SECURITY GOVERNANCE AFTER CIVIL WAR:
AID, INFLUENCE AND THE POLITICS OF POST-CONFLICT STATE-BUILDING

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Security Governance After Civil War: Aid, Influence and the Politics of Post-Conflict State-Building

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Abstract

Efforts to restructure security forces in countries emerging from civil war have led to mixed results. While large interventions have left police and military forces factionalized and ineffective, smaller interventions have resulted in more professional and publicly responsive forces. Moving beyond explanations that focus on broad outcomes, easily measurable inputs, or technical solutions, I delve into the politics of this core element of state-building. Based on field research on military and police reform in Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor Leste, I examine the interaction of external actors and domestic factions and the causal mechanisms for external influence over governance. I test my argument through a structured focused comparison of six cases of reform, a larger comparison of twenty-one countries, and a quantitative analysis of all post-conflict countries since 1990.

I focus on changes to the governance of security forces, including reforms to their composition, civilian oversight and management that reduce factional control. I find that such reforms are most likely when leaders are weakest politically and external support is most coherent. Leaders with a fragmented political coalition or dispersed revenue face threats from internal rivals and incentives to reduce the control of any one faction over the force, while those with cohesive coalitions and concentrated revenue sources tend to resist such reforms. Fragmented political and revenue environments also create opportunities for external influence, as leaders rely on external support to manage domestic challenges. Where external actors are sufficiently coordinated, they can condition assistance on reforms, or develop relationships with domestic leaders as a basis for
influencing preferences. The most far-reaching changes occur through a combination of aligned political interests, external leverage, and communication that fosters trust and consensus.

This research highlights a paradox of post-conflict state-building. Reforms to security governance are most likely where they are most difficult to achieve politically. As a result, external actors often undermine the conditions that enable influence by concentrating their support to weak leaders, and limit the potential for their own success. Understanding the political constraints and causal mechanisms for influence elucidates this and other core tensions inherent in post-conflict state-building.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When does international intervention transform the governance of security forces in countries emerging from civil war? Over the last two decades, donor countries and international organizations have devoted increasing attention to restructuring military, police and other security forces in the aftermath of civil war. The goals of these efforts have expanded from mere improvements in operational effectiveness to transformations in the governance and orientation of security forces, as they seek to turn politicized or factionalized perpetrators of human rights abuse into professional, well-managed service-providers. When they are successful, efforts to reform security forces are crucial to state-building and peace building, in reducing the risk of renewed conflict, underpinning democratization, and enabling economic development.

Despite increasing resources in a broadening set of countries, however, the effects of such efforts have been mixed. More puzzlingly, it remains far from clear how international actors contribute to such changes, or what factors accounts for their impact. None of the variables that have been associated with effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding – from the size of international peacekeeping mission and the amount of foreign aid to the severity of conflict or level of prior development – account for longer-term institutional change, especially to the governance of police, military and other security forces. On the one hand, some of the most robust interventions ever conducted have left security forces factionalized and abusive, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Timor Leste. On the other hand, less intensive interventions in poorer and more war-torn environments like Liberia, Sierra Leone and El Salvador have led to much deeper transformations in the governance of the security forces. Existing literature that focuses either on broad outcomes and easily measurable inputs, or on technical skills and procedures, cannot explain this complex but central element of state-building and peace-building.
To address this puzzle, I look beyond the effects of individual factors, tactics or procedures to analyze the evolution of security governance as a political process. I find that shifts in the governance of security forces from factional control to public responsiveness are most likely when leaders are weakest politically, and when external actors respond coherently to help them manage domestic challenges. Two sets of conditions affect the political vulnerability of post-conflict political leaders: the fragmentation of the ruling coalition, and the concentration of the state’s revenue sources. These conditions determine whether leaders must rely on the support of other parties, factions or external actors to maintain their authority, which, in turn, creates incentives to adopt measures that limit factional control over the security forces in order to broaden their support and manage internal challenges. These conditions also affect the potential for external actors to influence key decisions by shaping opportunities for them to build trust with key decision-makers, and by affecting their leverage and bargaining power. The level of unity among external actors also matters, in enabling them to seize these opportunities and respond coherently. External influence over core decisions depends both on the opportunities generated by the political and economic conditions within post-conflict states, and the ability of external actors to respond coherently.

This explanation emphasizes the deeply political interactions among external actors and political factions to explain the outcome of state-building efforts. As interveners have shifted their attention toward transforming governance, they have moved into increasingly contentious areas, involving shifts in authority among competing factions and struggles for control over core elements of the state. Yet most practitioners tend to focus on the technical elements like skills and procedures, while scholars have analyzed the effects of variables that can be easily quantified, like the amount of aid and troops or the level of hostility. In the chapters that follow, I move beyond these explanations to examine the contentious interactions that shape decisions regarding the nature of the state and its institutions. Through a comparison of six cases of efforts to reform the
governance of police and military forces in Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Timor-Leste, I examine how the pressures and constraints arising from local conditions shaped the impact of external assistance efforts.

By focusing on the interactions among domestic and external actors, I shed light not only on when but also on how external actors affect state-building. Much of the scholarship on state-building and peace-building examines the effects of intervention on broad outcomes like peace, democracy and economic growth, without clarifying how external actors contribute to these outcomes. Yet interventions often succeed or fail as a result of their interaction with the individual institutions and organizations that make up the state, and the complex processes that shape their performance. Numerous peacekeeping missions have left in their wake uncertainty, instability and renewed conflict due to the inability of states to manage the core functions that peacekeepers have sought unsuccessfully to strengthen. Limited understanding of these processes also constitutes a challenge for policymakers, who lack evidence for what works under different conditions, knowledge of the relevant dimensions, or strategies for how to address them. By going beyond correlational analysis to identifying the causal mechanisms that link conditions to outcome, I open the “black box” of post-conflict state-building. The resulting causal processes account for several puzzles that are encountered across sectors of state-building, such as why the largest investments often produce the least impact; why the weakest states sometimes appear to come furthest toward achieving state-building goals; why impact often varies from one institution to the next within the same country; why initially promising efforts later end in failure; and generally what accounts for the mixed impact of external intervention in post-conflict environments.

The security sector is an ideal arena to investigate these dynamics. In addition to its intrinsic importance for peace and public safety, it involves some of the most contentious struggles of state-building with implications for the core interests of formerly warring parties. It also consumes a large
portion of the resources of interveners, despite uncertain impact. Studying the evolution of security sector governance therefore highlights some of the core dynamics of state-building and the role of external actors within it. In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on the importance of security sector governance and explore what the scholarly literature does and does not tell us about the role of external assistance in shaping it. I then summarize my argument and methodology for testing it.

1. What Is Security Governance and Why Does it Matter?

The governance and oversight of security forces has emerged as a central component of peacekeeping, peace-building and post-conflict state-building efforts. As civil wars come to an end, whether through peace agreements, international intervention or victory by one side, re-building and restructuring the security forces almost always rise to the top of the list of priorities. Success in this area can contribute significantly to establishing and maintaining peace. Disarming and demobilizing combatants and integrating rival forces can increase confidence among warring parties and serve as credible signals that all sides are committed to peace.\(^1\) The inclusion of such measures in peace processes has been correlated with a lower likelihood of renewed conflict and longer duration of peace.\(^2\) Once disarmament is complete, external actors typically turn their attention to restructuring the military and police forces to reduce their propensity to commit human rights abuses and improve their capacity to maintain safety and security after peacekeepers depart. Measures that


strengthen civilian control and improve the professionalism of the forces can enable broader processes of democratization, and provide a foundation for economic development.

To achieve these objectives, international organizations and donors have expanded their focus from operational effectiveness to governance, management and oversight. At their core, these efforts aim to reduce the control of any one faction or party over the military, police and other security forces to broaden their responsiveness to the public as a whole. In practice, they have moved from training, equipping and mentoring security forces to reconfiguring their structure and composition, by re-drafting laws and regulations and by setting up new procedures for recruitment, promotion and discipline. Attention has also moved from the forces themselves to their oversight institutions – ministries, national security advisory bodies, legislative committees, judiciaries, commissions, local governments, and civil society organizations – to enhance civilian control, broaden accountability, and increase their responsiveness to broader segments of the public.

The expansion of security sector assistance to address governance and oversight is reflected in the broad embrace of the “security sector reform” (SSR) agenda by donor countries and multilateral institutions. The SSR agenda emerged during the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Western donor countries sought to support the transitions from authoritarian and communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and to re-configure the Cold War-era security sector assistance that

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5 Sometimes referred to as “security system reform,” “security and justice reform” or “security sector governance reform.”
was perceived to bolster authoritarian regimes. The agenda also embodied a growing interest by some donor countries in improving “human security” in countries affected by violence and poverty by reforming politicized, factionalized, repressive, poorly paid or corrupt forces. These efforts gathered steam through the “multidimensional” peacekeeping and peace-building missions of the 1990s that sought to restructure security forces as a basis for peace and stability. The agenda was eventually summarized in a seminal 2005 policy statement and subsequent Handbook on Security Sector Reform published by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD donor countries (OECD-DAC). The policy called on donors to re-orient their assistance to security forces in order to “increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound governance principles, including transparency and the rule of law.”

The SSR agenda has thus sought to infuse assistance to security forces with principles of democratic governance, civilian oversight and rule of law on the one hand, while focusing the attention of development actors on the need to address security issues on the other. It built on prior efforts to enhance civilian control of the military by expanding beyond education and training.

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7 The case for this type of intervention was made most prominently in a World Bank “Voices of the Poor” study that identified the absence of safety and security as a primary concern for poor people around the world. See Deepa Narayan, Robert Chambers, Meera Kaul Shah, and Patti Petesch. “Global Synthesis.” (Paper presented at the Global Synthesis Workshop: Consultations with the Poor, World Bank, Washington, DC, September 20, 1999).


11 OECD, Security System Reform and Governance.
military forces to addressing governance and public oversight, and by focusing on weak and conflict-prone states. Most development agencies, the United Nations, and some defense institutions have adopted their own policies or statements that reflect the OECD-DAC principles. The policies are reflected in a growing number of programs around the world that range from training and advising security personnel, to revising laws, procedures and administrative systems, to overhauling the processes that govern budgeting, financial management, personnel management, and internal discipline, to strengthening ministerial, legislative and judicial oversight.

Although the evidence cited above points to the positive effects of security sector reform measures in post-conflict contexts when they are successfully adopted, the role of external assistance in bringing about such reforms remains less clear. The impact of external assistance on the evolution of security sector governance has not been subjected to systematic cross-country analysis. While several country cases studies describe successful efforts to reform security forces, others point to limited impact as a result of ill-conceived objectives, poor organization and management, insufficient expertise, or political obstacles. Most fundamentally, failures to achieve objectives are

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attributed to donors’ inability to navigate the “complex political dynamics and informal norms and networks” that govern security forces, especially in conflict-affected countries. As critics point out, security forces tend to be “conservative, tradition-bound organizations distrustful of reform initiatives and resistant to changes,” especially those proposed by external actors with little history or knowledge of local context. Efforts by external actors to reduce factional control, broaden citizen responsiveness and strengthen transparent citizen oversight have frequently foundered as external actors have failed to navigate these complexities. As a result, some critics have begun calling for its reconceptualization to promote more direct engagement with the underlying political realities.

Despite widespread recognition that transforming security governance is difficult politically, the nature of the political challenges and the role of external actors in overcoming them remain poorly understood. Among donor program and policy reviews, explanations for success or failure are frequently reduced to vague references to “political will” or “local ownership.” As critics have pointed out, however, these labels obscure more than they explain. Explanations that cite “political will” beg the question of whose will or ownership is necessary for reforms to succeed. In any context, various factions and individuals pursue multiple and competing interests, values and

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17 Ball & Hendrickson, “Trends in Security Sector Reform”
18 Brzoska, “Development Donors”
21 The need for “local ownership” is a theme in most donor policy and technical guidance. See for example OECD, The OECD-DAC Handbook
23 Mobekk, “Challenges of Local Ownership”
priorities, with varying capabilities to achieve them. A focus on “local ownership” also obscures the role of external actors in shaping the content of the reforms to be “owned,” and in altering the interests or preferences among factions that affect their support for the proposed reforms. Some scholars point to the role of “external leverage” in to overcome political obstacles, with little clarity on what the obstacles are or what accounts for leverage. Beyond debating whether or not external assistance might contribute to reforms in the face of contentious political struggles, SSR literature provides little clarity on the means through which it might or might not affect these struggles.

2. The Roles of External Actors in Post-Conflict State-Building

While the impact of external assistance on security sector governance remains uncertain, a broader body of literature has sought to clarify its effects on other elements of post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building. Yet the findings from this research also remain inconclusive and contradictory, especially as they relate to building state institutions. On the one hand, several cross-country studies have found a positive correlation between the size of peacekeeping missions and amounts of foreign aid and the advent and durability of peace. On the other hand, the relationship between intervention and longer-term outcomes like establishment of electoral democracy and the development of institutions remains inconclusive.


peacekeeping success systematically correlated with democratization or governance outcomes.\textsuperscript{28} Literature on foreign aid in non-conflict contexts actually suggests that external assistance can have an adverse effect on governance outcomes,\textsuperscript{29} yet these effects have not been tested in post-conflict contexts in the presence of large peacekeeping missions. The development of specific institutions governing security, justice or other state functions has rarely been subjected to systematic testing in these contexts.\textsuperscript{30}

This uncertainty stems in part from a lack of clarity regarding how external actors affect governance in these environments. In these contexts, institution-building processes rest on key decisions to adopt and implement a certain set of reforms despite conflicting interests, which enable institution-building processes to advance. Understanding the causal processes through which aid affects these decisions can clarify the types of conditions that matter, and enable more precise testing of whether different forms of assistance contribute to outcomes. These causal processes, however, are often unclear in research on post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building, and they are rarely subjected to rigorous testing. Nonetheless, the types of explanations that appear – often implicitly – provide a useful starting point for understanding the role of external assistance, and a basis for testing it. External intervention and assistance are most commonly understood to play three types of functions in enabling external actors to influence key decisions in the state-building process: filling gaps in capacity or information; changing incentives to influence decisions and behavior; and altering norms, beliefs and preferences.

\textsuperscript{28} The one consistent is oil wealth, with is correlated both with peacekeeping success and with democratization. Fortna and Huang, “Democratization After Civil War”


\textsuperscript{30} One study tested the effects of peacekeeping on rule of law but found no clear correlation: Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede, “The Revival of the Rule of Law in the Wake of Civil War,” \textit{The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law} 4, No.1 (2012)
The first role involves external actors helping local authorities bring about reforms they desire for their own motives. Where leaders are interested in a certain set of reforms, external actors can “fill capacity gaps” by providing funds, equipment or knowledge that enable them to achieve their goals in the context of widespread destruction of infrastructure, loss of life, and flight of capable personnel. Well-timed resources can contribute much needed investment, or help build the physical and organizational infrastructure necessary to begin the “virtuous cycle” of development. In the security sector, external actors provide technical expertise to help design new policies and organizational structures, along with the material assistance and training necessary to carry them out. They also provide security guarantees to encourage factions to adopt reforms that undermine their control over the forces. In some cases, provision of information regarding the parties’ capabilities and compliance with agreements can be sufficient to enable reform, by reducing internal information asymmetries that inhibit parties from giving up their control over their forces.

Success of external assistance in fulfilling this role depends on its size and the specific inputs provided – it must be sufficient to fill the resource gaps and overcome the level of destruction, and it must be composed of the right technical and material inputs.

This function of external assistance loses its impact in the face of political resistance to reform. Sufficient resources may enable committed leaders to achieve goals they already support, and information flows may even reassure factions who fear giving up their weapons, but institutional reform often involves overcoming much deeper and entrenched resistance. Institutional reform involves long and protracted struggles, often within factions and organizations, over access to

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31 Doyle and Sambanis *Making War and Building Peace*; See also Fortna *Does Peacekeeping Work*, 93.


33 Walter, *Committing to Peace*

34 Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*.

35 On the input-based model, see James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltchik, Angela Timilsina. *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building From Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2005).
resources or authority.\textsuperscript{36} By giving up control over a security force, leaders may lose their ability to assign jobs to supporters, coerce rivals or protect assets. Well-funded efforts have failed when factions have reneged on their agreements, or exerted control through informal networks even after demobilizing their forces.\textsuperscript{37} Even if some officials support a set of reforms, factions and individuals who opposed the reforms can seek to block them. Factional leaders often manipulate assistance to their own ends by allocating it strategically to members of their faction,\textsuperscript{38} while using aid to avoid or undermine institutional reforms.\textsuperscript{39} As a result, foreign aid and intervention have been correlated with weak institutions and sometimes repression, including by the security sector.\textsuperscript{40} Since external actors often lack the contextual knowledge to navigate these complexities, even substantial and technically sound resources can result in failure.\textsuperscript{41}

External actors may overcome these challenges if their aid achieves influence through a second means of influencing institution-building, in which their assistance persuades post-conflict leaders to change their decisions and behavior by altering their incentives and payoffs. Recognizing


\textsuperscript{40} Kuperman has suggested that the possibility of intervention can lead to moral hazard that invites rebellion and repression by state institutions. Alan J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 52 (2008). For broader correlations between aid and weak institutions, see Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?”; Brautigam and Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.”

that economic and political incentives and opportunities often drive conflict, economic and political incentives and opportunities often drive conflict, scholars have pointed to the role of external actors in changing these incentives to neutralize potential spoilers and enable peace agreements to succeed. External actors can “raise the costs of war and the benefits of peace” by restricting access to revenue through sanctions, promising economic benefits to parties that commit to peace, changing the balance of military power with the deployment of troops, or threatening to use force against uncooperative parties. In post-conflict contexts, interveners seek to “cajole” reluctant leaders to adopt reforms that might be seen to threaten their interests by promising rewards or threatening sanctions in exchange for cooperation in advancing institutional reforms. Much of the literature has focused on this means of impact, and analyzed peace-building and state-building as a process of “continuous bargaining” among domestic and external actors.

The success of external actors depends on their relative bargaining leverage, and their ability to promise sufficient funds, troops and other resources to meaningfully change payoffs.

At the same time, the effectiveness of external support in persuading post-conflict leaders depends on a variety of other factors that are insufficiently explored in post-conflict contexts. On the one hand, scholars of foreign aid have drawn on principal agent models to show that the internal organization and incentives of donors often prevent them from credibly conditioning aid on policy


44 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work, 86; See also Doyle and Sambanis Making War and Building Peace, 55.

45 For a clear elaboration of this logic see Lise Morje Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work.

Donors with multiple goals tend to prioritize short-term stability objectives over long-term governance goals. Unwilling to risk a failure of the peace process, they fail to follow through on threats to withhold aid despite failure to adopt reforms. Endemic information asymmetries impede effective monitoring of desired reforms, resulting in a poor record of influencing policy reform even in non-conflict contexts. Coordination challenges among multiple donors undermine credible or coherent responses when they gather evidence that elites are failing to meet their commitments. Persuading reluctant officials to adopt reforms thus requires a degree of information management and organizational adaptation that is difficult for many donor organizations to achieve. On the other hand, conditions within post-conflict countries may also affect their leverage by increasing information asymmetries, or by increasing the size of payoffs needed to incentivize changes in behavior. Yet the effects of domestic conditions have rarely been explored. Zurcher et al introduce the notion of “adoption costs” that affect the cost and benefit for leaders of adopting certain reforms, while Narten and Zurcher and Barnett and Zurcher point to such factors as physical security, economic interests, or political authority and legitimacy that shape bargaining among external and domestic actors. Beyond these broad factors, however, the domestic conditions that shape the interests of domestic leaders and the leverage of external actors remain under-specified. Little is known about the specific conditions within countries that affect the potential for external leverage over decisions.

51 Narten and Zurcher, “Peacebuilding is Interaction,” 23; Barnett and Zurcher, “The Peacebuilder’s Contract”
A third type of explanation highlights the role of external actors in transforming parties’ preferences, either through diffusion of norms or through change in the actors themselves. Political leaders may see control over the security forces as an existential issue, and their officers and soldiers may hold deeply engrained beliefs about the appropriate use of force and responsiveness to society. In such cases, external actors seek to “transform preferences – and even the parties themselves,” by removing leaders through military or legal action and replacing them with more moderate individuals, or by fostering new norms to change their values and preferences. For example, by “helping military organizations, designed to fight on the battlefield, transform themselves into political organizations capable of competing at the ballot box,” external actors seek to create “new social agents” with preferences that are more aligned with stable and democratic governance. Scholars have focused on the role of external actors in promoting liberal values and practices that favor nonviolent resolution of disputes, protection of individual rights and democratic deliberation as a core element of peace-building and state-building. In the security sector, international officials seek to instill values favoring professional conduct, democratic oversight and responsiveness to the public through training and exchange programs, or conduct “vetting” programs to remove individuals who do not share these values.

Beyond suggesting the importance of such values for peace and democracy, the literature is far from clear on the process for promoting them or the conditions under which this mechanism might succeed. The conditions for norm diffusion described in other areas, such as the presence of frequent interaction, shared goals and communities of practice, rarely emerge in the context of

52 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 56.
53 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work, 101
54 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 313.
external interventions in post-conflict countries. Scholars have further pointed to the tension inherent in efforts to promote norms that espouse democracy, participation and local accountability through external imposition of liberal values rooted in other societies. Critics of the “liberal peacebuilding agenda” have pointed to the contradictions and double standards that arise as external actors routinely trade off liberal values for practical realities, while local actors resist and modify externally-driven norms to fit their own contexts and cultures. Although in some cases security officials and political leaders appear to have adopted the norms of professionalism and responsiveness espoused by Western donors, the means through which such changes occur, and the conditions under which they are likely to occur, have rarely been explored in depth.

Examining each of these processes highlights the importance of particular sets of causal mechanisms and underlying conditions in enabling external actors to influence key decisions in the state-building process. Yet both the mechanisms and the conditions – especially those within post-conflict countries – are poorly specified in literature on security sector reform and on post-conflict peace-building and state-building. In assuming that better financed and organized donors are more likely to succeed in achieving reform objectives, most accounts overlook the powerful economic and


60 One exception is Manning, who examines the process of transforming rebel groups into political parties. Carrie Manning, The Making of Democrats: Elections and Party Development in Postwar Bosnia, El Salvador and Mozambique (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
political incentives for parties to keep institutions politicized, as well as the internal capacities, networks and resources that affect external actors’ leverage and shape opportunities for transmission of norms. Recent scholarship on civil wars has focused on the internal organizational, network structures and societal conditions facing rebels and governments to explain the onset and conduct of war, but little is known about how these structures affect state-building processes after wars end. These conditions inevitably shape opportunities for leaders to adopt or oppose reforms, and for external actors to influence them. Understanding the impact of external actors on institution-building processes thus requires delving more deeply into the political and economic landscapes of recipient countries.

3. Security Sector Reform as a Survival Strategy

To understand when and how external intervention influences the evolution of security sector governance, I explore how domestic political constraints affect the interactions among politicians, security officials, and external actors to shape crucial decisions. I therefore take the politics of state-building as a starting point. In post-conflict environments political leaders’ primary concern is to consolidate their authority over the state in order to overcome challenges, implement decisions and deliver expected benefits to their supporters. To do so, they must gather sufficient support, in the form of political loyalty and financial resources, to build their political base and expand their legitimacy. The political networks and organizational structures in which loyalty and revenue are embedded shape the strategies available to leaders as they consolidate their authority. These strategies in turn shape key decisions regarding the composition, oversight and

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62 This argument builds on the extensive literature on state formation and performance. The logic and background is explored in more detail in the next chapter.
control of the security forces and other state institutions. These conditions also affect the potential role of external actors in influencing these decisions.

In post-conflict countries, changes to security governance that limit factional control over security forces are most likely to be adopted when leaders of the recipient state are weakest politically, and when external support is sufficiently coherent that they can rely on it to manage domestic political challenges. Weakness relative to other parties and factions forces leaders either to build alliances with other factions or to rely on external financial and political backing. In these contexts, reforms to security governance help assure their political – and sometimes physical – survival, by reducing the risk that rival factions might control the security forces, and by maintaining the support of external backers. The influence of external actors depends, in turn, on how coherently they respond and how reliable they are in helping to manage these challenges.

I focus on three sets of conditions that affect the weakness of post-conflict leaders and the coherence of the response: the fragmentation of the ruling coalition; the concentration of the state’s revenue sources; and the coordination among external actors. A ruling party that emerges from a conflict with a fragmented coalition must negotiate with multiple factions, often with questionable loyalty, in building their coalition. In return for their political support, the ruling party must often allow other factions control over key appointments in the government and security forces and influence over operations. Similarly, where the state’s main revenue sources are insufficient or dispersed under the control of various factions, the ruling party trades influence over appointments and policy for financial support. Since the resulting presence of rival factions within the security forces constitutes a threat to the ruling party’s authority, measures that reduce factional influence over the forces can help to mitigate this threat. Weak leaders may also turn to external actors for support. By providing security guarantees, monitoring their forces, and building the organizational structures that enhance discipline and professionalism, external actors can help neutralize the threats
to a fragmented ruling coalition with dispersed revenue sources. Yet their ability to provide credible guarantees, and to influence the governance structures that are put in place, depends on the coordination among external actors and the coherence of their response.

On the other hand, ruling parties with a cohesive political base or access to a concentrated source of revenue have less need to trade influence over state institutions for political support or to rely on external backing. Leaders who can count on a secure political or revenue base must focus on maintaining that base, rather than securing support from other factions or external actors. Reforms that limit factional control may jeopardize their ability to cater to their base, to maintain control over the forces, or to secure access to revenue, and thus engender opposition and resistance. In the face of a cohesive party with concentrated revenue, even coordinated external actors are unlikely to advance reforms that reduce factional control. At the same time, even in the presence of a fragmented ruling coalition and dispersed revenue, external actors who cannot coordinate their objectives and responses may fail to influence governance outcomes.

In addition to generating opportunities for security governance reform, these three conditions affect the means through which external actors exert influence over decisions. Most directly, the fragmentation of the ruling party and concentration of revenue sources affect the potential for external actors to contribute to institution-building by filling material or informational gaps, through the willingness of leaders to adopt security reform. Where political fragmentation or dispersed revenue has generated internal threats, leaders are more likely to support reforms that reduce factional control and to accept external material support to implement them. Parties with a cohesive base of support or concentrated revenue source are likely to reject or ignore external resources aimed at enabling such reforms. These conditions also determine the possibility for external leverage in persuading parties that do not favor reform. Dispersed revenue and political fragmentation affect the relative dependence of political actors on external support and the size of
the payoffs needed to persuade them. Fragmented coalitions may be easier to monitor than cohesive parties, as they may even invite external involvement in monitoring their own forces. Coordinated external actors are better able than uncoordinated actors to set coherent objectives and make credible threats as a basis for leverage. Finally, domestic conditions affect the potential for norm diffusion by shaping opportunities for communication and trust among domestic and external actors. Leaders who lack sufficient loyalty and trust in a fragmented coalition are more likely than leaders of cohesive parties to rely on external actors to monitor their forces and to develop the close working relationships and frequent communication that facilitate consensus and norm diffusion. Coordinated external can more effectively maintain such relationships and translate them into influence over preferences and norms than uncoordinated external actors.

Focusing on how domestic conditions shape interaction highlights two central paradoxes of post-conflict state-building that arise in the security sector. First, the greatest transformations in security sector governance occur where the ruling party is weakest politically, and where reforms are most difficult to achieve. The fragmentation of a ruling coalition and the dispersal of revenue create major obstacles for institutional change. Not only do leaders in these contexts face shortages of revenue, personnel and equipment, they must also convince multiple factions with questionable loyalty to agree to reforms that might threaten their authority and interests. Fragmented environments also generate monitoring challenges for both leaders and external actors, who struggle to understand the various factions and allegiances in a given context. Although leaders in such environments rely on external support, external actors must provide sufficiently credible and responsive assistance to inspire confidence that they will help overcome such challenges. As a result, where the potential for external influence and transformation are greatest, they are also most difficult to achieve. This paradox explains why success in achieving the desired transformations is relatively rare.
Second, even where they are most successful initially, external actors may sow the seeds of their own failure if they are not sufficiently attentive. When faced with weak leaders with uncertain control, external actors may try to bolster their authority by concentrating revenue and authority in their hands and allow them to build up their own loyal network. By helping to strengthen a single political faction in relation to others, donors may increase that faction’s political security, but they undermine the political weakness that makes reforms more attractive and that facilitates external influence. By strengthening one faction in relation to others, external actors may thus reduce the potential for reforms to security governance over time. This paradox explains the frequency of initial success in integrating and restructuring security forces followed by politicization over time. It also highlights the challenges of sustaining reforms even under the most conducive conditions.

4. Evidence and Research Design

I marshal three main strategies to test and elaborate the argument. First, a quantitative, multivariate analysis demonstrates the significance of these conditions across a larger set of post-conflict countries and tests alternative explanations. Second, a focused, typological analysis of all 21 cases of major international interventions in the last two decades further demonstrates the significance of the main variables while providing a basis for the selection of the in-depth cases. Finally, a series of structured focused comparisons of efforts to restructure the governance of police and military forces in Liberia, Timor-Leste and Bosnia and Herzegovina allow me to test the effects of each condition on the outcome, while elaborating the causal mechanisms that link the conditions to outcome. The case studies also allow for the exploration of alternative explanations and their relationship to my core argument. I briefly describe each of these strategies and discuss the evidence needed to support my argument.
All three research strategies examine cases of efforts to reform individual police or military forces in countries emerging from civil war. All of the cases occurred in countries that experienced a civil war followed by a period of at least five years of stability during which external actors devoted resources to restructuring the police and military. Focusing on countries in which the conflict ended at least five years prior to the study allows sufficient time to observe whether substantial reforms could be adopted and implemented. The cases are further limited to countries in which the conflict ended after the Cold War, when donor countries and multilateral institutions began pursuing security sector governance objectives. The cases cover three continents, as well as a variety of income levels and causes of war to demonstrate that similar variables and causal mechanisms matter across different settings.

For the qualitative and typological analyses, the cases are further limited to countries that experienced an intense level of external support, including the deployment of troops, high levels of foreign aid, and provision of equipment, training and other forms of support directly to the armed forces. Including only countries that experienced such robust external involvement avoids the potential selection bias that might occur if interveners select only the most difficult or easy cases. It also allows for the exploration of rich variation in local conditions and outcome, while holding constant the intensity of international assistance.

To establish the validity of my argument, I first test the argument through a quantitative, multivariate analysis of all countries in which a civil war ended since the end of the Cold War. This test employs several proxy variables, including existing datasets and new variables compiled from published sources. By showing a significant correlation between conditions and reforms in the

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63 A civil war is defined as a conflict between a state and one or more non-state groups internal to that state, in which conflict-related deaths exceeded 1,000, including at least 100 people on each side, and including at least 100 deaths per year. See Doyle and Sambanis, *Building War and Making Peace*, 133. For slight different definitions, see Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, No.2 (2010) and James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, No.3 (2004).
governance of security forces, this test demonstrates that these conditions matter across a variety of settings. The quantitative analysis also tests alternative explanations, such as the size of the intervention, level of destruction, depth of hostility and other domestic variables.

Second, I conduct a more focused comparison of 21 cases using typological analysis.\(^{64}\) In addition to demonstrating the correlation of individual variables, this analysis shows how configurations of conditions are related to the outcome. It suggests that the combination of a fragmented ruling party and dispersed revenue are necessary for reforms to occur, while the impact of external coordination is more contingent. This analysis also categorizes the cases according to distinct types, enabling a selection of cases for the in-depth cases studies.

The core of the analysis is a series of structured focused comparisons of six cases of efforts to reform police and military forces. The comparisons show that variations in each of the conditions affect the outcome of efforts to restructure the governance of security forces. Through a “most similar” case design, I compare cases that are as similar as possible except for one of the independent variables, to show how variations in each condition affected the outcome.\(^{65}\) To the extent that a variation in one of these conditions did not lead to the expected outcome, this would undermine my argument. To maximize analytic leverage, I conduct comparisons both within and across countries at two levels: between police and military forces, and between time periods for a single force. The case studies also reveal smaller-scale variations in the way leaders were affected by political fragmentation, dispersed revenue and external coordination that shaped specific outcomes within the overall reform effort.

The qualitative analysis also clarifies the causal processes that link domestic conditions to outcome and shape the specific role of external assistance. Drawing from hundreds of interviews, I

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\(^{65}\) George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 252
conduct “process tracing” to expose the “intervening causal processes” that link the conditions to outcomes, and assess whether they conform to the theory.\(^6\) I show how each combination of conditions shaped the relationship among political leaders, security officials and external actors in ways that are consistent with the theory, and how these relationships in turn affected their decisions regarding the governance of the security forces. This strategy relies on rich narratives describing reform efforts from the perspective of key decision-makers, external officials, and officials who received the assistance. Bringing together their different perspectives, these narratives reveal the constraints and pressures felt by decision-makers, how they navigated them and how their decisions shaped outcomes.

Focusing on causal mechanisms further generates observable implications that can serve as an additional test of my argument. In each case study, I examine not only on whether the conditions led to a certain outcome, but whether they led to expected types of pressure and enabled particular types of relationship between external actors and domestic leaders. Leaders of fragmented ruling parties should not only face greater pressure for reform, they should also exhibit trust and communication with external actors that leads to consensus over decisions, while external actors should achieve greater access to information that enables them to monitor implementation. In the presence of cohesive parties, external actors are unlikely to achieve much trust with local counterparts and face greater monitoring challenges. Similarly, dispersed revenue should foster reliance on external actors and enhance bargaining leverage for external actors who successfully condition their assistance on policy changes, but it does not necessarily result in increased trust. In countries with concentrated revenue, external actors should fail to enforce their conditions and exhibit limited bargaining leverage. Finally, the extent of coordination should affect both leverage and trust by shaping external actors’ ability to achieve coherent objectives, manage information and

\(^6\) George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 206
respond to local conditions. Tracing particular pathways from a given condition, to a set of pressures and types of relationships, to an outcome, should constitute a strong test for the logic of my argument, and help to falsify it if the expected implications are not observed.

The qualitative case comparisons also allow for an examination of alternative explanations. On the one hand, finding that configurations of conditions did not lead to the expected outcomes, or that significant transformations occurred in the absence of political fragmentation, dispersed revenue and external coordination would falsify my argument. On the other hand, evidence that the predicted causal mechanisms did not emerge under the expected conditions would also weaken my argument. For instance, finding that significant communication and trust developed in the absence of political fragmentation, that fragmentation did not lead to trust, that significant leverage occurred in the presence of concentrated revenue, or that dispersed revenue did not generate leverage would raise important doubts regarding the validity of my argument, since it addresses both the correlations of conditions and the causal mechanisms involved.

The case comparisons also enable me to identify evidence against alternative explanations to strengthen my argument. Looking within and across countries, I find that varying levels of reform occurred despite similar levels of aid, depth of hostility and destruction, which undermines the sufficiency of these alternative explanations. I also probe a variety of other explanations, from the role of individual leaders, to the types of technical inputs, to the prior level of state capacity. I find that in most cases, other types of pressures and constraints did affect outcomes. I contend, however, that these alternative explanations are not sufficient to account for variation in outcomes in post-conflict countries without considering the combinations of conditions that shape relationships between external actors and domestic decision-makers.

