PARTY MATTERS: THE INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF COMPETITIVENESS AND HEGEMONY IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government

By

Yonatan L. Morse, M.A.

Washington, DC
August 23, 2013
PARTY MATTERS: THE INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF COMPETITIVENESS AND HEGEMONY IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

Yonatan L. Morse, M.A.

Thesis Advisor: Marc M. Howard, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

What explains differences in electoral authoritarian outcomes? Why are some regimes able to utterly dominate elections with comparatively lower levels of fraud and coercion, while in other cases regimes can only muster slim vote margins? What explains differences in the competitiveness and hegemony of electoral authoritarian elections? This dissertation focuses specifically on Africa’s former single-party regimes and argues that differences in party capacity developed under single-party rule is a primary factor differentiating forms of electoral authoritarianism. Through typological theorizing and case-studies of Tanzania, Kenya, and Cameroon this project shows how single-party regimes that elevated the party as an important decision-making institution, made credible investments into party institutionalization, and kept open avenues for elite recruitment were less likely to experience elite defection during multiparty elections. Likewise, single-party regimes that built strong party-affiliated mobilizing structures and engaged in wide practices of social incorporation were able to rely on persistently large electoral support. In the absence of these party capacities regimes were forced to rely more heavily on fraud and a range of contingent factors to survive. By differentiating these forms of electoral authoritarianism and their variant institutional underpinnings this dissertation has significance importance for our understanding of the durability of authoritarianism and the potential path toward democratization.
This project could not have been finished without the help, prodding, and support from so many people met along the way. My first thanks go to the members of my Ph.D. committee at Georgetown University’s Department of Government. Marc Howard, Daniel Brumberg, Scott Taylor, and Andrew Bennett’s deep insights and expertise helped shape and sharpen my arguments, and they have all taught me enormously about research and what it means to be a teacher. My thanks also go to the department for their financial support and my peers who have read and influenced significant portions of this dissertation – Hesham Sallam, Beth Mercurio, Michael Koplow, Zacchary Ritter, Cory Julie, David Buckley, Jennifer Raymond, and Anjali Dayal.

Outside of Georgetown I have benefitted from the insights of several advisors and friends. Even if our meetings were brief, they have all shaped this dissertation. My sincere thanks go out to Joel Barkan, David Waldner, Steven Heydemann, Steven Levitsky, Thad Dunning, Catherine Kelly, Rachel Riedl, Leonardo Arriola, Keith Weghorst, and Philip Roessler. Big thanks also given to the faculty and students of the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, and especially David Collier, Jason Seawright, Gary Goertz, and James Mahoney. Without that intensive and invigorating training this dissertation would look very different.

Deep thanks also go to the countless people I met while researching and interviewing in Kenya and Tanzania. You are too numerous to list here, but your hospitality and willingness to let me into your worlds and ask deep questions about your lives was one of the highlights of this project for me, to which I am ever grateful. Much gratitude is also deserved to the faculty at the departments of political science at the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Nairobi, the staff at the Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), and to the faculty of the Institute for International Development in Nairobi. In particular, thanks to Samuel Mushi, Max Mmuya, Mwesiga Baregu, Adams Aloo, Njunga N’gethe, Michael Chege for spending time with me and teaching me so much about your history and politics.

Finally, none of this is possible without the support and encouragement of family, friends, and loved ones. You know who you are, and you know that I owe you all big time.

Many thanks,
Yonatan L. Morse
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: The Puzzle, Setting, and Argument ................................................................. 1
- The Puzzle: Electoral Authoritarian Variation .............................................................. 2
- The Setting: Africa’s former Single-Party Regimes ......................................................... 7
- The Argument and Cases: Divergent Patterns of Party Building and Electoral Authoritarianism ...... 13
- Methodological Notes and Research Design ................................................................. 15
- Plan of the Dissertation ................................................................................................. 19

PART I: THE BROADER PICTURE .................................................................................. 22
Chapter 2: Single-Party Regimes and Electoral Authoritarian Variation ......................... 23
- Conceptualizing Authoritarian Parties and Single-Party Regimes: An Overview of Approaches .... 29
- Developing the Concepts of Structural Articulation and Social Robustness .......................... 39
- How Party Capacity Influences Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes .................................. 44
- Alternative Theories and Approaches to Electoral Authoritarian Variation .......................... 47
- Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 55

Chapter 3 - From Single-Parties to Electoral Authoritarian Regimes, a Typological Theory .... 57
- Party Capacity in Single-Party Regimes ......................................................................... 58
- The Role of Economic Performance: Patronage and Voter Grievance .............................. 65
- Opposition Behavior: Eroding Vote Share and Leveling the Playing Field ....................... 71
- Western Linkage and Leverage: Constraining Incumbents, Empowering Oppositions ............ 77
- Putting the Space Together: Pathways to Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes .................... 83

PART II – THE EVOLUTION OF PARTIES UNDER SINGLE-PARTY RULE .................... 86
Chapter 4 – The Evolution of Strong Party Capacity in Tanzania ..................................... 87
- The Nyerere Era: Ujamaa and Party Supremacy ............................................................. 87
- The Mwinyi Era: From Ujamaa to Ruksa .................................................................... 102
- Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 105

- The Kenyatta Era: The Foundations of Clientelism ....................................................... 107
- The Moi Era: Attempts at Party Revitalization ............................................................... 123
- Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 129

Chapter 6 – The Evolution of Moderate Party Capacity in Single-Party Cameroon ............ 131
- The Ahidjo Era: The Push toward Centralization .......................................................... 131
- The Biya Era: The “New Deal” and Transition to the CPDM ......................................... 144
Chapter 1 : The Puzzle, Setting, and Argument

The advent of elections since the end of the Cold War has left some enduring puzzles for students of democracy and comparative politics. A significant number of regimes now combine elections with clear aspects of authoritarian practice, giving rise to terms such as semi-authoritarianism, hybrid-regimes, and most recently electoral authoritarianism. Yet while the term electoral authoritarianism conveys important information regarding the current range of electoral regimes and the state of authoritarianism, it masks what is essentially a heterogeneous phenomenon. In some cases regimes are able to utterly dominate elections with comparatively lower levels of fraud, while in other instances regimes can only muster slim victories in highly dubious elections. What explains these differences in the competitiveness and hegemony of electoral authoritarian elections and what does it tell us about how electoral authoritarian regimes construct electoral outcomes?

This dissertation focuses on Africa’s former single-party regimes and the role of party development under single-party rule in explaining variation in electoral authoritarian outcomes. A growing trend of scholarship has observed political parties as essential institutions for sustaining authoritarianism as well as competing in elections. As this dissertation will show, the process of party development under single-party rule diverged greatly with regard to the institutionalization and articulation of party practices and the breadth of social incorporation. While these dissimilarities did not appear to undermine regimes while contestation was deemed illegal, as these regimes transitioned to electoral politics important variance has occurred.

1 Recent work that uses the specific term “electoral authoritarianism” would include Aalen & Tronvoll 2009; Bogaards 2009; Bunce & Wolchik 2011; Carrion 2006; Diamond 2002; Geddes 2005; Greene 2007; Howard & Roessler 2006; Levitsky & Way 2010; Magaloni 2006; Schedler 2002; Way 2005. See also the edited volumes of Lindberg 2009 and Schedler 2006. Other recent work that studies elections under authoritarianism (but not necessarily electoral authoritarianism) would include Blaydes 2010; Cox 2009; Gandhi 2008; King 2009; Lindberg 2006; Lust-Okar 2005; Lust-Okar & Gandhi 2009; Posusney & Angrist 2005
Through typological theorizing and case-studies of Tanzania, Kenya, and Cameroon I argue that party capacity was a central factor differentiating the competitiveness and hegemony of African multiparty elections.

**The Puzzle: Electoral Authoritarian Variation**

Most studies of authoritarianism and electoral authoritarianism use the question of regime survival versus demise, or more ambitiously democratization as their starting point. These types of studies are problematic for a number of reasons. While the question of electoral turnover is obviously important, it is also likely a highly contingent event that makes it difficult to capture in a comparative theoretical framework. Likewise, the focus on survival versus demise masks what are essentially different electoral authoritarian experiences. In reality the term “survival” conveys very little about how exactly electoral authoritarian regimes perpetuate or reproduce their rule. At times regimes that survive in fact appear to be highly improvisational rather than reflective of established ruling orders. This dissertation instead looks at distinct electoral authoritarian outcomes as phenomenon to be explained.² When are some regimes able to dominate elections while using comparatively lower levels of coercion?

This presents two conceptual challenges – how to identify electoral authoritarian regimes and how to differentiate them? Minimalist definitions of democracy and authoritarianism, while ostensibly meant to prevent scholars from making Type I and Type II classificatory errors, prove inadequate for analyzing an empirical world of hybridity and are not without their own classificatory risks.³ Moreover, while there is increasingly stronger data on the quality of

---

² It should be noted that elections under authoritarian conditions are not new phenomenon. For instance, Juan Linz distinguished pluralism and popular mobilization as defining features of authoritarianism, often expressed in the form of elections (2000). Studies of single-party states in the 1970s and 1980s also emphasized the role of limited and uncompetitive elections (Collier 1982; Hayward 1987; Hermet, Rouquie & Rose 1978; Hyden & Leys 1972). The literature on transitions from authoritarianism sparked by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead also highlighted the role of limited elections as a prelude to democratization (1986).
³ Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, & Przeworski 1996; Schedler 2006 p.10
electoral contestation and political rights there is no theoretical consensus on what the exact
threshold between democracy and autocracy should be.\textsuperscript{4} For instance, in their survey of
competitive authoritarianism Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way maintain very strict criteria for
measuring democracy, and any violation of their principles of fair elections, protection of civil
liberties, or a level playing field renders a regime non-democratic.\textsuperscript{5} Notably, a case like
Botswana is classified as authoritarian rather than democratic. These issues have significant
theoretical consequences since they potentially bias the selection of cases.

The problem is more easily resolved as the number of cases declines and the investigator
has more direct interaction. For assessing a wider scope of cases, consensus and awareness of
bias is proven a more practical solution. Therefore I build on established methods for
distinguishing electoral authoritarianism from minimally democratic regimes. The departure
point is Dahlian – elections themselves need to be free and fair, there needs to be full suffrage,
and basic protection of freedom of expression and organization.\textsuperscript{6} As a proxy for these elements, I
utilize a conceptualization developed by Roessler and Howard that combines the Freedom House
Political Rights Score (FHP) and the Polity iv scores (Piv). Election years held with a FHP of
3 or higher \textit{and} a Piv score of 6 or lower are considered electoral authoritarian. Election years
with a FHP of 2 or lower \textit{or} a Piv score of 7 and higher are considered minimally democratic.\textsuperscript{7}

In addition to these criteria three other rules are incorporated. First, a regime must hold
multiparty or multicandidate elections for both the legislature and executive. This is an important
distinction from regimes that are more akin to “liberalized autocracies,” where elections might

\textsuperscript{4} Coppedge & Gerring 2011
\textsuperscript{5} Levitsky & Way 2010 p.365-368
\textsuperscript{6} Dahl 1971
\textsuperscript{7} Roessler & Howard 2009. These measures are for the year prior to the election in order to avoid including post-
election improvements. The classification also raises the Piv threshold for democracy from Roessler and Howard’s
initial study from 6 to 7. Doing so has reduced the classification divergence among others scholars of electoral
authoritarianism (Morse 2012).
only be held for the legislature or at the subnational level. The opening of all major offices for contestation changes the incentives that opposition parties face and provides them with additional focal points for contestation. Second, to be classified as either authoritarian or democratic a country must hold at least two election cycles. Otherwise regimes are categorized as unclassified. This includes regimes that have succumbed to civil war or a military coup before two elections could be held, as well as regimes that have undergone an electoral turnover prior to a second election. Incorporating this rule addresses the “fallacy of electoralism,” by looking at electoral quality over time and how new incumbents treat the democratic process. Third, any regime that satisfies a “two turnover” rule is considered democratic regardless of its electoral quality. This rule recognizes that turnover is an important dimension of democracy and might correspond with regimes that are known as “illiberal democracies” rather than electoral authoritarian. These rules are summarized in Figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1: Classifying Electoral Authoritarianism**

---

8 For some analysis of how oppositions behave differently under electoral authoritarian conditions see Bunce & Wolchik’s discussion of electoral revolutions in Eastern Europe (2011) and Howard and Roessler’s discussion of liberalizing electoral outcomes (2006). For work that looks at the difference incentives opposition parties face under conditions of liberalized autocracy see Lust-Okar 2006, 2009

9 Karl 1990

10 Huntington 1991

11 Zakaria 1997. In illiberal democracies incumbents are elected freely but run roughshod over constitutional limitations and abuse power while in office. The distinction is admittedly quite fuzzy, as it is likely that regimes illiberal democracies would devolve further into electoral authoritarianism.
The second challenge of differentiating forms of electoral authoritarianism is compounded by the fact that scholars have used inconsistent language. The terms “competitive” and “hegemonic” are often used but the distinctions are unclear.\(^\text{12}\) For instance, Levitsky and Way consider a regime hegemonic if opposition parties are physically precluded from competing or overly repressed. All other regimes are considered either stable or unstable electoral authoritarian, depending on whether there has been turnover or not.\(^\text{13}\) By contrast, Roessler and Howard infer from competitive authoritarianism a sense of instability and a tendency either to tip toward hegemonic electoral authoritarianism or electoral democracy. Competitive electoral authoritarianism is distinguished from hegemonic authoritarianism by a power threshold of 70% incumbent vote-share.\(^\text{14}\) Other scholars like Beatriz Magaloni and Kenneth Greene use the terms “hegemonic” and “dominant” interchangeably to connote electoral regimes with at least twenty years longevity.\(^\text{15}\) Others use different terminology to convey similar variation. Hadenius and Teorell use the categories “dominant party multiparty” and “pure limited multiparty,” while in the African context Nicolas van de Walle distinguishes “status quo regimes” from “contested autocracies”.\(^\text{16}\)

The fact that so many scholars find it important to note these differences is reflective of its theoretical importance. The term competitiveness appears as a key underspecified factor that can mean a number of things. One the one hand competitiveness can refer to the actual structure of contestation – the rules and restrictions that shape whether voters can actually translate their preferences into an actual electoral outcome. This is usually captured by looking at measures of

\(^{12}\) See Brownlee 2009; Diamond 2002; Levitsky & Way 2010; Roessler & Howard 2009; Schedler 2009

\(^{13}\) Levitsky & Way 2010 p.21-23

\(^{14}\) Roessler & Howard 2009 p.108

\(^{15}\) Greene 2007 p.16; Magaloni 2006 p.36-37. Generally, the term dominant party system refers to democratic settings (Pempel 1990) while hegemonic party systems refer to authoritarian settings. However, these distinctions are not always kept nor is it clear if the intention of these concepts was meant for an open electoral context.

\(^{16}\) Hadenius & Teorell 2007; van de Walle 2002
fraud or repression. On the other hand, competitiveness refers to the capacity of actors to mount credible alternatives or alternatively the capacity of incumbents to effectively mobilize votes. This aspect is captured in measures of vote-share, longevity, or the effective number of parties. To use a sport’s analogy, competitiveness can refer to the rules of the game or the player’s athletic ability. There is likely a relationship between uncompetitive structures and uncompetitive actors, but it is best to think of these two facets as distinct. In fact, at times regimes that repress the most are unable to deter deep opposition gains and vice-versa.

Again, rather than reject current terminology I utilize the commonly used terms competitive and hegemony to refer to these two aspects of competitiveness. A measure of electoral competitiveness is constructed that combines data on the freedom of association and expression, direct electoral fraud, and the use of state violence. Regimes that rank as competitive on at least two of these measures are considered competitive. Of course, by competitive it is not implied that elections are free and fair, only that elections are not as decisively impacted by coercion. With regard to hegemony, I recognize the importance of both power-thresholds and longevity. Regimes must be able to signal that they are powerful, and that is often through vote-share. But the longevity of a regime can serve the same function and too high a threshold might be impossible to sustain over longer periods of time. As a solution I use a shifting power requirement that decreases as the regime endures over multiple election periods (See Appendix I)\textsuperscript{17}

The combination of these two measures provides for a four-part classification of electoral authoritarian regimes based on a number of critical thresholds (Figure 1.2). All electoral authoritarian regimes must pass a minimal electoral threshold, but still remain below the

\textsuperscript{17} As Bogaards shows there have been various criteria for measuring party dominance ranging from simple pluralities to 70% vote-shares and from single elections to periods of twenty years. Moreover, approaches that examine the effective number of parties actually mask party dominance (Bogaards 2004).
democratic threshold according to the criteria laid out in Figure 1.1. Based on where a regime falls along its measure of competitiveness and hegemony determines which category of electoral authoritarianism it is classified as. First there are *competitive hegemonies* or regimes with relatively more open electoral conditions but also high levels of incumbent dominance. Second are *repressive hegemonies*, which while similar to competitive hegemonies as far as incumbent dominance, are punctuated by much higher levels of coercion and overt authoritarian practice. Third are *competitive electoral authoritarian* regimes where elections are fairly open and incumbents face significant opposition challenges. Fourth are *repressive electoral authoritarian* regimes where despite high levels of electoral coercion incumbents are unable to dominate the election. This dissertation is primarily interested in understanding why some regimes become competitive hegemonies rather than repressive hegemonies or repressive electoral authoritarian.

**Figure 1.2: A Conceptual Typology of Electoral and Electoral Authoritarian Regimes**

The Setting: Africa’s former Single-Party Regimes

While some of the implications of the data and theory discussed here are applicable to the broader field of comparative politics, the specific focus of this project is on the former single-party regimes of sub-Saharan Africa that have transitioned to electoral authoritarianism.
Although its modality of transition has been markedly different, Africa was swept by a wave of elections in the 1990s. This spread of electoral politics was accompanied by an initial optimism heralded as “Africa’s second liberation,” only to be tempered by more caution regarding the transformative impact of elections. Of the forty countries that held founding elections in the early 1990s, 40% were formerly single-party regimes, defined as states with single parties ruling de jure or de facto for at least a decade prior to a founding election. In comparison, 27% of states were military regimes, 13% were revolutionary regimes, and 20% were designated as “other.”

Table 1.1 describes the trajectories of these regime-types since founding elections. There is no doubt that present-day Africa is fundamentally different and much more open than Africa of 1989, but despite noteworthy improvements in democratic quality and a number of democratic success stories, electoral authoritarianism has become the dominant political order. Moreover, the majority of African electoral authoritarian cases were transitional from their former regime, meaning that the incumbent single-party, military, or revolutionary movement continued to govern after winning founding elections. In the cases of Nigeria and Zambia, the parties that defeated the incumbent during the election themselves created an electoral authoritarian regime (therefore it is termed post-transition electoral authoritarian). In several cases, founding elections gave way to further instability in the form of repeated military coups.

---

18 This refers to the role of social protest in the face of economic crisis as an impetus for political change (Bratton & van de Walle 1997). The noted exceptions are cases where not elections have been held like Eritrea and Swaziland. Also excluded from this discussion are the states of Somalia and Sudan, where elections have not been held on a national level.


20 Not included here are the longer standing democratic African states of Botswana and Mauritius or countries that have not to date held a national election, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and Swaziland. The “other” category refers to regimes where there was an unclear transition period like in Benin where Mathieu Kerekou dismantled his ruling party the Benin People’s Revolutionary Party (PRPB), cases of transition from racial or colonial rule as in Namibia and South Africa, or cases where years of civil conflict had blurred the line between the party, person, and military like in Congo-Kinshasa.

21 For comparison purposes included here are the older electoral authoritarian regimes that did not hold founding elections in the 1990s – Senegal and Zimbabwe.
(e.g. Comoros, Niger) or civil war (e.g. Angola, Sierra Leone). Also noted in Table 1.1 is whether the electoral authoritarian regime ended due to either an eventual electoral turnover or a military coup.

This dissertation’s limitation to the sub-set of single-party cases that survived their transition to electoral authoritarianism serves a primarily substantive purpose. An emerging consensus from a number of cross-national statistical studies indicates that context is crucial in understanding trajectories of electoral authoritarianism. While studies by Staffan Lindberg, Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell have found correlations between repeated elections and indicators of democracy and even democratization, scholars who confine their results to more specific contexts have reached other conclusions.\textsuperscript{22} For instance, Jonathan Hartlyn and Jennifer McCoy limit their study to the Latin American context and find that rather than repeated elections, it is whether elections were restorative or foundational that mattered more in explaining their democratizing impact.\textsuperscript{23} Similarly, a study by Roessler and Howard found that the timing of elections matters, noting that “since 1995…institutional arrangements have proven crucial” in explaining trajectories, while at the end of the Cold War regime collapse mattered much more than what type of regime actually preceded the election.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} Lindberg 2006, 2009; Teorell & Hadenius 2007,2009
\textsuperscript{23} Hartlyn & McCoy 2009
\textsuperscript{24} Roessler & Howard 2009 p.125
Table 1.1: Regime Trajectories after Founding Elections (by former regime type)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Regime Type / Post Founding Election Regime Type</th>
<th>Electoral Democracy</th>
<th>Survival as Electoral Authoritarian</th>
<th>Post-Transition Electoral Authoritarian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe (1994-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Djibouti (1993-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gabon (1990)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya (1992-2002)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique (1995-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal (1978-2000)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seychelles (1993-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania (1995-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Togo (1993-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Angola (1992-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau (1994-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gambia (1996-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana (1992-2000)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea (1993-2008)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi (1993-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Chad (1996-)</td>
<td>Ethiopia (1995-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda (2003-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda (1996-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe (1980-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Benin (1995-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lesotho (1993-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali (1997-2012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia (1989-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa (1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comoros (1990-2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congo-Kinshasa (2006-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia (1996-2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone (1996-2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Founding election in parentheses; * Electoral turnover; ** Military coup
Source: African Elections Database

This indicates that surviving elections is fundamental, as is the mode of transition from closed authoritarianism to electoral authoritarianism. Indeed, the African pattern of transition from authoritarianism largely differentiates the region from Eastern Europe or Latin America. In the post-communist realm electoral authoritarian regimes emerged within the context of party collapse and the creation of newly independent states as in Belarus, while in Latin America
electoral authoritarianism appears to be either foundational after a revolution as with the Mexican PRI, or the result of democratic regression as in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. Limiting studies to specific contexts further helps to illuminate different arrays of possible causal variables. For instance, several scholars have identified the role of post-transition economic performance and control of nationalist narratives as relevant factors for understanding Eastern European cases.²⁵ Levitsky and Way examine Western linkage as a factor much more relevant in Latin American cases than in Africa or Eastern Europe. The focus on single-party regimes that have transitioned to electoral authoritarianism logically leads one to incorporating the role of incumbent political parties.

In recent years there has also been some debate over what set of variables matter more factors that are proximal to the election itself or the broader institutional and structural features of the regime.²⁶ Proximal factors might include the regime’s use of fraud and coercion to win elections.²⁷ For instance, William Case notes that regimes can employ “clumsy” versus “skilled” forms of manipulation. Incumbents have no way of knowing whether their use of fraud will backfire or not, which can lead to deep cuts in public legitimacy. However, this seems to be placing the metaphoric “cart in front of the horse.” It is just as likely that regimes that employ skilled forms of electoral manipulation are less likely to require clumsy forms to begin with and can win elections by other means. For this reason Andreas Schedler’s attempt to statistically test the correlation between fraud and democratization leads him to the conclusion that the relationship is highly ambiguous and that that “elephant of endogeneity” lurks behind the results.²⁸

²⁵ Ishiyama 1995, 1997; McFaul 2002; Way 2005
²⁶ Brownlee 2007; Bunce & Wolchik 2011
²⁷ On the various types of electoral fraud see Calingaert 2006; Lehoucq 2003
²⁸ Schedler 2009 p.193-194
Another set of proximal variables involve the actions taken by opposition parties such as coalitions, boycotts, or even the specific type of campaigns parties forward.\textsuperscript{29} Here the argument is that if opposition parties are able to overcome coordination dilemmas and the temptation to fractionalize they are more likely to be able and reduce the incumbent’s vote-share and perhaps secure victory at the polls. On the other hand, opposition boycotts appear to be detrimental strategies leading to much larger incumbent vote shares.\textsuperscript{30} Once again, the problem with these approaches is their difficulty overcoming issues of endogenous causation. For instance, opposition coalitions might propel the competitiveness of an election, vice-versa, or both. Likewise, it is not clear whether an opposition boycott increases the incumbent’s vote-share or occurs because that vote-share was already a forgone conclusion.

For precisely these reasons numerous scholars have turned their attention to the role of structural and institutional variables, and in particular the role of authoritarian parties.\textsuperscript{31} Whether explicitly discussed or used within the broader context of “organizational” or “institutional” power, political parties are seen as important institutions for perpetuating authoritarianism and winning elections.\textsuperscript{32} As discussed in detail in the next chapter, parties can provide authoritarian regimes with platforms for elite recruitment and retention, structures for mobilizing voters, and even coercive tools. Single-party regimes provide a unique opportunity for studying authoritarian parties since they have had decades behind them of institutional development, and importantly legacies of social incorporation. By contrast, military regimes that have transitioned to electoral

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Bunce & Wolchik 2011; Lindberg 2006; Howard & Roessler 2006; Rakner & van de Walle 2009; Schedler 2009]
\item[Lindberg 2006b]
\item[Studies that incorporate structural/institutional variables have looked at ethnic cleavage (Rakner & van de Walle 2009), legislative strength (Fish 2006), ballot structure (Rakner & van de Walle 2009), ideological capture (Greene 2007), long-term economic performance (Magaloni 2006), state power (Slater 2011), budget cycles (Blaydes 2011), and Western linkage and leverage (Levitsky and Way 2010).]
\item[Bunce & Wolchik 2011; Gandhi 2008; Geddes 2005; Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni & Kricheli 2010]
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
authoritarianism often only built their parties a few years before the first election, making it likely that other factors were at play in explaining their performance at the polls.

The Argument and Cases: Divergent Patterns of Party Building and Electoral Authoritarianism

In the chapters that follow I examine how differences in party capacity developed under single-party rule impacted whether a regime transitioned to a competitive hegemony or not. Parties that were elevated as significant decision-making institutions, were well-institutionalized, and had fairly credible and open avenues for elite recruitment are considered structurally articulate and were more likely to retain elites during periods of multiparty elections. Likewise, parties that invested into formal mechanisms for social mobilization and engaged in widely conceived social incorporation are considered socially robust and could rely on persistent electoral support. In the absence of these types of investment, as regimes transitioned to multiparty elections they were forced to rely much more on coercive means, and at times could only win by much slimmer margins.

The argument is that party capacity is a key differentiating factor between competitive and repressive forms of electoral authoritarianism by providing an institutional platform for elite and voter retention. Therefore, competitive hegemonic regimes reflect potentially much more durable forms of authoritarianism. On the other hand, when party capacity is weak regimes must rely on other factors to establish an electoral hegemony. Here the role of contingency becomes much more relevant. In the following chapters I consider a number of other factors such as economic performance, opposition capacity, the nature of electoral coercion, and importantly Western linkage and leverage.
While this dissertation compares all ten cases of former African single-party regimes that transitioned to electoral authoritarianism, it dedicates extensive space to the cases of Tanzania, Kenya (1992-2002), and Cameroon (Table 1.2). These three cases represent three variant trajectories of electoral authoritarianism. In Tanzania the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has decisively won each election since 1995. Concurrently, it has done so with comparatively much lower levels of fraud and coercion. By contrast, in Kenya the electoral authoritarian experience of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) lasted only a decade during which elections were closely contested affairs, eventually leading to a turnover in 2002. Moreover, fraud and violence were employed extensively in 1992 and 1997. Finally, while in Cameroon initial conditions mirrored Kenya’s, the ruling Cameroonian People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) has since been able to regain its dominance, with comparatively higher levels of repression. Therefore these cases reflect important variation in outcome – a competitive hegemony (Tanzania), a repressive electoral authoritarian regime (Kenya), and a repressive hegemony (Cameroon).

Table 1.2: Classifying the Range of Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competitive Hegemony</th>
<th>Repressive Hegemony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (1994-)</td>
<td>Cameroon (1992-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gabon (1990-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
<td>Repressive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Regime ended by electoral turnover; ** Regime ended by military coup

Likewise, the cases also reflect important variation in the evolution of party capacity under single-party rule. In Tanzania CCM and its predecessor the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) were elevated by first president Julius Nyerere as important decision-making organs and provided with resources, geographic breadth, and procedural integrity. In addition,
TANU maintained a strong dedication to rural development, most symbolically through its policy of *ujamaa* and rural villagization. By contrast, KANU was infamously mostly a “paper party” – a weakly defined institution that held together a multiethnic coalition through the strong position afforded the executive and the continuous delivery of patronage. KANU’s social incorporation was likewise much narrower, and relied on the ethnic support of the Kikuyu under Jomo Kenyatta and of the Kalenjin under Moi. This resembles Cameroon’s experience with single-party rule to some extent. The CPDM and its predecessor the Cameroonian National Union (CNU), while not as neglected as KANU, was also dominated by an executive who held together a multiethnic coalition that privileged their own sectarian base – the northern Fulani under Amadou Ahidjou and the southern Beti under Paul Biya. These contrasts in electoral authoritarian outcome and party capacity have driven the case-selection. Tanzania acts as a theory-confirming case, Kenya as a counter-factual case, and Cameroon as an equifinal case, or an alternative pathway to a similar outcome.

**Methodological Notes and Research Design**

This dissertation follows recent developments in qualitative and mixed methodologies by using typological theorizing, within-case process tracing, and some cross-case comparisons. In recent years qualitative methodology has expanded greatly in terms of available analytical tools and the standardization of methods. A common theme across this new literature, which this dissertation shares, is that while there are shared standards and goals across methodological

---

33 There have been significant developments in qualitative methodologies since the seminal work of King, Keohane and Verba (1994). The term “qualitative research” traditionally applied to the use of case-studies or the comparative method, and was seen as secondary and inferior to the use of statistical inference (e.g. Lijphart 1971). In recent years a growing amount of literature has emerged to defend and elaborate upon qualitative methodology as a distinct tradition, while also attempting to find synthesis between qualitative and quantitative work. These developments include innovations in concept formation, the development of process tracing, logic fuzzy-set analysis, typologies and typological theorizing, and wider bases for case selection. See Collier & Brady 2010; Collier & Elman 2008; Collier & Mahoney 1996; George & Bennett 2005; Gering 2012; Goertz & Mahoney 2012; Lieberman 2005; Mahoney 2010; Ragin 2000, 2008; Seawright & Gerring 2008; and van Evera 1997
schools (which for these purposes refers to the qualitative versus quantitative division), qualitative methodologies are driven by a unique logic of inquiry. As such, the arguments presented here do not strive to provide universal laws or generalizable implications far beyond the case-selection. The methods discussed below help to verify the causal claims regarding each individual case and to draw some limited conclusions regarding the entire range of African single-party regimes. Moreover, causal inference is established differently – rather than using an analysis of congruent variation or conjunction across cases, this dissertation develops causal inference largely through causal-process observations.

Causal process observations (CPOs) are fundamental building blocks of process-tracing and distinct from data-set observations (DSOs). As Collier and Brady put it, “A causal-process observation is an insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process or mechanism and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal inference.” As such, the number of CPOs does not necessarily matter as much as the leverage gained from singular pieces of evidence. CPO evidence might not be comparable across cases due its focus on process and sequence, which might be unique to certain cases. Moreover, as opposed to a more “frequentist” approach to causal inference, the use of CPOs relates more to notions of Bayesian causal inference and counter-factual analysis. Prior theoretical expectations regarding a case will drive the leverage gained from novel facts.

CPOs also form the basis of process-tracing used for the development of a theory or within-case verification of a theory. While initially conceived as a method for tracing policy decision-making sequences, process-tracing has come to encompass a much wider approach

---

34 Beck 2010; Collier, Brady, & Seawright 2010; and Mahoney 2010
35 Collier & Brady 2004 p.277-278
36 Mahoney 2010 p.124
37 George & Bennett 2005 p.219; Bennett 2010 p.708
David Collier writes that “Process tracing…is an analytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena.” Not unlike a medical diagnostician, under this understanding of process-tracing a case would look for strong CPO evidence that either confirms or disconfirms theoretical expectations. There are four types of tests generated by CPOs according to this approach that provide necessary and/or sufficient evidence for establishing causal inference – Hoop Tests, Straws in the Wind, Doubly Decisive Tests, and Smoking Guns. While passing a doubly decisive test is the strongest CPO (simultaneously confirming a theory while disconfirming others), it is also highly unlikely in social science research. Instead, most scholars rely on combinations of hoop tests and smoking guns to incrementally make their case.

The types of tests presented in this dissertation are largely hoop tests. While passage of a hoop test presents strong evidence in a theory’s favor, it cannot affirm causal inference with certainty on its own. However, failure to pass a hoop test eliminates a posited hypothesis. Therefore, the combination of successful hoop tests for the relevant theory and an unsuccessful hoop test for rival theories provides a more stable ground for causal inference. The evidence used to pass hoop tests is often descriptive and was gathered largely through historical research and fieldwork in Tanzania and Kenya. During that fieldwork, extensive interviews were conducted with political participants (opposition and incumbent) to gain insights into the inner-

---

38 Generally, there appears to be some disagreement over the parameters of process-tracing and whether it should clearly link individual sequences from cause to outcome, or find theoretical implications. The former seems much more useful for comparative politics research where there is often non-linear and complex causal process at play. Moreover, in historical analysis factors that are more structural or institutional might not lend themselves to the former understanding of process-tracing. For more see the overview by George & Bennett (2005 p.205-232) and the discussion of different forms of CPOs in Mahoney 2010.
39 Collier 2011 p. 824
40 Collier 2011; George & Bennett 2005 p. 117; van Everra 1997
41 In this sense the use of CPOs and process-tracing is similar to Bennett’s notion of Bayesian inductive elimination (Bennett 2010).
workings of incumbent parties and the constraints upon opposition expansion. However, some evidence is also quantitative and takes the form of within-case statistical analysis. For instance, finding that patterns of electoral support does not correlate statistically with levels of economic development helps eliminate that factor as an explanation for that case.

The dissertation also makes use of some comparative means of generating theoretical leverage and typological theorizing. While not explicitly using structured comparisons, the three selected cases offer points of contrast and comparison. The limitation of formal structured comparisons based on Mill’s methods of agreement and disagreement have been well-noted.\textsuperscript{42} Cases are rarely sufficiently similar, there are always confounding variables, and the method does not allow for equifinal or complex causation. Absent complementary process-tracing it is difficult to develop causal inferences based solely on comparison. Therefore, this dissertation is not as explicit in its comparison but uses counter-factual thought experiments to compare cases. For instance, we might ask what a case like Kenya’s would look like with similar party capacities as Tanzania’s, or inquire if opposition behavior is a key explanatory variable why did it appear to not matter as much in one case as it did in the other.

Typological theorizing offers an alternative to structured comparison and the limitations of within-case analysis by allowing the delineation of multiple pathways to an outcome. Explanatory typologies, as opposed to conceptual typologies, specify scores for independent and dependent variables and notes how these variables operate individually, but also explores "contingent generalizations."\textsuperscript{43} In addition, such theorizing is useful for case-selection and in conjunction with process-tracing can provide solid grounding for causal inference. However, for these purposes typological theorizing is used primarily as a way to model causal complexity.

\textsuperscript{42} See George & Bennett 2005 p.153-156
\textsuperscript{43} George & Bennett 2005 p.235. See also Elman 2005.
Typological theorizing allows us to capture two important aspects of this study – path dependency and equifinality. Central to the argument is that strong single-party capacities have significant and determinative impacts on electoral authoritarian outcomes. On the other hand, within the context of weaker single-party capacities other variables come into play leading to similar outcomes via different possible causal paths.

Finally, a few caveats regarding studying and conducting fieldwork in authoritarian settings. Authoritarian countries are obviously not very open about their inner workings, and will clearly not admit that they manipulate election results. Moreover, data on election results from these countries can at times be circumspect. On the other hand, opposition parties have an incentive to overstate the extent of repression in order to cover up their own shortcomings. As a researcher, one is left with the delicate task of parsing through what is reliable information and what is hyperbole. At times throughout this dissertation I will note the source of data and consider its reliability. While individual pieces of evidence might be challenged, I argue that the cumulative impact of evidentiary material presented helps sustain the main arguments. At times these materials also need to be gathered in creative ways and often indirectly. For instance, to assess the impact of a regime’s social incorporation, in-depth discussions with opposition parties regarding their campaign strategies can be useful in determining what is actually hindering their expansion. Again, the cumulative impact of this evidence strengthens the argument.

**Plan of the Dissertation**

The dissertation proceeds in three parts. Part I looks at the broader picture by discussing the role and conceptualization of authoritarian parties and theorizing the relationship between party capacity and electoral authoritarian outcomes. Chapter 2 discusses the concepts of structural articulation and social robustness in more detail and shows how they provide better
ways for understanding authoritarian parties built under single-party rule. I also discuss how incorporating the role of parties is superior to other approaches such as modernization theory, electoral design, strong executives, and state capacity. Chapter 3 takes that understanding of party capacity and applies it to the full range of ten potential cases in a typological theory. The typological space evaluates the role of party capacity along with economic performance, opposition party capacity, and Western linkage and leverage.

Part II is dedicated to exploring the evolution of party capacity in the three selected cases for detailed analysis. Chapters 4-6 are based on extensive secondary and some primary document research. Each chapter traces the indicators of structural articulation and social robustness during the single-party period, and also notes changes in party capacity as each case transitioned to new executives amidst regional economic downturn. Chapter 3 discusses Tanzania and how Julius Nyerere used ujamaa as a key ideological force with which to reform the ruling party and launch a massive campaign of redistribution toward Tanzania’s subsistence sector. In 1985, Nyerere stepped down and the executive transitioned to Ali Hassan Mwini who oversaw massive economic restructuring and some important changes to the party. Chapter 4 looks at the case of Kenya and describes how KANU was utterly neglected by Jomo Kenyatta. It also evaluates the changes made after 1978 when the executive shifted to Daniel arap Moi who launched a party revitalization program. Chapter 5 examines the CNU and CPDM and evaluates the more moderate party capacity developed under both Amadou Ahidjo and his successor Paul Biya.

Part III turns to a study of how these parties competed in multiparty elections and tests the implications of their party capacities. These chapters are based in part on secondary sources, but also field interviews and within-case statistical analysis of the correlation between incumbent vote-shares and a number of relevant variables. Chapter 7 analyzes how CCM transitioned into a
competitive hegemony. I show how elite defection has been almost non-existent and how executive succession has occurred twice without splitting the party. Likewise, CCM has maintained a significant mobilization advantage, but especially from districts that benefitted disproportionately from *ujamaa*. The chapter also posits a number of alternative explanations such as the role of opposition parties, electoral coercion, and resource asymmetry and argues that they fail to pass critical hoop tests to explain CCM’s competitive hegemony.

Chapters 8 and 9 are dedicated to Kenya and Cameroon and explore first why they transitioned to repressive rather than competitive regimes and second why Cameroon was able to eventually able to establish electoral hegemony while Cameroon was not. In each case after the transition to multiparty elections there was as expected much higher levels of elite defection and severe tensions within the party over the issue of executive succession. Similarly, neither regime could rely on wide electoral support and instead had to mobilize more narrow ethnic communities to win elections marginally. However, these chapters also investigate a number of contingent factors – opposition capacity, electoral coercion, and Western linkage and leverage. I argue here that the primary differentiating factor is the much higher degree of Western linkage and leverage in Kenya, which ultimately also impacted the capacity of the opposition and the ability of the regime to continually use coercion.
PART I : THE BROADER PICTURE
Chapter 2: Single-Party Regimes and Electoral Authoritarian Variation

This chapter overviews the literature on authoritarian parties and offers a theory that relates party capacity as established under single-party rule to electoral authoritarian outcomes. In particular I explain how certain party capacities facilitated the transition to competitive hegemonies. Political parties have a long research pedigree dating back to the influential and now classic works of authors such as Weber, Duverger, and Michels, and are a bellwether in the study of democratic politics.\(^1\) However, the growth of single-party regimes in communist countries and across the developing world forced scholars to reconsider parties within a non-democratic context. Subsequently, this gave rise to inquiries into the origins of single-party regimes and their relationship to modernization.\(^2\) With the onset of the Third Wave, attention shifted to studying the durability of single-party authoritarianism in the face of global change and a deeper inquiry into how authoritarian parties perpetuate authoritarian rule.\(^3\) Throughout these developments two main questions have driven the discussion – what is it that parties in authoritarian settings actually do, and how are we to characterize differences in authoritarian parties or settings? For instance, are single-party regimes a monolithic category or are there differences in how they are structured and operate?

While we have gained important insights into how parties sustain authoritarianism, we still do not have a clear conceptualization of authoritarian parties or a theory that effectively

---

\(^1\) A very limited sample would include Aldrich 1995; Apter 1964; Downs 1957; Duverger 1954; Key 1964; Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Michels 2010; Ostrogorsky 1902; Sartori 1976; and Weber 1946

\(^2\) See in particular Coleman & Rosberg 1968; Huntington & Moore 1970; and LaPalombara & Weiner 1969

\(^3\) Recent prominent research on the comparative durability of party-based authoritarianism includes Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2010; Geddes 1999; and Levitsky & Way 2010
links differences in party evolution under single-party rule to electoral authoritarian outcomes. Instead authoritarian parties are often unclearly differentiated as weak or strong with greater reference to survival and demise rather than electoral variation. We know that parties can provide authoritarian regimes with some distinct advantages – a platform to maintain elite loyalty, a mechanism for social mobilization, and a tool for social monitoring – but understand much less what determines these capacities and how they impact the regime’s capacity to compete in elections. Within the African context, a wave of literature on single-party regimes that followed independence notably overstated their strength, many of which ultimately succumbed to military coups. For over a decade, very little was written about differences in the inner-workings of the surviving African single-party states.

This chapter offers an alternative conceptualization of single-party regimes and notes how differences in party development impacts trajectories of electoral authoritarian variation. It first discusses our theoretical understanding of what authoritarian parties do and how they might perpetuate authoritarianism and electoral authoritarianism. It then overviews a number of existing approaches to classifying political parties, authoritarian parties, and single-party regimes. I make the argument that these are either inadequate for the research question at hand or need to be significantly amended. Instead, I offer an alternative by suggesting two concepts to characterize party development under single-party rule – structural articulation and social robustness. The former refers to the coherence and permanence of governing institutions, the effectiveness of elite recruitment, and the position of the party vis-à-vis other political institutions. The latter refers to the size and scope of the party’s formal organizations for social

---

4 There is some work on the impact of single-party legacies on the ability of formerly communist parties to win elections in democratic settings (See Kitschelt 1995; Ishiyama 1995; and Ishiyama 1997) and on the likelihood of African electoral transition (Bratton & van de Walle 1997).
5 See the critiques made in Bienen 1979 and Zolberg 1967
6 Some exceptions include Collier 1982 and Liebenow 1986
mobilization, but also to the consequences of the regime’s central political and economic policies and their impact upon the type of social coalition the party relies on. These two concepts constitute the basis of a theory of party capacity, which is then related to electoral authoritarian outcomes. Finally, a number of alternative approaches to the study of electoral authoritarian variation are discussed.

**What Do Authoritarian Parties Do? Elite Retention, Social Mobilization, Public Monitoring**

Political parties hold a cherished place in the literature on democratic politics and state-development and are conceived as institutions that both solve elite coordination problems and provide necessary representative and expressive roles. However, in authoritarian settings, political parties are key institutions in the perpetuation of authoritarian rule. Barbara Geddes has been instrumental in arguing that single-party forms of authoritarianism are unique in their longevity and durability as compared with military or “personalistic” regimes. Several studies have found persistent correlations between single-party authoritarianism and longevity, a reduced number of military coups, and even economic growth. The posited reason is that parties are uniquely suited to the task of effectively resolving intra-elite conflict. Geddes argues that when divisions arise among elites, the incentive to remain loyal is very high due to the individual costs of defection. By contrast, when militaries govern states intra-elite conflict within the ruling junta threatens the institution of the military itself, which makes it easier for the military to cede power back to civilian rulers. By this understanding, parties lengthen “the time horizons on

---

7 Sartori 1976; Aldrich 1995
8 Geddes 1999
9 On the longevity of single-party authoritarianism see Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999; Geddes 2003; Smith 2005; Magaloni 2008; Magaloni & Kricheli 2010. On their ability to resist military coups see Cox 2008; Magaloni & Kricheli 2010. On their record of economic growth see Gandhi 2008; Gehlbach & Keefer 2008; Keefer 2008; and Wright 2008
which leaders weigh gains and losses,” and provide an institutional mechanism for resolving disputes.\textsuperscript{10}

Delving deeper into the correlation between single-party authoritarianism and longevity, other scholars have begun to elaborate on the causal process at play. Beatriz Magaloni has articulated how parties can effectively solve the “dictator’s dilemma,” whereby participants in the ruler’s coalition have no way of credibly knowing whether commitments will be upheld.\textsuperscript{11} Parties that control access to positions of power can maintain credible commitments through the institutionalization of certain practices like primaries. Likewise, Gelbach and Keefer note that parties are good at preserving credible commitments when they maintain intra-party transparency and focused expectations, again through the institutionalization of practice.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, some authoritarian parties are theoretically more “successful” than others because they provide a more level-playing field for elites, and are more successful when they can signal continued access, regular practice, and perhaps even fairness and equity.

On the other hand, party-based authoritarianism appears to be more resilient due to its unique mobilization capacity. This mobilization, often operative during single-party elections and during periods of electoral authoritarianism, allows incumbents to recruit new elites, co-opt oppositions, assess their own support, protect themselves from military coups or rebellions, and establish international legitimacy.\textsuperscript{13} Magaloni goes further to claim that the credibility of commitments between a ruler and their coalition is strengthened when the party is perceived as long-lasting. Electoral mobilization helps dictators “project an image of invincibility and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} Brownlee 2007 p.12 \\
\textsuperscript{11} Magaloni 2008. Other less effective ways of maintaining commitments between a ruler and his coalition are through legislative concessions (Gandhi 2008), private transfer (de Mesquita et al 2003), or organizational proliferation (Magaloni & Kricheli 2010) \\
\textsuperscript{12} Gehlbach & Keefer 2008 \\
\textsuperscript{13} See Acemoglu & Robinson 2005; Cox 2008; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009; Geddes 2006; Magaloni 2006; and Schedler 2006
\end{flushleft}
strength” to deter defections; this can lead to a very stable and long-lasting authoritarian equilibrium. As a result, parties have an interest in investing into mobilizing institutions like party youth wings, unions, or party cells. Moreover, parties have an incentive to maintain high levels of economic growth, or to create an effective system of rewards and punishments to ensure voter support. The regime’s control of public goods and the budget-cycle allows them to distribute patronage to supporters while punishing detractors.

Parties also provide authoritarian regimes with a source of stability through their capacity to monitor and coerce. Parties with countrywide presence down to the grassroots level can provide an effective apparatus that allows regimes to gather information about potential dissidents. Levitsky and Way note that authoritarian parties can act as substitutes or extensions of state power. Therefore, parties not only limit the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown to begin with, but “also ensure that defectors are less likely to succeed.” Moreover, in electoral authoritarian regimes, well-developed parties can also be utilized in new coercive ways by deterring opposition parties from expanding, or even by facilitating electoral fraud. Markedly, this type of public monitoring and coercion is often continually at work rather than employed simply for an election, and is therefore much more covert than coercion that is employed by security services or other state institutions.

As summarized in Figure 2.1 parties therefore perpetuate authoritarianism by fulfilling three functions – providing a mechanism that ensures greater elite loyalty predominantly through the maintenance of credible commitments, and a complementary system for popular mobilization

---

14 Magaloni 2008 p.729. Magaloni is discussing the hegemony of the Mexican PRI, which was technically not a single-party regime. However, there is no reason to dismiss the insights regarding the relationship between social mobilization and elite loyalty when applied to single-party regimes. Social mobilization can provide the same function, albeit perhaps less credibly or with less consequence due to the closed nature of the regime.

15 Blaydes 2011; Block 2002; Magaloni 2006, 2008 p. 729

16 Levitsky & Way 2010 p.62
and monitoring (that can be used in conjunction with elections).\textsuperscript{17} The outcome generally associated with the presence of such parties is authoritarian survival. However, we know that while single-party regimes endured for similar periods of time, once they transitioned to multiparty elections some survived while others did not, and those that did survive transitioned to very different forms of electoral authoritarianism. Indeed, under closed electoral conditions very disparate parties were able to survive by other mechanisms. The most obvious difference is that without contestation the cost of defection is much higher.

\textbf{Figure 2.1: The Functions and Consequences of Authoritarian Parties}

The question is whether these insights are relevant for understanding electoral authoritarian variation? How might mechanisms of elite retention, social mobilization, and public monitoring impact a regime’s propensity toward fraud and capacity to generate large vote-shares rather than just its survival? To answer this question requires a theoretical framework that links party capacity and electoral authoritarian outcomes, but also a clearer way to conceptualize authoritarian parties with regard to these theoretical functions. Beatriz Magaloni readily admits this problem, writing that her own account of authoritarian parties does not “address the problem of origins – how successful and credible political parties get established in the first place,” only

\textsuperscript{17} See also Magaloni and Kircheli 2010 for more on these distinctions.
how certain authoritarian equilibrium might function. This issue becomes compounded when analyzing not just authoritarian parties, but parties that ruled for decades in single-party regimes.

**Conceptualizing Authoritarian Parties and Single-Party Regimes: An Overview of Approaches**

There are a number of literatures on political parties, authoritarian parties, and single-party regimes from which one can draw insights. Unfortunately, they all suffer from some significant shortcomings. First, there have been several attempts at creating overarching party typologies based on fairly descriptive factors, such as the party’s proclaimed ideological orientation, central function, and organizational thickness. Recently, Gunther and Diamond have extended this approach to cover non-Western parties and provide more coverage and conciseness. Their typology examines the breadth of the party’s formal organization (mass or narrow), the party’s programmatic commitments (ideological or pragmatic, and the party’s toleration of pluralism (pluralistic or proto-hegemonic). This allows them to identify five overarching party-types (elite based, mass based, ethnicity based, electoralist, and movement parties), and fifteen distinct party-types that range from “elite-clientelistic” to “socialist class-mass”.

Notably, this general approach toward classification of parties was applied early-on to Africa’s nascent party systems after de-colonialization. Often these parties were the predecessors of single-party regimes and were involved in the anti-colonial struggle. The analytical impetus at

---

18 Magaloni 2008 p.725
19 Approaches that look at the functional aspects of parties include Neumann’s distinction between parties of individual representation and parties of social integration (1956), Kitschelt’s distinction between parties of electoral competition and parties of constituency representation (1989), and Woinetz’s distinction among vote-seeking, policy-seeking, and office-seeking parties (2002). Organizational approaches include Duverger’s types of cadre, mass, and devotee parties (1954), Kitschelt’s four-part classification of “centralist clubs,” “Lenninst cadre parties, “decentralized clubs,” and “centralized mass parties” (1994), and Panebianco’s mass-bureaucratic and electoral-professional types (1988). Otto Kircheimer combines these approaches by distinguishing bourgeois, class-mass, denominational, and catch-all parties (1966).
20 Gunther & Diamond 2003 p.171
the time was to understand why single-parties emerged, how they differed, and whether they were up to the tough tasks of national integration and economic development.\(^{21}\) Authoritarian parties were seen as crucial institutions linking new mass participants to elites – the inevitable result of the inherent weakness of state institutions and fragmented national identities across Africa. Single-party regimes were often categorized descriptively and according to their internal formal structures and ideologies. These classifications, perhaps most strongly articulated by Coleman and Rosberg made distinctions between mass and patron, pragmatic and revolutionary, and centralized and decentralized parties.\(^{22}\)

However, the reality of African politics after independence shed significant doubt on these classifications. African single-party regimes were notably weak, having successfully pushed for independence but then failing at exerting control over their countries’ peripheries. As Henry Bienen noted, “the characteristics attributed to political systems in Africa were often based on images that African parties wanted to convey to the world and themselves,” rather than any objective reality.\(^{23}\) Likewise, Samuel Huntington argued that African single-party regimes should simply be categorized as weak, since they were not forged out of clear social bifurcations and lacked the necessary revolutionary impetus to push forward sweeping social agendas or institutionalize into recurrent political patterns as in the communist states.\(^{24}\) Immanuel Wallerstein questioned whether parties in Africa served any representative or mobilizing function at all. Party activity was often dormant and gave way to the use of informal institutions.

\(^{21}\) See the essays in LaPalombara & Weiner 1969 and Rosberg & Coleman 1964
\(^{22}\) Coleman & Rosberg 1964; Hodgkins 1961; Morgenthau 1964; and Zolberg 1966
\(^{23}\) Bienen 1979 p. 41
\(^{24}\) Huntington 1970 p.12-13
and networks of patronage as the primary site of political activity. Wallerstein categorized this as the “no-party” state.  

These concerns found some empirical validation rather quickly, when several of Africa’s single-party regimes succumbed to military coups in the early 1960s. Coups quickly swept regimes in Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Clearly, the descriptive criteria used by scholars had missed key sources of weakness. However it is likewise equally clear that predictions regarding the death of African parties were premature. Those parties that survived early tensions went on to lead their countries for decades, making it impossible to disregard them as no-party states. However, as elections became key institutions under single-party rule, scholarly attention during the 1970s and 1980s largely avoided finding new ways of classifying African parties and party systems.

All this simply highlights the shortcomings of the descriptive approach to party classification, even in its most recent reincarnation. First there is a disregard for distinctions between democratic and authoritarian parties and their concurrent functional differences. Second, this has led scholars to imbue descriptive meanings upon parties that are not grounded in any observed reality of what the party is in practice. While there are potentially research questions that might find such typologies useful, they simply do not capture the abovementioned aspects of authoritarian parties. Instead, what is needed is an approach that looks with much greater detail at the precise nature of party institutions and their relationship to our understanding of what authoritarian parties do.

A second and recent line of research tackles authoritarian parties more directly by looking at the context of regime formation and how that might influence the party’s capacity to

---

25 Wallerstein 1966  
26 Collier 1982 p.96  
27 See Collier 1982, p.98 fn.4
resolve elite conflict. In Ruth Collier’s study of African single-parties, she notes how domination at the time of independence led to a greater resolution of elite conflict and therefore a more stable regime that was less prone to military coups.\(^\text{28}\) Moreover, she differentiated the type of electoral model adopted by single-party regimes – whether plebiscitary or competitive – as defining the quality of governance within the party. Plebiscitary regimes tended to solidify long-lasting coalitions while competitive regimes tended towards more overt patronage and competitive clientelism.\(^\text{29}\) Notably, Bratton and van de Walle used this categorization in their study of African electoral transitions. They found that plebiscitary regimes were more likely to hold national conferences while competitive regimes were more likely to hold rapid elections, however found no strong correlations between these party institutions and regime breakdown.\(^\text{30}\)

This approach has recently been employed by two other notable authors. Benjamin Smith argues that parties with little access to resources at their inception, or those that faced robust opposition, were forced to create more credible institutions that were conciliatory in nature. By contrast, parties with access to resources or those that faced weak opposition could buy-off oppositions without investing into party institutions. These latter types of parties were more likely to breakdown after the onset of the Third Wave.\(^\text{31}\) Similarly, Jason Brownlee maintains that the level of elite conflict at the inception of the party was highly determinative of subsequent patterns. If parties were able to resolve major policy disputes at their inception, the ruling alliance was likely to hold and the regime would endure pressures for democratization.\(^\text{32}\)

\(^{28}\) Collier 1982 p. 105
\(^{29}\) Collier 1982 p.118-139
\(^{30}\) Bratton & van de Walle 1997 p.173-177
\(^{31}\) Smith 2005
\(^{32}\) Brownlee 2007. This is similar to Dan Slater’s argument (2010), however he places the role of political parties as secondary to the role of state capacity.
The use of regime origins to explain authoritarian patterns is noteworthy because of its greater attention to the nature of political institutions rather than their descriptive attributes. However, it too suffers from some shortcomings. First, most of these studies are preoccupied with the question of regime breakdown versus survival (or their resistance to electoral reform), rather than electoral authoritarian variation. Second, there is a danger in conflating inception with the process of regime reproduction. The more relevant question is not necessarily what conditions held at the beginning of the party (although this again might matter for certain research questions), but what kind of institutions did the party actually build? For instance, Benjamin Smith claims that parties without access to resources at their inception did not invest in party structures, but he is not specific regarding what party structures might have mattered.

A third approach to draw from looks at the slightly ambiguous question of party institutionalization. Here we must first make a distinction between party institutionalization and party-system institutionalization. While the terms might be related (i.e. more institutionalized parties lead to more institutionalized party-systems), they are distinct, especially when dealing with the categorization of single-party regimes. Party-system institutionalization most often looks at the volatility of party-systems and is used largely within democratic contexts. Party institutionalization, while also used within democratic contexts, refers to the process by which parties become reified and acquire stability and value-infusion. Focus is usually given to the internal practices of the party and the party’s public perception. In this sense, the process of party institutionalization has direct relevance for our understanding of how authoritarian parties can bind elites through credible commitments and social mobilization. Indeed, the term is mentioned

33 Randal & Svasand 2002
34 See Mainwaring & Scully 1995 for the best overview of party system institutionalization. For an African application see Kuenzi & Lambright 2001
often, albeit without much specificity, in several of the abovementioned authors’ work on authoritarian parties.

However, the term “institutionalization” carries various meanings and is often short on observable measures. The term itself appears to date back to Samuel Huntington’s seminal work on the role of political parties during the process of socio-economic modernization. According to Huntington, better institutionalized parties are adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent.\(^{35}\) The most observable measures is party longevity (as a proxy for adaptability), which has since been used by scholars such as Geddes and Brownlee as a proxy for institutionalization.\(^{36}\) In more recent scholarship, Steven Levitsky differentiates institutionalization according to whether the organization goes through a process of “value-infusion” and “behavioral routinization”.\(^{37}\) When parties become entities valued in-of-themself and outside of their original function or policy-based goal, they are infused with value. When parties begin to exhibit regular and predictable internal behavior and abide by rules they have become routinized. The two terms, as Levitsky notes, are distinct as exemplified in the case of Peronism in Argentina, which scored high on value-infusion but low on behavioral routinization.

Other work has built on these insights into institutionalization and extended them to African contexts. Randall and Svasand combine other measures of institutionalization such as external validation (public perceptions) and decisional autonomy (dependency on other political institutions). This allows them to conceive of parties as possessing structural and attitudinal features. Parties are organizations with rules and procedures, but they also reflect the attitudes of participants. Moreover, parties can be assessed along both external measures (the party has

\(^{35}\) Huntington 1968 p. 12-24. These aspects were also noted by Huntington as factors that facilitate the transition of revolutionary single-party regimes to a more pragmatic stage (Huntington 1970).

\(^{36}\) Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007. The use of age as a proxy for institutionalization is highly misleading, especially with regard to the current set of cases since all parties are of nearly the same age.

\(^{37}\) Levitsky 1998. See also Panebianco 1988; Powell & Dimaggio 1991; and Selznick 1957
decisional autonomy and is reified in the minds of citizens) and internal measures (the party has value-infusion and behavioral routinzation). Basedau and Stroh use the same distinction between internal and external aspects of party institutionalization, but instead of measuring structural and attitudinal dimensions they use the terms “stability” and “value-infusion.” Parties are measured accordingly by their roots in society, external autonomy, level of organization, and coherence. In an important step forward, Basedau and Stroh develop an index of party institutionalization based on their four-party typology and note observable indicators such as alterations in party leadership, membership strength, and the degree of internal factionalism. This allows for a much more observational and process-based approach to conceptualizing authoritarian parties.

