الاتصال بمشرفي المشاريع في معهد البحوث الاجتماعية والاقتصادية المسحية على هذا الرقم .................................، وذلك من خلال الإشارة إلى الدراسة التنبية لمسح القيم العالمية في قطر.

شكرًا لك مرة أخرى وأسعدت بقائلك.
APPENDIX C: COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS

Letter sent to Mr. Mohamed Abdulatif, April 1, 2013, English and Arabic translation

Mr. Mohamed Abdulatif
Al Raya Newspaper
Doha, Qatar

Dear Mr. Mohamed,

My name is Jocelyn Mitchell, and I am a professor at Northwestern University in Qatar. I am currently writing my dissertation for Georgetown University on Qatar, focusing on the politics of legitimacy—all the ways that the state of Qatar attempts to create legitimacy among its citizens beyond economic distribution. I am arguing that Qatar’s political stability is not only because of how rich the country is, but rather how much attention the state of Qatar pays to nation-building as well as listening and responding to its citizens’ concerns.

I have been reading your cartoons for the past two years, and personally I think you are a genius. You have a unique and talented way of taking the important issues of Qatari society and depicting them in a way that is both humorous and serious at the same time. I would love to include some of your cartoons, with English translation, in my dissertation. I would fully cite you, and you would retain copyright over all of your images and work. I would also like to work with you to make sure that I am translating your cartoons in the most correct way.

I believe that including your cartoons in my dissertation will make the everyday stories of Qatari society come to life for my readers. It will improve my dissertation by making it much more fun to read. As well, I hope that it brings your work to the attention of the English-speaking world of Western academia.

I am attaching a draft of the copyright permission letter, as well as some examples of how I would like to use your work in my dissertation (see my excerpt on medical care in Qatar). I look forward to hearing from you! Thank you for your time.

Yours,

Jocelyn Sage Mitchell
Response from Mr. Mohamed Abdulatif, April 2, 2013, original Arabic and English translation

April 2, 2013

Professor Jocelyn Mitchell,

Greetings,

Your letter really made me happy, and I'm honored to help you to complete your dissertations through my work in any form you find suitable.

I just wanted to let you know that I do not mind you using my drawings in your dissertation for Georgetown University in Qatar as mentioned in your email and the copywriter draft letter you sent on the 1st of April 2013, and please consider this email as an official document of my approval.

If there is any work I have to do on my part, please do not hesitate to let me know and I will be happy to help.

I wish you all the best.

Sincerely,

Mohamed Abdulatif
E-mail from Mr. Mostafa Sheshtawy, May 8, 2013

From: Mostafa Sheshtawy
Subject: Re: To Mr. Mostafa Sheshtawy, about your photos
Date: May 8, 2013 9:58:52 AM GMT+03:00
To: Jocelyn S Mitchell

Dear Jocelyn,
About the photos, of course you can use them, I hope they are in good enough quality for your paper, if not let me know.
Best of luck.
- Mostafa

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E-mail from Mr. John Lockerbie, May 8, 2013

From: John Lockerbie
Subject: Re: To Mr. John Lockerbie, regarding your pictures
Date: May 8, 2013 12:52:16 PM GMT+03:00
To: Jocelyn S Mitchell

Dear Jocelyn,

I have no problem with your using my illustrations in your dissertation as I'm happy to encourage academic work, and the new al Wahhab mosque will make an interesting subject.

With kind regards
John
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6/3/12
6/4/12
6/6/12
6/7/12
6/11/12
6/20/12
6/24/12
6/26/12
6/28/12
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9/11/12a: Session 2, mins. 14–25,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_09_2012/11092012w2.mp3
9/11/12b: Session 2, mins. 25–27,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_09_2012/11092012w2.mp3
9/13/12: Session 2, mins. 11–17,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_09_2012/13092012w2.mp3
9/16/12: Session 1, mins. 43–50,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_09_2012/16092012w1.mp3
9/23/12: Session 2, mins. 44–46,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_09_2012/23092012w2.mp3
9/26/12: Session 2, mins. 48–50,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_09_2012/26092012w1.mp3
10/2/12a: Session 2, mins. 7–10,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_10_2012/02102012w2.mp3
10/2/12b: Session 2, mins. 16–19,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_10_2012/02102012w2.mp3
10/2/12c: Session 2, mins. 39–46,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_10_2012/02102012w2.mp3
10/14/12a: Session 2, mins. 23–26,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_10_2012/14102012w2.mp3
10/14/12b: Session 2, mins. 50–54,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_10_2012/14102012w2.mp3
10/21/12: Session 1, mins. 45–48,
   http://www.qatarradio.net/archive/w_10_2012/21102012w1.mp3