I examine similar data for each in-depth case, drawing from field work conducted in all three countries in 2009-2011. To measure each variable, I collected data from a variety of sources
including laws, policies and procedures, interviews, and administrative data. The data collected for each variable included the following.

- **Fragmentation of the ruling coalition:** I analyzed electoral and political party data to identify the primary cleavages and basis for political loyalty, as well as the composition of the government, cabinet and security forces to measure the cohesion or fragmentation within the ruling coalition;

- **Concentration of revenue:** I reviewed budget data on the primary sources of revenue to the government, from the ministry of finance or external sources like the IMF or World Bank to determine the primary revenue sources and the percentage of any one resource like oil or minerals that could be easily controlled.

- **Coordination of external actors:** I reviewed data on donor financing from the World Bank and OECD to determine the percentage of any one donor as a percentage of overall funding. I also examined funding and programming within the security sector to determine the number of donors, the presence of coordination structures, as well as the coherence of objectives, management of information, and coordination among them.

- **Security Force Transformation:** I reviewed the relevant laws procedures and regulations, as well as numerous reports and analyses that described the composition, civilian oversight and discipline within the force both prior to and at the end of a given time period.

In addition to evidence that characterized the conditions and outcome for each case, I examined the pressures felt by decision-makers, the nature of relationships among external and domestic actors and how their relative influence over outcomes depended on access to information, dependence, communication and trust. I present the contours of the relationship using excerpts from narrative accounts by key decision-makers and participants involved drawn from interviews, memoirs and public statements.

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67 The definition of security force transformation is further elaborated in the next chapter.
5. The Cases: Police and Military in Liberia, Timor Leste and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The three countries examined in this study include a variety of conditions and characteristics. As outlined above, all three countries experienced episodes of civil war followed by large-scale interventions involving the United Nations and bilateral donors, with a core objective of restructuring the security forces. The cases also varied in terms of the type, duration and depth of the conflict and the way that it ended, as well as the socio-economic and geographic conditions that spanned three different continents. They also differed in terms of the external actors involved in the security sector. Moreover, each country presents a particular comparison that focuses on one of the key independent variables for the study. As shown in Table 1, the cases include four of the eight possible combinations of cases, including all of the conditions of domestic conditions that enable some reform. \(^68\) Taken together, they help to demonstrate the core elements of my argument.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Political Fragmentation</th>
<th>Revenue Distribution</th>
<th>External Coordination</th>
<th>Pattern of Relations</th>
<th>Transformation (Predicted)</th>
<th>Transformation (Actual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia Armed Forces 2005-2010</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Coordinated</td>
<td>High Leverage, High Trust</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia National Police 2005-2010</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Uncoordinated</td>
<td>High Leverage, Low Trust</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH Armed Forces 1995-2005</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Coordinated</td>
<td>High Leverage, High Trust</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH Police 1995-2005</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Coordinated</td>
<td>Low Leverage, Low Trust</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste Nat’l Police 2000-2006</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Uncoordinated</td>
<td>High Leverage, Low Trust</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste Nat’l Police 2006-2010</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>Uncoordinated</td>
<td>Low Leverage, Low Trust</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Case Selection, Variables and Outcomes

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\(^{68}\) I do not include cases with cohesive coalitions and concentrated revenue, since the possibility for reform is limited.
The first comparison focuses on Liberia, a low-income country that was torn apart by two decades of intermittent civil war until 2003. The official security forces had largely collapsed, as factions within the military, police, rebel forces and militias alternately formed alliances and fought against each other. Although driven by ethnic identity earlier in the conflict, the most recent violence was driven primarily by the quest for resources and control of the state, and alliances and rivalries shifted regularly. After the end of the civil war, two years of a transitional government made up of numerous factions and parties were followed by an elected government that also struggled to assemble a coalition within a fragmented political environment. The country’s rich natural resources remained dispersed under the control of various factions. Yet donors offered substantial support, including for restructuring the police and military forces. While both forces adopted significant reforms, the outcomes varied between them. The military achieved a substantial transformation that included a complete disbanding, recruitment from scratch and creation of new oversight structures. The police went through an incomplete vetting process and partial changes to the management and oversight structures that allowed a variety of factions to remain influential within the force. I trace this variation to differences in coordination between the U.S., which served as the dominant donor for the military, and the United Nations, which took the lead for the police but struggled to coordinate with a multitude of other donors. The Liberia cases also illustrate the dynamics of trust and leverage under conditions of political fragmentation and dispersed revenue, as well as the paradox that external actors can undermine the conditions necessary for influence.

The second comparison moves to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where divergent outcomes between the military and police forces shed light on the role of political fragmentation as a crucial condition for enabling external influence. The country emerged in 1995 from a brutal, five-year civil war driven by ethnic divisions. The situation in Bosnia reveals a stark contrast with Liberia on its high level of political cohesion, driven by ethnically-defined political parties that relied on ethnic
divisions to maintain power. The federal structure established in the peace agreement, according to which thirteen different territorial units were established, each dominated by one ethnic group, further contributed to political cohesion in each level of government. Although political parties initially controlled substantial revenue, the country gradually came to rely on external financing as concentrated sources of wealth were dismantled. The country also experienced one of the largest international interventions ever conducted that was bolstered by a robust coordination structure and powerful incentives from the possibility of accession into the EU and NATO. Nonetheless external actors only partially achieved their objectives to restructure the military and failed in their efforts to centralize the police. This more limited transformation relative to Liberia can be attributed to the strength of cohesive networks, which undermined trust and created strong incentives for leaders to resist reforms despite the potential for leverage created by dispersed revenue. Only when those cohesive networks broke down, the resulting fragmentation enabled the communication, trust and influence that resulted in partial transformation of the military.

In Timor Leste, the introduction of a concentrated revenue source in between two distinct interventions sheds light on the effects of that revenue on the evolution of its police forces. The long struggle for Timorese independence from Indonesia ended in a severe episode of internal violence in 1999, followed by a UN state-building mission and the establishment of an independent state in 2002. Only four years later, another wave of internal violence led to a second UN mission. During both interventions, the UN Police mission led efforts to restructure the police forces with the assistance of several bilateral actors. During the first phase, from 2000-2005, a highly fragmented political landscape and little in the way of reliable revenue sources enabled a high level of influence. Although like with the Liberian police, uneven coordination limited external influence, external actors still achieve a partial transformation. During the second phase, from 2006-2010, increased oil revenue altered the political landscape as leaders no longer relied on external assistance and chose to
reject much of their advice. Although the fragmented environment still allowed for communication and trust among individual officials and external advisers, the absence of leverage limited both the potential for external influence and the changes to the governance of the police.

6. Conclusion and Organization of the Dissertation

Recent experiences of intervention from Afghanistan and Libya, to Cote d'Ivoire and Haiti have highlighted the expanding role of donor countries and multilateral organizations in seeking to transform governing institutions in states emerging from civil war. Increasingly ambitious reform objectives are often seen as unavoidable to achieve peace, yet they generate dilemmas and tensions for interveners and recipients that can undermine their success. As external actors struggle to understand the local context, they face constant decisions regarding whether to support or exclude one actor or another, to promote liberal values over peace, to enforce certain conditions over others, and ultimately whether they can succeed in transforming institutions in limited timeframes. While scholars have examined the overall outcomes and explored the tensions and quandaries involved, much remains to be learned regarding how these tensions play out in the specific institutional arenas that determine the success or failure of peace-building efforts.  

The security sector, as a core function of the state that has captured the resources and attention of donors in virtually every post-conflict operation, presents an ideal setting to investigate these tensions. In the chapters that follow, I explore the specific ways in which external assistance interacts with local conditions and pressures to shape the outcome of state-building efforts. Although each context presents a unique set of challenges, external interventions result in similar dilemmas for interveners, as well as similar constraints and opportunities for recipients, who react in

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remarkably predictable ways. As peace-builders within and outside post-conflict countries continue to struggle with these challenges, the insights from these cases could inform their strategies, tactics and behavior in ways that might help overcome some of the worst failures of the past.

The following chapters lay out the argument and the evidence to support it. The next chapter elaborates the theory, built upon insights from literature on state formation, institutional performance, and foreign aid, as well as on organizational dynamics that structure relations of leverage and trust. The chapter lays out the specific predictions that are tested in the subsequent chapters. The third chapter presents the results of the quantitative and typological analyses, providing an initial test of the validity of the argument and a basis for in-depth comparisons. I also discuss some of the limitations of multivariate analysis for this argument, and how I overcome them through the qualitative research. The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters present the case studies, laying out the comparisons described above, as well as the specific causal processes that occurred in each case. Each of the case study chapters highlights one of the key variables in my argument. The Bosnian police and military focus on the impact of political fragmentation and cohesion; the Timor Leste police reveal the effects of a concentrated revenue source; and the Liberian case clarifies the effects of variations in donor coordination even under the most conducive conditions for influence. The final chapter concludes by summarizing the argument, highlighting key findings, and laying out implications for further research and policy.
CHAPTER II
THEORY:
MECHANISMS OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE ON SECURITY GOVERNANCE

As external actors have pursued increasingly ambitious state-building objectives in countries emerging from conflict, they have waded into territory riven by dilemmas and uncertain outcomes. As a basis for enhanced security, democratization and economic development, donors have expanded their assistance from training and integrating rival factions to transforming the way they are structured, managed and governed. As they have done so, they have been forced to confront the political and social conflicts that lie at the heart of civil war and state-building. As a result, efforts by external actors to transform the governance of police and military forces have resulted in a highly mixed record in achieving their objectives. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, these political dynamics and the resulting variation remain under-explored in literature on post-conflict peace-building and state-building, which has tended to focus either on the intensity of conflict, the way it ended, or the size and organization of external actors to explain outcomes. Instead, understanding this variation requires a deeper look at the politics of post-conflict state-building. It entails examining how interaction among decision-makers, political factions and external actors vary with the conditions they face to shape key decisions and outcomes.

In this chapter, I propose a theory that explains when transformation of security sector governance occurs, and how external actors contribute to these changes. I argue that security force transformation is most likely where political leaders are weakest domestically, and where external actors are sufficiently unified to respond to their domestic political challenges. Two sets of conditions within the country affect the outcome of efforts to transform the governance of the security forces: the fragmentation of the ruling coalition and the distribution of its revenue base. In addition, coordination among external actors affects whether the opportunities created by the local
environment translate into external influence and reform. As leaders seek to consolidate their authority over the state in the aftermath of civil war, the sources and availability of revenue, loyalty and other crucial state-building resources shape their decisions about how to structure and manage state institutions. Leaders who emerge from a conflict with a cohesive and loyal political coalition or a concentrated source of revenue generally ensure that their constituents dominate the security forces in order to secure access to revenue and political support. These leaders have little need for external assistance to maintain their domestic coalition and strong incentives to resist external effort to transform the security forces. Leaders who face a more fragmented political landscape or more dispersed revenue sources must build inclusive coalitions and integrate rivals who control important constituencies or sources of revenue. These leaders may also rely on external backing to help them manage internal challenges and create opportunities for external influence. Domestic conditions thus shape the incentives and opportunities for reform and for external influence over policy decisions.

The outcome of these interactions also depends upon the ability of external actors to respond coherently to local conditions. Unified external actors can negotiate effectively with politicians who possess a strong political base, and reassure leaders with a more fragmented base that their promises of aid and political backing are credible. Although favorable domestic conditions are necessary for transformation to occur, the impact of external assistance on these transformations also depends on external actors’ ability to coordinate their assistance sufficiently to respond to those conditions. The combination of domestic political weakness and external coherence produce the most far-reaching changes to the governance of security forces.

Attention to the interaction of domestic political conditions and external responses highlights a paradox of post-conflict state-building: the highest level of external influence – and the greatest potential for institutional transformation – arises when domestic leaders are weakest. In such cases, leaders face the greatest challenges to building loyal security forces since they must
manage rivalries, shifting alliances and internal threats to their authority. As a result, they are most likely to build inclusive governing coalitions, to incorporate rivals, and to turn toward external support to manage these challenges. Where external assistance is coordinated and responsive, it can help leaders overcome these challenges while building stronger organizational structures that enable more effective governance. External assistance can thus help turn weakness into a source of long-term strength. In many cases, however, external actors end up strengthening one faction to the exclusion of others, usually in the interest of short-term stability or due to lack of coordination. Assistance provided in this way may contribute to immediate reforms, but it can also undermine the conditions that favor security force transformation by reinforcing political cohesion or concentrating revenue. If it is not carefully calibrated to addressing local political constraints, external assistance can thus undermine the sustainability of institutional change.

The remainder of this chapter elaborates this argument. The next section defines the dependent variable, security force transformation. Drawing upon literature on security sector reform, I outline a set of transformations that affects the responsiveness of security forces and highlights the core challenges of post-conflict state-building. The third section lays out the theoretical building blocks for the argument. I draw from state-building theory as well as literature on bargaining, principal-agent theory, and organizational networks to describe how state-building outcomes evolve as a result of interaction among leaders, factions and external actors. I identify the specific causal mechanisms through which external actors might influence these outcomes. In the fourth section, I describe the conditions within post-conflict countries and the characteristics of external intervention that shape these interactions and shape decisions. In the fifth section, I put the pieces together to outline how domestic conditions and external coordination interact to affect the potential for external influence and the extent of security force transformation.
1. Dependent Variable: Security Force Transformation

The process of rebuilding and reforming security forces in the aftermath of conflict embodies the core political struggles of post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building. During a civil war, each party’s armed forces are central to pursuing its interests, whether the civil war is fought over political change, control of territory, or access to resources. Political leaders also use armed forces to maintain authority within their own parties, by allocating positions, lucrative contracts, or protection in exchange for loyalty, or by using the forces to repress dissent. After the war ends, the maintenance of such relationships among political factions, state security forces and other armed forces can fuel tension, feed the growth of criminal networks, or enable violent repression. From the perspective of external donors and interveners, transforming the way security forces are governed and managed is, therefore, central to peacebuilding and statebuilding. Restructuring the forces, altering their composition and leadership, and broadening civilian oversight can reduce the risk of renewed conflict and serve as a basis for transition to democratic governance and long-term economic development. Yet such reforms may threaten the interests of parties and leaders who depend on their control over armed forces for security, political authority and access to resources. Even after troops are demobilized or integrated, factional leaders may seek to thwart reforms that undermine their control, or they may exert influence over segments of the army, police, intelligence...

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Restructuring police and military forces have been a central part of a growing number of interventions and assistance packages by the UN and bilateral donors in the context of multi-dimensional peacekeeping. See fn. 13 above.

On the relationship between demobilization and integration of combatants and security sector reform with the achievement and durability of settlements, see Hodie and Hartzell, “Civil War Settlement,” Walter *Committing to Peace, Toft Securing the Peace, Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work*.


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services or private militias through informal networks. Transforming the governance of security forces entails confronting – and overcoming – these tensions.

In examining the extent of transformation, I focus directly on these politically contentious dimensions. I define security force transformation, as the changes to laws, policies, procedures and behavior that reduce factional control over a given security force, consistent with the objectives of external actors. The security forces may include military, police, intelligence, and other statutory armed forces that are mandated to provide internal or external security. The changes under examination are embodied both in reforms to the laws, policies, and procedures that govern a particular force, and in the implementation of those changes in practice.

This definition emphasizes the locus of authority over security forces, and whether one or more factions can exert informal political control over its composition and operations. Where such transformation has not occurred, individual factions can influence the composition, leadership or behavior of the security force through official channels or informal ties. Security is provided as a “club good” that benefits one group to the exclusion of others, often in exchange for political loyalty or access to commercial opportunities rather than as a benefit to the public as a whole. To transform security into a “public good” available to the entire population, countries must adopt measures that limit the control of any one party or faction over the forces. Such measures include procedures for selecting officers that emphasize merit over affiliation, transparent processes for policy formulation and decision-making, credible systems for discipline, mechanisms for public


75 The definition of the “security sector” often includes non-statutory forces such as militias, private security companies or customary security providers, however since I am focusing on the dynamics of state-building, I limit my attention to statutory forces.

76 A “private good” is one that is provided to the public as a whole, from which no one individual can be excluded (non-excludable), and from which the consumption by one individual does not reduce the availability for others (non-rival). A “club good” is non-rival but excludable. While security provision is generally seen as a public good, in many conflict affected states the discriminatory provision and commercial nature of security turns it into a “club good” or even a “private good” which is both rival and excludable.
oversight, and legal limits to operations.\textsuperscript{77} For example, external actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina aimed to bring the military and police forces under the control of national-level ministries so that none of the political factions could use the forces for their own interests. In Sierra Leone, the U.K. sought not only to restructure the military, police and intelligence service, but to establish a new security decision-making structure aimed at reducing opportunities for political influence.

This definition of security sector transformation further emphasizes the influence of external actors over changes in the governance of security forces. As discussed in the previous chapter, most international donor agencies have adopted the “security sector reform” agenda that explicitly seeks to focus assistance to security forces on enhancing governance, civilian oversight and responsiveness to the public.\textsuperscript{78} As a result, in most cases of post-conflict intervention over the last two decades the shift from factional to broader responsiveness generally constitutes a core objective of external assistance. While leaders may adopt some of these changes for their own reasons and without external influence, such changes would not meet the definition presented here, which is interested in both these changes and the role of external influence on them. The extent of security force transformation therefore serves as an indication of both the changes in governance and the influence of external actors over them.

To facilitate measurement of these changes, I focus on three dimensions of security force transformation. Focusing on measurable changes also facilitates assessing the impact of external intervention, since external actors look for reforms that they can monitor and measure. The three dimensions include:

\textsuperscript{77} These measures are described in the extensive literature on Security Sector Reform. For an overview, see OECD, “Handbook” and Sedra, “The Future of SSR.” See also Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{78} This agenda is summarized OECD, “Handbook.” See also Chapter 1 for an elaboration of this agenda and its origins.
(1) **The composition of the forces**, including the extent to which the recruitment, selection, promotion, appointment to senior positions reflects the influence of political factions or merit-based criteria;

(2) **Civilian oversight**, including whether citizens and civilian officials in the executive, legislative and judicial branches have access to accurate information regarding selection, recruitment, budgetary allocations, management, policy, strategy and discipline, and whether they can influence these decisions through transparent mechanisms;

(3) **Legal limits**, including whether legal limits to the use of force are clearly defined, and the extent to which officials are held accountable for violations or abuses through transparent procedures with oversight by civilian authorities;

To assess the extent of security force transformation, I measure a country’s change over time rather than its conformity to a pre-defined set of laws, policies or structures. Starting from a baseline defined at the end of the conflict, I examine laws, policies, procedures and practices in all three dimensions, and measure the extent of changes during a period of roughly five years. The outcome thus falls along a continuum ranging from limited, to partial, to high transformation based on whether the transformation covers all three dimensions, and whether it affects only to formal laws and policies or extends to implementation. For practical purposes, I divide the outcome into the following three points along this spectrum:

(1) **High Transformation** entails substantial changes to law, procedure and policy in all three dimensions of security sector governance, as well as implementation of those changes in practice;

(2) **Partial Transformation** entails changes in one or two but not all three dimensions. The changes fall considerably short of the objectives of external actors, and/or are not implemented in practice. In such cases, key reforms have been adopted but the factions continue to actively exercise influence over parts of the force;
**Limited Transformation** entails little or no change in law, policy or practice in any of the three dimensions, allowing the same faction that controlled the force during the conflict to maintain its control or influence.

It is important to note what this definition does not include. Security force transformation as defined here does not address the operational effectiveness of a given force, but is limited to how it is structured, composed, managed and governed. Security sector transformation also does not include the effectiveness, or impact of a force on a country’s security. Such outcomes depend on a much broader set of factors than can be captured in this study. Nonetheless, changes to the governance of the forces can have important effects on these broader outcomes.

2. **State-Building as Interaction and the Determinants of External Influence**

The analysis of security force transformation takes as its starting point the politics of state-building and the struggles over revenue, loyalty and political support that shape the development of institutions. Competition over control of armed forces has figured prominently in accounts of state formation in both historical and contemporary contexts. The need to secure sufficient revenue and political support to maintain armed forces shaped the trajectory of state formation and the nature of institutions in Europe. In more recent episodes of state formation, the nature of the state has similarly varied with the sources of revenue and political loyalty. Predatory governments and security forces have emerged in the presence of abundant mineral resources or to protect a

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*Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States.*

narrowly defined segment of the population, while more protective forces have arisen from the need to facilitate production by a larger segment of the population in order to secure sufficient revenue.\textsuperscript{82}

In the aftermath of contemporary civil wars, as leaders seek to consolidate their authority over security forces and other parts of the state, they must similarly secure the revenue, loyalty and political legitimacy necessary to maintain power and implement policy decisions.\textsuperscript{83} To do so, they must contend with the actors and networks in which these resources are embedded, including other political parties, security forces and militias, commercial and private sector elites, and various political constituencies. In these environments, leaders may also turn to external sources like donor countries and multilateral organizations for financial support, political backing and security. Yet each of these potential supporters, both internal factions and external donors, inevitably seek to influence the structure of state institutions in exchange for their support to protect their interests.\textsuperscript{84}

The relative influence of each affects the decisions that determine the evolution of state institutions.

The evolution of security forces in post-conflict contexts directly reflects this interaction. The factions, individuals and donors that provide the revenue necessary fund weapons, equipment and salaries, whether directly through donations or indirectly through taxation, can influence decisions on how these resources are used. The outcome of security sector reform efforts thus emerges from the interaction of the domestic factions and external donors that provide revenue and political support to the ruling party as they play out around specific decisions regarding the laws, policies, personnel and operations. In post-conflict settings, where laws and structures are being re-

\textsuperscript{82} Bates, \textit{When Things Fall Apart}.


\textsuperscript{84} A similar logic emerges from the “selectorate” model developed by Bueno de Mesquita et al, but their focus on how institutions shape the sources of institution-building resources is less applicable to post-conflict settings where institutions are weak and under re-negotiation. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,” \textit{British Journal of Political Science} 32 (2002).
negotiated and transformed, these decisions fundamentally shape the behavior of the security forces and determine the extent to which the forces are oriented toward protecting individual factions or serving the public more broadly.

Focusing on interactions among political leaders, their constituents, and external actors sheds light on the specific factors that affect their relative influence over decisions. The previous chapter laid out three distinct pathways through which external actors might influence institution-building processes. Yet all of these pathways have generally been described as negotiations or interactions among two parties with fixed preferences, either two domestic factions, or a domestic faction and an external actor. In post-conflict environments with weak institutions and shifting alliances, however, decisions instead emerge from nested negotiations among factions, sub-factions and external officials that take place within and across organizational and party boundaries. For instance, pressures exerted by sub-factions within the ruling coalition may affect whether the head of state accepts reforms proposed by external actors, as well as his leverage in negotiating that reform. These interactions serve as “active sites of creation and change” that affect both the preferences and payoffs that shape decisions.

Viewing state-building decisions as the outcome of a series of interactions among actors and sub-actors in post-conflict environments helps to clarify the distinct causal mechanisms through which external assistance affects state-building. As discussed in the introductory chapter, three distinct roles for external actors are implicit in literature on state-building and peacebuilding: filling gaps in resources or information; cajoling leaders by altering payoffs; and influencing norms and values. While the first two are widely discussed and explained, the third has received much less

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86 On exception to the use of two-party bargaining models is Barnett and Zurcher, “The Peacebuilder’s Contract,” which analyzes a three-part interaction among donors, domestic actors and an internal faction.
explanation in literature on post-conflict peace-building and state-building. Moreover, the conditions that affect all of three of these pathways and when they are likely to operate remain largely unexplored. Viewing the state-building process as a series of interactions helps to clarify the causal mechanisms through which external actors exert influence through each of these pathways, as well as the conditions that allow each of them to operate.

The first and most common role of external influence involves filling gaps in domestic capacity, either by providing revenue, skills or equipment that domestic actors lack, or by facilitating the flow of information among rival parties. This role implies that parties support the adoption of the changes to their forces that reduce factional control, but either lack the wherewithal to do so or fear that they may be exploited by the other party if they do. Its operation assumes a set of preferences and payoffs among domestic actors that are favorable to these reforms. As previously discussed, however, post-conflict parties may resist such reforms due to the perceived costs or loss of benefits from adopting them. Understanding when this pathway is likely to operate to enable external influence thus requires understanding these perceives costs and benefits and their origin in domestic politics. For instance, a ruling party’s preference for reducing factional control may stem from its relationship with other factions, the resources available to the state, the loyalty of its political base, and its normative framework. The preferences assumed by this explanation are thus shaped directly from the conditions within the post-conflict state and the resulting interactions among domestic factions.

89 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler “Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict countries,” The European Economic Review 48 (2004); Dobbins et al, Congo to Iraq, Doyle & Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.
90 Zurcher et al, Costly Democracy.
Second, external assistance may bring about reforms when donors “cajole” leaders to take certain decisions in exchange for providing or withholding assistance.\(^{91}\) Since building effective security forces requires motivated personnel and the financial resources necessary to fund equipment, salaries and operations, promising revenue can be especially effective in shaping decisions.\(^ {92}\) This mechanism assumes some divergence in the preferences among external actors and domestic decision-makers over policy decisions. External actors can influence decisions by altering the payoffs for domestic actors to persuade them to adopt reforms they do not otherwise favor. Yet in many cases, they fail to achieve such influence despite promising extensive rewards. Understanding when external actors can influence decisions in this way requires a deeper look at the internal conditions and interactions that shape their relative leverage over decisions.

The ability of external actors to exert leverage over policy decisions depends in large part on three sets of relational dynamics. These dynamics are clarified in literature on bargaining among states and organizations, and on principal-agent dynamics. First, influence derives less from the amount of resources each side controls than from relative dependence of one actor on another for those resources.\(^ {93}\) Ruling parties that rely on internal revenue sources are less susceptible to external influence than those who rely on external support.\(^ {94}\) Similarly, ruling parties with support from multiple external actors are less dependent on any one of them than those who depend on a single external patron. On the other hand, external actors that rely heavily on a single party within the country, either for access to information or to maintain stability, may lose the leverage they gain from providing resources. The relative dependence of external actors on domestic leaders affects the

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\(^ {94}\) This logic is elaborated in Desha Girod, “Effective Foreign Aid.”
credibility that they will withhold resources if they fail to comply with conditions, and the significant
for the recipients if they withhold them. Second, the influence of external actors depends on the
coherence of their objectives. External actors with multiple and contradictory goals – the problem
of multiple principals described in the principal agent literature – may prioritize stability or peace
over state-building or reform goals, leading to low credibility that they will withhold resources if
leaders do not adopt reforms.\(^95\) In Afghanistan, for example, external actors have been willing to
overlook election fraud, corruption and human rights abuse to preserve cooperation with incumbent
leaders. Third, external actors may fail to influence policy if they cannot effectively monitor parties’
compliance with their requirements as a result of information asymmetries.\(^96\) In post-conflict
contexts, the number of factions, complexity of relationships and insecure conditions may inhibit
external actors from gaining a clear picture of a rapidly changing reality. The organization of
external actors and their ability to share and act upon information also affects their capacity to
monitor effectively. The leverage of external actors thus derives from domestic conditions as well as
their own organization, which shape their interaction with recipients.

A third role of external assistance involves the diffusion of norms and values that alter the
preferences of domestic decision-makers. Although less frequently elaborated in the peacebuilding
or state-building literature, this pathway is particularly relevant to the development of norms of
civilian control, respect for human rights, and public responsiveness in the security sector.
Normative change is also crucial to instilling discipline and to enforcing rules, in order to enhance
authority over the forces and minimize risk of renewed conflict. Unlike the previous two pathways
that imply the “logic of consequences” shaped by changes in payoffs under a fixed set of

\(^95\) This issue has been well developed in the principal agent literature. For an overview, see John W. Pratt and Richard
\(^96\) Pratt & Zeckhauser, *Principals and Agents*
preferences, this type of influence is based on the “logic of appropriateness,” in which influence derives from shared values and norms and changes preferences.  

The ability to instill common values and norms also depends on relationships and interactions within and across factions and organizations. The diffusion of norms most often involves frequent communication and sustained relationships that facilitate trust and common understanding. Yet they also depend on the structure of organizations and internal networks. As scholars of organizational change have shown, where organizations are highly cohesive internally, based on shared understanding and identity, they are more likely to exhibit internal discipline and trust but more likely to resist change and external influence. Relations with external actors are dominated by “brokers,” who exploit the overall lack of communication to monopolize the flow of assistance and information and manipulate it for their own benefit. In less cohesive organizations, top decision-makers may perceive threats from within their own force, especially in a security force that is made up of other factions outside their own network. They may thus depend on donors or others outside their own organization to manage monitoring challenges. Dependence on external donors can lead to “generalized trust relationships” between donors and recipients that facilitate frequent communication and trust, and facilitate mutual influence and consensus-based decision-making. Trust-based relationships provide a measure of confidence for domestic leaders that external actors will provide aid, political backing and protection when they need it. Frequent and


generalized communication also shapes actors understanding of problems, leading to greater consensus with external actors that shape their decisions.\textsuperscript{102} Such close relationships between domestic leaders and external officials leave both vulnerable to manipulation or backlash by other factions within the country that are not part of these relationships.\textsuperscript{103} Nonetheless, normative diffusion among top decision-makers is often sufficient to influence key decisions.

The role of external actors and the form of influence they can exert over the governance of security forces thus emerge from the interactions among domestic factions and external actors within the constraints of the political conditions facing both sets of actors. As leaders struggle to build effective and loyal security forces, their interactions with other factions and external actors shape preferences and payoffs, and generate opportunities for other actors to influence key decisions regarding the structure, composition and oversight of the forces. The interactions are in turn embedded within the conditions that affect the resources available to each actor to achieve their goals. The ability of external actors to influence the trajectory of security sector governance, whether by filling gaps, exerting leverage or changing norms, thus depends on the conditions within and outside the country that determine where leaders must turn for support, and how external actors fit into their political calculations. While scholars have focused on the organization of external actors to determine their leverage and influence, much less attention has been devoted to the configurations of conditions within post-conflict countries that enable influence. In the following section, I describe three sets of conditions that structure these interactions in post-conflict environments and shape opportunities for influence by external actors over security sector governance.


\textsuperscript{103} Where organizations are more integrated, the risks increase that sub-groups pursue their interests to the determinant of the group. See Williamson, \textit{Markets and Hierarchies}.  

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As a country emerges from civil war, three sets of conditions generate the incentives for leaders to adopt measures that reduce factional control over the forces and affect the potential for external influence over these measures. Within post-conflict countries, the fragmentation of the ruling coalition and the distribution of revenue sources enable security force transformation by affecting the extent to which ruling elites must rely on support from other factions or external actors to consolidate their authority. The vulnerability that results from a fragmented ruling party and dispersed revenue sources raises the value of external assistance in the political calculations of post-conflict elites. It also facilitates external influence by increasing dependence on external actors, and by fostering mutually supportive relationships that reduce information asymmetries and facilitate norm diffusion. Leaders of a cohesive ruling party or with access to a concentrated revenue source instead have a strong political imperative to oppose any measure that reduces factional control over the forces. They also are less likely to develop dependence, communication and trust with external actors. Even where leaders are weak, however, the extent of transformation also depends on the ability of external actors to respond coherently and assist weak leaders to overcome political challenges. Without credible external support that responds to their specific challenges, weak leaders must pursue other approaches to managing factional challenges pressure while ignoring the incoherent demands of external actors. In this section, I describe these three conditions and how they affect possibilities for security force transformation. In the following section, I lay out how these conditions combine to shape the evolution of post-conflict security forces.

3.1 Ruling Party Fragmentation

The structure of the ruling coalition and its relationships to the security forces shape the constraints and opportunities that leaders face as they make decisions regarding the governance of the security forces. The degree of fragmentation or cohesion of the ruling party is defined by the
extent to which pre-existing social ties or cleavages bind a ruling party and facilitate loyalty, discipline and authority over the security forces, or whether the party is instead made up of numerous factions with their own basis of loyalty. As a ruling party works to secure its authority over the security forces, the means available for fostering loyalty within the force shape the role of the force vis-à-vis the rest of society. On the one hand, forces that share pre-existing ties based on geography or ethnicity can be the easiest to control, yet such a force is unlikely to respond to the needs of people who do not share those ties. On the other hand, a ruling party that is fragmented among several parties and that faces the prospect of these factions influencing elements of the security forces must seek other means for instilling loyalty within the force, sometimes with the support of external backers. The fragmentation of the ruling party thus determines the options available to leaders, and the incentives to adopt reforms. It also affects the potential for external influence over the process.

Cohesive ruling parties face strong imperatives to oppose measures that reduce factional control over the security forces. Especially following ethnically or religiously defined conflicts, solidarity within armed forces tends to stem from ties based on ethnic, geographic or religious affiliation, along with strong links to political party networks. Where the forces are dominated by the ruling party’s network, it can use social ties to ensure fighters’ loyalty by facilitating monitoring and peer-pressure through informal social networks. Dominance by party networks at the officer level can further serve political ends, since senior officers are more likely to use the forces to repress political rivals. Leaders of cohesive parties may also benefit from economic enterprises maintained by senior military officers if those officers are part of the same social and political network. A security force recruited primarily from a cohesive political network also generates broader political

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advantages for a ruling party. By providing security selectively and favoring members of their own group, leaders of ethnically-based parties can enhance loyalty and political support among members of that group. Security forces that are dominated by members of their own social network can thus cement political loyalty both within and outside the security forces. As a result, leaders of cohesive ruling parties are likely to ensure that the security forces are dominated by the members of their own network and resist external efforts to reduce that control.

Cohesive ruling parties also limit opportunities for external influence over policy decisions. Officials who share cohesive ties are less likely to develop close relationships with external actors and less susceptible to normative transfer. Ruling parties based on cohesive and exclusive ties tend to exhibit strong social boundaries with other groups, as leaders of cohesive parties foster a sense of threat to deepen their authority. The resulting sense of threat strengthens internal group cohesion and loyalty, but it also reinforces boundaries with other groups. Strong group boundaries limit trust with external actors and impede the efforts of external advisers, mentors and trainers to establish relationships with counterparts. Relations tend to be characterized by mutual suspicion, with only a few exceptional individuals able to break through and establish effective relationships.

Cohesive ruling parties can also undermine the bargaining leverage of external actors by limiting access to information and reducing relative dependence on external actors. Where inter-group boundaries are strong and effective relationships are strong, a few officials or politicians with

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strong ethnic credentials may monopolize ties with external actors to bolster their own influence, while manipulating aid for their own benefit and diluting its impact. Such brokerage relationships exacerbate information asymmetries. Cohesive parties can also undermine the credibility of external actors’ threat to withhold aid. If ethnic identity defines political affiliation and non-ethnic parties cannot mobilize public support, external actors have no choice but to support them. In post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, external actors tried but failed to promote moderate, cross-ethnic parties, and were forced to negotiate with hardline parties that obstructed desired reforms. Those who favored the reforms were marginalized within their parties.