While several of these insights from the literature on institutionalization are valid, they need to be adapted to analyze the single-party context. For instance, external measures of party institutionalization such as roots in society might not be very relevant for authoritarian settings. In addition, while measures of party institutionalization are relevant to the credibility of commitments within an authoritarian party, there are other factors that impact them as well. For example, the process of elite recruitment is largely missing from this discussion. Here we can also look at the institutionalization of practices – the regularity of recruitment and the openness of competition. However, for authoritarian parties we would also be concerned with whether there are rewards for loyalty and service. Moreover there is also a distinction between elite recruitment that imposes some discipline on new members and that which simply recruits the metaphoric “highest bidder.” Elites that are socialized into party life (e.g. through ideological training) are likely to stake their claim within that party for longer, while those that are not can

38 Randal & Svasand 2002
39 Basedau & Stroh 2008. The two stabilizing generating aspects of parties are their roots in society and level of organization, while their value-infusion aspects are their autonomy and internal coherence.
more easily establish independent power bases to compete or balance against the ruling elite. There is also hardly any mention of the two other central theoretical claims made regarding authoritarian parties – mobilization capacity and public monitoring.

Finally, it is important to discuss two significant works that are more explicit in their conceptualization of authoritarian parties and relationship to electoral authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way, in their encompassing study of competitive authoritarian regimes, use measures of party scope and cohesion as a sub-dimension of their broader category of organizational power. This is observed with reference to the size of the party’s physical infrastructure and whether there are sources of elite cohesion outside of patronage such as sectarian identity or a history of nationalist struggle.40 In Beatriz Magaloni’s study of hegemonic parties and the Mexican PRI she surprisingly does not differentiate parties according to their internal institutionalization (although she does mention succession), but according to their mobilization efficacy. This efficacy is measured according to the regime’s long-term economic performance (which might in fact be out of the party’s hands) and its capacity to manipulate budget-cycles to reward loyalists and punish defectors.41

This scholarship has significantly influenced study, yet it is strange that while these authors have been instrumental in the conceptualization of both party institutionalization and authoritarian parties, they rely very little on those insights in their empirical work. Levitsky and Way’s conceptualization fits within the descriptive and origins-based approaches to party classification (albeit with some additional input from the literature on institutionalization). As a result, their notion of how political parties sustain authoritarianism is limited to the coercive aspects of parties and does not conceive of any sources outside of ideology or ethnicity to bind

40 Levitsky & Way 2010 p.61-66
41 Magaloni 2006 p.21
elites. Similarly, Magaloni’s conception of mobilization capacity is rather limited. Implicit in her argument is that prior to the use of budget-cycles a significant segment of the population had already decided to either support or oppose the regime. Authoritarian regimes do not randomly divvy carrots and sticks, but respond to developments in their patterns of support. Single-party regimes in particular have the ability to establish strong constituencies or conversely alienate constituencies due to their extend time in power. This requires a much deeper analysis of the social and economic policies enacted by the regime and especially the process of social incorporation.

These approaches to the classification of parties are summarized in Table 2.1. To recap, the descriptive and origin-based approaches are not very useful for the research question at hand, and suffer from significant shortcomings when it comes to the conceptualization of single-parties. The literature on party institutionalization, rooted more in observation and process, holds several insights that can be applied to the authoritarian context with some amendment. None of the current approaches directly tackle our fundamental understanding of how authoritarian parties work or might serve incumbents during elections. In other words, we need to conceptualize authoritarian parties (and especially those built under single-party rule) with much more direct reference to their elite and social functions and with much more attention to actual observations of the party in practice rather than their descriptive qualities. This is taken up with the introduction of the terms structural articulation and social robustness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptualization Basis</th>
<th>Examples of Party Types</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Descriptive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Thick vs. Thin</td>
<td>Simple categories that allow for easy comparison</td>
<td>No distinction between democratic and authoritarian context No relationship to theoretical understanding of parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centralized vs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wide vs. Scope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Left Wing vs. Right</td>
<td></td>
<td>Less attention to actual party practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary vs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional</strong></td>
<td>Elite vs. Patron</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral vs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origins-Based</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination at</td>
<td>Dominant vs. Non-</td>
<td>Attention to actual potential patterns of party life</td>
<td>Focus on survival vs. demise Less attention to regime reproduction and actual institutional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Dominant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Pattern</td>
<td>Plebiscitary vs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Resource</td>
<td>Accessible vs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Accessible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Strength</td>
<td>Strong vs. Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Conflict</td>
<td>Resolved vs. Non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observational</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Institutionalization</td>
<td>Institutionalized vs.</td>
<td>Strong focus on actual party practice</td>
<td>Not applied comprehensively in empirical work Needs to expand on range of sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Institutionalized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Cohesion</td>
<td>Material vs. Non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward-Punishment</td>
<td>Available vs. Non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Developing the Concepts of Structural Articulation and Social Robustness

While drawing on some of the insights noted above, this section outlines the concepts of structural articulation and social robustness, which present a more direct and observational-based approach for evaluating party development under single-party rule. Both of these dimensions look at formal organizations but more importantly they assess party practice with reference to their capacity to maintain elite loyalty and mobilize social support, which ultimately also impacts their ability to publicly monitor. Moreover, these two concepts give attention to the fact that parties under single-party conditions were evolving entities that at time made significant social and economic commitments to defined constituencies. Combined, structural articulation and social robustness provide the assessment for a measure of party capacity (See Appendix II).

Structural Articulation: Keeping Elites Bound to the Party

Structural articulation refers to three observable factors that can impact a party’s capacity to keep elites bound to the party, largely through the party’s ability to deliver credible commitments. First, it refers to the extent of party institutionalization. Parties that are more institutionalized can serve authoritarian purposes by exuding permanence and by providing voice to political aspirants. Institutionalized parties are those that have invested heavily into institutions such as functionary offices at the national and sub-national levels and those that hold regular party congresses where party members have an opportunity to express their voice. Likewise, highly institutionalized are usually wide-reaching institutions with chapters and branches throughout the country, at times down to a very small grassroots level. Yet, it is not enough for these structures to merely exist; they must also exhibit patterns of routinization. Therefore, we should observe evidence of secure funding for party operations, high levels of
membership, and enforced rules of internal governance that make party participation more credible and accessible.

Second, structural articulation refers to the processes of elite recruitment and retention. The challenge for autocrats is to continually recruit new elites while maintaining the loyalty of both winners and losers. Under single-party rule there are two ways rulers recruit new elites – through appointment and elections. Theoretically, elections are much more conducive toward greater elite loyalty since they potentially level the playing field. Yet, it also depends on how those elections operate in practice. For instance, as Ruth Collier noted, there is a broader distinction between competitive and plebiscitary single-party elections. In competitive elections since there are multiple candidates from the same party contesting a legislative seat in front of voters it increases the amount of elite access. By contrast, in plebiscitary regimes candidates usually vie against each other in an internal primary, which means that access to a legislative office is often the decision of a limited range of people who sit on a party’s central committee or national congress. In these cases, who you know might be more important than who supports you.

However, even within competitive regimes a key factor is level and repeated access, which in practice means a primary system that gives aspiring elites a fair chance and reinsures losers that they might compete another day. One mechanism to help ensure this is to impose some procedural integrity upon the nomination process, which relates to the abovementioned process of party institutionalization. Another way is to enforce some form of ideological guidelines upon candidates that limits the role of personal wealth and increases the importance of merit. This is an important distinction in the African context between parties that simply recruit the “highest bidder” or the staunchest “party man.” This process of elite recruitment also extends
to party offices (which increases the points of access aspiring elites have), but perhaps most crucially to the process by which a party selects its executive. Parties that have institutionalized mechanism of executive succession (often through primaries) are considered more structurally articulate.

Third, structural articulation refers to the position of the party vis-à-vis other central political institutions. This too contributes to the perception that the party is both the central avenue for promotion and that it is well-established. Primarily, the relationship between the party and the executive is likely to be highly determinative. Single-party regimes that concede significant decision-making power to party institutions such as national congresses or executive committees signal that participation in the party is likely to reap more benefits. The balance between the power of the party and other political institutions such as the civil administration, military and security services, or the legislature is likely to produce similar results and ensure that the party remains the main institution for elite promotion.

Therefore, structurally articulate parties are those where the party was elevated as a significant institution under single-party rule, where elite recruitment to the legislature, party, and executive was fairly open and credible (usually through a primary system and ideological requirements), and where the party itself was a well-institutionalized entity with a broad geographic reach. On the other hand, structurally inarticulate parties were often more ad-hoc or intermittent in nature and often did not have robust organization throughout the country. Elite recruitment was either highly plebiscitary or lacked any mechanisms to curtail elite ambition, which likely led to much more overt clientelism. Most explicitly, structurally inarticulate parties were often secondary governing instruments under single-party rule, subject to dominant executives, powerful civil administrations, and strong security forces.
**Social Robustness: The Capacity to Mobilize**

The term social robustness refers to the formal and informal mechanisms available to the ruling party for social mobilization. Parties can invest into important institutions that can be used during elections. These might include corporatist-affiliated structures for mass mobilization such as trade unions or women leagues. Youth movements are also important mobilizing institutions often used by single-party regimes. It is not enough for these organizations to be present on paper, but they must be backed with material support and staffing. In addition, the geographic breadth and depth of the party itself not only reflects upon its structural articulation but also its mobilization capacity. Parties with widespread organization across the country down to the grassroots level hold a significant mobilization advantage. In certain cases, party cells are built that can be used to mobilize support and deter support from opposition parties. These sub-national structures need to have some institutional permanence in terms of both financial resources and manpower.

However, social robustness also refers to the record of social and economic commitments made under single-party rule, or its pattern of social incorporation. Delving into the nature of social incorporation first of all helps explain when formal mechanisms of social mobilization (just like budget-cycles) are more or less likely to succeed. It also addresses a fundamental point with regard to single-party regimes – the fact that they have records to run on. In the African context, rural populations are the largest potential constituency for mobilization during elections, but one that was not always effectively targeted during single-party rule. Parties that reached out into the countryside to incorporate peasant and rural populations are considered widely

---

42 The role of social incorporation has recently been integrated into theories of authoritarian state building and durability. Urban bias has been used to explain patterns of authoritarian rule in sub-Saharan Africa and refers to the taxation of rural farmers in order to subsidize food in urban settings with the aim of generating political support. See Bates 1981; Bellin 2002; Heydemann 2007; and Waldner 1999.
incorporating. As evidence, we would notice active policies of incorporation such as income redistribution, the divergence of development funds, and party-building in the countryside.

On the other hand, parties that narrowly incorporate or are socially weak target much more limited communities. In the African context this has included bias toward urban communities over rural ones and cash and export-crop farmers over food-crop and subsistence-based peasants. Most importantly, single-party regimes with a much clearer ethnic bias to them are considered narrowly incorporative. This includes single-party regimes that were supposedly multi-ethnic in name but where there was clear evidence of bias toward the executive’s own ethnic cohort. This might include disproportionate public investments in regions populated by a specific ethnic group or public appointment within the party and government.

Both structural articulation and social robustness (summarized schematically in Figure 2.2) can be observed ex ante and scored qualitatively to qualify a single-party regime’s party capacity as strong or weak. These scores are incorporated into the typological theory presented in the next chapter and explored more deeply in the individual case-studies. There is no single factor that makes a party poorly articulate or narrowly robust, but rather it is a confluence of factors that at times coincide. For instance, parties that are subject to strong executives are usually poorly institutionalized, elite recruitment is constrained, and social incorporation is often along ethnic lines.

Figure 2.2: Conceptualizing Party Capacity (Structural Articulation and Social Robustness)
How Party Capacity Influences Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes

In this section I expand upon the theoretical relationships between party capacity and competitive hegemonic outcomes. Parties with high levels of structural articulation and social robustness bring with them distinct advantages to the electoral arena. Structural articulation is a key factor in providing additional sources of elite cohesion, which in turn helps to prevent defections during electoral periods. As opposed to parties with only material-based sources of cohesion (often holding together multi-ethnic coalitions), highly articulate parties provide organizational means of cohesion by creating the impression that the party is both permanent and a credible arena for elite participation. By contrast, parties that simply provide material means of binding elites are likely to be much more fragile.43 In other words, it is the distinction between a party acting as an institution versus simply an opportunity.

Consequently, we would expect that parties with higher levels of structural articulation will see much less elite defection during elections. Moreover, to a certain point this should hold true even as conditions change within and outside the party. For example, we would expect defection to remain low even as the cost of defection falls as opposition parties gain strength or institutionalize. These low levels of elite defection provide regimes with strong support during elections and allow them to rely on a wide network of party activists who will actively campaign for the party rather than seeking office elsewhere. This also makes it difficult for opposition parties to recruit popular politicians, instead forcing them to train new generations of party leaders. Crucially, parties with high levels of structural articulation often institutionalize executive succession, and thus prevent potential crises and moments for high-level defection from the party.

43 It is also noteworthy that material incentives are a constant condition across electoral authoritarian cases. Therefore, it does little at helping us explain variation in outcomes.
High levels of social robustness provide incumbent parties with important formal tools of mobilization, but also with wider social constituencies. Formal mechanisms of mobilization give incumbents a distinct advantage on the ground over oppositions during elections. Regimes can utilize these formal institutions (often coercively) to get out their own vote but also to repress opposition attempts at making inroads. On the other hand, wide patterns of social incorporation offer regimes reliable and significant areas of electoral support. Importantly, this electoral support is not necessarily the same thing as fundamental political or ideological support, but instead reflects an historic relationship that often takes decades to alter. This makes it difficult for opposition parties to expand their base of operation and reduces the demand or receptiveness of certain population to opposition efforts. Consequently, during elections we should be able to observe patterns of electoral support based on legacies of social incorporation, and that opposition parties are not only hindered by their own shortcomings but by their limited appeal.

When electoral authoritarian regimes can rely upon low levels of defection and reliable voter support, they are less likely to use fraud or coercive measures to win elections but are still going to be able and sustain larger vote-shares. These large vote-shares also theoretically reinforce the perception that the party is not going to be defeated and further reduces the propensity toward defection. Therefore, strong party capacities load the electoral game toward competitive hegemonies. In this sense, outcomes are also much more pre-determined and will only change as the underlying structural and institutional factors sustaining the regime begin to change such as a diminished rural population or a significant breakdown of the party’s structural articulation. For these regimes, coercion and fraud are not systemic features, but used strategically to help perpetuate large vote-shares (rather than say prevent defeat). It is likely that even without undemocratic practice incumbent vote-shares would still be high.
Alternatively, regimes with weaker party capacity will likely face very different circumstances during elections. In the context of low structural articulation we would expect that during elections elite defection would be much more likely. In the absence of organizational means of cohesion, these parties must rely more on material incentives and coercion to retain elites. There is therefore less reason to stay in the party if advancement has been blocked, voice is hindered, and alternative political parties become more readily available. This should especially hold true for elites who have suffered losses during primaries or have been blocked on their career advancement path. Critically, poorly articulate parties risk crisis during moments of executive succession, which can be the prelude for significant defection. Likewise low levels of social robustness limits the ability of incumbent parties to mobilize voters and monitor dissent. Importantly, it proscribes the type of support a regime can rely upon to narrow constituencies such as specific ethnic groups or even urban constituencies. If wider segments of the population (or even other identity groups) have been ineffectively incorporated into the party, as the regime faces crisis it will be forced to deal with higher levels of voter defection.

Therefore, during elections there is a predisposition toward less hegemonic electoral conditions and regimes are compelled into much higher degrees of electoral coercion to survive. Consequently, in the absence of institutional sources of elite and voter retention the pathway from weaker party capacity is likely to be impacted by more contingent factors that impact the ability of the regime to materially or coercively induce support. Three central contingent factors are incorporated into the theory – 1) the role of economic performance; 2) opposition capacity; and 3) Western leverage and linkage. These three factors have been highlighted in prior literature and are discussed in detail in the next chapter. Briefly, economic performance accounts for factors like growth, inflation, social development, and the frequency of economic crisis.
Opposition capacity refers to the extent of party institutionalization and the type of decision-making taken under electoral authoritarian conditions such as inter-party cooperation or election boycotts. Western leverage and linkage, as initially conceived by Levitsky and Way, is a variable that accounts for the ability and willingness of external Westerns powers to engage in policies conducive toward greater political or economic reform. The outlines of this theory are summarized in Figure 2.3.

**Figure 2.3: Party Capacity and Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes**

![Diagram showing party capacity and electoral authoritarian outcomes](image)

**Alternative Theories and Approaches to Electoral Authoritarian Variation**

This dissertation elevates the role of party capacity as developed under single-party rule as a primary causal variable shaping trajectories of African electoral authoritarianism. However, there are a number of alternative approaches that merit discussion. Some of the insights from these approaches are incorporated and further tested in the case-studies, while others are dismissed below.
Economic Explanations: Is this a Modernization Story?

While the next chapter investigates the role of economic performance, it is important to recognize the several prior studies that have looked at the notably ambiguous correlation between indicators of modernization and democracy.\(^{44}\) One of the firmer conclusions from these studies is that countries that penetrate higher levels of economic development are less likely to regress back toward authoritarianism. Theoretically, countries with higher starting levels of economic development (noted by GNP, education levels, or industrialization), would be able to sustain much more competitive and less hegemonic electoral conditions since opposition groups and civil society are likely to be much more developed. However, as shown in Table 2.2 these insights have very little relevance for the subset of cases under study. None of the cases can be considered high income, with possible exception of Gabon and Seychelles, and yet the cases vary greatly across measures of competitiveness and hegemony. In the case of Gabon, a large oil industry (50% of GDP) sustains higher levels of GNI per capita, while the case of Seychelles comes closest to satisfying a modernization story.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2: Economic Development and Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Middle Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-Middle Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank Indicators
Note: Classifications are based on World Bank guidelines and based on Per Capita GNI in 1990

\(^{44}\) See Boix 2003; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen & O’Halloran 2006; Lipset 1981; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi 2000; and Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens 1992
Electoral Institutions: District Magnitudes and Electoral Systems

Another set of approaches applicable to studying electoral authoritarian outcomes is the role of electoral institutions. For instance, the literature on district magnitude and its intersection with ethnic cleavages is well-established and has provided some insights into the structure of party systems.45 These theories, mainly rooted in the rational choice tradition and theories of strategic voting, argue that electoral outcomes are largely decided by incentives provided by the rules of the electoral game. Notably, this approach has gained some weight in the study of African party systems after the Third Wave.46 The results indicate that African party systems follow counter-intuitive logics – high district magnitudes tend to correlate with a reduced number of parties. This is attributed to patterns of party dominance during elections. Moreover, there have been some significant doubts raised whether theories of ballot structure can even apply within the context of undemocratic contestation.47 With regard to presidential elections, Rakner and van de Walle argue that two-round systems are likely to be less hegemonic because oppositions can unite in the second round against the incumbent.48

Table 2.3 provides the average district magnitude for each case under study and characterizes the electoral formula used for legislative and presidential elections. One evident fact is that there is quite a bit of variety when it comes to electoral design. The most influential design is clearly in Djibouti, where a unique multi-member party-block system has likely helped the ruling party secure 100% of the legislative seats. But there is no clear relationship between the structure of legislative elections and electoral authoritarian outcomes. With regard to presidential elections, one of the most indicative cases of repressive electoral authoritarianism is

45 See Cox 1997; Neto & Cox 1997; and Oredeshook & Shvetsova 1994
46 See Bogaards 2000; Mozaffar & Scarritt 2005; and Mozaffar, Scarritt & Galaich 2003
47 Mylonas & Roussias 2008
48 Rakner & van de Walle 2009 p.218-219
Kenya where a simple plurality system was in place and incumbent KANU presidents benefited from a constitutional stipulation that required presidential candidates to garner at least 25% of the vote in five of Kenya’s eight provinces. This does not mean that electoral systems were inconsequential, only that it is contingent upon other factors like party capacity or better seen as part an incumbent’s use of electoral coercion rather than a primary differentiating factor.

Table 2.3: Electoral System and Electoral Authoritarian Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average District Magnitude</th>
<th>Legislative Electoral System</th>
<th>Presidential Electoral System</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>SMD/MMD (PR)</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>MMD (PBV)</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>MMD (FPTP)</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>Repressive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Repressive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1978-1993)</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>MMD (PBV)/National List PR</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>20.83</td>
<td>Party List PR</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1993-2001)</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>MMD (PBV)/National List PR</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Competitive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>SMD/MMD (PR)</td>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>Competitive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Johnson & Wallack 2006; African Elections Database; Polity IV Dataset 2010
Note: FPTP=First-Past-the-Post; TRS=Two Round System; SMD=Single Member District; MMD=Multi-Member District; PBV=Party Block Vote; PR=Proportional Representation

**African Presidents: Neo-Patrimonialism and Executive Strength**

The role of African “big-men” and “neo-patrimonialism” in perpetuating authoritarian rule has been a cornerstone in the study of African politics. The terms convey an informal style of politics, which can exist alongside a formal legal order, whereby prominent individuals use their status and prestige to bestow protection and material benefits to a select group of supporters that act as that ruler’s clients. An institutional extension of neo-patrimonialism has been the

---

49 Bayart 2009; Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Jackson & Rosberg 1982
strong status afforded presidents in Africa, and their centrality in maintaining systems of political clientelism.\textsuperscript{50} Nicolas van de Walle has argued that strong presidentialism has been the defining feature of African electoral regimes.\textsuperscript{51} Strong presidents, through their control of access to the political game and distributive resources, provide incentives that fractionalize the party system. For electoral authoritarian outcomes, this implies that strong presidents will lead to more hegemonic outcomes and perhaps even more repressive outcomes due to the greater ease of using coercive force. Likewise, Nic Cheeseman has stressed the role of term limits as important in restricting the coercive nature of African regimes. He notes that due to the highly personalized style of African politics, successor candidates have much more difficulty winning electoral authoritarian elections.\textsuperscript{52}

These approaches paint too broad a picture and fail to address significant electoral authoritarian variation. If strong presidentialism is the defining feature of African politics, and the direct consequence of legacies of neo-patrimonialism, why have electoral outcomes differed so much? If term limits are a decisive factor why is it that in Tanzania – where one could credibly say that term limits have been enforced the strongest – does electoral authoritarianism appear to be the most stable? The answer is that there is simply no alternative to considering political parties to explain electoral authoritarian variation. Table 2.4 reports a measure of executive strength and a measure of whether a two-term limit has been enforced.\textsuperscript{53} It appears that stronger presidents are loosely more correlated with general measures of repression than with electoral hegemony. This, however, is to be expected given that stronger presidents are most

\textsuperscript{50} Bratton & van de Walle 1997 p. 61-63
\textsuperscript{51} Van de Walle 2003
\textsuperscript{52} Cheeseman 2010. See also Posner & Young 2007
\textsuperscript{53} Measures of executive constraint are in fact difficult to come by. Here I use the Polity IV executive constraint variable (lower means less constraint). I list the score for the year before the election and note changes throughout the electoral authoritarian period.
likely associated with weaker ruling party capacity, forcing regimes to rely more heavily on repressive means. Therefore, the role of executives only partially discerns between different forms of electoral authoritarianism.

**Table 2.4: Executive Strength and Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Executive Constraint</th>
<th>Two-Term Limit Enforced?</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Repressive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Repressive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1978-1993)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1993-2001)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Competitive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Competitive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** African Elections Database; Polity IV Dataset

**Note:** Seychelles has a three-term presidency that has not been reached yet at the time of writing.

_The Role of the State – State Capacity and the question of “Stateness”_

The role of state capacity in explaining authoritarian and electoral authoritarian outcomes has also recently been given new attention. Levitsky and Way conceive of state power as a central factor in their wider notion of “organizational” power (along with political parties). This is primarily manifest through the state’s coercive capacity and control of state economies.54 States with fairly cohesive and wide-scoped coercive capacity (e.g. militaries, secret police, or domestic intelligence units), are more likely to survive electoral challenges. We would also expect that countries with high levels of state capacity are more likely to repress and create hegemonies. Control of economic factors, either through state-owned industries or resource-based economies, can substitute for coercive capacity and provides incumbents with the capacity

54 Levitsky & Way 2010 p.56-61 p.66-67. See also Bellin 2005 and Way 2005
to punish and reward. In addition, the incumbent’s overwhelming control of resources can also
Crowd-out opposition parties and be used to fund robust electoral campaigns. More broadly, Dan
Slater expands on the sources of state capacity (especially the role of taxation) and elevates state
capacity as a vital catalyst of authoritarian stability. The emergence of strong and durable parties
can only, according to Slater, come as a consequence of strong authoritarian states.\textsuperscript{55}

Conversely, another perspective on state capacity does not utilize an authoritarian lens of
analysis, but derives insights from the literature on democratization. Here the notion of
“stateness” is seen as a factor that facilitates more competitiveness and a more open electoral
process. Stateness is a configuration of factors that improve the transparency and regularity of
state operations. For instance, Bratton and Change examine the relationship between measures of
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption and indices of democratic accountability in sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{56} They find that there
is considerable variation along some measures of stateness (e.g. rule of law) that corresponds
with democratization. For electoral authoritarian outcomes, we might believe that higher levels
of stateness would correspond with more competitive and less repressive electoral conditions.

The problem with both approaches is that they either have very little relevance to the
cases at hand or potentially confuse causal direction. Extending Levitsky and Way’s conception
of state capacity to cover all ten cases, we find that in general state capacity in Africa is weak
and does not correlate at all with electoral authoritarian outcomes. Likewise, applying a
“stateness” score based on Bratton and Chang’s work shows that with the exception of

\textsuperscript{55} Slater 2010. Slater’s main argument is that patterns of elite contention solidify differing patterns of elite
coalitions, and therefore different investments into state institutions. Stable Southeast Asian authoritarian countries
like Malaysia and Singapore are conceived as “protection pacts,” and are the consequence of radical mass politics
spilling into urban areas and provoking communal conflict. This creates the incentives necessary for elites to think
of their common interest and forge a “Leviathan” authoritarian state.

\textsuperscript{56} Bratton & Chang 2006. See also Linz & Stepan 1996 and Rose & Shin 2001
Seychelles, stateness (and rule of law) is uniformly weak. The issue is not just one of empirics, but one of theoretical importance. First, the capacity to coerce is not the same as a measure of actual coercion. Second, the relationship between state capacity and competitiveness is likely endogenous. Even if there are exogenous sources of rule of law (such as inherited judicial independence), these do not appear to be strong enough to explain electoral authoritarian outcomes. Greater competitiveness is simply built into the definition of states like Senegal or Tanzania, which does not make them democracies or progressing toward democracy.

Third, Dan Slater’s argument misses a central point with regard to the issue of parties versus states. State capacity is something that is forged by ruling coalitions, but also something that is inherited. Given the weaker inherited state structures of most sub-Saharan African states, party-building offered a prime alternative to developing robust states. A key example is the distinction between Tanzania and Kenya. Tanzania inherited what were by most understandings weaker state institutions than Kenya – it lacked a government civil service or an articulate regional form of government. It was this difference that led, in part, to two very different trajectories of party-building. Crucially, when both countries transitioned to elections in the early 1990s, Kenya’s higher degree of state capacity failed to win it elections decisively. Once again, when it comes to the issue of winning elections and especially the quality of contestation, there is no substitute for parties. State-based tools of ordering power, while important, are much more relevant for understanding closed forms of electoral politics.

---

57 Barkan 1984, 1994
Table 2.5: State Capacity and Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>State Scope</th>
<th>State Cohesion</th>
<th>State Economic Control</th>
<th>&quot;Stateness&quot; Score58</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>Electoral Authoritarian Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'İvoire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>Repressive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>Repressive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>Repressive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1978-1993)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>Competitive Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1993-2001)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>Competitive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>Competitive Electoral Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Levitsky & Way 2010; Author’s own score for missing cases; World Governance Indicators 1996

Conclusion

Political parties are indispensable institutions not only in democratic politics, but also in authoritarian and electoral authoritarian regimes. This chapter has discussed the conceptualization of authoritarian parties with regard to their central functional elements – their capacity to mitigate intra-elite conflict, mobilize social support, and publically monitor. Since established approaches to conceptualizing parties fail to squarely address these dimensions or address the unique circumstances of single-party regimes, this chapter has developed the concepts of structural articulation and social robustness. These terms use measures of authoritarian parties that correspond to our theoretical understanding of authoritarian parties, and are rooted in observation of actual party practice. Moreover, they give credence to the fact that single-party regimes were evolving entities, especially in terms of their social and economic commitments. Both structural articulation and social robustness have important consequences for the nature of electoral authoritarian contestation.

58 Following Bratton & Change 1996, this is calculated by a simple average of the constituent factors – Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.
In addition, other approaches to understanding variation in electoral authoritarian outcomes fail to provide clear insights or discern between different forms of electoral authoritarianism. In particular, the argument here is that when shifting from questions of survival versus demise to a deeper comprehension of the nature of electoral contestation, there really is no substitute for understanding differences in political parties. Heavy investments into structural articulation and social robustness under single-party rule help pre-determine the political game toward a competitive hegemony. It is only in the absence of strong party capacity that other second-tier explanatory variables begin to take on real meaning. This chapter has highlighted three factors as especially important – international leverage, opposition behavior, and economic performance. Chapter 3 turns to an analysis of the broader picture of electoral authoritarian trajectories among the ten cases, and an explication of the different pathways to distinct electoral authoritarian outcomes.
Chapter 3 - From Single-Parties to Electoral Authoritarian Regimes, a Typological Theory

What have been the trajectories of the formerly African single-party regimes as they transitioned into electoral authoritarianism, and what factors might explains these outcomes? This chapter builds a typological theory to model multiple pathways to electoral authoritarian outcomes and to investigate the specific role of party capacity, economic performance, opposition capacity, and Western linkage and leverage. Since several of these factors are also discussed in the individual case-studies of Tanzania, Kenya, and Cameroon the bulk of this chapter is dedicated to an empirical discussion of the other seven cases of former single-party regimes. Typological theorizing is not without its failings, which is why it must be supplemented by case-study work that provides process-tracing evidence. However, it does offer a way to construct and test complex mid-range theory that covers a specific range of cases, and to model “equifinality” or multiple pathways to similar outcomes.

The challenge when constructing a typological space is twofold. First, there is a tension between attention to detail and the need for parsimony. The more nuanced the scores on specific variables becomes and the more variables incorporated, the more complex and large the space becomes.\(^1\) Second, scoring ten cases across four independent variables and one dependent variable is data-intensive and ultimately relies on a qualitative judgment regarding each case (e.g. high vs. low on any score). To address these issues the variables are ultimately scored dichotomously and the coding schema is documented in Appendix II. Given the fact that there are four potential outcomes (repressive hegemony, repressive electoral authoritarian, competitive hegemony, and competitive electoral authoritarian), this allows for 64 possible combinations. To reduce the space even further, only actual outcomes are reported. One of the trade-offs with this

\(^1\) See Elman 2005 and George and Bennett 2005
parsimony is that it is more difficult to compare nuanced differences across cases. These types of comparisons are deferred to the case-studies where more in-depth discussion of each variable and more comparison is possible.²

Party Capacity in Single-Party Regimes

Using the concepts of structural articulation and social robustness to evaluate party capacity reveals quite a bit of variation among the ten cases. On the weak side of the spectrum are party constructs in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Kenya, and Togo. While these parties at times had formal structures throughout the country, they did not deeply penetrate the grassroots nor were they largely active between election periods. Correspondingly, the party tended to be of lesser importance for day-to-day governing in comparison with other institutions such as the executive, civil administration, or security services. These parties were also more likely to have a sectarian quality to them. On the strong side are parties formed in Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, and Tanzania. Here much deeper investments were made into party institutions and practices. While presidents remained strong, the party was also afforded significant authority. In addition, these parties were more often engaged in wider social incorporation.

Take for instance one of the most prominent Francophone countries under study - Gabon. The Democratic Party of Gabon (PDG) formed in 1968 by Omar Bongo had established national institutions and grassroots structures known as “sections” and “committees.” By 1973, the PDG had even built a fairly strong labor wing affiliated with the party known as the Confederation

² An alternative to typological theorizing is fuzzy-set and set-theoretic methods, as developed by Charles Ragin (2000, 2008). However, the number of cases required for effective qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) usually exceeds the number of cases here. Moreover, for QCA to work the dependent variable assumes some sort of linear relationship with the independent variables (e.g. stronger party capacity leads to stronger hegemony). By contrast, in this case the interest is in explaining distinctive types of outcomes, rather than gradations of an outcome. The combination of measures of hegemony and competitiveness make the use of QCA problematic.
Syndicale Gabonaise (COSYGA). But the party was extremely rigid, party congresses were held intermittently every 5-7 years, elite recruitment remained plebiscitary, and Bongo himself would devise national development plans. Bongo utilized the large patronage resources at hand from the booming oil industry to maintain a cabinet of over forty ministers, a large number considering the small size of Gabon’s population. Outside of a core group of leaders (the majority of which were related to Bongo), cabinet shifts were frequent and occurred nearly every four years. The dominance of Bongo even became a point of contention at the 1979 delegate’s conference of the PDG, leading Bongo to allow delegates to nominate some of the Central Committee and legislative members. In 1985 Bongo also resigned as secretary-general of the party and at the 1986 delegate’s conference made some efforts to incorporate women into the party. Importantly, Bongo relied heavily on the military and security services, in part due to French pressure to protect their economic interests. The Societe Generale de Securite (SGS) was a paramilitary force trained in part by the French mercenary Bob Denard and tasked with protecting the assets of the French oil company Elf-Gabon. The SGS later assisted Bongo in creating the 1,500 strong Presidential Guards (PG) stationed in Libreville. Prominent members of the military were often Bongo’s relatives, and also received appointments within the PDG and as cabinet members. Finally, executive succession was poorly institutionalized. After Bongo’s

---

4 Jackson & Rosberg 1982 p.158; Saint-Paul 1989 p.36. These ideas were usually articulated in major policy speeches given by Bongo, such as “Fighting the Old Devils,” in reference to a campaign against tribalism, or “La Renovation,” “Rénover la Rénovation,” “Le Libéralisme Economique Dirige et Plantife,” and “Le Progressisme Démocratique et Concerte,” all of which advocated for mixed economies of various degree (Saint-Paul 1989 p.31-33).
5 Barnes 1992 p.51
6 Ibid p.51-52; Decalo 1998 p.145
7 The intertwined relationship between Gabon and the French is often referred to as the Clan des Gabonais and specifically refers to the unique influence of Jacques Foccart (Charles de Gaulle’s chief African advisor), and his ties to the French oil company Elf. The influence of the Clan des Gabonais was controversially documented in Pierre Péan’s book Affaires Africaines. It was suggested that the Clan handpicked Bongo as the successor to Gabon’s first president Léon M’ba (Yates 1998 p. 106-117).
8 Barnes 1992 p.53-54; Yates 1998 p.120-121
death in 2009 succession followed hereditary lines to his son Ali and was accompanied by in-fighting and two major defections prior to the 2009 election.9

Likewise, the PDG was essentially an ethnic coalition that favored specific groups. Bongo was of the minority Bateke people from the distant eastern province of Haute-Ogooué and was therefore above the fray of the predominant ethnic rivalry between the Fang and Myene.10 Under Bongo, cabinets generally reflected an ethnic balance, with the prime minister always a Fang and the president of the National Assembly always a Myene.11 Yet, it became evident fairly quickly that public investments and appointments disproportionately benefited Haute-Ogooué and especially Bongo’s immediate family.12 By 1985 nearly 78% of all industrialization had taken place in three regions alone.13 At one point a quarter of cabinet ministers were Batéké, most of them Bongo’s relatives.

This pattern of party development is also evident in the smaller states of Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. For example, the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) was initially thought of as a ripe specimen for mass politics and party institutionalization because of the strength of the planter class and the role of powerful agricultural syndicates prior to independence. However, as Ruth Morgenthau notes in an early study of the PDCI, party leaders felt “they had little time to spend on party organization” and that “they already had a spontaneously evolving structure, along ethnic lines”.14 Politics under single-party rule were utterly dominated by the persona of Félix Houphuët-Boigny and a close and small circle of trusted leaders. Legislative elections were plebiscitary (until 1980), succession was never institutionalized, and the party atrophied and

9 Ahmadou 2009
10 Yates 1992 p.47
11 Neher & Bakary 1993 p.14. According to Decalo, while some prominent Fang were incorporated into the regime the PDG essentially reflected and anti-Fang coalition of southern and central ethnic groups (Decalo 1998 p.143).
12 Decalo 1998 p.137; Gardinier 1997 p.147; and Tordoff & Young 1999 p.272
13 Decalo 1998 p.121-144; Yates 1992 p.121. These investments infamously include the extremely costly Trans-Gabon Railway that linked Haut-Ogooué to the Libreville.
14 Morgenthau 1964, p.182-185
remained much weaker vis-à-vis state agencies.\textsuperscript{15} With regard to social incorporation, there was evidence that policies had benefited Boigny’s own Baoulé sub-group, but ethnic mobilization was less overt. Instead, the PDCI retained stronger support from cash farmers, and in particular cocoa and coffee, the two mainstays of Ivorian exports.\textsuperscript{16}

In Togo, the Rally of Togolese People (RPT) was likewise dominated by the character of Togo’s first president Gnassingbé Eyadéma and the military, which Eyadéma led in Africa’s first coup against the Sylvanus Olympio government in 1963. While the RPT existed on paper there were no elections until 1979 (when emergency rule finally ended), only becoming competitive in 1985.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, the RPT’s grassroots structure was not well-established and decision-making remained highly centralized within the presidency who appointed the majority of the party’s Politburo and Central Committee.\textsuperscript{18} The RPT was highly personalisitic and Eyadéma created a distinct cult of personality in explicit imitation of the Mobutu regime in Zaire.\textsuperscript{19} With regard to social robustness, despite some party mobilizing organs (a youth and women’s league), there were clear tensions between the north and south along ethnic lines. Cabinet membership was fairly balanced, but other public resources were skewed toward the north and the Kabye tribes of which Eyadéma was a member.\textsuperscript{20}

In contrast to these parties are the cases where party development reflected a much deeper commitment to structural articulation and wider notions of social incorporation. In Mozambique, the heritage of armed anti-colonial struggle and a process of ideological radicalization toward Marxism-Leninism turned the ruling party FRELIMO into a strong and

\textsuperscript{15} Jackson & Rosberg 1982 p.149-152; Mundt 1997 p.185-187. Jackson and Rosberg consider Houphuët-Boigny as an example of autocratic leadership alongside Ahidjou and Bongo.
\textsuperscript{16} Crook 1989 p.226
\textsuperscript{17} Decalo 1987 p.87
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid 1987 p.178-179
\textsuperscript{19} Ellis 1993, p.464-465
\textsuperscript{20} Heilbrunn 1993 p.282; Nwajiaku 1994 p.432
well-articulated organization. As Carrie Manning writes, FRELIMO was never a “personal party,” noting that internal structures mattered greatly.\(^{21}\) Indeed, after independence the party was elevated as the supreme decision-making body and quickly embarked on a program of mass mobilization and party construction at the grassroots level throughout the country. FRELIMO supported what were called “dynamizing groups” that consisted of locally elected officials tasked with raising political consciousness and overseeing a transition to collective agricultural production. These groups later became the foundation of a party cell system and a massive membership recruitment drive. Elections were initially held at the local level through nomination from a dynamizing group and after vetting by the local party (with a rejection rate of about 10%). However district, provincial, and the national assemblies were indirectly selected for the 1977 election. The second legislative election only took place in 1986, at which point provincial assemblies could elect representatives to the national legislature.\(^{22}\)

With regard to social robustness, in addition to party cells FRELIMO created three important mass mobilizing organs tied to the party. Women in particular, through the Mozambique Women’s Movement (OMM) were the most active and helped persuade women in rural areas to join communal villages. FRELIMO also developed The Mozambique Youth Movement (OJM) and the Production Councils, which were organized in all major factories across the countries and later formed the basis for the national Mozambique Worker’s Organization (MWO).\(^{23}\) Policy-wise, the party took its ideological commitments to rural peasant populations and laborers seriously. What was essentially a re-education campaign was launched against vestiges of the capitalist class, religious organizations, and traditional authorities. FRELIMO took aggressive steps toward establishing large state-owned farms and communal

\(^{21}\) Manning 2007 p.199
\(^{22}\) Isaacman & Isaacman 1983 p.129-130
\(^{23}\) Ibid 1983 p.126-128
villages. Still, while peasants were the primary target of state policy and the role of ethnic mobilization was clearly low, FRELIMO maintained the reputation of a party that was more oriented to the south of the country, rather than the predominantly Muslim center and north.  

Similarly, the Seychelles People’s Progressive Front (SPPF) used ideology to foster a much stronger political party. Essentially the successor of Albert René’s Seychelles People’s United Party (SPUP), the SPPF turned Seychelles into a single-party state following Rene’s 1977 coup against incumbent James Mancham. The party quickly proclaimed itself a “socialist avant garde Party,” to counter the fiscal (and personal) excesses of the brief Mancham era. The party organized itself into twenty-three branches, internal elections were held by secret ballot every year for local Executive Committees, and regular competitive elections were held for the legislature on the SPPF ticket. The party retained strong funding from large membership drives, the sale of party publications, and external support from the Soviet bloc. Despite this strong party institutionalization, the executive did remain dominant. Term limits were not enforced, in disregard of a stipulation in the 1979 constitution limiting the president to three terms after which the party would elect a new candidate. René was also accused of several human rights abuses throughout the 1980s. The SPPF had strong party-affiliated corporatist structures (the National Women’s Organization and the National Youth Organization) as well as a strong trade union (The National Workers Union). As far as social commitments, the small size of Seychelles makes the rural sector comparatively small (mostly small holder agriculture and fishing). Still, the SPPF was not ethnically defined and its socialist policies in education and

---

24 Isaacman & Isaacman 1983 p.113; Manning 2007 p. 191-193
25 Franda 1982 p.62. It is worth noting that Rene, as the FRELIMO regime in Mozambique, was highly influenced by Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere who funded and supported the military coup (p.49).
26 Ibid 1982 p.62
27 Baker 2008 p.280
health led to significant reduction in income inequality from the Mencham period, leading Seychelles to one of the highest development rankings in Africa.\footnote{Baker 2008 p.279; Franda 1982 p.98}

A more ambiguous case is the Socialist Party (PS) in Senegal. During the brief period of single-party rule from 1964-1978 the PS was ostensibly a weaker party. The party had good grassroots presence and some mass mobilizing organizations in certain regions, but was dominated by the strong role afforded the executive. First president Leopold Senghor was considered a “princely” figure, who utilized his strong status to mitigate elite conflict and oversee a complex patronage system that balanced clan chiefs, Islamic leaders, and urban interests.\footnote{O’Brien 1975; Jackson & Rosberg 1982 p.90-91; Fatton 1986} Legislative elections in 1968 and 1973 were also plebiscitary in a country-wide constituency, and succession remained a controversial issue. Yet, when it came to social robustness the PS had unique capacities. First, ethnic or religious mobilization was not as readily evident, likely due to the fact that Senghor as a Catholic had no real sectarian base. Second, at independence the role of Sufi Brotherhoods or marabouts was clearly the dominant form of authority outside of the major coastal cities. Senghor and his successor Abdou Diouf utilized these institutions as a substitute institution for reaching the rural countryside. As Villalon notes, marabout orders had unique organizational features and well-organized cells with much political potential.\footnote{Villalon 1999 p.135} In exchange for political largesse the marabout orders would issue endorsements for Senghor or Diouf, known as ndigals. This system, while outside of the formal confines of the party system, effectively linked the PS with large swaths of the rural population.

Table 3.1 summarizes the individual scores for structural articulation and social robustness and presents the final evaluation for party capacity. Note that Kenya’s score on party institutionalization improves due to a series of reforms enacted by Daniel arap Moi in 1978 and
discussed in Chapter 5. With two exceptions, the score for structural articulation corresponds
with the score for social robustness. In Mozambique FRELIMO’s strong party capacity is rooted
more in its structures of elite retention than its mobilization capacity. The opposite is true in
Senegal; the PS relied more on its social coalition with Sufi Brotherhoods than the articulation of
its party institutions. Among the weak cases there is much less divergence between a party’s
structural articulation and its social robustness. This indicates the interaction between narrower
social constituencies and weaker parties (and correspondingly stronger executives), which is
discussed further in Chapter 4 and 5.

Table 3.1: Party Capacity across Single-Party Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case / Indicator</th>
<th>Structural Articulation</th>
<th>Social Robustness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Institutionalization</td>
<td>Elite Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (+) = Strong; (-) = Weak

The Role of Economic Performance: Patronage and Voter Grievance

Economic performance theoretically affords a twofold advantage to electoral
authoritarian regimes. First, growing economies provide incumbents with the resources to
maintain patronage networks. This can involve rents garnered from state-owned industries and
resource extraction, or wealth generated from private sources that must pass through government
channels (e.g. through licensing agreements or government tenders). Either way, a growing
economy allows incumbents much more flexibility and can help maintain elite loyalty, albeit
perhaps temporarily. This can help electoral authoritarian regimes sustain higher levels of electoral hegemony and perhaps allow them to engage in lower levels of repression.

Concurrently, continued economic growth impacts the ability of the regime to retain electoral support and minimize voter defection. The role of both economic crisis and longer-term trends of economic decline have both been emphasized as factors that destabilize authoritarian regimes.\footnote{31 See, Gasiorowski 1995; Haggard & Kaufman 1995; Magaloni 2006}

Indeed, as Bratton and van de Walle stress, the transition to elections in Africa was preluded by popular protest that was in its inception economic in nature and in response to the severe downturn that began for most countries in the early 1980s.\footnote{32 Bratton & van de Walle 1997} Once again, higher voter loyalty theoretically translates into greater hegemony and less repression during elections.

Economically the period prior to the introduction of multiparty elections was uniformly stressful. For most countries the primary immediate culprit for the economic downturn was the global fall in both oil and commodity prices that began in 1976, which simply exacerbated existent mismanaged budgets. Countries like Cameroon and Gabon were heavily dependent on oil exports, which made them particularly vulnerable. In Cameroon foreign earnings fell from $694 million in 1984 to $243 million in 1986.\footnote{33 Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.98} In Gabon, revenues from oil exports declined from 65% of the budget to 30% of the budget over the same period.\footnote{34 Gardinier 1997 p.149-150} The global decline in oil prices further drove down already falling prices for export commodities, made worse by a series of drought years in the mid-1980s. Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Togo’s heavy reliance on export crops like coffee, tea, cotton, and cocoa made them particularly sensitive.\footnote{35 In Côte d’Ivoire receipts from cotton and coffee declined 40% and it was reclassified by the World Bank as a Low Income Country from a Middle-Income Country (Mundt 1997 p.187). Kenya’s GDP per capita declined for most of the 1980s due to falling revenues from coffee and tea (Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.47). Togo’s economy was also heavily dependent on the export of phosphates, which also declined precipitously during the 1980s (Helibrunn 1997 p.226).} Other countries like
Djibouti, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, and Tanzania had much more internally driven economies and centralized planning with regard to agriculture and industry, which had begun to stagnate in the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{36} The droughts and price fluctuations made what were already deteriorating economies much worse, further exacerbated in cases like Djibouti and Mozambique by civil war.

The need to borrow money to cope with the economic downturn led to self-imposed austerity as well as more robust economic recovery and structural adjustment programs negotiated with international lenders.\textsuperscript{37} These programs involved currency devaluation, dramatic cuts to social services and public subsidies, and the privatization of state-owned industries. This often coincided with the revelation of large corruption scandals in nearly every country, and formed the background for social protests in Cameroon, Kenya, Gabon, and Togo. Francophone countries were further handicapped by their limited monetary maneuvering capacity due to their involvement in the Franc Zone.\textsuperscript{38} In most countries founding elections were held under declining economic conditions. Since founding elections economic conditions have largely improved. By 1995 all countries under study had held founding elections and returned to positive growth (with the exception of Djibouti, which only returned to positive GDP growth in 2001).

Yet it is difficult to sustain that any country has since become an economic powerhouse. Looking at two of the broadest measure of economic performance, GDP per capita growth and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Tanzania, Mozambique, and Senegal relied quite heavily on agriculture as an economic mainstay (Lofchie 1978; Marshall 1990; Vengroff & Creevey 1997). By contrast, during this period Seychelles elevated itself from basically a subsistence economy to one built primarily on state-owned tourism, small fisheries, and other parastatals (Franda 1982; Baker 2008). Similarly, Djibouti's economy was largely non-existent prior to independence and has since relied on state run shipping and government employment (Brass 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{37} See Herbst 1990; Riddell 1992; Schatz 1994
\item \textsuperscript{38} In January 1994 France unilaterally devalued the Franc by 50%, much to the chagrin of several Francophone African leaders at the time. For more on this limitation see Widner 1994.
\end{itemize}
price inflation reveals a number of patterns. First there are countries that have seen persistent GDP per capita growth but simultaneously have experienced high levels of price inflation. These countries include Djibouti (since 2001), Mozambique, Seychelles, and Tanzania. For instance, in Mozambique despite average growth rates of 5% since 1995 the average price inflation rate has been nearly 12%. Likewise, in Tanzania growth of about 3.5% per year has been accompanied by a nearly 9% inflation rate. Second are countries that have maintained fairly low growth rates, but also have fairly low inflation rates as in Cameroon, Gabon, and Senegal. In Cameroon, GDP per capita rates since 1995 have been on average 1.4% and have never risen above 2.5%, while inflation has been on average 2.7%. Finally there are countries that have experienced some form of stagflation over this period – Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Togo – where growth rates have been very low and inflation very high. In Kenya between 1992 and 2002 the average growth rate was negative while inflation was an average 14%.

Several of these countries also experienced either a major crisis or another recessionary period. For most, these periods of declining growth were influenced by the global recession of the end of the millennium. Between 1997 and 1998 growth in Togo dropped from 10% to negative 5%, and remained negative until 2002. Much of this recession had to do with Togo’s continued reliance on dwindling phosphate reserves for export (Gogue & Evlo 2004). In Gabon growth had remained neutral for the years prior but in 1999 GDP per capita briefly fell to negative 11%. This would impact Gabon one again in 2009 in the aftermath of the 2007 global recession. Côte d’Ivoire’s recovery peaked in 1995 but was followed by a steady decline in growth that reached its worst in 2000 and persisted for some years after the military coup. Mozambique experienced a more mild recession

---

39 All data on GDP per capita growth, inflation, Human Development Index (HDI), and poverty comes from the World Bank Development Indicators Database (2010).
40 Much of this recession had to do with Togo’s continued reliance on dwindling phosphate reserves for export (Gogue & Evlo 2004).
41 This recessionary period was once again due to falling revenues from oil production due to a drop in the global price, but also due to rapid depletion of the country’s oil reserves.
over the same period, with GDP per capita falling from 5.5% to negative 1.5%. Finally, Seychelles went through a slew of years with negative growth from 1997 to 2003, also accompanied by high rates of inflation (on average 5%). In addition, it was seriously impacted by the global recession of 2007. Between 2008 and 2009 growth was negative 3% while inflation was over 30%.42

Looking at other indicators that reflect social well-being further reinforces the perspective that none of these cases can boast robust performance. In Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Kenya, and Senegal there was little improvement in the Human Development Index (HDI) or levels of poverty over the period of study, and in each case the actual level of HDI remained comparatively low.43 In Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, and Kenya there was actually an increase in the extent of poverty, most acutely in Kenya were the poverty headcount index increased from 44.8% in 1990 to 52.3% in 2000. In Tanzania, where growth rates have been high due to tourism and gold exports, there has also been little improvement along these social indicators. Tanzania has only been able to reduce its poverty headcount from 38.6% in 1995 to 33.4% in 2010, remaining one of the more underdeveloped countries on the continent. Likewise in Senegal and Togo the HDI score has barely nudged upwards (in the case of Senegal over a period of 22 years it has gone from 0.32 to 0.40) and poverty has remained extremely high (above 60%). Mozambique has shown the most improvement along these indicators, correlated with its much higher GDP per capita growth rate. However, despite increasing its HDI score by over 60% since 1990, it still ranks the lowest among these cases at 0.28. Gabon presents the clearest case for significant improvement – its HDI score has increased 23% since 1990 to 0.64, which places it far above the continental average, but its poverty rate still remains high. Finally,

42 Central Bank of Seychelles Report 2004
43 For poverty, this refers to the Poverty Headcount based on the national level of poverty (World Bank Indicators)
the case of Seychelles also stands as exceptional due to its much higher starting position. While there has been little improvement in its measures of social wellbeing, it has had little room to move up from during the period under study.

Finally, the role of corruption can also impact or exacerbate the perception of economic performance.\textsuperscript{44} There are once again few examples of improvement along this measure. Cameroon, Mozambique and Togo have moved up along the Heritage Foundation’s Freedom from Corruption Index from a paltry 10 to a sub-par 23, 26 and 27 respectively (for comparison, the global average is 40). In other cases there have either been increases in corruption (Gabon, Kenya, Senegal) or very little change from starting conditions (Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Tanzania). For instance, Tanzania entered multiparty elections in 1995 with a score of 30. During the next 15 years corruption increased and by 2010 its score was still 30. Given these scores, there is no country, again with the possible exception of Seychelles, where corruption is not a major public issue. Indicatively, outside of Seychelles the best score received by a country at the end of its electoral authoritarian period was Senegal, which scored a low 33.

Table 3.2 reports the scores of each economic indicator and provides a final qualitative judgment regarding economic performance. Since none of the cases rank high on any economic indicator the threshold for a positive score on economic performance is reduced to allow for comparison between cases – otherwise all would be measured negatively. This leaves Gabon, Mozambique, and Tanzania as the only cases that rank positively for economic performance. The case of Seychelles, while starting from much better standards of social wellbeing and control of corruption is nonetheless ranked as negative due to the frequency and length of its recessions. In the other cases (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Kenya, Senegal, and Togo) inconsistent

\textsuperscript{44} An alternative to the Freedom from Corruption Measure is Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. However, its coverage is limited prior to 2005.
growth and little improvement along social wellbeing indicators, as well as significant recessionary periods in some countries, limited the capacity of economic performance to theoretically retain elite or voter loyalty.

Table 3.2: Economic Performance across Single-Party Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / Indicator</th>
<th>Economic Growth &amp; Inflation</th>
<th>Improved Social Well-Being</th>
<th>Control of Public Corruption</th>
<th>Recession</th>
<th>Economic Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes (1996-2002)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes (1999-2000; 2009)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>- (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes (1998-2000)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes (1999-2002)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes (1997-2003; 2007-2010)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes (1997-2001)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes (1996-2002)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (+) = Strong; (-) = Weak

Opposition Behavior: Eroding Vote Share and Leveling the Playing Field

A consensus among a number of scholars is that broadly speaking African opposition parties are weak entities. Opposition parties lack administrative capacity, are non-existent between elections, and are merely vehicles for expelled elites to regain access to power.45 Correlatively, African party systems have been shown to be highly volatile, and opposition party fragmentation and party hopping are quite common.46 The explanation is that this outcome is due to the pervasiveness of clientelism or neo-patrimonialism as a basis for political behavior and the poor resource base of most opposition parties, which creates the incentives for party fragmentation, poor institutionalization, and ethnic voting.47 Yet, in reality there is very little

---

45 See Basedau, Erdmann, and Mehler 2007; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Manning 2005; and Widner 1997
46 Kuenzi & Lambright 2005
47 Van de Walle 2003; Wantchekon 2003
written about individual opposition parties.\textsuperscript{48} As Adrienne Lebas argues, the “presumption of weak parties obscures variation in the organizational strength, support bases, and electoral performance of opposition parties across countries and over time.”\textsuperscript{49}

Moreover as noted prior, within the literature on electoral authoritarianism opposition behavior is stressed as an important factor that can contribute to more competitive outcomes. While it is difficult to establish definitive causal direction these factors are still worth exploring.

The theoretical insights into opposition capacity under electoral authoritarian settings boil down to two central factors – party institutionalization and party decision-making. Parties that are able to establish an institutional capacity that persists over time are more likely to be able and sustain activities noted by Bunce and Wolchik such as registration drives or voter education campaigns.\textsuperscript{50} Parties with a stable administrative structure within and outside of the capital city are more likely to draw additional supporters and help prevent party fragmentation. On the other hand there are series of collective action dilemmas that opposition parties face – whether to cooperate, boycott, or become co-opted.\textsuperscript{51} These decisions can have a significant impact on a party’s competitive capacity.

The simplest way to assess party institutionalization across a number of cases is to note whether there have been stable opposition parties over elections. While party systems might fragment, the fact that the main contenders have remained over time indicates some sort of institutional permanence. This holds true in most cases except Gabon and Kenya, where major parties have frequently split and new arrays of political parties have contested nearly every election. For example, in Gabon the opposition movement showed significant promise with the

\textsuperscript{48} A number of exceptions include Randall & Svasand 2002 and Salih 2003. See also, Erdmann, Basedau, & Mehler 2006 p.10
\textsuperscript{49} Lebas 2011 p.21
\textsuperscript{50} Bunce & Wolchik 2011
\textsuperscript{51} Howard & Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006
reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1990. Prior in 1983, a significant opposition movement
had formed in France called the Movement for National Renewal (MORENA) under the
leadership of Paul M’ba Abessole; a Catholic priest with significant support from the North of
the country and the Fang community. Yet as elections approached MORENA split into the
National Woodcutters Rally (RNB) under Abessole and a faction known as MORENA-Original.
Further crisis within the MORENA coalition significantly split the party in 1998 when Pierre-
André Kombila, the first secretary of the RNB, left the party and formed the RNB-D while the
RNB became the RNB-RPG. In the 1998 presidential election, both Kombila and Abessole ran
for office. This internal fragmentation has left only one opposition party unscathed – the small
Gabonese Progress Party (PGP).

In the other cases there have been more stable patterns of opposition contention. In Côte
d’Ivoire, while the electoral authoritarian periods was brief, two significant parties contested
elections – the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) formed in exile by Laurent Gbagbo, and the Rally of
Republicans (RDR) formed by several government defectors. Likewise, in Mozambique every
election has been contested by RENAMO, the regime’s former civil war rival. In Senegal,
Abdoulaye Wade’s Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) was the central opposition party
between 1978 and 2000. Seychelle’s Democratic Party (SDP) under James Mancham was formed
in 1964 and governed the country briefly in 1976 before the country became a single-party state.
Seychelle’s other opposition party the Seychelle’s National Party (SNP) under Wavel
Ramkalwan has contested every election (previously as the United Opposition). In Togo, two
major parties, the Action Committee for Renewal (CAR) and the Union of Forces for Change
(UFC) have been the major oppositional contenders since 1992. Finally, Djibouti presents
somewhat of a mixed picture. The major oppositional force, the Front for the Restoration of

52 Gardinier 1997 p.149-152
Unity and Democracy (FRUD), the successor of the armed movement, joined government and subsequently did not serve any real oppositional role. Two much smaller parties, the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) and the National Democratic Party (PND) continue to contest.

While this immediate measure helps to isolate the cases of Gabon and Kenya, it also masks other indicators of party institutionalization. For instance, the FPI in Côte d’Ivoire was formed in exile and had very little time to build any institutions on the ground prior to the 1990 election and was only able to contest two-thirds of the legislative seats. Likewise the RDR only formed in 1995, the year of the election. The brief period of electoral authoritarianism makes it difficult to assess institutionalization. As noted in Chapter 9, Cameroon’s political parties have reflected clear ethnic and regional biases and experienced numerous elite defections. The case of Mozambique is also particularly difficult to assess. RENAMO has infamously found it difficult to make a transition from a military organization to a viable political party. It lacks much internal cohesion or decision-making organs and is dominated by its national chair and presidential candidate Afonso Dhlakama.

With regard to opposition decision-making, the record is also mixed. Looking at opposition coalitions, they have been exceptionally difficult to forge and maintain. The two most prominent opposition coalitions have occurred in Kenya and Senegal – the NARC and Sopi coalitions respectively, which ultimately removed incumbents from power. However, prior to these coalitions there was actually very little cooperation between opposition parties. In Kenya, the 1992 and 1997 elections were contested by a multitude of parties and candidates, with little evidence of cooperation. In Senegal, opposition cooperation was practically non-existent prior

---

53 Mundt 1997 p.189
54 See Carbone 2005; Harrison 1999; and Manning 1998
55 Hornsby 2012 p.597-602; Ndegwa 1998
to 2000. An opposition coalition would have mattered little electorally since the PDS was clearly the dominant opposition party.

In other cases there has been much more moderate cooperation in the form of smaller electoral coalitions, some strategic coordination during elections, and united fronts to push for constitutional amendments. In Côte d’Ivoire while the FPI and RDR did not really cooperate electorally, they formed the short-lived Republican Front prior to the 1995 election to try and amend the electoral code.\(^{56}\) Cameroon’s opposition parties were part of the National Coordination of Opposition Parties and Associations (NCOPA) in mid-1991, which collapsed shortly after and has never been replaced by similar cooperative efforts.\(^{57}\) In Seychelles, the DP backed the SNP presidential candidate Wavel Ramkalwani in 2001, and the two parties forged an electoral alliance in 2006 and 2007. Likewise in Tanzania and Togo there were brief moments when opposition parties coalesced around a unified presidential candidate. For instance, in 2005 Bob Akitani was the sole candidate in Togo for the CAR and UFC parties.

On the other hand, opposition parties have engaged in potentially negative decision making such as electoral boycotts or co-optation. Election boycotts are especially noted among the repressive regimes. In four cases – Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, and Togo – opposition parties have boycotted half or more of the elections. Among the competitive cases there have been no boycotts with the exception of Seychelles during the most recent presidential and legislative elections in 2011. With regard to co-optation, in Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, and Senegal major opposition figures have joined government, albeit briefly at times. Most clearly, following frequent party splits in Gabon, the majority of new parties (including the RNB-RPG)

\(^{56}\) Mundt 1997 p.195
\(^{57}\) Krieger & Takoungang 1998 p.126-131
have since joined a governing coalition that backed Omar Bongo for president in 2005. Likewise, in 1991 Abdoulaye Wade controversially joined the government as a minister for a year.\footnote{Gellar 1995 p.30-31}

Based on these assessments it is possible to come to some judgment regarding opposition capacity (Table 3.3). There are clearer cases of weak opposition capacity where both party institutionalization and party-decision making remained weak throughout the electoral authoritarian period. In Djibouti, the defection of the FRUD faction to the government following the 1993 election deprived the opposition of the bulk of its power. In Gabon, frequent party breakdown has fractionalized the opposition into smaller and smaller parties, some of which have joined government and some of which have boycotted elections. Likewise there are clearer examples of much stronger opposition capacity. In Seychelles, Mozambique, and Tanzania there have been steady opposition parties, moderate cooperation between parties, no boycotts (until Seychelle’s in 2011), and no co-optation by the ruling regime.

Scoring becomes a bit more ambiguous with regard to Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Senegal. In Côte d’Ivoire the short period of electoral authoritarianism prior to the military coup of 1999 makes it difficult to assess party institutionalization even though there were two main opposition parties. However given the short period these parties had to form, the conclusion is that at least for the electoral authoritarian period they were weakly institutionalized. While there was some cooperation between parties and no party was coopted by the regime, the frequent boycotts further undermined their capacity. As discussed further in Chapter 8, Kenya’s opposition parties were clearly weakly institutionalized yet avoided some of the most detrimental decision-making and at times were cooperative. Finally in Senegal Abdoulaye Wade’s PDS is one of the oldest opposition parties in Africa, testament to its stronger institutionalization despite its dominance by a singular personality, and generally made decisions that would increase its competitive capacity.
Table 3.3: Opposition Capacity across Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / Indicator</th>
<th>Party Institutionalization</th>
<th>Party Decision-Making</th>
<th>Opposition Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (+) = Strong; (-) = Weak

Western Linkage and Leverage: Constraining Incumbents, Empowering Oppositions

The final major theoretical approach to consider here is the role of Western leverage and linkage. As developed by Levitsky and Way, Western leverage refers to the sensitivity of a country to external pressures. This sensitivity is based on the size of the country’s economy, whether there are conflicting external foreign policy goals, and whether the country has “Black Knight” status.59 According to Levitsky and Way, even the threat of punitive action from an external power (or by contrast the promise of an external reward) can shape authoritarian behavior by forcing regimes to liberalize or by preventing a stolen election. However, leverage is limited due to the dominant focus on elections and electoral quality, rather than the broader spectrum of democratic qualities such as the protection of civil liberties or behavior between election periods. Accordingly, and relevant for this study, Levitsky and Way argue that leverage on its own is insufficient for explaining democratization.60 It might however, theoretically, explain broader contours of electoral authoritarianism such as incumbent vote-share or the degree of competitiveness.

---

59 Black Knight support refers to counter-hegemonic support from a country like Russia, China, Japan, or France seeking to balance European or American influence. However, the theoretical impact is very similar to conflicting foreign policy goals in that the end result is significant support for an autocratic regime from a prominent external power.

60 Levitsky & Way 2010  p.40-43
In addition, Levitsky and Way emphasize the role of Western linkage, or the density of political, cultural, and economic ties between a particular country and the United State or Europe.\(^{61}\) High degrees of Western linkage can translate into more persistent and useful implementation of Western leverage. Greater linkage increases the amounts of information international groups receive, as well as the probability that a Western power will use its leverage when authoritarian abuse is uncovered. Moreover, when linkage is higher it reduces the cost of domestic protest since opposition groups know that they will have the support of an international power. By contrast, when linkage is low but leverage remains high the pressure on regimes is likely to be much more intermittent.\(^{62}\) However, according to the measures developed by Levitsky and Way, in Africa despite some minor differences between countries linkage appears to be uniformly low.\(^{63}\)

With regard to economic leverage, Levitsky and Way note the absolute size of the country’s economy, whether it is a major oil producer, and whether it is a nuclear power.\(^{64}\) However, for more nuanced distinctions among the African context where none of the cases meet the criteria for low leverage, data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can provide insights.\(^{65}\) These two measures act as proxies for the extent of external financial exposure, or a country’s dependency on an external source for a significant amount of their budgetary needs. All of the countries here rely on development aid for a significant portion of their gross national product. The most dependent country under study is Mozambique, where development assistance has ranged between 20% and 50% of gross national

\(^{61}\) Ibid p.43  
\(^{62}\) Ibid p.51-53  
\(^{63}\) Ibid p.374-375 It is worth mentioning that Levitsky and Way rank Cameroon and Gabon as considerably higher on linkage than other African countries. However, this is likely due to the correlation between their linkage score and the fact that both countries are “Black Knights,” which would negate the impact of higher linkage.  
\(^{64}\) Ibid p.372-373  
\(^{65}\) All data is taken from the 2010 World Development Indicators Database
product (GDP). Other cases with high levels of aid dependency, defined as an average above 10% of GDP, include Djibouti (10%-40%), Kenya (5%-15%), Senegal (10%-15%), Tanzania (10%-30%), and Togo (5%-16%). By contrast, in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon (which is also a medium-sized oil producer), and Seychelles ODA has remained under single digits, most likely due to their more robust export economies and oil revenues (or in the case of Seychelles the dominance of tourism). However, when looking at FDI, the most dependent country is actually Seychelles, with an average rate of 10% of GDP due to the high level of foreign investment in the tourism industry. Other dependent countries with higher levels of reliance on FDI are Mozambique (~4% of GDP), Tanzania (~3% of GDP), and Togo (~2% of GDP). By contrast, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Kenya, and Senegal have relied much less on foreign investment to support economic growth during the period of electoral authoritarianism.

With regard to political leverage, Black Knight support and competing foreign policy goals all determine the extent to which an external power is likely to pressure a regime into reform. Two countries considered by Levitsky and Way as Black Knights are Cameroon and Gabon due to their extensive economic and military ties with France.\textsuperscript{66} Black Knight support in Cameroon is discussed in detail in Chapter 9, but broadly-speaking French bilateral aid was instrumental in seeing the Biya regime through the economic crisis of the early 1990s and later in easing access to IMF loan packages.\textsuperscript{67} Likewise, Gabon has enjoyed high levels of French economic support since independence (nearly 80% of development assistance is from France), rooted in the abovementioned “Gabonese Clan” and ties with the French oil company Elf. In both Cameroon and Gabon the French also have standing military accords and military

\textsuperscript{66} Levitsky & Way 2010 p.258
\textsuperscript{67} Takougang 2003 p.432
missions.\textsuperscript{68} In fact, the French have intervened militarily twice in Gabon, once in 1964 after the coup that ousted Leon M’ba and once in 1990 after the founding election, ostensibly to protect French economic interests.\textsuperscript{69}

However French support has also been extended to other Francophone countries not covered by Levitsky and Way. Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed unusually strong ties with France due to the presence of one of the largest settler populations and the largest French population in Africa.\textsuperscript{70} Militarily, the French also maintained a standing mission in Côte d’Ivoire of about 550 troops, which remained in place in response to the Rwandan crisis.\textsuperscript{71} In Senegal, while French economic assistance was not as strong as in other Francophone countries, the French nonetheless maintained strong military ties through a military agreement signed in March, 1974.\textsuperscript{72}

Throughout the 1990s, the French stationed over 1,000 troops in Senegal. Togo also kept strong military ties with the French during single-party rule and during the period of electoral authoritarianism. In 1986, the French intervened militarily to prop up the Eyadéma regime, and standing military agreements have remained in place since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{73} Still, Togo did not have the same economic ties to France as other African Francophone countries did with the French contributing a declining share of ODA since 1990 (still approximately 30\%-40\% of all of Togo’s bilateral aid).\textsuperscript{74}

One of the more interesting cases of external power support is Djibouti, which had previously enjoyed the same French backing but in recent years has also become a key American ally in the war on terror in Somalia. Djibouti lacks any natural resources or real economic

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{68} Decalo 1998 p.156; Gregory 2000
\textsuperscript{69} Gardinier 2000 ; Reed 1987; Tordoff & Young 1999 p.274-275
\textsuperscript{70} Crook 1989 p.216-217
\textsuperscript{71} Gregory 2000 p.442
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid 2000 p.438
\textsuperscript{73} Cummings 1995 p.389; Gregory 2000 p.437
\textsuperscript{74} World Bank Development Indicators
\end{flushright}
foundation. Until recently, the vast majority of the population was subsistence pastoralists. The main economic activity in the country is derived from its strategic presence straddling the Gulf of Aden and its port linking goods to landlocked Ethiopia.\(^{75}\) Since independence in 1977, France has provided extensive economic support to Djibouti. While total French support was small, per capita Djibouti was the largest recipient of French aid in Africa. In addition, the French kept a substantial military base in Djibouti.\(^{76}\) Following the September 11, 2001 attacks Djibouti became a central tactical center for American military operations in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. In December 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Djibouti and pledged continued presence of American troops for years to come.\(^{77}\)

As noted, while linkage influences the propensity of a Western power to exercise their leverage, it appears to be uniformly low in sub-Saharan Africa in comparison with other regions. One way to differentiate cases within sub-Saharan Africa is to look at the extent of Western reporting on political events and elections. This can indicate both the level of institutional ties (actual reporting staff) and public interest (a proxy for social ties). Looking at New York Times coverage that includes the terms “politics” or “elections” does in fact reveal some important divergence. At the low end are the cases of Seychelles, Djibouti, Cameroon, and Gabon with 38, 49, 157, and 182 mentions respectively. In the mid-range are the cases of Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and Togo with 664, 399, 380, 492, and 253 mentions respectively. The one outlier is the case of Kenya with 1,448 reports.\(^{78}\) What this highlights is the

\(^{75}\) Brass 2008 p.524-525  
\(^{76}\) Bollee 2003 p.483  
\(^{77}\) Ibid p.484; Brass 2008 p.526  
\(^{78}\) To account for whether this was due to the high level of reporting on the violence following the 2007 election (which itself indicates higher levels of linkage) I shortened the range to between 1990 and 2002. In this range there were still 871 reports. When limiting the time span for Côte d’Ivoire to 1990-1999 to account for the impact of the military coup, the number of reports is reduced to 351 (New York Times Historical Archive). Similar results are found when using the Lexis Nexus search function, which accounts for a wider range but shorter time span of Western news outlets.
unique form of linkage that exists between Kenya and the West, which is not captured in the measures employed by Levitsky and Way. This likely influenced the willingness of Western powers to pressure for reform, and is used to help measure the extent of external power pressure.

Using the two indicators of external financial exposure and external power pressure, each case is scored in Table 3.4. With regard to external financial exposure, the more robust economies of Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gabon did not rely as heavily on development assistance or on foreign direct investment. By contrast, Djibouti, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Togo were much more sensitive to external financial sources. Looking at external power support, the three cases of Cameroon, Djibouti, and Gabon are the clearest examples of strong external power support that would preclude democratic reform. Continued foreign support also supersedes whatever sensitivity Djibouti had to external financial sources as long as it continues to be an important ally in the war on terror and a major US military asset. These three cases, along with Côte d’Ivoire due to its lower economic exposure, are scored as negative on Western leverage while all other cases are scored as positive.

Table 3.4: Western Leverage across Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Indicator</th>
<th>External Financial Exposure</th>
<th>External Power Pressure</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (+) = Strong; (-) = Weak
Putting the Space Together: Pathways to Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes

Table 3.5 consolidates these findings into a single table and presents the different pathways to actual electoral authoritarian outcomes. The first major insight from the typological space is that in fact party capacity is a primary differentiating factor between competitive and repressive cases. This is in-line with the theoretical expectations that investments into articulate parties with mechanisms for elite retention and socially robust parties with mechanisms for social mobilization were likely to rely much less on repressive measures to win elections. By contrast, single party-regimes that had weaker party capacity all shifted to forms of electoral authoritarianism that were far more repressive.

The role of economic performance appears to be an important determinant of electoral authoritarian type, but manifests differently in the competitive versus repressive cases. Among the competitive cases, regimes that have sustained comparatively higher levels of economic growth or have seen measurable improvement in social welfare indicators (Mozambique and Tanzania), electoral hegemony has persisted. In the case of Seychelles, despite a stronger economic starting point, it has experienced extended periods of economic recession that have coincided with a decrease in the party’s electoral hegemony. With regard to Senegal, it too struggled for decades with stagnating economic conditions, little improvements in social welfare, and growing public corruption. By 1988, these conditions had led to a significant change in the regime when the Sufi Brotherhoods began to withdraw their public approval for Abdou Diouf and fundamentally altered the basis of social robustness the PS had built. With regard to the repressive cases, economic performance also largely differentiates the majority of repressive hegemonies from repressive electoral authoritarian regimes. Notably, Côte d’Ivoire was racked
by a significant economic downturn in the early 1990s yet was still able to muster highly
hegemonic outcomes. However, it succumbed to a military coup in 1999 after only two elections.

A better apparent predictor is the role of Western linkage and leverage, which as
expected does not appear to be relevant in explaining variation among the competitive cases. All
of the repressive cases with low levels of leverage were able to generate hegemonic vote-shares.
By contrast, while Kenya and Togo varied with regard to opposition capacity, they both were
susceptible to higher levels of Western linkage and leverage and remained repressive electoral
authoritarian regimes. In fact, as will be discussed in the case-studies the weaker economic
performance of Kenya is correlated with the higher degree of Western linkage and leverage that
kept the regime under perpetual pressure. On the other hand, Cameroon’s stronger economic
performance (which again was not stellar) corresponds with the significant external power
support it received from France and the United States, which helped mitigate the impact of
economic crisis and provided important political support.

This does not mean that opposition capacity had no impact, only that it was less relevant
in shaping the broader contours of electoral contestation. First, it is unsurprising that in the
competitive cases opposition capacity also ranks higher. The more open electoral conditions and
lesser restrictions on group association facilitate stronger party construction and limit detrimental
decision-making like boycotts or co-optation. Importantly, since these opposition parties are
facing a much more articulate and robust incumbent party the stronger capacity does not
correlate with lesser hegemony. Second, as the Kenyan and Cameroonian case-studies will show,
marginal differences in opposition capacity were an important factor in perpetuating repressive
electoral authoritarianism rather than repressive hegemony, and were also crucial in explaining
eventual electoral turnover.
That said, it should again be stressed that there are limitations to typological theorizing. The use of dichotomous coding limits our ability to estimate the impact of marginal effects. For instance, it is plausible that leverage might in fact be lower in Togo than in Kenya, which leaves opposition capacity as the potentially differentiating factor. Or, are there marginal differences in party capacity not captured in a dichotomous measure? Similarly, typological theorizing makes it difficult to capture interactions among variables. For example, how might Western linkage and leverage impact opposition capacity, or even the ability of a regime to continuously use coercive means? These issues are taken up in the detailed case-studies where a more in-depth discussion of the process of single-party formation is possible, and where observable implications can be tested through process-tracing.

Table 3.5: A Typological Theory of Electoral Authoritarian Variation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case / Indicator</th>
<th>Party Capacity</th>
<th>Economic Performance</th>
<th>Opposition Capacity</th>
<th>Western Linkage and Leverage</th>
<th>EA Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>REA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>REA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique, Tanzania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1978-1993)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (1993-2001), Seychelles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CH=Competitive Hegemony; CEA=Competitive Electoral Authoritarian; RH=Repressive Hegemony; REA=Repressive Electoral Authoritarian
PART II – THE EVOLUTION OF PARTIES UNDER SINGLE-PARTY RULE
Chapter 4 – The Evolution of Strong Party Capacity in Tanzania

This chapter discusses the evolution of strong party capacity in single-party Tanzania, which provided the underpinning for Tanzania’s subsequent competitive hegemony. Tanzania’s ruling party under single-party rule the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) and its successor Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) stand relatively unique within the African context.\(^1\) While it struggled to find its footing during its early years, following the Arusha Declaration of 1967 it embarked on significant reform of its ruling institutions and on one of the most elaborate and far-reaching attempts at social transformation on the African continent with its policy of *ujamaa*. During this period, TANU/CCM served as the central political institution in Tanzanian life and rural subsistence farmers became the primary targets of social incorporation.

**The Nyerere Era: *Ujamaa* and Party Supremacy**

As a political party, TANU has its origins in the pre-independence Tanganyika African Association (TAA); a loose organization of civil servants and teachers that became increasingly political following World War II. The TAA at times paralleled, but most often subsumed the role of tribal unions in rural areas. The primary stumbling block, which would continue to imperil TANU in its early years, was the lack of coordination between the central and peripheral branches. This was the impetus that led Julius Nyerere – Tanzania’s eminent father figure – to reorganize the TAA into TANU in 1954. TANU slowly expanded outside of the capital Dar es Salaam to become the central institution in opposition to the British authority.\(^2\) While physically unable to muster complete compliance from all regions of Tanzania, TANU was the only viable

---

\(^1\) TANU merged with the Zanzibar based Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in 1977 to form CCM. Throughout this chapter I will refer to the party as TANU or CCM depending on the context.

\(^2\) Bienen 1970 p.26-27
political organization in Tanzania. During early elections, immediately prior and after independence, this dominance was clearly evident. TANU won all the seats in the 1958 and 1959 territorial elections and all but one seat in the first post-independence election in 1962.

Yet despite this early dominance TANU found it extremely difficult to sustain a high level of popular mobilization. On paper the party emulated the Soviet Communist Party with a structure that paralleled the administrative units of the country and consisted of regional, district, and branch party chapters. At the center TANU had also developed a number of national organs such as the national chairman, national executive committee (NEC), national conference (NC), central committee (CC), and national headquarters. In reality, TANU’s ability to win elections was equally, if not more so, determined by the weakness of alternatives rather than its own inherent strength. Financially the party was strapped for cash and had immense difficulties exerting control over the nearly 1,500 regional and district branches. Membership numbers began to fall, as did voter turnout. In 1962 only 36% of eligible voters actually registered and only 63% of them voted.

TANU was handicapped by centrifugal pressures and a lack of ideological focus to sustain the party. The executive committee reflected the regional interests and the myopic ambitions of mid-level elites rather than a national agenda. Similarly, the central committee and national headquarters were responsible for a number of national tasks, but the persistent issue of

---

3 Bienen writes that by 1960 TANU had 498 organized branches while its main opposition party the African National Congress (ANC) had only nine, (Bienen 1970 p.57). TANU also claimed between 1.5 and 2 million members. A number of factors contributed to the emergence of TANU as the dominating political force at independence. First, while tribal and ethnic sentiments certainly played a role in Tanzanian political life, the country is fairly heterogeneous with over 120 ethnic groups spread throughout the country. Similarly, the colonial experience of Tanzania did not bequeath a legacy of land alienation or ethnic activism as it did in neighboring Kenya. Third, the early promotion of Swahili culture proved to be a unifying factor that brought together the varied social fabric of Tanzania into a more cohesive national culture. Fourth, the prominence of Julius Nyerere and his uncanny leadership skills cannot be understated as a factor that facilitated the strength of the TANU-led independence movement.

4 Ibid p.191

5 Glickman 1965 p.139
money led to frequent internal disagreement. There were early attempts at reform – the creation of the office of the presidency in 1962 and especially the appointment of local TANU secretary-generals to act both as party-men and government appointees. As Nyerere struggled to find an ideological focal point for the party tensions began to mount over the role of non-Africans in Tanzania, economic policy, and the relationship with the islands of Zanzibar. These tensions culminated in an attempted military coup in 1964, which was only aborted with British assistance. To astute observers like Henry Bienen, it appeared that Tanzania might be headed toward a similar demise as several of Africa’s other nascent single-party regimes.

By 1965 TANU emerged intact from these early conflicts and was armed with new vision and vigor. To cope with the dual challenge of stagnating economic conditions and party weakness, Nyerere implemented a new vision for a socialist single-party regime. Guiding his vision was the concept of *ujamaa*, which was proclaimed as official TANU policy with the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Although reforms had begun earlier, Arusha symbolizes a sharp break from past political patterns and the forging of a new type of single-party regime and a new relationship with Tanzania’s large rural population. *Ujamaa*, as envisioned by Nyerere was a version of African socialism based on concepts like economic self-reliance, communal and rural development, and single-party democracy. The absence of organized political alternatives and Nyerere’s preeminence as a national figure were key factors that facilitated the implementation of far-reaching social and economic policies with very little resistance.

---

6 Okumu & Holmquist 1984 p.51
7 Bienen 1970 p.563-381
8 *Ujima* refers to patterns of communal assistance that arose among villagers during peak season or in cases of emergency. *Ujamaa* refers to the translation of those principles of self-reliance and community to a national framework. (Hyden 1980 p.99)
9 For instance, Oscar Kambona – a major figure in the independence movement and crucial in ending the military coup of 1964 – was forced into exile over his disagreement with Nyerere over *ujamaa* and single-party rule (Mwansasu 1979 p.172-173). Another notorious instance was the expulsion of 9 sitting MPs who opposed *ujamaa* in 1968 (Samoff 1987 p.161).
The Evolution of a Structurally Articulate Party under Nyerere

Beginning in the immediate years prior to the Arusha Declaration, a number of steps were taken to elevate the party as the supreme political institution in Tanzania. Single-party democracy as a premise was officially enshrined in the 1965 constitution, which also gave TANU’s NEC and central committee significant control over national policy at the expense of parliament.\(^\text{10}\) Nyerere originally envisioned complete amalgamation of the legislature and the party. This suggestion was not put into practice, but instead the regional and district administrations were combined and their corresponding party positions and party secretary-generals acted simultaneously as government officials. Accordingly, the NEC was tasked with developing national policy while the legislature was tasked with its implementation.\(^\text{11}\) In 1975 the constitution was further amended to officially codify the supremacy afforded the party, stating that “the functions of the organs of the Republic of Tanzania shall be performed under the auspices of the Party”.\(^\text{12}\)

Ultimately, the office of the presidency (who also acted as party chairman) had final decisional power, but this did not necessarily diminish from the power of the party. The constitutions of 1965 and 1975 both stated that the “president shall act in his own discretion and shall not be obliged to follow Advice tendered by any other person”.\(^\text{13}\) In practice, despite the lack of parity between the party and the presidency, the party was afforded crucial decision-making power and often consulted. In fact it was the party NEC that pushed back on Nyerere’s

\(^{10}\) Miti 1980
\(^{11}\) Ibid p190-193. Miti also notes that the civil service was a discredited institution in Tanzania and dominated by foreigners at the time of independence. This facilitated Nyerere’s decision to forge the party as an alternative means of political influence.
\(^{12}\) Tanzanian Constitution 1975. At this point in time Nyerere appeared to back off somewhat from his earlier attempts at blurring the lines between government and party. In a number of speeches given between 1975 and 1977, Nyerere frequently asserted that while the party was supreme, it did not subsume government (Mwansasu 1980 p.176)
\(^{13}\) Tanzanian Constitution 1965
suggestion that the party and legislature merge. Nyerere also faced a referendum every five years and in 1977 the constitution was amended to limit presidential terms to two.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore, while the presidency was afforded a strong position it was comparatively not as dominating an institution as in several other African single-party regimes, nor was Nyerere’s governing style excessively authoritarian.\textsuperscript{15}

Resources and efforts were directed at institutionalizing the party at the center and at the sub-national level. Following Arusha, the party NEC were quickly paid salaries commensurate with members of parliament.\textsuperscript{16} The party secretariat in Dar es Salaam (and later Dodoma) eventually housed nine different functionary offices – the disciplinary committee, ideology and political education, foreign affairs, organization, finance, administration, social service, economic planning, and the defense and security offices. Money derived from the nationalization of major industries was diverted to fund these offices as well as the TANU Youth League (TYL) and Kivukoni Leadership College, which trained new generations of party staff. Great efforts were made to ensure that qualified individuals staffed these offices, and that each had an operating secretariat.\textsuperscript{17}

To strengthen the party throughout the country, and especially in rural areas, party branches were bolstered and funded in every ward and village. As part of \textit{ujamaa}, communal villages were encouraged and this allowed the spread of party branches to any village with more than 250 members. Within those branches party cells were established for every ten homes. Party

\textsuperscript{14} Tanzanian Constitution 1977
\textsuperscript{15} Coleman and Rosberg consider Nyerere as following a prophet-like model of leadership (alongside Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Sekou Touré in Guinea), and exhibiting strong moral leadership (1982). Others like Cranford Pratt have emphasized Nyerere’s educational background and role as \textit{mwalimu}, or teacher as defining his style of leadership (1976).
\textsuperscript{16} Okumu & Holmquist 1984 p.54-55
\textsuperscript{17} Tordoff 1967; Mwansasu 1979 p.185. Other regional party colleges were founded around the country throughout the 1970s (McHenry 1994 p.37).
branches were also established for any workplace with more than 50 employees.\textsuperscript{18} To attract effective officials to man these party branches, in 1973 the role of branch secretary and ward executive officer were merged (this paralleled the merger of government and party officials at the district and regional levels). Branch and workplace secretaries were required to undergo three months of party training at one of the party colleges.\textsuperscript{19} In 1973 a policy of decentralization was also vital in strengthening the roles of party district and regional chairmen, who directed major developmental programs and became key institutions in the TANU hierarchy.\textsuperscript{20}

Within the party, efforts were also made to allow for more transparency and regulated practice. After Arusha party congresses were held biannually and elections for party offices were held every five years. Bismark Mwansasu observes that up to the early 1970s, national conferences were disorderly affairs. After the 5\textsuperscript{th} annual conference, procedures were enforced such as written agendas, a process for passing party resolutions, and a requirement that party candidates submit forms in advance of the conference.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, these conferences were replicated at the regional and district levels and greater allowance was given to representation from the branch levels. The power of appointment to committees was also institutionalized - district and regional committees were no longer appointed by the chairmen but elected directly by their local conference. At the national level, after 1969 the central committee was also elected by the national conference rather than appointed by Nyerere.\textsuperscript{22}

TANU was also able to develop a system of elite recruitment and retention that was simultaneously open to new recruits, but also imposed discipline on its candidates and tied them

\textsuperscript{18} Mwansasu 1980 p.180
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid p.181
\textsuperscript{20} Samoff 1987 p.165-168; Maro & Mlay 1979. Bismarck Mwansasu further notes that despite decentralization, which afforded district chairmen considerable responsibilities in terms of developmental programs, there was still a shortage of qualified staff to write technical reports (p.182).
\textsuperscript{21} Mwansasu 1980 p.184
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid
strongly to the party. The central institution incorporated was regular semi-competitive legislative elections held every five years. During elections, several candidates could vie for nomination through their local branch and were then screened by their Annual District Conference (ADC). Prospective candidates were expected to make presentations and answer questions about their political past and adherence to party principles. After a vote by the ADC, the list of nominees – two per constituency - was submitted up the ranks to the party NEC, which could further vet candidates.\(^\text{23}\) On average, about 10% of candidates were rejected by the NEC and at times some constituencies ran unopposed.\(^\text{24}\) During campaigns, the platforms were essentially the same and candidates were forbidden from using any private resources for campaigning.\(^\text{25}\) This stands in stark contrast with how single-party elections were held in a case like Kenya where MP candidates were given much more autonomy and were generally expelled or denied nomination if they were too overtly ideological.

While the legislature has been referred to as a rubber stamp institution without any real decision-making power vis-à-vis the party, this underestimates the impact of parliamentary elections. First, they served as a mechanism for elite recruitment, which allowed for elite cycling. Between 1960 and 1985 each parliament rotated over half of its members (Table 4.1).\(^\text{26}\) While backbencher MPs were more susceptible, several prominent politicians and cabinet ministers have been voted out of office, including the prominent Foreign Minister John Malecela in 1985, a figure who will be noted later in the discussion of the multiparty era.\(^\text{27}\) Second, the disciplinary aspect of parliamentary elections strengthened the linkage between the party and the periphery.

\(^{23}\) Hyden & Leys 1972; Samoff 1987 p.157-158
\(^{24}\) Barkan 1984b p.90; Samoff 1987 p.163.According to Samoff the ADC rejection rates ranged between 20% and 47% while NEC rejection rates ranged between 0% and 61% during the 1965 election.
\(^{25}\) Candidates were given a symbol – the house (nyumba) or a hoe (jembe) to differentiate them (Bienen 1970 p.389).
\(^{26}\) Barkan 1984b; van Donge & Liviga 1989 p.51
\(^{27}\) Samoff 1987 p.158
and undermined clientelistic ties. Up through the 1980s party discipline was strictly enforced, which deprived MPs of developing strong material bases for clientelism. Instead, MP success was determined by their popularity and their adherence to the party’s ideological platform.\textsuperscript{28}

### Table 4.1: Turnover in Tanzanian Single-Party Legislatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Turnover Among MPs (% 1\textsuperscript{st} time MPs)</th>
<th>Backbenchers as a % of all MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Source:} Barkan 1984b, van Donge and Liviga 1989

Party discipline was further enforced through the NEC’s control of party membership and the enactment of a Leadership Code in 1967 that remained in place until the mid-1980s. The Leadership Code forbade TANU officials and elected representatives from engaging in secondary business endeavors. It required that every TANU and government leader be either a worker or peasant and became a part of TANU’s and Tanzania’s constitution in 1969. In 1975 the code was extended to all members of TANU and after the merger with the ASP in 1977 it became a part of CCM’s constitution.\textsuperscript{29} In fact, members were only converted from TANU to CCM membership if they could prove they grasped the party’s ideological principles.\textsuperscript{30} The NEC’s control of membership and the code was a fairly effective disciplinary mechanism – it was not used frequently to purge members, but again helped maintain closer ties between new recruits and the party.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} Barkan 1984b. See also van Donge & Liviga 1986 for their discussion of the role of parliament as a critical, albeit secondary, voice in Tanzanian political life under single-party rule.

\textsuperscript{29} McHenry 1994 p.30-31

\textsuperscript{30} Hyden 1980 p.137

\textsuperscript{31} Miti 1980
Life within TANU was not without its rewards and TANU established a fairly cohesive core of top-leadership. Critically, it did so while avoiding personalism. Positions like cabinet portfolios or NEC membership were fairly secure but had to be earned. Cabinet shuffles were common under single-party rule, and between 1960 and 1984 there were only three years when there was not a shift in cabinet.\(^{32}\) However, these changes were most often marginal, and elites who had penetrated the higher echelons of TANU were likely to stay there. Indicative of the staying power of cabinet members is the fact they were twice as likely to get re-elected for parliament as other members of parliament. Other party positions had similar staying power, and when members left the cabinet they often assumed other party positions and headed parastatals or other public institutions. Representative of this trend, during the 1982 internal TANU election all the NEC members, regional and district chairs were re-elected.\(^{33}\)

These investments into single-party structure make TANU/CCM stand apart in comparison with most other cases (and especially Kenya and Cameroon). Joel Samoff\(^{34}\) summarizes the exceptional role of the party in Tanzania writing that:

> “Unlike its counterparts in much of the rest of Africa...the party in Tanzania has maintained its vitality...it is not an institution that remains dormant most of the time, resuscitated only to mobilize voter support for elections. Rather, it is centrally involved in candidate screening and selections, and consequently work in the party is often a useful base for aspirants to higher office.”

The breadth and institutionalization of its party organs, the relatively open and rewarding yet disciplinary nature of its elite recruitment, and the elevation of the party above other political institutions imbued the party with additional sources of elite cohesion and that would later make it fairly immune to defection.

\(^{32}\) Van Donge & Liviga 1986b p.626. If anything, cabinet composition reflected an attempt at regional balance.
\(^{33}\) Van Donge & Liviga 1986 p.233
\(^{34}\) Samoff 1987 p.177
The Evolution of a Socially Robust Party under Nyerere

It is worth beginning a discussion of social robustness by mentioning that to this day TANU/CCM elicits a degree of respect even from its most vociferous detractors. First, TANU is indistinguishable from the move toward independence – the dominant organization at the time and largely credited with negotiating a non-violent transition. Second, the eminence of Tanzania’s founding father Julius Nyerere and his moral vision still attracts great amounts of respect. Nyerere is credited with uniting Tanzania’s multiple ethnic groups under the language of Kiswahili, and preventing the country from sliding into state-failure. While Nyerere’s social and economic policies are generally considered failures, his commitment to education, development, and equity are still revered. This has undoubtedly provided CCM with a rhetorical advantage over its opponents, and perhaps a unique capacity to mobilize.\footnote{35 These accomplishments were repeatedly affirmed and utilized by TANU and CCM during single-party elections (Samoff 1987 p.169-170).}

With regard to more specific investments into social robustness, the Arusha Declaration launched Tanzania on a new path of economic development guided by Nyerere’s vision of \textit{ujamaa}. This entailed the construction of a number of party-affiliated organizations constructed for the task of social mobilization. TANU maintained numerous affiliated mass organizations – the Union of Tanzanian Workers (JUWATA), Cooperative Union of Tanzania (CUT), Tanzanian Youth Organization (VIJANA), Tanzanian Parent’s Association (WAZAZI), Union of Tanzanian Women (UWT), and the Tanzanian Youth League (TYL). TANU elites viewed these mass organizations, and particularly the TYL, as important vehicles for translating party goals into reality, and they were replicated at the regional, district, and branch levels of the party.\footnote{36 McHenry 1994 p.53} The TYL was a crucial vanguard institution used for the construction of collective villages.
While these institutions provided outlets for mobilization, more critical have been the TANU party cells (*nyumba ya kumi kumi*). Cells were first founded in 1964 with the goal of establishing a self-sufficient party structure for every 10 homes. Once a cell grew to encompass 10,000 homes it became eligible for branch status. By 1970, some 7,200 branches and countless party cells had been established throughout Tanzania, operating year-round in urban and rural areas. The importance of cells cannot be underestimated and it was a massive undertaking by TANU. Cells ensured easier communication among party members and provided positions of prestige to ordinary citizens at the grassroots level. Cell leadership positions were paid modest sums, but enough to ensure a stable institutional structure. Cell leaders, or *mabozi*, were viewed as the primary institution for directing TANU initiatives and theoretically provided an avenue for political participation by the population. Cell leaders were officially responsible for explaining TANU policies, collecting party dues, registering new members, and keeping tabs on the activities of citizens.\(^{37}\) As Barkan notes, cells provided a system of linkage between the periphery and the center that was much more durable than the potentially personalistic ties between MPs and constituents.\(^{38}\)

These structures provided TANU and later CCM with a strong mobilization infrastructure, but it is the nuanced legacy of *ujamaa* that is also critical for understanding the party’s social robustness. The Arusha Declaration directed TANU toward the construction of collective villages (*ujamaa vijijini*). Nyerere envisioned these villages as an opportunity to extend the party to the countryside and popularize the socialist agenda.\(^{39}\) It is extremely important to note that *ujamaa* was not a uniform policy, but proceeded in waves. A more benign

\(^{37}\) Ingle 1972 p.171-172. The *mabozi* were also prominent members of their villages, and often fulfilled a social role. Several surveys conducted in the 1970s found that the majority of cell leaders’ time was not spent on TANU business, but on coping with issues like marital or landlord-tenant disputes (Miller 1970, Samoff 1974).

\(^{38}\) Barkan 1984b p.86.

\(^{39}\) Bienen 1970 p.335
version was enacted between 1967 and 1973, followed by the forced transfer of large segments of the population between 1973 and 1978. Moreover, while *ujamaa* failed on two fronts – both as a basis for economic development and an attempt at transforming the rural peasantry into productive socialists – this overlooks its key political consequences. Socialist development privileged rural, and predominantly subsistence farmers, over established cash-crop agriculture. Consequently, this entailed the redistribution of large amounts of wealth from the productive sectors of the Tanzanian economy to these rural populations.

The earliest attempts at villagization were led by the TYL, emulating the Israeli kibbutz movement.\(^{40}\) Villages were defined as voluntary – binding groups of people who willingly joined to work and live together. Peasants were encouraged to move into villages for ideological purposes, and Nyerere utilized the persuasive tools he had at hand such as the Catholic Church and state educational system. Nyerere himself lived in a model village in Dodoma, which proved to be instrumental in encouraging the growth of villages in that region between 1970 and 1973. However, once a village was constructed TANU and the TYL would assist in building roads and infrastructure, expanding primary education, and constructing basic health dispensaries and clinics.\(^{41}\) Importantly, as part of *ujamaa*, poll taxes and primary school fees were abolished. Geographically, the majority of the early villages were successfully constructed in rural areas with little cash-crop production (with the noted exception of Iringa), and in coastal towns where the sisal trade had collapsed. In addition, early efforts were deliberately focused on areas that lay along the TAZARA railway from Morogoro to Mbeya.\(^{42}\) Programs like “Operation Dodoma” were much more explicit in their use of material incentive to encourage villagization and saw some success. Hyden lists similar success stories in Iringa, where by 1972 “virtually all capitalist

\(^{40}\) The earliest success story was the Ruvuma Development Association in the late 1960s.

\(^{41}\) McHenry 1979  p.94-133

\(^{42}\) United Republic of Tanzania 1970; United Republic of Tanzania 1973
farming…had come to an end”.  

Progress was slow and by 1973 only 15% of the population had moved into communal villages. Frustrated, Nyerere declared that all Tanzanians would be required to reside in ujamaa villages by 1976. Subsequently, between 1973 and 1976 Tanzania witnessed the largest resettlement program in African history. Approximately 5 million rural Tanzanians were forcefully moved into collective villages (Table 4.2). Most notably, a large proportion of new village construction after 1973 was in areas where cash and export-crop production was much stronger, along the coffee and cotton growing areas of northern and northeastern Tanzania. At independence these regions were actually the backbone of the TAA and TANU. Ujamaa essentially reversed this relationship, and forced villagization was economically disastrous for these sectors. As Michael Lofchie notes, farmers in Arusha, Kilimanjaro and the Lake Zone soon found themselves “pariahs in their own nationalist party”.

Concurrent with the policy of forced villagization, TANU also cracked down on co-operatives and private shops, which acted as financial intermediaries in rural areas and were predominantly Asian-owned. In 1976, TANU launched “Operation Maduka,” meant to eradicate private retailers and establish communally owned shops in villages. The results were devastating, leading to food shortages and famine in rural areas and an end to the policy after only 2 ½ months. Similarly, the government decided in 1975 to abolish all cooperatives and introduce parastatals as the primary institution through which agricultural crops were sold and marketed. Again, the results were tragic for cash and export-crop farmers. The production of items like

---

43 Hyden 1980 p.102  
44 Officially legislated in the 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act, but implemented since 1973.  
45 Hyden 1980  
46 Denis Martin notes that voters from these regions were the “disturbing 6 per cent” who voted No in the presidential election of 1975 (Martin 1978)  
47 Lofchie 1994 p.154  
48 Famine in the 1970s was exacerbated by the rise in oil prices and severe droughts throughout the 1970s (Samoff 1987 p. 168-169).
coffee and tea stagnated in the 1970s and early 1980s. Agricultural growth in Tanzania was an anemic 1.6% between 1965 and 1980.\textsuperscript{49}

There is no doubt that \textit{ujamaa} failed as a policy for transforming Tanzanian society and as an economic rationale, but its political implications are often misunderstood.\textsuperscript{50} Goran Hyden has famously argued that \textit{ujamaa} failed to break economic patterns of subsistence agriculture and the “economy of affection”.\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, policies that were detrimental to cash-crop farmers essentially killed the productive sector of the Tanzanian economy and significantly contributed to Tanzania’s balance of payment crisis in the 1980s. But, while TANU officials might have been frustrated by their inability to transform the rural peasantry, in reality the way \textit{ujamaa} was implemented translated into a significant transfer of wealth and the virtual taxation of cash-crop farmers to subsidize less developed areas.\textsuperscript{52} Moreover, \textit{ujamaa} villagization entailed massive party institution-building in some of the most rural areas of the country. As a result Tanzania was a much more equal society than Kenya or Cameroon, albeit with much slower growth rates. Instead of “urban bias,” so characteristic of other African countries, TANU’s policies resulted in \textit{rural bias} in favor of subsistence farmers. TANU’s proclaimed commitment to workers and peasants were not mere rhetoric, but backed by actual policies and institution-building that incorporated a wide rural segment of Tanzania.

\textsuperscript{49} Lofchie 1994
\textsuperscript{50} Chege 1994 p.72
\textsuperscript{51} Hyden 1980
\textsuperscript{52} Lofchie 1994; Stren, Halfâni and Malombe also argue that urban centers in Tanzania went through a significant period of decay under \textit{ujamaa} (1994). Moreover, as Tripp writes, it was during this period that informal economies emerged in urban areas in response to the failure of the parastatal industry (1997).
Table 4.2: Growth in the Number of Ujamaa Villages and Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodoma</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iringa</td>
<td>11,600</td>
<td>216,200</td>
<td>207,502</td>
<td>243,527</td>
<td>244,709</td>
<td>804,391</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilimanjaro</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,616</td>
<td>5,009</td>
<td>4,934</td>
<td>3,176</td>
<td>14,508</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>70,673</td>
<td>203,128</td>
<td>175,082</td>
<td>169,073</td>
<td>218,888</td>
<td>386,664</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mara</td>
<td>84,700</td>
<td>127,371</td>
<td>127,370</td>
<td>108,868</td>
<td>233,632</td>
<td>626,687</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbeya</td>
<td>32,900</td>
<td>64,390</td>
<td>98,571</td>
<td>103,677</td>
<td>85,051</td>
<td>934,800</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morogoro</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>10,513</td>
<td>23,951</td>
<td>19,732</td>
<td>25,509</td>
<td>123,256</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtwara</td>
<td>173,027</td>
<td>371,560</td>
<td>441,241</td>
<td>466,098</td>
<td>524,126</td>
<td>667,413</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>13,641</td>
<td>32,099</td>
<td>49,846</td>
<td>40,864</td>
<td>1,437,095</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pwani</td>
<td>48,300</td>
<td>93,503</td>
<td>111,636</td>
<td>115,382</td>
<td>167,073</td>
<td>157,648</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukwa</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruvuma</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>29,433</td>
<td>29,430</td>
<td>42,385</td>
<td>62,736</td>
<td>378,511</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>12,265</td>
<td>15,292</td>
<td>12,052</td>
<td>18,425</td>
<td>940,335</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singida</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>51,230</td>
<td>59,420</td>
<td>59,420</td>
<td>141,542</td>
<td>247,834</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabora</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td>18,408</td>
<td>25,115</td>
<td>29,295</td>
<td>28,730</td>
<td>553,770</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>35,907</td>
<td>77,859</td>
<td>77,957</td>
<td>67,557</td>
<td>105,184</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Lake</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>9,491</td>
<td>16,747</td>
<td>13,280</td>
<td>15,958</td>
<td>26,432</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>4,464</td>
<td>5,556</td>
<td>5,628</td>
<td>5,008</td>
<td>6,944</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mascarenhas 1979
The Mwinyi Era: From Ujamaa to Ruksa

In 1985 Tanzania underwent what was regionally quite an unprecedented process – it peacefully succeeded the executive office from Julius Nyerere to the Zanzibari Ali Hassan Mwinyi. The ease of the transition, which occurred before the end of Nyerere’s second term, was itself testament to the strength of the institutions that Nyerere had put in place. As shall be discussed in the next chapters, executive succession in Kenya and Cameroon was far from institutionalized and gave rise to significant in-fighting within the ruling party during single-party rule. After the 1985 transition, CCM further institutionalized a process for electing the party presidential candidate through a primary system whereby national congress members could vote in a two-round system. If no presidential candidate made it past the 50% mark, the bottom candidates were dropped and a second round of voting was held to determine the victor. This system would later nominate Benjamin Mkapa as the first CCM candidate of the multiparty era.

The central challenge that Ali Hassan Mwinyi faced was the acute economic crisis that had taken its toll on the provision of public services and the party. During the prior decade, Nyerere was reluctant to address the rapid pace of inflation, crumbling infrastructure, and acute food shortages in ways that would undermine his vision of ujamaa. Rather than working through the World Bank/IMF, Nyerere enacted a short-lived National Economic Survival Program (NSEP) in 1980, which failed to address the fundamental economic issues. The Leadership Code had begun to fray as more and more party officials were implicated in corruption scandals, black markets dealings, and smuggling. Nyerere’s resignation in 1985 was done in protest over the growing corruption within CCM, but also to make room for Ali Hassan Mwinyi to take the reins of necessary economic reform, while he could focus on his chairmanship of the party.

Samoff acknowledges the remarkableness of the 1985 election of Mwinyi, and observes that the nature of prior Tanzanian elections had legitimized the transition from Nyerere (1987 p. 149).

Subsequently, Mwinyi oversaw what was essentially the dismantlement of the socialist state and swift liberalization of the Tanzanian economy. His presidency came to be known as the age of *ruksa*, or permissiveness. In 1985 Tanzania was accepted into a three-year IMF Economic Recovery Program (ERP), followed by the 1989 Economic and Social Adjustment Program (ESAP). These programs emphasized exchange rate adjustment, trade liberalization, government austerity, banking reform, and importantly a massive sale of parastatal industries (known as the Public Sector Reform Program, PSRP).\(^{55}\) Another important development was the restoration of the cooperative unions, which had been dismantled under *ujamaa* and replaced with collective villages. Ensuing cutbacks in social welfare, the growth of inequality, and increased opportunities for corruption incited several of the socialist ideologues, including Nyerere who resigned from his chairmanship in 1990.\(^{56}\) The perception was that the coalition of peasants and labor had begun to fray, replaced with a growing business-orientation (especially the Asian business sector).\(^{57}\) In 1988 CCM had officially renounced *ujamaa* and self-reliance as its guiding ideology (although it still retained the commitment to agriculture and rural development) and in 1990 the leadership code was officially abolished by the party NEC with the Zanzibar Declaration.

Further remarkable regarding the transition to Mwinyi was his ability to reshape the party and make it more efficient. At the national level Mwinyi streamlined the Central Committee by requiring some members to choose between their government portfolio and their party secretariat position, or by reappointing some older members to diplomatic positions to make room for younger blood. In 1991, Mwinyi appointed Horace Kolimba as secretary-general of CCM

---

\(^{55}\) For more on this see Campbell & Stein 1992 and Temu & Due 2000

\(^{56}\) Nyerere withheld from criticizing CCM overtly until 1990 when he stepped down as chair of CCM. He was one of the first to support multiparty elections and became highly critical of corruption in CCM and the rapid pace of privatization politics (*Tanzanian Affairs* 41 1992).

\(^{57}\) Baregu 1994; Costello 1996; Kaiser 1996; Mmuya & Chaligha 1994
(replacing Rashid Kawawa) and charged him with trimming the party of its excess bureaucratic fat. The party’s nine secretariat departments were consolidated into three – economic planning, mass mobilization, and finance. This structure was replicated from the national to the district level. In preparation for the impending multiparty elections, changes to the CCM constitution in 1992 abolished party branches in parastatals, the army, the police, and cooperative unions. The reforms also delinked regional and district commissioners from the party, creating a stronger differentiation between state and party.\footnote{Mmuya & Chaligha 1994 p.128-129} Finally, the JUWATA and CUT were ostensibly delinked from the party. In the case of the JUWATA it was replaced by the seemingly independent Organization of Tanzanian Trade Union (OTTU), but the president retained the right to deregister any OTTU branch.\footnote{Tripp 2000 p.202} In the case of the CUT, it was more successful at staking autonomous ground, but the power of the cooperatives had been decimated under single-party rule.\footnote{Tripp also notes the failed attempts of the UWT to claim some independence of CCM with the formation of a new women’s organization known as BAWATA (Ibid 2000).}

At CCM’s Chimwaga Congress in December 1992, further changes were made to prepare the party for multiparty elections. The office of CCM Vice-President on Zanzibar was created, which accorded Zanzibar much more decisional autonomy. CCM’s branch and cell system, which was pared back by Kolimba’s reforms, was supplemented by the \textit{wakereketwa} or party militants (called \textit{maskani} on Zanzibar), which were more ad hoc in nature and to be utilized much more extensively during campaigns and elections.\footnote{Ibid; CCM Secretariat Member, 2010, Author Interview} Since there was more distance between CCM and the cooperative and trade unions due to liberalization, new mass mobilizing institutions were created such as the Tanzania One Theater (TOT) the \textit{Umoja wa Wapanda Pikipiki} (CCM Motorcycle Club), and the \textit{Makamanda wa Vijana} (Youth Commanders of the \textit{Pikipiki} (CCM Motorcycle Club), and the \textit{Makamanda wa Vijana} (Youth Commanders of the
Party. These organizations travelled the country to popularize CCM. Likewise, CCM members who held national offices were now required to conduct regional tours to promote the party and recruit members.62

The Chimwaga Congress was also notable for highlighting the changing social alliance underlying CCM. At Chimwaga, the OTTU and CUT – ostensibly the official organizations representing peasants and labor - openly expressed dissent, stating that it would delay endorsing a political party. Likewise, for the first time prominent businessmen were invited and allowed to serve on CCM committees, or staff some of the remaining parastatal boards. 63 These developments and the broader impact of economic liberalization challenged CCM to find new ideological ways to guide the party, and were the subject of much public debate in the early 1990s. It was also against this backdrop that Julius Nyerere finally resigned from CCM and publically endorsed multiparty democracy.

**Conclusion**

Under the guise of ujamaa and the leadership of Julius Nyerere, TANU and later CCM became the paramount political institution in Tanzania. As a political party, CCM had a governing structure throughout the country down to the smallest grassroots level of ten homes and institutionalized governing practices that made the party a credible institution for elite participation. Likewise, elite recruitment was competitive, but also limited the role of individual wealth and lessened the impact of clientelistic politics. Candidates for either legislative or party offices under single-party rule were evaluated by their popularity and merit. Perhaps most critically, CCM was able to institutionalize executive succession through a two-term limit and primary system. Concurrently, CCM’s commitments to rural and especially subsistence-based

---

62 Mmuya & Chaligha 1994  
63 Ibid
peasants were backed by actual policy and institution building. Importantly, ujamaa has had a regionally varied impact on social incorporation.

The impact of liberalization has challenged both the structural articulation and social robustness of the party, by providing more avenues for corruption and altering the fundamental social pact the regime relied upon. Yet, this ultimately makes Tanzania a stronger case for testing the implications of party capacity. Theoretically, the degree of organizational cohesion and the entrenched wide pattern of support should translate into observable implications during multiparty elections. As discussed in Chapter 7, these include much less elite defection and patterns of electoral support that should correspond with ujamaa investments.
Chapter 5: The Evolution of Weak Party Capacity in Single-Party Kenya

This chapter discusses the evolution of Kenya’s weaker single-party system and its ruling party the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). For decades Kenya was considered by some observers a case of successful economic policy and even regime stability, given the relative openness of parliamentary debate. However, the façade of stability during single-party rule masked what was essentially one of the most poorly articulated parties on the continent and perhaps the starkest example of ethnic mobilization and coalition building. Unlike TANU, KANU never developed the same internal structures for elite recruitment, mitigation of disputes, discipline, or mobilization. Likewise, KANU did not engage in broad social incorporation but relied on ethnic coalitions that became much more explicit during the 1980s under second president Daniel arap Moi. A deeper reading into the period of single-party rule reveals that the term “single-party” itself is likely misleading. Instead, Kenya under KANU reflected an ethnic and executive-dominance regime rather than a functioning authoritarian party.

The Kenyatta Era: The Foundations of Clientelism

Kenya entered independence with a number of notable factors that were distinct from Tanzania or Cameroon. The major crucial difference, in part due to colonial policy and in part due to the structure of Kenyan society, was the fact that social divisions were much starker and defined (Figure 5.1). The legacy of colonialism and land alienation helped ensure that political forces in Kenya would remain segregated along ethnic and socio-economic lines. The Mau Mau Emergency of the 1950s pitted Kikuyu squatters (ahoī) against white settlers, but also against

---

2 The majority of Kenyans are Kikuyu (21%), which are related to the Embu, Meru, and Kamba people and make up approximately 38% of Kenyans. The Kikuyu are followed in size by the Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), and Kalenjin (11%) (Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.1).
other land-owning Kikuyu, especially from the Kiambu region in Central Province.\textsuperscript{3} British policy was essentially quasi-federal, which further encouraged the formation of regional rather than a unified anti-colonial movement.\textsuperscript{4}

These factions were evident in the organizations formed in the years prior to independence. KANU was founded in 1960 out of autonomous district associations and other political parties. It represented a coalition of forces within the Kikuyu community and between the Kikuyu of Central Province and the Luo of Nyanza Province.\textsuperscript{5} Kenya’s first president and KANU chair Jomo Kenyatta had familial ties to the wealthy Kiambu elites, but the party also represented the landless Kikuyu in the form of former Mau Mau activist Bildad Kaggia. The Luo were also divided into two factions. One also consisted of the landless and rural poor and was essentially represented by Luo Chief Oginga Odinga. A second consisted of Luo labor that followed the lead of former trade union activist Tom Mboya. In opposition to KANU was the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU), headed by Ron Ngala and Daniel arap Moi and representative of Kenya’s other smaller ethnic groups. These included the Kalenjin (Moi’s own ethnic group) of the Rift Valley, the Luhya of Western Province, and the Mjikenda of the Coast.\textsuperscript{6}

These parties also reflected different perspectives with regard to their stance against the British and the prospective nature of post-colonial Kenya. KANU had adopted a much more confrontational tone, while KADU supported the British constitution and the federal structure eventually adopted known as the \textit{majimbo} constitution.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[3] Widner 1992 p.41
\item[4] Bienen 1974 p.29
\item[5] The primary organization behind KANU was the Kenya African Union (KAU), which Kenyatta headed in the 1940s and early 1950s. KANU combined the KAU with the People’s Congress Party and the Kenya Independence Movement.
\end{footnotes}
While KANU was clearly not as dominant a party as TANU was in Tanzania, it enjoyed the upper hand as far as sheer numbers were concerned. In the pre-independence elections of 1961, KANU won 19 seats to KADU’s 11. In the first post-independence election in 1963, KANU won 83 out of 124 seats while KADU won 33, which made Kenyatta Kenya’s first prime minister.\footnote{Sanger & Nottingham 1964. A number of smaller parties also existed – the African People’s Party (an offshoot of KANU), the Baluhya Political Union, and the Coast People’s Party all competed in the 1963 election} Kenyatta was further able to demolish KADU through his control of the civil service and especially the provincial administration – an institution he would rely upon throughout his presidency. Kenyatta used the provincial administration to clamp down on both other regional organizations and KADU supported regions\footnote{Okumu & Holmquist 1984 p.52}. He further refused to implement parts of the majimbo constitution that provided financial assistance to those regions and engaged in a publicity campaign in favor of national unity and a single party.\footnote{Kenyatta used his national stature and the post-independence sentiment to paint his KADU opponents as enemies of national unity and remnants of colonialism.} The tactic worked and KADU
members soon began to defect to KANU as constituents demanded development funds. In December 1964, KADU officially dissolved and its remaining members joined KANU. The *majimbo* constitution was abolished and Kenya became a unitary and *de facto* one party state and presidential republic with Kenyatta as president and Daniel arap Moi as vice-president.

Other factors also shaped Kenyatta’s early decision making regarding KANU. First, Kenyatta was not involved in the actual construction of KANU as a party but came into it as an outsider. As head of the Kenyan African Union in 1954 Kenyatta was arrested and detained for several years under suspicion of involvement with the Mau Mau revolt. He was unable to direct the movement in a similar manner as Nyerere had in Tanzania or Ahidjou in Cameroon. Second, the colonial period had bequeathed to Kenya much stronger state institutions than in other African countries, most markedly with regard to the civil service and provincial administration. This provided Kenyatta with a possible alternative to governing through the party. Finally, economic conditions in Kenya provided a much firmer basis for export agriculture (predominantly coffee and tea) that was held by white settlers and the Kiambu elite. The latter proved to be not only a powerful interest group in Kenyan politics (that obviously coincided with ethnic divisions), but also a source of personal revenue for Kenyatta.

With KANU as the key governing party it faced a number of dilemmas – should it build a robust one-party state, should it engage in redistributive policies, or should it satisfy the needs of the export-crop economic community? In another sense, KANU faced similar constraints and challenges as TANU did – centrifugal pressures from regional leaders within the KANU coalition, weak party structures that could not enforce discipline on the periphery, and differing notions of what would best serve Kenya economically. Kenyatta’s recourse was clearly different

10 Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.12
11 Bienen 1974 p.29-44; Okumu & Holmquist 1984 p.52-53
from Nyerere’s, no doubt due to the different starting conditions but also as a result of conscious deliberation. The result was a weaker party that was neglected as a central institution of governance, the maintenance of a largely capitalist economy that disproportionately benefited the Kikuyu, and the establishment of overt clientelism as the main mode of linkage between the periphery and the center.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{The Evolution of a Poorly Articulate Party under Kenyatta}

Kenyatta’s recourse to the perceived realities of Kenyan politics was to create a single party that was loosely defined and subservient to the office of the presidency and the civil service. The party was open but adamantly anti-ideological and conservative in its outlook. When opposition to national policies became too great in the form of populist demands and calls for redistribution, Kenyatta could rely upon his control of coercive means to end it. Other factions were managed through the disbursement of patronage goods such as development and education funds, land, and public appointment. Kenyatta essentially represented the Kiambu elite. However, he would use his national prestige and role as president to elevate himself above factional politics within KANU. Kenyatta was the \textit{mzee} or “father figure,” above the fray of ethnic and district politics.\textsuperscript{14} Sustained by high levels of economic growth and agricultural output, Kenyatta could maintain this political order without institutionalizing the party in any meaningful way.

A number of steps were taken early on to weaken the party vis-à-vis the office of the presidency. One of Kenyatta’s first decisions was to end monthly consultation meetings with the KANU parliamentary group. Constitutional amendments further solidified the stronger role of

\textsuperscript{12} Jackson & Rosberg 1982, Widner 1992 p.55
\textsuperscript{13} Barkan 1994b p.11
\textsuperscript{14} Widner 1992 p.53-67
the presidency and made him “virtually independent of both party and parliamentary controls”. The 6th constitutional amendment of 1966 stated that the constitutional protection of movement, association, and expression would not be compromised if the president exercised his power under the Preservation of Public Security Act or the Detention Act. This essentially gave Kenyatta the capacity to detain Kenyans without trial. The 10th amendment of 1968 allowed for the direct election of the president instead of requiring parliamentary approval and ended annual approval of the Preservation of Public Security Act, which further insulated Kenyatta from any counterbalancing force.