Fragmented ruling coalitions that include multiple factions, each rooted in their own social or identity-based networks, are more conducive to security sector transformation. At the political level, leaders who lack a sufficient base of their own must build ties with other factions, often negotiating for political support in exchange for influence over policy or key positions, including in the security forces. Alliances shift frequently, and leaders constantly face the threat of defection from the coalition, and in some cases renewed violence or attack. As other factions succeed in influencing the composition of the leadership of the security forces, internal discipline and loyalty to the ruling party grow increasingly uncertain. Political leaders face increasing threats from within the security forces. In the absence of social or ethnic ties to foster discipline, they must find alternative means to build loyalty or monitor the forces. In some cases, leaders facing this type of vulnerability build security or intelligence units that operate in parallel to the fragmented military, in order to monitor other forces and protect the regime. In Liberia, for example, Charles Taylor chose to marginalize the Armed Forces when he could not replace its top leadership, and instead built an

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alternative militia dominated by his supporters. Yet as Taylor eventually discovered, this approach can further exacerbate factionalism and conflict, and parallel forces requires considerable resources to maintain. Leaders faced with such vulnerability may also continue to negotiate with various factions, and provide side payments in the form of senior appointments in the forces in return for loyalty. Alternatively, leaders of fragmented coalitions can invest in more time-consuming reforms that promote shared values and professional identity that cut across factions, and establish the organizational and oversight structures necessary to monitor and sanction abuses.\(^{109}\)

To overcome these challenges, leaders of fragmented coalitions often seek external support to consolidate their control over the security forces, thus generating opportunities for external influence. External actors may provide funds, equipment and technical assistance to help civilian leaders build the organizational structures that enhance their oversight, monitoring and control. They may also assist in monitoring their own force, through peacekeepers, embedded advisers and intelligence personnel on the ground. External support in fragmented political environments may take the form of “hybrid” governance or “shared sovereignty” arrangements in which the control of external actors over an element of state authority helps to neutralized domestic political challenges and overcome information asymmetries.\(^{110}\) While political leaders can use this support to manage domestic political challenges, external actors also benefit from such arrangements through greater access to information that can facilitate leverage. Leaders and external actors are also more likely in these to develop the relationships that facilitate constant communication and the transfer of norms. For instance, in 2005 the newly elected president of Liberia was faced with fragmented political scene made up of multiple parties, and limited trust or cohesion within or among the security forces.


Funds and political legitimacy provided by external actors enabled her to take controversial decisions in restructuring the military to reduce factionalism within the force. On the other hand, over-reliance on external actors can exacerbate internal asymmetries and lead to manipulation from within the ruling coalition or security forces. Although more fragmented ruling parties facilitate external influence, they can also increase the challenge of successfully implementing reforms without sufficient external assistance.

In sum, where ruling parties and security forces are dominated by cohesive political networks rooted in exclusive social ties, the provision of security tends to be discriminatory and external actors are unable to influence the governance of the forces. Fragmented ruling coalitions are more likely to adopt reforms since they must incorporate other factions in order to govern, and rely on external assistance to manage domestic challenges. Fragmented coalitions also facilitate leverage by external actors as well as the relationships that foster norm diffusion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of Ruling Coalition</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Effects on Outcome</th>
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| **Fragmented**                | Numerous parties with loose affiliations and shifting alliances  
                               -Security force includes members of rival factions within leadership | Internal factionalism and manipulation undermines discipline and encourages measures that reduce factional influence  
-Facilitates monitoring, trust and norm diffusion by external actors |
| **Cohesive**                  | Parties rooted in cohesive, ethnic or social ties  
                               -Government and security force leaders part of cohesive political network | Internal cohesion facilitates discipline and trust and discourages measures that reduce factional influence  
-Inhibits monitoring, trust and norm diffusion by external actors |

Table 2: Political Fragmentation: Characteristics and Effects

3.2 Revenue Distribution

Building loyal and effective forces also requires sufficient funding to pay, equip, train and maintain them. The source of revenue can, in turn, affect their orientation and behavior. Weinstein has shown that funding sources shape the organizational strategy and behavior of rebel and government forces during civil war, with those that rely on mineral resources for financing tend to
be more abusive and less disciplined than those that rely on the population. In the state-building context, the presence of resources can lead to “rentier” dynamics. Revenue from oil, mineral resources, foreign aid and other concentrated sources similarly shapes governance strategies by freeing rulers from the need to invest in effective bureaucracies that extract revenue and provide services. They also reduce the leverage of donors in promoting institutional reform. These dynamics depend primarily on the type of revenue rather than the amount. In the civil war context, the impact of natural resources on the conduct of the conflict depends on their “lootability,” as measured by the ease with which they can be extracted and transported, as well as their value-to-weight ratio, and their distance from the capital. In a state-building context, however, resources that are easily lootable and transportable are less useful for rulers than those that are more concentrated, and where extraction and allocation is less transparent and easier to monopolize and control. For instance, oil, natural gas, deep-shaft minerals, or monopoly control over lucrative industries can be easily controlled by the ruling party and allocated strategically to buy loyalty among rival factions or fund a repressive security apparatus to gather intelligence and eliminate dissent. In addition, control over allocation of state expenditures may matter as much as control over the source of revenues. For example, in Timor-Leste an oil fund set up by the government and donors

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111 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion.
113 Girod, “Effective Foreign Aid”
116 Reno emphasizes the importance of the ability of the ruler to monopolize the collection and distribution of revenue in explaining predatory rule and abusive forces. Reno, “Changing Nature of Warfare.”
has placed the revenues largely outside of government control, but discretion in allocating expenditures has enabled leaders to buy political support and affected the development of the security forces.

The concentration of revenue sources specifically affects incentives to reform security forces as well as opportunities for external leverage. Leaders with discretionary control over revenue can use the security forces to maintain access to these resources, and will resist reforms that dilute their control over the forces. A concentrated revenue source also frees leaders from depending on external donors, and allows them to maintain repressive or predatory security forces despite external objections. Where revenue sources are more dispersed, however, rulers must rely on rival factions or external donors to secure revenue. Lootable resources like diamonds or drugs can enable rival factions, rebel groups and militias to build alternative centers of power that they can use to challenge the ruling party’s authority or seek to influence state-building processes. As post-conflict leaders negotiate with these factions to gather sufficient revenue, they often allow these factions to influence top appointments in the cabinets and security forces. The resulting threat from within the forces creates an incentive to adopt measures that reduce factional control. Alternatively, leaders without concentrated revenue may rely on external donors for funding and assistance while they seek to broaden their financial base through improved taxation. The more they depend on donors for core revenue, the more leverage external actors can exercise over policy decisions. In post-war Sierra Leone, for example, the U.K. government negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding that included conditions involving police and military restructuring in exchange for a commitment to provide specific amounts of budget support. This agreement provided a framework for constant negotiations over the details of security sector reforms, while enhancing the U.K.’s influence over the process.

118 Girod “Effective Foreign Aid,” Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work.
The distribution of revenue sources thus determines the locus of financial dependence among elites, security forces and external actors and affects their relative bargaining leverage. While dispersed revenue sources forces leaders to rely on domestic factions and generates opportunities for external influence, the presence of a concentrated revenue source decreases incentives for reducing factional control over the forces and limits the potential for external influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue Distribution</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Effects on Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dispersed</strong></td>
<td>- State revenue is low or dispersed among numerous factions</td>
<td>- High reliance on domestic factions and/or external actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Regime must negotiate with factions or build new institutions to extract revenue</td>
<td>- Enables external actors to impose conditions and bargain over access to aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concentrated</strong></td>
<td>- Large source of revenue, such as mineral resources or major business monopolies</td>
<td>- Low reliance on domestic factions or external actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Regime directly controls revenue with discretion over allocation</td>
<td>- Limited opportunities for external actors to impose conditions for access to aid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Revenue Distribution: Characteristics and Effects

These two domestic conditions thus shape domestic incentives for elites and opportunities for external influence. A fragmented ruling party and dispersed revenue both contribute to political vulnerability and weakness, forcing leaders to rely on domestic factions and external actors for financial support, political backing and information about their forces. These conditions also affect the relative dependence, flow of information and potential for trust-based relationships among domestic leaders and external actors. As illustrated in the chart below, while either one of these conditions contributes to political vulnerability, the combination of both conditions creates the conditions most conducive for external influence by generating bargaining leverage and fostering mutual trust and consensus. On the other hand, the absence of either condition significantly limits the possibility that leaders will adopt reforms to security governance and that external actors will influence them effectively. The presence of one conditions but not the other leads to partial transformation. Fragmented parties that control concentrated revenue may allow pockets of
influence but resist major reforms that dilute their financial control; and cohesive parties with dispersed revenue must adopt conditions in exchange for aid, but implementation of those reforms will be limited due to continued pressure from cohesive factions. Moreover, while these conditions create opportunities for external influence, the extent of their influence also depends on their responsiveness of these conditions and their ability to coordinate their responses effectively.

**Figure 1: Enabling Conditions for Security Force Transformation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue Sources</th>
<th>Concentrated</th>
<th>Dispersed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Composition**

- Cohesive
- Fragmented

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### 3.3 External Coordination: Translating Opportunities into Influence

Faced with a conducive environment in which external assistance can benefit leaders politically, the influence of external actors over the structure of security forces also depends on the capacity donor countries, agencies and multilateral organizations to coordinate their interventions effectively. Studies of peacekeeping and peacebuilding frequently point to the amount of resources\(^{119}\) to explain the impact of external assistance. Yet while attributes such as the level of funding or skill of personnel may affect the quality of assistance, they have little bearing on the impact of aid in the face of resistance by political and security leaders. The extent to which donors

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\(^{119}\) Dobbins et al, *From Congo to Iraq*; Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work*; Doyle & Sambanis; *Making War and Building Peace.*
coordinate their objectives, manage information and react coherently to changes on the ground more directly affects their ability to persuade reluctant officials to adopt reforms. Recognition of these factors has become so widespread that “calls for improved coordination have become something of a mantra among scholars and practitioners of statebuilding.”

Coordination among donors most directly affects their ability to “cajole” leaders by conditioning assistance for policy changes. Clear objectives and common conditions on aid, especially when specified in peace agreements or strategic plans, enhance the credibility of donors in enforcing their conditions. Coherence among donors also helps to reduce the possibility that leaders might secure alternative sources of funding. Information-sharing and shared-decision making structures facilitate monitoring and enable donors to react coherently to changes on the ground. A lead donor or empowered coordinator can improve the coherence of donors’ response to these changes. In contrast, the failure to agree on common objectives, share information or act coherently enables recipient country officials to ignore demands from one donor while benefiting from support from another. Such coordination failures can undermine influence over policy even where recipients are highly dependent on external assistance.

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120 Paris, “Understanding the Coordination Challenge”
122 Howard, *UN Peacekeeping*.
124 On donor coordination and influence in non-conflict contexts, see Barbara Lippert and Gabi Umbach, “The Pressure of Europeanisation From post-communist state administrations to normal players in the EU system,” *Central European Review of International Affairs* (2005); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., *The Europeanization of central and eastern Europe* (Cornell University Press, 2005).
125 Howard, *UN Peacekeeping*.

Coordination among external actors also affects their ability to build trust with domestic leaders that enables changes in preferences. Especially in fragmented political environments where leaders rely on external actors to help manage internal political threats, the level of coherence among external actors can affect post-conflict leaders’ confidence in external actors’ ability to help them manage those threats. A robust coordination structure or the presence of a dominant donor that can coordinate assistance provides recipient officials with a single and coherent interlocutor and facilitates communication. Well-coordinated donors ensure that information about performance flows from advisers at lower levels to senior officials, to ensure that the overall policy and aid flows respond to internal challenges as they evolve. Long-term commitments that are rooted in long-standing colonial relationships or shared objectives can facilitate stable and productive relationships among officials that are crucial in building and maintaining trust. For example, the UK’s decisions to make a ten-year commitment of funding to Sierra Leone following its civil war, with clear benchmarks and funding levels written into a memorandum of understanding, facilitated a between high-level officials in both governments. In contrast, where numerous donors with different approaches compete for influence and access, recipients are less likely to develop a stable relationship with any one donor, undermining the influence of any single donor. Where they lack confidence in the ability of external actors to address internal threats or to share information, leaders of fragmented parties pursue other strategies to manage political challenges, like building parallel security forces that fuel increased factionalism.

Effective coordination thus enables donors to translate opportunities into influence over policy decisions. Influence through bargaining leverage and through trust relationships require coherent objectives, effective sharing and management of information and the ability to align assistance and respond coherently to changes on the ground. Yet the specific response that is most effective varies by context. While credible threats can enhance bargaining leverage where the ruling
party is cohesive and dependent on external support, in more fragmented environments the
development of trust requires a commitment to provide resources, and to collaborate with domestic leaders to manage internal pressures. In the most influential instances of external assistance, both forms of influence are present. In sum, unified external actors exert greater influence over recipient leaders, resulting in greater security force transformation, while the absence of coordination undermines their influence and limits the prospects for transformation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Coordination</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Effects on Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordinated Donors</strong></td>
<td>- Unified and clear objectives</td>
<td>- Strengthens credibility of external actors to withhold aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Processes in place for sharing and managing information about behavior</td>
<td>- Improved information flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Joint decision-making structures</td>
<td>- Facilitates stable relationships and trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Un-Coordinated Donors</strong></td>
<td>- Multiple and conflicting objectives</td>
<td>- Undermines credibility of threats to withhold aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Limited information-sharing</td>
<td>- Inhibits information flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Donors react independently and differently to changes on the ground</td>
<td>- Undermines stable relationship and trust</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: External Coordination: Characteristics and Effects

4. Domestic Weakness and the Paradox of Post-Conflict State Building

This analysis predicts that security force transformation occurs in the presence of political fragmentation, dispersed revenue and coordinated external actors, where the leadership that emerges from a conflict is most vulnerable politically and financially, and external actors respond credibly. This combination of conditions generates incentives for domestic leaders to adopt reforms that limit their authority over the forces, and to depend on external actors for financial and political backing. These conditions also affect the potential for external actors to develop the bargaining leverage and trust relationships necessary to exert influence over the formulation, adoption and implementation of reforms, by shaping the level of dependence, flow of information and potential for cooperative relationships.

The combination of these three conditions thus generates the most conducive setting for externally-supported security force transformation to advance in post-conflict countries. Yet each
condition does not produce the same effect. While favorable domestic conditions are necessary for reforms to advance, the external response affects the extent of reform. Other configurations of conditions may therefore lead to partial or limited transformation. For instance, a cohesive ruling party with a dispersed revenue base may rely on external actors for funding and equipment, but resist any reforms that dilute its control over the security forces. Under such conditions, external actors may succeed in conditioning aid for certain policy changes, but implementation may stall due to limited influence over norms and practices. Alternatively, leaders of a fragmented political coalition with a concentrated revenue source may rely on individual external efforts that suit them politically, while rejecting other reforms, leading to partial transformation. Leaders who face domestic challenges but lack coordinated external assistance may adopt certain changes for their own interests, but these reforms may diverge from the reforms promoted by external actors. Where political authority is rooted in concentrated revenue and a cohesive ruling coalition, security sector transformation is unlikely even if external actors are highly coordinated. These combinations of conditions, causal mechanisms and outcomes are summarized in Figure 2.
In most contexts, recipients and donors face conditions that are somewhere along the spectrum of each dimension, leading to various configurations of conditions. These conditions can also vary over time or with different security forces, each of which is linked to its own configuration of factional networks, resources and external support. In addition, other factors – from individual personalities to prior history – also affect the ultimate outcome of reforms. Without permissive domestic conditions and a coordinated external response, however, substantial changes in security sector governance are unlikely to advance.

The analysis highlights a paradox of external intervention in post-conflict state building: the conditions that favor transformation are those in which domestic leaders are the weakest, and which are the most challenging for building disciplined and professional security forces. In the face of political fragmentation and dispersed revenue, leaders overcome internal divisions and financial shortfalls by negotiating with allies and rivals for political support and revenue, often in exchange for influence over appointments and operations that undermine professionalism and entrench factionalism. Fragmentation within the security forces also enables security officials to manipulate external aid and undermine the implementation of new laws or procedures. Yet these conditions also foster greater reliance on external actors, which increases their bargaining leverage and facilitates trust relationships with vulnerable leaders. The resulting influence and support of external actors help leaders manage domestic challenges, and enable politically difficult decisions to reduce factional control by altering the composition and broadening civilian oversight. To overcome the myriad internal challenges, however, external assistance must be sufficiently coordinated to respond flexibly and coherently to changes on the ground. This paradox sets a high bar for the organization of external actors in enabling security sector governance reforms.

A deeper paradox and dilemma arises for external interveners, as they may inadvertently alter the conditions that enable security governance transformations. Even under favorable conditions,
domestic leaders and external actors must invest significant resources, political commitment and
time, to adequately monitor the behavior of the forces and the factions within them, to overcome
day-to-day challenges, and to painstakingly build the organizational infrastructure and shared values
necessary for effective and publicly oriented forces. Yet the long-term commitment necessary to
achieve such changes runs directly counter to most external donors’ short time horizons and desire
for quick results. Instead, donors with limited timeframes tend to seek “champions” to quickly push
through reforms. By picking favorites and concentrating resources in the hands of a narrow set of
elites, donors may enable political leaders to maintain their authority without engaging in the
arduous work of building broad coalitions or investing in sustained organizational reform.
Bolstering the authority of a single faction can undermine the fragmentation that favors reform, by
weakening incentives to pursue reforms, or by fueling a political backlash among other factions who
react by rejecting external support. By helping weak leaders to achieve a more cohesive base or
concentrated revenue source without building broader coalitions or stronger organizational
infrastructure, donors may thus reverse the conditions that favor their own success. In such cases,
the results of assistance are at best unsustainable, and at worst external actors may directly
undermine their own objectives.

On the other hand, assistance that is carefully calibrated to local contexts can reinforce the
conditions that are conducive to security force transformation. By fostering cross-cutting ties or
reconciliation among parties and factions, integrating previously excluded groups into politics,
improving the collection of revenue, or contributing to a broader source of legitimacy inside and
outside of the security forces, external actors can help build the basis for broader coalitions and
revenue sources. Donors can also reinforce political competition and accountability across
institutions to strengthen the deeper underpinnings of democratic oversight over security forces.
Such changes are extremely gradual, and the impact of external assistance on these conditions
remains uncertain and difficult to measure. Without attention to the underlying conditions and relationships that underpin governance changes, however, external actors may ultimately fail to influence security sector governance or other state-building objectives.

5. Conclusion

As a core function of the state, the evolution of security forces reflects the broader political struggles within the country in the aftermath of civil wars. Even after violent conflict ends, security forces may develop to protect citizens and maintain stability, but they may also enable political actors to pursue factional interests to the detriment of public safety and security. How they evolve after the end of civil wars depends on the political conditions that shape leaders’ choices as they consolidate their authority, and as they seek the political and financial resources necessary to survive politically. These conditions affect the sources of authority they must rely upon and the relationships they need to build, and shape opportunities for domestic factions and external actors to influence the state-building process. Three sets of conditions – the fragmentation of the ruling coalition, the distribution of revenue sources, and the level of coordination among external actors – combine to affect the process and outcome of efforts to re-build and re-structure security forces.

Where leaders are most vulnerable politically, they are most likely to build broader coalitions and rely on external actors, leading to the greatest potential for reforms that limit the influence of factions and broaden the responsiveness of the forces. Leaders with a cohesive political base or concentrated revenue source are less likely to adopt or implement such reforms. At the same time, external response also matters, since external actors who are insufficiently coordinated fail translate opportunities for influence into actual change. Whether security forces evolve to protect the interests of the few or to serve the safety of many thus depends more on the configuration of relationships and resources than on the types of training or technical assistance provided by donors.
This theory highlights the challenges facing donor officials and post-conflict leaders who are interested in building more professional, democratic or publicly responsive security forces. Security force transformation is most likely under a limited and relatively rare set of conditions, where domestic leaders are weak and external actors are well coordinated. This reality generates a daunting set of pitfalls for external actors, even where conditions are most aligned in their favor. Even in the most favorable cases, donors may fail to achieve or maintain the necessary level of coordination, neglect the build organizational infrastructure, or inadvertently alter domestic conditions close off opportunities for influence and weaken incentives to adopt reforms. This theory thus explains the frequent cases of limited impact of donor intervention despite extensive resources. It also explains the few cases that have succeeded.

The effects of donor assistance depend less on the techniques, skills and equipment they deploy than on the way these resources are deployed. The greatest impact stems from effective relationships with leaders and responsiveness to the challenges they face in particular contexts. Strategies aimed at cultivating trust, deepening leverage or building relationships are at least as important as the particular policies procedures, training approaches and other techniques. As the case studies will demonstrate, the most successful interventions often produce outcomes that differ in form than the changes proposed by donors, but emerge from painstaking negotiation and discussion and are therefore adapted to the local context. Over the long-term, moreover, the greatest impact of donors in the security sector and other state-building processes may stem from their effects on the conditions within the country, including the political composition and the distribution of revenue, that shape opportunities for influence and change.
CHAPTER III

EVIDENCE ACROSS COUNTRIES:
MULTI-COUNTRY COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

Through a series of cross-country comparisons, this chapter provides evidence for my argument that security force transformation is most likely when leaders are weakest domestically, as they rely on domestic or external support to manage political challenges. I marshal several types of evidence in support of this argument, including a multivariate regression analysis of all post-conflict cases since the end of the Cold War that draws on a range of existing and original data sources; a more focused comparison of 21 cases of countries that experienced international intervention after civil war; and a detailed, qualitative analysis of the evolution of military and police forces in three countries that emerged from conflict over the last two decades. Each of these methods presents its own limitations, as I discuss below. Nonetheless, the three methods complement each other to generate a robust test of the core elements of my argument. Through the evidence presented below, I show that changes that reduce factional control over security forces depend on upon conditions within post-conflict countries that weaken leaders politically; that these changes are most likely in the presence of a combination of these domestic conditions and coordinated response by external actors; and that these configurations of conditions enable changes through specific causal mechanisms that create domestic incentives for reforms and opportunities for influence by external actors. In this chapter, I present the results of the two multi-country comparisons and set out the framework for the case studies, which I present in the subsequent chapters.

These different methodological approaches and sources of evidence allow for three separate tests of my argument. First, through a multivariate analysis of all cases of conflict termination since the end of the Cold War, I show that the conditions outlined in the previous chapter that weaken leaders politically – a fragmented ruling coalition and dispersed sources of revenue – are correlated
with transformations in security force governance across a large set of post-conflict countries. This test shows that the basic argument – that political weakness creates opportunities for security governance transformation – is valid across countries and contexts. This analysis further demonstrates that other explanations present in the literature for the impact of aid on state-building and peace building outcomes do not perform as well in accounting for the variation in the evolution of the governance of security forces. On the other hand, the quantitative analysis suffers from several limitations, including insufficiency of the data and observations. It also fails to test core elements of my argument, that certain configurations of conditions are necessary for transformation to take root as a result of particular causal mechanisms. After laying out these limitations, I turn to a more focused analysis of a smaller set of cases.

The remaining tests examine a more focused set of cases and wider array of data to demonstrate core elements of the argument. The second test applies typological analysis to shows that certain configurations of conditions are most associated with high levels of transformation. Through a comparison of 21 post-conflict cases, I show that even where external support is substantial, the combination of dispersed revenue and a fragmented ruling coalition is necessary for a high level of transformation, and that coordinated external assistance increases both the likelihood and extent of reform. This smaller set of cases allows for overcoming the data limitations of the quantitative analysis, while going beyond correlation among individual variables to demonstrate how configurations of conditions matter for enabling security force transformation to advance. Third, through a deeper examination of the military and police forces in three countries, I demonstrate the causal mechanisms through which political fragmentation and dispersed revenue combine with the coordination of external actors to enable security force transformation. This more focused analysis allows me to compare individual military and police forces within each country, as well as specific reform efforts involving those forces, resulting in a total of six cases and numerous instances of
specific reform efforts. Through process tracing, I show that variations in each of these conditions, while other conditions remained constant, affected the evolution of the governance of security forces. I also clarify the causal mechanisms through which these variations affected outcomes, by creating incentives for reform and shaping the dependence, credibility, information and trust that is necessary for external actors to influence policy. Although the third test is fully laid out in the following chapters, I begin here by using the data from the first two analyses to select the most appropriate cases.


Through a multivariate regression analysis of post-conflict countries, I test the hypotheses that ruling party fragmentation, dispersed revenue and external coordination are correlated with security force transformation. The argument laid out in the previous chapter emphasizes that a configuration of conditions – political fragmentation, dispersed revenue and unified external actors – enables the highest level of transformation to occur, and that other configurations lead to either partial or limited transformation. This configuration of conditions is an important element of the argument – domestic conditions enable transformation by creating political incentives for leaders and opportunities for external actors, while the response of external actors determines whether they can translate opportunities into influence. Although quantitative analysis does not lend itself to testing the effects of such configurations of variables, finding that each of these conditions is correlated with security governance transformation would provide substantial credibility to the argument. A finding that one or all of these conditions is correlated with security governance transformation would help prove that local political conditions matter to the evolution of governance and to the impact of external aid, and that they do so in a similar way across countries. On the other hand, finding that none of these conditions is related to security governance
transformations, or that other variables better predict the outcome, would weaken my argument.

The analysis therefore tests the following three hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Security force transformation is most likely when the ruling coalition is most fragmented, and least likely to occur when the ruling coalition is most cohesive.

**Hypothesis 2:** Security force transformation is most likely when revenue to the state is most dispersed, and least likely to occur when revenue to the state is most concentrated.

**Hypothesis 3:** Security force transformation is most likely when external actors are most coordinated, and least likely to occur when external actors are least coordinated.

This analysis can also test whether other variables are associated with transformations in security sector governance. I explore whether several alternative explanations found in the literature on peacekeeping and peacebuilding are related to security force transformation. As outlined in the first chapter, although few studies have specifically sought to account for security governance transformation across countries, several scholars have looked at the determinants of external actors’ success in achieving other peacebuilding and state-building outcomes. Some scholars have found that in addition to the presence of peacekeepers, the amount of aid, size of the peacekeeping mission, and robustness of the mandate affects the likelihood of success in achieving peace and stability.\(^{127}\) Peacebuilding scholars have also focused on the difficulty of achieving peace and reforming institutions, as measured by the level hostility and destruction wrought by the conflict.\(^{128}\) On the other hand, tests of both sets of variables on the level of democracy have not yielded consistent results.\(^{129}\) Their effects on the development of specific institutions like the security forces have not been systematically tested, however. Finding that these variables predict security forces transformation better or at least as well as the conditions I propose would undermine my argument. Therefore, I test the following three alternative hypotheses:

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127 Dobbins et al, *From Congo to Iraq*; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*; Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work*; For an overview of these findings, see Fortna and Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects.”

128 Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*.

129 Several authors have failed to find consistent evidence of these variables on the level of democratization after civil war. For a review of the literature, see Fortna and Huang, “Democratization After Civil War.”
Hypothesis 4: Security force transformation is most likely when external interventions are most intensive.

Hypothesis 5: Security force transformation is most likely when external actors have greatest formal authority, as defined by a UN mandate.

Hypothesis 6: Security force transformation is least likely when the intensity of the conflict and depth of hostility are greatest.

1.1. The Cases

The analysis examines all of the countries that emerged from civil war over the last two decades. To select the cases, I draw from the Uppsala University Conflict Data Program (UDCP) Civil War Termination Dataset. Although other datasets are available, the UDCP dataset includes the most up-to-date data, and includes cases of conflict termination. Internal armed conflict, or civil war, is defined as a conflict between a government and a non-governmental party, in which the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 1,000 battle deaths. Although the UDCP dataset includes all cases of at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year, I include only the cases in which the cumulative battle deaths totaled at least 1,000, since only such major conflicts are likely to spur substantial institutional reform on the part of the central government. The UDCP codes a conflict has having terminated when it ceases for at least one year either because it does not meet the threshold of 25 battle deaths, rebel organization or incompatibility. Each case of conflict termination is coded according to whether it ended through a peace agreement, cease-fire, victory, or it did not meet the threshold of 25 battled deaths. Although the dataset comprises all cases of conflict termination since 1946, I limit the selection to those conflicts that ended after the Cold War (starting in 1990), since deliberate and widespread efforts by external actors to reform security

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132 This definition is commonly used by civil war scholars. See Fearon and Laiti, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” and, Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War, Building Peace*.

133 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/
governance in post-conflict states began after the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{134} Although a single country may be present for multiple conflicts, I ensure that each case is for a separate conflict or that ended at least two years apart. The cases end in 2007, to allow at least five years following the conflict to measure the change in security sector governance after the conflict. The dataset yields 76 cases of civil war termination from 1990 to 2007.\textsuperscript{135} Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 5.

1.2. Variables and Measurement

A major challenge in studying institution-building in post-conflict states through quantitative analysis has been identifying robust quantitative measures of the phenomena under examination. Since these tend to be multi-faceted and complex, identifying single, numerical variables that can approximate the change can be difficult. To compound this challenge, post-conflict environments produce limited and often unreliable data for most political processes as a result of the weakness of government of institutions, flight of personnel and wartime destruction. I therefore select proxy variables that come as close as possible to measuring the conditions and outcome, given the data limitations. These variables include both data from existing, published datasets, as well as data compiled from primary sources that aim to more directly address the variables than any existing data sources. Although imperfect, these proxy variables serve as plausible estimates by measuring one or more of the core dimensions of each of the conditions under investigation.

To measure the extent of security sector transformation, I use the change in the ICRG score for the Military in Politics score.\textsuperscript{136} The ICRG rates the extent of military in politics on a six-point scale, ranging from a low score for a full-scale military regime to a high score for a country with no military participation in government. I measure the change in the score during a five-year time

\textsuperscript{134} As described in Chapter 1, the SSR agenda began with the reform of post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, post-authoritarian transitions in Latin America in the early 1990s, as well as the early multi-dimensional peacekeeping. See also Brzoska, “Development Donors.”

\textsuperscript{135} Two additional cases, both involving Israel, are dropped from the final sample, since it is an outlier on several of the variables and biased the results.

\textsuperscript{136} For details of the data and methodology, see http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx
period to assess whether the governance of the military has gone through any significant changes. Although the ICRG Military in Politics score is not an exact measure of factional influence over the military, and it focuses only on the military rather than the police, it is the most direct measure of the change to the governance and oversight of the military that is available across countries. Especially in post-conflict countries, a change in this score should be a direct reflection of successful – or unsuccessful efforts – to alter the governance of the military. It also directly addresses one of the three elements of my definition of security force transformation, the extent of civilian oversight. Moreover, since the removal of the military from politics is almost always a core objective of external actors working in the security sector, it is a good measure of the success of donor-funded efforts in the security sector.

For the main independent variables, the fragmentation of the ruling coalition, the concentration of revenue sources and the coordination among donors, I use existing datasets and construct new variables based on data compiled from published sources. The fragmentation of the ruling coalition as defined in the previous chapter includes several elements, such the number of factions within the governing coalition, the ease with which they break off and shift alliances, the extent to which they are rooted in pre-existing ties that foster loyalty, and the extent to which these ties are shared between the security forces and political party leaders. As a measure of this concept, I use the percentage of seats that the ruling party controls in the legislature, using data compiled from the websites of parliaments and electoral commissions in each country as well as secondary sources when necessary. A lower percentage represents of seats in the legislature indicates greater fragmentation. Since the ruling party does not have a sufficiently cohesive and broad base to win

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137 Other measures considered included human rights scores, rule of law scores, however most of these were focused on potential effects of successful reform that are attributable to multiple other factors, rather than a measure of the reform itself.

138 Where data was not available from national sources, I used data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union which compiles information on legislatures around the world at http://www.ipu.or.
election or govern on its own, it must reach out and negotiate with other factions to pass legislation and consolidate its authority.\textsuperscript{139} The higher the percentage of seats in the legislature, the more cohesive the ruling party and the more reliable its support, obviating the need to reach out to other parties. I expect this measure to be negatively correlated with security force transformation.

To account for the concentration of revenue, I include the rents from the production of oil as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.\textsuperscript{140} I expect oil rents to be negatively correlated to security force transformation. Although not the only source of concentrated revenue, oil is perhaps the most concentrated revenue source possible, and has been associated with poor institutional responsiveness.\textsuperscript{141} Oil most directly embodies the types of dynamics – discretionary control over a concentrated source of resource – that affect security force governance. I also test the effects of other natural resource rents, also from the World Development Indicators, including timber, diamonds and other minerals. I expect other resource rents to be positively or uncorrelated due to the likelihood that they are dispersed under the control of other factions. Using oil rents as a percentage of GDP measures oil dependence, or its importance relative to other revenue sources. I expect dependence, rather than the overall amount of oil, to most significantly affect governance by shaping incentives and opportunities for leaders. I also test the effects of oil rents per capita, which measures the overall amount of oil rents.

To estimate the level of donor unity, I measure the percentage of aid provided by the largest donor to a country. The data is calculated using foreign aid data drawn from the World Bank’s

\textsuperscript{139} The effect of seat percentage is regardless of whether the country has parliamentary or presidential system, or whether the electoral rules are majoritarian or proportional. Either way, a low percentage of seats means that the executive must face opposition groups and build coalitions in order to govern.

\textsuperscript{140} I also test a binary variable coded as 1 if fuel exports make up more than 33 percent of total merchandise exports, following Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” Including this variable does not affect the findings.

\textsuperscript{141} See for example Beblawi and Luciani, \textit{The Rentier State}, Anderson, “The State in the Middle East,” and Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War.”
Donor coordination can arise through a variety of means, from a lead donor to effective coordination structures that succeed in achieving consensus on unified objectives, gathering information, and credibility responding to changes on the ground. This measure focuses on one aspect, the presence of a lead donor, with the caveat that it may not be capturing other important forms of coordination. Nonetheless, I expect the percentage of aid provided by a single donor to be positively correlated with security force transformation, especially when the other two conditions are conducive to reform.

Several variables are included as tests of alternative explanations present in the literature on state-building and peacebuilding. To measure the effects of the intensity of external involvement, I include the total amount of foreign aid (official overseas development aid) per capita received during the first five years after the conflict, from the World Development Indicators. Since it includes all donors, it measures the total intensity of the intervention rather than the share of each donor. I also test two alternative measures of the intensity of intervention, the number of peacekeeping troops and the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission as reported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. According to the literature, more troops and more aid should be correlated with security force transformation. As an additional measure of the intensity of the mandate, I include a measure of the robustness of the mandate from Fortna (2008), which is coded from a monitoring to a peace enforcement mission. To account for the depth of hostility and intensity of conflict, I include the duration of the conflict, from the UDCP dataset, as well as the total number of deaths in the conflict and whether the conflict was ethnically-based, both from the Doyle and Sambanis dataset. Longer duration and greater number of deaths and ethnic conflict

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142 I calculated the percentage of the amount of aid provided by the largest aid provider as a percentage of total official development aid for a given year. Data on foreign aid was drawn from the 2011 World Development Indicators. See World Bank. World Development Indicators 2011 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2012)

143 From The World Bank, World Development Indicators.


145 See fn. 26, above. See also Collier et al, Post-Conflict Risks.
should limit the changes to the governance of the security forces due to the hostility and destruction that makes reform more difficult to achieve.