Kenyatta also relied on the authority vested in the civil service and especially the provincial administration to bolster his coercive capacity. This is an argument put forward most strongly by Susanne Mueller, who argues that powers vested by the British authority in the civil administration allowed Kenyatta to use licensing requirements and economic sanctions to detract opposition as he had done to facilitate the demise of KADU. The civil service had tools at hand to enable the restriction of potential opposition such as the licensing of public meetings, issuing travel permits, and registering political parties. Moreover they were encouraged to provide an informational outlet to the president with regard to any potential subversive activity. Kenyatta also had control over public employment, the disbursement of development funds, trade licenses, which provided him with “carrots” in addition to the “sticks” vested in the office of the presidency and the civil service. \(^{16}\)

Under Kenyatta KANU atrophied as a political party and stopped serving much of a real political function. The KANU National Executive Council (NEC) and Governing Council had little organizational capacity, rarely met, and were severely understaffed. By 1975 KANU only

\(^{15}\) Okumu & Holmquist 1984 p.54  
\(^{16}\) Mueller 1984 p.402-407. See also Bienen 1974
had an interim secretary-general who had already held the position for five years.\textsuperscript{17} It was incredibly difficult for KANU to organize elections to elect new party officers. Between 1966 and 1978 there were no national level party elections, despite attempts in 1973 and 1977.\textsuperscript{18} An effort in 1970 to recruit one million people into the party resulted in recruiting only a few hundred thousand.\textsuperscript{19} At the branch level, elections were intermittent and unorganized affairs, which often resulted in several local internal coups within KANU.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, financial transgression at the branch levels were widespread, as was the practice of buying membership cards in bulk and distributing them to supporters to bolster perceptions of branch strength.

During parliamentary elections the party only played a role in accepting or rejecting candidates, but was largely ignored after the nomination process. Between elections the party rarely met, which led some observers to term Kenya a “no-party state”.\textsuperscript{21} Reform-minded members of KANU like J.M. Kariuki began to claim that KANU was dead as a political party and had “been driven into obscurity.”\textsuperscript{22}

KANU’s system of elite recruitment was based on open competitive elections for parliamentary office, but did not enforce the same level of discipline on its members as TANU, which exacerbated KANU’s weakness. In Kenya, MPs were actively encouraged to develop their own personal linkages with constituents through a policy known as \textit{harambee}, or self-help. MPs were allowed to organize their districts for local projects and received matching funds in return

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Weekly Review} June 30, 1975
\textsuperscript{18} Okumu & Holmquist 1984 p.62-63. These attempts followed the 1970 Mombasa Conference and the 1975 Nakuru Conference. The later was supposed to lead to elections in April 1977, which were cancelled just weeks prior to the scheduled election (\textit{Weekly Review} April 11, 1977).
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Weekly Review} June 30, 1977
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Weekly Review} February 8, 1975. Okumu & Holmquist 1984 p.61. Bennett notes that during the early Kenyatta years the party’s national headquarters phone lines were disconnected and it had a debt of £20,000 (Bennett 1966 p.339)
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Weekly Review} March 17, 1975
for this organization. The only stipulation was that local leaders not engage in any ideologically motivated behavior or threaten Kenyatta at the center.\textsuperscript{23} As Barkan notes, the challenge for MPs was “to create a political base that is large enough for the regime to value and coopt, but not so large for the regime to fear”\textsuperscript{24}

Parliamentary elections still served a recruiting function and like Tanzania, Kenya did hold regular parliamentary elections every 4-5 years (1966, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1978, 1983, and 1988). Under Kenyatta nomination for office was much less controlled than in Tanzania – essentially anyone could run for office with little oversight by the KANU NEC. Unlike in Tanzania, multiple candidates could run for office on the KANU ticket, at times averaging over 4 candidates per seat.\textsuperscript{25} Candidates who had held higher positions in government (ministers and assistant ministers) were more likely to get re-elected. However in Kenya the National Assembly consisted of fewer backbenchers than in Tanzania (40\%-50\% versus 60\%-70\%). Moreover, backbencher turnover was much lower in Kenya, probably due to the ability of MPs to secure more steady footholds in their constituencies. Between 1969 and 1978 turnover among all elected MPs in Kenya was between 41\% and 58\% (versus 64\% to 80\% in Tanzania). Similarly, very few backbenchers were unreturned to parliament or did not run for re-election. Therefore, while the system of recruiting was fairly open, the ability of the Kenyan MP to secure access to substantial levels of resources made the system much less accessible than in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{26}

Rather than reflecting an institutionalized and articulate party, Joel Barkan has argued that KANU represented a tiered structure of patronage. At the apex was the undisputed dominant

\textsuperscript{23}Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.15
\textsuperscript{24}Barkan 1984b p.78
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid p.91
\textsuperscript{26}Barkan wrote in 1984 that the nature of MP linkage in Kenya was highly dependent on access to resources and was therefore a zero-sum game. In the context of ethnic division, he predicted that the increased level of vertical integration through clientelism may be the precursor of horizontal disintegration as resources dwindled (1984b).
role of the president with Kenyatta acting as the mzee. Underneath Kenyatta, were the regional leaders who most often represented different ethnic identities and were most often cabinet ministers. Beneath them were the future regional leaders who acted as the assistant ministers, followed by the constituency leaders (usually backbenchers), and local notables (tribal leaders and businessmen). The system relied heavily on personal relationships and was prone to breakdown and inconsistency.27 Jackson and Rosberg have termed this system an aristocracy, where Kenyatta surrounded himself with “an inner “court” of fraternal Kikuyu politicians from Kiambu who rose to political prominence with him.28 Kenyatta, as the final arbiter and with the assistance of state institutions like the civil service was the only person who could resolve controversial policy questions.29

Kenyatta had little tolerance for challenges to his authority, a redistributive thrust to the party, or the de facto single party state. The first test came in the early 1960s as the party split between a “conservative” wing represented by Kenyatta and Moi and the “radicals” led by Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia. Between 1964 and 1966 the Odinga-Kaggia bloc pushed for the foundation of the short-lived party school, the Lumumba Institute.30 At the KANU delegates meeting in Limuru in February of 1966, Kenyatta led his own attempt at party revitalization by creating no less than nine provincial vice-presidential positions, which were manned by Kenyatta loyalists. Subsequently the Odgina-Kaggia bloc split in May from KANU to form the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). It put forth a manifesto critical of KANU and accused it of “creating a wealth exploiting class among Africans”.31 The party was shut-out during the by-elections of

---

27 Barkan 1984b p.80-81  
28 Jackson & Rosberg 1982 p.99  
29 In reality Kenyatta was heavily assisted by the Minster of State in the Office of the President Mbiyu Koinange, who was also above opposition (Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.15).  
30 Widner 1992 p.57. The school was placed under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and eventually dissolved.  
31 Okumu & Holmquist 1984 p.62
1966 (known as the “little general election”), and in the local government elections of 1968. Provincial governors were instructed to declare all KPU candidates disqualified. In 1969 the KPU was declared illegal, and the parliamentary elections held that year were effectively single-party.

While this episode essentially precluded the formation of an alternative to KANU, it did not end acerbic internal disagreement and fractionalization. As mentioned, Kenyatta attempted to position himself above the fray while essentially satisfying the needs of his Kiambu constituency. In the absence of any institutional mechanism for conflict resolution, when patronage failed Kenyatta’s resource was to use coercion. Tom Mboya, an early Luo labor leader and ally of Kenyatta who was immensely popular and instrumental in the decimation of the KPU, was assassinated in 1969, assumed on order from Kenyatta. In the early 1970s factions emerged within KANU between Kenyatta’s close circle (also known as the “family”) and a new populist coalition. As evidence regarding the disparity between the Kikuyu (and especially the Kiambu) and other Kenyans grew, an oppositional force in parliament led by J.M. Kariuki, John Marie Seroney, Charles Rubia, and Martin Shikuku emerged. As a counterforce, in 1971 Kikuyu factions formed an ethnic welfare association outside of the confines of the party known as the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA). GEMA pushed for the formation of a stronger ideological party, partially as a way to secure Kikuyu interests. Kenyatta’s response was in the

---

32 George Bennett has shown how the shut-out of the Odinga-Kaggia bloc at the Limuru Conference and subsequently in the “little general election” of 1966 and the local election of 1969 were orchestrated by rival Luo Tom Mboya (Bennett 1966).
33 The family faction literally consisted of members of Kenyatta’s family to which he had married into. Three of Kenyatta’s brothers in law served in government, as did two of his nephews, his son, and daughter. Most notably, Mbiyu Koinange – the MP for Kiamba and Minister of State – was Kenyatta’s brother in law and held a prominent and untouchable position (Widner 1992 p.76).
34 Ibid p.93
form of stock purchases in GEMA-owned corporations. However as with the KPU, ideological attacks were not tolerated and repression was used to end the populist opposition.\(^{35}\)

These irreconcilable divisions within the party persisted toward the end of Kenyatta’s life. A new rift sparked between supporters of vice-president and scheduled successor Daniel arap Moi and members affiliated with GEMA. Flush with cash from the 1975 coffee boom, GEMA made several attempts at changing the process of succession. One tactic was to change the constitution, which allowed the vice-president to assume the presidency immediately in case of death for a 90 day period before elections were held. This tactic was opposed by Kenyatta, who risked undermining the system of ethnic balancing and patronage. A second tactic was to find allies within KANU and use the 1977 scheduled national party elections to elect sympathetic personnel. However, as mentioned these elections were cancelled at the last minute. Finally, GEMA attempted to form a Luo-Kikuyu alliance in parliament (with figures like Odinga and Paul Mbuya). Moi responded by reaching out to other Kikuyu like Mwai Kibaki and other Luo such as William Okongo Omamo and Isaac Omolo Okero.\(^{36}\)

The succession from Kenyatta to Moi should not be taken as an indication that the party had suddenly become institutionalized in any meaningful sense. Instead as Coleman and Rosberg note, allowing Moi to take the presidency was a very reluctant and contested choice.\(^{37}\) The party that Moi inherited was a poorly defined organization that on the one hand reinforced MP independence from the party and on the other hand entrenched the role of a strong executive. There were little organizational sources of cohesion between elites, and the party was not a dominant institution in decision-making. Rather it simply provided a loose format for nominating

\(^{35}\) This coalition was noted as essentially cutting across ethnic identity. However, by 1975 its leader J.M. Kariuki had been assassinated and other members like John Seroney, Martin Shikuku, Waweru Kanja, Mark Mwithaga, and Charles Rubia were detained for several years.

\(^{36}\) Widner 1992 p.114

\(^{37}\) Coleman & Rosberg 1982
MPs for office. By contrast the most prominent political institutions were the civil administration and the security forces – all at the hands and control of a dominating executive office.

*The Evolution of Narrow Social Robustness under Kenyatta*

Concurrent with Kenyatta’s decision to maintain KANU as a weak institution was his decision to opt out of any transformative public policy. While ostensibly committed to African socialism and a mass party, in reality KANU failed to establish wide mobilization capacity and primarily engaged in capitalist-based development that largely abided by the economic and ethnic logics that dominated the country. Economically, the approach was a success as noted by Kenya’s comparatively higher levels of economic development throughout the 1960s and 1970s.\(^{38}\) Politically, these gains were perceived as unevenly distributed and tilted toward Kikuyu interests, who admittedly had the advantage of a better economic starting position. In addition, economic gains were not necessarily attributed to the party’s policies but to a specific political patron. Consequently, very little formal investment was made into party mobilization structures and social incorporation remained very narrow.

Following independence Kenyan development was presumably guided by the 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10, entitled “African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya.” The position paper, drafted by Tom Mboya was socialist in title alone. Instead, it was used as a tool to circumvent the populist coalition that had risen in the form of the KPU, and upheld the principles of private property, foreign investment, enterprise, and stated an explicit tolerance of greater economic inequalities.\(^{39}\) However, in reality capitalist-led development was highly politicized in Kenya, and Kenyatta used his control of land distribution and educational resources

---

\(^{38}\) Barkan 1984; Barkan 1994

\(^{39}\) Leys 1975 p.220-224. As Leys notes, the Sessional paper only required the government to consider controls to mitigate economic inequality. He further suggests that the paper was partially written by an American economist in Mboya’s ministry (1975).
to strategically appease populist demands, but primarily to benefit his close circle. Kenyatta’s first commitment was to his Kikuyu base, and especially the landed Kikuyu of Kiambu. But he also faced significant pressures from the former Mau Mau rebels and the landless with calls for land redistribution and an alleviation of inequality.

The redistribution of scarce arable land and educational resources to Kenya’s rural poor were effective tools during the Kenyatta years. Pre-dating independence, the British had already established the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) with the goal of redistributing 1.2 million acres of settler land to 35,000 African yeomen and peasants without much success.\(^{40}\) The LDSB was supplemented by the Million Acre Scheme, which created three different plot sizes (25 acres, 40 acres, and 100 acres) to be distributed largely to landless peasants. By 1971 the program had resettled approximately 34,000 families, mostly Kikuyu, in the former White Highlands of the Rift Valley. This was followed by the Haraka Program that resettled approximately 13,000 registered squatters on 10 acre subsistence plots and the Shirika Scheme that resettled families on even smaller 1 acre lots.\(^{41}\) Similarly early education spending was high, nearly doubling during the first decade after independence, resulting in a rapid growth in the number of primary and secondary schools.\(^{42}\)

These gestures toward alleviating social inequality and addressing the issue of landlessness ultimately faced the challenge of overcoming the ethnic tensions over land distribution and the narrower base of power Kenyatta had aligned himself with – the Kikuyu of Kiambu. For instance, while the number of small plot farms grew from 17% in 1963 to 26% in 1977, the proportion of land concentrated in a few large holdings remained persistently high.\(^{43}\)

\(^{40}\) Leo 1981  
\(^{41}\) Widner 1992 p.49  
\(^{42}\) Cooksey, Court & Makuru 1994 p.209  
\(^{43}\) Migot-Adholla 1984 p.206-207
Even following the various land schemes, over three-quarters of the previously White-owned plots of the Rift Valley remained intact as large-scale farms. As Migot-Adholla notes, rural development policy emanated from “the need to diffuse insurgency during the Mau Mau revolt and the period immediately preceding,” but “has supported the better placed, more enterprising, and often wealthier individuals.” 44 The most profitable land was purchased by the political elite of Kenya (largely Kikuyu), who became the owners of the majority of tea, coffee, and horticulture export plots. 45

Throughout the 1970s the perceptions grew that access to new land in the Rift Valley was skewed toward the Kikuyu, to the disadvantage of the Kalenjin and other smaller tribes. 46 This favoritism toward the Kikuyu persisted in other realms such as the staffing of the civil service, and in access to higher education. 47 Two-thirds of the key provincial commissioners were Kikuyu, and the overwhelming majority of parastatal heads were Kikuyu, and more specifically of Kiambu. 48 During the majority of Kenyatta’s tenure, the commissioner of police, head of the special branch, and head of the paramilitary GSU were all Kikuyu. 49 Throughout the 1970s growing evidence emerged that the Kikuyu had disproportionately benefited from state privilege and economic development. A report published by the International Labor Organization in 1972 illuminated regional differences in welfare and the disproportionate benefit garnered by Kikuyu-strong Central Province. Similarly, land distribution programs were phased out in the 1970s leading to greater consolidation of farms into large-scale holdings. Finally, a crisis in the

44 Migot-Adholla 1984 p.207; See also Hornsby 2012 p.249-250
45 Lofchie 1994 p.151-152. Kenya under its semi-capitalist system far outperformed Tanzania’s socialist system when it came to agricultural exports. Kenya did not overvalue its currency, which encouraged agricultural exports, and its commodity boards paid a much higher price to producers for export crops
46 Hornsby 2012 p.249-254. Land issues were not limited to the Rift Valley but were also prominent along the coast where a squatter community had developed under Arab rule. The coastal land was highly valued, and Kenyatta actually issues a presidential edict that banned the sale of land in Coastal Province without his personal permission.
47 Leonard 1991 p.86-87
48 Hornsby 2012 p.255-256
49 Ibid p.232
maize industry in the upper Rift Valley, which had become the agricultural staple of the minority Kalenjin, further highlighted the disproportionate benefits garnered by the Kikuyu. As farmers shifted to export crop production, corresponding services to deal with the excess grain such as storage facilities or export boards did not appear.  

Part of the reason for these continued inequalities were not only deliberate policy but the structure of linkage Kenyatta utilized between himself and the periphery – *harambee*. While in place prior to independence, *harambee* (Kiswahili for “pull together”) was institutionalized under Kenyatta. Generally, residents of a constituency would pool resources for a local development project such as a water well and receive supplementary or matching funds from the government. MPs would organize their constituents and also make significant monetary contributions. Therefore local leaders had an incentive to temper local disputes and tensions to facilitate compromise. In 1965, *harambee* took on a much more central role as a part of national development policy. Local leaders were judged by their capacity to receive *harambee* funds. As Widner notes, *harambee* was a “tactic in pursuit of political order, and essential tool for facilitating compromise and encouraging politicians to limit their bids for control of party offices and platform”.

While economically efficient, the *harambee* program had two significant political consequences. First, it did little to alleviate inequality since those who started farther ahead with regard to wealth and education (generally the Kikuyu of Central Province), were likely to be able and raise more *harambee* funds. This was in addition to the deliberate diversion of funds to Central Province *harambee* projects. Indeed, the first official *harambee* project of the Kenyatta

---

50 Widner 1992 p.77-83
51 This was also made explicit in the Sessional Paper Number 10 on African Socialism. *Harambee* was the topic of massive campaigning in the late 1960s by Kenyatta himself (Ibid 1992 p.62).
period was funds for a hospital in Kiambu.\textsuperscript{52} Second, as long as there were resources to distribute the system persisted with little upheaval, but the gains were not attributed to the party but to the local patron. Sustained by high levels of economic growth from Kenya’s export agricultural sector, Kenyatta could shuffle resources to other regions when needed, but it had to be channeled through the local representative rather than the party system.\textsuperscript{53}

Finally, with the role of political clientelism and ethnic mobilization institutionalized in Kenya there was a lesser need to develop party-affiliated formal institutions for social mobilization. Kenya had relatively strong labor unions at independence that became fairly factious over issues of economic alignment. In 1965 Kenyatta dissolved the existing labor unions and consolidated them into the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). But, as Adrienne Lebas notes COTU was separated from party mobilization and “the ruling party never viewed unions as a key channel for communication or implementation of policies.”\textsuperscript{54} Likewise a number of other organizations that could have been used for social mobilization existed outside of the party such as the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and several other organizations passed on from the colonial cooperative movement that catered in particular to the coffee and tea exporters, business associations, and a national women’s organization.\textsuperscript{55}

On the other hand, a number of important institutions with the explicit task of mobilization emerged outside of KANU along ethnic lines. In June 1970 the Gikuyu, Embu, and

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid
\textsuperscript{53} Barkan & Holmquist have also investigated the social bases of harambee by examining the initiators and funders of most projects. They find that while harambee was popular among all Kenyans, there was stronger support among the small and middle peasantry and that they have used it as leverage against the state. In addition, they find that why harambee provided Kenya with stable politics and effective clientelism but might also facilitate greater division between regions (Barkan and Holmquist 1989). See also, Holmquist 1984.
\textsuperscript{54} Lebas 2011 p.104. This does not imply that the labor unions were autonomous. In fact, Kenyatta retained the right to appoint the COTU president and write the COTU constitution. But this reflected Kenyatta’s fear of organized labor, rather than using it to mobilize support.
\textsuperscript{55} Barkan 1994 p.19
Meru Association (GEMA) was founded to lobby for the expressed interests of those ethnic groups and to act as a welfare union. GEMA became an important action group during the Kenyatta years, with strong influence over the slate of KANU candidates in Central Province and Nairobi. Later GEMA was a powerful force during the change the constitution movement to replace Moi with a Kikuyu candidate to succeed Kenyatta. At one point GEMA was described as “the only well-organized mass movement in Kenya…with properly elected national district members and with regular meetings,” in contrast with the disarrayed KANU. Partially in response to the formation of GEMA, other tribal unions from the independence period began to take on a more prominent role, such as the Luo Union, the Abaluhya Association, the Kalenjin Association, and the Mjikenda Union.

The Moi Era: Attempts at Party Revitalization

Following Kenyatta’s death in 1978, new president Daniel arap Moi took some significant and deliberate steps to reinvigorate KANU as a political party. Jennifer Widner has gone so far as to argue that Moi successfully established a party-state in Kenya, albeit not to the same extent as TANU did in Tanzania. However a closer assessment of what Moi actually did with KANU reveals that the reforms did not fundamentally change the poor structural articulation or narrow social robustness established during the Kenyatta period. In fact, KANU became an increasingly important coercive tool of public monitoring rather than an institution for retaining elites. Moreover, if under Kenyatta the social coalition perhaps inadvertently benefited the Kikuyu disproportionately due to their original higher economic standing, under Moi the party became much more explicitly aligned toward the interest of Moi’s own Kalenjin ethnic group and an alliance of smaller tribes at the expense of the Kikuyu and Luo.

56 Hornsby 2012 p.311
57 Weekly Standard May 19, 1975
58 Widner 1992
Moi benefitted from a short “honeymoon” period during which he took a conciliatory tone toward the forces opposed to his succession. He released dozens of political prisoners and did not dismiss any GEMA members from KANU. In 1978 Moi reshuffled the cabinet and KANU held its first national delegates congress in twelve years to elect new executive committee officers. There was significant turnover at the 1978 congress, and importantly Moi helped elevate Nyeri-based technocrat Mwai Kibaki as vice-president of both Kenya and KANU.59 During the 1979 national election campaign, Moi’s slogan was Nyayo, loosely translated into “follow” and meant to invoke following in Kenyatta’s footsteps by embracing a philosophy of “love, peace, and unity.” Moi spoke emphatically about the wananchi, or the average citizen, and took a decisively more populist tone during that election. The 1979 elections were relatively free and fair, albeit with significant turnover in the mixed Kikuyu-Kalenjin constituencies of the Rift Valley. Likewise, the new expanded cabinet of 1979 (from 23 to 34 portfolios) only marginally changed the ethnic composition of the 1974 cabinet, with a slightly higher proportion of Kalenjin and Luhya members, but the same proportion of Kikuyu. 60 In 1980 there were other moderate attempts at reforming KANU, by requiring branches to open bank accounts and submit statements to the party’s national treasurer. Moreover, KANU required that branches build physical property on plots of land issued by the government.61

Yet new realities of Kenyan political life quickly took their toll and seriously altered Moi’s approach to governing. First, economic conditions changed dramatically as the cash-crop boom of the mid-1970s came to an end. As with neighboring Tanzania this led to a growth of urban centers, higher inflation, and unemployment. This meant that Moi had far less patronage

59 Weekly Review October 28, 1978
60 Hornsby 2012 p.331-346
61 Office of the National Treasurer, KANU/1/3(252) 1980; Kenya African National Union Governing Council, Meeting Notes (March 25, 1980).
resources at his disposal to sustain a wide coalition. Second, Moi was not a Kikuyu and did not hold the same prestigious position as Kenyatta, even within his own Kalenjin ethnic group. In fact, elder Kalenjin statesmen were rare and Moi had to rely on the established Kikuyu elite for advice. This meant that early on Moi felt threatened from within his governing group, which likely encouraged him to facilitate divides between his Kikuyu allies, Charles Njonjo and Mwai Kibaki, over the vice-presidency. Finally, by 1982 these tensions culminated in an attempted military coup. Moi had slowly been cultivating tribal loyalists within government at the expense of his Kikuyu advisors, while in tandem Oginga Odinga seemed poised to launch a new opposition political party, the Kenya African Socialist Alliance (KASA). Moi responded with detainments without trial and a constitutional amendment known as section 2(a) that officially banned the formation of political parties outside of KANU. In August 1982, a coup that originated in the Air Force largely by Luo officers failed.

In the aftermath of the coup, Moi made a strong push for elevating KANU as the supreme institution in Kenyan politics, however with the goal of securing his grip on power by promoting hardliners, and especially tribal kinsmen. There was a big membership drive and attempt to construct branches with grassroots nomination of candidates. In 1985 KANU once again held national elections (the first since 1978), however the secret poll was abolished and replaced with a queuing system that was much more open to manipulation and allowed Moi to replace five members of the NEC. Three years later in 1988 KANU once again held national party elections under the queuing system, used to oust several Central Province branch chairmen like Kenneth

---

62 In addition to his close Kalenjin advisor Nicolas Biwott these other Kikuyu figures were Charles Njonjo, Mwai Kibaki, Geoffrey Kariithi, Jeremiah Kiereini, and G.G. Kariuki (Hornsby 2012 p.334).
64 Ibid p.372-379
65 Some other attempts at party revitalization included requiring all civil servants to be members of KANU, the banning of ethnic welfare societies like GEMA and the Luo Union, and the purchase of the Nairobi Times as the official newspaper of KANU (Weekly Review October 14, 1988).
Matiba and Martin Shikuku. Likewise, Moi created the KANU National Disciplinary Committee (NDC), which was staffed by Moi and used to purge individuals from the party. This was most prominently implemented after the 1989 election to oust both Matiba and Shikuku along with a slew of other party members.

Moi also manipulated the process of elite recruitment to ensure that loyalists were elected to a much weakened legislature. In September 1983 Moi suspended parliament and called for snap elections. While the party NEC did not prevent people from contesting the election, accusations of bias and fraud were widespread. Notably, former insider G.G. Kariuki was likely rigged out of his seat in Laikipia West, as were several of Odinga’s allies in Nyanza. In 1986 Moi altered the process of elite recruitment from a fairly open competitive process to a much more plebiscitary mode. Party primaries using the aforementioned queuing system were incorporated. Candidates who won over 70% of the primary would contest the election unopposed. If no candidate won 70% of the primary vote only candidates who won more than 30% of the primary vote could contest the election. The 1988 primaries and national election were the most rigged in Kenyan history (approximately one-third of the seats) and led to several significant losses of prominent KANU members. The most famous individual rigged out of office was Charles Rubia whose opponent in Starehe was elected without contest with 70.5% of the primary vote. Since many individuals were rigged out of the party primary, they had no recourse for recounts.

Parallel to these changes to KANU were increases in executive strength over the party. First, as was used prior to the military coup attempt of 1982, the use of detention without trial

---

66 Hornsby 2012 p.460  
67 For a personal account of this see Kariuki 2001  
68 Weekly Review February 25, 1988  
69 Hornsby 2012 p.456-458
remained a coercive tool that Moi could use. Moi deployed the police and GSU much more heavily to rural areas, and spending within the Office of the President, which oversaw these units, was higher than any other ministry or government agency at the time.\(^{70}\) The period between 1982 and 1990 saw an increase in executive orders that limited freedom of expression, with over 160 prominent political activists arrested.\(^{71}\) One way Moi could overcome opposition to the use of detention without trial was by severely weakening the judiciary through apparent bribery and by repeatedly replacing chief justices (four in a matter of five years).\(^{72}\) In November 1986, the 22\(^{nd}\) amendment to the constitution was passed that eliminated tenure for the attorney-general, state-controller, and auditor-general and instead made them simply presidential appointments. The amendment also removed the position of chief secretary in the Office of the President. In August 1988 yet another constitutional amendment passed that abolished the secure tenure of judges and members of the Public Service Commission. The amendment also increased the period the police could detain a suspect from 24 hours to 14 days.\(^{73}\)

With regard to social robustness, there was a distinct shift in KANU away from the Kikuyu toward an alliance between the Kalenjin, Luhya, and smaller tribes (in fact reflecting the original KADU party alliance).\(^{74}\) This became apparent in the nature of public appointment and cabinet composition. For instance, while between 1963 and 1978 there had been one ministerial dismissal, between 1978 and 1991 there were 12 firings, 5 forced resignations, and 6 ministers

\(^{70}\) Widner 1992 p.145  
\(^{71}\) Barkan 1994b p.25. Examples would include the Film and Stage Plays Act that was used throughout the 1980s to curtail freedom of speech, the Vagrancy Act that allowed Moi to arrest youth in urban areas who could not prove an abode or employment, or the Outlying and Special Districts Acts which gave the civil administration the power to enforce travel restrictions and curfews. In general, the Kenyan penal code allowed Moi to decree criticism of the government as seditious. Throughout the 1980s the threat of treason was often employed by Moi, leading to a “paranoid style” of politics (Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.38).  
\(^{72}\) Hornsby 2012 p.407  
\(^{73}\) Ibid p.460  
\(^{74}\) In reality these changes began prior to the coup. For instance, as mentioned the 1979 national election was used to ensure that Kalenjin won mixed districts in the Rift Valley. In addition, already in late 1978 Moi had begun to re-staff the military with Kalenjin, Kamba and minority tribe individuals (Hornsby 2012 p.336).
were not reappointed after a general election. This trend largely benefited the Kalenjin at the expense of Kikuyu representation. In 1983 Moi purged former attorney-general and suspected coup plotter Charles Njonjo and his supporters from KANU. Moi retained a weakened Mwai Kibaki as his key inroad with the Kikuyu, but Kibaki eventually lost the vice-presidency in 1988. Likewise, Moi replaced all but one of Kenya’s Provincial Administrators and nearly half the District Commissioners. The Kenyan civil service, long the purview of Kenyatta-era Kikuyu, was taken over by Kisii Simeon Nyachae (himself later forced into retirement in 1985). There was also evidence that appointment to chief parastatals shifted toward the Kalenjin and their allies, and that public salaries were skewed as well.

The shift toward a narrower coalition also meant a divergence of resources away from the Central Province to the Rift Valley. Public expenditures on roads, health, water, and education changed, as did patterns of *harambee* contributions (Table 5.1). The most significant change in policy was the shift from policies that supported the coffee and tea producers in Central Province with provisions to the grain and cereal growers in the upper Rift Valley and Western Kenya. As Michael Lofchie documents, the price index for wheat nearly tripled while the total production grew by 30%. Moi also sought to temper the autonomy of the coffee and tea producers by banning the Kenyan Farmer’s Association (KDA) and replacing it with the Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union and began to interfere directly in the affairs of the Kenyan Planter’s Cooperative Union (KPCU), an organization that was responsible for cash payments to coffee

---

75 Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.46  
76 Hornsby 2012 p.403-404  
77 Barkan 1994b p.24  
78 Hornsby 2012 p.443  
79 Ibid p.447-448  
80 Lofchie 1994 p.158
producers even before they received final payment from the coffee board. These policies led to an unprecedented, but unsustainable, economic boom in the upper Rift Valley.

Table 5.1: Regional Distribution of Harambee Contributions (1977-1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Province</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Province</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Province</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conclusion

By the early 1990s on the surface KANU was a different party from what Kenyatta had constructed. Kenyatta had operated an elaborate system of clientelism that rested upon his own persona, continued economic growth, and open but ultimately weak party, and sporadic recourse to repression. By contrast, Moi attempted to project power from the center and preferred directives to negotiations with regional elites. Following the 1982 coup attempt Moi’s style of governance became more paranoid and his use KANU reflected his desire for new forms of political control. KANU of1990 reflected slightly higher levels of party institutionalization, but did not reflect significant improvement to either the structural articulation or social robustness of the party. Rather, as Throup and Hornsby write, “one of the key weaknesses of this new

---

81 Ibid 1994 p.161
82 Similarly the largely Maasai pastoralist communities of Kenya benefitted from the Moi government’s economic policies through the divergence of development aid and the creation of the Ministry for Reclamation and Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (Hornsby 2012 p.439-440).
search for authority and legitimacy was that whilst Kenyans pragmatically bowed their heads to this new order, they had no particular commitment to what it represented” 83

---

83 Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.38. The interesting counter-factual is if Kenyatta or another had not passed away or a Kikuyu had succeeded him, what impact multiparty elections would have on the party then. Economic crisis and global change was largely outside of Moi’s hands, so one can assume that multiparty elections would still be held. The argument here is that even in those circumstances the party would have a much more difficult time sustaining a competitive hegemony and defection from the Kalenjin and Luhyia would probably be likely. Moreover, the fact that there was such crisis upon the eve of Kenyatta’s death is again evidence that the party was weakly articulated.
Chapter 6: The Evolution of Moderate Party Capacity in Single-Party Cameroon

In this chapter I discuss the evolution of party capacity under single party-rule in Cameroon. The ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) and its predecessor the Cameroon National Union (CNU) while ultimately coded as weak reflected moderate party capacity. The party was neither abandoned as KANU nor elevated as TANU. Like KANU, the single-party systems of the CPDM and CNU were more akin to dominant-executive systems holding together multiethnic coalitions. The party paralleled a tiered system of patronage emanating from the executive office, held together by the continuous availability of resources, and when necessary coercion. Likewise, ethnicity (and especially regionalism) motivated social mobilization, becoming more prominent as the presidency transitioned from first president Ahmadou Ahidjo to Paul Biya. However, the party was still afforded some degree of prominence, most notably through the regularity of party congresses and the geographic breadth of the party.

The Ahidjo Era: The Push toward Centralization

As in Kenya, Cameroon entered independence with a strong sense of regionalism exacerbated by its unique colonial legacy. First, Cameroon’s bifurcated colonial experience bequeathed a federated structure with an Anglophone Western Cameroon (previously known as British Southern Kamerun) and a Francophone Eastern Cameroon. In 1958 Ahmadou Ahidjo became the second Prime Minister of French Cameroon and in 1960 French Cameroon became the independent Cameroon Republic and Ahidjo its president. In 1960 Southern British Kamerun voted to join the Cameroon Republic while Northern Kamerun joined the Federation of Nigeria. In July 1961, at a conference held in the city of Foumban both sides assented to the Federal Republic of Cameroon (Johnson 1970; LeVine 1971).

---

1 In 1958 Ahmadou Ahidjo became the second Prime Minister of French Cameroon and in 1960 French Cameroon became the independent Cameroon Republic and Ahidjo its president. In 1960 Southern British Kamerun voted to join the Cameroon Republic while Northern Kamerun joined the Federation of Nigeria. In July 1961, at a conference held in the city of Foumban both sides assented to the Federal Republic of Cameroon (Johnson 1970; LeVine 1971).
colonial era parties formed along a regional basis. The main cleavage was primarily between the
underdeveloped north consisting of mainly Muslim Fulani and the diverse pagan Kirdi people,
and the more developed south consisting of numerous Christian ethnic groups. In addition, the
Bamileke – an overarching term for approximately 90 groups that were dominant in the
Anglophone Northwest but had made inroads into the Western and Littoral regions – were
perceived as the main economic powerhouse of the colonial period.² Third, Ahidjo, himself a
northern Fulani, did not hold the same national prestige as Nyerere, nor was he a landed-elite like
Kenyatta. Rather, Ahidjo only came to power through French machinations to remove
Cameroon’s first prime-minister Andre Marie-Njoya.³

Consequently, at independence the political landscape was diverse. The dominant party
in French Cameroon was Ahidjo’s Cameroonian Union (UC) – a northern-based party formed in
Ahidjo’s hometown of Garoua and reflective of his own background.⁴ During the territorial
elections of 1956 the UC won 43% of the seats and in the first post-independence election it won
51%, the majority of which were in the north. Following the UC were the southern-based
Democratic Party of Cameroon (PDC) and the western-based Popular Front for Unity and Peace
(FPUP).⁵ In British Cameroon the dominant Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) under
the leadership of John Ngu Foncha largely represented the interests of the northwestern
grasslands while the Cameroon’s Peoples National Convention (CPNC) under Emmanuel Mbelle
Endeley fused together several southwestern parties and identified itself with the coast, or “forest
peoples,” who tended to dominate the agricultural and export-crop production. Prior to

² Despite the noted diversity within the Kirdi community the north was seen as relatively more homogenous than the
south. For clarification purposes the ethnic composition of Cameroon can be loosely broken down into broader
groups – The Bamileke/Bamoun (38%), the Bassa/Duala/Bakweri (12%), the Ewendo/Beti (18%), the Fulani (14%),
and the Kirdi (18%) (Joseph 1977; Kofele-Kale 1986).
³ Le Vine 1986 p.22; Le Vine 2003
⁴ Johnson 1970; LeVine 1971
⁵ The FPUP was the reincarnation of the Union of Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), which was outlawed by the French
for its apparent radicalism and use violence. It is best documented by Richard Joseph (1977)
independence the KNDP was more supportive of the move toward unification between Western and Eastern Cameroon, while the CPNC was more inclined toward unification with Nigeria.\footnote{Johnson 1970; LeVine 1971; DeLancey, Mbuf, & Delancey 2010; Krieger 2008 p.22-32}

**Figure 6.1- Ethnic Groups in Cameroon**

During the first years following independence Ahidjo took steps to amalgamate the other parties under the banner of a “Grand National Party,” the CNU, through the use of material incentive and coercion. By 1961 the FPUP had dissolved and its leaders took up cabinet positions in the Ahidjo government. Those who opposed the move toward a single-party, like the PDC and the newly legalized UPC were severely weakened through the arrest of their key members. By the 1965 legislative election the PDC had lost all of its seats. In tandem, Ahidjo utilized the rivalry between the KNDP and the CPNC by initially offering the minority CNPC the opportunity to merge with the CNU. Out of fear of being outmaneuvered by the CNPC, the KNDP assented to dissolve itself and unify with the CNU. The CPNC followed suit and by 1965
the entire Federal Republic of Cameroon was under the auspices of a single party. However, the bifurcation of Cameroon and the internal divisions were to persist and impact the party structures the CNU consequently developed. While the party remained somewhat active, Ahidjo pushed hard for abolishment of the federal structure and the centralization of power within the executive.

*The Evolution of Moderate Structural Articulation under Ahidjo*

According to Mark DeLancey the essence of the CNU “was the cohesion of a few important people, each of whom brought his/her loyalties to the party”. As in Kenya, the CNU was strongly characterized by its elite and clientelistic nature. Ahidjo brought together the variant social interests of post-colonial Cameroon – the Anglophones, southern and western ethnic groups, his traditional northern base, the bureaucracy, the military, and the business community – but the party never cohered into much more than a format for the delivery of patronage. As long as economic resources flowed (and they did throughout Ahidjo’s tenure partially due to agricultural productivity and partially due to the discovery of oil resources) Ahidjo was able to use the party and the state to distribute positions of prestige. Personal loyalty mattered much more than any ideological commitment and Ahidjo relied on the frequent rotation of elites within the party, civil administration, and the parastatals to maintain a semblance of equitable distribution. When loyalty was doubted or allies appeared too threatening, coercion was employed as well.

This translated into a mixed record with regard to actual party structures. On the one hand the original UC structures were actually quite robust in northern Cameroon. Indeed, one of the reasons the UC was able to contest so effectively up north during the territorial elections was its well-established local party organization (down to the cell level) and the institutionalization of its

---

7 Johnson 1970; LeVine 1971. See also the essays in Kofele-Kale 1980
8 DeLancey 1989 p.52
9 Le Vine 1986 p.23
parliamentary group at the expense of traditional elites. However, following the formation of the CNU much of this institutionalization stalled. The CNU structure mimicked the territorial administration, with forty-nine party sections, numerous sub-sections, and then local committees corresponding with the territorial department, arrondissement, and quarter or village. Notably, the CNU had no regional party structure, reflecting the primacy afforded to provincial governors, and it is not clear how well institutionalized the lower-levels of the party were since already in 1960 resistance from southern politicians stalled the efforts of party growth. Despite the large expansion of the party in the 1960s, party activity remained stifled, especially at the local level where committee meetings were poorly attended events.

That said the CNU was never completely abandoned as a functioning party. Its governing structures – the National Congress, National Committee, Central Committee, and the Political Bureau – continued to function and were renewed on a regular basis, albeit in a plebiscitary manner. Party life between national elections was not as robust as in Tanzania, but party congresses were held every five years beginning in 1969 and in different cities. Still, these were mainly choreographed events where party delegates would merely endorse Ahidjo’s policies and not formats for debate. The CNU had a substantial youth wing (YCNU), and women’s wing (WCNU), which while also not as active between national party events or

---

10 The task of institutionalizing the UC was left to the secretary-general Moussa Yaya who led a registration drive that filled the ranks of the party with younger activists in order to reduce the hold of traditional Islamic chiefdoms in the north (lamidos). In 1966 Yaya was replaced as secretary-general by Samuel Kame as part of the UC-KNDP merger (Azarya 1976; Bayart 1978 p.52-54).
11 Bayart 1978b p.73-76; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.42
12 Bayart 1978b p.80. They were in fact expanded in the early 1970s in an attempt at party revitalization. The Political Bureau was elected by the National Congress, but simply approved the list of names that Ahidjo himself would draw up, usually reflecting his desire to balance region, ethnicity, and ideological orientation.
13 DeLancey, Mbuh, & DeLancey 2010 p.87
14 Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.78
elections was established at the departmental level as well.\textsuperscript{15} The CNU also had an established party school (école des cadres), directed for several years by Joseph Charles Doumba.\textsuperscript{16}

With regard to elite recruitment and retention the picture is also mixed. Elections were held regularly every five years beginning in 1973. Under single-party rule the CNU maintained a single district that covered the entire country and voters would elect representatives by a plebiscite of a pre-approved list of candidates from the CNU.\textsuperscript{17} There was, however, intense competition within the party for the nomination (approximately 22 candidates for every parliamentary seat), but ultimately the candidates were nominated by Ahidjo and the Political Bureau of the CNU.\textsuperscript{18} Likewise, the criteria for selection tended to be idiosyncratic and related more to the perceived loyalty of a candidate to Ahidjo than their ideological commitment. However, cabinet shifts were quite frequent and individuals had very little chance of serving in the same ministry for over four years.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, executive succession was not institutionalized. Indicative, Ahidjo changed the constitution in 1979 to ensure that his prime-minister Paul Biya (a position only invented a few years earlier) would succeed him. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the succession led to a severe political crisis between Biya and Ahidjo.\textsuperscript{20}

What is much clearer is that Ahidjo’s impulse was to centralize power at the expense of the CNU. This was accomplished in three ways – abolishing federalism, increasing executive power, and developing a strong security service. With regard to federalism, the Foumban constitution of 1961 gave the central government in Yaounde significant control over the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} DeLancey, Mbu, & DeLancey 2010 p.87
\item \textsuperscript{16} Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.75
\item \textsuperscript{17} This election system was in fact a point of contention within the CNU, with liberal elements pushing for a two-candidate process as in Tanzania (Bayart 1978 p.75).
\item \textsuperscript{18} Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.52. The countrywide single-district was also the way by which Ahidjo essentially killed off any alternative parties. Suggestions to pass a constitutional amendment banning other political parties did not pass, but the single-district system precluded an opposition party from forming.
\item \textsuperscript{19} DeLancey 1989 p.60; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.52
\item \textsuperscript{20} Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.66
\end{itemize}
distribution of most political resources (e.g. national security, education, infrastructure money).

With the power of appointment at Ahidjo’s hand he could limit the influence of Anglophone Cameroon’s prime-minister.\(^{21}\) Between 1969 and 1970 the constitution was amended to allow the president to appoint the prime minister of West and East Cameroon and to allow the federal vice-president to act as regional prime-minister. Ahidjo used these amendments to nominate pro-union Solomon Muna in place of John Ngu Foncha. Other new provisions centralized tax and tariff collection in Yaounde. Likewise, resources were either diverted or withheld from Anglophone Cameroon. For instance, most imports and exports began to ship through the port of Douala rather than Limbe and Anglophone Cameroonian utility companies were replaced by Francophone Cameroonian companies. In May 1972, Ahidjo’s referendum to abolish the federal state passed nearly unanimously.\(^{22}\)

With regard to executive power, the French had already bequeathed substantial emergency powers in response to the UPC uprising. These gave Ahidjo the power to declare a state of emergency and loosely define what he considered the “national interest” to pass restrictive laws and use arrests and detention with little oversight.\(^{23}\) Article 8 of the unitary constitution also allowed Ahidjo to appoint and dismiss ministers without legislative approval, while Article 9 allowed the president to issue statutory rules.\(^{24}\) Takougang and Krieger note that legislatures were often unaware they could even initiate legislation.\(^{25}\)

\(^{21}\) Ibid p.47-48. The Foumban constitution created two states, each with its own prime-minister and legislature and a federal assembly with a president (Ahidjo) and vice-president (John Foncha).

\(^{22}\) Ibid p.48-50

\(^{23}\) The most important laws were the 1962 Anti-Subversion Act used to dismantle the UPC, the Press Law of 1966 requiring pre-approval of newspapers and periodicals that essentially killed private media in Cameroon, and the 1967 Freedom of Association Law 1967 that required pre-authorization from governors for political meetings (Eko 2003; Nyambo 2008).

\(^{24}\) DeLancey 1989 p.57

\(^{25}\) Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.51
Political Bureau had served time in the OP. Ahidjo maintained a civil and military cabinet within the OP and kept ministry delegates to maintain more control over specific ministries like the territorial administration. Finally, after the end of the federal state Ahidjo re-divided Cameroon into seven provinces from six by splitting British Cameroon into North West and South West Provinces. Each province had a governor appointed by Ahidjo, and each province was subdivided into prefects and divisions who all reported back to the minister of territorial administration and the president.

Finally, the centralization of power was cemented through the creation of new coercive institutions. The Service de Documentation (SEDOC), a French-created intelligence service, became the Centre National De Documentation (CND) under Ahidjo alongside the Brigades Mixed Mobiles (BMM). Both organizations, which were primarily staffed by northern-Cameroonianians from Ahidjo’s home region, were responsible for imprisonment and interrogation, and likely extensive torture. The CND and BMM kept a strong network of informers throughout the country, often through Ahidjo’s control of the territorial administration.

Throughout Ahidjo’s tenure, coercion was used extensively against anti-government elements (generally students), most notably in 1976 when over 2,000 people were arrested. For several years travel across regions required special passes (called laissez-passer) and media was tightly monitored, including foreign media that was frequently confiscated if it printed articles that were deemed too subversive.

This centralization of powers has led external observers to note that single-party Cameroon under Ahidjo was “Gaullist” in nature, or that Ahidjo was “without a doubt a political

---

26 Bayart 1978 p.77
28 Jackson & Rosberg 1982 p.155; Takougang & Krieger 1989 p.54
29 Takougang 2004 p.77-78
strong man likened to a stern father unwilling to brook even the slightest degree of political 
independence among his children”.  

Although, the party was never quite neglected as in Kenya and elites had much less independence, regionalism, which was encouraged by the colonial experience and at times coincided with ethnic and religious identity, hindered the integration of elites into the party. Rather, as in Kenya, the party was an amalgamation and was based on much more explicit patronage and coercion emanating from the executive.

*The Evolution of Narrow Social Robustness under Ahidjo*

The same tendencies that kept the CNU a poorly articulated party also determined the breadth of social incorporation under Ahidjo. While maintaining a strong verbal commitment to rural development, Ahidjo in fact oversaw a system that benefited the economic interests of a small urban elite, while also redistributing resources that disproportionately benefitted his northern Fulani base. As in Kenya, this translated into a much better record of macroeconomic growth than in Tanzania. Up through the late 1970s GDP persistently grew, sustained by comparatively better agricultural outcomes, and Cameroon was one of the few African countries to be self-reliant with regard to food production.  

The discovery of modest oil reserves (kept in secret offshore accounts until the Biya period) provided the state with hundreds of millions of dollars that could also be used to cover the inefficiencies of state-owned industries.

Development under Ahidjo was articulated in a series of five-year plans that reflected a number of guiding principles. The overarching theme was *planned liberalism*, which was meant to provide a mix of state-led development and private enterprise. Planned liberalism was responsible for the development of Cameroon’s major parastatals, transportation infrastructure,

---

31 DeLancey, Virginia 1986
32 Benjamin & Devarajan 1986; van de Walle 1993 p.141
and other major industries. Concurrently, Ahidjo and the CNU emphasized the principle of self-reliance with regard to food production. The third and fourth development plans saw a conscious shift toward agricultural and rural development as part of a broader program of agricultural revival launched in March 1973 and termed by Ahidjo the “Green Revolution.” As part of these plans approximately 30% of public investment was targeted for rural development, and the National Fund for Rural Development (FONADER) was created to service loans to rural small holder farmers. In addition, development plans were meant to facilitate the creation of agricultural estates, pioneer villages, and various development projects to encourage youth settlement in rural areas.

When it came to actual implementation of these ideas, the urban bias of the Ahidjo regime was exposed. For instance, while the FONADER was formed to modernize agricultural production through the provision of interest-free loans, the primary benefactors were in fact urban citizens who had the wherewithal to complete the application process. Likewise, urban citizens were able to leverage their educational advantage to benefit from land tenure laws and build medium-sized plantations on supposedly unclaimed land. Relatedly, while the first and second development plans did have provisions for smallholder farmers, the latter plans were noted by a shift toward larger agro-businesses, the majority of which failed to live up to production estimates. Virginia Delancey has documented how agricultural productivity rates fell during the late 1970s, in part due to the lack of investment in the agricultural sector to the benefit of urban development. Furthermore, the Cameroonian pricing board would pay farmers

33 Ndongko 1986; Delancey 1989; Fonge 2004. Other attempts at rural invigoration were pursued by encouraging the development of smaller urban centers. Party congresses and agricultural fairs were used as opportunities to invest in roads and public buildings. These efforts failed to stop migration from rural areas to Yaounde and Douala
34 Ndongko 1986 p.100-101
35 DeLancey 1989 p.62-63; DeLancey, Mbuh, & DeLancey 2010 p.267
36 Willame 1986
lower than market rates for export crops like cocoa and coffee, and use the surplus to subsidize urban amenities, incentivizing farmers to produce less.\textsuperscript{37} Indicative of the failure of the Green Revolution, Cameroon experienced one of the highest rates of urbanization in Africa, jumping to 36\% by 1982.

Another aspect of the CNU’s narrow social incorporation was the ethnic bias tilted toward Ahidjo’s northern base. With regard to political appointments, this was more of a matter of perception than reality. As Table 6.1 reports appointment to public office was largely proportional and included important southern politicians like Theodor Mayi-Matip, who served for nearly two decades as the President of the National Assembly, and Anglophone Emmanuel Egbe Tabil who held the Ministry of Posts, Telephones, and Telegraph for several years. While, as mentioned, cabinet positions had very little staying power, throughout the years of the Ahidjo unitary state regional representation was fairly maintained.\textsuperscript{38} The more notable bias with regard to public appointment was the disproportionate lower number of seats allocated to Littoral Province. An explanation, provided by Leonardo Arriola, is that this was part of an implicit agreement with the Bamileke ethnic community, the historically dominant indigenous capital and trading strata in Cameroon. In exchange for economic freedom, the Bamileke implicitly agreed to stay out of government politics.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37} DeLancey 1986 p.137-145
\textsuperscript{38} Kofele-Kale 1986; DeLancey 1989 p.58-59; Takougang 2004 p.75
\textsuperscript{39} Arriola p.156. It is important to note that this was also derivative of Ahidjo’s position as a northern-based politician. Unlike, Kenyatta, Ahidjo was not a member of the economic elite and therefore had to negotiate with the Bamileke rather than pushing their interests (See also Konings 1996).
Table 6.1: Provincial Representation in Major Organs of Government/State (1976-1984)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% National Assembly Deputies</th>
<th>% Seats in CNU Central Committee</th>
<th>% Seat in CNU National Political Bureau</th>
<th>% of District Prefects</th>
<th>% of Sub District Prefects</th>
<th>% Ministers and Vice-Ministers</th>
<th>Regional Population as % of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North and Far North</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West and South West</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa, Central, Southern</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Kofele-Kale 1986

However, when it came to the allocation of funds there was a relatively undocumented shift of resources to the north. This was justified as part of Ahidjo’s program of *balanced development*, meant to address the inequalities engrained by the colonial experience. The northern portions of the country were in fact the least developed in terms of income and access to education and health services.\(^{40}\) There was also very little export agriculture in place, little food crop production (mostly groundnuts) and a large subsistence-based and pastoralist population.

Under Ahidjo, economic development policy was informally referred to in the national assembly as *Garoua d’abord* (Garoua first) in reference to Ahidjo’s hometown. For years while there was no road linking the major cities of Yaounde and Douala, an extensive road network was constructed up north and a new airport and sports stadium built in Garoua.\(^{41}\) Popularly, the allies and beneficiaries to the north were known as the “Garoua Barons,” which exacerbated the already existent north-south divisions and created additional tensions in Eastern Province, where despite similar lower starting economic conditions, much less public investment was made.\(^{42}\)

---

\(^{40}\)DeLacney 1989 p.114

\(^{41}\)Ibid p.62-63; Ngenge 2003; Van de Walle 1993 p.141

\(^{42}\)Konings 1996 p.249
Likewise, balanced development did not alleviate the perceived economic dependency of Anglophone Cameroon on Francophone Cameroon. This became the root of what came to be known in Cameroonian circles as the “Anglophone problem”. After unification, the process that had seen a major port city like Limbe decline continued. The government required that all exports and imports pass through the Douala river port and moved the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB) to Douala. This was a large expense, since unlike Limbe (or other Western Cameroon port cities like Tiko), the Douala port was up-river and therefore the passage had to be dredged annually. In the fourth five-year development plan, large amounts of money were allocated for the development and annual dredging of the Douala port. In the following years most major businesses and banks closed down in Limbe. At the same time Anglophone residents felt a cultural bias. While the constitution provided for bilingualism, in practice French was the dominant language. For instance, to attain a General Certificate of Education required compulsory French but not English. University attendance was by far dominated by French speaking students and instruction remained primarily in French. This bias was perceived within government as well, where while proportionally represented Anglophones did not hold the major portfolios of defense, finance, foreign affairs, or territorial administration.

What partially compensated for the CNU’s weak social incorporation was the moderate extent of formal party channels for social mobilization. As noted above, the CNU was never completely abandoned as a political party and did retain institutional capacity for social mobilization in the form of party cells (mostly in the north), youth and women leagues. In fact,

---

43 Konings & Nyamnjoh 2004
44 Kofele-Kale 1986 p.64-65
45 Ngenge 2003. In 1978 an oil refinery (SONARA) was built in Limbe, after much speculation that it too would be built in Douala. However, it was staffed mostly by Francophones who lived in a satellite village outside of Limbe. Furthermore, oil company royalties were not paid to the Limbe local government but to Douala where the companies were actually headquartered (Ibid p.79-81).
46 Between 1964 and 1974 at the University of Yaounde there were only 6% Anglophone students (Kofele-Kale 1986 p.68). See also, Chumbow 1980.
the latter two were important institutions for the CNU – nearly 45% of the total party membership was in the WCNU and 23% in the YCNU.\textsuperscript{47} On the other hand, the CNU did exert some control over trade and labor unions, but not to the same extent as in Tanzania. The Union National Travailleurs du Cameroun (UNTC) was the unified trade union of Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon and was controlled by the CNU’s political bureau.\textsuperscript{48} But, as Jean-François Bayart notes, this relationship was evolving and often a tenuous one.\textsuperscript{49}

**The Biya Era: The “New Deal” and Transition to the CPDM**

As in Kenya, the transition from one president to another was far from institutionalized and brought to the fore significant factionalism, most salient along ethnic lines. Ahidjo’s sudden resignation on November 4, 1982 (apparently due to illness), was preceded by significant infighting over new constitutional provisions Ahidjo had enacted to ensure that Paul Biya, the sitting prime minister, became his successor rather than the designated President of the National Assembly. Likewise, there was a “change the prime-minister” movement to replace Southern-based and Beti Biya with Muslim northerner and Minister of Armed Forces, Sadou Daoudou. Following the succession and likely as a compromise Ahidjo remained chairman of the CNU, Muslim northerner Bello Bouba Maigari was named prime minister and the Ahidjo cabinet remained largely intact. However early cooperation between Ahidjo and Biya gave way to a bifurcation of authority and an almost inevitable political crisis.\textsuperscript{50}

It became imminently apparent that Ahidjo was reluctant to actually cede power as he increasingly made attempts to assert party primacy over the office of the presidency. In January 1983, Ahidjo publicly stated that the party was the primary policy-making institution in the

\textsuperscript{47} DeLancey 1989 p.54
\textsuperscript{48} DeLancey, Mbuh, & Delancey 2010 p.86
\textsuperscript{49} Bayart 1978 p.81
country. Following National Assembly elections in May 1983 (during which Ahidjo had a strong hand in approving the single list of candidates), he offered a constitutional amendment to make Cameroon a de jure one-party state and for the CNU Political Bureau to choose the presidential candidate. 51 On Biya’s part, he had already begun to show independence when he publically campaigned on a platform of “rigor and moralization” in public life to combat corruption and attempted to revise the CNU constitution and allow multiple candidates to run for nomination. On August 22, 1983 Biya announced the discovery of a plot attempt against the government, which implicated Ahidjo. A week later, Ahidjo resigned as president of the CNU and remained in Paris in self-exile (he was later convicted in absentia in February 1984). Biya quickly held a presidential election in January 1984, which he won with no contestation, and reshuffled his cabinet, most notably by dropping Bello Maigari and replacing him with northern Christian Luc Ayang. 52 The final challenge was an actual military coup attempt in April 1984, led by northern colonels and captains. The coup was poorly executed and quickly put down with numerous arrests and death estimates ranging up to 350 people. 53

Biya’s response to these challenges was a mixture of political realignment, but also some important measures of party revitalization. Following the coup attempt Biya took advantage of the situation to replace seven members of the CNU’s Political Bureau and expand the Central Committee to fifty-five members while maintaining the perception of regional balance and,

51 While the law did not explicitly prohibit other parties from forming, there were enough legal and economic hurdles in place to deter opposition parties from forming.
52 DeLancey 1989 p.66-71; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.69-73. Another important step taken by Biya was to redraw provincial boundaries and split the North into three provinces (Adamwa, North, and Far North) and the South into two provinces (Center and South).
53 In response, Biya actually downplayed the northern element in the coup. The coup was likely triggered by Biya’s decision to dismantle the Republican Guard and transfer its mostly northern troops to other branches of the military. However, the planning had taken place over a number of months with assumed support from Bamileke business interests who were responding to Biya’s initial anti-corruption campaign (LeVine 1986 p.38; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.73-74).
importantly, keeping some Ahidjo era politicians within his sphere.\textsuperscript{54} The 1985 Bamenda Party Congress was opportune for Biya to legislate his “New Deal,” or supposed push toward a more participatory polity. As Takougang and Krieger note -

\begin{quote}
“Unlike previous party congresses that were merely well-choreographed events to showcase party officials and endorse policies that had already been approved by the president and the party’s Political Bureau and Central Committee, delegates were forthright and very critical of government policies.”\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

The Bamenda Congress re-christened the CNU as the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM). Once again the Central Committee was expanded to sixty-five members, which allowed reform-minded individuals and new business elites to enter the party. Crucially, Biya finally introduced competitive elections for party offices, legislative nomination, and even the presidency. During the 1986 party election over half of the district party presidents were replaced by new members, as were large majorities of the women and youth wings leadership. Likewise, in the 1988 legislative election 85\% of those elected were new members.\textsuperscript{56}

It is of course important not to overstate the extent of reform that the CPDM introduced. For instance, while technically multiple presidential candidacies were possible in reality the various pre-requisites made it essentially impossible for someone else to contest the election. Candidates would need to present a petition with 500 signatures from each of the ten provinces and from elected officials in the legislature and the central committee of the CPDM.\textsuperscript{57} Similarly, while competitive elections were a welcome addition by most party cadres, the CPDM Political Bureau was still primarily responsible for sifting through the list and eliminating candidates that could be potential threats. In this sense, the elections were semi-competitive like those in single-party Tanzania, where candidates were evaluated based on their popularity but also adherence to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{54} DeLancey 1989 p.73-76; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.75.
\textsuperscript{55} The Bamenda Congress was in fact commonly known as the “New Deal Congress” (Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.78)
\textsuperscript{56} Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.81
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid p.82-83; Ngo 2004 p.428-430
\end{flushleft}
the guidelines that emanated from Biya and the CPDM Political Bureau. With regard to succession, the situation became even murkier when in 1983 Biya eliminated the position of prime minister and re-designated the President of the National Assembly as the constitutional successor to the presidency until new elections could be held.