I control for other factors that might affect the trajectory of security sector governance following the end of the conflict. I include a measure of GDP per capita the year the conflict ends. Low levels of economic development have been correlated with renewed violence, as well as greater difficulty building institutions. On the other hand, higher income could bolster the financial and human capacity within the country necessary for transforming security force governance. I also include GDP growth during the first five years after the conflict. Rapid economic growth can reduce incentives for parties to maintain their own militias and provide an economic basis for institution-building. Although other variables such as infant mortality, population density and urban population have also been associated with state strength, GDP per capita is the most directly related to state-building. I also control for the type of outcome, whether the conflict ended in cease-fire, peace agreement, victory by one side, or merely ended. Countries where conflicts ended in victory by one side that emerges with firm control over the security forces, may be less prone to reform than those in which a cease-fire or peace agreement if the actors need to compromise. I also include measures of regional variation from the UDCP dataset to control for the possibility that reform efforts or the impact of external actors might vary by region. Finally, I control for regression to the mean by including the ICRG Military in Politics score at the end of the conflict, since countries at the higher or lower end of the scale are more likely to move toward the center.

146 The World Bank, *World Development Indicators*
148 The World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.
149 Collier et al, *Post-Conflict Risks*.
150 From the UDCP Conflict Termination dataset. A conflict is coded as having ended if it does not meet the threshold of 25 battle deaths the following year.
151 Toft, *Securing the Peace*.
152 Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” I also test the effects of the ICRG score prior to the conflict in the robustness checks, described below.
### Table 5: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-yr Change in Military in Politics Score (milinpolchg)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>ICRG Political Risk Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Party Share of Legislative Seats (execshare)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>55.54</td>
<td>26.19</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>Electoral Commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Rents as % of GDP (oilrents)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>19.26</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>89.06</td>
<td>WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Unity (donorunity)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>30.50</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Transfers of Foreign Aid per capita (odapc)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41.44</td>
<td>65.50</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>389.45</td>
<td>WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention Mandate (interventiontype)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>ICRG Political Risk Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Related Deaths (deaths)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>103,588</td>
<td>276,839</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Doyle &amp; Sambanis 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration (duration)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>UDCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic or Religious War (ethnic)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Doyle &amp; Sambanis 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military In Politics score at end of conflict (milinpolend)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>ICRG Political Risk Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (gdppc)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2,471</td>
<td>6,470</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>36,819</td>
<td>WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (gdpgro)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>-9.33</td>
<td>30.62</td>
<td>WDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Type (outcome)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>UDCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (region)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>UDCP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3. Analysis and Results

I estimate the effects of each of these variables on the change in the governance of the military forces through ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression, with clustering of standard errors by country. The results are presented in Table 6. Since a higher score on the ICRG scale represents greater civilian control over the military, a positive coefficient implies positive correlation with transformation in security force governance.
The results support the first two hypotheses and demonstrate a key element of my argument, that the domestic conditions that weaken leaders politically enable security force transformation. Starting with a basic model (Model 1) that includes the three independent variables and four control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Change in Military in Politics Score 5 Years after the Conflict</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Party Share of Legis. Seats</td>
<td>-0.015*</td>
<td>-0.015*</td>
<td>-0.020**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(execshare)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Rents as % of GDP</td>
<td>-0.020****</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
<td>-0.020*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(oilrents)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Unity</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(donorunity)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Transfers of Foreign Aid per capita</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(odapc)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate of Intervention</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(interventiontype)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Duration</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Duration)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic or Religious War</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ethnic)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military In Politics score, end of conflict</td>
<td>-0.479***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.460***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(milinpolend)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.00008**</td>
<td>-0.00005</td>
<td>-0.00009****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(gdppc)</td>
<td>(0.00003)</td>
<td>(0.00011)</td>
<td>(0.00003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.022*</td>
<td>-0.019*</td>
<td>-0.027**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(gdpgro)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Type</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(outcome)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
<td>-0.399</td>
<td>-0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(region)</td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
<td>(0.389)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>3.707***</td>
<td>3.927***</td>
<td>3.901***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.340)</td>
<td>(1.370)</td>
<td>(1.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>0.5085</td>
<td>0.5426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** indicates significant at 1% level. ** indicates significance at 5% level. * indicates significance at 10% level.
variables, I find that both domestic conditions – the share of executive seats in the legislature and the amount of oil rents as a percentage of GDP – are significantly and negatively related to security governance transformation. A decrease of 30% in the ruling party’s share of seats in the legislature is associated with nearly a half point improvement in the ICRG Military in Politics score, on average, well above the mean change of 0.30 points. Similarly, countries that depend on oil for 30% of their GDP achieve a change of 0.60 points less than countries that do not depend on oil. These results are significant at the conventional .1 and 0.05 levels, meaning that there is less than a 10% and 5% chance respectively that these relationships are due to chance. The graphical representations in Figure 3 suggest that both oil rents and political fragmentation may be necessary but not sufficient for a high level of transformation, since all of the countries with high changes in in the ICRG scores are at the upper left of both charts, meaning that they have a low share of legislative seats and are not oil exporters. This necessity argument is further explored below.

![Graphs](image-url)

**Figure 3: Change in Military Governance, Political Fragmentation and Oil Rents**

On the other hand, donor unity is not significantly correlated to changes in military governance across countries, at least on its own. Since according to my argument donor

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153 The effects of non-oil resource rents are not statistically significant at conventional levels, likely reflecting the opposite effects of different revenues and their potential for capture by other factions.
coordination only matters to the extent to which the conditions within the country are conducive, it
is not surprising that the variable on its own would not be significantly related to the outcome.
Donor coordination may also be endogenous, for example occurring most often in cases where
conditions are least conducive, or otherwise responding to the political environment. In addition,
this measure that focuses on a single donor’s share of aid may fail to capture important coordination
structures like an empowered representative or UN coordination. Although a significant
relationship would have provided evidence that the coordination of external actors systematically
affects the likelihood of transformation on its own, the absence of a significant relationship does not
in itself undermine the argument. I further explore the complexities of this relationship below.

Of the control variables, per capita GDP, GDP growth and a country’s ICRG score at the
end of the conflict are significantly related to security governance transformation. Surprisingly, the
relationship with GDP per capita appears negative, with wealthier and more rapidly growing country
less likely to transform security governance. However the relationship actually appears to depend on
income level – by dropping the wealthiest countries and leaving only low and middle-income
countries in the sample, the sign for per capita GDP reverses and remains statistically significant in
all three models. This finding suggests that for lower and middle-income countries, the wealth and
capacity within the country are important factors in enabling transformative reforms to advance
even where political conditions are conducive, while wealthier countries are less likely to pursue such
reforms. A country’s score at the end of the conflict is also negatively and significantly related to the
change over time, since countries at the higher end of the spectrum have more trouble improving
further. How the conflict ended is not significantly related to the outcome, confirming the
argument that the development of institutions post-conflict thus has more to do with the political
and economic conditions at the end of the war than the way the conflict ended. The regional
variable is not significant in this model, but replacing it with dummy variables for each region does
yield significant and negative relationships between African and Middle Eastern countries and security force transformation. Countries in these two regions are thus less likely to achieve security force transformations even when conditions are conducive. This finding might be explained by factors such as regional diffusion, legacies of colonialism or military culture in those regions.

The analysis further demonstrates that other variables in the literature fail to predict security governance transformation. In Models 2 and 3, I test Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 related to the intensity and mandate of external interveners. I find that while the coefficients on the two independent variables remain significant, none of the variables measuring alternative explanations are significantly correlated with the outcome. On the external side, neither the level of aid nor the robustness of the mandate predicts a change in the military’s governance. Similarly, neither the duration, nor the presence of ethnic conflict, nor the number of deaths explains the variation in security force transformation. These results should be interpreted with some caution due to the small size of the sample to limitation of the data on deaths in conflict. Nonetheless, the effects of ruling party fragmentation and revenue concentration remain statistically significant even in this smaller sample.

1.4. Robustness Checks

The results are robust to several alternative specifications and robustness checks. Altering the dataset by dropping high income countries that may bias the sample, such as the UK, Russia and Israel yielded similar results. To reduce possible clustering effect, I dropped cases within the same country less that were less than five years apart. In the most conservative specifications, oil rents per capita remained significantly and negatively related to the outcome, while the statistical significance of ruling party fragmentation dropped just below the p<0.10 threshold to P<0.12. Since these tests further reduced the sample size, however, this finding can still be considered robust.

154 I included only duration and ethnic variables in the displayed model since the limited number of observations for the number of deaths variable resulted in an even smaller sample size of 33 observations. Nonetheless, it did not change the results for either the explanatory or alternative variables.
Alternative specifications of the variables yielded interesting findings. Replacing oil rents as a percentage of GDP with oil rents per capita yielded the same results, but only by dropping high income countries (above $10,000 US per capita GDP) where oil rents are high per capita but low as a percentage of GDP. This suggests that oil wealth operates differently in wealthy countries where institutions are strong, but that both dependence and the overall amount affect security governance. Replacing oil rents with other natural resource rents did not generate a significant correlation with governance change, suggesting that oil is qualitatively different from other forms of resources.

Other changes did not affect the findings. I replaced the amount of foreign aid with the number of troops and with a dummy variable specifying the presence and mandate of UN intervention. I also tested a different timeframe for the change in the dependent variable by replacing it with changes in the ICRG Military in Politics score after 3 years and 7 years rather than 5 years. The results remained consistent after 3 years, but after 7 years the executive’s share of legislative seats was no longer significant at conventional levels. This may reflect limitations of the data, since a several recent cases did not have data going up to 7 years. It may also indicate that external actors have a narrow window to achieve reform even under conducive conditions, and that these conditions are unlikely to remain years after the end of the conflict.

Since there were several missing observations in the ICRG dataset. I tested whether this might bias the results, and found that missing observations were not correlated with any of the independent or control variables. I replaced the independent variable measuring the ICRG score at the end of the conflict with the score prior to the conflict. This would address the possibility that the change actually captured occurred during the conflict rather than in the post-conflict phase. The ICRG score prior to the conflict was negative and significant leaving the results for other variables
unchanged.\textsuperscript{155} When both the score prior to the conflict and the score at the end of the conflict were included, however, only the score at the end of the conflict remained significant. The effect of the former may be a result of countries at the higher end of the spectrum having less room to improve.

Another alternative specification that yielded an interesting finding was to replace the variable for the level of hostility, measured by whether the conflict was ethnically based, with the ethno-linguistic fractionalization score.\textsuperscript{156} Although whether the conflict was ethnically based was not correlated with security force transformation, the elf score was, with a higher score decreasing the likelihood of transformation. Yet while the elf has been used a measure of ethnic conflict,\textsuperscript{157} it does not capture the level of hostility or division among ethnic groups. On the other hand, elf may be associated with political fragmentation, since countries with ethnic divisions have a greater likelihood of having cohesive, ethnically-based parties. This finding is consistent with my argument.

I sought to correct for issues of multicollinearity. Some of the alternative variables were related to the independent or control variables, such as foreign aid and GDP, as well as the number of deaths and oil rents. While these issues did not affect the base model, they may have biased the results of the models that tested alternative explanations. Removing variables these variables did not affect the significance or magnitude of the effect of the two independent variables.

2. Limitations of Quantitative Analysis

While the results from the multivariate analysis presented above provide strong evidence that political weakness is associated with security force transformation across post-conflict countries,
some caution is warranted is warranted in relying on this analysis as a test of my argument. Several limitations of this analysis undermine the reliability of this test, including weakness in the data, the small sample of cases, the assumptions of the model, and their relationship to my argument. Core elements of my argument, including the configuration of conditions necessary for transformation and the causal mechanisms through which these conditions affect outcome, remain unaddressed. In this section, I outline these limitations, before moving onto addressing them through a different type of analysis in the following section.

The regression analysis addressed several challenges that have plagued analyses of post-conflict peacebuilding and state building. For instance, Fortna and Huang point out that studies of the effects of intervention on post-conflict democratization tend to suffer from several flaws, including equating cases during and after the Cold War despite a fundamental change in the nature of intervention, and measuring change in the level of democracy from before the war, rather than after the war.\(^{158}\) The analysis also suffers from the difficulty of disentangling multi-causal phenomena, as well as limitations in the data.\(^{159}\) To address these issues, my analysis includes only post-Cold War cases, recognizing the systematic difference in external institution-building efforts and assistance to the security sector. It also examines the effect on a change in the governance of security forces over the five years after the war, taking the end of the war as the baseline and looking at change rather than an arbitrarily defined end point. Since it controls for the size of the intervention, this strategy helps to isolate the effects of post-conflict institution-building efforts.

Yet some of these strategies impose trade-offs, while other issues remain unaddressed. Limiting the sample to post-Cold War cases results in a relatively small sample size that reduces the robustness of the test, especially the more variables are included. Such a small sample is highly sensitive to potential biases in the model or flaws in the data, and leads to some variations in the

\(^{158}\) Fortna and Huang, “Democratization After Civil War.”

\(^{159}\) Sambanis, “Using Case Studies.”
findings as a result of alternative specifications. I try to mitigate this issue by including the fewest number of variables in each model and testing various specifications, but this in turn can lead to omitted variables that bias the results and leads to lower levels of statistical significance than might be found in a larger sample. The small sample size also entails certain assumptions that may not be fully met. As Call points out in his study of civil war, “the small sample size also effectively imposes the uncomfortable requirement that researchers assume that the underlying data generation process is identical across all cases of civil war recurrence.”\

In reality, the cases are heterogeneous and operate in distinct ways, which violates the underlying assumption of the model. While I have sought to correct for some of this by clustering by country, the concern remains salient given the small sample size.

The dearth of accurate and precise data from conflict countries presents another obstacle to measuring and analyzing the effects of complex concepts. As Gleditch and Ruggeri point out in their review of civil war literature, many of the indicators “are relatively crude indicators of the underlying concepts.” Several scholars have criticized the use of weak proxies like GDP per capita to measure a variety of concepts from wealth to state strength in multivariate analyses. Once again, I have sought to overcome this issue by moving beyond the proxy variables in existing datasets to construct variables more focused on the particular concepts. For example, the share of seats by the executive directly measures the ruling coalition’s need to build alliances, although it does not capture the entire concept. Similarly, including oil rents as a measure of revenue concentration yields a close approximation of the ability of countries to strategically allocate revenue, but does not capture other sources of revenue concentration like control over commercial enterprises or other mining activities.

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162 This strategy was first used by Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency,” and used in several subsequent analyses. See Call, Why Peace Fails for a critique.
operations. The ICRG Military in Politics score also provides a good measure of changes in security force governance, but it only covers the military and does not include the element of factional composition. In addition, each of these sources presents problems of missing data, especially in post-conflict states where data collection is limited. Missing observations – including the dependent variable – also reduce the sample size and raise questions regarding the validity of the tests. The robustness of the findings regarding the two key variables of political fragmentation and oil rents help to mitigate some of these concerns, but the concern remains that the data is inaccurate or incomplete.

Other assumptions inherent in the regression model raise further concerns. For example, the possibility of selection bias has plagued studies of the impact of foreign aid on peacebuilding and state-building outcomes. Since external actors choose where they intervene, any correlation between external resources and outcomes within country risks capturing the choices by interveners to intervene in certain countries but not others, for example those with the greatest destruction or most dispersed revenue. The non-finding regarding donor coordination may suffer from similar problems, for example if large, bilateral donors tend to devote their resources to countries with poorly governed security forces, this effect would counter-balance a positive correlation with security force governance. This bias might also affect the null-finding regarding the intensity of intervention. Selecting the dependent variable as change over time, should reduce this effect but it does not eradicate it. I discuss an alternative approach to minimizing this effect below.

Perhaps most importantly, regression analysis remains inadequate for fully testing my argument. While the analysis shows that political fragmentation and revenue concentration are correlated with security force transformation across all post-conflict countries since 1990, it does not test whether certain configurations of conditions affect the outcome, or the causal mechanisms

through which these conditions affect security sector governance. I argue not only that political weakness enables security governance transformation, but that it does so in a particular way, as a result of a combination of factors that result in domestic political weakness and opportunities for external influence. The effects of configuration of conditions, or necessity of certain combinations of cases, cannot be adequately tested in a correlational model. In addition, the causal mechanisms through which domestic conditions shape the impact of external actors on the outcome – by shaping the level of dependence, credibility, information and trust among external officials and domestic leaders – are not captured through this approach. Evidence that such mechanisms operate in practice would help to elucidate the effects of external assistance on a range of institution-building outcomes. Yet as George and Bennett point out, such complex, multi-staged argument, or the causal mechanism through which it operates, cannot be tested in large-n analysis.  

In sum, while the quantitative analysis presented above provides a crucial test for my argument by showing that political fragmentation and revenue concentration are systematically related to changes in security force governance, this test is insufficient. In the next section, I provide an additional test relying on a smaller sample of cases that helps to show how configurations of conditions affect the outcome, and relies on more precise measurements of the underlying concepts. This analysis also facilitates the selection of cases for an in-depth test of my argument that clarifies the causal mechanisms through which local conditions affect variations in security force transformation and shape the impact of external intervention.

3. Typological Analysis

A comparison of a smaller and more focused set of cases provides further evidence in support of my argument and reveals that certain configurations of conditions are necessary for high

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164 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 21
levels of security force transformation to occur in the presence of post-conflict intervention. This analysis includes examines only the subset of cases of civil war termination between 1990 and 2007 that experienced intensive external intervention that included UN peacekeepers. Although it does not ensure validity to all cases, this subset of cases is most relevant to my argument that is concerned with the impact of external actors and their interaction with domestic actors on governance.

Focusing on a smaller set of cases enables a more precise estimation of conditions and outcomes, and addresses several other limitations of the regression analysis discussed above, including the possibility of selection bias, the correlation among variables and the assumptions of homogeneity. Using Typological Theory this analysis moves beyond correlation among variables toward “contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions [the independent variables] behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified dependent variables.”

Typological analysis thus provides an additional and complementary test of my argument by demonstrating the effects of different combinations of conditions within this subset of cases.

3.1. The Cases: Post-Conflict Intervention

Drawing from the larger set of post-conflict cases specified above, I narrow down the selection to all of those cases that experienced a United Nations peacekeeping intervention. This selection yields a set of 21 cases of civil war termination followed by UN intervention between 1990 and 2007. The same country is included more than once only if it experienced separate interventions more than five years apart within this time period – which occurs in the cases of Angola, Timor Leste and Liberia). The presence of a UN intervention signals that external actors – including both bilateral donors and multilateral organizations – devote substantial resources in terms of troops and civilian personnel, along with the foreign aid, political backing and other forms of assistance that come along with UN peacekeepers. In all of these cases, external actors sought to

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165 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 235
achieve some changes to the governance of the security forces during the first five years of the intervention. This narrower set of intervention thus helps to focus on how security governance transformations arise or fail as a result of the relations among external and domestic actors. Indeed, despite the fact that all of the countries experienced sizeable external interventions, they exhibit significant variation in the extent of transformation of the security forces that can be explained by my theory.

This more focused sample helps to overcome some of the problems inherent in the large-n analysis presented above. First, it minimizes the potential for selection bias, by examining only the variation among cases that were selected for intervention. Second, the smaller number of cases allows for more precise estimation of the variables, by supplementing the data included in the quantitative analysis with other data from qualitative sources. Third, it eliminates requirements of unit homogeneity, lack of correlation among explanatory and control variables, and other challenges that might bias a regression model. Moreover, even though the validity of the argument may not extend to all post-conflict cases, it does cover an important subset of those cases in which external actors intervene. Since all of the cases of UN intervention after civil war are included, there is a strong likelihood that the evidence presented in this analysis will be valid for future cases as well.

3.2. Variables and Measurement

To measure the dependent and independent variables, I rely on the measures used in the quantitative analysis supplemented with additional qualitative data. Using the quantitative measures specified above ensure the consistency of data with the prior analysis and across cases. However, in some cases data for certain variables is unavailable, particularly in the case of the ICRG Military in Politics score which is not available for all of the UN intervention countries. Maintaining a focus on the military, I supplement the ICRG scores with data from publishes reports that assess changes in the governance of the military from a variety of sources. I also supplement the variable for political
fragmentation or cohesion with data from elections and political party structure in each country. This supplementary data is especially relevant for countries with a share of legislative seats of just above 50%, which can be either fragmented or cohesive depending on the context. For the measure of revenue concentration, I supplement the rents from oil revenue with rents from other natural resources as a percentage of GDP. Only countries with mineral or oil rents above 30% of GDP are considered to have concentrated revenue, while countries with other natural resources like timber and diamonds that are more difficult to control are considered dispersed. In addition to filling in missing data, drawing from these sources allows for a more nuanced and precise coding of each of the variables.

Based on this data, each case is assigned a value for each of the three independent variables and the dependent variable. Following my theory, the independent variables are coded along a dual axis – a fragmented vs. cohesive ruling party; dispersed vs. concentrated revenue; coordinated vs. uncoordinated donors. For each variable, I list the quantitative data, where available, and note where it does not clearly reveal the coding of that case. In the case of political fragmentation, ruling parties that control under 50% are clearly fragmented, those over 60% of legislative seats are clearly cohesive – as borne out by additional qualitative data – but between 50% and 60% the coding varies according to whether the party has a cohesive, ethnic or regional base or whether their base of support varies widely election to election. For revenue concentration, countries with oil or mineral rents greater than 15% of GDP are considered to have concentrated revenue. Donors are considered coordinated when a single donor provides more than 25% of aid to the government or a coordination structure is in place, as detailed. The dependent variable, security sector transformation, is coded along a three-point scale, from limited, to partial to high transformation. This three-part coding reflects the coding described in Chapter 2. A change in the ICRG score
greater than 1 indicates a substantial change that I code as high transformation, a change between 0 and 1 is coded as partial, and a change of 0 or negative is coded as limited.

### TABLE 7: Typological Analysis – Conditions and Outcomes for 21 Cases of Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Revenue Concentration (Natur. Res. Rents % of GDP)</th>
<th>Cohesion (Executive Party % Legis. Seats)</th>
<th>Donor Coordination (% largest donor)</th>
<th>Expected Change (Change in ICRG Mil in Pol Score)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone 2000</td>
<td>Dispersed: timber, diam., minerals (8%)</td>
<td>Fragmented (40%)</td>
<td>High (18% + UK MOU)</td>
<td>High (+2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberia 2003</strong></td>
<td>Dispersed: timber, diam., minerals (58%)</td>
<td>Fragmented (13%)</td>
<td>High (27%; US lead)</td>
<td>High (+2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua 1990</td>
<td>Dispersed timber (7%)</td>
<td>Fragmented (55%)</td>
<td>High (27%; US lead)</td>
<td>High (+1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador 1991</td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Fragmented (46%)</td>
<td>High (52%; US lead)</td>
<td>High (+1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo 1999</td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>High (44%; EU accession)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon 1992</td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Fragmented (16%)</td>
<td>Low (14%)</td>
<td>Partial (High (+4))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia 1993</td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Fragmented (45%)</td>
<td>High (25%; EU &amp; NATO)</td>
<td>High (Partial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia 1998</td>
<td>Dispersed timber (6%)</td>
<td>Fragmented (52%)</td>
<td>Low (20%),</td>
<td>Partial (Partial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia 1996</td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Fragmented (N/A)</td>
<td>Low (23%; ltd. aid to govt)</td>
<td>Partial (Limited (0))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala 1995</td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Fragmented (54%)</td>
<td>Low (20%)</td>
<td>Partial (Limited (-1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi 2006</td>
<td>Dispersed forestry (11%)</td>
<td>Fragmented (54%)</td>
<td>Low (20%; Netherlands)</td>
<td>Partial (Partial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia &amp; Herzeg 1995</strong></td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Cohesive (61%)</td>
<td>High (17%) (OHR, EU, NATO)</td>
<td>Partial (Partial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste 1998</td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Cohesive (57%)</td>
<td>High (30%, UNTAET)</td>
<td>Partial (Partial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique 1990</td>
<td>Dispersed forestry (9%)</td>
<td>Cohesive (52%)</td>
<td>Low (9%)</td>
<td>Limited (Limited (0))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda 1994</td>
<td>Dispersed Forestry (8%)</td>
<td>Cohesive (100%)</td>
<td>Low (14%)</td>
<td>Limited (Limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan 1998</td>
<td>Dispersed (none)</td>
<td>Cohesive (60%)</td>
<td>Low (13%)</td>
<td>Limited (Limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia 1990</td>
<td>Dispersed - timber, diam., minerals (22%)</td>
<td>Cohesive (78%)</td>
<td>Low (17%)</td>
<td>Limited (Partial (1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timor Leste 2006</strong></td>
<td>Concentrated: oil (58%)</td>
<td>Fragmented (24%)</td>
<td>Low (15%)</td>
<td>Limited (Limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo 2001</td>
<td>Concentrated - oil, diam, minerals (18%)</td>
<td>Fragmented (52%)</td>
<td>Low (17%)</td>
<td>Limited (Limited (0))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola 1995</td>
<td>Concentrated oil (85%)</td>
<td>Cohesive (86%)</td>
<td>Low (18%)</td>
<td>Limited (Limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola 2002</td>
<td>Concentrated oil (55%)</td>
<td>Cohesive (86%)</td>
<td>Low (18%)</td>
<td>Limited (Limited)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3.3. Results

The typological analysis provides strong evidence for my argument that the combination of a fragmented ruling party, dispersed revenue sources and coordinated external actors security force transformation. Table 7 shows the configuration of conditions along with the expected and actual transformation of security sector governance for each country. The outcome in 16 of 21, or 75% of the cases, is as expected. Moreover, all of the variations from the expected outcome are merely in the extent of intervention – between partial and limited, or between partial and high transformation – with no case varying between limited and high transformation.

The analysis also suggests that the presence of political fragmentation and dispersed revenue sources may be necessary for security governance transformation to occur in the context of external intervention, while the addition coordinated external response is almost always required to translate the opportunities created by domestic conditions into change. As shown in Table 8, none of the cases of high transformation occurred in the absence of both political fragmentation and dispersed revenue. All but one cases of high transformation also received a coordinated external response, and all but one of the cases with all three conditions experienced a high level of transformation. In cases of partial transformation, at least two of the three conditions were present, while in cases of limited transformation, at least one of these two conditions was absent. As suggested by the regression analysis, the combination of political fragmentation and dispersed revenue appear to be necessary though not sufficient for transformation.

Coordination among external actors, at least as measured by the presence of a predominant donor, only accounts for security governance transformation in conjunction with local conditions. When local conditions are conducive, a high level of coordination usually leads to high transformation, although in two cases, those of Cambodia and Georgia, only partial transformation

Note that the focus for the purposes of this analysis is on the governance of the military forces.
was achieved. When local conditions are not entirely conducive, even high coordination leads to partial transformation at best. In Lebanon, local conditions high transformation occurred as a result of conducive local conditions, despite limited coordination among external actors and relatively low levels of aid. In sum, external coordination is neither necessary nor sufficient for security governance transformation, but it does contribute to that outcome under the right configuration of conditions.

4. Selection of Cases for the Qualitative Study

The typological analysis laid out above further serves as a basis for the selection of cases for a deeper qualitative analysis that can clarify the causal mechanisms through which the three conditions affect outcomes. The conditions within countries and the organization of external actors enable or constrain security sector transformation through specific causal pathways, including by shaping the flow of information, relative dependence and trust that affect the relationships among external and domestic actors. Clarifying whether these causal mechanisms operate requires a deeper analysis of the cases, that traces how these conditions affected the outcome, and investigates the particular pressures on decision-makers that shaped their behavior. At the same time, comparisons within and across these cases further demonstrated that variations in each of the three conditions affected outcomes.

To show how conditions affect outcomes and elucidate causal mechanisms, I employ a “most similar” case design. This design entails comparing cases that “differ in only one independent variable and also in the dependent variable.” Such comparisons help to demonstrate that the variation in the outcome was a result of the dependent variable. In the chapters that follow, I

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167 George and Bennett *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 252
conduct process-tracing “to establish that the variation in the outcome was indeed due to the single independent variable that differed between the cases.”

The comparison is based on across-case and within-case analysis. Focusing first on the two necessary conditions – fragmentation of the ruling party and concentration of revenue sources – I select three of the four possible combinations of domestic conditions, excluding a case in which neither of the conditions is conducive to reform and external influence is highly unlikely. Looking at the Table 7, the highlighted cases, Liberia in 2003, Timor Leste in 2006 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, represent these three combinations. Liberia in 2003 illustrates how the combination of highly fragmented ruling party, dispersed revenue and coordinated external actors can enable substantial transformation to the security forces. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the presence of cohesive political factions provides a useful comparison to Liberia that demonstrates how political cohesion limits the possibility of reform even when revenue is dispersed and external actors are unified. In Timor Leste, the presence of substantial oil revenue after 2006 reveals how concentrated revenue limits transformation even when the ruling party is fragmented. These three cases also provide a wide variety of regional variation to test whether similar mechanisms operate across contexts.

Within-case comparisons provide for more controlled comparisons that isolate the effects of each independent variable while eliminating many of the confounding differences between countries. Each of the comparisons shown in Table 8 demonstrates the impact of one of the three conditions. The comparison between military and police forces in Liberia after 2003 reveals the effects of variations in donor coordination. While fragmented politics and dispersed revenue provide opportunities for security force transformation overall, variations in the coordination among external actors affected their ability to translate opportunities into influence leading to high

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168 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 252.
transformation for the military but only partial transformation for the police. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, variation in political fragmentation explains the much greater transformation of the
military relative to the police, although the overall level of political cohesion results in only partial
transformation even for the military. In Timor Leste, the increase in oil revenue after 2006 reduced
the influence of external actors, resulting in more limited transformation to the police relative to the
period between 2000 and 2006, even though coordination improved and politics grew increasingly
fragmented in the latter period. Finally, each of these cases disaggregated into sub-cases of individual
reform efforts, that reveal how variations in political fragmentation, revenue concentration and
external coordination around particular reform efforts. These comparisons are further elaborated in
the subsequent chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly fragmented</td>
<td>Highly Dispersed</td>
<td>Coordinated - U.S. Lead</td>
<td>Cooperate with leaders; credible bargaining</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia National Police: 2003-2008</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Highly Dispersed</td>
<td>Med./Low Coordination – UN lead + U.S. and other donor support</td>
<td>Bargaining; limited trust and confidence</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of BiH 2002-2007</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>High Coordination OHR + NATO accession</td>
<td>Trust with key leaders; credible bargaining</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste National Police 2000-2006</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Med./Low Coordination – UNTAET Administration but uncoordinated donors</td>
<td>Trust with key leaders; failed bargaining</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste National Police 2006-2010</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>Low Coordination – UNMIT + Australia + Portugal bilateral leads</td>
<td>Trust with individuals but lack of dependence</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 8: Cross-Country and Within-Country Comparisons
5. Conclusion

This chapter deploys a series of cross-country comparisons to demonstrate two core elements of my argument regarding the impact of external assistance on security force governance after civil war. First, a quantitative, multivariate analysis of all cases of civil war termination since the end of the Cold War demonstrates that two conditions within post-conflict countries—fragmented ruling parties and dispersed revenue sources—are correlated with transformations in the governance of military forces. These findings validate my argument that security force transformation is most likely to occur in conditions of political weakness by post-conflict leaders. These results are especially notable given the limitations of the data, including gaps and small numbers of cases. In addition, this analysis provides some evidence that alternative explanations that predict the success of external actors on other objectives like ending conflict, including the size of the intervention, the depth of hostility and the intensity of the conflict, do not predict changes in the governance of security forces. While other variables may affect outcome, domestic political weakness appears to affect the potential security force transformation more systematically than other variables in the literature.

The data also show that another set of factors affects the potential for transformation, as measured by a country’s per capita GDP. This finding suggests that the conditions that affect political weakness may enable security force transformation, but they are not sufficient. The capacity to design and carry out reforms and the country’s resource base—both elements captured by its per capita GDP—also affect the potential to carry out complex reforms. This is especially likely when external interveners are not present to fill shortfalls in revenue and capacity. Moreover, even where a country’s economic and bureaucratic capacity is greater, it is unlikely to pursue reforms without the right domestic incentives or external influence.
A second test focused on a smaller subset of twenty-one cases that experienced external intervention demonstrates that despite these other potential factors, security force transformation requires a combination of domestic conditions that lead to political weakness and – in most cases – a coordinated response by external actors. In all but one case of substantial transformation, all three conditions were met, and all of the cases leaders faced both political fragmentation and dispersed revenue. Since all of these cases experienced a high level of external intervention that included efforts to transform the security forces, it bolsters the claim that external assistance requires this combination of conditions to result in security force transformation. Several cases where domestic conditions were conducive but external actors did not respond coherently resulted in only partial or limited transformation. In all of the cases where leaders maintained some source of political strength – either a cohesive base or concentrated revenue – efforts by external actors to promote security force transformation achieved only partial success.

This combination of tests provides a strong case for the validity of my argument that security force transformation in post-conflict countries occurs when leaders are weakest politically and external actors are most responsive. However a crucial element of my argument remains unaddressed, regarding the causal mechanisms through which external actors affect governance in these environments. In the previous chapter, I described how political weakness may create incentives to limit factional control, but that in these challenging environments leaders are unlikely to pursue reform without external backing and support. In the following chapters, I show not only that certain configurations of conditions led to certain outcomes, but clarify the causal mechanisms through which each variable affected the outcome. I do so by selecting three cases which exhibit variation in the outcome as a result of variation in each of the required conditions for success. To clarify how external assistance affects security force governance outcomes, I turn to the case studies.
CHAPTER IV
FROM WEAKNESS TO STRENGTH:
RESTRUCTURING THE MILITARY AND POLICE IN LIBERIA

On September 9th 2005, Gyude Bryant, the Chairman of Liberia’s National Transitional Government, signed an agreement that ceded unprecedented control over his country’s governance to outsiders. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP), proposed by donor countries as a means to control corruption, placed foreign financial experts within Liberian government agencies, and granted them the authority to approve or disapprove expenditures. Bryant had originally resisted the plan and most of Liberia’s leading politicians had vehemently opposed it. As a presidential candidate, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf criticized GEMAP as “a challenge to Liberia’s sovereignty” and called on Liberians to “oppose it and reject it outright.”

Yet after a contentious set of negotiations, Bryant eventually accepted the plan, while other politicians joined him in endorsing it. In her inaugural address four months later, President Johnson-Sirleaf formally endorsed GEMAP as a central component of her efforts to “wage a war on corruption” and for “ensuring competence and integrity in the management of our own resources.”

The negotiations over GEMAP embodied a persistent tension that defined Liberia’s post-civil war state-building process. This tension between domestic political imperatives and the demands of external assistance resulted in significant variation in outcomes across the country’s institutional landscape that cannot be explained by the overall conditions within the country or the size of the external presence. On the one hand, Johnson-Sirleaf and other Liberian leaders

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170 The NTGL negotiated out another provision of the proposal that would have brought in foreign judges to rule on Liberian domestic legal cases.
recognized the necessity of external donor funds for the reconstruction of a country devastated by 14 years of civil war and saddled with $3.5 billion in external debt. External actors support guaranteed security, managed a tense disarmament process, bolstered the legitimacy of a weak government, and provided the funds necessary for government institutions to function. Yet reliance on external donors also came at a hefty political cost, by inviting criticism that Liberian leaders were bowing to external pressure at the expense of national sovereignty, and by imposing conditions that would limit their room to maneuver politically. As a result, while some institutions went through substantial reforms with the heavy involvement of external actors, while others continued to reflect wartime patterns of patronage or neglect. The ways in which Liberian leaders managed the tension between external and domestic demands shaped the evolution of each institution.

This tension was especially pronounced in the security sector, where it contributed to divergent outcomes in efforts to restructure the military and police forces. A few months prior to signing on to GEMAP, Chairman Bryant had signed a less publicized but equally controversial agreement that led to the demobilization of the entire Armed Forces of Liberia and its reconstitution under the supervision of the U.S. Government. The decision to effectively hand over control of the armed forces was, like GEMAP, criticized as an impingement on Liberia’s sovereignty. Within just a few years, however, the plan had led to the transformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) from a factionalized and marginalized army to a broadly representative and more professional force, though it remained dependent on the support of the U.S. Government. The Liberian National Police (LNP) also went through a comprehensive restructuring process under the supervision of the United Nations (U.N.), but it has continued to struggle with factionalism, political


173 The terms of this restructuring are spelled out in the Agreement Between the U.S. Government and National Transitional Government of Liberia, signed by Gyude Bryant and U.S. Ambassador John Blaney in May 2005. This document is analyzed in further detail below.
interference and allegations of corruption and abuse. These outcomes, and the contrast between the far-reaching transformation in the army and the partial transformation of the police, reflect the ways in which Liberian leaders of the military and police used external resources to navigate internal political and economic pressure, and how external donors responded to these domestic constraints.

The evolution of the Liberian military and police forces from the end of the conflict in 2003 until 2010 demonstrates how political weakness on the part of the ruling coalition creates incentives for institutional transformation and opportunities for influence by external actors. The fragmentation of the Liberian political environment and the security forces, along with the difficulty of securing revenue dispersed among powerful factions, generated incentives to build a broad and inclusive political coalition made up of multiple factions and to seek external support to maintain that coalition and strengthen the state. As factions within and outside the coalition sought to influence the governance of the security forces, leaders used external resources to resist these pressures, and to consolidate their authority over the security forces and over the state as a whole.

The case also demonstrates how variation in the coordination and responsiveness of external actors can limit the extent of transformation, even under the most favorable conditions. Although the political and economic context favored an inclusive approach to institution-building and dependence on external support, the ability of Liberian leaders to implement measures that would reduce factional influence over the security forces depended on the responsiveness of external actors to their constraints. For the military, the presence of credible and coherent external actors inspired sufficient confidence among key leaders to manage internal challenges, and generated sufficient pressure to force reluctant actors to accept difficult decisions. For the police, the multiplicity of external actors and the poor coordination among them limited their utility for managing domestic political challenges. Top police officials were instead forced to rely on internal networks in ways that allowed factional pressure to undermine institutional reform.
To demonstrate how the different configurations of domestic and external conditions in Liberia contributed to the varying outcomes for the military and police, this chapter draws from extensive field work conducted in Liberia in 2010. The analysis is based on careful review of Liberian law, policy documents, and administrative data, as well as interviews with over 100 Liberian and international officials and observers, including key decision-makers who oversaw the police and military restructuring processes, and police and military officers who went through them. Drawing on this research, I demonstrate how domestic conditions generated pressures on decision-makers, and how the interaction between domestic and external leaders shaped crucial decisions that determined the structure and governance of the police and military forces.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the state of the Liberian military and police forces at the end of the war, focusing on their composition, civil oversight and legal limits. The second section lays out the conditions in post-war Liberia, including the level of political fragmentation, the dispersal of revenue sources, and the uneven coordination of external assistance. In the following sections, I trace how these conditions shaped interaction between domestic and external actors, and how these interactions shaped outcomes for the Armed Forces of Liberian (AFL) and the Liberian National Police (LNP). I also show how variations in the outcomes for each force can be traced to variations in the dynamics of the relationships among domestic and external actors, including relative leverage and trust.

1. The Liberian Security Sector at the End of the Conflict

The Liberian security sector after 14 years of civil war was aptly described as “highly fragmented, factionalized and dysfunctional.” The sector was divided among numerous armed

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groups, each of which was dominated by one of the country’s political or ethnic factions and organized as tools of repression and extraction for narrow, factional and personal interests. A report commissioned by the U.S. Government at the end of the war counted as many as fifteen national-level agencies with statutory authority to bear arms, arms, arrest, detain, investigate or collect intelligence, with poorly defined and overlapping mandates – not including the armed rebel factions that had fought during the war.\textsuperscript{175} All of these forces, including the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Liberian National Police (LNP), had been dominated by different political factions at various times, and many had participated in the conflict. During the civil war, various factions gained political power, groups broke down and reconstituted, alliances shifted repeatedly, resulting in the proliferation of armed forces and factionalism within them.\textsuperscript{176} As violence escalated during the early 1990s, fragmentation among government and rebel factions resulted in a “seven cornered fight” among rebel groups and government forces. During the second phase of fighting in the early 2000s, two major rebel factions, the LURD and MODEL, fought against several government “special security units,” as well as a variety of smaller militias with various levels of structure and organization.

Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2003 resulted in the disarmament and disbanding of all “irregular” armed forces and “special security units,” the security sector remained highly fragmented and factionalized.\textsuperscript{177} Even after the “irregular” combatant groups

\textsuperscript{175} Gompert et al, \textit{Making Liberia Safe}, 41. These included Ministry of Defense (MOD); Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN); Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); Ministry of National Security (MNS); National Security Agency (NSA); Liberia National Police (LNP); National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); Special Security Service (SSS); Customs—Financial Security Monitoring Division (FSD); Forest Development Authority Police (FP); Liberia Petroleum Refining Company Security Force (LPRC); Liberia Seaport Police (LSP); Liberia Telecommunications Corporation Plant Protection Force; Monrovia City Police (MCP)—also known as Department of Traffic and Public Safety; and Roberts International Airport Base Safety (RIA).


\textsuperscript{177} "Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia (GOL), The Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties, Accra, Ghana, August 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2003."
had been disbanded, the Liberian government was left with a multitude of competing forces with overlapping mandates. Several of these forces had been used as tools of brutal repression, particularly under the Charles Taylor regime that ruled from 1997 to 2003. For most Liberians, “police and military officers were not regarded as a source of protection, but rather as powers to be feared.”

1.1. Ethnic Exclusion and Marginalization in the Armed Forces of Liberia

The Liberian military’s record of abuse grew out of a long history of ethnically-based exclusion and repression. Its predecessor, the Frontier Force, was created in 1908 to protect the interests of the Americo-Liberian elite as they struggled to establish themselves more than fifty years after declaring the sovereignty of the Liberian state. Its main functions were to protect the Liberian borders from encroachment by neighboring colonial powers, to extract revenue from the hinterland, and to repress the periodic rebellions and attacks from indigenous communities that had not accepted their sovereignty. The officer corps was recruited primarily through the closed family networks of the Americo-Liberian elite, while the rank and file was drawn from indigenous communities who either supported the Liberian state or were forcibly recruited. This structure largely remained when the Frontier Force became the Armed Forces of Liberia in 1956. Americo-Liberians continued to dominate the officer corps while indigenous Liberians, who were increasingly drawn from semi-literate indigenous youth who had migrated to Liberia’s cities, constituted the bulk of the force. In 1980, a group of non-commissioned officers from this latter group staged a coup d’état that upended the traditional dominance of the elite in the country’s politics and society, and marked the beginning of two decades of violent turmoil.

178 Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia, 10
180 Much of the participation of indigenous communities was the result of rivalries among communities. See Levitt, The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia.
1.1.1 Composition

As a result of its turbulent history, the AFL grew increasingly homogenous in its composition, especially after 1980. Samuel Doe, who emerged as leader of the new government following the 1980 coup – owing largely to being the only coup leader with a high school education – moved to consolidate the control of indigenous Liberians over the force. Yet competition over leadership soon began to fuel ethnically-based rivalries.\(^{181}\) Doe increasingly placed members of his Krahn ethnic group in key positions. Following an unsuccessful coup attempt by General Thomas Quiwonkpa, the commanding general of the armed forces, Doe used the AFL to conduct brutal repression of Quiwonkpa’s Gio ethnic group. Opposition to Doe’s increasingly brutal regime eventually escalated into full-fledged civil war in 1989 when Charles Taylor’s NPFL militia emerged to challenge the regime militarily. The NPFL were made up largely of Gio and Mano who had been the object of repression, although several members of the Americo-Liberian elite provided material support. In response, Doe recruited volunteers, inflating the ranks of the AFL from 6,500 to nearly 15,000 mostly untrained, unpaid and ethnically Krahn soldiers.\(^{182}\) The army continued to be known as “Doe’s Army” long after his death at the hands of rebel forces in 1990, and took part in the fighting the wracked the country for the next seven years.\(^{183}\)

Although Charles Taylor tried to change the army’s composition, it remained ethnically homogeneous and became increasingly marginalized throughout this rule. Following his victory in the 1997 elections, Taylor tried to purge the army of Doe’s supporters and insert his own loyalists, ignoring the terms of the 1996 Abidjan Accords and its provisions for a military restructuring

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process. In response, a group of soldiers attacked and ransacked the Ministry of Defense building demanding compensation. Instead of trying to change the composition of the army, Taylor shifted his attention toward building parallel militia forces that were personally loyal to him, including most notably the Anti-Terrorist Unit led by his son Charles “Chucky” Taylor. Meanwhile, although a few former NPFL fighters managed to find their way into leadership positions in the force, the army remained dominated by Krahn and increasingly marginalized by Taylor.

1.1.2 Civilian Oversight

The manipulation and marginalization of the AFL occurred in the context of a legal framework and institutional tradition that centralized authority in the hands of the president and did not allow for broader civilian oversight. The 1956 National Defense Law, which remained in force until after the end of the war, granted the President authority to appoint and fire officers, and to review and approve individual disciplinary cases with no mention of external oversight over appointments, operations or policy. The 1972 Executive Law provided the Minister of National Defense with “complete authority over the armed forces.” Both Doe and Taylor used this authority to insert loyalists into leadership positions while seeking to remove political opponents. The 1986 Constitution adopted under Samuel Doe also included some provisions to check executive dominance, including by granting the legislature authority to “declare war and to authorize the Executive to make peace” to “make rules for the governance of the Armed Forces of Liberia” and to “make appropriations therefore.” Yet the weak – and sometimes absent – legislature rarely exercised any such role in practice. Instead, the legislature left the 1956 defense law in place without amendment, and facilitated continued manipulation by the executive. Both Doe and Taylor used

184 AFL Restructuring Commission, Restructuring Commission Report, 5, see also Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report, 133.
their complete control over budget, appointment and operations to manipulate the AFL. While Doe inflated the force with his own loyalists, however, Taylor withheld funding and resources from the force in order to marginalize it, while channeling resources to alternative militias. By the end of the civil war, AFL soldiers were owed over thirty-six months in salaries.\footnote{\textsuperscript{188} Interview with former AFL soldiers, January 2010, Monrovia, Liberia.}

\subsection*{1.1.3 Legal Limits}

Centralized executive control and manipulation also undermined legal limits on the force. Although the 1956 Defense Law specified procedures for courts martial in case of indiscipline, the nature of offenses were not clearly specified and almost never applied in practice. Instead, Doe asserted personal control over the armed forces, promoted individuals based on personal loyalty, and used the army to repress political rivals and to protect himself against assassination attempts. Especially as poorly trained and paid recruits inflated the AFL, soldiers received limited supervision and were encouraged to loot and pillage to sustain themselves, resulting in frequent human rights abuses. Under the Taylor regime, soldiers were simply ignored. Since 1997 until 2003, AFL soldiers operated in the absence of any supervision. Underpaid and forcibly marginalized, many soldiers had either gone home or joined rival factions.

\subsection*{1.2. Factionalism and Abuse in the Liberian National Police}

The Liberian National Police also developed into a patchwork of factions that reflected the country’s political composition, and that enabled manipulation and repression by successive leaders. Established in 1956, the LNP was mandated to carry out a variety of law enforcement functions including “the detection of crimes, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life, liberty and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{189} An Act to Amend the Executive Law with respect to the National Police Force, 6 June 1975, Sub-Section 74.}
1.1.2 Composition

Initially established with a professional model of recruitment, training and promotion, the police grew increasingly factionalized throughout the conflict. During what became known as the “golden era” of policing in the 1970s, it boasted a professional cadre of investigators who were required to complete a professional training program and overseen by the Ministry of Justice.\textsuperscript{190} Appointments legally required “advice and consent” of the Senate, and promotions within the force were subject to merit-based review.\textsuperscript{191}

During the interim and transitional governments of the early 1990s, however, the police force’s composition increasingly reflected the factionalism present in the broader political sphere. Following the fall of Doe’s regime in 1990, a series of coalition and power-sharing governments were formed as attempts to end the conflict. The Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), formed in 1990, was followed by three successive Liberia National Transitional Governments (LNTGs) from 1993 until the election of Charles Taylor in 1997. As the main warring factions entered these transitional governments, each inserted its loyalists into the police in order to exert control over the force. The 1993 Cotonou Peace Agreement, for instance, granted Taylor’s NPFL the right to select the Police Director, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) chose the Deputy Director, and other factions recruited their own members into the force at all levels.\textsuperscript{192} The police soon came to reflect the country’s political divisions as the various factions were represented within the force.

1.2.2 Civilian Oversight

Discretionary control over the police by the executive combined with limited civilian oversight in practice enabled political factions to use the police to pursue narrow political interests. The Police Law allowed discretionary control by the president, who was empowered to directly

\textsuperscript{190} This “golden era” was described to the author by several former and actual Liberian police officials and international observers during interviews in Monrovia in 2010.

\textsuperscript{191} An Act to Amend the Executive Law with respect to the National Police Force, 6 June 1975, Sub-Section 74.

\textsuperscript{192} Interview with former LNP Officer, Monrovia, Liberia, January 18, 2010.
appoint the Director, Deputy and Assistant Directors of Police. Within Liberia’s highly centralized political system, this framework facilitated the President’s use of the police for politically motivated operations. During the war, factions both inside and outside of the government used the police for politically motivated investigations, arrests and detentions. One officer who held a senior position during transition governments described the situation during this period:

“There were 5 interim presidents, each had representation in the police who were reporting back to their bosses, always defensive, not carrying out orders for the opposite side…. I knew if I passed an order up, it wouldn’t be implemented, if I passed an order down, it could be leaked to faction members who would undermine it... My life was always in danger.”

1.2.3 Legal Limits

The police force came to be responsible – and frequently rewarded – for serious human rights abuses, and formal legal limits were rarely applied in practice. Under Joe Tate, a cousin of Charles Taylor who was appointed as Police Director, the police were accused of numerous abuses, from shooting and killing alleged armed robbers to detaining, interrogating and beating journalists and opposition members. After his election to the Presidency, Taylor replaced most of the top level of leadership of the police with NPFL fighters. Since much of the rank and file had either joined prior to the civil war or been appointed by other factions, Taylor was unable to control the entire force. Instead, he created a special unit within the police, the Special Operations Division (SOD), which was dominated by former NPFL fighters and used primarily to combat political opponents and rival factions. Members of the SOD were paid a one-time fee of $150 and expected to loot and pillage to support themselves. The majority of the force remained poorly paid and forced to rely on petty corruption to survive. They were rewarded and promoted only for showing political loyalty to Taylor, usually through brutality or repression. At the end of the war, the force

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193 Interview with former LNP Director, Beatrice Munah Sich, Monrovia, February 10, 2010.
194 The most notable of the numerous incidents committed by Tate personally or by the LNP included the detentions and interrogations of journalist Phillip Wesseh in 1997 and of opposition member Tiawan Gongkloe in 2002. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report, 131; Levitt, The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia, 213.
195 Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia, 9.
remained highly factionalized. Its leadership initially remained loyal to Taylor, but it quickly divided under the influence of the various factions that entered the government. Demoralized, starved of resources, and poorly supervised other than for political purposes, police officers more often spent time on repression or revenue extraction than on service to the public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Armed Force of Liberia</th>
<th>Liberia National Police</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition</strong></td>
<td>Dominated by Krahn ethnic group and Doe loyalists</td>
<td>Leadership dominated by Taylor loyalists, rank and file divided among rival factions and professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian Oversight</strong></td>
<td>Tight executive control in law and practice; limited oversight by ministry and legislature rarely exercised in practice</td>
<td>Tight executive control in law and practice; limited oversight by ministry and legislature rarely exercised in practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Limits</strong></td>
<td>Mandate includes external and internal roles; disciplinary system defined (based on U.S. Code of Military Justice) but not applied; limited supervision or discipline</td>
<td>Mandate includes internal security roles; disciplinary system defined in procedures but politicized during Taylor government; abuse and corruption rewarded</td>
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Table 9: State of the AFL and LNP at the end of the civil war in 2003

2. **Conditions for State-Building in Post-Conflict Liberia**

Following the end of the conflict in 2003, the AFL, the LNP and the other Liberian security forces developed in the context of a highly fragmented political environment and as well as dispersed sources of revenue. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on August 18, 2003, established the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) composed of the three major warring factions – LURD, MODEL and Taylor’s NPFL – along with eighteen political parties and several civil society groups. During the NTGL’s two year period of government, none of the factions were powerful enough to consolidate their authority. Many members of the government and legislature focused either on preparing for the 2005 elections, or on looting the slice of the state that they controlled.\(^{196}\) The state remained largely bankrupt, unable to collect taxes or sustain day-to-day operations. Following the 2005 elections, the fragmented political and fiscal environment continued to pose a challenge for the government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. She needed to rely on

the support of multiple factions to build a majority in the legislature, raise revenue, and control her own bureaucracy. At the same time, Liberian leaders used the heavy external presence, which included a UN peacekeeping force and rising levels of foreign aid, to manage internal pressures. The combination of domestic pressures and external response shaped how decision-makers within the state structured and managed the state institutions under their authority.

2.1. The Fragmented Political Environment

From a highly centralized system dominated by the Americo-Liberian elite, the Liberian political landscape evolved into a fragmented environment that included sixteen ethnic groups, several rebel factions and dozens of political parties. Prior to the 1980 coup d’etat, the country’s primary division between “Congo and Country” was rooted in the struggle between Americo-Liberians in Monrovia and indigenous communities in the hinterland. After the 1980 coup brought indigenous communities to power, these tensions were superseded by inter-ethnic conflicts, primarily between Doe’s Krahn ethnic group and the Gio and Mano who tried to unseat him in 1984, and who later dominated the NPFL rebel group. These inter-ethnic divisions also devolved over time. As various factions pursued territorial, economic and political goals, factions broke apart and re-formed, and alliances shifted opportunistically. Stephen Ellis described the factions that fought the 1993-5 civil war as: “small groups of fighters in occupation of territory [who] used adherence to various nationally-known factions like a marketing franchise.” Rather than following any ethnic identity or motivation, war objectives evolved toward purely economic motives. As Ellis described, “the object of factional activity was to wrest control of territory and economic resources, and individual war-bands often threatened to split from their patrons or fought each other for turn even within factions….Alliances were constantly forming, dissolving and reforming.”

Ethnic boundaries became highly permeable, serving at most as a tool for mobilizing fighters and local-level

\[\text{197} \text{ Ellis, } The \ Mask \ of \ Anarchy, \ 104. \]

\[\text{198} \text{ Ibid, } 204. \]
support. Since fighting was focused primarily on securing resources and territory, loyalty to local strongmen was much more salient than any ethnically or geographically-defined identity.

The structure of political parties after the end of the war reflected the country’s political fragmentation. In the 1997 election, Taylor had succeeded in winning three fourths of the votes cast, and received support across ethnic and regional divisions – particularly among youth. His victory revealed a lack of party cohesion or loyalty that only deepened in the post-war period. In the 2005 elections, twenty-one parties fielded presidential candidates along with one independent. Certain parties had a previous history and a few – like Brumskine’s Liberty Party or Al Hajji Koroma’s ALCOP alliance – drew from a regional or ethnic base. Most parties, however, revolved around individual leaders and lacked any coherent source of identity, policy agenda, or organization.

In the run-up to the 2005 elections, the main warring factions largely disintegrated as their leaders split off to join competing parties. The two top vote recipients, George Weah’s CDC and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s Unity Party, both included top leaders from the LURD, MODEL and Taylor’s NPP party. The results of those elections further demonstrate the absence of party loyalty or cohesion. As shown in Table 10, although Liberian regions and constituencies tend to be ethnically homogeneous, most constituencies split their votes among different parties for the presidential, Senate and House of Representative races. The maps in Figure 4, which show the results of the 2005 Senate and House races, illustrate the remarkable absence of support for any cohesive ethnic or geographic identity.

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200 For example, top leadership within the LURD chose to support the Unity Party over the party of its leader Sekou Conneh, including his wife and co-leader Aisha. David Harris, “Liberia 2005: an Unusual African Post-Conflict Election,” 
201 Electoral data is drawn from Republic of Liberia National Elections Commission, 11 October 2005 Election Results: National Tally Center Results Report for the Election of the President, Vice President and House of Representatives. Monrovia, November 23, 2005. See also Harris, “Liberia 2005,” 387.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Top Presidential Candidates (% of votes)</th>
<th>Top Senate Candidates (% of votes)</th>
<th>Top House Candidates per District(^2) (% of votes)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bomi</td>
<td>UP / E. Johnson-Sirleaf (33.9%)</td>
<td>NDPL (12.2%)</td>
<td>COTOL (11.7%)</td>
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<td>1. COTOL (21%) / NDPL (16%)</td>
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<td>2. NDPL (29%) / NDM (16%)</td>
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<td>3. CDC (31%) / COTOL (20%)</td>
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<td>Bong</td>
<td>NDPL/ W. Tubman (42.2%)</td>
<td>NPP (28.4%)</td>
<td>1. UP (27.6%) / NPP (18.8%)</td>
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<td>Ind. (20%)</td>
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<td>5. CDC (32.0%) / LP (18.8%)</td>
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<td>6. NDM (28.9%) / COTOL (19.7%)</td>
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<td>Gbarpolu</td>
<td>UP / E. Johnson-Sirleaf (43.1%)</td>
<td>NRP (22.2%)</td>
<td>1. NRP (32.6%) / UP (27.3%)</td>
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<td>UP (14/3%)</td>
<td>2. LP (19.1%) / UP (18.5%)</td>
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<td>3. UP (44/4%) / NRP (26.4%)</td>
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<td>Grand Bassa</td>
<td>LP / C. Brumskine (58.0%)</td>
<td>Ind. (21.2%)</td>
<td>1. UP (24.8%) / NRP (21.8%)</td>
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<td>LP (17.7%)</td>
<td>2. LP (26.0%) / NPP (20.7%)</td>
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<td>3. LP (20.2%) / FDP (19.0%)</td>
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<td>4. LP (47.8%) / UP (16.2%)</td>
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<td>Grand Cape Mount</td>
<td>COTOL/ H. Sherman (62.8%)</td>
<td>NPP (28.9%)</td>
<td>1. NPP (36.4%) / LP (25.9%)</td>
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<td>MPP (16.2%)</td>
<td>2. COTOL (45.8%) / LP (19.3%)</td>
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<td>3. COTOL (38.0%) / LP (32.6%)</td>
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<td>Grand Gedeh</td>
<td>CDC / G. Weah (88.3%)</td>
<td>NDPL (19.6%)</td>
<td>1. NDM (29.7%) / CDC (25.6%)</td>
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<td>COTOL (15/4%)</td>
<td>2. Ind. (57.9%) / LP (10.7%)</td>
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<td>3. CDC (36.2%) / ALCOP (18.3%)</td>
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<td>Grand Kru</td>
<td>CDC / G. Weah (50.5%)</td>
<td>COTOL (16.3%)</td>
<td>1. APD (22.8%) / UP (21.9%)</td>
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<td>APD (14.6%)</td>
<td>2. COTOL (26.4%) / LP (15.1%)</td>
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<td>Lofa</td>
<td>UP / E. Johnson-Sirleaf (25.9%)</td>
<td>COTOL (15.4%)</td>
<td>1. LP (33.0%) / Ind. (16.3%)</td>
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<td>ALCOP (12.8%)</td>
<td>2. ALCOP (26.1%) / UP (21.4%)</td>
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<td>3. ALCOP (30%) / PRODEM (19%)</td>
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<td>4. COTOL (40.8%) / LP (22.7%)</td>
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<td>Margibi</td>
<td>UP / E. Johnson-Sirleaf (24.0%)</td>
<td>LP (19.1%)</td>
<td>1. LP (35.9%) / COTOL (24.2%)</td>
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<td>CDC (12.8%)</td>
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<td>4. Ind. (22.1%) / LP (18.8%)</td>
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<td>Maryland</td>
<td>NDPL/ W. Tubman (31.3%)</td>
<td>UP (15.0%)</td>
<td>1. APD (34.2%) / UP (22.8%)</td>
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<td>UP (14.6%)</td>
<td>2. UP (29.4%) / NDPL (20.0%)</td>
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<td>3. NPP (33.5%) / COTOL (18.3%)</td>
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<td>Montserrado</td>
<td>CDC / G. Weah (37.4%)</td>
<td>CDC (13.3%)</td>
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<td>CDC (12.4%)</td>
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<td>Nimba</td>
<td>CDC / G. Weah (23.8%)</td>
<td>Ind. (33.8%)</td>
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<td>COTOL (17.4%)</td>
<td>2. COTOL (57.0%) / LP (20.4%)</td>
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<td>5. CDC (35.7%) / COTOL (23.7%)</td>
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<td>6. Ind. (22.8%) / NPP (18.4%)</td>
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<td>River Cess</td>
<td>LP / C. Brumskine (46.0%)</td>
<td>UP (21.2%)</td>
<td>1. IND. (23.9%) / CDC (17.8%)</td>
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<td>LP (14.4%)</td>
<td>2. UP (22.0%) / LP (16.2%)</td>
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<td>River Gee</td>
<td>CDC / G. Weah (49.9%)</td>
<td>COTOL (26.9%)</td>
<td>1. COTOL (50.4%) / COTOL (31.0%)</td>
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<td>COTOL (10.7%)</td>
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<td>3. LP (29.2%) / LDP (11.8%)</td>
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<td>Sinoe</td>
<td>CDC / G. Weah (45.5%)</td>
<td>APD (29.8%)</td>
<td>1. UDA (31%) / NATIVPOL (23%)</td>
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<td>APD (25.7%)</td>
<td>2. APD (26.2%) / NRP (16.4%)</td>
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<td>3. APD (33.3%) / CDC (23.7%)</td>
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Table 10: Results of the First Round of Liberia’s 2005 Elections by County (Government of Liberia National Elections Commission)

\(^2\) The top two candidates per electoral district won seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives
\(^3\) Of the 18 seats in Montserrado, 11 went to CDC, 7 went to UP, and the remainder split between LP (2 seats), NRP (1 seat), NPP (2 seats), COTOL (1 seat), APD (1 seat) and 3 independents.
Figure 4: Results of Liberia’s 2005 First Round Senate and House Elections by County (Source: Republic of Liberia National Elections Commission)

As the fragmented political landscape shaped the composition of the NTGL as well as the post-election legislatures and government, it severely constrained the choices available to Liberian decision-makers as they sought to build and maintain their political authority. During the NTGL period, Chairman Gyude Bryant exercised little authority or influence over legislators, ministers or agency heads. He allegedly resorted to paying off members of the transitional legislature through government accounts to ensure the passage of critical legislation.\(^{204}\) Once elected, Johnson-Sirleaf faced a similar challenge. Although elected with 59% of the vote in the second round of voting (she had scored only 20% in the first round), her Unity Party controlled only four seats in the 30-member Senate and 8 seats in the 64-member House. None of the eleven parties that won seats in the House and Senate controlled more than 23% of the seats in either chamber. Several powerful warlords and faction leaders – some of whom were elected to legislative seats despite being placed on the UN travel ban or asset freeze list – sought to use their positions to protect their personal or political interests. Some of these legislators controlled remnants of Taylor’s business enterprises, including

Taylor’s ex-wife Jewel Howard-Taylor, elected as a Senator in Bong County, and his close financial associate and former son-in-law Edwin Snowe, elected as a Representative from Montserrado County. Others maintained ties to networks of ex-combatants and strong regional support, including former rebel generals Prince Yormie Johnson, former leader of the ULIMO faction and elected as Senator from Nimba County, Kai Farley, a former MODEL commander elected as Representative from Grand Gedeh County, and Adolphus Dolo (aka General Peanut Butter) and Saah Richard Gbollie, both former commanders in Taylor’s NPFL rebel group and elected as a Senator from Nimba County and Representative from Margibi County, respectively. As the president sought to pass legislation and implement policy, she would need the support of these and other influential actors who controlled votes in the Parliament, held sway in their regions, and could influence segments of the state bureaucracy.

2.2 Dispersed Revenue

The post-war Liberian administration also faced severe revenue shortages, with resources dispersed under the control of powerful factions and little revenue flowing to the state. Prior to the civil war, the Liberian state had sustained itself largely from the sale of rubber, much of it through a concession to the Firestone Corporation that funded 60% of government revenues between 1950 and 1970. This concentrated source of revenue enabled a highly centralized state and networks of patronage. During the civil war, as various rebel groups looted the country’s iron ore, gold, timber, diamonds, rubber and other resources, most revenue disappeared from the official budget. For instance, recorded diamond sales that had once totaled $150 million a year dropped to $30 million in 1991 and $900,000 by 2001 – which was only 10-15% of what was actually leaving the

The lucrative timber industry paid only 14% of taxes it owed, and most extractive industries operated outside official state control. Although it did not flow to the state, the revenue did benefit Charles Taylor. He built up a network of enterprises devoted to activities ranging from the sale of timber, gold, diamonds and iron ore to the lucrative shipping registry, telecommunications, and the importation of fuel, rice and other commodities, all at a hefty profit that mostly evaded government taxation. In 2000, he managed to secure the sole legal authority to negotiate and execute all commercial contracts in Liberia related to the exploitation of commodities to ensure he would personally benefit. As government revenue dropped to $85 million in 2001 – with nearly a third of that budget expended directly by the “Office of the President” – Taylor personally diverted revenue from Liberia’s natural resources to maintain the loyalty of a network of supporters and to fund the war effort.

After Taylor’s departure from Liberia at the end of the war, revenue sources were dispersed among the various factions and individuals who managed to secure control of one commodity or another. Opportunities for enrichment proliferated as networks of ex-combatants seized control of rubber plantations, smuggled diamonds and gold through Freetown and Conakry in violation of U.N. sanctions, and stripped functioning railroads, warehouses and processing plants to sell them as scrap metal. NTGL officials used their control over state-owned enterprises, like the shipping registry and Liberian Petroleum Refinery Company, to line their pockets. Members of Taylor’s commercial networks continued to profit from their control of much of the business in the country,

210 The Strategic Commodities Act was passed in February, 2000. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report, 341.
212 See Reno, Warlord Politics; Anti-Corruption Efforts in Liberia.
from the monopolistic Lone Star telecommunications company to CEMENCO, the sole producer of cement.\textsuperscript{214} Politicians also received funding from networks in the Liberian diaspora, and Charles Taylor himself allegedly financed several political parties for the 2005 elections.\textsuperscript{215}

Lingering control of the country’s revenue sources by powerful factions and individuals generated challenges for a government struggling to consolidate its authority. As shown in Figure 5, over 50\% of the Liberian state’s revenue stemmed from taxes on international trade and other corporate taxes. The majority of mineral and agricultural concessions that had previously funded the government remained non-functional or outside government control.\textsuperscript{216} The administration was forced to rely on the cooperation of the powerful business leaders and political figures that controlled these export industries to replenish government coffers. The Johnson-Sirleaf administration succeeded in nearly tripling revenue from $82 million in 2005 to $234 million in 2010.\textsuperscript{217} Yet most of these individuals accustomed to operating without contributing taxes through official channels, and expected direct benefits in return for financial support. In the absence of a strong state, raising revenue required tough negotiations and alliances with individuals and factions who controlled the revenue. These factions, in turn, sought to exert their influence over the state.

\textsuperscript{216} Income from concessions would become an increasingly important part of government revenue starting in 2008.
2.3. Uneven Coordination of External Assistance Efforts

In the face of a fragmented political environment and dispersed revenue, the Liberian government relied heavily on external financial, political and security assistance to manage domestic challenges and strengthen the state. Although external actors responded with substantial financial, political and security assistance, uneven coordination across sectors contributed to varying outcomes in efforts to restructure state institutions. Like other post-conflict countries, Liberia received a heavy influx of external assistance following the end of the conflict. Over 15,000 military troops and 1,115 civilian police officers deployed as part of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), while overseas development assistance (ODA) to Liberia increased from $55 million in 2002 to $505 million in 2009, which was equivalent to roughly $140 per capita.\(^{218}\) External resources helped finance day-to-day services for the Liberian population, while the international presence guaranteed physical security and bolstered the political legitimacy of the transitional and elected governments.

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\(^{218}\) OECD-DAC. Data provided by the Liberian Ministry of Finance differ slightly, totally $450 million in 2009.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total 2003-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilaterals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries</td>
<td>77.37</td>
<td>173.66</td>
<td>147.57</td>
<td>187.71</td>
<td>229.59</td>
<td>1,138.42</td>
<td>359.47</td>
<td>709.41</td>
<td>3,023.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DAC Countries</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>26.11</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>28.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilaterals</td>
<td>36.61</td>
<td>50.15</td>
<td>78.43</td>
<td>72.63</td>
<td>512.46</td>
<td>472.74</td>
<td>175.13</td>
<td>1,146.59</td>
<td>2,544.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Donors</td>
<td>113.99</td>
<td>223.83</td>
<td>226.05</td>
<td>260.55</td>
<td>742.78</td>
<td>1,637.27</td>
<td>534.78</td>
<td>1,857.52</td>
<td>5,596.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per capita (in $)</td>
<td>35.20</td>
<td>68.95</td>
<td>69.91</td>
<td>78.59</td>
<td>201.66</td>
<td>341.90</td>
<td>133.62</td>
<td>355.26</td>
<td>1,285.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nonetheless, much of the aid was not sufficiently coherent or accessible for Liberian leaders who were struggling to manage domestic pressures. Unlike in neighboring Sierra Leone, where donors financed between 40 and 50% of the government budget – or roughly 10% of GDP – during the first five years after the conflict,\textsuperscript{219} most aid to Liberia was disbursed outside of the state budget. Although foreign aid paid for 57% of state operations between 2003 and 2008, and the U.S. contributed nearly 20% of that aid, three quarters of aid was executed by donors completely outside the control of the Liberian government (see Figures 6 and 7). As a result, only 10-20% of the government’s meager revenue originated from external sources.\textsuperscript{220} Since U.S. funding accounted for a large portion of donor aid, the policy of the U.S. government not to fund the state budget contributed significantly to this pattern.\textsuperscript{221} Funds spent outside of government mechanisms not only limited the influence of the Liberian government over their disbursement, they also imposed the burdens of negotiating with individual donors with different spending modalities, disbursement schedules and funding priorities.