Similarly, while Biya significantly lifted limitations on free speech and movement as part of the New Deal, the essential core of the Ahidjo security state remained in place. The notorious CND was simply re-dedicated as the Direction Général d’Etudes et de la Documentation (DIRDOC). As part of the New Deal Biya articulated a “National Charter of Freedom,” which encouraged greater press freedom, removed bans on previously controversial publications, and encouraged cabinet members to spend more time with the media. However, this did not end government censorship, which was retained by a new press law (No. 3292/L/MINAT/DAP/LP of November 8 1983), and used frequently to penalize and arrest journalists and editors who were perceived as crossing the line with regard to their coverage of corruption and criticism of the CPDM. Moreover, the Ahidjo-era 1962 anti-subversion and 1967 freedom of association acts were not rescinded and used throughout the 1980s to regulate media as well as nascent civil society organizations.

In addition, economic decline placed immense stress on Biya’s desires for rural reform and the system of regional balance that Ahidjo had fostered. Biya’s socio-economic vision, articulated with his concept of “Communal Liberalism,” was meant to address regional inequalities and rural underdevelopment. The Sixth Development Plan (1986-1991) allocated 25% of the budget to rural development, this time focused on mid-sized farms of 10-15 hectares.

59 Ibid p.90-92
60 In addition, part of the New Deal was meant to decentralize decision making to village communities, which never happened in practice (DeLancey 1989 p.77-78).
and also on private rather than communal ownership. However the efficacy of this program, as in the case of Ahidjo’s rural reform plans, is largely doubted.\textsuperscript{61} Within Biya’s own Beti ethnic group there were also calls for economic redress, exacerbated by the economic crisis of the mid-1980s. By the late 1980s Ahidjo’s semblance of regional balance had unraveled, and 75\% of prefects, sub-district chiefs and parastatal heads were Beti.\textsuperscript{62} The perception of southern domination at the expense of the Northern Fulani and Bamileke was referred to as the replacement of the “Garoua Barons” with the “Beti Mafia”.\textsuperscript{63}

Moreover, initial Anglophone hopes of social and economic redress were also quickly replaced with an increased sense of dependency and relative under-development. In September 1983, Biya’s Minister of Education modified the requirements for the General Certificate of Education (similar to a baccalaureate) by making French the required language of all students. Subsequent protest by Anglophone students at the University of Yaounde forced Biya to rescind the change, but the sense of French cultural imposition remained palatable. In 1984, Biya also changed the name of the country from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon, a move perceived by many Anglophones as another step in a long series of attempts to stifle their cultural identity. Opposition to Biya in the media and civil society, mostly located in North West Province, became the main targets of arrests and censorship. Economically, the recessionary pressures of the late 1980s created anxiety among Anglophone farmers, who attributed the crisis to Biya’s corruption and feared privatization and liquidation of major Anglophone agro-businesses.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{61} DeLancey 1989 p.123  
\textsuperscript{62} Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.95; Takougang 2004b p.112-116; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2004 p.199  
\textsuperscript{63} Takougang 2004b p.108; van de Walle 1993  
\textsuperscript{64} DeLancey 1989 p.75-76; Takougang 2004b p.107-108; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2004 p.194-199
Conclusion

While the single-party period under Ahidjo did not completely neglect the party and the reforms initiated by Biya did open the party somewhat, the essential logics embedded during the Ahidjo years did not change. Regarding the Biya era, Mark DeLancey notes that “the Biya administration is a continuation of both the pattern and process of rule established by Ahidjo and a reliance on personnel drawn from very much the same strata of society.”\(^{65}\) In fact, as in Kenya, the dual challenges of economic decline (and mismanagement) with pressures from previously less privileged sectors of a multiethnic coalition made these patterns much more explicit. Under Biya the strong presidentialism founded during the Ahidjo-era was never in doubt (despite gestures from Biya’s New Deal) and the logic of ethnic mobilization became much more evident. As the CPDM entered an era of multiparty elections, it retained strong coercive capacity but lacked strong organizational sources of elite cohesion and widespread social support.

\(^{65}\) DeLancey 1989 p.78
PART III – SINGLE-PARTY REGIMES IN COMPETITION
Chapter 7: The CCM and the Path to Competitive Hegemony

This chapter assesses how strong party capacity generates a competitive hegemony by looking at the record of elite defection and an analysis of constituency-level election results. The expectation is that given the high degree of structural articulation elite defection is going be small and not as sensitive to changing conditions such as economic decline or the evolution of stronger opposition parties. On the other hand, the implication of CCM’s social robustness is that it should generally enjoy a mobilization advantage through its use of formal institutions like party cells, but also that its strongest support should come from those areas that benefitted from earlier forms of *ujamaa*. In addition this chapter looks at a number of alternative approaches to understanding CCM’s hegemony – opposition capacity, electoral coercion, and resource asymmetry - which if credibly eliminated, provide more credence to the posited theory of party capacity.¹

Tanzania’s transition to multiparty elections was not accompanied by large-scale social protest but was instead a much more top-down driven process.² In response to the changing global landscape and socio-economic character of CCM, by 1990 Nyerere had begun to publicly advocate for ending the single-party state.³ While there was some pressure from civil society, it was CCM that took the initiative. In 1992 the government’s Nyalali Commission travelled the country to investigate the prospects for multiparty elections and later that year the Political Parties Act legalized opposition parties. Subsequently, over a dozen parties formed, but only five have been able to win legislative seats - the National Convention for Construction and Reform

---

¹ It should also be noted that the majority of this chapter is more relevant to politics on the mainland of Tanzania and not the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar. Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous region with a distinct political history and culture, and its own parallel government (the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar).
² Shivji 1991; Bargeu 1994; Barkan 1994; Hyden 1999
³ Nyerere is famous for stating “When you see your neighbor getting a shave, you had better wet your hair so to avoid a dry shave” (*Daily News* July 18, 1990).
(NCCR-M), the Party of Democracy and Progress (Chadema), the Civic United Front (CUF), the United Democratic Party (UDP), and the Tanzanian Labor Party (TLP). Since the founding election of 1995 the electoral strength of these parties has ebbed and flowed, but they have yet to significantly challenge CCM (Tables 7.1 and 7.2).

**Table 7.1: Tanzanian Presidential Election Results (1995-2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CCM</th>
<th>NCCR</th>
<th>Chadema</th>
<th>CUF</th>
<th>UDP</th>
<th>TLP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Benjamin</td>
<td>Augustine</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mkapa</td>
<td>Mrema</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Lipumba</td>
<td>Cheyo</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61.8%)</td>
<td>(27.8%)</td>
<td>(6.4%)</td>
<td>(4.0%)</td>
<td>(1.5%)</td>
<td>(0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Jakaya</td>
<td>Sengondo</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Lipumba</td>
<td>Cheyo</td>
<td>Augustine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kikwete</td>
<td>Mvungi</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>(16.2%)</td>
<td>(4.2%)</td>
<td>Mrema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(87.4%)</td>
<td>(0.49%)</td>
<td>(11.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.75%)</td>
<td>(7.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jakaya</td>
<td>Hashimn</td>
<td>Wilibrodd</td>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Muttamwega</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kikwete</td>
<td>Rungwe</td>
<td>Slaa</td>
<td>Lipumba</td>
<td>Bhatt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62.8%)</td>
<td>(0.31%)</td>
<td>(27.0%)</td>
<td>(8.3%)</td>
<td>Mgayhwa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Tanzanian National Electoral Commission (Various Years)

**Table 7.2: Tanzanian Parliamentary Election Results (1995-2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CCM Seats (%)</th>
<th>NCCR Seats (%)</th>
<th>Chadema Seats (%)</th>
<th>CUF Seats (%)</th>
<th>UDP Seats (%)</th>
<th>TLP Seats (%)</th>
<th>Total Opposition Seats (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>186 (80.2%)</td>
<td>16 (6.9%)</td>
<td>3 (1.3%)</td>
<td>24 (10.3%)</td>
<td>3 (1.3%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>46 (19.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>202 (87.5%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>4 (1.7%)</td>
<td>17 (7.4%)</td>
<td>3 (1.3%)</td>
<td>4 (1.7%)</td>
<td>29 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>206 (88.8%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>5 (2.2%)</td>
<td>19 (8.2%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>16 (6.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>187 (77.9%)</td>
<td>4 (1.7%)</td>
<td>23 (9.6%)</td>
<td>24 (10.0%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
<td>53 (22.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Tanzanian National Electoral Commission (Various Years)

---

Other important parties at the time included the National League for Democracy (NLD), Popular National Party (PONA), Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA), Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD), and the United People’s Democratic Party (UPDP).
The Party Resilient: Elite Defection in Multiparty Tanzania

While elite defection from CCM does occur, it is very rare to find national-level figures that have either held cabinet portfolios or top offices in the party hierarchy who have defected. Similarly, despite a high degree of turnover during parliamentary primaries the number of defectors has been surprisingly small. This remarkable pattern of elite loyalty is despite the fact that the environment within and outside CCM has clearly shifted over the years. Stringent debates between socialists and capitalists, party reformers and party conservatives, have rattled the party. The Mwinyi and Kikwete administrations have been racked by massive corruption scandals, and CCM’s primary system has repeatedly been accompanied by accusations of corruption and vote-buying. At times elections have been held during periods of economic duress or when opposition alternatives seemed more credible (especially during the 1995 and 2010 elections). Indeed, it is during these moments that the party has stepped in to ensure the procedural integrity of the party’s nomination process.

For a number of reasons, the 1995 elections was one of the most critical tests of CCM’s structural articulation. First, it was a founding election, and was held against a backdrop of immense social and economic change. One of the consequences of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s was massive inflation and in 1994 prices had skyrocketed 20%. Second, there was a clear national oppositional figure in the form of Augustine Mrema. Mrema was a prominent member of CCM and the former Minister of Interior. The revelation of corruption scandals during Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s tenure pushed Mrema even further into the national spotlight as an anti-corruption crusader, making him into one of the most popular figures in

5 McHenry 1994; Mmuya 1998
6 Between 2005 and 2010 Tanzanian was rattled by the Bilali scandal, Barrick Gold Mine scandal, BAE radar scandal, and the Richmond affair grabbed national headlines (Tanzanian Affairs 89 2008). The latter was in particular damaging and involved an apparent front-company that was awarded lucrative public contracts and implicated former Prime Minster Edward Lowassa who resigned but was not charged.
Tanzania. This ultimately led to his expulsion from government, after which he left CCM and joined the NCCR-M as its national chairman and presidential candidate. Third, this was the second presidential transition since Nyerere left office and the candidate field was crowded with over 17 aspirants.

What subsequently followed was testament to the strength of CCM as a political party. The process for selecting the ultimate presidential candidate was followed fairly closely with no political fallout at the end. Candidates could nominate themselves if they were age eligible, had 250 signatures from party members, a university-level education, and could pay a 1,000,000 Tsh deposit. The seventeen candidates were first vetted and interviewed by the party CC. The CC reduced the list to six candidates who were discussed in the party NEC in Dodoma, and later limited to just three who faced a vote in the party’s National Congress – Benjamin Mkapa (viewed as Nyerere’s favorite candidate), Jakaya Kikwete (considered the youth candidate) and Cleopa Msuya (the sitting prime minister and considered the establishment figure).

Competition between these figures was intense and forced into a second round of voting that pitched Mkapa against Kikwete. Mkapa won the primary narrowly 686 to 639. None of the primary losers defected to form or join an opposition party. Kikwete was compensated by an appointment as Foreign Minister and encouraged to contest the primary later down the road, which he did successfully in 2005.

At the parliamentary level, candidates continued to nominate themselves through their branches or party districts and underwent a process of preferential voting. The vast majority of the 232 constituencies were contested during the primary by multiple candidates, ranging from

---

7 “The Mrema Phenomenon” Tanzanian Affairs 40 1991. To date, Mrema has been the most prominent figure to defect from CCM, although at the time he did not hold any position within government or the party.
8 Mwase & Raphael 1995
9 Several CCM leaders apparently believed that Mkapa was the best consensus figure who could bridge the gaps between the young, old, and reformers (“Election Guide” Tanzanian Affairs 52 September 1995)
three to fifteen per constituency. As under single-party rule, further restrictions were placed by the CCM NEC on eligibility and the NEC retained the right to intervene in dubious primary races. However in 1995 CCM did not intervene much in the process despite reports that money had been used frequently to buy a nomination. At the end of the primary period, 40 sitting MPs (including two sitting ministers and five regional commissioners) lost their nomination. Subsequently, there were only 12 primary losers who defected (out of nearly 800 candidates) – 5 to NCCR-M, 4 to Chadema, 2 to CUF, and 1 to the NLD.

This stability persisted during the 2000 and 2005 elections. While immediate economic conditions had improved over this period and the stature of Augustin Mrema clearly diminished after his defection from NCCR-M to TLP (see below), there were still tensions within CCM over the procedural integrity of MP nomination and another potential succession crisis with the end of Mkapa’s term. Moreover, the death of Julius Nyerere in 1999 provided a potential new opening for dissent since he had clearly been a unifying figure within the party. In 2000, while Mkapa ran essentially unopposed (only one other candidate submitted a nomination, Eugene Munasa), the parliamentary primaries were characterized by intense competition and numerous accusations of corruption and fraud. This time, CCM’s NEC intervened more heavily and overturned nominations in at least 11 constituencies. Consequently, there were only two notable defections from CCM – Lumuli Kasyupa and Ndembela Ngunangwa, both to the Tanzanian Labor Party (TLP).

As in 1995, the 2005 presidential primary was crowded with over eleven candidates competing. Once again CCM’s CC reduced the list to five candidates, and ultimately three

---

10 “Winners and Losers” Tanzanian Affairs 53 January 1, 1996
11 TEMCO 1996 p.77. Stephen Wassira, the MP for Bunda and former Minister of Agriculture defected to NCCR-M, but after winning his seat returned to CCM.
12 TEMCO 2001 p.55-61. It should be noted that CCM’s NEC delayed announcing its parliamentary candidates until the deadline set by the Electoral Commission, possibly to prevent defections.
competed in the primary – Mark Mwandosya (Minister of Transport and Communication), Salim Ahmed Salim (a veteran politician and chairman of the Nyerere Foundation), and 1995 candidate Jakaya Kikwete (Minister of Foreign Affairs). Noticeably, CCM veteran and former Prime-Minister John Malecela was dropped. Malecela, an elder politician, had also been a contender in 1995 but his public disagreements with Nyerere likely influenced the party’s NEC decision to not nominate him. Kikwete, who as noted was a strong candidate in 1995 with significant youth support, received Mkapa’s endorsement and beat Salim Salim and Mwandosya 1,027 to 476 to 122.\(^\text{13}\)

During the parliamentary contests, competition for MP positions was still stiff but more open than in 2000. While in 2000, twenty-five constituencies ran unopposed in the primary by 2005 there were only two.\(^\text{14}\) As in 2000, there were again frequent accusations of vote-buying and CCM’s NEC once again had to involve itself in the process. Publicly, there were rumors that a wave of defections was about to sweep CCM after the primary and once again this failed to materialize. Only one incumbent MP, Lupa’s Njelu Kasaka, defected to the CUF (eventually returning to CCM). In Kagera, two parliamentary aspirants defected to Chadema to unsuccessfully contest their seats (one had his candidacy overruled by the CCM NEC and the other lost the primary).\(^\text{15}\) In Biharmulo West, Phares Kabuye defected to TLP and won his seat on the opposition ticket. Several of the primary losers took further measures by going to the media to deny rumors that they had intended to defect to an opposition party.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{13}\) TEMCO 2006 p.29. Mkapa also added background criteria for selection as a candidate that were beneficial to Kikwete. In addition, since Kikwete was a Muslim and had remained loyal after his defeat in 1995, there was speculation that he was a natural choice for the candidacy. CCM’s presidents have rotated from Muslim (Mwinyi), Mkapa (Christian) to Kikwete (Muslim) (USAID 2010).

\(^{14}\) TEMCO 2006 p.31

\(^{15}\) Ibid p.34

\(^{16}\) Michael Okema “Today, the Road to Riches Lies Through CCM” *East African* September 7, 2005
The 2010 election had many similarities to the 1995 election as it saw the economy once again stall and the revelation of immense corruption scandals. Between 2005 and 2010 corruption pitted two observable factions within CCM against each other – the reformers led by parliamentary Speaker Samwel Sitta and the conservatives led by Prime Minister Edward Lowassa and CCM secretary-general Yusuf Makamba. As tensions mounted, Kikwete stepped in and formed a three-person commission in November 2009 to negotiate between the two factions. There were also stronger party alternatives. First, Chadema’s presidential candidate Wilibrod Slaa led a much publicized campaign against corruption during which he infamously published a list of suspected implicated individuals. While perhaps not as popular as Augustine Mrema, Slaa was clearly a national figure who could draw crowds. Second, the emergence of a new party – the Chama Cha Jamii (CCJ) led to rumors of massive defections from CCM, including Sitta’s.

In reality defections were surprisingly non-existent. Only two senior CCM members defected – Fred Mpendazoe the MP from Kishapu and an outspoken critic of corruption and Sikutu Philip Chibululu of Mwanza, also known as the “Mandela” of CCM for his time spent in prison. The CCJ was later denied registration by the Registrar of Political Parties and several of its members moved to Chadema. During the CCM parliamentary primaries, many observers once again speculated that there would be several defections. In response to the criticism over past primaries, CCM’s NEC loosened its grip on MP selection and over seventy sitting MPs lost their seats in the primary. These included once again the veteran John Malecela, his third such

17 “Rift in CCM Now in the Open” Tanzanian Affairs 95 January 1, 2010
18 Bernard Lugongo “Mpendazoe: Why I have Quit CCM” The Citizen March 31 2010; Frederick Katulanda “’Mandela’ of CCM defects and joins CCJ” The Citizen April 8 2010
19 Indicative of the ambiguous origins of CCJ, its national chair Richard Kiyabo moved to Chadema and later became a member of CCM. Mpendazoe contested the Segerea seat in Dar es Salaam and lost to CCM’s candidate (Daily News July 15, 2010).
rejection in recent history. Defections were few, and only John Shibuda’s (MP for Maswa) defection to Chadema drew national headlines. Shibuda was subsequently shunned by several other primary losers in CCM. Thomas Nyimbo of Njombe West perhaps summarized best the sentiment within CCM, stating that “as a politician you should learn to give in…Sometimes you must agree with what the party’s hierarchy decided”.

Predictions that corruption and ideological decline would erode CCM’s structural articulation have proven pre-mature. While not immune to defection, the relatively competitive processes for selecting MPs and presidential candidates has helped ensure that factions and individuals remain committed to the party. Moreover, the party itself has stayed devoted to these procedures, stepping in at times to address accusations of corruption during primaries, or by contrast loosening its grip on candidacy. As a result, national level figures have rarely defected (with the exception of Augustin Mrema in 1995). Committed socialists like John Malecela, who has repeatedly failed nomination for top offices, have remained loyal to the party. Indicative, after Jakaya Kikwete’s narrow defeat in a second round of voting in 1995, he waited ten years to contest the primary again when he likely could have banked on his popularity to forward a strong candidacy with an opposition party. Likewise, parliamentary candidates have overwhelmingly hitched their political careers to CCM.

The Party Dominant: Patterns of Social Support in Multiparty Tanzania

One crucial hoop test to pass is to show that in fact CCM’s mobilization structure is in place and used during elections. Unfortunately, direct data is hard to come by since CCM

---

20 “CCM Bigwigs Lose Primaries” Daily News August 2, 2010
21 Frank Kimboy & Bernard Lugongo “I’m Decamping to Chadema, says Shibuda” The Citizen August 18 2010. The other defectors were Muita Mwikebe Waitara (Tarime), Sijapata Fahili (Kigoma North) Omari Nkwarulo (Kigoma North) and Optatus Likwelie (Kigoma South) to CUF, Kulikoyela Kahigi (Bukombe) and Thomas Nyimbo (Njombe West) to Chadema (Rodgers Luhwago. “CCM paying dear price for axing primary poll winners” IPP Media October 10, 2010).
22 USAID 2010
officials will not divulge numbers, but do admit (as do opposition parties) that party cells are used during elections to organize rallies and register voters.\textsuperscript{23} Mmuya and Chaligha have also noted that the OTTU and UWT actively campaigned for CCM in 1995.\textsuperscript{24} According to a limited survey of five districts between 1995 and 1997 CCM had 38,121 party cells in place, or 97.2% of all registered party cells. The ten-home cell was also overwhelmingly the primary political office familiar to citizens. Nearly twice as many people claimed to know their ten-cell leader than their ward or village government chairman. Likewise, citizens were much more familiar with cell-level meetings and decisions.\textsuperscript{25} Indicative of the utility of CCM’s mobilization network, CCM’s presidential vote-share is high across the country (Figure 7.1). There are very few districts where CCM presidential candidates win with less than 60% of the vote (presidential vote-share correlates with legislative vote-share by 73%). In addition, there is a statistically significant 10% difference in vote share between rural and urban constituencies.

However, Figure 7.1 also exhibits regional patterns of support and highlights CCM’s comparative greater electoral success in southern and central portions of the country.\textsuperscript{26} Opposition parties generally offer a supply-side version of this outcome, claiming that their lack of resources inhibits their expansion and capacity to compete. Once they reach a voting population with their message, that constituency usually becomes much more competitive. As one opposition party member noted, “we are strong where we go and we go where we are strong”.\textsuperscript{27} Yet this does not answer the question of why certain areas of the country are targeted for expansion over others. Opposition parties have always done better and have consciously

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{23} CCM Secretariat Member, 2010, Author Interview
\textsuperscript{24} Mmuya & Chaligha 1994 p.140-141.
\textsuperscript{25} Mukandala 2010
\textsuperscript{26} Note also the strong opposition performance in Kilimanjaro and the southern coastal regions. As mentioned below, these are considered sectarian strongholds – the Chagga in Kilimanjaro and Muslims along the coast with stronger ties to Zanzibar and Pemba.
\textsuperscript{27} John Mnyika, (Temporary Secretary-General Chadema) 2010, Author Interview
\end{flushleft}
diverted resources to the areas surrounding Lake Victoria (Kagera, Mara, Mwanza, and Shinyanga). For example, in 1995 Augustine Mrema was able to win 40% of the votes in Kagera, 39% in Mara, 23.5% in Mwanza, and 20% in Shinyanga. Similarly, CUF’s presidential candidate Ibrahim Lipumba garnered between 10% and 20% of the vote in these areas in 2000 and 2005, while Chadema’s candidate Wilibrod Slaa won between 30% and 40%.28

Both CUF and Chadema have deliberately shifted party resources to the “Lake Zone” due to the high concentration of voters, but also the perceived greater amenability of the population to the opposition’s message. This is generally attributed to differences in political background, culture, and civic education. For instance, both Joran Bashenge and Ibrahim Lipumba of CUF believe that political activism in the Lake Zone dates back to the independence period and the co-operative movement. These were regions where cash-crop agriculture was stronger and took the brunt of TANU’s repression in the late 1970s. The Lake Zone also had a stronger missionary presence prior to independence, and therefore better educational opportunities that inculcated civic virtues and political activism. By contrast, Zitto Kabwe of Chadema claims that political awareness is greater in areas that border other countries, which makes citizens more involved in regional political change in countries like Kenya or Zambia.29

On the other hand, opposition parties have made very little inroads or attempts at penetrating the central and southern areas of the country. Indeed, between 1995 and 2010 the regions of Dodoma, Iringa, Morogoro, Mtwara, Ruvuma, Singida, and Tanga have polled exceptionally high for CCM’s presidential candidate. Out of approximately 45 electoral constituencies CCM has won on average over 70% of the vote in all buy four (the more urban

28 Tanzanian National Electoral Commission (Various Years). The decline of CUF in the Lake Zone is likely due to the fact that the party dedicated much more of its resources to Zanzibar after the post-2000 violence. In 2005, CUF also had no MP seats on the mainland, which limited its credibility.
29 Joran Bashenge (Deputy Secretary General CUF), 2010, Author Interview; Zitto Kabwe (Deputy Secretary General Chadema), 2010, Author Interview; Ibrahim Lipumba (National Chairman CUF), 2010, Author Interview
constituencies of Kondo, Iringa Urban, Kilwa, and Pangani). Opposition parties have likewise only won six MP seats in these regions. As with the Lake Zone the reasons offered are either historical or socio-economic. For instance, Dodoma has long been a region supportive of CCM, the target of early development funds, and where Nyerere moved the capital in 1973.\textsuperscript{30} Chadema 2010 campaign manager Mwesiga Baregu claims that “CCM has a grasp on their [voters] minds – from the 10-house cell” and that it is an issue of “poverty, ignorance, and fear”.\textsuperscript{31} Likewise, Chadema national chair Freemon Mbowe states that in those regions “CCM’s capital has for a long period of time been based on the politics of fear”.\textsuperscript{32} A frequent tale is that voters in these areas still believe that Julius Nyerere is alive.\textsuperscript{33}

Figure 7.1: Average CCM Presidential Vote-Share by District (1995-2010)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.1.png}
\caption{Average CCM Presidential Vote-Share by District (1995-2010)}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Source:} Tanzanian National Election Commission (Various Years)

\textsuperscript{30} Wilibrod Slaa (Secretary General Chadema), 2010, Author Interview
\textsuperscript{31} Mwesiga Baregu (Campaign Manager Chadema), 2010, Author Interview
\textsuperscript{32} Freemon Mbowe (National Chair Chadema), 2010, Author Interview
\textsuperscript{33} For an exceptional ethnography of the intersection of rural life in Sinigda Region and elections see Phillips 2010. Philips discusses among other things the prominence afforded Nyerere and his association with CCM as well as the role of the local party leaders.
To test some of these assertions I conduct a statistical test of the impact of several variables at the district and regional level upon the average CCM presidential vote-share. By using the average vote-share over a period of four elections, it mitigates differences that might be due to factors like fluctuation in economic performance. Data are collected on social indicators like population density, population growth, percent of young voters, poverty and developmental indicators, education statistics, and access to health care. To assess whether the supply of opposition parties is correlated with a decreased CCM vote-share, a measure of the average number of opposition parties competing per constituency in parliamentary elections is used. Finally, the impact of *ujamaa* villagization on vote-share is assessed by incorporating data on the number of villages created prior to 1973, the year after which villagization took on a much more violent tone. All models report robust standard errors to cope with heteroscedasticity.\(^{34}\)

The district results are reported in Table 7.3. When only analyzing the impact of socio-economic indicators, the strongest predictors of CCM’s vote-share are employment and access to health services. There was little evidence to suggest that geographic proximity to a border, the distribution of population, or age were significant factors. There was also little evidence to support the assertion that CCM voters tended to be less educated, poorer, or even that employment by the state correlated with more CCM support. For instance, the average literacy rate across regions in 2002 was 58.7%. It was significantly lower in regions like Shinyanga (49.8%), which has been highly supportive of the opposition, while in Iringa – a CCM hotbed – literacy was much higher (70%). Similarly, Shinyanga is one of the poorest regions in Tanzania, with nearly 45% of the population living below the poverty line (in contrast with a national

---

\(^{34}\) During the preliminary data-analysis a number of outliers were identified – the districts of Karatu, Hai, and Moshi Vijijini. These districts have persistently been strongholds for Chadema, likely due to strong ethnic affiliation with the Chagga group. They are therefore excluded.
average of 36.7%). The results do not change substantively when certain possibly correlated variables are omitted.

When a measure of opposition party capacity is added it is significant ($p=0.01$) and the coefficients on employment and access to health services are reduced slightly. Taking the potential for endogeneity into consideration, an increase in the number of parties competing for parliamentary seats in a district decreases CCM’s presidential vote-share by approximately 2%. While the substantive impact appears to be very small, there is some truth to the supply-side explanation of electoral dynamics – opposition parties are slightly stronger where they go rather than simply going places where they are strong. However, when an index of the extent of regional villagization is added, the $r^2$ increases substantially and the result is also significant ($p=0.003$) and substantive. It is important to note that as expected the impact of villagization after 1973 no longer has any impact.

To help interpret the results, expected values are generated holding all other variables at their mean (Figure 7.3). Districts within regions that did not go through high levels of villagization (1st and 2nd quartiles) were likely to produce CCM vote-shares between 65% and 70%, while those that did (3rd and 4th quartiles) were likely to produce CCM vote-shares between 75% and 80%. In addition, once controlling for villagization the importance of post-secondary education (which theoretically should lead to higher opposition support) becomes significant and grows in substance. This indicates that the establishment of a strong social constituency in the southern and central parts of the country has translated into persistent electoral outcomes. By contrast, the lower amount of resources forwarded during this period to other regions, which were also the primary target of coercive *ujamaa*, has allowed for less hegemonic electoral conditions.
Figure 7.2: Expected CCM Vote-Share by Ujamaa Index and Average Parties (District Level)

Note: Robust standard errors represented

Figure 7.3: Expected CCM Vote-Share by Ln Ujamaa and Average Parties (Regional Level)

Note: Robust standard errors represented
Table 7.3: OLS Regression of Average District CCM Vote Share (1995-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV=Average CCM Vote Share</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ln Population Density</td>
<td>-0.43 (1.09)</td>
<td>-0.44 (1.09)</td>
<td>-0.49 (0.97)</td>
<td>-0.50 (0.89)</td>
<td>-0.83 (0.88)</td>
<td>-0.83 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population 20-40</td>
<td>0.22 (0.62)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.64)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-2002</td>
<td>-0.68 (0.66)</td>
<td>-0.60 (0.68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Literacy Rate</td>
<td>0.08 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>-3.03 (2.56)</td>
<td>-2.38 (2.77)</td>
<td>-2.75 (2.74)</td>
<td>-5.80* (2.33)</td>
<td>-4.14* (2.01)</td>
<td>-4.01 (1.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Employed / Total Population</td>
<td>0.68*** (0.1)</td>
<td>0.66*** (0.1)</td>
<td>0.68*** (0.1)</td>
<td>0.64*** (0.1)</td>
<td>0.50*** (0.15)</td>
<td>0.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Access to Electricity</td>
<td>-0.41 (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.44 (0.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Below Poverty Line</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Population/ Health Facility</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.11** (2.59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.41* (2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Public Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average # Opposition Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujamaa Index (1973)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujamaa Index (1974)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujamaa Index (1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>95.59***</td>
<td>98.09*** (28)</td>
<td>98.79*** (24)</td>
<td>96.95*** (24)</td>
<td>84.78*** (24)</td>
<td>87.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.78)</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>(25.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.5

Sources: Hyden 1980; Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics District Profiles 2004; Tanzanian National Election Commission (Various Years); Tanzanian Planning Commission (Various Years)
A similar test is conducted at the regional level where there is data available regarding GDP and the extent of villagization that corresponds better to the unit of analysis. The tradeoff is that the number of observations is greatly reduced, especially if an urban center like Dar es Salaam is excluded. The Models in Table 7.4 test the extent of rural population (which at the regional level is highly correlated with measures of literacy, school enrollment, and poverty), measures of GDP, the number of opposition parliamentary parties, and the natural log of the number of *ujamaa* villages against the average CCM presidential vote-share. The results reinforce some of what was found at the district level, but show stronger regional effects for villagization upon the size of CCM’s vote-share, and no impact for the supply of opposition parties. In model 5, which drops the insignificant variables, regions with low villagization had expected CCM vote-shares of approximately 55%-65%, and those with high levels of villagization 65%-75% (Figure 7.3).

While these models are not exhaustive, they contribute to a better understanding of the emergent pattern of CCM’s electoral support and help substantiate its strong correlation with legacies of *ujamaa* villagization. This reflects two trends – the consequence of transferring wealth to the most under-developed areas of Tanzania and the concurrent destruction of the cash-crop economy (which was in fact the historical base of TANU). However, this electoral support should not be conflated with a deeper sense of adulation for CCM, only that expectations of political delivery are strongly embedded with the ruling party and apprehension regarding opposition parties much higher. In a sense, for many rural voters CCM is the “devil you know,” simply because it has historically been the only “devil” to come around and is therefore still preferable to the relatively unknown opposition entities.
Table 7.4: OLS Regression of Average Regional CCM Vote-Share (1995-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV=Average CCM Vote Share</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Rural Population</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Population / Health Facility</td>
<td>-10.25</td>
<td>-7.41</td>
<td>-9.22</td>
<td>-3.38</td>
<td>-3.29</td>
<td>-5.17</td>
<td>-5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.89)</td>
<td>(5.90)</td>
<td>(6.08)</td>
<td>(4.11)</td>
<td>(3.77)</td>
<td>(3.39)</td>
<td>(6.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Employed / Total Population</td>
<td>1.43***</td>
<td>1.07**</td>
<td>1.11**</td>
<td>1.20**</td>
<td>1.19***</td>
<td>0.98***</td>
<td>2.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>-0.00*</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Ujamaa Villages (1973)</td>
<td>4.18*</td>
<td>4.30*</td>
<td>5.12**</td>
<td>5.11**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.74)</td>
<td>(1.78)</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average # Parties</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.60)</td>
<td>(3.53)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Ujamaa (1974)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Ujamaa (1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>108.19</td>
<td>56.42</td>
<td>56.50</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>32.98</td>
<td>39.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61.19)</td>
<td>(63.34)</td>
<td>(64.05)</td>
<td>(46.18)</td>
<td>(43.80)</td>
<td>(36.11)</td>
<td>(68.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses ; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Source: Hyden 1980; Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics Regional Profiles 2004; Tanzanian National Election Commission (Various Years); Tanzanian Planning Commission (Various Years)

Assessing Alternative Explanations in Tanzania

The second part of this chapter is dedicated to evaluating three other potential causes of Tanzania’s competitive hegemony - the weak capacity of opposition parties, the pervasiveness of fraud and repression, and the persistent resource asymmetry between CCM and its rivals. While there is evidence to support all of these approaches this section argues that they fail to meet critical threshold tests that would provide concrete evidence that these factors are causally determinative or sufficient for explaining Tanzania’s competitive hegemony. Failure to pass these “hoop tests” provides greater confidence in the suggested theory of party capacity.
Is the Opposition to Blame for CCM’s Hegemony?

A common explanation of Tanzania’s hegemony points a finger at the failure of opposition parties to institutionalize and improve their competitive capacity.\(^{35}\) As Tim Kelsall writes, “Parties have been little more than collections of individuals. The organizations have been poorly institutionalized, and in such circumstances personality splits have easily spelled their demise”.\(^{36}\) While there is supportive evidence, these arguments tend to conflate electoral support with institutionalization. Moreover, these observations are often based on a limited time span and do not consider Tanzania’s opposition parties in a broader comparative perspective. Indeed, while relatively unsuccessful at the polls Tanzanian has had a comparatively stable party system with five persistent legislative players. There have also been significant improvements in opposition party institutionalization and behavior over time (especially with regard to CUF and Chadema). Importantly, despite these improvements opposition parties have only recently begun to improve their standings at the polls.

The sources of poor institutionalization are readily apparent. First, at their inception opposition parties reflected some narrower ethnic constituencies. The CUF party was the product of a merger between the Zanzibari-based KAMAHURU movement and the mainland’s Chama Cha Wananchi (CCW). KAMAHURU was led by former CCM members who had been jailed on Zanzibar for several years and the CCW by human rights lawyer James Mapalala. However, the influence of Zanzibari and particularly Pemba-based business interests was very perceptible. The deeper roots of the party were clearly on Zanzibar and along the Muslim dominated coast of the mainland. In fact, over 90% of the CUF’s founding 3,000 members was Muslim. Similarly the central financiers of Chadema came predominantly from the Chagga business community of

\(^{35}\) Hoffman & Robinson 2010; Hyden 1999; Mmuya 1998; Tripp 2000; van de Walle 2003;  
\(^{36}\) Kelsall 2003
Kilimanjaro. While the party maintained some national representation (one-third Muslim and one-third rural), over 50% of the party’s founding members were urban and of a private business background. The UDP too was strongly associated with the family of its founder John Cheyo and his ethnic roots in Shinyanga region among the Sukuma people where it has consistently won the Bukoba Urban seat.\textsuperscript{37}

In 1995 the NCCR-M was the least associated with a clear sectarian origin, largely because it was the one party more closely linked with a popular movement – the National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR). The NCCR, created in 1990, was a platform founded by former TANU minister Abdallah Fundikira and brought together several academics and human rights activists. The NCCR-M was also successful at establishing a large youth constituency and building a stronger presence in rural areas than any other party at the time. Approximately 45% of its founding membership was between the ages of 18 and 30, one-third was Muslim, and the vast majority came from rural areas (85%). The apparent wider basis of support led some to conclude that NCCR-M would likely be the strongest party in 1995 and the most likely to grow into a solid opposition party.\textsuperscript{38} In spite there was some evidence of ethnic mobilization. The party had ties to the Luo through its chairman Mabere Marando and to the Haya of Kagera through its secretary-general Prince Bagenda. When former CCM minister Augustin Mrema joined in 1995, he brought with him important support from his Chagga cohorts.

Second, since 1995 there have been important moments of party breakdown, most infamously with the collapse of NCCR-M in 1999. The party had already suffered from leadership conflict in 1995 when Prince Bagenda took a section of the party to form Mageuzi-

\textsuperscript{37} Mmuya & Chaligha 1994
\textsuperscript{38} Baregu 1994; Mmuya & Chaligha 1994.
Asilia, but returned to NCCR-M after Mrema became chairman. After Mrema’s defeat, rifts began to grow between himself and former chairman Mabere Marando. Mrema was publicly accused of running the party as his personal fiefdom and siphoning party funds for personal gain. In 1999 Mrema defected from NCCR-M to TLP, taking with him the bulk of the party’s financial support and youth base (and reportedly the desks and stationary from party headquarters).

Expectedly, during the 2000 election NCCR-M had no presidential candidate and by 2005 it had no parliamentary representation. Similar tensions plagued CUF, who in 1998 expelled its co-founder James Mapalala. The party has since been dominated by its national chair Ibrahim Lipumba and secretary-general Seif Hamad, who are also the party’s perennial presidential candidates on the mainland and Zanzibar.

Third, while every party with the exception of the UDP runs well-staffed national offices in Dar es Salaam, the extent of infrastructure throughout the country is questionable. On paper the parties all emulate CCM’s organizational structure with organs like a national congress, national executive committee, and central committee replicated at the regional, district, and branch levels (CUF has another level between district and branch known as a Zone on the mainland or Electoral District on Zanzibar). Each party also built mass affiliated mobilizing structures like women and youth leagues as well as party cells. In reality, it is difficult for any opposition party to give an accurate assessment of its own institutions. Membership cards are handed out randomly at political rallies with no oversight. Communication is difficult across the country so there are no consistent reports on branch-level activity. Defection is also an issue at

39 NCCR-M called its cells shina la wa furukutwa and CUF the barza or maskani (depending on whether they were on Zanzibar or the mainland). Only Chadema and UDP did not have party cells incorporated into its organizational structure, but it did have them informally (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994; Mmuya 1998).
the sub-national level, and several party officials admit that their party branches are manned by opportunistic individuals waiting to be bribed by CCM to defect.\textsuperscript{40}

Despite these concerns there are some overlooked and crucial pieces of evidence. First, the Chadema party has maintained a cohesive leadership since its inception and has been able to frequently rotate its top offices without party breakdown. In 1996 party co-founder and chair Edwin Mtei resigned and was quietly replaced by secretary general Bob Makani of Shinyanga. In 2005 Makani was replaced by Mtei’s son-in-law Freemon Mbowe who was the party’s presidential candidate that year. While this did little to alleviate the sense that Chadema was a Chagga dominated party (Mbowe is a known and wealthy Chagga businessman), in 2005 Mbowe helped to re-launch the party under new colors and expand its central committee to reflect a more national composition. This was part of a wider-scale familiarity tour called “Operation Sangara.” Furthermore, in 2010 rather than nominating Mbowe, Chadema elected Karatu MP and the party’s secretary general Wilibrod Slaa as its presidential candidate. In another sign of the greater cohesiveness of Chadema’s leadership, in 2009 Kigoma MP Zitto Kabwe challenged Mbowe for the chairmanship of the party. While Mbowe accepted the challenge, Kabwe rescinded a few days later after pressure from the party’s elder wing, claiming that he did not want to risk party unity.\textsuperscript{41}

Second, both CUF and Chadema have made claims to investing heavily into sub-national infrastructure to compete with CCM’s ten-cell system. The CUF boasts that since 1995 it has built party branches in every village in Tanzania and has a mobilization network that is unparalleled among the opposition. Likewise, part of Chadema’s “Operation Sangara” stressed local leadership training, effective recruitment at the regional and district levels, and the

\textsuperscript{40} In the 2010 election alone over 100 opposition party members defected to CCM (\textit{Daily News} September 12, 2010).

\textsuperscript{41} “I dropped out of the race to preserve unity, says Zitto” \textit{The Citizen} August 31, 2009
construction of CCM-like party cells. To assess these claims I use a proxy for sub-national institutionalization that uses the legislative vote-share. The logic is that to run a parliamentary candidate a party must have the financial and organizational means at hand to nominate someone and mobilize voters. How that capacity evolves over time and more importantly how well it maintains that capacity can act as an indicator for the stability of sub-national infrastructure. However, it is also important not to conflate electoral support with organizational capacity. The success of any individual candidate could be due to personal popularity rather than party institutionalization. Therefore I bracket the results into three categories – no candidate (0), a candidate but with less than 10% of the vote (1), or a candidate with over 10% of the vote (2), to create an aggregate score of 0-2 for every district.

The results reported in Figure 7.4 group the district-level data on legislative elections into Tanzania’s regions for easier observation. Scores that average 1 and above indicates that a party was able to persistently field a parliamentary candidate. As expected, CUF and Chadema have the most nationwide capacity and have been the only parties able to field candidates in every region on the mainland (since 2000). Moreover, they clearly have strengths beyond their supposed ethnic homelands. In the case of Chadema outside of Kilimanjaro it has capacity in Arusha, Kigoma, Manyara, Mara, Morogoro, Mwanza, Rukwa, Shinyanga, and Singida (largely in-line with their stated expansion policy around Lake Victoria). With regards to CUF, outside of Zanzibar and the coastal areas of Lindi and Pwani it has persistent capacity in Dodoma, Morogoro, Mtwara, Mwanza, Ruvuma, Shinyanga, Singida, and Tabora, and Tanga. In the cases of NCCR-M and UDP sub-national capacity is much more limited. Furthermore, with NCCR-M the results also incorporate the much stronger capacity it had in 1995, which was

---

42 Bashange Interview; Slaa Interview
clearly not institutionalized by based on the popularity of Augustin Mrema since the party is now reduced to a core constituency in Kigoma region.\textsuperscript{43}

With regard to actual opposition behavior there are also important signs of strength. While there has never been a broad-based election coalition like the NARC in Kenya, Tanzanian opposition parties have supported single presidential candidates. In 1995, Chadema entered an informal alliance with NCCR-M and TLP to support Augustin Mrema as the opposition’s presidential candidate. Similarly, in 2000 Chadema and CUF entered an informal agreement to nominate Ibrahim Lipumba as president, while the TLP nominated Mrema (note that the UDP did not participate in any of these coalitions).\textsuperscript{44} In 2003, following the observed success of NARC in Kenya, Bob Makani of Chadema formed “Umoja” (unity in Kiswahili) as a platform to unite opposition parties. However disputes between Makani and the CUF led to a string of defections until only the UDP and several smaller parties remained within the movement.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} Since 2000 the NCCR-M under the chairmanship of James Mbatia has gradually rebuilt its party with a specific focus on Kigoma, where it won four seats in the 2010 election (Samweli Ruhuza (Secretary General NCCR-M), 2010, Author Interview).

\textsuperscript{44} Mmuya 1998. According to the parties these coalitions ultimately failed because it was difficult for parliamentary candidates to win without the support of a presidential candidate and without legislative seats parties missed out on state funding that was based on vote and seat-share.

\textsuperscript{45} McHenry 2004
Figure 7.4: Opposition Party Index by Region (1995-2010)

Source: Tanzanian National Election Commission (Various Years)
Opposition cooperation has also entailed strategic coordination over parliamentary contests. To assess the extent and success of this cooperation Table 7.5 reports the number of “potentially spoiled” and “actually spoiled” parliamentary contests. Potentially spoiled contests are those where CCM’s parliamentary candidate received less than 60% of the vote and more than one major opposition party contested the constituency (assuming that a single candidate might have better bonded the opposition). An actually spoiled contest is one where CCM’s candidate won with less than 50% of the vote. The majority of the actually spoiled races were in the regions of Dar es Salaam, Kigoma, Lindi, Mara, Mwanza, Pwani, and Shinyanga – precisely those areas where opposition support is the highest. At times there were clearly parties that likely pulled votes from a frontrunner. For instance, in 2005 CCM’s candidate won 47.5% of the vote in Kisesa (Shinyanga), while Chadema’s won 35%, the UDP’s 10.1%, and CUF’s 6%. At other times contests were spoiled because of the sheer number of parties competing, which fragmented the electorate. Still, even at the peak of this disunity in 1995, if all the potentially spoiled contests went to the opposition it would only give them slightly over one-third of the legislative seats.

Table 7.5: Number of Actual and Potentially Spoiled Mainland Contests by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Potentially Spoiled Contests</th>
<th>Actually Spoiled Contests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>41 (17.7%)</td>
<td>14 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>37 (16%)</td>
<td>8 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>30 (12.9%)</td>
<td>5 (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>40 (16.7%)</td>
<td>10 (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Potentially spoiled = Incumbent wins with less than 60% of the vote and there is more than one party contesting; actually spoiled = Incumbent wins with less than 50% of the vote
Source: Tanzanian National Election Commission (Various Years)

When it comes to other forms of opposition behavior like election boycotts or government co-optation, Tanzania’s opposition parties have not engaged in behavior observed in other electoral authoritarian contexts. Not surprisingly, only the CUF has resorted to these tactics on Zanzibar, indicative of the different political context where elections have been much
more violent. Between 1995 and 2005 the CUF took part in the election but boycotted the Zanzibar legislature. These boycotts were used to pressure CCM on Zanzibar to negotiate with the opposition and led to a power-sharing agreement in 2009 that made CUF’s Seif Hamad the Vice-President of Zanzibar. Outside of these events, no other opposition party has boycotted an election or joined government. Instead, opposition parties have taken advantage of a provision in the Tanzanian constitution that allows them to form “shadow cabinets.” In 1995 this cabinet was formed by CUF and UDP, in 2000 by CUF, in 2005 by CUF and Chadema, and after the 2010 election by Chadema.

This assessment of Tanzania’s opposition party capacity argues that the key to CCM’s hegemony is not rooted in the failings of the opposition. Indeed, along several observable indicators, and especially in comparison with the cases of Kenya and Cameroon, opposition parties in Tanzania have exhibited much stronger competitive capacities. To some extent this is counter-intuitive, since given the opposition’s lower electoral success one might expect the parties to fragment and allow themselves to be co-opted by the regime. This was the case with NCCR-M, whose success in 1995 was largely due to the ability of Augustin Mrema to mobilize voters and not due to the deeper institutional roots of the party. Likewise the UDP party shows no sign of moving beyond a narrowly ethnic party. However with regard to CUF and especially Chadema, they have gradually improved the strength and national reach of their parties. Importantly, this has resulted in only marginal improvement in their vote-share.

_Electoral Coercion: Does CCM Force Its Way to Hegemony?_

While comparatively lower levels of electoral coercion are built into the definition of competitive hegemony, Tanzania’s opposition parties themselves repeatedly claim that their

---

46 Commonwealth 2010
failure in elections is primarily due to the issues of legal constraint, government repression, and electoral fraud.\textsuperscript{48} There is of course evidence to support this perspective, which will be discussed below. However, a closer analysis of the record of electoral coercion shows that opposition parties have not been subject to systematic repression (at least on mainland Tanzania) and that there actually have been improvements in the competitiveness of elections over time. This becomes especially clear when Tanzania is considered in comparison with the cases of Kenya and Cameroon, discussed in the next chapters, where opposition parties have endured blatant rigging, sweeping arrests, and even ethnic violence.\textsuperscript{49}

Opposition parties note the number of repressive laws that offer CCM a number of embedded advantages. For instance, the first-past-the-post electoral system itself is seen as beneficial to the incumbent (although this same system was in place in Kenya with obviously different results).\textsuperscript{50} However, while legislative seat allocation would have been different under a proportional representation system, it still would not reduce CCM’s seat-share below hegemonic levels, nor does it address CCM’s capacity to generate hegemonic presidential vote shares.\textsuperscript{51} It is also often pointed out that the Nyalali Commission of 1991 recommended the repeal of 40 pieces of legislation to prepare for multiparty elections.\textsuperscript{52} Yet the controversial Preventive Detention Act (1962), National Security Act (1970), Newspapers Act (1976), New Agency Act (1976), Societies Ordinance (1954), and Emergency Powers Act (1986) all remain on the books.\textsuperscript{53} These

\textsuperscript{48} Lipumba Interview; Mbowe Interview; John Nkolo (Secretary General UDP), 2010, Author Interview. This perspective has recently received more prominent focus in Hoffman & Robinson 2009
\textsuperscript{49} A similar evaluation of the comparatively less repressive environment in Tanzania can be found in Whitehead 2012
\textsuperscript{50} Bogaards 2000; Hoffman & Robinson 2009
\textsuperscript{51} In fact legislative and presidential vote shares are highly correlated. The most difference a PR system would have made was in 1995 when CCM won 80.2% of the seats with just 59.1% of the vote. In 2000 and 2005 CCM won 87%-88% of the seats with 68%-70% of the vote and in 2010 it won 77.8% of the seats with 63.4% of the vote.
\textsuperscript{52} Hyden 1999; Tripp 2000
\textsuperscript{53} Other pieces of legislation recommended for repeal by Nyalali largely addressed Tanzania’s penal code in an attempt to make it more congruent with global human rights standards.
allow the government to detain individuals indefinitely without trial, control the dissemination of information to the public, de-register civil society organizations, and regulate media by making publishers liable for material deemed seditious. More recently, the Tanzanian Broadcasting Act (1993) necessitates state licensing for private broadcasting and the Non-Governmental Organization Act (2003) requires NGOs to serve the public interest, defined purely in economic terms of poverty reduction.

A survey of the State Department Human Rights annual reports between 1995 and 2010 shows that outside of Zanzibar, mainland opposition has suffered sporadic repression. The two most prominent leaders to incur such measures have been Augustin Mrema and Ibrahim Lipumba. In 1999 Mrema was briefly arrested on sedition charges, and in 2001 arrested over his role in a 1996 mining accident. Similarly, Lipumba was arrested and beaten along with 50 other CUF members during a protest rally in Dar es Salaam in January 2001. Lipumba was later briefly detained in both July 2003 and December 2005. In total, there have been approximately sixteen other incidents of political arrest between 1995 and 2010. Most of these incidents occurred during opposition protests and rallies deemed illegal by the government, as for instance in November 1999 when 160 members of NCCR-M were arrested in front of the UN headquarters. On other occasions, there was opposition intimidation and arrests during by-elections in May 2004 in Moshi Rural (TLP members) and in October 2008 in Tarime (Chadema members). Apparently arbitrary arrests occurred in December 1999 when a regional chairman of Chadema, Walid Kaborou, was arrested and in May 2004 when several members of the Karatu branch of Chadema were arrested. Likewise, opposition parties have been denied organizational

---

54 Tripp 2000; Hoffman & Robinson 2009
permits, but not frequently or widespread throughout the country (only eight recorded incident in the State Department records).\textsuperscript{55}

With regard to media repression the evidence is again similar. During most years journalists on mainland Tanzania do report pressure to self-censure, and there have been well covered cases of media intimidation. Some newspapers have been suspended for short periods of time – the Rafiki in November 1995, the Majira in July 1999, the MwanaHilisi throughout 2008, and the Kulikoni and Leo Tena in January 2010. Similarly, nearly every other year there has been a case of either journalist arrest or violent intimidation. For instance, during the 2010 election the government threatened to shut down one of Tanzania’s most popular papers, the Mwananchi, for its negative coverage of the Kikwete administration.\textsuperscript{56} Still, the Tanzanian press ranks as one of the most open on the continent. In 2010 Reporters without Borders ranked Tanzania at 41, up significantly from its tanking of 62 in 2002 (and a much better ranking compared to Kenya and Cameroon).\textsuperscript{57}

A main area of concern for opposition parties is the fairness of the election itself and the impartiality of the National Election Commission (NEC). Appointment to the NEC is by the president and its finances are tied to the Prime Minister’s office.\textsuperscript{58} The NEC is the only institution in Tanzania that can process disputes over presidential election results. Returning officers who man the polling stations are predominantly public sector employees, and while opposition parties have been able to man stations with their own polling agents, they are often

\textsuperscript{55} U.S. Department of State. \textit{Tanzanian Human Rights Practices}, U.S. Department of State: Washington D.C. (Various Years). The other notable case of political detainment has involved Reverend Christopher Mtikila’s Democratic Party (DP) and his frequent arrests over the years. The DP was denied registration for its explicitly anti-Asian and anti-Islamic rhetoric and advocacy of separation between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar.

\textsuperscript{56} “Government Threatens to Ban Mwananchi” \textit{The Citizen} October 20, 2010

\textsuperscript{57} Reporters without Borders 2010

\textsuperscript{58} TEMCO 1996 p.137-138
unable to financially. All opposition parties have a deep-seated suspicion of the NEC and its capacity to fairly oversee elections.

One available source for evaluating electoral integrity in Tanzania is the reports of the Tanzanian Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), affiliated with the University of Dar es Salaam. TEMCO hires teams of observers that far exceed the capacity of any international group; monitoring the entire election process months in advance, and manning over 5,000 polling stations on voting day. This data should obviously be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism since TEMCO members are public sector employees from the university system, which might add an element of bias to their reporting. Still it is the best available source of information and has not shied away from making controversial statements like deeming the 2000 Zanzibar election as completely fraudulent. When combined with assessments from other observation groups they can help make judgments regarding electoral manipulation.\(^{59}\)

The reports indicate a number of persistent issues that come up every election. First, voter registration has been flawed due to the limited number of registration centers, some registration impropriety, poor maintenance of registration records, and several instances of voting day registration irregularities. Second, vote counting remains a controversial issue, especially at polling stations where opposition parties cannot ford a polling agent to certify results and during the transfer of ballot boxes. Result announcement has been delayed in a number of instances and certification procedures are not always followed to the letter of the law. However, several of these election irregularities have been attributed to the lack of resources and organizational capacity rather than malice intent. Government spending on elections has actually increased substantially from approximately 10 billion Tsh in 1995 to 30 billion Tsh in 2005, which has

helped remedy issues with the delivery of registration cards, delivery of voting materials, and staff training.

The NEC has also taken steps to improve the credibility of the election. For instance, in 2005 a permanent registry was created. Voter registration has increased from approximately 9 million in 1995 to 16 million in 2005 and 19 million in 2010. TEMCO reports also indicate that vote-counting has become more streamlined and systematized due to technical innovations like the incorporation of transparent ballot boxes and better training procedures. During the 1995 election several polling stations certified results and sealed those results in the physical ballot boxes, which allowed district officers to potentially disregard them. Counting at stations has likewise improved immensely (as has the opposition’s capacity to monitor elections through the use of new technology like cell phones in 2010).60

Again, this is not to argue that opposition parties in Tanzania are not subject to repression or that elections are completely free and fair. Rather it is meant to argue that in comparative terms, the degree of electoral coercion is lower and not systematic. Coercion appears to be much more sporadic or even strategic, targeting specific constituencies and elections rather than used as a tactic to win the election. What is clear is that CCM does not cheat itself to victory, but it marginally contributes to its hegemony.

Resource Asymmetry: Does CCM Outspend Its Way to Hegemony?

Related to the issue of electoral coercion is the issue of access to resources, notably finances and media, which can skew the electoral playing field in CCM’s direction. First, under single-party rule the line between government and party was essentially blurred, which has allowed CCM to utilize government institutions for campaign purposes. For example, it is not uncommon for district and regional commissioners to offer their resources to CCM candidates

---

60 By 2010 TEMCO gave an A grade to 68% of the nearly 5,000 polling stations it visited and a B grade to 30%.
such as vehicles or staff.\(^{61}\) In addition, public stadiums, sporting arenas, and even parking garages that were publically owned under single-party rule became CCM property. These resources are not as available to opposition parties, who are often forced to hold makeshift rallies in makeshift spaces.\(^{62}\)

Second, CCM has been able to secure much higher levels of financing to fund campaigns.\(^{63}\) During the 1995 election public subventions were granted to candidates that were fairly proportional and allocated in installments through the Prime Minister’s office (approximately $10,000 per presidential candidate and $1,000 per parliamentary candidate). However, following the opposition gains of 1995 (and accusations that the monies were misappropriated) the subvention was replaced with a public subsidy known as a *ruzuku*. The *ruzuku* is distributed according to the prior election result – half based on the party’s vote-share and half based on the party’s seat-share. In 2000, CCM received nearly 400 million Tsh in subsidies. By 2010 it received 2.3 billion Tsh, while Chadema received 750 million Tsh, CUF 150 million Tsh, and NCCR just 1.2 million Tsh.\(^{64}\)

In addition to public financing, CCM has been able to rely on its network of business contacts to make large undocumented contributions to the presidential campaign. In 1995 CCM apparently raised 17.5 billion Tsh from business interests, even though there was an official cap on campaign spending of 5 billion Tsh.\(^{65}\) In 2010 the cap on campaign spending was raised to 50 billion Tsh, and it was reported that CCM neared that ceiling.\(^{66}\) This unparalleled access to funds has allowed CCM to canvas the country with posters and billboards, bus people in for large and


\(^{62}\) Ibid

\(^{63}\) This is clearly evident just by observing billboards. No other party but CCM can afford huge billboards that line the main streets in Tanzanian cities.

\(^{64}\) TEMCO 2011 p.118

\(^{65}\) TEMCO 1996 p.113

\(^{66}\) TEMCO 2011 p.118
colorful rallies, and importantly distribute small tokens of patronage – usually in the form of CCM clothing, basic food staples, and at times outright cash contributions. However, opposition candidates have also been able to conduct nationwide campaigns and secure their own access to steady funding. This is done through two means – contributions from allied business elites and small grassroots donations at campaign events or through the internet and a cell phone payment service (called M-Pesa). In 1995, Augustin Mrema used his national prestige and support from the Chagga business community to travel to every region in Tanzania. CUF, through its ties to Pemba business interests (many of whom reside in Dar es Salaam) was able to send Ibrahim Lipumba around the country in 2000 and 2005. In 2005 and 2010 Chadema (which also has important financiers from the Chagga community) used a helicopter to tour the entire country. In 2010, Wilibrod kept a campaign schedule on par with Jakaya Kikwete and reportedly had a budget of over 5 billion Tsh.