\textsuperscript{219} Data provided by the Government of Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance.
Beneath this overall picture of incoherence, however, lay significant variations in the levels of donor unity and coordination within and across sectors, including between the military and police. U.S. Government funds were distributed unevenly, leaving some sectors to smaller donors or largely neglected. For instance, while the U.S. dominated the security and health sectors, it was much less active in transportation, electrical, water and infrastructure spending. Within the security sector, over 85% of US funding was spent on the military, with only 10% of its funds going to the
Liberian National Police and the remaining 5% devoted to the Special Security Service tasked with guarding the president and high-level officials. \(^{222}\) Assistance to the LNP was led by the U.N. Civilian Police (UNPOL) contingent of the UN Peacekeeping Force. The U.N. contingent lacked funds for anything beyond its own operational costs, leaving the LNP reliant on a multitude of smaller donors to cover training, equipment and other needs. As shown in Table 12, this funding allocation resulted in a much more fragmented picture for the funding of the Liberian National Police than for the Armed Forces of Liberia. The variation in the source and mechanisms of assistance for the two forces, and resulting differences in the level of donor unity and coordination, contributed to significant differences in the processes and outcome of restructuring efforts.

\(^{222}\) This data was provided by the Government of Liberia Ministry of Finance. U.S. Embassy Officials provided different numbers for their assistance to the AFL during the same period due to different definitions for what was included, totaling $250 million. I use the GOL number in this chart for consistency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount ($USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Rebuild Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)</td>
<td>153,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR China</td>
<td>Renovate three AFL bases</td>
<td>in-kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>12 scholarships for Ministry of Defense officials in Alliance Francaise + specialized training</td>
<td>in-kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Trained 1 battalion; seconded general and officers</td>
<td>in-kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Advisors to the Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>in-kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total AFL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>153,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP</td>
<td>E.C.</td>
<td>Support to National Police Academy</td>
<td>2,192,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Basic police equipment and computer hardware</td>
<td>85,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Support to the formation of the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) and vehicles for the ERU.</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Establishment of 10 Women and Children Protection (WACP) Units and relevant training of police; support to rehabilitation of the Liberian Police Academy through building/ rehabilitation of dormitories</td>
<td>1,982,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Renovation and equipment for the 10 Police County HQ with WACP Units and the Police Academy</td>
<td>2,935,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Establish capacity for civil society oversight services, including oversight board for LNP</td>
<td>713,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>High Level Advisors to the Liberia National Police</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Train and Equip Emergency Response Unit (ERU)</td>
<td>11,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Training and Equipment for the LNP</td>
<td>3,607,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Equipment for the LNP</td>
<td>4,357,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Barracks Construction</td>
<td>211,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Specialized Training &amp; Equipment</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Barracks Construction</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total LNP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36,985,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIN</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Equipment, training and technical assistance</td>
<td>202,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Mentor, Train &amp; Equip SSS</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Sector</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UNDP managed Trust Fund to support implementation of Government's National Security Strategy</td>
<td>4,280,183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 12: External Funding to Liberia's Security Sector, 2005-2010 (Source: Republic of Liberia Ministry of Finance, Liberian Ministry of Defense²²³) |

3. Restructuring the Liberian Security Sector and the Politics of Mutual Coopting

The fragmented political environment and dispersal of revenue sources following the end of Liberia’s civil war enabled significant reforms, especially in the security sector. These conditions

²²³ This data was provided by the Government of Liberia Ministry of Finance. Although it is not necessarily consistent with data provided by the donors it is the most widely circulated data.
constrained the options available to Liberia’s leaders as they sought to consolidate their authority, forced them to broaden their coalitions and rely on external assistance to manage domestic challenges. Indeed, the context following 2003 and the resulting approach marked a significant break from the reality that had shaped governance strategies of previous leaders. Samuel Doe had favored his own ethnic base to ensure a loyal following – particularly in the military – but he had also been forced to incorporate members of the Americo-Liberian elite to secure revenue from their commercial networks.224 Taylor had responded to the increasing political fragmentation by building a broader coalition that cut across ethnic and party divisions. Yet his personal control over a network of commercial enterprises enabled him to strategically allocate revenue to maintain political support. Both Doe and Taylor leaders also faced constant threats from inside and outside their coalitions, and relied on coercion by a growing number of overlapping security and intelligence forces to maintain control. As an international official remarked, “during the war, the enemy was in front of you, but you always had to watch your back.”225

In the post-conflict period, changed conditions fostered new governance strategies. The fragmentation of the political scene and the loss of control over revenue sources prevented Liberia’s post-conflict leaders from relying either on ethnically-based loyalty or resource-based patronage. The breakdown of traditional social and political ties combined with the legacy of constantly shifting alliances limited the possibility of building a reliable or cohesive political base. The dispersal of Taylor’s commercial enterprises among various factions and individuals left most revenue outside of the control of any single politician. At the same time, the increase in foreign aid into the country generated new sources of revenue and political support. Leaders could rely on external political, security and financial backing to bolster their authority. Yet the coherence and credibility of external donors varied over time and across sectors, affecting the extent to which they could serve as

224 Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy*

225 Interview with Senior UN Official, Monrovia, January 29, 2010.
sufficiently reliable sources of finance, information and security to overcome political challenges. The extent to which leaders relied on external resources, in turn, affected the influence of external actors over their policy and institution-building choices.

The results therefore varied by sector and institution. During the NTGL, some factional leaders with little external support and few long-term prospects for political power used their authority to loot government resources as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{226} Others with longer-term prospects sought to consolidate their political or financial base in order to enhance their bargaining position vis-à-vis the future government. Those with access to sufficient external support, like Minister of Defense Daniel Chea and Minister of Justice Kabinetah Janneh, used that support to build their political legitimacy or to ensure their physical survival in the face of threats. The reliance of these two leaders on external financial and political backing would affect crucial early decisions in the restructuring of the military and police forces.

Following the 2005 elections, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf also relied heavily on support from external donors – who had strongly endorsed her during the elections – to maintain a broad and fragmented coalition. After declaring her intention to build a “government of inclusion,”\textsuperscript{227} she appointed a number of political rivals to key positions in ministries, agencies and boards, including rival presidential candidates, former rebel leaders, and several individuals who controlled commercial or financial enterprises – some of whom were on the UN asset freeze and travel ban lists or were associated with Charles Taylor.\textsuperscript{228} She also actively courted external support. During her first year in

\textsuperscript{226} Mike McGovern, “Rebuilding a Failed State: Liberia,” \textit{Development in Practice} 15 (2005),764; See also Reno, "Anti-corruption Efforts in Liberia"


\textsuperscript{228} Some of the more prominent appointments included rival presidential candidate Joseph Korto to Minister of Education, Jeremiah Sulunteh, the vice-presidential candidate for the NDPL party that had placed fourth highest with nearly 10% of the vote as Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, and Kabinetah Janneh, a top leader of the LURD rebel group to the Supreme Court. Associates of Charles Taylor who controlled remnants of his commercial networks included Benoni Urey, the former maritime commissioner was appointed Mayor of Careysburg, Emmanuel Shaw, a close financial associate of Taylor’s and former head of the Liberian Petroleum Refining Corporation who was
office, she visited the White House and the U.S. Congress, and offered to host the new U.S. Africa Command headquarters, and affirmed her commitment to the One-China policy. Working closely with external advisers, she worked to fulfill the World Bank’s HPIC Completion Point requirements that led to the cancellation of $4.6 billion in external debt. To manage the challenges of a broad and fragmented coalition full of potential rivals, she also cultivated her own trusted networks, appointing close friends and associates despite allegations of corruption and lack of competence.

Within the overall context of political fragmentation and dispersed revenue sources, variations in the availability, coherence and reliability of external resources forced leaders to pursue different strategies across sectors and at different times. In some sectors, where external assistance was reliable and coherent, as in the macro-economic, financial and military sectors, close cooperation enabled her top officials to manage domestic pressure while affording external actors significant influence. In other areas, the lack of coherence of donor funding forced Liberian leaders to rely on personal networks, and to bargain with competing factions in ways that undermined externally-driven reforms. These two contrasting approaches were apparent in the development of two central pillars of the security sector, the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Liberian National Police.

appointed to the Board of Directors of the Liberian Airport Authority – although his appointment was later rescinded amidst popular opposition – former NPFL general John T. Richardson was appointed to the board of directors of the National Port Authority, and the list goes on. See, for example, "Sirleaf starts to form government, some appointments spark protest". IRIN Africa, February 14, 2006, accessed November 3, 2011. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=58143.


232 HPIC was achieved on June 29, 2010 leading to $4.6 billion in external debt cancelled after structural reforms.
### Table 13: Summary of Cases: Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and Liberian National Police (LNP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Fragmentation</th>
<th>Revenue Distribution</th>
<th>External Coordination</th>
<th>Means of Influence</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFL – NTLG (2003-5)</strong></td>
<td>Highly fragmented</td>
<td>Highly Dispersed</td>
<td>High Coordination U.S. Lead</td>
<td>Cooperate with leaders – high trust, high leverage</td>
<td>High Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFL (2005-10)</strong></td>
<td>Highly fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>High Coordination U.S. Lead</td>
<td>Cooperate with leaders– high trust, high leverage</td>
<td>High Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LNP – NTGL (2003-5)</strong></td>
<td>Fragmented but MOJ with Cohesive base</td>
<td>Highly Dispersed</td>
<td>High Coordination UN lead + U.S. support</td>
<td>Cooperate with LNP leaders – high trust, high leverage</td>
<td>High Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LNP – (2005-10)</strong></td>
<td>Highly Fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Low Coordination UN lead + multiple donors</td>
<td>Bargaining and confrontation-declining trust, high leverage</td>
<td>Partial Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **The Armed Forces of Liberia: the Creation of a “Cadillac” Army**

4.1. **Political and Fiscal Pressure in the Defense Sector**

At the end of the civil war, the Liberian army reflected the broader political and economic landscape – bereft of resources and fragmented among various factions. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) called for the force to be “restructured,"233 the specific terms of the restructuring process depended on a series of subsequent decisions that evolved through the interaction of individual Liberia leaders and external actors. Faced with extreme political vulnerability and financial dependence on the one hand and a credible and responsive external donor on the other, Liberia’s civilian defense leaders opted to adopt a set of reforms with U.S. assistance that would radically transform the country’s military.

These decisions were driven by severe financial and political constraints that rendered defense leaders reliant on external support. Financially, the legacy of neglect during the Taylor

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233 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Article VII.
government left the army with few paid personnel, little functional equipment and virtually no budget with which to rebuild. The 2005 state budget allocated the entire armed forces only $4 million – which amounted to a total of $266 per soldier.\textsuperscript{234} In reality, most of the 15,000 soldiers and hundreds of civilian personnel on the books had not been paid in over three years.\textsuperscript{235}

Of even greater concern to civilian leaders, especially to Daniel Chea who served as the Minister of Defense during the NTGL, was the internal fragmentation of the force and its leadership. The rank and file consisted largely of Krahn fighters recruited under Samuel Doe, while the top ranks of the army were divided among those who had fought for and against Taylor. Since Chea had served as defense minister under Taylor, many soldiers were hostile toward him and personally threatened him.\textsuperscript{236} He also had to share his authority with the leaders of various rebel factions and political parties. Following the establishment of the NTGL, a Defense Advisory Council was set up comprising the top generals from the AFL and the main rebel factions, LURD and MODEL, to define the terms of the restructuring process. As their own militia groups were disbanded, each of these factions sought to use the restructuring process to insert their fighters into the AFL, and thereby ensure their influence over the military. With his own network largely disintegrated since Taylor’s departure, Chea was in a particularly weak position during the negotiations over the terms of the restructuring process. The Chairman of the NTGL, Gyude Bryant, who also lacked his own constituency and relied on external support, could not provide him much political backing.

4.2. The U.S. Government’s Dominance in the Defense Sector

The commitment by the U.S. government to play a dominant role in the restructuring process provided these leaders with a reliable and coherent external backer. The U.S. government

\textsuperscript{234} National Transitional Government of Liberia, \textit{National Budget for the Fiscal Year July 1, 2005-June 30, 2006}.

\textsuperscript{235} Interviews with former AFL officers, Monrovia, Liberia, February 2010.

had signaled its commitment to supporting the process by acquiescing to a provision in the CPA requesting that “the United State of America play a lead role in organizing this restructuring program” for the AFL.\textsuperscript{237} Although most of its troops were committed to its operation in Iraq, the U.S. government contributed $150 million during the first five years after the conflict – a substantial sum for a state with a total budget of $80 million.\textsuperscript{238} These funds, expended primarily through private contractors, would cover everything from recruiting, training and equipping the new force to its housing, food and other operational costs as it was trained.

The U.S. government’s involvement in the Liberian defense sector was highly coherent, managed directly by the U.S. Ambassador with a small and dedicated staff. With its attention focused on Iraq, Washington policymakers had delegated most decision-making to the skeletal staff in the U.S. Embassy. For the security sector, the staff initially consisted of the U.S. Ambassador and the Defense Attaché.\textsuperscript{239} Delegation of authority enabled unified and coordinated decision-making and implementation. Even after the U.S. Embassy staff expanded and the State Department contracted with two private firms, DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), to design and implement the restructuring process, the program was managed almost entirely in Monrovia and a series of U.S. Ambassadors and Defense Attaches devoted personal attention and control over the program.\textsuperscript{240} The dominant U.S. contribution to the restructuring process, which far outweighed those of other donors, also enabled it to define the terms of the policy discussions. Through regular meetings of a Defense Support Group, U.S. officials coordinated other external

\textsuperscript{237} Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Article VII.
\textsuperscript{238} This data is from the Government of Liberia. The U.S. Government reported providing $250 million during the same period. See Nicolas Cook, “Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance,” CRS Report for Congress. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 22. See also Table 11 and fn. 281, above.
\textsuperscript{239} Interview with Ambassador John Blaney, Washington, DC, April 21, 2011.
\textsuperscript{240} Interview with U.S. Embassy Official, Monrovia, January 26, 2010.
donors, including Nigeria, Sweden, France, China, Ghana, the U.K., and UNMIL, each of which provided smaller contributions in the form of training, scholarships and advisers (see Table 12).  

4.3. Bargaining over the Size and Structure of the AFL

On its face, the relationship between the Liberian military and its U.S. backers appeared to be one of total dependence and dominance that generated significant leverage for the U.S. over the defense restructuring process. The Liberian state’s total lack of resources and the U.S.’s commitment to fund the new force left it completely dependent on the U.S. Especially during the NTGL, when the government had little financing of its own, Liberian leaders were compelled to accept any conditions set by the U.S., and had little leverage with which to negotiate. Many of the terms the U.S. proposed, from the size of the new army to its composition and recruitment process, went directly against the interests of many of the major factions and were vociferously opposed. Yet as many Liberians saw it, most of the decisions early on were imposed upon them by the U.S. as a result of its significant leverage.

The most controversial decisions involved the size, composition and structure of the new force. Among leaders of the main Liberian factions, a consensus emerged early on around a plan that would have built the AFL around a core of former fighters from the army and each rebel faction, adding newly recruited soldiers to rebuild its pre-war strength of 6,000 soldiers. This plan was consistent with the provision in the CPA that the restructured force “may be drawn from the ranks of the present GOL forces, the LURD and the MODEL.” The U.S. Embassy, however, proposed a much smaller force of 2,000 people based on the notion that the Liberian government would not be able to sustain a larger force financially. U.S. officials also favored complete demobilization and recruitment from scratch, to avoid incorporating fighters tainted by a legacy of

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242 Interviews with members of the Defense Support Group, Monrovia, January and February 2010.

243 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Article VII.
human rights abuse or factional allegiance. Both proposals were vehemently opposed by the generals and political leaders who made up the council tasked with designing the restructuring process. Liberian leaders saw a smaller army as a blow to their national sovereignty and a threat to their national security. The smaller size and recruitment from scratch also threatened the interests of rebel leaders who hoped to secure places for their own fighters and thereby preserve their influence over the new force. Others saw total demobilization as risky in light of the violent rebellion that had occurred in response to Taylor’s attempt to disband the army in 1997.244

The decision regarding the size of the force was resolved following difficult negotiation, in which the U.S.’s greater leverage allowed it to prevail. The U.S. had developed a clear position, the U.S. Ambassador was directly involved and he was willing to condition assistance on meeting these terms. According to the U.S. Ambassador:

“[Based on] analysis of balance of payments, revenue in the future, I said they couldn’t afford ten or eight or six thousand. I went back to Gyude [Bryant]. He said they would never accept it. The factions would never accept it. They would go back to war. I dug in my heels. He said six, I said two. He brought in other people, rebel leaders, and others to beat on me. He eventually accepted two.”245

Many Liberian leaders agreed that the country’s dependence on U.S. financing was the primary factor in shaping all of the key decisions, including to disband the army and army and limit its size was the. As one former senior NTGL official put it:

“The size of the army was influenced significantly by the cash realities, meaning what the U.S. could do, since the CPA requested U.S. assistance. The U.S. played a lead role in the estimate and came up with a figure…they required money, and only the US was available to provide money and training.”246

4.4 Mutual Coopting and the Development of Trust

Although financial dependence provided the U.S. with significant bargaining leverage, financial dependence and bargaining were only part of the story. The vulnerability of Liberian leaders combined with the strong U.S. commitment resulted in the development of a close working

244 Interview with Senator Blamoh Nelson, Monrovia, Liberia, January 14, 2010.
245 Interview with U.S. Ambassador John Blaney, Washington, DC, April 21, 2011.
246 Interview with Ambassador Wesseh, Monrovia, Liberia, February 9, 2010.
relationship among top Liberian defense officials and U.S. embassy personnel. This relationship developed during the NTGL period and continued through the Johnson-Sirleaf administration. This relationship was rooted in the extreme political fragmentation that posed security and political threats, and forced Liberian leaders to rely on the U.S. for financing, for the information necessary to monitor the force, and for the political backing necessary to overcome pressure from other factions. At the same time, the U.S. government’s commitment to play a dominant role provided Liberian leaders with a credible interlocutor and backer, which fostered trust and communication that led to consensus over crucial decisions. Close and mutually dependent relationships between a small group of U.S. and Liberian officials enabled them to implement controversial decisions – often over the opposition of other factions – that fundamentally altered the AFL’s size, composition, legal framework and civilian oversight structure.

Although some of the key decisions regarding the size and composition of the force were negotiated with leaders of factions and parties that opposed them, the proposals were mostly developed through highly collaborative discussions among a small group of U.S. and Liberian officials, particularly Minister of Defense Daniel Chea and NTGL Chairman Gyude Bryant, and the U.S. Ambassador and Defense Attaché. By working closely with Chea and Bryant who retained nominal authority over the defense forces, U.S. officials could bypass the opposition of factional leaders. Chea, who lacked his own cohesive network and felt threatened by the possibility of a force dominated by hostile factions, relied on U.S. support to protect himself. The U.S. Ambassador had personally urged Chea to stay on as Defense Minister, arguing that “as long as he was Defense Minister, they wouldn't kill him, but I thought otherwise they would kill him, and the war would start again.” In addition to guaranteeing his physical survival, U.S. support enabled Chea to make sure that his rivals did not dominate the new force. Through frequent communication, he worked

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with the U.S. to design a restructuring process that would address their common interests. U.S.
officials, in turn, became increasingly dependent on him to make the key decisions that would
advance their objectives. As one U.S. official involved in the discussion put it, “Chea was the
political will on the Liberian side. He was a good faith actor. He was instrumental.”\(^{248}\)

This close cooperation resulted in an agreement between Chea and the U.S. Ambassador to
disband the force and limits its size. The decision on the size and composition of the force was
adopted through a 2005 Executive Order that Chea persuaded Bryant to sign. Meanwhile, the
council of generals nominally mandated to define the restructuring process – as well as other
members of the NTGL, the legislature and civil society – were sidelined from the decision-making
process. According to a member of that council:

> “Gyude Bryant set up a Defense Advisory Council, that included the US, UN, EC, ECOWAS, AU and
so forth, as well as the LURD, MODEL and the AFL to come up with policies and plans to restructure the
armed forces… but it was all done by the Presidency. The [CPA] said restructure, not disband. In weekly
meetings with all of the stakeholders, the US and UNMIL, we opted to retain 1,000-1,500 people each with
certain skills… [but] Bryant and Chea thought the corruption at the top echelon was too much, so they decided
to get rid of everybody.”\(^{249}\)

The close and mutually dependent relationship between U.S. and Liberian officials was
formalized through a 2005 bilateral agreement, also negotiated with Minister of Defense Chea and
signed by Chairman Bryant and U.S. Ambassador Blaney.\(^{250}\) The agreement created a Joint Defense
Advisory Committee co-chaired by the Liberian Minister of Defense and the senior U.S. military
representative in Liberia to manage the restructuring process. The U.S. Government formalized its
commitment to “pay for the recruitment program, USG contract personnel, equipment, and
logistical support during training, as well as the refurbishment of the training and operational

\(^{249}\) Interview with former rebel leader and member of the Defense Advisory Council, Monrovia, Liberia, February 4,
2010.
bases.\textsuperscript{251} In exchange, the Liberian government agreed to the terms favored by the U.S. regarding the mandate, size and structure of the force, as well as the process for recruitment and training. The agreement also granted the U.S. formal influence over all aspects of the restructuring process and the shape of the new military by making the U.S. Ambassador or Military Attaché a deciding member of a Joint Personnel Board that would approve the recruitment of each individual soldier, and of a Joint Review Board that would decide on the allocation of Liberian and external funds to the military.\textsuperscript{252} Centralizing decision-making with a small group would help to maintain active and ongoing communication and sharing of information, while protecting both Liberian and U.S. officials from political pressure that might threaten the reforms.

Close cooperation based on mutual dependence and trust continued to shape the new AFL during the Johnson-Sirleaf administration. In an environment characterized by political fragmentation, multiple security threats, and pressure from various factions to influence the composition of the new military, consistent U.S. support provided a measure of security while helping to neutralize factional pressure. Soon after taking office in 2005, the President declared her intent to cooperate with the U.S. and to fulfill the terms of the 2005 agreement. Her appointment of Brownie Samukai as Minister of Defense further signaled her intention to maintain the relationship. Having served in U.N. missions and lived in the U.S., Samukai was comfortable interacting with American and other foreign officials. Early in his term, he affirmed Liberia’s commitment to work within the framework of the 2005 bilateral agreement, and was outspoken in

\textsuperscript{251} Ibid, Article VII
\textsuperscript{252} “A Joint Defense Advisory Committee (JDAC) will be established by the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia and the Chairman of the GOL to coordinate the SSR program, to include overseeing the boards/committees, which may be established by the JDAC to address specific personnel issues, in particular recruitment, management, will be undertaken by a Joint Personnel Board (JPB), established by the JDAC. The Minister of Defense and a senior U.S. military representative in Liberia will serve as statutory members and co-chairs of the Board.” Exchange of Notes of April 15\textsuperscript{st} and April 20\textsuperscript{th} 2005, Articles II & III.
his belief that “any attempt to stop the process would not have been in the best security interest of Liberia.”

Although reliance on the U.S. came at a political cost, it also allowed the government to resist significant factional pressure to influence the composition of the force. On the one hand, the president invited criticism that she had sacrificed her country’s sovereignty, given up control of its military to an outside power, and embraced an externally-driven vision for the size and structure of the force. On the other hand, allowing external actors control over major decisions also limited the influence of political rivals over the new force. Legislators, politicians and civil society activists who were shut out of decision-making complained bitterly that they were not consulted on key decisions. Yet the regime was freed from the need to placate these rivals by granting them influence over the composition and operations of the new force. This approach thereby eliminated a potential threat to the regime.

The effects of this relationship were most clearly evident in the recruitment process. The involvement of the U.S. in the process provided the necessary financing, it helped Liberian civilian defense leaders overcome informational constraints, and it enabled them to manage pressure from political factions. According to Samukai:

“In 2006, I was under pressure to stop the recruiting process by civil society and the legislature. They said here is a list of constituents who want to get in. I didn’t want any of it. I refused with support from the U.S.”

Support from the U.S. in this case consisted of a comprehensive recruitment, vetting and training process, funded and managed by the U.S. Government through its private contractors. To facilitate the total demobilization of the army, U.S. contractors designed a severance package, and mobilized

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253 The agreement was re-signed in 2008, with all of the original terms included. Interview with Minister of Defense Brownie Samukai, Monrovia, Liberia, January 28, 2010.


255 Interviews with members of legislature and civil society organizations, Monrovia, January 2010.

256 Interview with Minister of Defense Brownie Samukai, Monrovia, January 28, 2010.
other donors to help fund it. For the recruitment process, the U.S. contractors designed and managed a battery of physical, medical, aptitude and literacy tests for each potential recruit. They also conducted a costly vetting process, in which teams of Liberian and expatriate officials traveled all around the country to every candidate’s home community to investigate their background and involvement in human rights abuse or criminal activity. This process significantly increased the level of information available to the Ministry of Defense for the selection process. Close communication between the Minister of Defense and the U.S. Defense Attaché ensured information on each candidate was shared, and could be used to counteract political pressure. Through the Joint Personnel Board, which also included a U.N. representative and the Dean of the Law School, the U.S. Defense Attaché could reject any individual candidate, and provide political cover for decisions regarding politically connected candidates. The attention of the U.S. Ambassador, who was “involved in the minutiae,” ensured high level political support.

As the restructuring process moved from recruitment into training, equipping and structuring the new force into the revision of the legal, financial, administrative and civilian oversight processes, close cooperation between Liberian and U.S. officials ensured a high level of U.S. influence over the process. Direct control over many aspects of the process, such as training the new recruits, managing their equipment, and rehabilitating and maintaining their bases, enabled U.S. officials to dictate the structure and content and to directly monitor their performance.

4.5 Missed Opportunities and Mixed Results

Within the context of a high level of U.S. influence overall, several specific outcomes varied in their consistency with U.S. objectives as a result of variations in the extent of U.S. support and the

257 The severance package remained controversial, in part because of insufficient communication about its terms. Demobilized soldiers continued to demonstrate for more funding long after they were demobilized.

258 Interviews with U.S. Embassy and Dynacorps Officials, Monrovia, January 21, 2011. See also Mala, Security Sector Reform in Liberia, 31.

259 Interview with U.S. Embassy Official, Monrovia, January 26, 2010.

ability of Liberian officials to influence key decisions. Disagreements inevitably arose among U.S. and Liberian officials over the details of the restructuring process, leading to discussions and negotiations. Although taken within the framework of considerable trust and cooperation, as well as dependence on the U.S. for financing, information and technical support, the outcomes of each of these discussions reflected the dynamics of the relationship as they played out around each issue. In some cases, the U.S. was unable to respond credibly – due to internal bureaucratic constraints or personal relationships – and Liberian leaders sought other sources of support. In other cases, Liberian leaders used the leverage that they earned from the extent to which U.S. officials dependence on them to move the process forward. This leverage enabled Defense Minister Samukai to negotiate elements that were ostensibly under U.S. control, including criteria for recruitment, contents of the training program, and selection of individual officers and ministry staff.

One such disagreement arose around the development of the officer corps for the AFL. Since all 2,000 soldiers were recruited at once, all at an entry-level rank, the new force lacked an experienced officer corps. U.S. officials planned to gradually build an officer corps by selecting the most promising and best educated individuals from among the recruits. Those selected received additional training, and were commissioned as junior officers who would gradually rise through the ranks. This plan would have left a significant leadership and supervision gap for years to come, since the inexperienced Liberian soldiers would only reach as high as Captain within the first five years. To fill this gap, the Liberian Minister of Defense requested the U.S. to second active duty officers to command the force, but the U.S. declined due to its own legal restrictions. Unable to depend on the U.S., the Liberian Minister of Defense turned to other external actors and to his own domestic network. He requested the support of ECOWAS, the community of West African states, which agreed to provide officers to fill supervision roles, including a Nigerian general to command the army. He also turned to his own domestic network, and recruited a group of former AFL officers
who had served with him in the early 1990s. The U.S. Government strongly opposed both approaches, concerned that they would dilute U.S. influence and training, and even threatened to withhold funding for the force.\textsuperscript{261} Within the context of a mutually dependent relationship, however, such threat could not be credible. Given their inability to address this need, U.S. officials reluctantly recognized the Minister’s concern. After some discussion, the U.S. agreed to accept both solutions proposed by the Minister, provided all officers were subject to vetting by U.S. officials.\textsuperscript{262}

Other variations in outcomes emerged from limits to U.S. responsiveness and ability to commit its resources, as in the development of the Ministry of Defense. To build civilian oversight, the U.S. had planned to help re-building and strengthen the Ministry of Defense. The U.S. sponsored the demobilization all 425 ministry personnel, recruited and trained 110 of the most qualified personnel, and helped design a new structure for the ministry. A gap in U.S. funding severely curtailed the planned training, however. As a result, planned mentoring and “on-the-job training” program were cut out of the program, and the ministry was left to assume its new functions largely on its own, resulting in a modification of the original design. The U.S. thus “missed a valuable opportunity to shape the operation of the new MOD as an institution [and]… deprived the Ministry’s political leadership—Minister of National Defense Brownie Samukai and his Deputy and Assistant Ministers—of a valuable tool in asserting control of the Ministry.”\textsuperscript{263} The U.S. sent advisers to the ministry later on, and other donors including the U.K. and Sweden sought to partially fill the gap by sending advisers. The U.S. government’s inability to respond early on, however, curtailed its influence over the appointment of key personnel, and forced the Minister to instead on his own network in filling key positions.

\textsuperscript{261} Interview with Minister of Defense Samukai, Monrovia, January 28, 2010.
\textsuperscript{262} Through a provision known as the “Leahy Amendment,” U.S. law prohibits security assistance without vetting. Since the U.S. was contributing to per diem for ECOWAS officer, they were also required to vet them.
The greatest source of tension, however, reflected the high level of mutual cooperation and trust and the substantial external influence over outcomes. Tension arose early on from the Minister’s feeling of being “sidelined” by the U.S. contractors who were carrying out much of the work. As he relied on information by U.S. advisers to monitor his own force and financing to ensure it functioned, the distance created by placing the contractor between him and U.S. officials led to significant frustration. The Minister sent “nonstop requests” directly to the U.S. Embassy to raise concerns and seek assistance on specific issues. To overcome this tension, U.S. Embassy personnel worked hard to accommodate and sought to ensure that he felt his concerns were being addressed. The contractors were eventually replaced with active duty military personnel to serve as advisers and mentors, and to exert continued U.S. influence as Liberia assumed control over the force. When disagreements arose, neither side could fully impose its perspective since both sides were too dependent on the other, and neither could credibly threaten to withhold resources or cooperation. Most issues were resolved through discussion and compromise, in the context of a relationship characterized by a high level of communication and mutual trust.

4.6 Outcome: The AFL’s Substantial Transformation

Cooperation between U.S. and Liberian officials resulted in the complete restructuring of the AFL, including the recruitment and training of new soldiers, establishment of a new force structure, reorganization of the Ministry of Defense, and adoption of a new legal framework. Decisions were taken primarily through discussion and cooperation between Liberian and U.S. officials in the context of a high level of trust and mutual confidence. These discussions enabled decisions to emerge that reflected U.S. influence but also addressed Liberian concerns. In some specific cases, outcomes were affected by lack of U.S. responsiveness or the ability of Liberian leaders to exert leverage through their control over the process or use of alternative sources of funding. Other

donors also contributed resources such as mentors, equipment, reconstruction of bases, or training opportunities. As a result, some specific decisions diverged from U.S. recommendations, while others reflected lack of attention by U.S. to core oversight issues, such as the role of the legislature and civil society. Nonetheless, the overall framework and majority of the decisions reflected a high level of U.S. influence.

4.6.1 Composition

The composition of the new AFL provides the clearest evidence of the force’s transformation. The demobilization and recruitment process, funded primarily by the U.S. government, transformed the force from one dominated by a single ethnic group with a factionalized leadership, to one that reflected the geographic and ethnic composition of the country. As a result, no ethnic or political group constituted more than 14% of the force. Strict educational, physical and human rights standards, along with a competitive process that accepted only 15% of eligible candidates, resulted in a better educated and skilled force than ever before. The development of the officer corps resulted in a more mixed outcome, as the officer corps was made up of individual handpicked by the Minister of Defense who had not been selected through the recruitment process. This response to a practical reality reflected the influence of the Minister of Defense and local political constraints. Nonetheless, even they were vetted by U.S. officials, and U.S. officials worked closely to mentor and advise them.

4.6.2 Civilian Oversight

The nature of civilian oversight also evolved considerably. On the one hand, the potential for more transparent civilian oversight immediately increased with the recruitment of a new army that was not dominated by any one faction. U.S. advisers also helped draft a new National Defense

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Act that greatly expanded the scope of civilian oversight. Adopted in 2008, the law granted the Ministry of Defense direction over policy, procurement and finance, set up a new Inspector General, and subjected the appointment of the Chief of Staff and the budget to legislative approval.267 The U.S. also recruited and trained all of the Ministry of Defense staff, and helped set up a new organizational structure. Limitations in the U.S. investment in this area also undermined its effectiveness. The ministry’s weakness in managing basic administrative and oversight functions – from procurement to finances – produced serious setbacks and delayed the army from becoming fully operational.268 Although these weaknesses partly reflected broader challenges, limited attention in this area undermined the extent that reforms were implemented.

The U.S. government also neglected to engage actors outside the ministry or to strengthen their oversight capacity. Members of the legislature and civil society complained of being left out of the “closed process,” that did not provide the legislature with the opportunity to even confirm officers, as stipulated in the Defense law.269 An attempt by U.S. officials to involve civil society organizations was aborted after they reacted with negatively to having been left out of key decisions.270 Having had few opportunities for input in the defense restructuring process many legislators and activists remained suspicious and hostile to the U.S.-sponsored reforms. Although keeping decision within a closed circle helped defense officials resist factional pressure, the absence of involvement by political parties, legislators and civil society weakened opportunities for

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270 According to a number of activists in Monrovia, there were opportunities to participate in the national security strategy, but they have been consistently left out of the defense reform process. Interviews with civil society activists, Monrovia, January-February 2010. See also Adedeji Ebo, “The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper No.9 (2005).
participation from potential supporters of the reform process. Without a base of domestic supporters, the Liberian defense sector remained vulnerable to domestic political pressure, especially as active U.S. support declines.

4.6.3 Legal Limits and Discipline

The legal framework governing the mandate of the force and its limits went through substantial revisions that also reflected U.S. influence. The 2008 National Defense Act limited the role of the AFL to defend against external military threats and circumscribed its activity within the country. The law specified mechanisms for discipline and accountability through a detailed Code of Military Justice, modeled after the U.S. code. U.S. assistance has generally helped to bolster discipline within the AFL through its ability to monitor the force and share information with the Liberian Defense Ministry. U.S. advisers embedded in the force reported disciplinary issues through their chain of command to officials in the U.S. Embassy, who in turn reported issues to the Nigerian commanding general or the Minister of Defense. Several serious disciplinary issues have been addressed as a result of the “active duty officers who serve as day-to-day advisors, whose responsibility is to keep the [U.S. OSC Chief] apprised of misconduct, and might then go to the AFL Commander, who will probe and take appropriate measure.”

On the other hand, the absence of an experienced Liberian officer corps, their lack of experience in dealing with disciplinary issues, and the absence of Liberian military lawyers, has contributed to a weak disciplinary system. Given the limited number of U.S. advisers, the civilian leadership has mostly had to rely on the former AFL or ECOWAS officers to exercise command and supervision. As a result of different – and often conflicting – standards for discipline, along with the failure to coordinate on a consistent approach to discipline, these officers sometimes failed

272 National Defense Act 2008, Article 1.2
273 Interview with AFL Officer, Monrovia, January 21, 2011.
to report misconduct even through their own chains of command and sometimes even contributed to indiscipline within the force.\textsuperscript{274} Enforcement in the area of discipline remained mixed. A U.N. report found that several “incidents of ill-discipline on the part of Armed Forces personnel, including harassment of civilians, altercations with national police, including one resulting in the murder of a police officer, and criminal activity, continued to raise concern.”\textsuperscript{275} Overall, however, the discipline and professionalism of the force improved considerably.

4.7 Prospects for the New AFL

Close cooperation between Liberian and U.S. officials resulted in significant transformation to the governance of the AFL. A relationship of mutual dependence between a small group of politically vulnerable leaders and a committed external donor enabled substantial external influence over decisions and implementation, Liberian leaders in turn used external support to counteract domestic political pressure and resist factional influence. In specific areas where the U.S. government was less responsive in overcoming financial, political or information constraints, however, Liberian leaders sought to compensate by turning to their own networks or to other donors. Yet overall, the structure, composition and governance of the force continued to reflect substantial U.S. influence.

At the same time, the concentration of decision-making among a small group of leaders may also have had detrimental effects on the long-term prospects for the force. Although the exclusion of opposition factions facilitated controversial decision and helped minimize political pressure, it also fueled suspicion and opposition by those left out of the process. The absence of broader support for the restructuring process has led to concerns about the sustainability of these decisions in the face of financial and political pressure. As U.S. support declined from its peak during the first five years after the conflict, the Liberian government increasingly struggled to manage the logistics

\textsuperscript{274} Interview with AFL Officer, Monrovia, January 19, 2011.
or finances of maintaining the new army.\textsuperscript{276} Without the support of outside constituencies, and without a stable or reliable base of support, the AFL in 2010 remained highly dependent on U.S. support and increasingly vulnerable to internal pressure. At the same time, U.S. reliance on a single interlocutor may have undermined the conditions that enabled its influence, by allowing the Minister of Defense to consolidate his own network within the military. The Minister of Defense was criticized for allegedly relying on personal networks for some senior appointments and allocation of contracts, and for relying on external support to shield him from investigation or prosecution.\textsuperscript{277}

The closed process could thus result in a backlash against the restructuring process with a change in government, or enable the ruling party to consolidate a narrow based within the military and resist future influence. Much of the evolution will depend on the continued involvement of external actors led by the U.S. The longer-term effects of this process remain to be seen.

5. The Liberian National Police: Building a Ship While Sailing it

5.1 Political and Fiscal Pressure on the Police

In rebuilding the Liberian National Police (LNP) following the end of the civil war, Liberian leaders faced many of the same challenges their counterparts faced in the defense sector, including factionalism and limited resources. On the fiscal side, although the police was not as deliberately marginalized as the army, it also faced severe financial constraints. The total budget for the 2004-2005 fiscal year amounted to US $1.3 million for a force of 3,500, translating into a total of $371 per officer.\textsuperscript{278} Two years later, the government allocated only $4 million, while the cost of salaries alone

\textsuperscript{276} U.S. resources declined from $50mil to $20mil per year by 2010, but they sent a greater number of military advisers reaching 62 active duty military personnel the same year. Interview with U.S. Embassy Official, Monrovia, January 26, 2010.


\textsuperscript{278} The annual salary for an entry-level officer was roughly $950 – which barely covered the cost of living. National Transitional Government of Liberia, National Budget for the Fiscal Year July 1, 2005-June 30, 2006.
amounted to $4.5 million. In the past, officers had relied on petty extortion of the population to supplement their income – in competition with several other law enforcement forces with overlapping authority. This practice enabled powerful individuals and political factions to exert pressure on the police force.

At the same time, the LNP was even more fragmented than the army. Through successive transitional governments set up during the civil war, political and rebel factions had succeeded in inserting their own fighters into the police. The force became increasingly factionalized among groups with various regional, ethnic and language ties and susceptible to the influence of factional leaders who used those ties for their personal benefit. The Director of Police appointed during the NTGL, Chris Massoquoi found himself threatened by rival factions within the force over which he had little influence. Massoquoi sought to divert police resources to his own network to strengthen his position within the force, while publicly complaining about attempts by other officials and political leaders to curry influence among police officers. On the other hand, NTGL Minister of Justice Kabineh Janeh, a former leader of the LURD rebel faction, turned to his own base and sought to incorporate LURD fighters into the LNP to bolster his influence. Unlike Massoquoi, who was forced to rely heavily on external support, Janeh sought to draw on his political weight to counter external demands. Yet the fiscal and political pressure limited his leverage in this process.

5.2 The UN Police, Bilateral Donors and the Challenges of Coordination

Despite conditions conducive to external influence, coordination challenges among the LNP’s external supporters weakened its influence and undermined many aspects of the restructuring

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279 Interview with former Police Director Beatrice Munah Sieh, Monrovia, February 20, 2010.
280 See fn. 175, above for a list of these forces. This account focuses only on the LNP since it was the only one to go through a large-scale donor-funded reform process.
283 Telephone interview with former UN Police Commissioner Mark Kroeker, April 7, 2010.
process. The CPA had called for the UN Mission in Liberia’s (UNMIL) United Nations Police Mission (UNPOL) to assist in both the “maintenance of law and order” and “the development and implementation of training programs for the LNP.”\textsuperscript{284} The UN Security Council therefore included in UNMIL’s mandate the objective of “restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing.”\textsuperscript{285} The UN Police emerged as the lead actors in designing and implementation the restructuring program for the LNP.

Several organizational constraints within UNPOL undermined its ability to develop the coherence it would need to serve as a credible partner for Liberian politicians and police officials. First, the UNPOL mission did not control resources beyond those needed to fund its operational costs. It was also precluded by its own rules from using its funds to purchase equipment or other material for the LNP, or even from donating its own equipment.\textsuperscript{286} Financing for training, supplies and equipment was expected to come from the bilateral assistance programs of other donors, but these funds were fragmented among numerous small programs. Bilateral donor funds frequently came with “strings attached” based on each donor’s priorities and interests without any consultation with the UN.\textsuperscript{287} Although the U.S. Government played a dominant funding role initially, U.S. resources for the police were much more limited relative to other funding sources than they were for the military (see Table 12, above). Although the U.S. government contributed police officers to serve as part of the UNPOL mission, the U.S. government officials who controlled funds and managed the overall relationship with Liberian leaders were much less involved in the process, especially after the immediate post-war period.

The UNPOL mission was also plagued by internal challenges that undermined its ability to achieve a cohesive approach or build confidence among Liberian counterparts. The mission’s

\textsuperscript{284} Comprehensive Peace Agreement Article VIII
\textsuperscript{286} Telephone interview with former UN Police Commissioner Mark Kroeker, April 7, 2010.
\textsuperscript{287} Interview with UNPOL Advisor, Monrovia, January 27, 2010.
personnel consisted of police officers seconded from 40 countries with different doctrines, procedures and approaches to policing, each deployed for short rotations often lasting a mere 6-12 months. The numerous, contradictory policing approaches lead to confusion regarding the vision and direction for the LNP. Tensions over UNPOL’s core mandate further undermined the coherence of its objectives. The UNPOL mission was officially tasked with developmental and oversight tasks, including “to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia” and to “assist in the training of civilian police,” while being prohibited from “executive” functions such as arresting, detaining or using force. Yet most UNPOL officers had little experience in tasks other than executive functions, and frequently became involved in operations despite the limitations on their mandate. The tendency to focus on operational tasks rather than developmental ones also led to parallel chains of commands and information systems. As UNPOL set up its own systems for monitoring crime and for investigating internal violations rather than supporting those of the LNP, information-sharing among senior UN and Liberian police officials declined. The constantly rotating cadre of UNPOL officers, many of whom preferred to act on their own than invest in relationships with Liberian counterparts, further undermined the development of trust between UN advisers and their domestic counterparts and weakened their influence.

5.3 External Coordination and Bargaining Leverage Early On

Initially, a high level of external coordination between the UN and the U.S. Government enabled them to negotiate effectively with reluctant leaders, resulting in transformative decisions regarding the structure and composition of the LNP. Since UNPOL Commissioner Mark Kroeker and the head of UNMIL Jacques-Paul Klein were both U.S. citizens, they communicated frequently.

289 UN Police Commissioner Mark Kroeker remarked that “[UNPOL] would get involved, clear the streets – this was beyond their mandate, but it was a matter of leadership. If a riot occurs, we will have to deal with it.” Telephone Interview with former UN Police Commissioner Mark Krocker, April 6, 2010.
with the U.S. Ambassador and came to a consensus around key issues. As the U.S. was initially looked upon as Liberia’s primary external sponsor and source of funds, U.S. backing served as an important source of leverage. When the U.N. could not persuade Liberian officials on their own, they could count on the U.S. to “cajole” Liberian officials into accepting reforms in exchange for U.S. support.

The most significant decisions early on revolved around the composition of the force. As with the military, controversy quickly emerged surrounding the process for selecting the officers for the LNP. The leaders of the main factions preferred to reserve places within the force for their fighters, while U.N. officials argued that all LNP officers should be subjected to a new recruitment, vetting and training process regardless of whether they had served as police officers or fighters in the past. Police Director Massoquoi who lacked his own political base sided with the UN in this argument, against most of his senior officers, since he recognized his internal weakness and the benefits of external support. Minister of Justice Janeh, a former rebel leader who sought to protect his network of fighters, opposed the U.N.’s proposal. UNPOL Commissioner Mark Krocker recalled the difficult negotiations around this issue:

“The Ministry of Justice continually pushed for a group of LURD fighters to be made police officers….We said, ‘Mr. Minister, no country injects former fighter into a police organizations. Every police officer must have credentials: training, moral character, educational standards.’ Most fighters couldn’t even read. He would push that these guys should become police officers. This is where we fought.”

In the early stages of the mission, the UN benefited from strong backing from its main sponsor, the U.S. government. Krocker, Klein and U.S. Ambassador Blaney developed a unified position on the LNP restructuring process and persuaded other donors to join them. The UN Police drafted a Memorandum of Understanding laying out the terms of the restructuring process and built broader support among other donors and top officials through a Rule of Law Implementation

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290 Interview with senior LNP Officer, Monrovia, February 8, 2010.
291 Telephone Interview with former UN Police Commissioner Mark Krocker April 7, 2010.
Committee. Having worked closely with these top officials to develop the plan, it reflected consensus among donors, Director Massoquoi and other leaders – including Chairman Bryant – who recognized their vulnerability and the value of external backing. In the face of continued resistance by Minister Janeh and other police leaders with factional ties, Kroeker requested that the U.S. and other donors increase their pressure. As Kroeker recalled, the U.S. Ambassador responded by conditioning U.S. assistance on their signing onto the terms in the Memorandum of Understanding:

_I took it all the way to the mission leadership and the Chairman. [SRSG] Klein called the Chairman [Bryant] – the two of them were on good terms – and worked every political angle to preserve the idea of officers based on standards...I had long discussions with [U.S. Ambassador] Blaney, he really embraced it, he would champion it, he would call in people and say the US will support X, but won’t support it unless you sign this – they signed it and here comes the aid, several million dollars._

As a result of this coherent pressure, Janeh and other leaders agreed to the terms advanced by the UN that called for a comprehensive vetting, training and recruitment program. In the early stages of the process, the U.S. continued to maintain pressure by threatening to withdraw its support if Liberian leaders failed to adhere the terms of the agreement. The coherent and coordinated approach between the U.S. and the U.N. enabled a combination of effective bargaining and consensus-based decision-making with Liberian leaders. Yet as the process went on, declining coordination and involvement by the U.S. undermined leverage and trust.

5.4 Uneven Coordination and Declining Trust

Despite continued political fragmentation and financial dependence that favored external influence, growing coordination challenges among the U.N. and bilateral donors steadily undermined their influence over implementation. As the restructuring process progressed into implementation, conditions appeared favorable to external influence. The LURD largely

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292 Interview with former UN Police Commissioner Mark Kroeker, April 7, 2010.
disintegrated in the lead-up to the 2005 elections, and Janeh was appointed to the Supreme Court by the new government. The police force remained internally factionalized and its leadership remained dependent on external assistance. Police Director Beatrice Munah Sieh, who was appointed by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in early 2006, described the situation she found in the LNP at the start of her tenure:

“When I came in….I met all of the factions there. Everybody was doing their own thing. There was no chain of command, policies or manual. The UN was trying, but it was a power struggle, they were always fighting.”

As Director of Police operating in a fragmented environment with few resources, Munah Sieh felt compelled to rely on external assistance. She “wanted to deal with everybody since we were coming out of war, and we needed the training, we needed everything.” She therefore welcomed the support of UNPOL and other bilateral actors.

Yet the lack of coherence among UNPOL and bilateral actors eroded the police director’s confidence that they would help her address the challenges she faced, and contributed to a strained and often hostile relationship. U.S. support for the police quickly declined after the first two years of the mission. Although the U.S. government continued to provide financial resources, it provided fewer police officers to UNPOL who could facilitate communication between the LNP and the UNPOL director was no longer a U.S. citizen. Based on the notion that “the UN would be responsible for the Police, the U.S. for the military,” U.S. personnel shifted toward a lower level of engagement on the daily challenges of the restructuring process. Meanwhile, since the U.N. lacked its own source of financing, “all of the vehicles, stationary, office equipment and so forth came from different donors.” As coordination among numerous donors grew increasingly complex, UNPOL failed to ensure that various donor resources addressed a coherent set of

293 Interview with former LNP Director Beatrice Munah Sieh, Monrovia, February 10, 2010.
294 Interview with former LNP Director Beatrice Munah Sieh, Monrovia, February 10, 2010
296 Interview with Senior LNP Official, Monrovia, February 1, 2010.
objectives Liberian officials, and lacked its own resources to fill in the gaps. Liberian officials became increasingly frustrated with UNPOL’s inability to channel resources toward their priorities. As Johnson-Sirleaf’s first Ministry of Justice Philip Banks recalled:

“The unfortunate thing is that only [UNMIL] had equipment and facilities to work with — all of the records and computers were with UNMIL… I wanted them to help the police build that capacity, but they didn’t do it.”

Limited coherence within the UNPOL mission also contributed to frustration among rank and file police officers and strained relationships with foreign advisers. With little equipment of their own, LNP officers were forced to rely on UNPOL officers for basic logistics such as transportation, fuel and equipment, but they received inconsistent support from constantly rotating personnel. UNPOL’s tendency to promote conflicting approaches to core operational concepts like the use of force, arrest and investigation further sowed confusion and undermined trust. One LNP officer described the confusion created by these multiple approaches:

“Each instructor could teach his style of Drill. The U.S. would teach class 1. The Nepalese would teach class 2 … Every instructor would teach their way of cuffing, and so on. Everyone teaches his own way.”

The multitude of approaches, along with the pattern of rapid rotation that prevented advisers from establishing productive relationships with their counterparts, soon rendered UNPOL officers more of a hindrance than a help overall.

The UNPOL missions’ inability to effectively manage or share information further undermined mutual trust. LNP leaders struggling to assert their authority failed to receive the support they needed to monitor the factionalized force. UNPOL’s parallel information systems impeded access by Liberian officials to the crime data, performance data or monitoring reports

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297 Interview with former Minister of Justice Philip Banks, Monrovia, January 25, 2010.
298 One Liberian civil society remarked that “I visited a police station in 2006. They told me this is the way the guys in Fiji do it, this is how they do it in Haiti, it results in confusion.” Interview with Civil Society Activist, Monrovia, January 19, 2011.
299 Interview with Senior LNP Officer, Monrovia, February 20, 2010.
collected by UNPOL officers. Instead of helping Liberian leaders to overcome internal informational constraints or achieve control over their subordinates, UNPOL kept its crime database and monitoring systems confidential and refused to share it with the LNP. The leadership of UNPOL instead used the information to apply pressure through threats to de-certify individual officers. Meanwhile, LNP officers “looked at the [UNPOL] advisors as if they were spying on them.”

The increasingly confrontational relationship undermined trust and influence at all levels. On the one hand, LNP found it difficult to trust the constantly rotating UNPOL officers with contradictory approaches and who would not share information. For their part, lacking effective relationships, many UNPOL officers saw the force as full of former criminals and human rights abusers. The relationship grew increasingly confrontational, especially at the highest levels. As a senior UNPOL officer recalled:

“We struggled – due to the relationship between the Director and the Commissioner. The former Commissioner blamed us for having good relationships, he wanted us to fight on his behalf.”

This confrontational approach inhibited trust and poisoned relationships between UNPOL and LNP officers at all levels, and undermined the ability of UNPOL officers to influence their counterparts. As one senior officer put it:

“The [UNPOL Officers] used to come in, look at records, and leave. They were benefitting, but our people were not benefitting. People were being brought back in and put into the system. They were getting the report they wanted, but my people weren’t learning or developing…. They were writing policies, but the top [Liberian] police people were not involved. The new police would say yes, yes, yes, and then they would leave and it was over.”

As LNP officials came to feel that UNPOL would not help them address the severe challenges they were facing, they increasingly ignored them or rejected their advice, while turning toward other means to manage internal pressure.

300 Interview with UNPOL Advisor, Monrovia, February 2, 2010.
301 Interview with UNPOL Adviser, Monrovia, February 2, 2010.
302 Interview with former LNP Director Beatrice Munah Sieh, Monrovia, February 10, 2010.
The absence of trust played out most clearly in the vetting process that had been agreed upon between Liberian and international officials, and which was supposed to serve as the foundation for a more professional and responsive force. According to the agreement, every serving LNP officer would pass a background check for involvement in criminal activity, human rights abuse or war crimes, meet a set of medical, physical and educational standards, and go through a re-training program. UNPOL developed a detailed policy and managed all aspects of the vetting, recruitment and training programs. Yet the lack of trust among UNPOL and LNP officers undermined these processes. Limited resources prevented UNPOL from conducting as intensive a vetting process as the U.S. had conducted for the military, and forced them to rely on second-hand reports by the media and non-governmental organizations rather than first hand investigation. Limited trust among Liberian and U.N. officials impeded the vetting process since people with information refused to come forward. Constant rotation by UNPOL personnel undermined consistent decision-making, as applicants rejected by some UNPOL officers were accepted by others in order to speed up recruitment. The resulting inconsistencies in the results fueled perception among LNP officers that the process was being manipulated for political reasons, and further discouraged them from sharing information with UNPOL for fear of retribution. The persistence of factions within the LNP in turn fueled the perception among UNPOL officers that the LNP was full of criminals. As UNPOL officers systematically excluded LNP officers from the process, they perpetuated a cycle of mutual suspicion and mistrust, while factionalism deepened as individuals with known criminal or human rights abuse records nonetheless found their way into the force. One LNP officer described the role LNP officers played in the vetting process:

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305 According to LNP and UNPOL officers, the standards were increasingly ignored as they approached the deadline they had set for reaching the target number of 3,500 officers.
“During the initial recruitment, Liberians went with them, but were asked to wait while UNMIL did the background check. But [UNPOL officers] didn’t know the terrain…. Sometimes the LNP members helped, for example the personnel section brought the folders. Some were part of the recruitment process, but the trust was not there. UNMIL was under the impression that everyone was part of the crisis, and we didn’t share much information with them.”

Limited trust between Liberian and UN officials similarly interfered with the development of management systems within the LNP and the oversight capacity of the Ministry of Justice, the legislature and the public. Although the agreement between the U.N. and the Liberian government envisioned a significant U.N. role in re-writing policies and procedures, UNPOL’s efforts in this area were frequently rejected or ignored. Some of these failures stemmed from confusion, as UNPOL officers from various countries proposed conflicting models that undermined the development of unified procedures. More fundamentally, limited communication and mutual suspicion between Liberian and UNPOL officers led to hours of wasted effort by UNPOL officers who wrote policies that were rejected:

“For the operations and planning procedures, instead of building capacity of the LNP to draft and implement plans, UNPOL wrote them and tried to get them signed. The UN would write the plan, bring it to the IG, she would consult her advisors who would say ‘tell them no and reject it.’ So they would reject it…. The UN spent hours creating manuals and procedures. They are mostly used as doorstops.”

Even when new policies were officially adopted, UNPOL officers’ inability to develop sufficient confidence of LNP officers to influence their behavior encouraged LNP officers to ignore new policies and revert to previous practices. Most of the UNPOL officers assigned to the administrative departments, for example, were never given access to financial accounts, personnel records, logistics inventories and other crucial pieces of information, effectively rendering their presence irrelevant. Instead, control over finances, logistics and personnel were closely guarded by LNP officers in key positions, who allocated material resources through favored networks in

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306 Interview with Senior LNP Official, Monrovia, February 1, 2010.
307 Interview with UNPOL Advisor, Monrovia, January 22, 2010.
308 Interview with UNPOL Advisor, Monrovia, January 27, 2010.
order to build influence within the force, with little regard for actual needs or priorities.\textsuperscript{309} Calls by UNPOL officials for an audit of financial management within the LNP were repeatedly ignored.\textsuperscript{310}

Unable to rely on external actors for the support or information necessary to overcome factional pressure from within and outside the police force, Liberian leaders instead sought to shore up their own networks within the police. As a result, appointments were increasingly driven by politics and loyalty rather than merit, as the ruling party negotiated with various factions to secure their loyalty. Liberian leaders, including the Directors of Police, Ministers of Justice and the President, were accused of promoting and appointing officials out of personal or family loyalty, while they “sidelined competent people because they didn’t trust them.”\textsuperscript{311} Several officers maintained positions in the police despite having failed UN vetting,\textsuperscript{312} and senior police officials were appointed by the President despite credible allegations that they were involved in human rights abuse or criminal activity.\textsuperscript{313} The President and other top officials resisted pressure by the U.N., U.S. Embassy and the public to remove officials seen as lacking the competence to hold their positions.\textsuperscript{314} With limited access or influence over key decisions, international officials were left “scratching their heads” over appointments that clearly prioritized loyalty over competence.\textsuperscript{315} Such appointments exacerbated factionalism within the force as LNP officers at all levels remained suspicious of their own organization and sensitive to pressure from outside the force. As one LNP officer described, the failure of the U.N. to influence these appointments also affected morale within the force:

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\textsuperscript{309} Interview with senior LNP Officer, Monrovia, February 20, 2010.
\textsuperscript{310} Interview with UNPOL Advisor, Monrovia, January 22, 2010.
\textsuperscript{311} Interview with former LNP Official, Monrovia, January 16, 2010. This perception was widely held among LNP officials, international officials and other observers.
\textsuperscript{312} Interview with UNPOL Advisor, Monrovia, January 22, 2010.
\textsuperscript{313} The most controversial senior appointments included Paul Mulbah, former police director under Charles Taylor involved in numerous allegations of repression in human rights abuse, as well as a former member of the President’s personal security guard who had been accused of criminal misconduct. Mulbah was eventually removed after public outcry but re-hired as a “Special Security Adviser” to the police director.
\textsuperscript{314} Interview with UNPOL Advisor, Monrovia, January 22, 2010.
\textsuperscript{315} Interview with U.S. Embassy Official, Monrovia, January 26, 2010.
“UNMIL recommended that besides the Director, all other appointments should come within the promotion system. But the president decided to name deputies and assistant directors. UNMIL had disqualified some of them. This created morale problems, since people realized they couldn’t be promoted without political appointment. UNMIL couldn’t do anything about it, they have allowed the system to continue like this.”

5.5 Outcome: The LNP’s Partial Transformation

Despite significant influence early on, coordination challenges among external actors limited their influence over the police restructuring process, leading to a partial transformation. In the face of a highly fragmented environment and limited financial resources, Liberian leaders looked to external support to help rebuild the Liberian National Police. Early on, effective coordination between UNPOL and the U.S. Embassy enabled international officials to overcome resistance by factional leaders and define the terms of the restructuring process. This coherence quickly eroded, however, as internal organizations struggles emerged within the U.N the U.S. shifted its attention toward the military, and various donors pursued different priorities and approaches. For politically weak Liberian leaders struggling to assert control over a fragmented force, the inability of external actors to provide consistent support forced them to turn toward their own networks, and to allow domestic factions greater influence in exchange for political loyalty. Like the military, however, the outcomes of the process varied over time and across specific reforms, depending largely on the dependence of Liberian leaders on external actors for resources and information, and the ability of external actors to respond coherently.

5.5.1 Composition

The restructuring process significantly altered the LNP’s composition, although its implementation did not meet external standards. During the NTGL period, when UNPOL, the U.S. and other bilateral donors pursued a unified approach, they succeeded in achieving consensus with vulnerable leaders, while applying their leverage to overcome political oppositions by factional leaders. UNPOL designed and implemented a restructuring policy that required every individual

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316 Interview with senior LNP Official, Monrovia, February 1, 2010.
officer to be carefully vetted, to pass educational, physical and medical standards, and to undergo a training program prior to being accepted as a police officer.\textsuperscript{317} The vetting process removed 2,700 individuals due to allegations of involvement in crime and human rights abuse. Of the new 3,500-strong force, only 836 officers, or 25% of the force, remained from before the end of the war.\textsuperscript{318}

As the process advanced, however, failures in communication and limited trust among UN and LNP officials allowed individuals with criminal backgrounds or political ties back into the force, including at the senior levels. Reviews conducted by the Ministry of Justice and UNPOL found the process to be “seriously flawed.”\textsuperscript{319} Senior LNP officers remained convinced that because “a lot of people had information but wouldn’t come forward,” “the same people are in the system.”\textsuperscript{320} A subsequent vetting process conducted by U.S. officials to recruit officers for the elite Emergency Response Unit confirmed this suspicion, in finding that only 35% of LNP officers could pass their vetting standards.\textsuperscript{321} At the senior levels of the force, several individuals were appointed to leadership positions despite having failed to meet the vetting criteria. Especially among the top three ranks, political loyalty was prioritized over competence, leading to serious concerns for the management of the force. An assessment of the skills of senior managers conducted in 2010 found that only 10 out of 145 met the requirements for their position.\textsuperscript{322} According to the former Minister of Justice:

“At the senior level of the police the major concern was not inappropriate use of power, the concern was about competence of senior level management. If they had been competent, the problems would have been reduced.”\textsuperscript{323}


\textsuperscript{319} Interview with former Minister of Justice Philip Banks, Monrovia, January 25, 2010.

\textsuperscript{320} Interview with former LNP Director Beatrice Munah Sieh, Monrovia, February 10, 2010.

\textsuperscript{321} Interview with UNPOL Adviser, Monrovia, February 10, 2010.

\textsuperscript{322} Interview with UNPOL Office, Monrovia, January 16, 2011 and with LNP Officers, Monrovia, January 27, 2010.

\textsuperscript{323} Interview with former Minister of Justice Philip Banks, Monrovia, January 25, 2010.
The appointment of such officials not only weakened performance, it also undermined morale and discipline and contributed to factionalism within the force. As a result of increasing breakdown in trust, UNPOL and other donors exercised little influence over these appointments.

### 5.5.2 Civilian Oversight and Management

Efforts to strengthen civilian oversight and internal management achieved more limited success than the recruitment and vetting process. An attempt in 2007 to replace the 1975 Police Law with a new Security Law stalled in the face of political opposition – fueled in part by certain factions’ unwillingness to lose influence over individual forces or units. In the absence of revised legislation, UNPOL attempted to foster change through internal policy revisions, for instance by changing the rank structure to facilitate merit-based promotions. Yet as a result of discrepancies between these new procedures and the existing law, many of these efforts were ignored. Major procedures that were adopted due to UNPOL efforts were never implemented in practice. For example, despite a new promotion policy drafted by UNPOL, no promotions were conducted between 2003 and 2010.

The resulting vague and conflicting administrative procedures also hindered oversight by the Ministry of Justice and facilitated political pressure. Legislators and political appointees in the ministry exploited vague procedures to collude with LNP officers in the illicit distribution of resources and positions. In 2009, the Minister of Justice and LNP Director were publicly questioned before a session of Parliament when they could not account for vehicles and other equipment allocated to the force. At the same time, many legislators pressured LNP officials to

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324 The sticking points include provisions to merge some of the smaller law enforcement forces, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency and the National Bureau of Investigation into the LNP, which, in the absence of external support, have provided more latitude for politicized appointments and influence. A new Security Law was finally adopted in 2011.


protect their supporters from actions by law enforcement forces. As one senior LNP official explained:

“One of our major constraints is political pressure – from Cabinet Ministers, politicians, legislators, those in the hierarchy. Sometimes when you’re investigating a crime, someone calls you from the Mansion and tells you to relinquish the case. The officer is afraid and goes along with it. If he refuses, it’s a problem for him.”

Meanwhile, external actors generally failed to engage with legislators, civil society or other constituents regarding the restructuring process. The lack of communication inhibited trust, and preserved the confrontational relationship among the LNP, Liberian politicians and external actors.

5.5.3 Legal Limits and Discipline

The inability of UNPOL to monitor, manage information or gain the confidence of LNP officers also contributed to weak discipline throughout the LNP. Five years after the restructuring process began, despite its objective to enhance the professionalism of the force, observers were highlighting the lack of discipline as a central challenge facing the LNP. In the absence of a revised legal or procedural framework, LNP officers complained that they the lacked tools necessary to incentivize good performance or to discipline infractions. Absenteeism reached as high as 70% during the first five years following the end of the conflict. For more serious cases, UNPOL set up a Non-Compliance Unit, and encouraged UNPOL officers to monitor LNP officers and report cases through their own chain of command. Yet this parallel structure did little to enhance discipline within the force. The LNP’s own Professional Standards Division’s provided little relief for all but the most severe cases due to limited resources and little presence outside of Monrovia. Only in 2010, UNPOL began directing its resources toward supporting the Professional Standards Division, resulting in more routine cooperation between the Non-Compliance Unit and the Professional Standards Division, and “an increase…in the number of investigations into allegations

327 Interview with senior LNP Officer, Monrovia, February 8, 2010.
328 Interviews with LNP Officers in Gbarnga, Kakata, Saniquellie, Liberia, February 2010.
329 Interview with LNP Officer, Monrovia, February 2, 2010.
of crime or corruption against police officers.” At the most senior levels, however, officers were rarely subject to sanction, as they “would be prepared to go to the President, which they did on a number of occasions.” Having failed to build trust at the senior levels, UNPOL was generally been unable to engage at that level.

As a result, according to journalists, civil society activists and citizens interviewed around the country, the LNP has generally failed to address incidents of abuse or punish those responsible. A 2008 U.N. report noted that “disciplinary problems and misconduct have also raised concerns regarding low morale and demonstrated systemic weaknesses in command and control.” A 2008 national perception survey found that 67% of the population trusts the police “not at all” or “a little.” A set of surveys conducted in 2011 found that only 33% of the population believed that the police provide security to the public, while 43% of Liberians believed the LNP is corrupt, and 64% of Liberians believe they would have to pay for the police to investigate a crime. Another survey found that only 19% of crime victims report to the police, and of those who have, 56% report having paid for their services.

5.6 Prospects for the LNP

Although the weakness of Liberian leaders created an opening for external influence over the police restructuring process, the inability on the part of external actors to respond coherently or credibly limited that influence. While poor coordination overall contributed to limited trust and

331 Interview with former Minister of Justice Philip Banks, Monrovia, January 25, 2010.
334 When asked who provides security, 49% of the population responded either “nobody” or “ourselves.” These results were consistent across Monrovia and more rural areas. Patrick Vinck, Phuong Pham, and Tino Kreutzer. “Talking Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes About Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia.” (Berkeley: University of California Human Rights Center, 2011).
336 Vinck et al, “Talking Peace.”
undermined influence, pockets of deeper transformation indicate the potential for influence with sufficient coherence. In addition to the early leverage that led to agreement on the restructuring plan, more effective coordination among the U.S., UNPOL and other donors led to greater influence. For instance, the U.S. prioritized the development of an Emergency Response Unit to respond quickly to high threat situations. The U.S. Embassy devoted significant resources, helped to coordinate other actors, and worked closely with counterparts through a committee that negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding to define the structure and standards for the unit. As the Minister of Justice at the time described, “The US had funding, they insisted on their own trainers, and got involved in it, so we worked closely with them to set up guidelines and process.”

Over time, U.S. and other bilateral donor officials took further steps to engage with leaders and repair poor relationships. After LNP Director Muneh Sieh was embroiled in a scandal that revealed her lack of control over her own force, the U.S. Embassy sent retired senior U.S. law enforcement officials to serve as personal advisers to the Police Director and other top LNP officials. These advisers were specifically tasked with “fortifying management capacity” and “establishing trust” as a basis for a more productive relationship. The U.K. government sponsored a retreat for Liberian and UN officials in late 2008 aimed at developing a common strategic vision and plan for the LNP to overcome coordination challenges. These and other steps slowly increased confidence in external support. After five years of poor relationships and growing factionalism within the force, however, it would take much longer to re-build confidence and overcome these challenges.

337 Interview with former Minister of Justice Philip Banks, Monrovia, January 25, 2010.
338 Sieh was put on three month probation after sparking an gunfight between officers of the LNP and the Seaport Police in July 2007, and a subsequent board of inquiry recommending her dismissal.
339 Interview with UNPOL Adviser, Monrovia, January 22, 2010.
340 Interview with UNPOL Adviser, Monrovia, January 27, 2010.
6. Conclusion

The post-conflict police and military restructuring processes in Liberia illustrate the dynamics of state-building under conditions of extreme political weakness. A highly fragmented political environment with revenue sources dispersed under the control of powerful factions left Liberian leaders extremely vulnerable, and forced them to incorporate rivals and reach out to external sources of support. Under these conditions, the presence of a nearly 17,000-person UN peacekeeping mission and the commitment of funds by several donors helped weak Liberian leaders to consolidate their authority. Gyude Bryant, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and members of their governments used security, financial and political backing from external actors to overcome domestic political pressure and strengthen state institutions. In the security sector, external support enabled the ministers of defense and justice to take controversial decisions to adopt merit-based recruitment, transparent decision-making, enforcement of legal limits, and other mechanisms that would limit political or factional pressure over the military and police forces.