Similar issues need to be addressed with regard to media coverage. CCM has enjoyed an unfair advantage through its manipulation of state-owned sources like Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD), Television Tanzania (TVT), and the newspapers Daily News and Sunday News. In addition, since 1992 an array of new private media has emerged that is at times highly partisan in its content and coverage. With regard to state-owned media in the past there has been a clear bias in favor of CCM. In 1995 and 2000 not a single opposition event was covered on RTD and very few on TVT. Similarly, private media in 1995 and 2000 was largely in favor of CCM –

---

67 Lipumba Interview; Mbowe Interview
68 Ibid
69 TEMCO 2001 p.79
70 Chadema national chair Freemon Mbowe is also a successful Tanzanian businessman who owns several hotels, nightclubs, touring companies, and even the national newspaper Tanzania Daima.
71 This is based on newspaper reporting and copies of Slaa’s campaign schedule from Chadema headquarters. On the other hand, the resource environment is much less conducive toward parliamentary candidate who have to raise their own finances and at time face much more robust CCM structures at the sub-national level.
72 TEMCO 2001 p.73-74
Radio Press Africa gave twice as much coverage to CCM than the opposition, Radio One three times, and Star TV seven times.\textsuperscript{73} Most blatant was ATV, owned by CCM supporter and parliamentary aspirant Abood Aziz who publically announced that his station would not cover any opposition party. ATV also became infamous for broadcasting graphic documentaries about African civil war and genocide that associated those events with opposition forces that disrupted national tranquility.\textsuperscript{74}

Since 2000 there has been marked improvement in media coverage, both public and private. In their report on media coverage in 2010, Synovate Research notes that public newspaper coverage reported nearly twice as much on CCM, and only reported negatively on Chadema and CUF. However, public radio coverage (still the most accessible form of media in Tanzania) devoted slightly more time to Chadema than CCM. Chadema also nearly tied CCM in TVT coverage. Private newspapers tend to be more partisan, but since 2000 the opposition has gained affiliated outlets. The papers Majira, Nipashe, and Uhuru are seen as affiliated with CCM, the papers Mwananchi, Tanzanian Daima (which is owned by Chadema national chair Freemon Mbowe) are affiliated with the opposition, and the Citizen and Guardian comparatively neutral. Similarly, parties in 2010 had their own affiliated radio stations, Radio One and Uhuru with CCM, Magic with opposition parties, and Clouds, Wapo, and RFA neutral. With regards to private television, ITV and ATV are still highly biased in their coverage toward CCM, but other stations are more balanced. Another indicator of the closing gap is the amount spent on advertisement in media in the month prior to the election. In 2010, while Chadema spent half as much as CCM did, it still amounted to a significant amount of approximately 2 billion Tsh.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid p.179
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid p.181
\textsuperscript{75} Synovate 2010
Resource asymmetry, more than the weak capacity of opposition parties or the coercive electoral environment, appears to be a much more significant hurdle for opposition parties. CCM is able to fund much larger campaigns and has sufficient resources to theoretically buy votes if necessary. However, once again the evidence suggests that this is not the determinative factor in explaining CCM’s hegemony. The electoral playing field, while still skewed, has leveled considerably and has not prevented opposition parties from launching nation-wide campaigns. With this improvement, CCM’s vote-share has remained hegemonic. Moreover, resource asymmetry cannot explain the regional pattern of CCM’s electoral support. Greater cash spending does not correlate with dominance across the country, and clearly CCM spending “buys” it more votes in some areas versus others. Finally, in comparison with Kenya and Cameroon, Tanzanian opposition parties are at an advantage due to their access to both public and private financing.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored how institutional investments under single-party rule into structural articulation and social robustness shaped the electoral arena and were central factors in explaining how a competitive hegemony is constructed. Elites in Tanzania have remained strongly bound to the party and CCM has shown remarkable resourcefulness and an ability to self-correct, even as the role of ideology has disappeared and corruption has become a central political issue. This chapter has also demonstrated how voters who were the primary recipients of early *ujamaa* investments have remained strongly allied with CCM, and has left the north much more amenable and demanding of opposition parties. CCM’s formal capacity to mobilize through its system of party cells and its large resource advantage might explain why it generally
garner strong voter support throughout the country, but it is the legacy of *ujamaa* that explains regional patterns of support.

Concurrently, the chapter has evaluated three central alternative explanations – the inherent weakness of Tanzania’s opposition parties, CCM’s use of fraud and repression, and CCM’s large resource advantage. This chapter has attempted to show the limitations of these arguments in explaining Tanzania’s competitive hegemony. In comparison with the other cases under study the opposition in Tanzania is at an advantage – they have fairly stable national parties, they do not incur blatant repression or electoral malfeasance (in fact electoral conditions have improved), and have been able to secure access to resources and media coverage. Still, this has not translated into corresponding electoral dividends. Even at their most competitive (in 1995 and 2010), CCM has still maintained two-thirds of the legislature and over 60% of the presidential vote-share. The failure of these approaches to pass significant hoop-tests bolsters the argument that CCM’s strong party capacity is the primary explanatory factor.
Chapter 8: The KANU and the Path to Repressive Electoral Authoritarianism

Between 1992 and 2002 KANU contested narrowly won elections with high levels of electoral coercion, eventually leading to its defeat at the polls by an opposition coalition known as the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)(Tables 8.1 and 8.2). This chapter links this outcome to KANU’s much weaker party capacity. As expected, during elections KANU could not maintain elite cohesion and elite defection was rampant, exacerbated by a succession crisis in 2002. Likewise, KANU could not rely on wide mobilization but instead had to count on its capacity to mobilize its affiliated ethnic communities. Consequently, electoral coercion was much higher and vote margins much slimmer. On the other hand, KANU was unable to benefit from factors that would allow it to shift toward a repressive hegemony as the CPDM did in Cameroon. This chapter argues that the repressive electoral authoritarian outcome was primarily due to the high level of Western linkage and leverage that kept the regime in perpetual economic and political crisis, while also empowering the opposition and putting direct pressure on Moi.

The transition to multiparty elections was pursued reluctantly by Moi. Political opposition was multifaceted and included a younger generation of mostly lawyers (known as the Young Turks), various church groups, and expelled KANU elites like Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, and Martin Shikuku (in addition to long-standing opposition figure Oginga Odinga). Moi’s reaction was heavy-handed. In February 1990, Foreign Minister Robert Ouko was found murdered, sparking rumors of political assassination. On July 4 1990, Matiba, Rubia and Odinga’s son Raila were detained under the Preservation of Public Security Act. Three days later an opposition rally was violently dispersed leaving over 20 people dead and 1,000 injured (called the Saba Saba protests). In August regime critic Bishop Alexander Muge was killed in a car
crash, again rumored to be politically motivated. In May 1991, Oginga Odina was arrested after attempting to register a new political party (The National Democratic Party).  

These developments, compounded by a severe economic downturn and continental political changes, brought further pressures upon Moi and KANU. Already in June 1990, Moi had appointed Vice-President George Saitoti to seek ways to reform KANU and limit the public’s outrage. This led to the end of the queuing system and 70% primary rule, created a new KANU disciplinary committee, ended party expulsion, and created the position of KANU Vice-Chairman. But, by mid-1991 the opposition had unified and founded the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD). FORD, explicitly a forum and not a political party, arranged a number of mass rallies throughout 1991. Foreign pressure also stepped up when in September 1991 the entire Paris Club suspended balance of payments support for six months. Later that year KANU held a special delegates conference and repealed Section 2(a) of the constitution, paving the way for elections the following December.  

Table 8.1: Kenyan Presidential Election Results (1992-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KANU</th>
<th>FORD-A</th>
<th>DP</th>
<th>FORD-K</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Daniel arap Moi (36.35%)</td>
<td>Kenneth Matiba (26%)</td>
<td>Mwai Kibaki (19.45%)</td>
<td>Odinga (17.48%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4 candidates (0.71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Daniel arap Moi (40.12%)</td>
<td>Martin Shikuku (0.6%)</td>
<td>Mwai Michael Kibaki (31.09%)</td>
<td>Waimalwa Odinga (8.29)</td>
<td>(10.92%)</td>
<td>10 candidates (9.58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Kenyatta Uhuru (31.32%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Kibaki (62.20%)*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3 candidates (6.48%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Member of the NARC coalition


1 See Chege 1994; Hornsby 2012; and Throup & Hornsby 1998. I have benefitted enormously from the work of David Throup and Charles Hornsby and their detailed history of multiparty Kenya. Their 1998 account is nearly a day-by-day record of events.

2 Ibid
Table 8.2: Kenyan Parliamentary Election Results (1992-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>100 (53.2%)</td>
<td>107 (51%)</td>
<td>64 (30.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORD-K</td>
<td>31 (16.5%)</td>
<td>17 (8.1%)</td>
<td>21 (10%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORD-A</td>
<td>31 (16.5%)</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>23 (12.2%)</td>
<td>39 (18.6%)</td>
<td>39 (18.6%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>21 (10%)</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>15 (7.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORD-P</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>3 (1.4%)</td>
<td>14 (6.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPK</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>6 (2.9%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>59 (28%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>3 (1.6%)</td>
<td>7 (3.3%)</td>
<td>5 (2.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Member of the NARC coalition

The Crumbling Party: Elite Defection and Succession in KANU

As expected, and in stark contrast with CCM’s experience, after the legalization of opposition parties elite defection was widespread. The historic weakness of KANU’s governing institutions, the sense of independence inculcated by Kenyatta, and the much starker ethnic identity of the party made for an untenable situation, only exacerbated by Moi’s attempt to enforce party discipline. In December 1991, the majority of KANU local infrastructure from Central and Nyanza Provinces defected in droves to FORD. In Murang’a District alone 100 local KANU leaders defected, citing disenchantment “with the utter confusion and contradictions in the entire leadership of KANU”. At the national level, among these early defectors were prominent KANU members like the party’s national chairman Peter Oloo-Aringo, who just a few weeks earlier had expressed his own skepticism of multipartyism. Oloo-Aringo departed KANU along with Minister for Manpower Development Njoroge Mungai, former Vice-President Josephat Karanja, and Chief Secretary of the Civil Service Geoffrey Kariithi.

4 Hornsby 2012p.478
5 The Weekly Standard January 10, 1992

189
A second wave followed Mwai Kibaki, who defected from KANU in December 1991 to form the Democratic Party (DP). Kibaki, the recently resigned Vice-President and one of the most prominent Kikuyu in government since independence, initially maintained hope that internal reform within KANU might work and continued to hold on to a group of Kikuyu moderates within the party. Yet opposition from Moi’s Kalenjin inner circle and the dissolution of an inquiry commission into the death of Robert Ouko precipitated Kibaki’s resignation. The defection of Kibaki was the opening that many remaining Kikuyu within KANU were waiting for. In the two weeks after Christmas the Kikuyu establishment of Nyeri, Kiambu, and Kirinyaga Districts joined the DP. On December 27, former cabinet minister Paul Ngei resigned, also citing the unresolved murder of Robert Ouko and the rigged elections of 1983 and 1988. Two days later the Minister for Science and Technology George Muhoho resigned, along with the Assistant Minister for Cooperative Development and former Moi ally Njenga Karume, and Assistant Minister for Agriculture John Gachui. In addition, several non-Kikuyu like Eliud Mwamunga, Kyale Mwendwa and John Keen also defected to the DP.

Defections from KANU continued throughout the year, and picked up during the primary season in November 1992. The DP began to make some inroads into the Kalenjin and Kisii areas in May and June with the defection of Kisii’s James Nyamweya and Keiyo’s Charles Murgor. During the three weeks after the dissolution of parliament on October 21, 1992 ten-percent of KANU’s parliament defected. These included one minister, seven assistant ministers, and the

---

6 Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report December 26, 1991
7 Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report January 6, 1992. These early defections were at times temporary. For instance, Njoroge Mungai discovered early on that he would not be able to contest office as a member of FORD. Facing financial bankruptcy, Moi welcomed him back to KANU 5 weeks after his defection. Relatedly, Moi utilized the financial despair of some potential defectors to keep them in KANU as in the case of Arthur Magugu and Julius Kiano (Throup & Hornsby 1998 p.186).
8 Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report December 27, 1991
9 Hornsby 2012 p.488
10 Ibid p.488-499
KANU chief whip. Fourteen Kikuyu MPs defected to the DP, two to the FORD-A party and two to the FORD-K party. This spelled the end of KANU’s association with the Kiambu District, leaving only Arthur Magugu in the party. Defections were not limited to Central Province either. Thirteen MPs defected form Nyanza, Western, and North-Eastern Provinces including known KANU figures like Onyango Midika (MP Kisumu), Job Omino (MP Kisumu Town), Ochola Ogur (MP Nyatike), Bahati Semo (MP Vihima) and Seth Lugonzo (MP Ikolomani). Among the Kamba community of Eastern Province Kyale Mwendwa, Josephat Mulyungi, Joseph Munyao, Jonesmus Kikuyu, Frederick Kalulu, Paul Sumbi, Agnes Ndetei, and Joseph Kiliku defected.11

The primary season witnessed yet another wave of defections from KANU. Amidst allegations of rigging, the KANU Appeals Tribunal ordered new primary elections in 43 constituencies; however the order was overturned by the KANU Secretary-General.12 Consequently, while only 12 of 75 defeated incumbents defected (largely from Kisii), non-incumbent defection was substantial.13

Between its narrow 1992 victory and the 1997 election, KANU was able to recoup some lost ground. KANU was assisted by the growing fractionalization of the opposition as well as improved economic conditions (see below). Splits within the FORD party had already led to a significant break prior to the 1992 election into the FORD-Asili (FORD-A) and FORD-Kenya (FORD-K) parties. The FORD-A, also divided by leadership disagreements between Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, and Martin Shikuku, saw defections of its Luhya supporters back to KANU. In the DP, several of the non-Kikuyu leadership like John Keen and Eliud Mwamunga returned to KANU.14 Simultaneously, Kenya also had a modest economic recovery between

11 Throup & Hornsby p.296-298
12 Ibid p.312-313
13 Ibid p.332-333
14 Hornsby 2012 p.545-546
1994 and 1996, made possible due to the restoration of foreign aid, but also some important reforms to the public sector. While between 1991 and 1993 real GDP per capita declined, between 1994 and 1996 there was on average 2% growth.\textsuperscript{15} Likewise, inflation rates fell from their peak of nearly 50% in 1994 to below 5% by the end of 1995.

Although the period between 1992 and 1997 did not witness the same bleeding as before, it was still marked by severe internal factionalism within KANU. As expected given the absence of any institutional mechanism the issue of succession lurked in the background. These divisions were publically headlined as a rivalry between the KANU A and KANU B groups. The former represented a more moderate and reform-minded group of KANU leaders like Simeon Nyachae, William ole Ntimama, Musalia Mudavadi, and Kalonzo Musyoka, while the latter reflected the hardline wing of the party with figures like Nicholas Biwott (a long-standing Moi ally and suspect in the Ouko murder) and George Saitoti. KANU A also reflected a faction of the party that wanted to see a broader alliance with other minority groups like the Kisii, Luo, and the Luhya, while KANU B embodied a faction that was more prone to entice the Kikuyu back into the party. As tensions publically increased and the KANU A faction called for new party elections, Moi equivocated by returning Biwott to the cabinet and demoting Ntimama and Nyachae, but later asking publicly for forgiveness from them.\textsuperscript{16} Likewise, the equivocation between KANU A and KANU B caused tensions within the multifaceted Kalenjin community and its smaller allied communities (Kipsigis, Masaai, Kamba, Kisii).\textsuperscript{17} Ultimately, national party elections were not held to avoid bringing several of these issues to the fore.

Subsequently there were some significant defections during this period, especially following another contentious primary season. Approximately 800 candidates competed in the

\textsuperscript{15} World Bank Indicators; Hornsby 2012 p.561
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid p.582-583
\textsuperscript{17} Ajulu 2001; Steeves 1998
primary, 190 changed parties during the primary, and of those 100 were defections from KANU to the opposition.\textsuperscript{18} Once again some prominent and long-standing KANU politicians abandoned the party. Specifically, Assistant Minister for Supplies David Mwenje defected from Embakasi in Nariobi. In Coastal Province, Suleiman Rashid defected to the small Shirikisho Party of Kenya (SPK), and Emmanuel Karisa Maitha from Kisauni to the DP. In Eastern Province, Kyalo Kaindi defected to the Social Democratic Party (SDP). In the Rift Valley there was rumor of a large Maasai defection in Kajiado, yet only Samson ole Tuya and Gideon Konchela left for the DP. Other defections in the Rift Valley were Taaita Towett’s to the Party of Independent Candidates (PICK), Kimunai Soi to the SDP, Kimtarus Kirior and Frederick Chesereck to DP, and Peter Ejore to FORD-K. In Nyanza, where KANU support was virtually non-existent Protus Kebati Momanyi defected to the DP. In Western Province, more important Luhya figures like Charles Gimos and former director of the party’s woman and youth section Julia Ojiambo defected to FORD-K.\textsuperscript{19}

By the 2002 election, the growing tensions over succession finally took their toll. Moi’s commitment to succession was ostensible, but there were still significant doubts of whether he actually would cede power or try to amend the constitution.\textsuperscript{20} The challenge was that in addition to the fact that there was no clear process for selecting a successor Moi did not have a natural Kalenjin heir. Key allies like Nicholas Biwott or his own son Gideon Moi were widely opposed. The first crack occurred in 1999 when Simeon Nyachae, a Kisii and potential successor, defected with the majority of the Kisii support to the FORD-P.\textsuperscript{21} The second crack occurred when an alliance was formed between KANU and Raila Odinga’s party the National Development Party

\textsuperscript{18} Hornsby 2001 p.2000
\textsuperscript{19} Momanyi had defected in 1992 and then returned to KANU. This was his second defection reflecting the opportunistic attitude most MPs viewed KANU with.
\textsuperscript{20} Ajulu 2001; Kanyinga 2003; Ndegwa 2003; Steeves 1997
\textsuperscript{21} Hornsby 2012 p.626-664
This alliance, which later became an official merger, sent ripples throughout the KANU leadership over the issue of succession. One way to appease the growing concerns was to amend the KANU constitution to allow four vice-chairs (similar to Kenyatta’s 9 vice-chairs), filled by Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya), Paul Ngala (Mjikenda), Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba), and Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu), while Luo Raila Odinga became the party Secretary General. This left Maasai and standing Vice-president George Saitoti on the sidelines as the main loser in the succession battle.\textsuperscript{22}

The third and decisive crack happened when Moi opted to groom Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor (commonly referred to as “Project Uhuru”). Kenyatta, the son of first president Jomo Kenyatta, was seen by Moi as a consensus figure that could deliver Central Province in the election, and also had the support of most of the Kalenjin establishment. On July 28, 2002 Moi announced that Kenyatta would be his successor, without going through any party channels, and took him on a national promotional tour. This precipitated a strong reaction from the other KANU leaders who demanded free elections for selecting KANU’s presidential candidate. Seven potential presidential candidates, including the four KANU vice-chairmen and George Saitoti, toured the country as the “Rainbow Alliance” pushing for institutional reform within KANU. Moi reacted with a combination of carrots and sticks that split the Rainbow Coalition down the middle, leading to Saitoti’s defection. On October 13, 2002, the remaining Rainbow Alliance (consisting of Raila Odinga, William ole Ntimama, Moody Awori, and Kalonzo Musyoka)
defected from the party. Consequently, as in 1992 local party organization defected en masse along ethnic lines. Once again, nearly the entire Luo community brought in by Odinga left.

It has been argued that Moi miscalculated with his choice of Uhuru Kenyatta. Yet, the fact remains that any choice would have likely caused rifts in the party. In another sense, the 2002 election was similar to the succession from Kenyatta to Moi, only that this time the opportunity to defect was available for discontented elites. All of this simply highlights the weak sources of elite cohesion that KANU possessed as a political party, which facilitated high levels of defection. Defectors often expressed very little loyalty to KANU as an institution, often expressing their disappointment in party life and the dominance of the executive. Musikari Kombo, a former KANU member and one of the founders of FORD-K expresses this sentiment succinctly “KANU was like an overcrowded small hut in the rain. It was under the clutch of one individual – a personalistic style of politics. Moi would ask you to jump and you would respond ‘how high?’”

**Ethnicity Triumphs: The Narrow Social Coalition of KANU**

The second central implication of KANU’s much weaker party capacity is that it should generally face a mobilization challenge due its weaker party infrastructure, but also that it should have trouble mobilizing widely conceived social constituencies. By most accounts, a key driving factor behind Kenya’s three elections between 1992 and 2002 has been the role of ethnic mobilization. In fact, while unarguably violence and fraud as well as opposition disunity played a

---

23 Brown 2004; Hornsby 2012 p.679; Kanyinga 2003. The Rainbow Coalition took over the defunct LDP party as their platform. They later entered into negotiations with the National Alliance of Kenya to form the NARC coalition to contest the 2002 election.

24 Hornsby 2012 p.683. Additional defections included cabinet minister Joseph Nyagah and former Kalenjin insider Mark arap Too. Musalia Mudavadi, who had expressed his desire to run for president, explains his decision to stay in KANU as due to a feeling of familial loyalty, since his father Moses Mudavadi had come up in the party with Moi at independence (Musalia Mudavadi (Deputy Prime-Minister), 2012, Author Interview)

25 Hornsby 2012; Mudavadi Interview 2012

26 Musikari Kombo (FORD-K Founding Member), 2012, Author Interview
role, it was KANU’s ability to acutely manipulate ethnic differences that allowed it to win by narrow margins in 1992 and 1997.\(^{27}\) As Charles Hornsby suggests, “the ethnic sensitivities that had underlain politics in the single-party era became overt and self-reinforcing”.\(^{28}\) KANU relied on a narrow coalition put in place by Moi and based on the prominent role afforded the Kalenjin community and other smaller allied groups (parts of the Luhya, the Maasai, Somali, Kisii, and Mjikenda). By doing so, and despite KANU’s later attempts to forge a wider alliance, election results were quite stark – KANU essentially relinquished any support from the Luo and Kikuyu communities, thus depriving it of nearly 40% of the electorate.

As Figure 8.1 shows, voting patterns in Kenya followed very distinct regional patterns that largely mimic the ethnic coalition put into place by Moi. In fact, as David Throup and Charles Hornsby note KANU’s vote-shares in 1992 coincide almost precisely with KADU’s vote shares in the 1963 election.\(^{29}\) KANU support is essentially peripheral and concentrated in the Rift Valley and North-East Provinces, as well as parts of Eastern and Coast Provinces. Looking at provincial averages KANU presidents averaged 63% of the vote in Rift Valley, 73% of the vote in North-East, and 54% of the vote in Coast. By contrast, in Central Province the average KANU presidential vote-share has been 13%, in Nyanza it has been 15%, and in Nairobi 19%. In the other provinces of Eastern and Western the KANU presidential vote-share has averaged 35%.

This provides for a stark contrast with Tanzania, where even in its weakest areas of vote-share it still mustered nearly half the vote. This indicates that there are two processes at play here – the absence of robust social constituencies to mobilize and the absence of formal institutional mechanisms of mobilization. Indeed, it is unclear what sort of party infrastructure KANU

\(^{27}\) See Ajulu 2002; Elischer 2008; and Steeves 1997;  
\(^{28}\) Hornsby 2012 p.503  
\(^{29}\) Throup & Hornsby 1998
actually had on the ground between 1992 and 2002. As noted above, the sub-national party infrastructure itself defected from Central and Nyanza provinces. According to individuals previously and currently involved with KANU, the party owned property in every district, but not necessarily buildings. Moreover, there were very few assets below the branch level (which corresponded loosely with constituency and was formally the lowest level of the party). Most party activity took place at the district-level.\textsuperscript{30} Rather, the party relied heavily (as it did under single-party rule) on the personal popularity of its candidates and their financial wherewithal.

**Figure 8.1: Average KANU Presidential Vote Share by District (1992-2002)**

![Average KANU Presidential Vote Share by District](image)

**Source:** The Institute for Education in Democracy 2003; Throup & Hornsby 1998; *The Weekly Standard* January 9, 1998

The ethnic basis of vote-share in Kenya is also strongly substantiated through statistical analysis. Table 8.3 reports the results of an OLS regression that tests socio-economic indicators (similar to those available for the Tanzania case-study), the average number of opposition parties

---

\textsuperscript{30} Nick Salat (Secretary-General, KANU), 2012, Author Interview; Job Waka (Organizational Director, KANU), 2012, Author Interview. Since KANU’s defeat in 2002, the party was forced to abandon its headquarters at the Kenyatta Conference Center. In the process, much of KANU’s record-keeping from 1992-2002 has been lost. As a result these assessments are based on property records shared by KANU with the author and personal interviews.
competing, and the majority ethnic makeup of a district against the average KANU presidential vote-share.\textsuperscript{31} The final model also reports whether that district was won by KADU during the 1963 legislative election. When just testing for socio-economic factors, there is very little evidence that this mattered in explaining vote-share. Only the role of poverty has some statistical significance, but very little substantive impact (an approximately 0.5% increase in KANU vote-share for every 1% increase in the poverty headcount). Likewise, adding the average number of opposition parties to the regression makes no statistical or substantive difference. As will be discussed below, this is to be expected given the weak basis of opposition parties in Kenya.

However, when adding data on the ethnic composition of districts the results actually become over-determined ($r^2=0.61$). For clarity and comparison purposes Model 5 excludes the category of Kalenjin and drops the insignificant and unsubstantial variables. In Kikuyu and Luo districts the average KANU vote-share is approximately 54% lower than in a Kalenjin district. Also noteworthy is that other ethnic communities were also likely to vote much less for KANU than in Kalenjin-dominated districts. The Luhya districts do show a substantive but insignificant effect, likely reflecting the split within the Luhya community between its KANU and opposition supporters. In addition, when adding ethnic composition some of the influence of socio-economic indicators changes – the role of poverty is eliminated but the role of population density becomes more substantive and meaningful. Population density, at least in this case, might be a better indicator of rural settlement than the definition in the Kenyan census. Finally, as expected KADU-won districts exude substantive statistical significance and are a strong indicator of KANU vote-share between 1992 and 2002. This significance disappears once the role of

\textsuperscript{31} As with Tanzania a number of outliers were uncovered during post-estimation and removed from the final results. These are the three highly urban districts of Nairobi, Mombassa, and Kisumu.
ethnicity is incorporated (not reported), highlighting the fact that the ethnic alignments of independence-era Kenya have simply not shifted much in the years since independence.

Delving a bit deeper into the role of ethnicity Figure 8.2 divides Kenya into five overarching “types” identified by Throup and Hornsby. First are the homogenous “ethnic homelands,” where parties could rely on extensive kinship support – the Kalenjin in parts of the Rift Valley, the Kikuyu in parts of Central Province, and the Luo in Nyanza. Second are the “allied territories, which depending on the specific group were more or less likely to change votes. For instance, the Meru of Central Province are ethnically related to the Kikuyu and therefore strongly allied, while KANU could supposedly rely on the persistent support of the Somali tribes of North-East Province and the Mjikenda of the Coast. Third, there are areas where competition was essentially within the opposition, as in parts of Central Province where the Kikuyu split the vote. Fourth are “ethnic borderlands,” where multiple ethnic groups had settled and often erupted into violence over issues of land. Finally there are the smaller “swing communities” of the Kisii, Kamba, and parts of the Luhya where loyalties were much more fluid.
Table 8.3: OLS Regression of Average KANU District Presidential Vote-Share (1992-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV=Avg. KANU Presidential Vote-Share</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5 (Kalenjin Excluded)</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Population Rural</td>
<td>0.0304</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Literacy Rate</td>
<td>0.0783</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>3.566</td>
<td>4.290</td>
<td>2.544</td>
<td>-1.151</td>
<td>3.980</td>
<td>-5.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>0.550**</td>
<td>0.538**</td>
<td>0.406*</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.332*</td>
<td>0.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headcount</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Number Opposition Parties</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>-22.48**</td>
<td>-30.24***</td>
<td>-53.72***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td></td>
<td>(7.391)</td>
<td>(7.378)</td>
<td>(8.161)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td></td>
<td>-33.05***</td>
<td>-56.15***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>(5.480)</td>
<td>(6.225)</td>
<td>(14.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADU 1963</td>
<td></td>
<td>-18.18</td>
<td>(14.04)</td>
<td>(17.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>30.05</td>
<td>26.40</td>
<td>44.56**</td>
<td>54.25***</td>
<td>80.17***</td>
<td>41.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r²</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

It is these essential facts that also drove KANU’s campaign strategy. Between 1992 and 1997 KANU aimed to retain the support of the swing communities and intimidate the mixed ethnic communities. As noted later, prior to the 1992 election tribal clashes occurred in nearly every district where the Kalenjin bordered with other ethnic groups. Simultaneously Moi reached out to figures like Simeon Nyacahae of the Kisii by returning him to a ministerial position.32 For the 1997 election the strategy was similar. Electoral boundaries were redrawn to create 26 new constituencies, largely along ethnic lines, that in a sense finished the forced ethnic cleansing of 1992.33 On the other hand, Moi lost a large number of supporters from the Kamba community in Eastern Province when Charity Ngilu ran for president on the SDP ticket. Consequently, Moi was only able to retain approximately 30% of the community’s support. The elevation of Musalia Mudavadi as the finance minister during this period was also a factor that kept Luhya support during the 1997 election.

32 Hornsby 2012 p.492-497
33 Hornsby 2012 p.586-612
The persistent non-hegemonic electoral outcome was due to Moi’s inability to expand his coalition to the Luo and Kikuyu.\textsuperscript{34} Ultimately, KANU’s mere survival hinged upon Moi’s capacity to maintain the support of his own Kalenjin and their narrow circle of allies. By 2002, this ability was no longer there. The expectation was that by elevating Uhuru Kenyatta, KANU would be able to garner the support of a large proportion of the Kikuyu. Instead, the gains from the Kikuyu were completely offset by losses from Moi’s own Kalenjin. Moreover, by the 2002 election KANU had lost the support of some of the important swing communities. The Kisii largely followed the defection of Simeon Nyachae to FORD-P while the Kamba continued to depart, this time following Kalonzo Musyoka to the NARC. Two other critically allied groups also left KANU in 2002 – the Maasai and Mjikenda. Both had been the targets of ethnic violence over land disputes in years prior that went largely unaddressed by KANU (see below). The shift among the Maasai was further facilitated by the defection of George Saitoti. These changes along ethnic groups are summarized in Table 8.4 and serve to highlight the narrow constituencies that KANU was forced to rely upon and the path that led to its ultimate defeat at the polls.

### Table 8.4: KANU Presidential Vote-Share by Ethnic Community and Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>+25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhyia</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>+1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>+10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mjikenda</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>-46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maasai</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>-30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Hornsby 2012; the Institute for Education in Democracy 2003; Throup & Hornsby 1998; *the Weekly Standard* January 9, 1998

\textsuperscript{34} Already in 1997 Moi returned the following Kikuyu into KANU and government – Philip Ndegwa, John Kariuki, Stanley Githunguri, Joseph Kamotho, GG Kariuki, and Kuria Kanyingi (Steeves 1997 p.42-43).
Why No Hegemony? Opposition Capacity, Electoral Coercion, and Western Leverage

The first part of this chapter has argued that KANU’s weak party capacity was the main factor explaining why it transitioned to a repressive electoral authoritarian regime. The other relevant question is why KANU was unable to regain dominance as the CPDM did in Cameroon? What prevented KANU from enticing back defected elites or from co-opting opposition parties? In this second part of the chapter I look at the role of opposition capacity, electoral coercion, and Western linkage and leverage. I argue that generally Kenyan opposition parties were extremely weak entities but there were notable improvements in the ability of opposition parties to contest, and that electoral coercion had declined over election cycles. However, the main factor that largely shaped both of these other variables was the high degree of Western leverage and linkage.

Opposition Capacity: The Comparative Weakness of Kenya’s Opposition Parties

The unification of forces under the Rainbow Coalition in 2002 was a remarkable moment in Kenyan and African history that sealed the fate of an already crumbling regime.\textsuperscript{35} It is even more impressive considering the apparent institutional weakness the opposition had presented prior to 2002. Over the course of ten years Kenya’s opposition parties were notorious for their proclivity toward fragmentation, elite defection, and narrow ethnic mobilization. Compared to Tanzania, Kenya’s opposition parties were much less institutionalized and at times exhibited detrimental decision-making. This is strong evidence that the inability of KANU to establish electoral hegemony is not due to the inherent strength of the opposition, but due to the weakness of its party capacity. However, on the other hand some specific factors mattered like the relative lack of co-optation by KANU and the opposition’s persistent participation in elections.

\textsuperscript{35} Barkan 2004; Brown 2003; Hornsby 2012; Ndegwa 2003; Steeves 1997
The initial Kenyan opposition movement, FORD, represented a broad alliance of the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya. While it enjoyed extensive popular support it was clearly beset by divisions from its inception. The first division was generational between its founding group of veteran statesmen (Oginga Odinga, Kenneth Matiba, Musinde Muliro, and Martin Shikuku) and a younger generation of academics and lawyers, or the “Young Turks” (Paul Muite, Peter Anyang’Nyong’o, James Orengo, and Gitobu Imanyara). The second division was ethnic and ideological, exemplified by the more radical redistributive politics of Oginga Odinga versus the more conservative position of Kenneth Matiba.

Tensions between Odinga and Matiba led to an untenable situation, whereby in August 1992 both were operating competing party headquarters – the Agip House with Odinga and the Muthithi House with Matiba (who had actually spent a majority of this period under hospital care in London). By October both sides agreed to re-register as new parties – FORD-K under Odinga and FORD-A under Matiba. Ostensibly, the major dispute within FORD was over the process by which an eventual presidential candidate would be selected (known as Section 13 of the FORD constitution). In reality, the constitutional disagreement brought to the fore all the major divisions within the movement. The majority of Young Turks sided with FORD-K, which also held Luhya elder statesman Musinde Muliro and the younger Kikuyu Paul Muite. By contrast, FORD-A was largely devoid of Luo but had stronger representation from the Kikuyu through ties with Matiba and the Luhya through Martin Shikuku.

---

36 Branch 2011 p.208; Hornsby 2012 p.488
37 From various interviews with Young Turks and older politicians from FORD it is evident that there was even dispute over whom actually founded FORD – whether it was the Young Turks inviting the older politicians to participate or vice-versa. In particular Martin Shikuku is highlighted as someone who helped sideline the Young Turks from prominent positions of power in late 1991.
38 In particular, Paul Muite suggested that the FORD constitution be changed to have the Annual Delegates Conference nominate the presidential candidate rather than a direct election at the branch level, citing the lack of resources FORD had to launch a countrywide primary.
The 1992 split was merely the prelude to persistent opposition fragmentation. With KANU’s victory, the perception within FORD-K was that Muide had failed to deliver the Kikuyu vote in Central Province and that Odinga was making overtures toward the KANU government. The Kikuyu faction left the party in late 1993 after facing pressure from Odinga’s son Raila and Muliro’s successor Michael Wamalwa.\(^{39}\) Oginga Odinga’s death in January 1994 fueled further rivalries between Raila and Wamalwa over leadership of the party. Once again, during the party elections of April 1995 two slates of candidates were elected and Raila Odinga left FORD-K to form the National Development Party (NDP).\(^{40}\) This left FORD-K as mostly a Luhya party and the NDP as a predominately Luo party. Nor were other parties immune to leadership tensions. Disputes in FORD-A between Martin Shikuku and the ailing Kenneth Matiba precipitated a massive defection of the Luhya back to KANU.\(^{41}\) In 1997 Matiba left FORD-A to form the Saba Saba Asili party while other FORD-A members left to form the new FORD-People party.\(^{42}\)

The other major opposition party, the DP, was not initially perceived as an ethnic coalition party, but as a distinctly Kikuyu party and especially formed for discarded KANU leaders.\(^{43}\) The power struggles within the various FORD parties ultimately benefitted the DP, which attracted more KANU defectors in 1992 than FORD did. The DP was also able to gather some support from a major swing community, the Kamba, by attracting national figures like Charity Ngilu. However, by 1996 the party had lost 11 national figures back to KANU and found itself in a deep financial hole. In 1997 Ngilu left the party to contend the presidency on the SDP ticket (along with former FORD-K Young Turk Peter Anyang’Nyong’o).\(^{44}\) While the DP was the

\(^{39}\) Hornsby 2012 p.545-546; \textit{The Weekly Standard} January 24, 1993
\(^{40}\) \textit{The Weekly Standard} June 9, 1995; \textit{The Weekly Standard} December 1, 1995
\(^{41}\) Steeves 1997 p.40; Hornsby 2012 p.546 \textit{The Weekly Standard} December 1, 1995
\(^{42}\) Hornsby 2012 p.601-602
\(^{43}\) Branch 2011 p.208; Hornsby 2012 p.488
\(^{44}\) Hornsby 2012 p.594
only party to survive and actually improve its legislative gains, these advances were limited entirely to Central Province, the Kikuyu regions of the Rift Valley, and Nairobi.\(^{45}\)

The frequent fragmentation and the logic of ethnic mobilization also translated into much weaker physical infrastructure. Figure 8.3 reports the same party institutionalization score used to assess Tanzania’s opposition parties. The caveat is that the 2002 election is excluded for all parties except FORD-A, since it is difficult to ascertain what party candidates were actually running on due to the NARC coalition (data is by district, grouped by province). What the data show is that no party had much infrastructure in the KANU strongholds in the Rift Valley and North-East, with the exception of the DP in districts with a Kikuyu majority. Outside of the Rift Valley parties had big gaps in the extent of their infrastructure based on their respective ethnic bases. FORD-K clearly led in the Luhya strong Western Province but lacked capacity in Central and Eastern Provinces. Correspondingly, the DP lacked infrastructure in Western and Nyanza, but maintained strong capacity in Central and Eastern where it could rely on the Kikuyu and their allied ethnic communities. Raila Odinga’s NDP was most explicitly a party of the Luo in Nyanza. Only the FORD-A kept the most nationwide institutional structure, but this capacity was intermittent (averages below 1). One further notable trend is that most opposition parties also maintained institutional capacity in the Coast Province, which as mentioned was a key ethnic community that defected to the opposition in 2002.

---

\(^{45}\) Party fragmentation continued up to the 2002 election. Raila Odinga’s NDP would later dissipate and merge with KANU, but Odinga would later use the small Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as his platform once he defected. Charity Ngilu would later leave the SDP to form the National Party of Kenya (NPK). There were also a number of other smaller parties formed by factions of the major opposition parties. These include Paul Muite’s Safina and James Orengo’s Muungano wa Mageuzi (United Movement for Change).
Figure 8.3- Opposition Party Institutionalization Index

Source: Hornsby 2012; the Institute for Education in Democracy 2003; Throup & Hornsby 1998; the Weekly Standard January 9, 1998
Given the narrow ethnic basis of opposition parties, cooperation became a much more important factor if the opposition hoped to topple KANU. As in Tanzania, it is also possible to look at the impact of opposition legislative coordination (or lack of coordination) upon the number of ballots that are potentially or actually spoiled (Table 8.5). Coordination between parties over legislative seats appears to decrease when the regime itself seemed more vulnerable as in 1992 and 2002. In comparison with Tanzania, the number of potentially, but especially actually spoiled ballots, is considerably higher. However unlike in Tanzania, despite this poor record of coordination the incumbent KANU was unable to establish electoral hegemony. Once again, the weakness of Kenya’s opposition appears to help explain why KANU was able to survive for two election cycles, but not why the regime was forced to contest narrower vote-shares to begin with.

Table 8.5: Potentially and Actually Spoiled Ballots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Potentially Spoiled Ballots</th>
<th>Actually Spoiled Ballots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>41 (21.8%)</td>
<td>20 (10.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>39 (18.5%)</td>
<td>15 (2.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>37 (17.6%)</td>
<td>14 (6.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Potentially spoiled = Incumbent wins with less than 60% of the vote and there is more than one party contesting; actually spoiled = Incumbent wins with less than 50% of the vote

On the other hand two important factors differentiate Kenya’s opposition parties from others under similarly repressive conditions – the absence of electoral boycotts and co-optation. With the exception of Raila Odinga and the NDP, no opposition party joined government or formed an official alliance with KANU. Likewise, every major opposition party continued to participate in elections, despite pressures from within the movement to boycott. For instance, during the 1992 election cycle both FORD and the DP threatened to boycott the election multiple times, and even considered boycotting the results and refusing to take their seats. In 1997, Kenneth Matiba and his new party Saba Saba Asili controversially boycotted the 1997 election.
over the lack of constitutional reform, but by that time the party had lost most of its significance compared to FORD-K, DP, and NDP.\footnote{This decision is attributed by some members of FORD-A as one of the main reasons for its decline (Kathangu Interview).}

In fact, the formation of the NARC coalition and the defeat of KANU in 2002 were to a large extent derivative of KANU’s failed efforts at co-optation. As noted, in June 2001, Raila Odinga and the NDP joined the KANU government and in March 2002 the parties officially merged (unofficially referred to as New KANU). While the opposition had held informal talks for years over the possibility of an opposition coalition, the merger between KANU and NDP was the necessary impetus that led to more serious formal negotiations, which in fact began just a few days after Odinga was made a cabinet secretary.\footnote{Arriola 2012 p.195; Ndegwa 2003 p.151-152} With the Luo apparently firmly in KANU’s corner, this made it very likely that KANU would be able to win the 2002 election, and much more decisively than in 1997.\footnote{Hornsby 2012 p.679} In January 2002 the DP, FORD-K, and NPK created the National Alliance for Change (NAC) as a platform for opposition coordination, which also involved several civil society organizations that pledged to support a unified presidential candidate.\footnote{Ibid 672-674; Ochuodho 2012 p.91-111}

Yet at the time there was little consensus over who that presidential candidate might be. Within the NAC the major frontrunners were Mwai Kibaki, Michael Wamalwa, and Charity Ngilu, each with their corresponding ethnic backing. Outside of the NAC Simeon Nyachae and the FORD-P, had formed a rival opposition coalition called the Kenya People’s Coalition (KPC), which included Safina and the Labor Party of Kenya, but was still largely a Kisii organization. Negotiations between the two factions failed to reach an agreement, and on July 28, 2002 the
NAC registered as a political party called the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK). By mid-2002 the opposition still lacked the capacity to credibly challenge KANU, and indeed it looked like KANU’s success at co-opting the NDP might ensure even larger vote-shares.

Moi’s selection of Uhuru Kenyatta drove a series of events that led to the NARC coalition. First, the issue of candidacy within the NAK was finally resolved (in fact the NAK was formed the same day as Moi announced Kenyatta as his successor). The understanding within the opposition was that if Moi nominated a Kikuyu or even Maasai George Saitoti, then Mwai Kibaki would run to avoid losing the Kikuyu vote. If Moi was to nominate a candidate from a different ethnic background like Luhya Musalia Mudavadi, the opposition would consider Michael Wamalwa or even reach out again to Simeon Nyachae. With Kenyatta as the candidate, in September 2002 Kibaki was announced as the NAK’s presidential candidate, Michael Wamalwa as the vice-president, and Charity Ngilu as prime minister (a position not yet created).

Second, the defection of Raila Odinga’s “Rainbow Coalition” to the LDP made it possible to form a super coalition that could actually defeat KANU. At that point, there were three competing opposition grouping – the NAK, LDP, and the KPC. Since the NAK and the LDP each represented multiethnic coalitions they could theoretically defeat KANU on their own, but very narrowly, which was a risky prospect. In addition, Kibaki’s elevation as the central opposition figure in the months prior made him the clear frontrunner. The LDP had in fact begun negotiations with both the NAK and KPC before they even defected, and had signed a memorandum of understanding with Simeon Nyachae that would have created a new party called

---

50 Arriola 2012 p.195-205; Hornsby 2012 p.672-674
51 Brown 2004; Ochuodho 2012 p.106. As Leonardo Arriola argues Kibaki also had the financial wherewithal to become the coalition frontrunner and avoid pressure to hold an election within the NAC. This in particular limited Charity Ngilu’s ability to negotiate, since she had spent most of her funds on the 1997 election and her new party the NPK (2012).
the Rainbow Coalition. The understanding was that the three opposition factions would unite under the NARC banner and would later decide on a process for selecting their presidential candidates. However, at the launching rally in Uhuru Park on October 14 Odinga surprisingly endorsed Kibaki for president. Consequently, the KPC withdrew from the NARC and a new memorandum was signed between the LDP and NAK that replaced Ngilu with Odinga as the future prime minister.\textsuperscript{52}

While the specific reasons for Odinga’s sudden withdrawal from his agreement with Nyachae are unclear, the end result was a large enough multiethnic coalition that could defeat KANU.\textsuperscript{53} However, both the defeat of KANU and the ability of the opposition to unify are highly derivative of the weakness of KANU as a political party rather than the inherent capacity of the opposition. The subsequent breakdown of NARC is further proof of its opportunistic origins.\textsuperscript{54} Indeed, if succession had not been as contentious an issue, KANU would have likely retained the Odinga faction. Given the disagreements between the NAK and KPC, this would have ensured a decisive and potentially hegemonic KANU victory. The deeper question is what other factors exacerbated the inherent weakness of KANU as a party and prevented it from establishing an electoral hegemony?

\textit{The Role of Electoral Coercion: Constitutional Reform and the Means of Violence}

Electoral coercion in Kenya was a much more palpable and potentially decisive factor than in Tanzania. As in other cases, KANU enjoyed exceptional constitutional advantages built-in during single-party rule that let it regulate opposition parties’ ability to organize. KANU also

\textsuperscript{52} Badejo 2006 p.221-237; Ochuodho 2012 p.113-134
\textsuperscript{53} According to Odinga’s own biography, he had faced resistance from Kibaki and Wamalwa during early negotiations (he had only received a verbal offer from Ngilu to take the prime minister position), compelling him to sign an agreement with Nyachae. However, his preference was always for the NAK since it would ensure the sheer numbers necessary to defeat Moi decisively (Badejo 2006).
\textsuperscript{54} Wanyande 2003
employed violence fairly extensively against opposition elites and voters, most notably through its’ tacit support for ethnic violence in several of Kenya’s mixed electoral districts. Finally, there is strong evidence that in 1992 and 1997 KANU utilized its control over the civil administration to commit fraud and decisively impact election results. Yet, what is remarkable about the Kenyan case is the extent of improvement in electoral conditions over time. This improvement in electoral conditions limited KANU’s ability to dominate elections and helped keep it in a state of repressive electoral authoritarianism.

With regard to constitutional advantages, Stephen Ndegwa has succinctly identified numerous laws that impacted the opposition’s ability to assemble, speak, and contest the 1992 election. For instance, the Public Orders Act allowed District Commissioners to license public meetings and the Chief’s Authority Act allowed local chiefs to implement the Public Orders Act with little impunity. These laws were enforced nearly entirely against the opposition prior to the 1992 election, often violently.\textsuperscript{55} The farther the opposition travelled into KANU territory, the harsher the repressive measures became, making it virtually impossible for opposition parties to campaign in the Kalenjin heartlands.\textsuperscript{56} This type of coercion was also severe in areas of Western Province like Trans-Nzoia that held the swing communities of the Kisii. Likewise, the Outlying District Act and Special District Act allowed the government to restrict travel to what it deemed sensitive areas, and allowed KANU to essentially close off the distant and rural Northeast Province. Importantly, with regard to election regulation the Kenyan constitution allowed the president to appoint the Electoral Commission (EC), required that a presidential candidate win at least 25% of the vote in five of Kenya’s eight provinces, and established single-member districts.

\textsuperscript{55} Ndegwa 1998 p.198-200
\textsuperscript{56} Hornsby 2012 p.525-526
with a first-past-the-post system. These provisions were seen as highly advantageous to KANU and led to a significantly disproportionate system.\textsuperscript{57}

These constitutional provisions were the central target of immense and persistent lobbying on the part of civil society and opposition parties throughout the 1990s. The Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (CCCC), a coalition of jurists and law societies, convened a national assembly in April 1997 that attracted several opposition figures. The CCCC eventually evolved into the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC). Set on rewriting the Kenyan constitution, the NCEC took to the streets in a series of protests between May and August of 1997; the most infamous of them on July 7, 1997 (referred to as the second \textit{saba saba} protests). The NCEC protests were violently repressed by the KANU government, which helped create a rift within the movement between its political supporters and the civil society and church-based associations.\textsuperscript{58} In August 1997, Moi finally assented to a constitutional reform initiative – the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG). In the eyes of several civil society members this was a move to co-opt the constitutional issue and take it away from the streets to the closed confines of the parliament.\textsuperscript{59}

Yet what came out of the IPPG were a number of important constitutional revisions. First, the Constitution of Kenyan Amendment Bill expanded the electoral commission from 11 to 21 members, allowed the opposition to appoint some members, and removed the presidential power to appoint additional MPs. A later omnibus bill made changes to several of the restrictive laws used in 1992 to inhibit opposition movement and speech. The Preservation of Public

\textsuperscript{57} Ajulu 1990 p.198-200. According to the author’s calculations in 1992 KANU won 53.19% of the seats with just 29.63% of the votes and in 1997 50.95% of the seats with 38.63% of the votes. This is due to the close nature of most legislative races. In 2002 KANU won 30.47% of the seats with 28.01% of the vote while the NARC coalition won 59.5% of the seats with 50.3% of the vote.

\textsuperscript{58} Hornsby 2012 p.539-617; Ndegwa 1998

\textsuperscript{59} Maina Kiai (Co-Founder CCCC), 2012, Author Interview
Security Act, Vagrancy Act, the Outlying Districts Act, and the Special Districts Act were all repealed. The Chief’s Authority Act was amended so that chiefs could no longer implement the Public Orders Act without writs of authority. The Public Orders Act itself was amended so that parties needed only notify the District Commissioner of a public meeting or rally. The Broadcasting Act was changed to allow more opposition party airtime and the Societies Act (which limited the registration of new parties) was amended so that the registrar had to reply to requests within 120 days. Finally, the IPPG set some of the framework for further constitutional review by establishing the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act (CKRC), whose chairman would controversially be appointed by the president. 60

The IPPG process was ultimately controversial, and some argue that it failed to address some of the fundamental issues such as presidential power to appoint the attorney-general and the head of the EC, the 25% rule, or the power of appointment to the planned constitutional review committee.61 The IPPG reforms also split the opposition movement. The DP, SDP and FORD-K sided with the government while the NDP and FORD-A remained in opposition and allied with the NCEC. Those who remained in opposition felt vindicated when the process of constitutional reform stalled between 1997 and 2002.62 Talks over the structure of the CKRC exploded in 1998 and stalled until January 2002 when Yash Ghai (a Kenyan-Asian constitutional lawyer) was selected to head the review commission. Ghai brought the opposition parties and government together to form a new CKRC of 27 members. Between March 2001 and March 2002 the CKRC travelled the country to gather input in hopes of drafting a new constitution prior to the 2002 election. However the timetable proved too tight and a draft constitution was only presented in September. Moi could simply dissolve parliament before a constitutional conference

61 Ndegwa 1998
62 Kiai Interview
could be convened. Yet the failings of the IPPG and CKRC aside, the reforms themselves significantly changed the legal atmosphere in which opposition parties contested.

In addition to the constitutional issues, elections during this period were marked by the use of excessive ethnic violence that was not explicitly sanctioned by KANU, but neither prevented. Between 1991 and 1992 ethnic clashes in the mixed districts of the Rift Valley were widely perceived to be perpetuated by Kalenjin KANU politicians. KANU’s response was inaction, while KANU hardliners like Kipkalya arap Kones were able to unabashedly declare the areas “KANU zones” and prevent FORD or DP members from visiting. By the election in December nearly 1,000 people had been killed and 250,000 were internally displaced – mostly Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya. Subsequent investigations implicated several Kalenjin politicians – most prominently Moi’s close ally Nicholas Biwott. From the opposition’s perspective, this was a deliberate strategy to create homogenous constituencies and to prevent the opposition from being able to satisfy the 25% rule. The violence subsided in December as international observers came for the election, but resumed again in 1993 in Eldoret, Nakuru, Mt. Elgon, and West Pokot. This time the violence was directed against Kikuyu and some Kisii communities (the latter targeted by Maasai youth).

Ethnic violence subsided somewhat again in 1994, but by 1995 clashes once again intensified. In March 1995, Kalenjin youth were engaged in a six-hour gun battle throughout Trans-Nzoia and Bungoma districts. Unlike in 1992, the violence this time was also concentrated

---

63 Hornsby 2012 p.625-670. The new constitution provided for a bicameral legislature, mixed-districts, and limited presidential powers. For more on the process of constitutional reform in Kenya see Mutua 2009.
64 Hornsby 2012 p.490-492. Also implicated was a short-lived organization known as Youth for Kanu '92 (YK'92), unaffiliated with the party but funded by businessman Cyrus Jirongo who had ties to the Moi family (Branch 2011 p.200).
65 Branch 2011 p.199-200
66 Ibid 2011 p.212-215. KANU Maasai politician William ole Ntimama, is reported as publically proclaiming that all the Kikuyo should leave his constituency of Narok North while Kipkalya arap Kones threatened to expel the Luo from Kericho and Bomet districts if they continued to support FORD-K.

215
within the Kalenjin alliance. In October 1995, there were clashes in Kapenguria between the Pokot and Turkana, and in Kerio twenty-seven people were killed in clashes between the Pokot and Marakwets who were suspected of considering voting for the opposition. In 1997 violence spread to the Coastal regions between the Mjikenda and migrant Luo and Kamba communities (mostly in Likoni district). Here the cause was twofold – there were disputes over land ownership, but there were also religious overtones and tensions between the Arab Muslims (represented by the KANU-affiliated Islamic Party of Kenya) and indigenous African Muslims. KANU leaders, fearful that migrant communities would tip the vote, did little to prevent violence that displaced nearly 100,000 people.\(^67\) Conversely, the coastal violence was also detrimental to KANU since it harmed the robust local tourism industry and alienated significant segments of the Mjikenda community who began to migrate to the Shirikisho party. Similarly, violent clashes between the Maasai and Kisii over land rights in October and November of 1997 likely hurt KANU prospects among important swing communities.\(^68\)

The remarkable development by 2002 was the absence of violence.\(^69\) As Stephen Brown notes, the absence of violence was the “dog that did not bark in the night.”\(^70\) One of the primary reasons for this is again derivative of KANU’s weak party capacity. With the formation of the NARC coalition and the fact that two Kikuyu would compete against each other, political violence lost much of its political efficacy. Moreover the defection of the Rainbow Coalition with Raila Odinga took with its some of the very people supposedly responsible for perpetrating this violence.\(^71\)

---

\(^{67}\) Branch 2011 p. 222-227; Hornsby 2012 p.602-603
\(^{68}\) Hornsby 2012 p.602-603
\(^{69}\) Hornsby 2012 p.619-620
\(^{70}\) Brown 2004 p.332
\(^{71}\) Ibid 2004 p.332-333
Finally, the impact of electoral fraud parallels the developments with regard to violence. During the 1992 election, observer reports indicate that there were administrative issues with voting (in particular due to heavy rains that delayed the distribution of voting materials) and some polling station incidents, but that the bulk of irregularities occurred during registration and the counting period. According to the IRI report, up to 3 million Kenyans might have been disenfranchised due to registration issues. According to calculations made by Charles Hornsby, result falsification impacted at least 50 seats, of which KANU was outright able to steal between 15 and 20. Likewise, Moi’s presidential vote-share was inflated by approximately 250,000 votes. The rigging practices were at times quite blatant. In some constituencies voters were deemed illiterate and a KANU agent would write their preference down instead. In other constituencies polling stations were actually taken over by KANU agents or observation teams were refused entry. During counting, stuffed boxes were at times snuck in to replace actual results.

Over the next two election cycles there were marked improvements in electoral conditions. In 1997, partially due to the IPPG reforms and partially due to the increase in international and domestic observation, the election was noticeably more open than in 1992. The recorded malpractices were mostly limited to the Kalenjin homelands, where KANU sought to maximize its vote-share. In addition, bribery reports were widespread at the polls, but ballot stuffing was far less common. However, as in 1992 the most blatant practices took place during the actual vote count. As a result, it was once again likely that Moi’s vote-share was inflated, although not in any critical sense that he would have lost the election otherwise, and KANU was

---

72 International Republican Institute 1993; National Election Monitoring Unity 1993. According to these reports and assertions from the opposition, in 1992 KANU further tilted the election by increasing the money supply by nearly 30% to fund the KANU campaign.
73 Hornsby 2012 p.534-535
able to steal between five and six seats.\textsuperscript{74} By 2002, while there were still accounts of voter intimidation and bribery, the count was deemed free and fair by international and domestic observers. As with the absence of violence, the reason was that with the NARC coalition in place the rigging would have had to be massive. Likewise, there was improved monitoring and administrative capacity. For instance, observer groups used a parallel count that was advertised prior to the announcement of the actual results.\textsuperscript{75}

The changes in electoral coercion differentiate Kenya from both Tanzania and Cameroon. Electoral coercion started at much higher levels than in Tanzania. However, unlike in Cameroon, it improved markedly over election cycles. During the 1992 election, which was the most rigged, violent, and restrictive of this period, KANU was still only able to eke out slim vote-shares. This again indicates that it is the party capacity that matters first, and that the repression is actually derivative of this capacity. Moreover, the regime’s resort to ethnic violence likely cost KANU the support of some of its allied communities, and is clearer evidence of what William Case called “clumsy manipulation”.\textsuperscript{76} The counter-factual is that had KANU retained the capacity to repress, opposition parties might have been more likely to boycott or become co-opted, which would have helped KANU to establish electoral hegemony. While this section has argued that this was partially due to the breakdown of KANU itself in 2002, the next section helps link that outcome with the higher level of Western linkage and leverage.

\textit{Western Linkage and Leverage: A Regime in Perpetual Crisis}

As noted in Chapter 3, Kenya has held a more visible standing in the West due to its prominence as the British East African capital, the large British settler community, and the

\textsuperscript{74} Hornsby 2012 p.616; Institute for Education in Democracy 1998
\textsuperscript{75} See for instance the reports of the Carter Center 2003; Commonwealth 2006; European Union 2003; and Institute for Education in Democracy 2003. Admittedly, due to the fact that there was turnover in this election this might have caused observers to overlook flaws in the electoral process.
\textsuperscript{76} Case 2006
significant tourism industry. In addition, the relatively high degree of dependency on foreign sources of finance, and the lack of any significant conflicting foreign policy goals meant that Western powers were in a unique position to influence Kenyan elections. Throughout the multiparty era Western leverage made an impact in a number of significant ways. First, the use of contingent aid was effective at keeping the regime in a state of perpetual crisis. Second, leverage was used to compel Moi into constitutional concessions and helped empower the election observation process. Third, leverage had a direct political influence on both the calculations made by the opposition and the regime. This was particularly important when it came to the issue of whether to boycott elections and the issue of succession within KANU.

It should first be noted that linkage between Kenya and the West was also elevated due to the unique influence of US Ambassador Smith Hempstone. Between 1989 and 1993 Hempstone was instrumental in highlighting Kenya’s poor democratic credentials and promoting the new opposition movement. He also had a conspicuously dour relationship with Moi and it was quickly evident that Hempstone would follow a much more activist approach, which caught both Moi and the Bush White House off-guard.\textsuperscript{77} In Hempstone’s words,

\begin{quote}
\textquote{I would infinitely have preferred evolution with Moi rather than revolution against him…In some ways it seemed to me I had no choice. Destabilization was a possible consequence of reform. But it was the probable outcome of trying to prop up the inequitable status quo, as the British were trying to do.} \textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

By May 1990 Hempstone had already proclaimed that continued US support would be contingent upon the development of democratic institutions and the protection of human rights. After the\textit{saba saba} protests of July 1990, Hempstone lobbied the US and other embassies for reductions in military and economic aid, leading Moi and other KANU hardliners to call for his

\textsuperscript{77} Hornsby 2012 p.467-468. Much of this relationship is well-documented in Hempstone’s biographical account \textit{Rogue Ambassador} (1997).

\textsuperscript{78} Hempstone 1997 p.169
expulsion from the country. By 1991 the Norwegian, German, and reluctantly even the British ambassadors began to vocally express their displeasure with the Moi regime.\(^79\)

Hempstone and other foreign embassies were likewise instrumental in promoting the fledgling FORD as the key opposition movement. For instance, Hempstone was personally responsible for helping human rights lawyer Gibson Kuria gain asylum in the United States in July 1990 following the \textit{saba saba} protests (personally escorting him to the airport to avoid a potential assassination). In November 1991, Hempstone housed Martin Shikuku in his public affairs counselor’s home after a wave of arrests swept up most of the opposition leaders.\(^80\) Later that month Hempstone hosted a lunch with the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Bob Houdek with five members of the opposition.\(^81\) It is also reported that British officials were key figures in encouraging the opposition to form a forum rather than a political party. According to one account, it was British politician Sir David Steel who suggested the idea to Young Turks James Orengo and Gitobu Imanyara.\(^82\) According to Raila Odinga, it was his meeting with the British Embassy’s Political Officer Alan Eastham that sparked the idea of a unified opposition forum.\(^83\)

A consequence of the greater prominence given Kenya was the use of contingent aid throughout the multiparty era (summarized in Figure 8.4). On November 26, 1991 the Paris Club cut balance of payments and aid disbursement in half absent any significant political or economic reform. The fiscal crisis that ensued was partially responsible for Moi’s reluctant suspension of

\(^79\) The Norwegians went as far as to end all bilateral assistance and diplomatic relations until March 1994 after Moi had arrested political activist and Norwegian resident Koigi wa Wamwere. In October 1991 the new British government of John Major had convened with Moi in Harare, Zimbabwe to press him to change his image. Hempstone takes limited responsibility for the British change of heart, noting that Moi likely became “too much of an embarrassment for London to tolerate unless he changed his ways” (Hemspstone 1997 p.246-247).
\(^80\) Hemspstone 1997 p.102-112
\(^81\) Ibid p.250-256
\(^82\) Peter Anyang N’yong’o (co-founder FORD-K), 2012, Author Interview
\(^83\) Badejo 2006 p.158-159
Section 2(a) of the constitution. In early 1991 the KANU government began to implement some limited economic reform under the tutelage of Finance Minister George Saitoti. However, by the end of 1992 only the French had restored small amounts of bilateral aid. This meant that KANU had to contest the 1992 election under immense resentment and pressure from the public to deliver economic recovery, and had also lost some control over distributive tools due to privatization.

Following the 1992 election, negotiations between Kenya and international lenders stalled. It was only in November 1993 that the Paris Club agreed to finance a new aid package of $850 million in direct aid and $170 million in balance of payment support and in 1996 that the IMF approved a new loan program. This followed months of hard-fought changes to the Kenyan economy, now overseen by new Finance Minister Musalia Mudavadai. These changes were much more substantial and included allowing a fully floating currency, the removal of price controls on important commodities like fuel, wheat, maize, and sugar, and further parastatal privatization. Between 1994 and 1996 the Kenyan economy rebounded, most indicative by a reduction in the rate of inflation from a peak of 50% in 1993 to 10% by 1996. However, this turn of events did not necessarily bolster KANU’s prospects. As Mudavadi explains, the economic reforms triggered a backlash from KANU hardliners who were “married to the former regime,” and found it difficult to maneuver in a liberalized environment. Mudavadi further notes that Moi was extremely reluctant to accept these measures, but that the economic necessities and Kenya’s aid dependency were critical decision factors.

---

84 Hornsby 2012 p.486  
85 Ibid p.561  
86 World Bank Indicators 2011  
87 Mudavadi Interview. One consequence of this economic liberalization was the greater availability of financial resources to opposition parties from newly formed private banks (Arriola 2012).
Still, the softened pressure from international donors meant that no significant political reforms took place for a while. Throughout the early 1990s ethnic clashes continued in most areas of the Rift Valley and the constitutional reform movement received little support from the West due to the perception that it was too radical and threatened regional stability (especially following the Rwandan Civil War). Yet, following the violent second saba saba protests the US pressured the IMF to suspend loan disbursements, leading to an immediate fall in the value of the Kenyan shilling and a quick rise in interest rates. Pressure from Western countries forced both the opposition and Moi into the compromise IPPG as a format for amending the constitution. Following the 1997 election, some aid was restored by the London Club of commercial creditors, the British Government, and aid agencies like Oxfam (mostly food aid), but by 1999 Kenya had received the lowest level of foreign aid since 1989.

Prior to the 2002 election, contingent aid once again set the stage for regime crisis. In mid-2000 a significant agreement was brokered between the Moi regime (and its negotiator Richard Leakey) and the World Bank. The deal returned donor funding in the form of a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan of $198 million, and a $288 million debt rescheduling with the Paris Club. In exchange, Kenya established the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), along with a slew of other economic reforms like higher VAT, tariff reform, new banking legislation, weekly financial updates to the IMF, and a reduction of the civil service by more than 30,000 jobs. The bitter pill was difficult to swallow, and once again alienated several KANU hardliners. By December 2000 the fund had only distributed $43 million and was completely suspended once the KACA was deemed unconstitutional by the

---

88 Hornsby 2012 p.565-566; Kituyi Interview
89 Ibid p.599. The loss of loans led to a sell-off of Kenyan treasuries and currency. Musalia Mudavadi was forced into an emergency budget that immediately raised taxes and cut government expenditure.
90 Ibid p.630
Kenyan High Court. Between 2001 and the election in December 2002 Kenya underwent another recessionary period of negative GDP per capita growth and higher rates of inflation.91

Figure 8.4: Bilateral Aid and IMF Disbursements to Kenya (1990-2002)

A second consequence of the greater degree of linkage was the much greater role given to election monitoring and explicit democracy promotion. Extensive pressure from American and British embassies on the chairman of the Kenyan Electoral Commission Zacheus Chisoni helped ensure a number of important technical innovations for the 1992 election like larger ballot boxes that could be better sealed, and ballots printed outside of the country.92 External donors also helped fund and establish the National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU), a domestic observation coordinating organ that trained over 7,500 domestic observers.93 During the election itself, a large number of foreign observers were allowed into the country, most prominently the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Federal Electoral Commission, the International

91 Ibid p.634-637
92 Hornsby 2012 p.510
Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the Commonwealth Team. The latter sent the largest observation team in the organization’s history. National teams from Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, German, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were also sent, totaling over 150 external observers.\footnote{Foeken & Dietz 2000 p.135} However, this still only translated into approximately 45 polling stations per international observer, which limited the validity of observer reports. Indicative, all the Western observer reports noted significant irregularities, but none went as far as to term the election fundamentally fraudulent (also indicating a shift in Western policy toward post-election stability).\footnote{The KANU government also took steps to prevent more observation. Since the election date was changed to December this left short time for organization and some delegates did not want to miss Christmas. In addition, the National Democratic Institute, the Carter Center, and the German observation group were denied entry (Hornsby 2012 p.514).} By contrast, domestic observers much more willingly declared the poll invalid and even criticized the political leanings of external observer groups.\footnote{Kibara 2003 p.294-295}

The period of the mid-1990s was referred to by Charles Hornsby as the “era of the NGO,” in reference to the flood of aid money that supported the bourgeoning field of democracy promoting civil society organizations. By the end of the decade, Kenya had the highest concentration of NGOs on the continent.\footnote{Hornsby 2012 p.586} NEMU was converted into the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), with a much broader commitment to democratic education. The Kenyan Human Rights Council (KHRC) was likewise funded nearly entirely by Western donors. With regard to external observers, during the 1997 election foreign countries organized into the Donors for Development and Democracy Group (DDDG) to coordinate their efforts, and created a shared Election Observation Center that tracked events prior to the polls throughout November and December.\footnote{Ibid p.605} On the day of voting 90 teams visited over 500 polling stations and counting

\footnote{\textit{\textsuperscript{94} Foeken & Dietz 2000 p.135} \\ \textit{\textsuperscript{95} The KANU government also took steps to prevent more observation. Since the election date was changed to December this left short time for organization and some delegates did not want to miss Christmas. In addition, the National Democratic Institute, the Carter Center, and the German observation group were denied entry (Hornsby 2012 p.514).} \\ \textit{\textsuperscript{96} Kibara 2003 p.294-295} \\ \textit{\textsuperscript{97} Hornsby 2012 p.586} \\ \textit{\textsuperscript{98} Ibid p.605}}
halls.\textsuperscript{99} Once again domestic observers, this time coordinated through the IED, were strongly supported by Western countries which trained nearly 28,000 poll workers (nearly four times the amount in 1992). However, as in 1992 there was no statement from any major observation group that the election was fundamentally flawed. Controversially, the initial DDDG report had concluded that the parliamentary elections were fundamentally flawed but that language was later edited out of the final report.\textsuperscript{100}

Ironically, the 2002 election was probably the worst monitored by international observers, but saw further important improvements in domestic observation capacity. This time the EU sent the largest observation team, followed by the Carter Center (including former president Jimmy Carter), the African Union, and the Commonwealth Group. There was no coordination as had taken place in 1997, but the domestic observation program was expanded significantly and unified through donor money. The Kenya Domestic Observation Program (K-DOP) was created and made it possible to monitor every constituency and finally conduct a parallel count of the vote.\textsuperscript{101} On the day of voting, every polling center had either a domestic observer or a party agent present to witness. As a result, foreign and domestic observers were fairly unanimous and unequivocal in their support of the election result and the process.\textsuperscript{102}

Finally, Western leverage made a difference by shaping actors’ perspectives and actions. For instance, between June 1992 and January 1993 a number of boycott movements emerged within the opposition. First, in June 1992 FORD and the DP threatened to boycott over issues with voter registration. Pressure from Smith Hempstone on the parties led them to renege on that commitment. In December, a week prior to the polls opposition parties once again threatened to

\textsuperscript{99} Foeken & Dietz 2000 p.143  
\textsuperscript{100} Hornsby 2012 p.616  
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid p.683  
\textsuperscript{102} Hornsby 2012 p.695
boycott the election over the abuses they had suffered during the campaign. Once, again pressure from Hempstone, to whom many in the opposition felt personally indebted, changed the parties’ position. Finally, after the election opposition parties initially rejected the election outcome but donor pressure was instrumental in convincing them to take their seats.\textsuperscript{103} Several opposition party members note that the continued support from Western countries, while imperfect, emboldened them. Former KANU MP Julia Ojiambo summarizes this sentiment, stating that “we needed a relentless fight. It was that feeling of confidence because there was an eye somewhere that would question what would happen if it did. Hempstone encouraged that eye. There was the impression that the international community was watching what was happening.”\textsuperscript{104}

With regard to Moi’s own relationship with the West and especially the United States, the relationship did warm somewhat but was never close. Notably, during President Clinton’s visit to Africa in 1998 Moi was not visited. However, the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi in August 1998 did improve security cooperation. In 1999 and 2000 the Kenyan army conducted joint exercises with the US, and in 2002 restored military aid.\textsuperscript{105} However, between 2001 and 2002 the US held a number of high level meetings with Moi that explicitly discussed the rumors that he intended to change the constitution to run for a third term. In his visit to Kenya in May 2001, Collin Powell met with Moi and urged him not to run again if he hoped to regain access to international lending. Powell also met with Mwai Kibaki, sending a strong message to the opposition.\textsuperscript{106} In June and November of 2001 Moi met with President Bush (once at the White

\textsuperscript{103} Brown 2001 p.731
\textsuperscript{104} Julia Ojiambo (KANU member 1966-2002), 2012, Author Interview
\textsuperscript{105} Hornsby 2012 p.660-661
\textsuperscript{106} Marc Lacey “In Kenya, Powell Repeats Call for new Generations of Leaders” \textit{New York Times} May 27, 2001
House and once at the UN General Assembly) where he was again warned in private not to change the constitution.107

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the central theoretical implications of KANU’s weak party capacity, both in terms of its poor structural articulation and low social robustness. As expected, defection became a major and persistent issue during multiparty elections, especially following the succession crisis of 2002. Likewise, voting patterns largely reflected ethnic alliances engrained by Jomo Kenyatta, but perpetuated by Daniel arap Moi. Consequently, KANU was always on the verge of defeat and used electoral coercion – both in terms of violence and fraud – much more systematically to win elections by narrow margins. On the other hand, this chapter has also argued that it is not the strength of Kenya’s opposition parties that explains this outcome. In spite of the NARC coalition Kenya’s opposition parties were some of the weakest on the continent, prone to fragmentation, poor institutionalization, and at times bad decision-making. In fact, if the co-optation of Raila Odinga had not failed, KANU might well have regained its footing.

The primary reasons Kenya was unable to reinstitute itself as a repressive hegemony were its much weaker capacity and the comparatively high levels of Western linkage and leverage. Perhaps more than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya was vulnerable and subject to persistent use of contingent aid, high levels of election monitoring and democracy assistance, and direct pressure on both opposition parties and the Moi regime. This translated into perpetual regime crisis, limited KANU’s ability to coerce, empowered the opposition

107 Brown 2004 p.333 n.5; Kiai Interview. It remains speculative why Moi eventually decided not to try and run for a third term. According to Reverent Timothy Njoya, who was at the forefront of the church’s anti-Moi agenda it was a combination of Western pressure, Moi’s desire to redeem himself in the eyes of Western countries, and Moi’s own Christian faith (Timothy Njoya, 2012, Author Interview).
movement at critical moments, and helped force a succession crisis. These factors exacerbated KANU weak party capacity and facilitated the process of elite defection and social alienation that came to define KANU in the multiparty period.
Chapter 9 : The CPDM and the Path to Repressive Hegemony

This chapter looks at how party capacity impacted the CPDM and Paul Biya’s ability to compete in multiparty elections and what factors explain why the regime was able to transition to a repressive hegemony. As in Kenya, the transition to elections occurred amidst economic decline, large scale popular protest, and reactionary government repression. The founding elections of March and October 1992 dealt the CPDM a harsh blow and compelled them to forge a legislative alliance with a minority party. As expected, elite defection and narrow electoral support played a big role in the final outcome. However here is where the similarities with Kenya largely end. In the following elections the CPDM has been able to restore its hegemony over electoral politics. This chapter will argue that the central differentiating factor is low levels of linkage and leverage as expressed through the Black Knight support Cameroon received from its key patron France and conflicting US foreign policy goals following the Iraq war of 2003. Low linkage and leverage helped stabilize the CPDM, weakened Cameroon’s opposition capacity and allowed the regime to continue and use high levels of coercion.

The details of the economic crisis that plagued Cameroon in 1987 (as in other African countries) are well-documented.¹ A combination of external shocks, economic mismanagement, and growing corruption plunged Cameroon into a spiral of stagflation that forced Biya into negotiations with the IMF over a structural adjustment loan in 1989. The subsequent austerity measures, aligned with the regional growth of elections and perceived ineptitude of the Biya regime, gave way to oppositional activity beginning in Anglophone North West province. In January 1990, Pius Njawa – publisher of the newspaper Le Messager – was arrested. In February 1990, prominent lawyer Yondo Black was arrested after trying to form a political party. In

---

¹ van de Walle 1993 p.143-152; Konings 1996; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.115-158;
March 1990, John Fru Ndi formed the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in Bamenda. At a rally in May six people were killed by security forces. By the end of 1990, two new party and press laws legalized opposition politics.²

Prior to the 1992 election scores of new political parties were formed and a seemingly strong front constructed to force Biya into a National Conference and significant constitutional reform. In addition to Fru Ndi’s SDF, former prime minister (and formerly exiled) Bellou Bouba Maigari built on his northern Fulani support and founded the National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP). The UPC reinstated itself, with support coming primarily from Littoral Province and amongst the Douala, Bassa, and Bamileke. The Cameroon Democratic Union (UDC) led by Adamou Ndam Njoya – a notable Bamoun chief - relied heavily on support from Noun Department in West Province. Finally the Movement for the Defense of the Republic (MDR) of Dakole Daissala represented the Kirdi community of Far North Province. Together, the opposition formed the National Coordination of Opposition Parties and Associations (NCOPA) to pressure Biya into a national conference, which he rejected vociferously. The NCOPA coordinated a country-wide strike, the *villes mortes* or ghost-towns campaign, which shut the country down for months. However, by the end of 1991 Biya this unity had faded as Biya began negotiations with the opposition, excluding the SDF who boycotted the process (more on this below). Legislative elections were held on March 1992 and presidential elections in August. Since, there have been three more election cycles where the CPDM have only increased their electoral gains (Tables 9.1 and 9.2).

² These laws were known as the “Liberty Laws” - the Freedom of Mass Communication Law No. 90/052 and the Political Parties Law No. 90/056.
Table 9.1: Cameroonian Presidential Election Results (1992-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CPDM</th>
<th>SDF</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>UDC</th>
<th>UPC</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(seats/%)</td>
<td>(seats/%)</td>
<td>(seats/%)</td>
<td>(seats/%)</td>
<td>(seats/%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Paul Biya (39.98%)</td>
<td>John Fru Ndi (35.97%)</td>
<td>Bello Bou Maigari (19.22%)</td>
<td>Adamou Ndam Njoya (3.62%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2 Candidates (1.21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Paul Biya (92.57%)</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Henri Hogbe Ndlend (2.50%)</td>
<td>5 Candidates (4.93%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Paul Biya (70.92%)</td>
<td>John Fru Ndi (17.40%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Adamou Ndam Njoy (4.48%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>13 Candidates (7.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Paul Biya (77.99%)</td>
<td>John Fru Ndi (10.71%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Adamou Ndam Njoya (1.73%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20 Candidates (9.51%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.2: Cameroonian Legislative Election Results (1992-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CPDM (seats/%)</th>
<th>SDF (seats/%)</th>
<th>UNDP (seats/%)</th>
<th>UDC (seats/%)</th>
<th>UPC (seats/%)</th>
<th>MDR (seats/%)</th>
<th>Other (seats/%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>88 (49%)</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>68 (38%)</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>18 (3%)</td>
<td>6/ (10%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>116 (64.5%)</td>
<td>43(24%)</td>
<td>13(7%)</td>
<td>5(3%)</td>
<td>1(0.5%)</td>
<td>1(0.5%)</td>
<td>1(0.5%) (MLJC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>149 (83%)</td>
<td>22 (12%)</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>5 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (1.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>153 (85%)</td>
<td>16 (9%)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
<td>4 (2.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (0.5%) (MP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Party under Pressure: Elite Defection and Succession in the CPDM

As expected the legalization of opposition parties and multiparty elections brought to the fore deep resentments within the CPDM that were very difficult for the party to reconcile and led to defections of some of the party’s top leadership. This was particularly acute during the founding election period, but also a salient feature of CPDM politics over the next two decades (summarized in Table 9.3). Defection did not, however, drain the party the same way that it did in Kenya, and did subside as the risk of electoral defeat diminished. One reason is possibly that the CPDM’s party capacity was higher than KANUs, providing elites with a longer time horizon.
and commitment to the party. On the other hand, the CPDM was able to react much more harshly to defectors than KANU was. Likewise, CPDM primaries were comparatively closed affairs, held very close to the election itself, which limits the obtainability of data and diminishes the likelihood of defection. In addition, besides the presence of significant elite defection, as expected the issue of executive succession became a source of tension within the party, culminating in Paul Biya’s controversial 2008 decision to amend the constitution and remove term limits.

The aftermath of the violent 1990 Bamenda rally and the subsequent legalization of political parties caused significant cracks within the CPDM. Unsurprisingly, the first prominent figure to defect was John Ngu Foncha – the former leader of the Anglophone KNDP, architect of Cameroonian unification, and the longstanding Vice-President of the CPDM. In June 1990, Foncha resigned in protest from the CPDM, citing the government’s resort to violence in Bamenda and his own personal disillusionment with the party. According to Foncha, he had been systematically denied an audience with Biya and believed himself to have become “an irrelevant nuisance” that had “to be ignored and even ridiculed.” Foncha joined fellow Anglophone Solomon Tandeg Muna, who had resigned back in 1988, and did not affiliate with an opposition party. However, by 1994 both figures had joined the South Cameroon’s National Council to push for Anglophone causes (see below).³

Biya’s resistance to a national conference with the opposition and the ongoing violence and economic disruption of the villes mortes campaign brought further rifts to the party, largely from its Northern and Littoral-based politicians. A progressive wing within the party began to pressure Biya for internal reform of the CPDM and a national conference. This movement was ostensibly led by Jean-Jacques Ekindi (CPDM Wouri section), Henri Hogbe-Nlend (CPDM Paris

³ *West Africa* June 25- July 1 1990; *BBC World Service* June 13, 1990
Section), and Henry Bandolo (Minister of Information), but was reported to include a wider range of figures including François Sengat Kuo (CPDM Political Bureau), Sadou Hayatou (Secretary General at the Presidency), Ferdinand Oyono (Minister of Housing), Joseph Fofe (Minister of Youth and Sports), Georges Ngango (former Minister of Education), Thomas Melone (CPDM Sanaga Maritime), and Mbong Bayem Silas (CPDM Nyong and Kelle). Several of these figures were part of a new generation of leadership that Biya had brought into the CPDM under his New Deal, while others were older politicians and members of the original UPC party. Hogbe-Nlend stated in an interview that the CPDM was completely corrupt and operated in an undemocratic manner, especially noting that since 1985 the central committee and political bureau of the party had not met.

The products of these tensions were a number of significant top-level defections and reported large defections at the local level. In May 1991, Jean-Jacques Ekindi resigned from the CPDM to form the Progressive Movement (MP), claiming that “the advent of multipartyism necessitates a revision of the strategy and structures of the party; but the president who is the only one who can call an extraordinary congress has obstinately refused”. In February of 1992 François Sengat Kuo claimed that the “CPDM is no longer faithfully applied” and defected to the SDF. Likewise, Thomas Melone and Henri Hogbe-Nlend left the CPDM to join the UPC. These were compounded by other defections from CPDM members who were not explicitly part of the progressive wing - Victoria Tomedi Ndando’s (CPDM Women’s Wing) defection to the SDF, Garga Haman Hadji’s (Minister of Public Function) defection to form his own party based on his Far North support the Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD), and Samuel Eboua

---

5 Jeune Afrique Economie May 1991
6 West Africa May 20-May 26 1991; West Africa March 2-March 8 1991
7 West Africa 1992
(Chairman of the Cameroon Airlines Company) defection to help form the UNDP all drew national headlines.\(^8\)

At the local level the extent of defection is more ambiguous. It is fairly certain that in North West province extensive defection at the grassroots occurred from the CPDM to the SDF party.\(^9\) Likewise, Adamou Ndam Njoya’s UDC party built on his traditional title to essentially tear apart the CPDM infrastructure in Foumbam. Once the senior prince in the region Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya resigned and broke his ties with the CPDM to transfer his support to Ndam Njoya, other junior princes and party rank and file followed suit. This led Takougang and Krieger to note that in the buildup to the 1992 elections the CPDM resembled “a calving iceberg, while the opposition remained dynamic and unified.”\(^{10}\) Yet, it is difficult to pinpoint specific numbers or individuals (especially due to the highly centralized primary process within the CPDM), and as reporting at the time noted, the pressures on the CPDM did not amount to a mass exodus, and most individuals took a “wait and see approach”\(^{11}\).

Defection notably slowed down following the 1992 election, which was to be expected given the decline in the viability of opposition parties (discussed below), but continued to trouble the CPDM. Immediately after the 1992 election the Governor of Eastern Province George Achu Mofof resigned his post and the CPDM after revealing that he had been pressured to secure at least 60% of the vote for CPDM candidates in the recent election.\(^{12}\) The most notable cases of defection prior to 1997 involved Biya’s close ethnic circle and were over presidential nomination. In December 1996, the CPDM finally convened its second ordinary congress (the

---

\(^8\) Krieger 2008 p.88; DeLancey, Neh Mbu & Delancey 2010. One could also include Noucti Tchokwago who formed the Cameroon Pan-African Congress (CPC). Other members of the progressive wing like Joseph Fofe resigned and returned to practicing medicine rather than joining opposition politics.

\(^9\) BBC World Service March 27, 1991

\(^{10}\) Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.132

\(^{11}\) Jeune Afrique April 9, 1991

\(^{12}\) BBC World Service October 21, 1992; National Democratic Institute 1993;
first since the Bamenda congress of 1990) to reelect Biya as party chair, and hence as the 1997 presidential candidate. Victor Ayissi Mvodo, an Ewondo from Central Province and the important Minister of Territorial Affairs challenged Biya over the presidential nomination. Mvodo was found dead shortly thereafter. A year later Minister of Health and Biya’s personal physician Titus Edzoa declared that if he could not contest the presidency from within the CPDM he would nominate himself as an independent candidate for the presidency. In subsequent months him and his campaign manager were arrested, tried and sentenced for 15 years on charges of embezzlement.\(^\text{13}\)

The 2002 to 2004 election cycle brought to the fore new segments within the CPDM that again reflected a more progressive element critical of the lack of internal democracy within the party. Following the lopsided CPDM victory in the parliamentary elections of 2002 (and a large cabinet reshuffle), a new group of reformists congealed within the party to push for party reform. In January 2003 the new progressive wing, led by Chief Mila Assoute, published the *Livre blanc du groupe pour la modernization du RDPC*. Assoute claimed to have the support of over 100 Central Committee and Sub-Section presidents, including known figures like Samuel Ze Bembe, Samuel Efoua Mbozo’o, Mve Elemva, and Christian Penda Ekoka.\(^\text{14}\) Opposing the perceived inertia within the party and the exorbitant levels of corruption, in March 2004 Assoute warned of a political clash unless a statutory CPDM ordinary congress and central committee meeting were held to elect new party officials.\(^\text{15}\) In September, Assoute further criticized Biya for nominating

\(^{13}\) Smith, Patrick “How Long Can Cameroon’s Biya Rule?” *BBC News Online* March 17, 2008 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7300784.stm). Two other notable defections during this period include Simon Munzu, the CPDM South West delegate to the Constitutional Technical Committee who left to join the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and Central Committee member and parliamentarian Albert Dzongang who joined the Party for Popular Development (PPD) and ran for president in 1997.

\(^{14}\) “Money in the Pipeline” *Africa Confidential* 44, no. 16 August 8, 2003

\(^{15}\) Alain Batongue *Mutations*, March 4, 2004; Charly Ndi Chia “Central Committee Member Wants Biya to Step Down” *Post Tribune* September 16, 2004. The CPDM had convened an extra ordinary congress in July 2001, again to re-elect Biya as party chair, but had not held an ordinary congress since 1996.
himself as the 2004 presidential candidate, and threw his own name into the nomination process. After rejection by the Central Committee, Assoute resigned from the CPDM (by 2007 he had formed his own political party The Democratic Movement for the Modernity of Cameroon, RDMC).\textsuperscript{16}

Simultaneously, Biya faced pressure from his northern allies when in September 2002 the M\textit{émorandum sur les problèmes du Grand North} was published and castigated Biya and the CPDM’s neglect of North Province. The signatories to the memorandum were allied members of government, but not of the CPDM – Antar Gassagay (UPR), Issa Tchiroma Bakary (UNDP), Hamadou Moustapha (ADDP), Garga Haman Adji (ADD), and Dakolé Daïssala (MDR).\textsuperscript{17} By 2004, Gassagay and Bakary had left government and entered the nascent National Coalition for Reconciliation and Reconstruction (CRRN).\textsuperscript{18} They were joined by a Northern CPDM politician and former Minister of Post and Telecommunications Sanda Oumarou.\textsuperscript{19} These northern politicians later encouraged recently dismissed Finance Minister Edourad Akame Mfoumo to defect and become the group’s presidential candidate in the CRRN. Mfoumo was reluctant, and eventually pledged his loyalty to Biya, claiming that “he owed him everything.” Underlying the northern rebellion was discontent over Biya’s nomination as president and growing rumblings about a potential successor to Biya.\textsuperscript{20}

The period between the 2004 and 2011 presidential elections was characterized by growing sensitivity within the CPDM over the issue of succession, new action to combat

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] The Herald October 6, 2004. There was an unsuccessful attempt to make Assoute the presidential candidate for the opposition front, the Coalition for National Reconciliation and Reconstruction (CRRN).
\item[17] “Money in the Pipeline” Africa Confidential 44, 16 August 8, 2003
\item[18] “Seven More Years” Africa Confidential 45, 20 October 8, 2004
\item[19] Jacques Doo Bell “Le Messager October 2 2003; Jacques Doo Bell “Rdcp: Mila Assoute desavoue par les siens” Le Messager March 12, 2004
\end{footnotes}
government corruption, and some important attempts at party revitalization. The 1996 constitution stipulated two seven-year presidential terms, meaning that 2004 was theoretically Biya’s last run. At the time the issue of succession was not discussed very openly. In June 2004, in response to a rumor that Biya had died while in Geneva, Minister of Communications Jacques Fame Ndongo asserted that “to gear up for the process of selecting a successor would be equivalent to casting seeds to the wind and thus starting a tempest in a peaceful forest.”

Biya himself claimed that discussion of succession was akin to “opening a Pandora’s Box.” On July 21, 2006, Biya convened another extraordinary congress of the CPDM to re-elect himself chair. There was a momentary opposition to his nomination from Nyong and So’o MP Tobie Ndi, whose candidacy was disqualified in advance. Biya used the occasion of the congress to castigate open discussion of succession.

Internally, the issue of succession clearly jolted several party elites as there was no natural successor who had been groomed in public life (much the same way that Biya was initially groomed by Ahidjo), or a clear way to navigate Cameroon’s delicate ethnic and regional balance. In 2007 two CPDM lawmakers, Gregoire Owona and François Foning had begun to publicly oppose presidential term limits. In January 2008, Biya told US Ambassador Janet Garvey that he intended to amend the constitution to remove term limits, and that this was necessary to end the internal jockeying for the position. On April 10, 2008 amidst the most widespread protests since the early 1990s, the constitution was amended to lift term limits. While at the time it was not clear whether Biya would actually run in 2011, several CPDM members

---

21 Christopher Boisbouvier “Cameroon: Communications Minister Queried on President’s Death Rumor” Jeune Afrique-L’Intelligent June 20-26, 2004
22 François Soudan “Paul Biya: It is Either Me or Chaos” Jeune Afrique February 9, 2008
23 Eugene Nfongwa & Roland Akong Yaounde July 19, 2006
24 “Group of Lawmakers Pushes for Biya’s Third Term” Jeune Afrique April 6, 2007
noted that this delayed a crisis in the party and gave Biya some time to plan an eventual exit from politics. But, the tenuous question of succession persisted as it became clear that there still was no consensus figure or manner for electing one within the CPDM without tearing the party apart. In March 2009, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Amadou Ali spoke candidly (and controversially) with US Ambassador Janet Garvey, claiming that it would be unacceptable to the North for Biya to nominate either another Beti or a Bamileke. Unsurprisingly, in 2011 Biya was re-elected party chair and therefore elected the presidential candidate.

This all coincided with some significant attempts at party reform. First, in 2006 Biya launched “Operations Eparvier” to combat staggering government corruption, which made Cameroon according to Transparency International one of the most corrupt countries on the planet. This program, which lasted for several years, did cause some heads to roll. By 2010 over 20 cases had been prosecuted (often under dubious judicial conditions) and 77 people had been convicted. Second, during the 2007 primary season while the central committee of the CPDM did reverse some grassroots decisions, for the most part it let over 80 sitting MPs lose their primaries in what were perceived as the most democratic primaries in CPDM history. Finally, the CPDM finally convened a third ordinary congress on September 15, 2011 – the first since 1996. The ordinary congress was an opportunity for Biya to expand the Central Committee and Political Bureau (from 250 to 350 and 22 to 30 respectively) and allow grassroots party members to finally provide some input. Likewise, it again re-elected Biya as the party chair and presidential candidate with little opposition. Prior to the congress Mfoundi MP Saint Eloi

26 Ambassador Garvey (2009-03-12) Cameroon’s Justice Minister Says North Will Support Biya, but not another Beti or Bami, WikiLeaks cable 09YAOUNDE256 Retrieved 2013-03-01. The difficulty of choosing a successor was reinforced in a later conversation with Minister of Territorial Administration Marafa Yaya (Ambassador Garvey (2009-05-29) Biya’s Succession Uncertain, Says Senior Cameroon Minister, WikiLeaks cable 09YAOUNDE482 Retrieved 2013-03-01).
Bidoung III and Tobie Ndi once again conveyed their desire to contest the candidacy, but reneged prior to the congress. During the congress itself Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform Rene Ze Nguele surprisingly opposed Biya’s nomination (the sole opposition vote) but was disqualified from submitting his own name.

During this period there were further notable defections at the national and grassroots level, reminiscent of the 1992 election cycle. After the 2007 nomination process, some disgruntled candidates began to openly support opposition candidates and express their frustration with the process. It was also reported that there was large spread defection of grassroots sections of the CPDM from parts of Far North Province. At the national level, on February 16 2010, the Director of the National Investment Company Esther Dang left to run as an independent candidate. More prominent were the protests made by Paul Abine Ayah, the MP for Manyu in South West Province. On January 3, 2011 Ayah resigned from the CPDM and joined the People’s Action Party (PAP), claiming that he feared for his life and that the “very CPDM that prides itself with practicing ‘advanced democracy’ seems to connive at, or perhaps, even encourage the ruthless condemnation of rudimentary practices of democracy such as declaring one’s candidacy for a post within the party.”

---

30 “Congres RDPC: René ZeNguélé était le seul et unique Challenger de Paul Biya au poste de President National de RDPC” Yaounde September 16, 2011
31 Le Messager February 16, 2010
### Table 9.3: National Level CPDM Defectors (1988–2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Defector</th>
<th>Date of Defection</th>
<th>Prior Position</th>
<th>Province of Origin</th>
<th>Defected To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Muna Tandeg</td>
<td>April 1988</td>
<td>President of National Assembly</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>SCNC (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Ngu Foncha</td>
<td>June 12, 1990</td>
<td>CPDM Vice President</td>
<td>North West</td>
<td>SCNC (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Jacques Ekindi</td>
<td>May 1991</td>
<td>Wouri Section Head</td>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Sengat Kuo</td>
<td>February 1992</td>
<td>Political Bureau Member</td>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri Hogbe-Nlend</td>
<td>Mid 1991</td>
<td>Paris Section Head</td>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>UPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Melone</td>
<td>Mid 1991</td>
<td>Sanaga Maritime Section Head</td>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>UPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Tomedi Ndando</td>
<td>Mid 1991</td>
<td>Women’s Wing Leader</td>
<td>South West</td>
<td>SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nucti Tchokwago</td>
<td>Mid 1991</td>
<td>Central Committee Member</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>CPC/SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Eboua</td>
<td>Mid 1991</td>
<td>President of CAMAIR</td>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garga Haman Hadji</td>
<td>August 1992</td>
<td>Minister of Public Function</td>
<td>Far North</td>
<td>ADD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Achu Mofor</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Governor East Province</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Resigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Munzu</td>
<td></td>
<td>CPDM Technical Committee on Constitutional Affairs</td>
<td>South West</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Ayssi Mvodo</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Minister of Territorial Administration</td>
<td>Center (Ewondo)</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titus Edzoa</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Minister of Health</td>
<td>South (Beti)</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Dzongang</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Central Committee Member</td>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>PPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Mila Assoute</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Former Minister of Posts and Telecommunications</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>RDMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanda Oumarou</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esther Dang</td>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>Director of National Investment Company</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Abine Ayah</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>Manyu MP</td>
<td>South West</td>
<td>PAP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Various News Reporting*
Ethnic Alliances: The Social Isolation and Realignment of the CPDM

CPDM patterns of electoral support, as shown in Figure 9.1, largely reinforce the theoretical expectations given the process of social incorporation under single-party rule. The CPDM has maintained a core constituency in South and Central Provinces (home of Biya’s own Beti ethnic group) and a core opposition in North West Cameroon. For some comparison, the left side of Figure 9.1 also represents the presidential vote-share from 1992 (the legislative elections were boycotted). The 1992 results exemplify the stark narrow social mobilization capacity of the CPDM, reminiscent of Kenyan elections. In 1992, Paul Biya was unable to muster over 30% of the vote in the Anglophone, Bamileke, and Northern regions and could only draw hegemonic vote shares from his ethnic cohorts in Center, South, and Eastern provinces. This is further indicative of the weaker formal mobilization capacity of the CPDM. Yet between 1997 and 2007 (using legislative voting data), the CPDM has been able to reconstitute an electoral hegemony by maintaining its core constituency, but also by extending its electoral support to significant parts of Eastern, Northern, and South West Province. As will be discussed below this was partially due to the organizational reach of the party, but primarily the co-optation of significant political opposition.

---

33 Data availability on constituency-level election results requires some adaptation. First, the boycotts of the legislative election of 1992 and presidential election of 1997 make comparing over years more difficult. Second, there is limited data available on presidential elections. Therefore, this section compares the 1997-2007 legislative results.
Socio-economic data at the constituency level is quite sparse (in part due to the fact that a census was not held between 1987 and 2005), but from what is available there is some correlation with CPDM vote-shares. The gender ratio, which indicates the proportion of males to females and is a proxy for under-development (“male bias”), is statistically significant. Likewise, the participation rate can indicate both under-development due to low access to polling stations or alternatively government infringement (which is why ballot invalidation is also included), is also initially significant. In both cases 1 percent increases in either translates into a 1-1.5% increase in CPDM vote-shares. This builds up to a substantive impact, especially when considering that the predicted value of CPDM vote share when the gender ratio is set at its mean (x=97.25) is 60.66%, but when changed to its maximum (x=110.9) the predicted CPDM vote
share jumps to 81.19% (all other variables kept at their mean). Similar results are obtained when considering the participation rate.\textsuperscript{34}

Unsurprisingly the correlation between CPDM vote-share and ethnicity is highly significant and substantive. Moreover, it eliminates the statistical significance of the participation rate (which is therefore likely correlated with ethnicity), reduces the significance of the gender-ratio, and increases the $r^2$ by a significant amount. Beti-dominated departments are likely to produce 30% more CPDM vote share than non-Beti departments. Adding the “grasslands” category to designate the various ethnic groupings of North West Cameroon validates the other side of the electoral story, producing CPDM vote-shares that are 20% lower than in other departments. When adding a wider spectrum of ethnic affiliations, the strongest correlation between ethnicity and CPDM vote-share remains amongst the Beti, Grasslands, Bamoum, and Fulani ethnic groups. Interestingly, Kirdi and Bamileke designations do not appear to matter. Given the historical backgrounds of the two groups and their ambiguous relationship with the CPDM this is actually to be expected. The Kirdi are the often overlooked non-Muslim majority of Far North Province and tenuously allied with the Fulani. The same is true about the Bamileke, Cameroon’s primary business community.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} At the regional level, where there is available data on socio-economic indicators there is no relationship between poverty, access to healthcare, education, or unemployment with CPDM vote-shares. However the small sample size (n=10) makes these results highly inconclusive.

\textsuperscript{35} For more on the Bamileke and their relationship to both Biya and the opposition see Arriola 2011.
Table 9.4: OLS Regression of CPDM Legislative Vote-Share (1997-2007)\(^{36}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV=Average CPDM Legislative Vote Share</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5 (“Other” Excluded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Participation Rate</td>
<td>0.922***</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.0884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.233)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Ballot Invalidation Rate</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>2.078</td>
<td>1.497</td>
<td>1.962</td>
<td>3.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.522)</td>
<td>(1.373)</td>
<td>(1.360)</td>
<td>(1.425)</td>
<td>(1.792)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Average Opposition Participation</td>
<td>-0.873</td>
<td>-1.125</td>
<td>-0.521</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
<td>-1.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.931)</td>
<td>(4.199)</td>
<td>(4.198)</td>
<td>(4.274)</td>
<td>(3.751)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Rural (2005)</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.250*</td>
<td>0.256*</td>
<td>0.267*</td>
<td>0.262*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Ratio (2005)</td>
<td>1.447***</td>
<td>1.268***</td>
<td>1.253***</td>
<td>1.304***</td>
<td>1.361***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.324)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beti</td>
<td>28.91***</td>
<td>29.02***</td>
<td>29.93***</td>
<td>35.04***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.941)</td>
<td>(5.046)</td>
<td>(5.139)</td>
<td>(6.241)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassfields</td>
<td>14.56***</td>
<td>13.13**</td>
<td>14.49*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.940)</td>
<td>(4.310)</td>
<td>(5.968)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>-8.283</td>
<td>-6.196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.689)</td>
<td>(5.683)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirdi</td>
<td>-2.922</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamileke</td>
<td>11.25*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.335)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>10.25*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.048)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-157.8***</td>
<td>-101.5**</td>
<td>-101.0*</td>
<td>-100.7*</td>
<td>-109.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42.78)</td>
<td>(37.65)</td>
<td>(38.01)</td>
<td>(38.73)</td>
<td>(36.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; \(^{*} p < 0.05, \(^{**} p < 0.01, \(^{***} p < 0.001)\)

Sources: Cameroon Tribune June 9, 1997; Le Yaounde July 22, 2002; Mutations August 13, 2007; Bureau Central 2005; Author coding based on Lewis, Simons, & Fennig 2013

Given, this analysis boils down complex ethnic groupings into imperfect categories that ease comparison. For instance, the term “grasslands” refers to a multitude of often competing ethnic groups that are very difficult to differentiate. The “other” category includes important groups like the Duala, Bassa, Bakweri, Baka, Makaa, Gbaya, and Dii. Much of this ethnic and linguistic complexity cannot be adequately captured in a statistically meaningful model. Figure

\(^{36}\) The observations for the highly urban departments of Fako and Mfounndi are excluded due to the high leverage they exhibited in post-regression analytics. It should be noted that while there is a numerical difference in urban and rural support for the CPDM (rural meaning that at least 50% living under rural conditions according to the 2005 census) it is statistically insignificant.
9.2 disaggregates some of the ascribed ethnic identities into more groups for some limited comparison. Along with the Beti, the most substantial CPDM support comes from a number of smaller ethnic groups – the Shawa Arabs of Logone-et-Chari (Far North), the Baka Pygmies of Kadey (Eastern), the Oroko of Ndian (South West) and the Bafia of Mbam-et-Inoubou (Center). Table 9.5 further shows those communities whose voter support has shifted the most over the 1997 to 2007 period. The CPDM made ethnic gains nearly across the board, but most crucially within the Bamileke community as well as some of the Grassfields and Bamoum areas.

**Figure 9.2: Average CPDM Legislative Vote Share by Ethnic Group (1997-2007)**

*Sources: Cameroon Tribune June 9, 1997; Le Yaounde July 22, 2002; Mutations August 13, 2007*

Author coding based on Lewis, Simons, & Fennig 2013
Table 9.5: Change in CPDM Vote-Share by Ethnic Community (1997-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Community</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakossi</td>
<td>64.63%</td>
<td>62.94%</td>
<td>56.18%</td>
<td>-8.45%</td>
<td>61.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroko</td>
<td>70.37%</td>
<td>81.05%</td>
<td>70.04%</td>
<td>-0.33%</td>
<td>73.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beti</td>
<td>86.17%</td>
<td>91.06%</td>
<td>88.98%</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>88.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shawa Arabs</td>
<td>69.25%</td>
<td>79.50%</td>
<td>77.28%</td>
<td>8.03%</td>
<td>75.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duala</td>
<td>34.98%</td>
<td>58.81%</td>
<td>46.74%</td>
<td>11.76%</td>
<td>46.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>57.50%</td>
<td>62.61%</td>
<td>69.35%</td>
<td>11.85%</td>
<td>63.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassa</td>
<td>40.53%</td>
<td>44.96%</td>
<td>52.96%</td>
<td>12.43%</td>
<td>46.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>41.24%</td>
<td>56.74%</td>
<td>54.90%</td>
<td>13.66%</td>
<td>50.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirdi</td>
<td>46.22%</td>
<td>60.64%</td>
<td>62.51%</td>
<td>16.29%</td>
<td>56.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakweri</td>
<td>38.36%</td>
<td>57.58%</td>
<td>57.84%</td>
<td>19.48%</td>
<td>51.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baka</td>
<td>55.86%</td>
<td>88.99%</td>
<td>79.65%</td>
<td>23.79%</td>
<td>74.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamoum</td>
<td>15.40%</td>
<td>35.30%</td>
<td>40.80%</td>
<td>25.40%</td>
<td>30.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassfields</td>
<td>23.22%</td>
<td>34.46%</td>
<td>48.98%</td>
<td>25.76%</td>
<td>35.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gbaya</td>
<td>44.39%</td>
<td>69.52%</td>
<td>71.78%</td>
<td>27.39%</td>
<td>61.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bafia</td>
<td>56.39%</td>
<td>77.35%</td>
<td>84.21%</td>
<td>27.82%</td>
<td>72.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamileke</td>
<td>30.22%</td>
<td>49.92%</td>
<td>59.79%</td>
<td>29.57%</td>
<td>46.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: National Democratic Institute 1997; Cameroon Tribune 2002; Le Yaounde 2007; Author coding based on Lewis, Simons, & Fennig 2013

A number of factors need to be considered to explain the establishment of electoral hegemony. First, Biya and the CPDM forged an alliance with the Kirdi and Fulani through Dakole Daissala’s MDR party (who joined government in 1992) and Bello Boubia Maigari’s UNDP (who joined government in 1997). Both figures would later support Biya for presidency in 2004 but continue and contest the legislative election, which explains the significant but non-hegemonic vote-shares the CPDM garners in those areas. Likewise, Biya courted Bamileke support, the financial base of the opposition, who had already begun to grow disillusioned with the opposition during the prolonged viles mortes campaign. This support never reached hegemonic vote levels but brought a significant number of voters and elites to the CPDM’s fold. Throughout the 1990s prominent Bamileke entrepreneurs found themselves in central positions in the CPDM hierarchy. During the 2004 presidential election, Biya enjoyed the official

---

37 Fonchingong 1998; Diklictch 2002; Takougang 2003;
endorsement of Cameroon’s two largest business organizations, the Groupement Inter-Patronal du Cameroun (GICAM) and the Chambre de Commerce, d’Industrie, des Mines et de l’Artisanat (CCIMA).  

Second, Biya also actively tried to undermine opposition parties in the Anglophone regions through a mixture of patronage appointments and by encouraging ethnic associations allied with the CPDM. In 1991 the position of prime minister was reinstated, and following the 1992 presidential election, Biya appointed North West’s Simon Achidi Achu as prime minister; the first time an Anglophone had held such a position. In 1996, due the inability of Achu to deliver North West votes during the 1996 municipal election, the position shifted to South West Province, first to Peter Mafany Musonge (1996-2004) and then to Ephraim Inoni (2004-2009), before returning to North West’s Philemon Yang (2009-present). This essentially split the Anglophone opposition and helped limit it to its original North West origins. Simultaneously, Biya decision to legalize and encourage ethnic associations was widely seen as a way of circumventing opposition parties, especially in Anglophone regions. The most critical of these organizations was the South West Elite’s Association (SWELA), which in 1996 merged with a broader coastal organization known as Sawa (coast in Duala). It held the explicit goal of articulating and promoting the interests of coastal peoples in reaction to the growth of the SDF among the Grassfields and Bamileke regions of North West and Western Province and Grassfield migration to South West Province (derogatorily called the Anglo-Bami hegemony). In the late 1990s, Biya attempted to replicate this by organizing traditional chiefs (known as

---

38 Takougang 2003; Arriola 2011 p.160-167. Arriola argues that the large involvement of the Cameroonian government in banking and finance made Bamileke entrepreneurs initially skeptical of Biya and his realignment of wealth toward the Beti, but ultimately dependent on the regime for continued access to financing.

39 Takougang 2003; Takougang 2004 p.82-84; Krieger 2008

40 The growth of ethnic associations and the construction of a new coastal identity in contrast with the Anglophones and Bamileke is widely documented as the politics of allogeny and autochtony in Albaugh 2011; Awasom 2004; Krieger 2008; Nyamnjoh 1999 Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998; and Socpa 2006
fons) from North West Province into the North West Elite Association (NWELA). This partially succeeded in drawing some Anglophone support away from the SDF from four main chieftaincies.  

Finally the role of organization is also important in explaining the ability of the CPDM to win hegemonic vote shares. The CPDM had retained some institutional capacity across the country and maintained control over significant mobilization tools (especially women and youth leagues). As mentioned in Chapter 7, these organizational features were the task of Charles Doumba, the organizing secretary of the CPDM. Doumba retained that post until 2007 when he was replaced by Emmanuel Rene Sadi. Sadi was tasked with renewing grassroots level of the party, and notably shuttled between CPDM sections in preparation for the 2007 election, and afterwards to heal grassroots level disagreements and disputes. This no doubt assisted in preventing grassroots defection, but also helped ensure institutional continuity in preparation for 2011. As Emmanuel Konde notes, “the CPDM has won election after election since the introduction of multiparty competitive elections in Cameroon principally because it is the best organized party in the country. From the Cell, Branch, Sub-Section, Section, Central Committee to Political Bureau, the CPDM is the only party in Cameroon that can boast a system of organization that is durable”.

While the moderate party structure of the CPDM likely helped prevent elite defection and allowed the party to effectively mobilize support during elections, it is also clearly evident that Biya was compelled to navigate the same ethnic social logic that drove Daniel arap Moi to unsuccessfully attract either Kikuyu or Luo support. The question then becomes, what factors

---

41 These are the fons of Kumbo, Bafut, Bali-Nyonga, and Mankon (Krieger 2008 p.69-74)
42 Between 2007 and 2011 Sadi ended crises in Littoral, Center, and West Provinces (Stephane Tchakam Cameroon Tribune June 25, 2007), Mfoudi (Jean François Channon Le Messager March 11, 2010).
allowed Biya to be successful where Moi was not? What explains Biya’s greater ability to build cross-ethnic alliances? The next section takes up these questions by looking at the evolution of opposition parties, the role of electoral coercion, and the crucial influence of Western linkage and leverage.

**Why Hegemony? Opposition Weakness, Electoral Coercion, and Western Leverage**

In this section I again assess the role of opposition capacity, electoral coercion, and Western leverage upon the degree of electoral competitiveness and hegemony. This section demonstrates that generally opposition parties have followed a similar fragmentary and ethnic pattern as in Kenya, but are further weakened by their inability to cooperate, their boycott of elections in 1992 and 1997, and their co-optation by the regime. Likewise, electoral coercion was notably higher in Cameroon – both the direct manipulation of the ballot process and the curtailment of civil liberties. There was very little constitutional reform and heavy handed use of gerrymandering and manipulative ballot structures to ensure legislative victories. Finally, unlike in Kenya the extent of Western linkage and leverage was extremely low. This section will show how that enabled Biya to weather economic crisis and prevented opposition parties from establishing important linkage with external powers. This negative leverage further facilitated Biya’s ability to use repression and shaped the incentives opposition parties faced.

**The Rise and fall of the Cameroonian Opposition**

In 1992 what appeared to be a robust opposition movement would over the next two decades deteriorate into an increasingly fragmented environment. The five main opposition parties – the SDF, UNDP, UDC, UPC, and MDR – have either disappeared completely, been co-opted, or fallen back on narrower ethnic communities with little party infrastructure outside of their ethnic homelands. By 2010 nearly 200 opposition parties were in existence, with only a
handful actually contesting the parliamentary elections and even fewer winning seats. Attempted cooperation between opposition parties has been a constant unfulfilled theme of the multiparty era and the decisions in 1992 and 1997 to boycott elections to this day remain a controversial issue that has possibly had a deleterious impact on the parties’ viability.

With regard to institutionalization, as noted above the original parties have quite clear sectarian origins, which is also reflected in the regional distribution of their votes. Most strikingly, Ndam Njoya’s UDC party has really only won seats in the Noun Department where he draws on his Bamoum support. Similarly, while the UPC is Cameroon’s oldest political party (banned between 1955 and 1991), its leadership is largely confined to the Littoral region and support from the coastal ethnic communities. The MDR, a Kirdi party from Far North Province was rumored to be the creation of the government. On the other hand, the UNDP’s two initial founders strove for a broader geographic representation. Bello Bouba Maigari, a northern Muslim, was a powerful figure under Ahidjo before being forced into exile after the 1984 coup attempt while Samuel Eboua was a southerner from Littoral Province. Likewise, the SDF’s strong roots in North West Province are well documented, but it has consistently been the only party able to forward candidates in all of Cameroon’s Provinces (except Far North in 2007), partially due to its early alliance with several of the Bamileke business class.

The poor institutionalization of these parties is also evident in the patterns of top-level fragmentation that nearly immediately plagued them after their legalization. Prior to the 1992 legislative election the UPC split between an external faction of former exiles led by Ndeh Ntumazah called the UPC-N and an internal faction led by Augustin Kodock called the UPC-K.

44 Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.135-136
45 For more on the opposition’s origins see Fonchingong 1998; Takougang & Krieger 1998; Dicklitch 2002; Takougang 2003; Fombad & Fonyam 2004. The most cumulative account of the SDF’s origins is Milton Krieger’s *Cameroon’s Social Democratic Front* (2008).
In 2002 CPDM defector Henri Hogbe-Nlend took another faction to form the UPC-H. Also in 1992, the UNDP split when Bouba Maigari orchestrated his selection as party chair, facilitating Eboua’s resignation (he went on to form the Movement for Democracy and Progress, MDP). Two years later, UNDP leaders Moustapha Hamadou and Issa Tchiroma essentially defected from the party when they took ministerial positions without Maigari’s approval. They were subsequently dismissed from the party and formed the National Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP), claiming it as the authentic UNDP.\textsuperscript{46}

Even the SDF, which was initially the most powerful opposition party and supposedly the most institutionalized, suffered from significant fragmentation at the national level. In 1992, the SDF had taken party construction seriously – building party offices based on wards of 100 people, institutionalizing regular meetings and accounting practices, and even founding a party newspaper called the \textit{Echo}.\textsuperscript{47} However clashes with John Fru Ndi over his leadership style and domination of the party were the cause of frequent party factionalism. In 1992, the party’s secretary-general (and Ndi’s uncle) Siga Assanga was expelled from the party, as was SDF campaign manager Bernard “Ben” Muna later in 1995. In 1998 ten of the party’s legislative representatives resigned the SDF in protests over the “perceived tribalism and authoritarianism of its leadership.” Later that year the first national vice-chairman of the party Mahamat Souleymane was dismissed for calling for an unauthorized party convention.\textsuperscript{48} By the 1999 party convention in Yaounde, Milton Krieger notes that delegates appeared much more “indigenous” and northern in orientation.\textsuperscript{49} In 2002, a large group of dissidents defected to form the Alliance of Progressive Forces (AFP), including party vice-president and one of the remaining party

\textsuperscript{46} Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.199; Ngoh 2004 p.445-448
\textsuperscript{47} Takougang & Krieger 1998; Krieger 2008 p.83
\textsuperscript{48} Dicklitch 2002 p.172; Ngoh 2004 p.447-448
\textsuperscript{49} Krieger 2008 p.84-85
figures from North Province Maidadi Saidou Yaya.\textsuperscript{50} Just a few years later in 2006, dispute over the legal chairmanship of the party precipitated yet another large defection to the AFP led by Ben Muna (who had returned to the party in 2005).\textsuperscript{51} Finally, in 2011 popular SDF figure Edith Kah Walla defected to contest the presidency as a member of the Cameroon People’s Party (CPP).\textsuperscript{52}

However, the most important split within the SDF was the emergence of a much more radical Anglophone opposition. The Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) began as an underground organization with a more militant stance toward constitutional issues. It became a formal political organization in July 1992, electing notable exile and famous author Albert Mukong as its secretary-general. The CAM was instrumental in bringing together several Anglophone groups in the city of Buea in April of 1993 under the auspices of the All Anglophone Conference (AAC I). The “Buea Declaration” called for strong federalism and the United Nations to resume its responsibilities and address issues of Anglophone sovereignty, placing direct pressure on Fru Ndi’s attempt to position the SDF as a party committed to decentralization and weaker federalism in order to retain francophone support. A year later, the AAC II convened in Bamenda and produced a declaration that warned the government that if Anglophone concerns were not addressed it would uniformly declare independence. The AAC II also gave birth to a formal organization – the South Cameroons National Council (SCNC), which attracted politicians like Solomon Muna and John Foncha. By 1995 the SCNC had produced an

\textsuperscript{50} Also included were Evariste Saidou Yaya (Communications Chief, later returned to SDF), Samuel Tchwenko (National Executive Committee member), Yves Epacka (National Executive Committee member), Kofele Kale (National Executive Committee member), Alhaji Sani (Yaounde Section President) (“Crise au SDF. Le principal parti d'opposition explose” \textit{Afrique Express} February 9, 2002
\textsuperscript{51} Georges Dougueli. “Cameroun: John Fru Ndi’s Problems” \textit{Jeune Afrique} September 19, 2006. Fru Ndi would also continue and clash with much of his Bamileke Western Province support (Guy Modeste Dzudie “Sdf: Clash entre Fru Ndi et le président provincial du Sdf-Ouest” \textit{Le Messager} October 31, 2007).
\textsuperscript{52} Remi Carayol “Africa Reportedly to Hold 18 Presidential Elections in 2011” \textit{Jeune Afrique} January 3, 2011
“Independence Program” for Southern Cameroonians. While explicitly a pressure group and not a political party, the SCNC’s support has ebbed and flowed but self-admittedly drew Anglophone support away from the SDF, especially in South West Province.

Expectedly, some more formal measures of party institutionalization illuminate the large differences in institutional capacity across parties and the comparatively weak institutionalization of the major parties. As shown in Figure 9.3 the SDF and the UNDP geographic breadth clearly outweigh the capacity of the UDC and UPC. Yet, both the SDF and UNDP have much stronger capacity to compete in their traditional areas of support – the North West, South West and West Provinces for the SDF and the Far North, North, and the northern part of Adamawa for the UNDP. These high scores along the index make it difficult to assess whether the party is actually institutionalized or simply relying on its ethnic backing. In regions outside of their ethnic homelands the SDF and UNDP have difficulty forwarding a candidate repeatedly across elections, which corresponds with scores that average below 1.

---

Figure 9.3: Cameroonian Party Institutionalization Index by Province (1997-2007)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{SDF} \\
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Adamawa} \\
\text{East} \\
\text{Far North} \\
\text{Littoral} \\
\text{North-West} \\
\text{West} \\
\text{South} \\
\text{South-West}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{UNDP} \\
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Adamawa} \\
\text{East} \\
\text{Far North} \\
\text{Littoral} \\
\text{North-West} \\
\text{West} \\
\text{South} \\
\text{South-West}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{UDC} \\
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Adamawa} \\
\text{East} \\
\text{Far North} \\
\text{Littoral} \\
\text{North-West} \\
\text{West} \\
\text{South} \\
\text{South-West}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{UPC} \\
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Adamawa} \\
\text{East} \\
\text{Far North} \\
\text{Littoral} \\
\text{North-West} \\
\text{West} \\
\text{South} \\
\text{South-West}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

Sources: Cameroon Tribune June 9, 1997; Le Yaounde July 22, 2002; Mutations August 13, 2007
Failed cooperative efforts have also hindered the opposition’s capacity to compete effectively. As in Kenya, there was a broader sense of consensus at the beginning of the multiparty era when all parties participated in the NCOPA to press for a sovereign national conference and coordinate the *villes mortes* strikes. Yet the ethno-regional divisions, differing political aspirations, and the debate over the future role of federalism tore at the coalition.\textsuperscript{54} When the UNDP, UDC, and parts of the UPC assented to talks with the regime (known as the Tripartite talks), the NCOPA fell apart. The former parties signed on to the “Yaounde Declaration” in November 1991, which postponed debate over a national conference.\textsuperscript{55} Fru Ndi and the SDF replaced the NCOPA with the Cameroon-Sovereign National Conference (ARC-SNC), but could only attract some UPC support. Another attempt at unifying behind Fru Ndi as the presidential candidate called the Union for Change also failed in bringing any substantial opposition unity. The 1992 election, both presidential and legislative, undoubtedly suffered from the lack of unity and contributed to Biya and the CPDM’s slim victory.

In subsequent elections numerous attempts at opposition coalitions have failed. The remnants of NCOPA became the Front of Allies for Change (FAC) – a conglomeration of nearly 15 parties, all except the SDF without any legislative presence. The FAC quickly dissolved when the SDF withdrew its support in 1995.\textsuperscript{56} The next most important attempt at an opposition coalition occurred before the 2004 presidential election with the Coalition for National Reconciliation and Reconstruction (CNRR) founded in November 2003. Originally the brainchild of the SDF and UDC parties, it attracted several dissident members of Northern based parties, including elements of the UNDP. The CNRR committed to elect a single presidential

\textsuperscript{54} Bouba Maigari is quoted as opposing Fru Ndi’s presidential aspirations because Cameroon was “not ready for a president who could not speak the tongue of Molière” (Gros 1995).

\textsuperscript{55} Fonchingong 1998; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.141-142; Takougang 2003; Fombad & Fonyam 2004 p.467-468

\textsuperscript{56} Fonchingong 1998; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.206
candidate, and took a national tour to familiarize the population with its endeavors. It also launched frequent protests to pressure the regime to create an electronic voter registry. To nominate a candidate, a panel of ten representatives (four from the SDF) created 15 criteria by which to score candidates. Ndam Njoya was elected as the CNRR’s presidential candidate with a score of 15/15 as compared to Fru Ndi’s 11/15, largely due to the fact that Fru Ndi did not speak French. Subsequently, Fru Ndi resigned from the CNRR to run independently as the SDF candidate.\(^57\) Since then there have been no major efforts at opposition cooperation.

With regard to legislative cooperation, as shown in Table 9.6 the CPDM has over time gained strength, but the opposition has actually done better at avoiding splitting tickets. In 1997, twenty-three seats were actually spoiled. Given the mixed system that Cameroon uses, the lack of opposition coordination was costly and would have reduced the CPDM’s legislative seat share to just below 48%. By 2007 better coordination would have mattered much less but could have reduced the CPDM’s seat-share from hegemonic to competitive levels, especially if we include the numerous districts where the CPDM vote-share was just over the 50% mark and likely impacted by fraud.\(^58\)

**Table 9.6: Potentially and Actually Spoiled Ballots**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Potentially Spoiled</th>
<th>Actually Spoiled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>49 (27.2%)</td>
<td>23 (12.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>52 (28.9%)</td>
<td>12 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>39 (21.7%)</td>
<td>9 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Potentially spoiled = Incumbent wins with less than 60% of the vote and there is more than one party contesting; actually spoiled = Incumbent wins with less than 50% of the vote

**Source:** National Democratic Institute 1993; *Cameroon Tribune* June 9, 1997; *Le Yaounde* July 22, 2002; *Mutations* August 13, 2007

\(^57\) François Soudan “How the Opposition Committed Suicide” *Jeune Afrique-L’Intelligent* September 26, 2004; “Seven more years” *Africa Confidential* 45, 20 October 8, 2004. The other CNRR candidates were Marcel Yondo and Sanda Oumarou. It should also be noted that the CNRR had minor competition from another opposition coalition led by Jean-Jacques Ekindi, the Front of Alternative Forces (FFA).

\(^58\) These type of situations most commonly occurred in Diamare Nord, Mano Danay, Mayo Tsanaga, Mongo Sud, Benoue Est, Mayo Louti, and Manyu.
Opposition capacity was also hindered by the decision of parties to boycott the 1992 legislative and 1997 presidential election. With regard to the immediate impact, the SDF’s and UDC’s boycott of 1992 contributed to the CPDM’s slim victory. The SDF actively encouraged its supporters to not show up at the polls, where there was a reportedly abysmal turnout of approximately 25%. As a result, the CPDM was able to sweep all of the North West and Foumban seats, while the UNDP and UPC picked up support from areas where turnout was much higher. The boycott of 1997 also likely contributed to Biya’s hegemonic vote-share since the CPDM only garnered 49% of the votes during the legislative election but 92.5% of the boycotted presidential vote. Over the long-term, the efficacy of these boycotts remains controversial topics within the parties, especially the SDF. In 2002, the decision to not boycott the election became a point of contention over Fru Ndi’s leadership, reflecting the disputed accounts within the party whether it has been an effective strategy or not.

More damaging to the oppositions’ prospects has been the ease by which significant elements have been co-opted into the regime, undermining the likelihood of a cross-ethnic opposition. In particular, as mentioned above it has been Biya’s ability to realign with northern barons that has been detrimental to the opposition’s prospects. The Kirdi MDR joined government in 1992 to provide the CPDM with a legislative majority. The UNDP, while critical of the defection of some of its members in 1992, found itself in government after the 1997 election when Bello Maigari and Pierre Hele took government positions. These two parties, along with elements of the UPC that had been co-opted, formed the “Presidential Majority,” which allowed them to hold on to ministerial positions even without the legislative backing in

59 Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.145
60 Takougang 2003 p.425
return for presidential support. For instance, MDR chair Dakole Daissala remained in government until 2007 despite the fact that his party lost all of its seats in 2002. In fact, the alliance with the CPDM was a cause of severe tension within the UNDP following the 2002 legislative election during which it won only a single seat. Oppositional members of the UNDP criticized the regime’s use of fraud in the election but also considered Maigari’s decision to join government as ruinous to the party.

In summary, the Cameroonian opposition reflected much of the same weaknesses that plagued the Kenyan opposition – poorly institutionalized entities that relied heavily on individual personality and ethnicity to mobilize support, which further inhibited cooperation across parties. The main difference in behavior is the success of Biya’s co-optation strategy, which has allowed the regime to reach out to ethnic communities that were not incorporated into the party and generate hegemonic vote-shares. Yet, the success of this strategy cannot be attributed solely to the greater opportunistic nature of Cameroon’s opposition parties. For a better explanation we must consider the fact that electoral coercion has also remained very high in Cameroon, parties have received very little external support, and the regime itself has been provided with stabilizing measures from Western powers.

*The Persistent Use of High Levels of Electoral Coercion*

As in Kenya, elections in Cameroon have been marked by much higher levels of electoral coercion than in Tanzania. The CPDM has been accused of repressing media and opposition parties, gerrymandering election districts, manipulating voter registration lists, impartial election monitoring, and outright voting day fraud. During the 1992 and 1997 elections, as in Kenya, the

---

61 The UPC-K supported Biya in 1992 but it was Henri Hogbe-Nlend who joined government as Minister of Science and Technology (dismissed in 2002). Kodock continued to support Biya in the Presidential Majority, and joined government in 2002 until his dismissal in 2007. As of the 2007 election the UPC had no legislative seats.
higher level of electoral coercion did not translate into hegemonic vote-shares but likely assisted Biya and the CPDM claim slim electoral victories. However, in contrast with Kenya, this coercion persisted without much hindrance for the next decade and there has been little to no constitutional improvement.

One consequence of the Yaounde Declaration of 1991 was the creation of the Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters, which met intermittently between 1993 and 1995 as various parties brought draft constitutions forward for debate. However, since the SDF and UDC had boycotted the 1992 election, Biya had little trouble finally passing a revised constitution in January 1996 (Law 96/06). The final product retained language and ideas from other draft constitutions, but essentially upheld the status quo. The state was conceived as decentralized yet unitary and Biya retained the right to appoint regional governors who could oversee locally elected councils. In addition, the included bill of rights was subject to the ambiguous “higher interests of the state.” Other opposition suggestions like the creation of a vice-presidency, a majoritarian presidential election system, or a prime minister accountable to legislature were not included. The suggestion that the executive be confined to two seven-year terms was part of the new constitution, but as noted this was amended in 2008. Similarly, while the constitution added a Senate and a Constitutional Council to oversee election disputes, neither has to date actually been created.

One important constitutional provision that did not change was the right of the executive through its control of the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) to redistrict based on the peculiar interests of any constituency. This allowed Biya to benefit greatly from gerrymandering that explicitly took geographic size into consideration when redistricting, rather than simply population size. For the 1997 legislative election, the electorate was increased from

---

63 This is well covered in Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.182-192
56 to 74 constituencies, the number of single member districts changed from 4 to 23, and the number of multi-member districts changed from 45 to 51. For the 2007 election the number of constituencies again rose to 85, now with 33 single-member districts. Generally speaking multi-member districts favor opposition parties. Therefore, the gradual move toward smaller districts is seen as benefitting the CPDM. The vast majority of these changes happened in North, Far North, and North West Provinces. In particular, in 2007 nearly every multi-member constituency in North West was split into single-member districts, and indeed the CPDM moved from claiming one seat in the region in 1997 to 9 seats in 2007.64

In real numerical terms, if seats were allocated based on population size alone the district magnitude would be quite different. Using data on national and department level populations (based on the official census of 2005 and World Development Indicators data), the ratio of population per seat ranged from 80,000 to 100,000 over the years (total population divided by 180 legislative seats). Most impacted are the urban departments of Mfoundi (Central Province), Wouri (Littoral Province) where seat allocation is approximately 10 seats below what it should be. Outside of these urban departments, on average Center Province is over-allocated 8 seats, West Province 6 seats, Eastern Province 5 seats, Littoral Province 3 seats, and South Province 3 seats. By contrast North Province is under-allocated 5 seats and Far North Province 2 seats. Only North West and South West Provinces have toed their seat distribution to actual population trends (although some individual departments are under-allocated).65 Therefore, on balance, Biya’s Southern, Center, and Eastern basis is provided a significant advantage.

The reformed constitution also did not limit the strong arm of the executive, most notably through its control of regional prefects, and ability to declare emergency law and use the armed

---

64 An excellent account of these changes and their impact on the SDF’s prospects is found in Albaugh 2011.
65 See also International Foundation for Election Systems 1997 and Albaugh 2011.
forced to back it. In 1992, John Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest and North West Province placed under curfew due to protests in reaction to the flawed legislative election. It is estimated that nearly 300 people were killed by security forces that year.66 During the 1997 campaign, North West and South West Provinces were the sites of extensive violence and frequent detentions. The provinces were again placed under curfew from March 27 until just a few weeks prior to the May election, and John Fru Ndi was detained briefly.67 At times, prefects denied opposition requests to hold meetings, even though the law simply required that they be notified (and removed that requirement during the two-week buildup to the election itself). Most remarkably, the SDF was denied a national tour in Center, North, Far North, Adamawa, and East Provinces until the official start of campaigning on May 3. This also impacted the UNDP who were denied rallies in Mbam-et-Kim (Center Province), Bipindi (South Province), and Maroua (Far North Province).68

The aggressive attitude of the government toward opposition parties continued largely unabated during the next decade, and is well-documented by human rights organizations and the U.S. State Department’s annual reports on human rights. One striking example is the illegalization of the SCNC and the arrest of its key figure Albert Mukon along with 19 others on sedition charges in 2002. In subsequent years, numerous attempts by the SCNC to organize were dispersed by security forces. In addition, the government has responded harshly to the challenges from its northern supporters and the nascent alliances in 2003 and 2004. In May 2003, the

66 Takougang 1998
67 International Foundation for Election Systems1997; Article 19 1997 p.24-28. The arrest of SDF members was not limited to North West. In January 1997, SDF North Province President Saidou Yaya Maidadi was arrested while in June 1997 SDF National Executive Committee member Jean-Michel Nintcheu was detained in Douala and SDF Center Province President Alhadji Sani was arrested in Yaounde.
68 Article 19 1997 p.22-24. One of the most marked sites of opposition repression was in the Department of Mayo Rey (North Province), where the traditional lamdio of Rey-Bouba explicitly warned opposition parties not to campaign. Human rights abuses and random detention of opposition members and supporters in illegal prisons appeared to be rampant.
authors of the “northern memorandum” were detained briefly. Between 2003 and 2004 the prefect of Wouri banned all FAF activity in his department. Both the FAF and CNRR were at times prohibited from holding rallies in Douala, Yaounde, and Center Province. Bizarrely, in August 2004 an SDF district chair, John Kohntem, was murdered by CPDM parliamentarian Gah Gwanyin Doh III. In August 2006 John Fru Ndi and other SDF members were arrested over the murder of Gregoire Diobule, who had been killed in mob violence at a contentious SDF meeting. While Ndi has repeatedly appeared in court and several others remained imprisoned for years, the charges have been continuously postponed. Finally, for the bulk of 2008 the governor of Littoral province banned all rallies and demonstrations, using the Preservation of Public Order Act.  

Similar to the aggression shown toward opposition parties, the Cameroonian media has remained one of the most repressed on the continent. Despite the liberalization of the media in 1991 through law 90/052, the executive retained extensive control over media through censorship and laws pertaining to defamation. In fact, in 1996 the press law was amended (Law 96/04) to require all publications to pass a screening by the governor of each province. Likewise, the government’s control of licensing agreements helped to diminish the impact of the growing private radio market. Therefore, while there are currently over 200 private newspapers and 70 private radio stations, only a few dozen operate regularly. Already in 1991 the government’s censorship prerogatives were used to intermittently ban several opposition papers like 

---

69 Amnesty International (Various Years); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (Various Years); “Money in the Pipeline” *Africa Confidential* 44, 16 August 8, 2003

70 For instance, according to the Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index in 1994 only 10 countries had less press freedom than Cameroon. By 2010, there were 16 countries less free than Cameroon. By contrast, according to the Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index, in 2010 there were ten countries with less press freedom (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Swaziland, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Sudan, and Eritrea).
Between 2005 and 2008 Philip Njaru, a long-standing oppositional investigative reporter, was continually harassed and at times beaten severely. Finally, in a noted 2011 case, Cameroon Express reporter Germain Cyrille Ngota was detained along with two other journalists for allegedly forging government documents and died in prison a few months later under suspicious circumstances.\textsuperscript{73}

Finally, the elections themselves have been significantly marred by fraud and only slightly improved over the years. The 1992 elections stand out as particularly fraudulent. In fact, the National Democratic Institute withdrew its observation commitment from the legislative

\textsuperscript{71} Papers were required to submit an edition for review by the prefect of each region.
\textsuperscript{72} Article 191997
\textsuperscript{73} International Foundation for Election Systems 1997; Amnesty International (Various Years); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (Various Years); Commonwealth 2004 p. 28-29
election in March and only observed the presidential election in October. A number of issues came to the fore during that election. First, in the absence of a coherent electoral code or an organization outside of the MINAT to administer elections, registration was abysmally low (4.2 million out of a population of approximately 12 million). The presidential election was called early (Biya’s term was not up until 1993), and the period for registration was limited to four months and involved handing voters a registration card. In reality, numerous voters were not given registration cards, registration lists were not published early, and on voting day there were several inaccuracies. Second, the partiality of MINAT as an election administrator became evident as opposition party representatives were at times denied entry into polling places and ballot tabulation at the sub-divisional and divisional levels occurred with little oversight. One glaring practice was the destruction of ballots at the polling stations once a vote had been counted, leaving no real way to dispute the tally. The results published by MINAT, after much delay, were different from the SDF’s parallel count that predicted John Fru Ndi the winner and showed regional discrepancies in North West, South West, and North Provinces. The legitimacy of the 1992 vote was further tarnished by the confession of the governor of Eastern Province that he had been pressured by the CPDM to produce over 60% returns for Biya.

While voting day irregularities have improved, the issues with registration and the impartiality of the election management bodies have only progressed slightly. With regard to the 1997 legislative election, the Commonwealth observation team reported that “voter’s registers were generally not available for public scrutiny three days before the poll as required by law,” and that once again vote counting became much less transparent once the tallying sheet left the

---

74 For more detail about the 1992 election and the tally discrepancy see Gros & Mentan 2003
75 National Democratic Institute 1993; Takougang & Krieger 1998 p.142-152.
polling station. They concluded that the election “suffered from a flawed base”.\textsuperscript{76} The IFES observation team echoed these conclusions, stating that “Cameroon had made little progress in the development of a democratic elections process.” In 1997, registration remained very low at approximately 4.2 million and there were over 150 appeals to the Supreme Court, overwhelmingly from opposition parties.\textsuperscript{77} Both observation teams lamented the fact that the provisions of the 1996 constitution to create a Senate and Constitutional Council were unaddressed, and instead all election organization was handled by the partial MINAT. 

During the next two election cycles there were some improvements to the election process, but still several concerns regarding registration and counting. In 2000, the government created the National Election Observatory (NEO), but it was only up and running in time for the 2004 presidential election. Once again, registration practices were not followed uniformly and the registration lists once again were not published in time to address discrepancies. For instance, several sub-divisional officers suddenly required a national identity card to register, contrary to standing law that required only a proof of identity. Likewise, while counting at the polling station was still fairly transparent, that ended once ballot boxes were transported.\textsuperscript{78} The mismanaged NEO was later scrapped and replaced with Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), a much more robust organization, but at its core still an appointed committee of 18 members. The other development prior to the 2007 and 2011 elections was the use of grant money from the United Nations Development Program to create an electronic registry. In 2011 registration actually increased by 2 million to 7.2 million people. The 2011 election was markedly improved

\textsuperscript{76} Commonwealth 1997
\textsuperscript{77} International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1997
\textsuperscript{78} Commonwealth 2004; Tuou 2009. During the 2007 legislative election, there were no external observation teams but the US embassy sent ten teams to each province and reported similar concerns as in 2004 – severe issues with registration, incidents of fraud, and also issues with the indelibility of the thumb ink used to prevent fraud (Ambassador Marquadt (2007-07-23) \textit{Cameroon Elections: Disappointing at First Blush}, WikiLeaks cable 07YAOUNDE910 Retrieved 2013-03-01).
as far as administration and counting, but external observers still noted significant issues with the accuracy of registration lists, most often due to problems with distributing registration cards. 79

Low Linkage and Leverage: Black Knight Support and Conflicting Foreign Policy Goals

The influence of low linkage and leverage is the most striking difference between the cases of Cameroon and Kenya. Throughout the multiparty era Cameroon has faced very little pressure to reform either politically or economically, which has allowed the Biya regime to skirt the issue of constitutional change, limit opposition group linkage opportunities, and weather economic crises. Looking at purely material conditions, this did not have to be the case – despite Cameroon’s moderate oil revenue it depends heavily on foreign aid and foreign direct investment. The reason for the low level of actual foreign pressure is twofold. First, Cameroon enjoys “Black Knight” support from its central patron France, which has not only prevented reform but actively engaged in supporting the Biya regime economically and politically. Second, the 2003 Iraq War and Cameroon’s presence on the UN Security Council significantly limited American involvement in democracy promotion. Much of the data in the next section comes from US embassy documents obtained through the Wikileaks project.

French support is rooted in the significant French economic interests built in Cameroon since colonialism. During the Ahidjo era French financial support was an essential factor that allowed continued economic growth and the maintenance of Ahidjo’s system of ethnic alliances. Numerous treaties of economic and military cooperation were negotiated at independence and later renegotiated in 1973 with little change. This has solidified French input into policy-making, and has kept the French in a position to provide continuous technical assistance, financial aid, and military support. Monetarily, the Cameroonian system is tied to the Franc through its

inclusion in the Central African Franc Zone, leaving an important monetary policy tool in the hands of an external government, but also facilitating greater French investment. During the Ahidjo period, between 20% and 60% of Cameroonian exports were to France, while between 45% and 55% of imports were from France. Under Biya, the relationship with France appeared to cool down, especially since France allowed Ahidjo to live in Paris in exile. Biya only visited France for the first time after the Bamenda Conference of 1985. However, it was under Biya that the French interest in oil also became much deeper. The French owned oil company Elf-Aquitaine (later absorbed by Total) accounted for nearly 68% of Cameroonian oil production.

In practice, this has translated into important French financial support for the Biya regime during moments of crisis. During the *villes mortes* campaign while France was cutting aid to countries like Benin and Mali, it increased Cameroon’s aid from 385 million francs to 519 million francs. Following the highly fraudulent 1992 legislative election, while Germany and the United States cut Cameroonian aid, France arranged for Biya to receive a $45 million loan through Elf-Aquitaine. In 1993, France provided another $53 million to pay civil servant salaries, while the IMF rescinded loans. The following year France wrote off $534 million of Cameroon’s debt. In 1995, when the Franc was devalued by 50% the French government helped Cameroon secure $101 million in standby credit from the IMF.

By 1997, through French pressure the IMF had reestablished a new $221 million structural adjustment loan that also allowed Cameroon to renegotiate nearly $2 billion of its debt with the Paris Club. Despite very limited improvements in government transparency the IMF

---

81 Cosse 2006. Along with oil, there are as of 2010 approximately 200 French companies in Cameroon or French business holdings – Orange telecommunications, Cameroon Railways, SODECOTON, Group PHP, Bollore, Cementcom.
82 Cumming 1995
84 Arriola 2012
approved a $121 million PRGF loan in 2000, a $26.8 million PRGF loan in 2005 (only disbursed in 2007), and a $144 million Exogenous Shocks Facility loan in 2009 to cope with the global recession of 2007-2008. In fact, as Figure 9.4 shows, during the recessionary years of the early 1990s when the Biya regime was at its most vulnerable bilateral aid actually increased, largely through French assistance. In later years, when bilateral aid declined Biya was able to secure significant IMF disbursements. When those programs ran their course, Cameroon saw its bilateral aid increase, again largely with French support. One of result of French aid is that Biya has avoided some of the most significant banking reforms demanded by the IMF. As Leonardo Arriola carefully documents, Cameroon is one of only three African countries where the number of commercial banks has actually declined since multiparty elections. As a result, the dominant role of the state in banking has prevented opposition parties from access to important sources of revenue.

Figure 9.4- Bilateral Aid and IMF Disbursements to Cameroon (1990-2010)

Source: World Bank Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund

---

85 International Monetary Fund (Various Reports)
86 Arriola 2011 p.123. The unusual presence and influence of the French in Cameroon has not gone unnoticed by both French and American observers. In 2007, French Ambassador Truquet noted that incoming French president Nicolas Sarkozy would have to reevaluate the French footprint in Cameroon given the disproportionality between its assistance and limited interests in the country (Ambassador Marquadt (10-24-2007) Sarkozy-Biya Summit: A French View from Cameroon, WikiLeaks cable 07YAOUNDE1271 Retrieved 2013-03-01)
French Black Knight support of Cameroon has also had important political influence that shaped Biya’s decision-making and shielded Cameroon from pressure from other Western powers. Primarily, this has involved downplaying issues of governance and democratic reform in favor of regional stability. For instance, following the highly fraudulent 1992 legislative election, President Mitterand infamously sent a congratulatory letter to Biya while other ambassadors in the country were publicly condemning the conduct of the elections. In 1993, the French ambassador to Cameroon Yvon Omnes ended his tenure and joined the Cameroonian government as a technical advisor to the president. During the Chirac years, the Franco-African summit was conducted in Yaounde where he seated Biya next to him and referred to him as “his good friend.” In 2004, to much criticism, Chirac sent his congratulations to Biya before the results were certified by the Supreme Court and while other embassies had not yet endorsed the election.

Most strikingly after Nicolas Sarkozy’s victory in the French election in May 2007, some noted a possible change in the degree of French assistance to Cameroon. Yet within days of Paul Biya’s first visit with Sarkozy in July, the CPDM began calling for constitutional change to remove term limits. It was popularly understood that Biya had travelled to Paris actually to ask permission to change the constitution. The French response to U.S. inquiries about their position on the constitution was that “France sees the ongoing debate about changing the constitution as an internal affair for Cameroonians to decide. France will not make statements or press Biya on the term limit issue”.

---

87 Dicklitch 2002; Gros 2003
88 Alain Batongue Mutations October 19, 2004; International Crisis Group 2010
their discussions with their French counterparts was that “The French are focused on encouraging stability for both regional security reasons and to benefit commercial interests. The French government is in a position to influence Biya’s political calculations. If they chose to more actively engage Biya on democracy and good governance, the French might be able to improve their image among average Cameroonians”.  

The leverage of other external powers like Great Britain and the United States has also been very limited. While Anglophone opposition parties had hoped for more support from Great Britain, Biya negotiated Cameroon’s entrance into the Commonwealth in 1995. This provided Biya with increased commerce with Britain, but also helped isolate the Cameroonian opposition from external sources of support. In 1997, the SDF inaugurated its first chapter in London, yet already faced a robust CPDM presence amongst the Cameroonian diaspora. Likewise, while there have been numerous international observer teams at nearly every Cameroonian election, their ties with domestic observation groups have been severely limited. According to limited data during the 1997 and 2004 elections international observation groups were not engaged in domestic training, and there were only approximately 1,400 domestic observers (in comparison with Kenya’s 15,000).

With regard to the United States more specifically, attempts at pressuring Biya into domestic reforms were overshadowed by a conflicting foreign policy goal - the fact that Cameroon became a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in 2002, during the buildup to the Iraq War. The initial Cameroonian position, influenced by the French, was to support continued weapons’ inspections. The U.S. began an extensive lobbying effort to

91 Ambassador Garvey (2009-09-10) Cameroon’s Complicated Relationship with France, Wikileaks cable 09YAOUNDE769 Retrieved 2013-03-01
92 Amin 2004 p.172
93 Tikm Mbah Azonga “Can Fru Ndi Prevail” West Africa May 12-17 1997
94 Kelley 2012
persuade Cameroon not to oppose U.S. backed resolutions. Biya was promised bilateral trade concessions, military aid (surplus weaponry and $2.5 million in training and education), and political support over the Bakassi Peninsula dispute (the oil-rich peninsula deemed by the International Court of Justice in 2002 to be Cameroonian territory, yet only transferred in 2006). In 2002, Biya had a one-on-one meeting in Paris with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Walter Kansteiner and a telephone call with President Bush. On the eve of the American invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, Biya was President Bush’s White House guest. At a press conference, Biya was congratulated by President Bush on his record of reform and privatization.

This placed the United States in an awkward position between trying to promote the Bush administration’s democratic reform initiative with their commitment to Biya. Tellingly, in 2009 Ambassador Janet Garvey noted that a meeting with President Obama might “provide an opportunity to thank Biya for his unwavering pro-American stance on many important issues (especially the Iraq war and investment in Cameroon)” but also to “encourage him to move forward with political and economic liberalization”. Indeed, the American response to election irregularities and governance to that point was rather tepid. In 2007, Ambassador Niels Marquardt took a fairly drastic step by “blacklisting” Cameroonian Finance Minister Abah Abah over conspicuous corruption. Yet, he also deliberately withheld comment on the 2007 legislative election. In 2008 the US government took a critical stance toward Biya’s constitutional amendment, including a widely reported speech by Ambassador Garvey and a visit from Deputy

95 “Caught in the Crossfires” *Africa Confidential* March 2003.
98 07YAOUNDE732 2007-06-07 Marquadt; 07YAOUNDE741 2007-06-08 Marquadt
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs James Swan. Yet the language of Garvey’s speech was deliberately non-confrontational, stating that “we acknowledge every country’s right to change its constitution and in our experience term limits and periodic leadership change – at least every decade – are healthy for democracy”. In 2009, the U.S. gathered other diplomatic missions to boycott the swearing-in ceremony of the ELECAM election commission, but there was no further substantial U.S. action.

The inability of the U.S. government to significantly impact Cameroon’s democratic progress was in fact highlighted in a self-reflective embassy brief from 2009 commenting on 50 years of U.S. commissions in Cameroon. In it, Ambassador Garvey notes Cameroon’s contribution to the war in Iraq resolution, as well as their abstention from voting on the Goldstone Report on the Gaza Conflict in 2009. Simultaneously, she notes the leadership of the American mission in criticizing corruption, electoral fraud, and the 2008 constitutional amendment. Yet, she starkly concludes that outside of polite conversation “it is difficult to say that we have substantially moved the ball on the things that matter most to us” and that Cameroon has never had a free and fair election. Garvey recommended much more aggressive U.S. engagement with Cameroon including more senior level engagement, a series of political tripwires to guide U.S. policy, closer work with EU nations, a Washington-led effort to pressure France, and sharper coercive tools such as visa denials.

To conclude, low Western linkage and leverage has operated through four causal mechanisms. First, French monetary stabilization provided Biya with the necessary support at

100 Ambassador Garvey (2008-02-20) Cameroon: Ambassador Engages on Constitutional Change, Wikileaks cable 08YAOUNDE167 Retrieved 2013-03-01
102 Ambassador Garvey (2009-11-13) Rethinking our Approach to Cameroon, Wikileaks cable 09YAOUNDE971 Retrieved 2013-03-01
periods of crisis, therefore limiting the propensity toward defection and also limiting the opposition’s ability to gain access to finance. Second, French political support has shielded Biya from international scrutiny during elections, while providing him with the political backing to amend the constitution. As a result, Biya and the CPDM have avoided a succession crisis, which given the internal haggling likely would have split the party. Third, the opposition’s low linkage with external powers has deprived it of both material and political support and limited the extent of election observation, both domestic and international. Fourth, conflicting U.S. policy goals have impeded their ability to effectively push for democratic reform and counter French influence.

The inability, or unwillingness, of Western powers to significantly use their leverage over Cameroon has had significant consequences for the trajectory of electoral authoritarianism. Unlike in Kenya, Biya and the CPDM regime have remained unencumbered by constitutional reform and have been able to use persistent high levels of electoral coercion. Concurrently, the lack of political and economic reform and the low levels of linkage with Western powers have weakened an already fragile and divided opposition movement. With little recourse or real option of operating as a legislative actor, opposition parties could either bandwagon with the regime as the MDR, UPC, and UNDP, or risk falling into obscurity like the SDF and UDC. The decimation of the opposition through repression and co-optation has left the CPDM as the only viable political party left in the country, and paved the way for the CPDM to institute a repressive hegemony.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that Cameroon’s weaker party capacity has impeded its ability to compete in multiparty elections. The party provided little in the way of elite integration or
mechanisms for mitigating elite disputes, which as expected has led to frequent rifts within the party, numerous defections, and internal crisis over the issue of succession. The narrow social coalition underpinning the CPDM is also associated with regional patterns of voter support that coincide with Cameroon’s complex ethnic tapestry. Still, since the party was never completely neglected under single-party rule and maintained a fairly wide geographic presence, it was able to deter some defection and organize relative effectively for elections.

However, this chapter has also contended that this more moderate party capacity is not primarily responsible for the CPDM’s ability to establish a repressive hegemony. Rather, this chapter has highlighted the role of a number of interconnected contingent factors – the inherent weakness of Cameroon’s opposition parties, the persistent use of high levels of electoral coercion, and especially the role of low Western linkage and leverage. Combined, these factors helped ensure that Biya was able to avoid the harshest kinds of economic and political pressures and punt on the issue of succession, which limited further elite defection. Importantly, these factors helped Biya successfully co-opt significant portions of the opposition and improve the CPDM’s vote-share to hegemonic levels.
Chapter 10: CONCLUSION

What explains the observed variation in electoral authoritarian outcomes amongst Africa’s former single-party regimes? Why are some regimes able to dominate elections with comparatively less fraud and coercion? This dissertation has explored these questions by drawing attention to the process of party construction and social incorporation under single-party rule. Through a typological theory that compared ten cases of former African single-party regimes and individual case-studies of Tanzania, Kenya, and Cameroon, I have argued that there were important differences in the types of investments single-party regimes placed into party institutions and how they conceived of social constituencies. These factors provided regimes with different institutional platforms through with which to contest multiparty elections and were the primary factors explaining why some regimes transitioned to what was termed here a competitive hegemony, rather than a repressive hegemony or a repressive electoral authoritarian regime.

When single-party regimes elevated the party as an important political decision-maker, institutionalized party practices, and maintained credible avenues for elite recruitment and promotion, they were able to rely on organizational sources of cohesion and were less likely to experience defection or succession crises during multiparty elections. Likewise, single-party regimes that targeted broadly-defined social categories for incorporation such as rural peasants and avoided logics of ethnic mobilization or urban bias were able to rely on substantial voter support during multiparty elections. This reduced the necessity of engaging in repressive behavior while also guaranteeing regime stability and repeated large voter support. The case-study of Tanzania was used to exemplify these processes, while also showing how opposition
capacity, electoral fraud, and resource asymmetry were less relevant for explaining competitive
hegemonies than the institutional benefits enshrined during single-party rule.

In other single-party regimes the party was in reality a less relevant or completely
irrelevant institution. Rather, the regime was dominated by a strong executive who maintained a
system of rule through their control of patronage resources and repressive institutions (and
crucially the absence of electoral contestation). Parties were at times, yet most explicitly in
Kenya, utterly neglected as institutions of governance or elite integration and instead served as a
tool of political control and material distribution. Often this was associated with much higher
saliency afforded to ethnicity. While dominant executives at times strived to keep a semblance of
ethnic or regional balance, they in fact enshrined what Bratton and van de Walle have termed the
neo-patrimonial character of the African state and used their control of the levers of power to
elevate their own ethnic cohorts.¹ As shown in Kenya and Cameroon, these regimes transitioned
to an electoral authoritarianism that was much more repressive and correlated with higher
degrees of elite defection, succession tension, and narrow voter mobilization along ethnic lines.

Furthermore, in repressive cases of electoral authoritarianism I argue that subsequent
trajectories are much more contingent. While the typological theory indicates that under
competitive conditions longer-term economic performance might be a regime’s eventual Achilles
Heel, under repressive conditions three interconnected factors were singled out and discussed in
the context of Kenya and Cameroon – opposition capacity, the degree and consistency of
electoral coercion, and Western leverage and linkage. Not surprisingly, given the more
repressive starting conditions in these regimes opposition capacity tended to be much weaker
than in competitive hegemonies. Yet arguably, the main factor differentiating repressive

¹ Bratton & van de Walle 1997; van de Walle 2003
hegemonies from repressive electoral authoritarian regimes is the role of Western leverage and linkage.

Here the comparison between Kenya and Cameroon becomes quite vivid. In Kenya, Western powers and in particular the United States used contingent aid strategically to force the Moi regime into significant economic and political reform. Likewise, Western linkage with Kenya was much higher and led to closer ties between Western powers and Kenya’s fragile opposition movement. This led to a number of critical factors that undermined Moi’s ability to generate electoral hegemony – it kept the regime in perpetual crisis, helped push KANU into a succession crisis in 2002, empowered opposition parties while limiting potentially detrimental behavior such as boycotts, paved the way for moderate yet important constitutional reform, and greatly increased the extent of election observation.

On the other hand, Cameroon was not only less susceptible to Western leverage due to its access to oil revenues, but enjoyed significant Black Knight support from France and limited political pressure from the United States due to conflicting foreign policy goals over the Iraq War of 2003. Likewise, Cameroon’s opposition parties were denied significant links with foreign powers such as Great Britain or the United States. As a result, Biya and the CPDM were not as impacted by the economic crisis of the early 1990s and the recession of 2007. Political and economic reform remained limited, electoral coercion remained much higher across elections, and Biya was easily able to amend the constitution in 2008 to abolish term-limits and run again in 2011. As a result, defection never opened a floodgate, the issue of succession was averted, and opposition parties were much more easily co-opted to provide the CPDM with the vote-share it needed to establish a repressive hegemony.
This dissertation has also attempted to bridge three sets of literatures, with broader implications that I discuss below. First, I have engaged with the literature on authoritarian parties and more specifically single-party regimes by using our current state of theory to expand on the range of sources used to evaluate their capacity. Second, I have tried to provide more nuanced ways of conceptualizing electoral authoritarian outcomes. While I have avoided explicitly theorizing about democratization or even authoritarian breakdown, there are implications for these lines of inquiry. Third, this dissertation has interacted with the literature on African elections and attempted to paint a much more varied experience of single and multiparty regimes than is often presented in work that strongly stresses neo-patrimonialism or ethnicity as the essential driving forces of African politics.

**Taking Authoritarian Parties More Seriously**

Scholars are growingly aware that political parties are key institutions in sustaining authoritarianism. Yet this finding only holds if parties reflect what we theoretically assume they are supposed to do. When considered as institutions that bind or integrate elites (especially through their ability to credibly commit) and that allow for the incorporation and mobilization of important social sectors, when single-party regimes transitioned to multiparty elections some clearly failed at sustaining those functions. Indeed, the term “single-party regime” masks what were essentially dissimilar regimes that were able to survive for similar periods of time largely due to the continued closed nature of electoral politics. Once economic crisis and regional pressures forced regimes into political liberalization, trajectories clearly took on a varied pattern.

The use of the terms *structural articulation* and *social robustness* were meant to take party construction more seriously and to provide a solution to the issues noted in classifying single-party regimes and authoritarian parties in Chapter 2. Rather than observing moments of
regime formation or using more descriptive means of designating parties or single-party regimes, the terms are meant to provide observational criteria of the party in practice that are theoretically grounded. If parties are to provide credible commitments then one should consider more than simply their physical scope or the revolutionary zeal of their founding figures, but also their inner-workings and practices.² Likewise, if parties perpetuate authoritarianism through mass mobilization, one should look beyond formal institutions of mobilization to consider the historic evolution of the party and its relationship with conceived social constituencies.³ Taking this deeper view of authoritarian parties is particularly important when analyzing single-party regimes that had decades to develop these institutional capacities.

While these insights are primarily meant for better understanding the single-party context, they can possibly be extended to understand a wider range of electoral authoritarian regimes. In the African context this would include revolutionary movements that formed political parties such as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in Ethiopia or the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, as well as military regimes that formed political parties in the years prior to holding elections such as the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) in Equatorial Guinea or the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) in Burkina Faso. While these parties did not have decades of institutional history behind them, differences in how their parties evolved might help explain their electoral authoritarian trajectories. In these cases the criteria for observation might be slightly different than the single-party context. Moreover, since these regimes built their parties essentially from scratch the analytical focus shifts to what factors facilitated party institutionalization or wider social incorporation.

² Levitsky & Way 2010
³ Magaloni 2006
This study does provide some observations about the conditions that facilitate strong party construction that are worth mentioning. First, the role of rural politics is still especially important in the African context and central in understanding the evolution of African single-party regimes. For comparison purposes, in 1960 in Tanzania, Kenya, and Cameroon rural populations were about the same proportion of the total population, at around 90%. By 2010, this proportion had dropped to 80% in Tanzanian and Kenya, but to a much lower 42% in Cameroon.\(^4\) This is indicative of Ahidjo’s ineffective attempts at rural development, which were overshadowed by the urban and ethnic bias of the regime. The size of rural populations of course tells us very little (as noted in the insignificance of this factor in the statistical models in Chapter 7-9). In Tanzania it was the importance of subsistence-based rural sectors as opposed to cash and export crop producers that formed the backbone of the CCM regime. It is also important to again note that social incorporation does not necessarily convey any sense of deep affection between a party and a constituency, only an affinity or even dependency that is difficult to break.

Second, the role of ideology also appears as crucial in providing the necessary cover for forming more articulate party structures or embarking on more robust modes of social incorporation. There is an echo here of Samuel Huntington’s central inferences regarding how revolutionary single-party regimes were more likely to transform into a more pragmatic stage.\(^5\) While Huntington at the time did not see this as especially relevant for African states, it is no coincidence that the rise of socialism was much more pronounced in regimes with more articulate and robust party structures (Mozambique, Seychelles, and Tanzania). In the case of Tanzania, the emergence of \textit{ujamaa} as the central development guideline provided Julius

---

\(^4\) World Bank Development Indicators
\(^5\) Huntington 1970
Nyerere with the necessary cover to re-launch TANU after five years of significant internal strains and an attempted military coup.

Third, there is central tension that underlies the description of party evolution in Tanzania, Kenya, and Cameroon. The narratives presented in chapter 4-6 attempted to reconcile the differing structural conditions of each case with the conscious decisions of participant actors. At independence ethnicity in Tanzania already had a lower saliency and there was not a significant capital or land-owning class that could shape politics. Nor was Nyerere part of a political elite but a school teacher by training. By contrast, ethnicity was already engrained during the colonial era in Kenya and Cameroon. In Kenya, the Kikuyu capital class, which was sturdily tied to Kenyatta, had a large say in the trajectory of party building. In Cameroon, legacies of northern alienation and under-development held some sway over Ahidjo, as did the tensions between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon. Each founding leader was faced with a different set of constraining circumstances, so does the party simply reflect the structural conditions in place after colonialism?

The answer is that to some extent this is true, but that this does not matter much for the theory offered here. While these structural conditions undoubtedly constrained leaders, the narratives have argued that there was central element of choice involved and a role to play for leadership. Tanzania’s experience of party building and socialism was actually contrary to several of the initial social forces at play and cannot be disassociated from the choices and leadership style of Julius Nyerere. Likewise, I have tried to show how leaders like Jomo Kenyatta faced pressure from elements of his party to reform itself and to address issues of landlessness. Given Kenyatta’s temperament, he chose not to counter the social structures in place after colonialism but to build a regime upon them. Likewise, Ahmadou Ahidjo initially had
a much stronger party in place in northern Cameroon, which was consciously weakened due to Ahidjo’s concerns with centralizing state power in the executive and unifying Cameroon.

Regardless, the thrust of this dissertation is that starting conditions matter but what is more crucial is what institutions evolved as a consequence of those starting conditions. Path dependent stories rooted in critical junctures often have difficulty of addressing the issue of path reproduction or risk being overly deterministic. By adding both an element of choice to the process of party formation and utilizing observational criteria of the party in practice I have sought to avoid these pitfalls. My argument is that multiethnic societies do not necessarily lead to repressive electoral authoritarian outcomes, but those that do not avoid the logic of ethnic mobilization under single-party rule are much more likely to have weaker parties and narrower social constituencies, which ultimately influences how they contest multiparty elections.

**Implications for the Study of Electoral Authoritarianism**

Elections have clearly not been the death knell of authoritarianism but they do provide for a fascinating puzzle. Since elections open up regimes to greater vulnerability, why have some been more successfully adaptive than others? Moreover, do all electoral authoritarian regimes adapt similarly? The answer from this dissertation is that clearly not. By shifting attention away from simply comparing survival versus breakdown, it allows us to better understand the sources of [*authoritarian durability*](#). Indeed, the terms “survival” and “durability” are often conflated in the study of electoral authoritarianism. For instance, Levitsky and Way placed Cameroon and Tanzania under the same banner of “stable authoritarianism,” simply due to the fact that they have both survived multiparty elections for similar periods of time.\(^6\) This tells us very little about the sources of their electoral success and survival.

\(^6\) Levitsky & Way 2010
Providing more categories for classifying election outcomes (and by delving deeper into the inner-workings of authoritarian parties) lets us see how election outcomes are created differently across cases. Competitive hegemonies like Tanzania under CCM, Mozambique under FRELIMO, or even Seychelles under the SPPF reflect durable forms of authoritarianism that are able to rely on deeper institutional investments to repeatedly produce the same election results. In these cases large vote-shares are indicative of strong party capacity to both retain elites and mobilize social support. By contrast, repressive regimes like Cameroon under the CPDM, Gabon under the PDG, or Kenya under KANU reflect much more brittle regimes and are much more sensitive to short-term changes. For instance, Cameroon’s eventual hegemony is not only due to the capacity of its party, but its ability to withstand crisis, deflect on the issue of succession, and co-opt opposition parties.

Distinguishing survival from durability also challenges the contention that repeated unfair elections inevitably translates into more open electoral conditions and eventual democratization. This dissertation has deliberately avoided explicitly theorizing about democratization precisely in order to avoid this teleology. In fact, the case of Tanzania shows how lower levels of electoral coercion have stabilized below a democratic threshold, and that this is a sign of electoral authoritarian durability rather than improvement. In cases like Cameroon, repeated elections have clearly not led to improved electoral conditions. By 2011, some election observers noted marginal improvements, but this was likely the result of the fact that the opposition in Cameroon had been so heavily repressed for so long or co-opted by the CPDM that repression was less needed. Given this understanding, improved electoral conditions at times reflect a regime that is more confident in itself rather than one pressured or socialized into reform.

---

7 Lindberg 2006, 2011
While not as engaged with the question of democratization, this dissertation has provided insights into the potential for turnover or electoral authoritarian breakdown. As noted, in competitive hegemonies the deeper institutional roots of the regime require taking a much longer time perspective when contemplating turnover. In the case of Tanzania this involves the gradual erosion of the organizational sources of cohesion that have served CCM for so long and demographic change that is making urban politics much more relevant. This does not mean that opposition actors will have no role in this process, only that they must play a much longer and different game. Indicatively, Chapter 6 showed how Tanzania’s opposition parties have likely understood this and are in fact stronger than perhaps previously assumed or expected. The most successful opposition party to date, Chadema, has clearly considered the long-term with a focus on stronger institutionalization of the party at the national and grassroots levels.

In repressive regimes with poorly institutionalized parties, marginal changes can make a much bigger impact and one that appears especially important is executive succession. As seen in the cases of Kenya and Cameroon the presence or absence of conflict over elite succession can have important consequences, and this appears to be the case in other instances as well. In Gabon the PDG selected Omar Bongo’s son Ali Bongo as the 2009 presidential candidate, leading to the defection of the sitting prime-minister and interior minister. In 2005 Omar Bongo won 79.1% of the presidential vote, but in 2009 Ali Bongo could only muster 41.7%. In Djibouti, while election results did not change much, the 1999 transition from Hassan Gouled Aptidon to his nephew Ismail Omar Guelleh led to the defection of former FRUD spokesman Abatte Ebo Adou. In Côte d’Ivoire, after succession from Félix Hophouët-Boigny to Henri Konan-Bédié the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) was formed by disillusioned PDCI ministers. Highly repressive measures

---

8 Linel Kwatsi “Gabon PM Quits to run for President as Independent” Reuters July 17, 2009
employed during the 1995 election ultimately helped provoke the military coup of 1999. In Togo, following the death of Gnassingbé Eyadéma in 2005 the military stepped in to name his son Faure Gnassingbé as president and controversially prevent elite conflict over succession.

Under repressive conditions the impact of opposition behavior is also quite different. As shown in Chapter 3 and the cases-studies of Kenya and Cameroon, repressive regimes strongly diminish the prospects for opposition party institutionalization and cooperation. Given the greater weakness of incumbent regimes in these cases, this weaker opposition capacity has allowed incumbent parties to slip by narrowly and survive, especially during founding elections. After founding elections the relationship is less direct. Since opposition capacity is strongly correlated with both the regime’s ability to continuously use coercive means and its’ ability to resist crisis, opposition parties face a dilemma – bandwagon with the regime or risk being the “last man standing” in opposition. This is what apparently happened in Cameroon, where now only remnants of the SDF and UDC remain staunchly oppositional. Parties that are able to resist the temptation to bandwagon, as in Kenya, are more likely to keep regimes on their toes. But again, it helps if the regime is on its toes to begin with.

This brings us to another set of actors that appear to be the most important factor in explaining electoral authoritarian outcomes – external powers. Levitsky and Way are correct to note that linkage and leverage are crucial factors in explaining the survival of electoral authoritarianism. This dissertation makes three slight corrections to that thesis. First, it is only in the context of weak party capacity and repressive regimes that this matters. Second, there is a role for linkage in the African context as evident in the case of Kenya. Third, there are important conflicting foreign policy goals in Africa as well that hinder democracy promotion in the region.

---

10 Toungara 2001
11 Terry Leonard “Togo Succession an Affront to Democracy” Associated Press February 9, 2005
Moreover, this dissertation has elaborated on some of the specific ways through which linkage and leverage operate that are summarized schematically in Figure 10.1. First, low linkage and leverage can lead to persistently high electoral coercion, either through direct repression and electoral fraud or by deferring constitutional reform. Second, it can also create impotent opposition parties with little political empowerment or financial capacity (especially if low leverage helps regimes manage the process of economic liberalization). Moreover, low levels of linkage diminish an opposition’s ability to develop a domestic election observation capacity, which further allows the regime to use persistent high coercion. Finally, low linkage and leverage provides political and economy stability. In the cases described here this has involved measures like political support for abolishing term limits and financial support to maintain ruling coalitions and avoid real economic liberalization. As a result, opposition parties were more likely to become co-opted and elite defection was likely to slow, leading to repressive hegemony.

**Figure 10.1- A Potential Path to a Repressive Hegemony**

![Diagram of a Potential Path to a Repressive Hegemony]

**Implications for African Politics and Democracy**

The third impetus for this project was to examine the status of African democracy and to highlight the diversity of African politics. In their seminal work on African democracy, Bratton and van de Walle argued that neo-patrimonialism was the heritage that distinguished Africa from
other regions, and that it would define the continent’s future democratic credentials.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, Chabal and Daloz argued that the “instrumentalization of disorder” was derivative of the patrimonial nature of the African state.\textsuperscript{13} An indeed the current state of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is tenuous. Turnover has been elusive, political instability continues to plague several countries, and in some cases where opposition parties did in fact overturn incumbent governments, subsequent regimes have simply continued authoritarian practices. Is Africa therefore doomed to the logics of “Big Man” politics?

The answer offered here is not to deny the impact of neo-patrimonialism, but to place it in context. First, the assumption that African states are all dominated by overwhelmingly strong presidents is clearly untrue, and much recent research has gone to identify cases where African executive power has been limited by factors like term-limits or by increasingly strong legislatures.\textsuperscript{14} This dissertation has offered another way by which executive power is limited – through their political party. The Tanzanian case offers an example of how a political party was afforded significant decision-making authority and actually institutionalized so that one could credibly observe its formal functioning. Part of the current challenge for CCM is to reconcile its factions that want to see this formality better implemented with those who strive to undermine it by using the party to create personal patronage networks.

Second, it is also untrue that ethnicity has inevitably formed the basis of all African regimes and politics. Ethnicity at times did become highly politicized under colonial rule for several reasons mentioned here, amongst others the use of regionalism or the uneven spread of economic gains. This proved either a difficult hurdle to overcome or a source of political capital manipulated by founding presidents. When ethnicity became the foundation of political strength

\textsuperscript{12} Bratton & van de Walle 1997 p.269  
\textsuperscript{13} Chabal & Daloz 1999  
\textsuperscript{14} Barkan 2008; Cheeseman 2010; Posner & Young 2003
and engrained under single-party rule, it proved much more difficult to overcome as regimes transitioned to multiparty elections, which likely simply exacerbated these tendencies. In these instances, ethnic mobilization not only undermined incumbent regimes, but also made it very difficult for opposition parties to coalesce and cooperate.

Yet the case of Tanzania also indicates that African political parties can be integrative institutions with important consequences for subsequent political developments. This highlights the fact that ethnic or sectarian identities are part of a menu of potential identities that only at times become congruent with political aspirations. Not only has CCM diminished the saliency of ethnicity in politics but has bridged the important religious divide of the country. The rotation of CCM’s presidential candidate from a Christian (Nyerere) to a Muslim (Mwinyi) to a Christian (Mkapa) and back to a Muslim (Kikwete) serves this purpose. This is not to deny that overcoming inherent social division is an easy task, but only that it is possible. Indeed, during multiparty elections CCM frequently utilizes the fear of ethnic division (as did KANU and the CPDM) to castigate opposition parties, which itself is manipulative of ethnic identity. Likewise, the continued resistance to CCM on Zanzibar risks exacerbating relations between Muslims and Christians on the mainland.

Third and related to the issue of ethnicity, competitive clientelism or the fragmentation of political parties in order to gain access to political spoils is not a uniform feature of African political systems. Looking again to Tanzania, what is remarkable is that opposition parties like Chadema and to some extent CUF have been able to branch out from their initial narrow ethnic setting to become more akin to a truly national party. While at first glance this might seem

---

15 See Posner 2005 and Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010
16 Moreover, since the 2010 election there has even been discussion of bridging the gender gap by nominating Asha Rose-Migiro the former UN Deputy Secretary General (Frank Kimboy “Migiro Factor Fuels 2015 Polls Debate” The Citizen January 23, 2012).
17 Heilman & Kaiser 2002
counter-intuitive given CCM’s dominance, this is actually to be expected given the type of regime they are forced to contend with. CCM offers opposition parties an organizational model that they self-consciously emulate as they see it perform successfully during elections. Moreover, the strong institutionalization of CCM makes it difficult for opposition parties to attract defectors to mobilize their parties, or conversely for top leadership to defect to CCM. This compels parties, or at least those that learn this lesson, to focus on institutionalization and gradual expansion.

This has important implications for the status of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. When logics of neo-patrimonialism, competitive clientelism, or ethnic mobilization are institutionalized under single-party rule, what follows an electoral transition does not look that much different. The complete disintegration of the NARC coalition after KANU’s defeat in 2002 and the 2007 electoral violence are evidence to that effect. On the other hand, while competitive hegemonies like Tanzania have deeper sources of stability, they also bode well for the potential post-transition environment. As CCM grapples with the internal challenges to its structural articulation and the gradual decline of its social base of support, there is strong probability of a turnover (obviously contingent on several factors, including to what extent CCM is willing and capable of coercing its way to victory). In that case Tanzania might actually transition to a fairly stable two or three-party system, which would be a strong step forward for democracy in Africa.
APPENDIX I: Coding Electoral Authoritarianism

COMPETITIVENESS

**Freedom of Association:** Competitive (1) if the Freedom House Civil Rights Score for that election cycle (averaged across election years when needed) is 4 or lower. Otherwise it is coded as uncompetitive (0)

As a robustness check the CIRI Human Rights Data Project’s Empowerment Right’s Index was consulted (scores above the median of 7 are considered competitive). When there was divergence in coding, qualitative sources were consulted to adjudicate.

**Electoral Integrity:** Competitive (1) if the Lindberg 2006 coding of electoral fraud for that election cycle (averaged across election years when needed) is 2.5 or lower (coded by author for missing years). Otherwise it is coded as uncompetitive (0)

**State Violence:** Competitive (1) if the Gibney Political Terror Score for that election cycle (averaged across election years when needed) is 2 or lower. Otherwise it is coded as uncompetitive (0)

As a robustness check the CIRI Human Rights Data Project’s Physical Integrity Rights Index was consulted (scores above the median of 4 are considered competitive). When there was a divergence in coding, qualitative sources were consulted to adjudicate.

**Scoring Competitiveness:** An election year or cycle is coded as competitive if the country ranks as competitive on at least two of the abovementioned criteria

HEGEMONY

**Power-Threshold and Longevity:** If the regime has only held two elections, it must maintain over 70% of the presidential vote-share and 60% of the legislative seat-share. If the regime has won more than two elections, it must maintain over 60% of the presidential vote-share and 60% of the legislative seats. Regimes that meet these criteria are coded as Hegemonic (1) or Non-Hegemonic (0) for that election year or cycle

---

1 The Freedom House Civil Liberties score, while somewhat correlated with the Political Rights score, measures freedom of association and speech more directly. Linberg’s scale of electoral fraud uses analysis of multiple election observer reports and opposition party reactions to election results to make a four point judgment – the election was free, the election was free but flawed, the election was impacted by fraud, and the election was significantly impacted by fraud. Data is available up to 2004 for African countries. Gibney’s Political Terror Scale varies from 1-5, and uses a combination of US State Department and Amnesty International Reports.
SCORING ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN TYPE

Election Years / Cycles: Each election year or cycle is coded as a competitive hegemony (CH), competitive electoral authoritarian (CEA), repressive hegemony (RH), or repressive electoral authoritarian (REA) based on the combination of its competitiveness and hegemony scores.

Regime Periods: A regime period is coded as CH/CEA/RH/REA based on whether at least two consecutive and non-founding election years/cycles were conducted as that regime-type (unless the regime has not held more than two elections).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1992 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>REA</td>
<td>RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1997 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2002 (l) / 2004 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2007 (l) / 2011 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1990 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td>RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1995 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1992 (l) / 1993 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1997 (l) / 1999 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td>RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2003 (l) / 2005 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2008 (l) / 2010 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1992 (l) / 1993 (p)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1996 (l) / 1998 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2001 (l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td>RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2005 (p) / 2006 (l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2009 (p) / 2011 (l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>REA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1992 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>REA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1997 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>REA</td>
<td>REA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2002 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>REA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1994 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1999 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2004 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2009 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** p = presidential; l = legislative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1978 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1983 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1988 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1993 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1998 (l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2000 (p) / 2001 (l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.51</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1993 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1998 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>2001 (p) / 2002 (l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>2006 (p) / 2007 (l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>2011 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1995 (p, l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td>RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2000 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2005 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2010 (p, l)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1993 (p) / 1994 (l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>REA</td>
<td>REA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1998 (p) /1999(l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>REA</td>
<td>REA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2002 (l) / 2003 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>REA</td>
<td>REA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2005 (p) / 2007 (l)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>RH</td>
<td>RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2010 (p)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** p=presidential; l=legislative
APPENDIX II: Coding the Typological Theory

PARTY CAPACITY

Structural Articulation

Institutionalization

High: Parties with established offices at the national and sub-national levels that are well-equipped and staffed, high membership, and that hold regular party congresses.
Medium: Parties with established national-level presence, some sub-national presence, and moderate membership. The regular operation of the party is often ad hoc and party congresses are held irregularly.
Low: Parties with poorly established national and sub-national presence and low membership. The regular operation of the party is ad-hoc and party congresses are rarely held.

Elite Recruitment

High: There are competitive elections for legislative seats and party offices, transparent primaries, some ideological enforcement, and rewards for service. The executive succession is institutionalized through a primary.
Medium: There are competitive elections for legislative seats and/or party offices, but the process is not transparent and material influence strongly determines candidacy. The process for executive succession is not clear.
Low: There are plebiscitary elections for legislative and/or party offices and the process of executive succession is not clear.

Party Position

High: The party is afforded considerable decision-making power vis-à-vis other political institutions, at times acting on par with the executive.
Medium: The party is afforded some decision-making authority, but much less in comparison with other political institutions.
Low: The party is completely dominated by the executive and rarely consulted on matters of policy.

Social Robustness

Formal Institutions

High (2): The party has established corporatist structures for mass mobilization, youth leagues, and an institutionalized party apparatus down to the grassroots level.
Medium (1): The party has affiliated corporatist structures, youth leagues, and party branches or cells, but they are intermittent or poorly maintained.
Low (0): The party lacks affiliated mass mobilizing institutions.
Social Incorporation

Wide (2): The party targets and channels resources toward the benefit of a widely conceived social grouping such as rural communities and/or peasants.
Moderate (1): The party channels resources toward rural sectors but there is also evidence of bias toward urban, wealthy, or ethnic constituencies.
Low (0): The party is clearly biased toward urban, wealthy, or specific ethnic constituencies.

Scoring Party Capacity

Party capacity is scored dichotomously as High if scores are $\geq 5$ and Low Otherwise

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Economic Growth and Inflation

High (2): The economy experienced steady positive growth in GDP per capita while also maintaining low levels of inflation (below the average 5% inflation rate).
Medium (1): The economy experienced steady positive growth in GDP per capita but also high levels of inflation, or, low to negative levels of growth in GDP per capita but also low levels of inflation.
Low (0): The economy experienced both low to negative levels of growth in GDP per capita and high levels of inflation (stagflation)

Improved Social Well-Being

High (2): There are significant improvements in either HDI or the poverty headcount and the overall level of social well-being is high.
Medium (1): There are significant improvements in either HDI or the poverty headcount, but the overall level of social well-being is still low.
Low (0): There have been no improvements or declines in either HDI or the poverty headcount and the overall level of social well-being remains low.

Control of Public Corruption

High (2): There has been significant improvement according to the Heritage Foundation’s Freedom from Corruption Index and the overall level of corruption is below the global average.
Medium (1): There have been some improvements in the Freedom from Corruption Index, but the overall level of corruption is above the global average.
Low (0): There have been no improvements or declines in the Freedom from Corruption Index and the overall level remains above the global average.
Recession

Yes (0): Since 1992 there have been periods of sharp declines in GDP per capita.
No (1): Since 1992 there have not been periods of sharp decline in GDP per capita.

Scoring Economic Performance

Economic performance is scored dichotomously as High if scores are $\geq 2$ and Low otherwise.

**OPPOSITION CAPACITY**

Party Institutionalization

High (2): The same parties have persistently contested elections and present evidence of strong institutionalization such as elite cohesion and strong sub-national infrastructure.
Medium (1): The same parties have persistently contested elections but there is evidence of weak institutionalization such as elite defection and weak sub-national infrastructure.
Low (0): Frequent party fragmentation, which is indicative of poor elite cohesion and weak sub-national infrastructure.

Party Decision-Making

High (2): Parties are often cooperative, avoid electoral boycotts, and have not been co-opted by the regime.
Medium (1): Parties are at time cooperative, but some might have been engaged in an election boycott or been co-opted by the regime.
Low (0): Parties are non-cooperative, frequently boycott elections, and are easily co-opted by the regime.

Scoring Opposition Capacity

Opposition capacity is scored dichotomously as High if scores are $\geq 3$ and Low otherwise.

**WESTERN LEVERAGE AND LINKAGE**

External Financial Exposure

High (2): Countries rely on both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for over 10% of GDP.
Medium (1): Countries rely on either Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for over 10% of GDP.
Low (0): Countries do not rely on either Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for over 10% of GDP.
External Power Pressure:

**High (2):** Countries have no Black Knight support and are not the site of competing foreign policy goals from a Western country. Linkage, as noted by Western newspaper coverage, is also higher.

**Medium (1):** Countries have moderate Black Knight support and/or lower levels of linkage with Western powers.

**Low (0):** Countries have either significant Black Knight support or are the site of competing foreign policy goals from a Western country. Linkage is generally lower.

Scoring Western Leverage and Linkage

Western Leverage and Linkage is scored dichotomously as High if scores are $\geq 3$ and Low otherwise.
REFERENCES


Economic Change in Latin America, Africa and Asia, by Alex Fernandez Jilberto and Andre Mommen, 244-265. New York, NY: Routledge, 1996.


—. "The Mozambican Experience: FRELIMO and RENAMO." In *From Revolutionary Movements to Political Parties: Cases from Latin America and