Compliance with these decisions, however, depended on the responsiveness of external actors to help manage factional pressures as they continued to arise. When external actors provided flexible and responsive support, Liberian leaders relied on their assistance and allowed them the access they needed to influence the restructuring process. The commitment by the U.S. Government and strong relationships with its officials enabled Liberian defense officials to implement controversial decisions regarding the composition, oversight structure and governance of the AFL. Coordination challenges among UNPOL and bilateral donors to the police undermined the utility of their assistance to Liberian leaders struggling to control a factionalized force. As external influence over the police declined, reforms that were agreed to early on were poorly implemented in practice.
The Liberian case demonstrates that the impact of external resources on post-conflict state-building depends not only on the amount of resources, coordination of external actors, or intensity of the conflict, as previous scholars have argued. Instead, it results from the interaction of external and domestic actors within the constraints of political conditions that affect their receptivity to external support. When external support responds directly to domestic challenges, opportunities for influence arise. Only then do the amount and coordination resources enable greater impact.

The case study further highlights the central role of trust in enabling consensus and norm diffusion that is poorly captured in accounts of post-conflict intervention that focus on filling capacity gaps or exerting leverage. In the Liberian context of fragmented politics and dispersed resources, the deepest external influence emerged not from threats to withhold resources, but from commitments to provide it, and from external actors’ responsiveness in addressing sources of domestic weakness. External influence emerged from efforts by external actors took the time to understand domestic constraints, to share information, communicate, build relationships and respond to the needs of local officials. Where external actors adopted a more confrontational approach, and sought to use information and resources to build their leverage – as the UNPOL did at times with the police – rather than help manage domestic challenges, their advice was rejected and ignored as leaders sought other means to address the challenges they faced. The story of security sector transformation in Liberia is thus one of forging mutually beneficial relationships based on mutual dependence, frequent communication and information-sharing, and a high level of trust. Negotiation and threats were useful at times, especially when dealing with leaders whose interests diverged with those of the ruling party. To influence a fragmented ruling party with dispersed revenue, however, external actors were best served by adopting a cooperative, relationship-building approach.
The successes and failures of external donor programs in Liberia also highlight the significant challenges and tensions facing external actors who see to promote institutional change in post-conflict states. Although Liberia may have been highly conducive to external influence, the fragmented political environment also generated numerous obstacles to reform. The level of long-term commitment and responsiveness required to overcome the challenges of these environments is rarely achieved for donors driven by short-term objectives, constantly rotating personnel, and shifting priorities. As domestic leaders depend on external support, they are likely to face increased challenges in sustaining reforms as donor support declines. The U.S. approach to the AFL began with the notion that “in five years the U.S. does everything, then hands over the best 2,000 man force in Africa.”341 This hands-on approach enabled Liberian leaders and U.S. officials to work together to overcome domestic pressure, while allowing only a few compromises to the U.S. vision of the new force. But the “Cadillac force,” as it is known by some Liberians, remains highly dependent on U.S. support both financially and politically. The failure to engage with the legislature or other elements of civil society have limited broader civilian oversight and left the AFL especially vulnerable to domestic political pressure as U.S. support declines. On the other hand, efforts of LNP officials to “build the ship while sailing it,”342 forced it to contend with various pressures throughout its development, resulting in compromises and factional influence that undermined transformation but may have left it less reliant on external actors. Donor support for both the LNP and AFL therefore raises questions about the sustainability of external reforms under even the best conditions, and what changes might be required – including in the political context itself – for reforms to take root.

341 Interview with U.S. Embassy Official, Monrovia, January 19, 2011.
342 Interview with UNPOL Adviser, Monrovia, February 2, 2011.
CHAPTER V

THE POLITICS OF FEAR:
POLICE AND DEFENSE REFORM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Seven years after the end of the Bosnian Civil War, the international community’s state-building efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared to be in crisis. With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) in December 1995, the country emerged from a brutal war between Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs that left roughly 100,000 dead, over 2 million displaced, and a population traumatized by massive human rights abuses.343 The conflict led to one of the largest peacebuilding interventions ever conducted, involving 60,000 international troops and over $5 billion dollars in aid. Multilateral and bilateral actors including NATO, the European Union the OSCE, the United States and several other countries devoted considerable attention to restructuring the police, military and intelligence forces. Yet they struggled to overcome factionalism and division within these forces, in the face of persistent opposition to reforms by the nationalist parties. By 2002, reform efforts appeared headed toward failure after a short-lived, moderate political coalition replaced by ruling parties on all sides of the ethnic divide that were most opposed to the reforms. As international resources declined and opposition remained strong, observers pronounced that they had reached the end of international efforts to keep Bosnia whole.344

Over the next five years, however, external assistance to the security sector contributed to a mixed set of outcomes, including one of the most successful reforms of the post-Dayton era, as well

as one of its major failures. An effort to restructure the defense sector led to the abolishment of separate armed forces and unification under one, multi-ethnic authority. A similar effort focused on the police failed to centralize authority over the police or reduce the control of local political factions. This mixed outcome raises two core questions. First, how did external assistance achieve major reform objectives for the armed forces despite declining resources and political hostility? Second, why did they succeed for the armed forces but fail for the police?

I argue that this mixed outcome can be explained by variations in the level of political cohesion among the ruling parties and their relationships to the security forces. Following the war, as state authorities became increasingly dependent on external financial support, authority nonetheless remained concentrated under the control of ethnically-defined nationalist parties opposed to any reform that might dilute their authority over the security forces. In the defense sector, a split between civilian and military leaders created an opening for external influence as vulnerable leaders sought external support to manage the threat of a military they did not fully control. With external actors unified in support of pushing Bosnia toward NATO accession, they responded with coordinated and credible assistance. This combination of internal fragmentation and external unity enabled the development of sufficient communication and trust to achieve consensus on difficult compromises, and generated the leverage external actors needed to persuade opponents to accept them. In the police sector, despite the incentives of EU accession and coordinated external support, links between nationalist parties and local police forces remained strong and deepened following the defense reform. As cohesive parties grew stronger, they not only blocked efforts to restructure the police, they also undermined the implementation of defense reforms, leading to partial transformation of the military and limited transformation of the police.

Through a comparison of the military and police in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on the period from 2002-2007, this chapter demonstrates the impact of variations in the cohesion of ruling parties in the context of dispersed revenue. It also sheds light on the causal mechanisms through which aid affects state-building outcomes in post-conflict environments. The remainder of the chapter proceeds in four sections. In the next section, I describe the state of the military and police forces in Bosnia at the end of the war to establish the baseline for the analysis. The second section describes the conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including political cohesion, increasing revenue dependence and a coordinated international community that shaped the evolution of the security forces. In the following two sections, I describe how these conditions affected relationships among external actors and domestic leaders and shaped negotiations on the structure of military and the police forces. For each force, I show how evolving local conditions created pressures on decision-makers and affected opportunities for external actors to develop trust and exert leverage over local officials. For each force, I conclude with a description of the state of the security force at the end of this period to characterize the outcome of reform efforts.

1. The Bosnian Police and Military Forces after Dayton

At the end of the civil war, the security sector was deeply divided among the three main parties to the conflict, each of which controlled its own security forces. The Constitution adopted as part of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) in 1995 divided the country into two Entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), with a weak State government unifying the two Entities. The FBiH was further divided into ten Cantons and the autonomous Brecko District that was established in 1997. The RS was dominated both

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346 The Constitution of BiH was adopted as Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995.
347 The FBiH Constitution, which was adopted in 1994 as part of the Washington Agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, divided the FBiH into ten cantons. The Breko District was established in 1997 as a result
demographically and politically by ethnic Serbs, while either ethnic Croats or Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims controlled each Canton. The military and police forces reflected this system of ethnically-based division. Each of the two Entities maintained its own military force, and thirteen separate police forces operated across the ten Cantons, two Entities and autonomous district. The security forces served as nationalist symbols for each ethnic group, and helped to provide a sense of security against perceived threats from the other ethnic groups. The forces also served as a locus of informal political control by the ethnically-based political parties that controlled each canton and entity.

1.1. The Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Under the terms of the Dayton Accords, each of Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups maintained control of the militaries they had controlled during the war. In the lead-up to the war, the Bosnian contingents of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) split along ethnic lines and formed three separate forces, the Serb Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS), the Croat Defense Council (HVO) and the Bosniak Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). The Serb VRS and Croat HVO maintained close linkages to the militaries in Belgrade and in Zagreb, respectively, which provided weapons, equipment, finances and logistical support. The ARBiH, which lacked a close external sponsor, relied heavily on informal smuggling networks for weapons and supplies. As a result, it remained more decentralized, comprised of a “multiplicity of local armed forces, each governed by a different combination of political elements” at the local level. All three forces worked closely with militias and paramilitary forces like the Croat Zebras, the Serb White Eagles, of international arbitration over a disputed section of the boundary between the two entities, and placed under international supervision.

348 The main exceptions were the Brcko District, which was ethnically mixed but remained under the authority of an international supervisor, and two cantons within the Federation, Mostar and Travnik and were split demographically but had separate administrations each dominated by one of the two main ethnic groups in the area.


Arkán’s Tigers, and the Bosniak Green Berets that ran their own smuggling, organized crime and commercial activities and committed some of the worst atrocities of the war. The armies in post-conflict Bosnia emerged directly from these wartime forces.

1.1.1. Composition and Structure

Following the signing of the DPA, the three military structures remained largely intact, each one ethnically homogeneous and led by wartime generals. In the RS, the VRS maintained its wartime structure and chain of command, as VRS officers continued to receive salaries and direction from JNA headquarters in Belgrade. In the FBiH, a loose alliance between the ARBiH and HVO that had evolved during the war was formalized through the merger of the two forces into the Army of the FBiH (VFBiH). A U.S.-run “Train and Equip” program attempted to integrate the Bosniak and Croat components of the VFBiH through common training and doctrine. Yet the two components maintained separate structures and chains of command within the joint force.

The composition of the forces reflected these divisions. The personnel inherited by each of three forces were ethnically homogeneous and poorly trained, many having been conscripted during the war. Although the forces were downsized following the war from 264,500 in the VFBiH and 154,000 in the VRS to 55,000 and 56,000 respectively in 1996, the ethnic composition and leadership remained unchanged. Those with the strongest nationalist credentials tended to remain, ensuring

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353 The VFBiH was established by the Washington Agreement in March 1994.
357 This downsizing was required by the DPA under Annex 1B.
a strong ethnic identity within the force. Senior leaders, many of who had been involved in human rights abuses, maintained close ties to the dominant political parties.

1.1.2. Civilian Oversight

The legal regimes in both Entities formally provided for limited oversight by civilian authorities, while involvement of military leaders in political parties politicized the governance of the forces in practice. The Dayton Constitution granted the Entities complete authority to maintain and deploy their own armies, under the command of the Entity presidents as commanders-in-chief. Separate Entity defense laws granted a range of powers to the Entity ministries of defense to organize policy, planning, supplies, equipment and recruitment of personnel, and to Entity parliaments to approve military financing, defense plans, senior appointments and the use of force. In the RS these provisions were contained in a Law on the Army for the VRS that was updated following the war, but still reflected Yugoslav area concentration of power with the executive. In the FBiH, Croat and Bosniak forces were formally governed by separate laws that had not been updated, and that referred to structures that no longer existed. At the State level, a Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) was established to “coordinate the activities of the armed forces,” which translated into mere information-sharing in practice. Across entity lines, the VFBiH and VRS had little direct contact other than in meetings of the SCMM that were directed by international forces.

In practice, civilian oversight was concentrated among party leaders as it had been since before the war, and neither the ministries nor the legislatures exercised substantial oversight. The Entity presidents exercised almost exclusive authority over the forces, while political party networks

360 Constitution of BiH, Article V.
361 Maxwell, “From Three Armies to One,” 4.
and defense authorities continued to exert influence through informal channels. In the RS, military officers maintained close political and financial ties to the ruling SDS party that had led the Serb war effort, while continuing to receive their salaries from Belgrade. In the FBiH, Croat officers received financial support from the Croatian government in Zagreb and direction from the HDZ party that dominated politics in the areas under Croat control. The Bosniak forces were dominated by members of the ruling SDA party, although as a result of their fragmented structure many units remained loyal to local warlords associated with one of the other main parties, the SBiH and the SDP. Senior appointment and resource allocation were driven by party leaders, and military budgets stayed off the books. Supplies were mostly acquired through informal arrangements with local businesses that allowed soldiers access to food, fuel, equipment in exchange for protection. These arrangements also benefited party leaders and cemented their authority and access to revenue. While 25% of each Entity’s budget was swallowed up by the military, most funds disappeared into party networks. As a result, equipment aged, pay to the lower ranks was withheld, conscripts were often sent home without pay, and morale steadily deteriorated.

1.1.3. Enforcement of Legal Limits

The predominance of informal arrangements also undermined discipline within the forces. After the war, military personnel and informal militias continued to participate in politically motivated violence, including forced evictions and targeted assassinations. Military officers from all three ethnic groups were involved in lucrative smuggling networks tied to weapons industry in

364 World Bank “From Aid Dependency to Fiscal Self-Reliance,” 50.
365 41% of Federation budget, 20% of the consolidated Federation budget (including cantons and municipalities) and 26% of RS budget was spent on the military. World Bank, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Expenditure Review,” Report No. 17161-BIH (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997).
neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{367} Although the most egregious human rights violations declined under the supervision of NATO forces, standards of conduct and disciplinary procedures remained obsolete and rarely enforced. According to NATO and OSCE observers, the Entity laws on defense and on military service “do not provide for adequate democratic control of the military nor provide controls to ensure that authorities fulfill their constitutional and legal responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{368} Regulations were rarely enforced, and most soldiers, including large numbers of conscripts and reserves, operated under limited or absent supervision. The general lack of discipline reflected overall military governance driven by political rather than military priorities. As one NATO official noted, “the two armies settled into peacetime existences characterized by limited funding, limited training, poorly maintained equipment and infrastructure, little credible operational capability, a lack of transparency in defence funding, and – within the VF – de facto separate organizations and chains of command for Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats.”\textsuperscript{369}

1.2. The Bosnian Police Forces

The police forces were also divided and tied to nationalist political parties. The police had actively participated in the civil war, including in combat against other ethnic groups, in smuggling weapons and humanitarian supplies, and in committing atrocities. Following the war, each of the country’s thirteen jurisdictions established its own police forces that managed all aspects of law enforcement within its territory. These forces responded more to informal political directives than formal authority, and rarely cooperated across ethnic lines.

1.2.1. Composition and Structure

The police forces were comprised largely of former fighters and individuals with links to the dominant ethno-nationalist political parties. As members of the armed forces and militias were

\textsuperscript{367} Andreas, “Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace.” This smuggling came to light as a result of the Orao Affair, described below.
\textsuperscript{368} Defense Reform Commission (DRC), “The Path to Partnership to Peace,” 83.
\textsuperscript{369} Maxwell, “From Three Armies to One,” 4.
demobilized at the end of the war, many “swapped their camouflage-type uniforms for blue ones and joined the police forces.” Recruitment into the police and promotion through the ranks was based primarily on affiliation with wartime networks and political elites rather than law enforcement experience or qualification. As a result, each force was dominated by the majority ethnic group in its jurisdiction, with the exception of Mostar and Travnik, where separate, ethnically homogeneous police forces operated under a divided local administration. The absorption of fighters into the police forces resulted in bloated forces totaling 45,000 officers, nearly three times the number of officers per citizen than other European countries.

1.2.2. Civilian Oversight

Authority over the police forces was exercised primarily by local political parties, reflecting the legacy of civil war and one-party rule. In Yugoslavia, the police had formed part of the Ministry of Interior (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova or MUP), which merged law enforcement, intelligence and repressive functions under the direction of the ruling party. Following the war, each Entity and Canton created its own MUP, based on their authority under the Dayton Constitution for “maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies.” Most of them adopted Yugoslav-era procedures that concentrated authority for appointing personnel, defining budgets and controlling operations in the hands of the minister. As a result, local political parties exercised complete control over the

371 The one other exception was Breko, where multi-ethnic institutions remained under the direct authority of an international supervisor.
372 The number of police personnel at the end of the war in Bosnia translated into roughly 1 police personnel for 100 inhabitants, compared to 1 police personnel for 220 inhabitants in Slovenia, 1 for 257 in Hungary, and 1 for 300 in Germany. ICPMD, “Financial Organisational and Administrative Assessment of the BiH Police Forces and the State Border Service: Final Assessment Report,” Sarajevo, 30 June 2004, 59.
373 Constitution of BiH, Article VIII
374 The 1996 Federation of BiH Law on Internal Affairs gives the minister control over virtually all functions and procedures in the FBiH MUP. Article 24 states, inter alia, that the minister can “decide on the resources for the work of the Ministry” and “on the rights and duties of Ministry employees.”
police.\textsuperscript{375} In 1997, the U.S. General Accounting Office reported that “the primary problem in reforming police is that political leaders of all three ethnic groups continue to use police as a means of furthering their political aims.”\textsuperscript{376}

The division of the police into thirteen autonomous forces also inhibited cooperation across Canton and Entity lines. Police officers who had fought each other during the war refused to cooperate on day-to-day law enforcement issues, and legal differences between thirteen separate criminal procedure codes made prosecution across these boundaries virtually impossible. Criminals could evade arrest simply by driving from one Canton or Entity to another.\textsuperscript{377} Although the State government was mandated to take on transnational law enforcement issues such as “immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation, international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement,” it lacked its own forces or the authority to induce coordination among local forces.\textsuperscript{378}

\subsection*{1.2.3. Enforcement of Legal Limits}

Close ties between police and local political parties also resulted in frequent human rights abuses, corruption and indiscipline. As military forces were demobilized, local polices forces were “filled with demobilized soldiers loyal to local political forces,” and incidents of violence committed by the police increased.\textsuperscript{379} A 1998 UN report cited over 900 such cases of “direct abuses by the police” as well as “local police negligence in responding to crimes against minorities” that were under investigation.\textsuperscript{380} Many of these crimes were politically motivated, including “beating of individuals at the time of arrest, and torture and ill-treatment during interrogation, with individuals

\textsuperscript{378} Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article III.
\textsuperscript{379} ESI, “Reshaping International Priorities,” 6.
frequently targeted for their political opinions,” as well as targeting of minorities and preventing returns to their communities. Police officers were also involved in illicit smuggling and extortion networks liked to the ruling party in their jurisdictions. In December, 1996, the United Nations reported that “most of the violations of human rights which occur in Bosnia and Herzegovina (by some estimates as many as 70 per cent) are the work of the police forces of the Entities themselves.” Although the UN tried to monitor and sanction such abuses, mutually supportive relationships between the police and local political leaders often obstructed investigation or sanctions for such incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
<th>Police Forces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition</strong></td>
<td>Divided into two separate Entity armies; ethnically homogeneous and dominated by nationalist leaders</td>
<td>Divided into thirteen local forces, mostly ethnically homogeneous, dominated by former fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian Oversight</strong></td>
<td>Weak formal oversight at entity level; Informal control by external patrons and nationalist parties</td>
<td>Political control by Ministries at local level; Influence of nationalist parties over personnel, budgets and operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Limits</strong></td>
<td>Obsolete regulations, and political influence; declining human rights abuse but low discipline and professionalism</td>
<td>Frequent politically motivated human rights abuse; Political influence undermines discipline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 14: Status of the Bosnian Police and Military Forces after Dayton

2. Conditions for State-Building in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina

The evolution of the police and military from this baseline reflected the dominance of cohesive parties that sought to preserve their authority despite growing dependence on an increasingly unified group of external actors. The Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war also strengthened the authority of the ethnically defined, nationalist political parties that had led the fighting by granting them control over separate Entities and Cantons. The demographic dominance

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383 ESI, “Reshaping International Priorities,”6
385 Human Rights Watch, “Beyond Restraint.”
of most of these jurisdictions by one ethnic group, along with favorable electoral rules and a system of ethnic vetoes, helped to preserve their power at the local and State levels. Over time, however, governments grew increasingly dependent on external financial support, especially as socialist and wartime financial structures were dismantled, parties lost control over local revenue sources, and the economy failed to recover. The resulting dependence along with the movement toward EU and NATO accession enabled an increasingly unified group of donors coordinated by the Office of the High Representative to try to influence the governance structure. As the OHR sought to reduce factional control and centralize government functions in the central State, its influence would depend largely on the cohesion of political parties at a given time and for a given institution.

2.1 Political Cohesion: the Dominance of Ethnic Politics

Cohesive nationalist parties rooted in ethnic identity dominated politics in post-war Bosnia. The Dayton Constitution reinforced ethnic cleavages by devolving governing authority to regions that had become ethnically homogeneous as a result of ethnic cleansing during the war. Since electoral boundaries were drawn around these regions, as shown in Figure 8, ethno-nationalist parties succeeded in entrenching their power in the Cantons and Entities where their ethnic group constituted the majority. In the State government a complex consociational system guaranteed representation to each of three ethnically-defined “constituent peoples” through separate voting, proportional representation, seats allocated by ethnicity, and veto power.

The political salience of ethnic identity was also rooted in the lack of trust among the members of the three main ethnic groups – many of whom had suffered atrocities at the hands of

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387 This system that allocated seats to “constituent peoples” has been challenged in the European Court of Human Rights for excluding minority ethnic groups. For an elaboration of the electoral rules and their effects, see Roberto Belloni, "Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina," International Peacekeeping 11 (2004).
another group during the war. Suspicion and mistrust were especially prevalent in areas where different ethnic groups interacted most frequently.\textsuperscript{388} Most Bosnians continued to define themselves primarily according to their ethnic rather than common identity, and policies seen as favorable to one ethnic group were inevitably perceived as threatening by others.\textsuperscript{389}

This combination of electoral rules and mutual fear ensured that ethnically-defined politics dominated.\textsuperscript{390} Voters expressed overwhelming support for parties that favored ethnically-based approaches,\textsuperscript{391} and politicians were consistently re-elected “by appealing only to the voters from their own ethnic group, and had no incentive to moderate their behavior and act cooperatively.”\textsuperscript{392} Each cycle of elections was accompanied by a rise in ethnically charged rhetoric, which consistently succeeded in mobilizing votes.\textsuperscript{393} Given the effectiveness of ethnic affiliation as a mobilizing tool, leading party leaders sought to preserve the rules that enabled their parties to keep an electoral edge.

\textsuperscript{388} In a 2003 survey focused on inter-ethnic trust found low levels of trust, with the lowest levels of trust in the most ethnically heterogeneous areas. Peter Håkansson and Fredrik Sjöholm, “Who do you trust? Ethnicity and Trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” \textit{Europe-Asia Studies} 59, no. 6 (2007), 968.

\textsuperscript{389} A majority of 57\% saying that “above all they are either Bosniak, Croat or Serb” rather than “citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Oxford Research International, \textit{The Silent Majority Speaks} (Sarajevo: UNDP, 2000), 49. This is broadly consistent with the results of other surveys, see for example United Nations Development Program, \textit{Early Warning System: Bosnian and Herzegovina, Annual Report 2002} (Sarajevo: UNDP, 2002), 10; United Nations Development Program, \textit{Early Warning System: Bosnian and Herzegovina, Annual Report 2008} (Sarajevo: UNDP, 2008), 64.

\textsuperscript{390} Belloni, “Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering.”

\textsuperscript{391} Public opinion polls conducted since the war have consistently found both overwhelming support for integration into Europe and the West, and sizable support for ethno-religious politics. A 2009 survey by Oxford Research International measured the former at 71\% and the latter at 45\%. Oxford Research International, \textit{The Silent Majority Speaks}, 49.

\textsuperscript{392} Belloni “Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering,” 338.

As a result, parties rooted in a cohesive, ethnically-defined base have consistently dominated politics at all levels of government. Table 15 displays the results of elections for the State National Assembly where voting is separated by Entity.\footnote{One third of the seats in the National Assembly are reserved for voters in the RS and two thirds are reserved for voters in FBiH.} In the RS, the SDS party that led the war effort was initially challenged only by more extreme nationalist parties like the SRS. In the Federation, the SDA party took the largest share of Bosniak votes, under the leadership of Alija Izetbegovic who was considered the leading wartime hero. The more fragmented structure of the Bosniak military nonetheless enabled parties led by other local warlords, including the Bosniak Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) and the multi-ethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP), to maintain a share of power.\footnote{ESI, “Reshaping International Priorities,” 14} In majority-Croat cantons, the Croat HDZ party created a shadow government called the Republic of Herceg Bosna with support from the hardline government in Croatia. Officials who
were seen to be cooperating too much with other ethnicities or with the international community were replaced or marginalized.\textsuperscript{396}

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<td>FBIH</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>FBIH</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>FBIH</td>
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<td>KCD\textsuperscript{397}</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBiH</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
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<td>HDZ</td>
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<td>HDZ-1990</td>
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<td>SDS</td>
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<td>Sloga</td>
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<td>SNSD</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRS-RS</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPRS</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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Table 15: Share of Parliamentary Seats in the BiH National Assembly, 1996-2006 (Source: Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

When brief periods of relative moderation occurred, they were inevitably followed by a swing among voters back toward the nationalist end of the spectrum, demonstrating to politicians that ethnic politics remained crucial to maintaining power. A change of electoral rules in 1998 and 2000 gave an edge to more moderate parties that had previously served in the opposition. In the RS, the SLOGA coalition led by the SNSD party rose to power with the backing of external powers. In the Federation the multi-ethnic SDP party formed the Alliance for Change coalition that was brokered by external actors. By 2002, however, both of these coalitions had fallen apart and the nationalist parties, including the SDA and SDS, were returned to power.\textsuperscript{398} Following the 2006 elections, the SNSD finally defeated the SDS, but its victory and persistent hold on power since then

\textsuperscript{396} Ibid, 9
\textsuperscript{397} The KCD was a coalition of the SDA and SBiH party that formed for the 1998 election.
was based on a solidly nationalist stance. In the Federation, the SBiH party that led the government after 2006 similarly took a turn toward nationalist politics. As Singer has noted, “creating the horizontal networks of cooperation between ethnic groups will not be possible until the vertical networks of control within each group are broken.”

2.2 Dispersed Revenue and Donor Dependence

The composition of revenue sources grew increasingly dispersed during the post-war period. Although Bosnia had served as the industrial heartland of Yugoslavia, the collapse of its economy during the war left it dependent on external support. In 1996 grants from external donors accounted for 22.7% of GDP and 30% of government revenue. Yet local political parties initially retained discretionary control over revenue through socialist-era financial structures and illicit commercial activities. Substantial support from Serbia and Croatia flowed directly to nationalist political parties and remained off the books. The dominant party in each ethnic community also controlled economic activity through the Yugoslav-era payment bureau system, which had split along ethnic lines during the war. The payment bureaus controlled financing, managed the payment of salaries, withheld fees and taxes, and collected the payroll tax which was the largest source of revenue. A study conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1999 found that the payment bureaus were still being used by political parties to “penetrate every aspect of economic life,” by controlling access to credit, licensing and other means.

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399 This turn toward a more nationalist stance is described in greater detail in the section on police reform, below.
401 World Bank “From Aid Dependence to Fiscal Self-Reliance,” 18.
402 Ibid.
403 The three payment bureaus were the SPP, which was linked to the Serb payment system in Belgrade, the Bosniak ZPP and Croat ZAP that were nominally unified but operated as separate payments systems in practice. See ESI, “Reshaping International Priorities,” 5; See also USAID, Payments Bureaus in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Obstacles to Development and a Strategy for Orderly Transformation (Washington, DC: USAID, 1999), 25.
404 World Bank 2002
to restrict economic opportunities to favored clients.\textsuperscript{405} Ruling parties also controlled wide networks of state-owned and private economic activities, including public utilities, social services, banks and state-owned enterprises.\textsuperscript{406} They also participated in tax evasion and smuggling operations in partnerships with organized crime groups that had developed to procure weapons and humanitarian supplies during the war.\textsuperscript{407} A 2000 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that these networks remained intact, and that “political parties are now inseparable from criminal organizations.”\textsuperscript{408} Despite the official cost to the government - loss to the budget totaled $136 million annually for the Republika Srpska alone\textsuperscript{409} - the discretionary revenue and political capital generated through these networks enabled politicians to build and maintain their authority.\textsuperscript{410}

Over time, however, the end of this revenue system left governments increasingly dependent on official revenue. In 1999, a USAID project dismantled the payment bureaus and replaced them with a streamlined treasury and financial management system that increased the revenue authority of the State.\textsuperscript{411} The new system forced officials to reconcile all revenues and expenditures through a single account in each Canton and Entity, and significantly reduced their discretion over expenditures. After the system was adopted in 2002, the FBiH finance ministry reported that the system had helped to save about $14 million in expenditures, and similar savings were realized in the Republika Srpska and the State.\textsuperscript{412} External actors also cracked down on smuggling and customs evasion through the European Union’s Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office to Bosnia (CAFAO),

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\textsuperscript{405} USAID, “Payments Bureaus in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8. For a description of the Payment Bureau system, see also ESI, “Reshaping International Priorities,” 5; Timothy Donais, The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia. (Routledge, 2005), 17.

\textsuperscript{406} ESI 1999, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{407} Smuggling was essential to procuring weapons, equipment and humanitarian supplies in contravention of sanctions during the war. See Andreas, “Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace,” 76; Donais Political Economy of Peacebuilding, 74.


\textsuperscript{409} Ibid, 41.

\textsuperscript{410} Andreas, “Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace,”, p. 84


\textsuperscript{412} Ibid.
and the international Stabilization Force (SFOR) conducted a series of raids on enterprises accused of involvement in criminal activities linked to the HDZ, the SDA and SDS. Bosnian Croat and Serb politicians also lost the support of external patrons in Croatia and Serbia, especially after the death of Croat President Franjo Tudjman in 1999, and the departure President Slobodan Milosevic from Serbia in 2000.

By 2002, almost all revenue was being collected through official channels, much of it provided by Western donors. In 1999 grants from western donors still made up 20% of the revenue for each Entity government. In the absence of informal sources of revenue, Canton, Entity and State governments were forced to rely on funding from Western donors as they faced severe budget deficits that rose to 10% of GDP between 1996 and 2000. By 2002, economic growth slowed to under 5% from a high of 86% in 1996 due to a regional economic downturn. Reduced tax revenue combined with the financing requirements of sprawling system of unemployment benefits and transfers to war veterans severely strained entity budgets. Politicians did manage to maintain some control over local funds through the control and sale of state-owned enterprises that brought infusions of cash into Entity coffers. In 2006, for example, the RS government generated nearly $1 billion in revenue through the sale of Telekom Srpskes and a state-owned refinery. Only 42%

413 Most notable was the SFOR raid on Mostar-based Herzegovacka-Banka linked to the HDZ, along with similar operation on SDA and SDS activities. See Donais, The Political Economy of Peacebuilding, 76.
414 Support from Serbia had already begun to decline as a result of worsening relations between the leading parties in Serbia and the RS.
417 Ibid, 11.
418 Donais, The Political Economy of Peacebuilding.
419 Among the more notorious examples were the sales of the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo to a businessman linked to the Bosniak SDA party for a fraction of its value, and of the Mostar Aluminum Company to loyalists of the Croat HDZ party. Donais, The Political Economy of Peacebuilding, 118. Privatization was also manipulated through a voucher system that allowed ruling parties to distribute disproportional shares to war veterans and other party loyalists and bought other shares from impoverished citizens for as little as 3% of their value. GAO “Bosnia Peace Operation,” 31.
of large enterprises had been privatized by 2008, and those that had been sold had generated revenue for the Entity governments. Despite these occasional sales, however, with tax collection increasingly centralized and illicit sources of revenue constrained, governments remained highly dependent on financing from external donors.

2.3 External Coordination through the High Representative and Euro-Atlantic Integration

As the Bosnian government grew increasingly dependent on external funding, external actors gradually improved their coordination. With a NATO Stabilization Force of 60,000 troops and a UN police contingent of 2,057 officers for a population of 4 million, the peacekeeping intervention was one of the largest ever undertaken. During the first five years after the war, external actors contributed $5.1 billion, accounting for up to 30% of GDP and over $1,100 per capita. From the beginning, mechanisms were put in place to coordinate the multiple actors. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), comprised of interested countries and organizations, formulated political and policy guidance. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) monitored implementation and coordinated international efforts on the ground. As illustrated in Figure 9, a rough division of labor was established, with NATO assigned to lead the military force, the UN leading an International Police Task Force (IPTF), the OSCE coordinating arms control, security-building, human rights and elections, the UNHCR leading refugee resettlement and humanitarian assistance.

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422 Dobbins et al, *Congo to Iraq*.
operations, and the World Bank and European Commission coordinating reconstruction.

Figure 9: Post-Conflict Donor Coordination Structure in BiH, 1997. Source: GAO.  

Despite challenges early on, this structure eventually facilitated effective coordination.

Initially international officials complained of “niche mandate implementation, duplication and lack of strategic planning,” which left ample leeway for Bosnian political leaders actors to manipulate assistance and channel it to their local networks. The OHR, which was forced by its mandate to “respect their autonomy within their spheres of operation,” was unable to coordinate the multiple actors operating on the ground. Yet the PIC soon took steps to overcome these challenges. At a meeting in Bonn in 1997, the PIC increased the High Representative’s authority and coordination mandate. The OHR was authorized to take “interim measures” where the state failed to act consistently with the Dayton Accords, and to “take actions against persons… who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or

427 Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 10, Article II.
the terms of its implementation.” These “Bonn Powers” enabled the OHR to impose laws and regulations and dismiss officials, and to generate pressure on local politicians to advance reform priorities. From 1998 to 2006, successive High Representatives Carlos Westendorp, Wolfgang Petritsch and Paddy Ashdown used the Bonn Powers in nearly 800 decisions on issues ranging from minority returns to the introduction of a common currency and vehicle license plate. The Bonn Powers also enhanced coordination by making OHR a focal point for external actors, as they sought to achieve consensus so that their issues would be incorporated into the OHR’s high profile agenda. The OHR put its convening power to use through regular meetings of donor representatives to coordinate objectives and approaches.

Starting in 2000, external coherence received another boost from the Euro-Atlantic integration process. That year, the European Union had launched its Stabilization and Association Process aimed at integrating the countries of the Western Balkans, and the PIC affirmed the objective of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s integration into the EU and NATO. The PIC declaration defined an agenda of reforms aimed at centralizing authority and reducing internal barriers to economic activity to enable EU and NATO integration. To pursue this agenda, external actors worked to enhance coordination. Starting in 2002, the High Representative was dual-hatted as the EU’s Special Representative to increase coherence. As shown in Figure 10, the EU provided the largest share of funds while most other donors – including the U.S. as the second largest donor – explicitly directed their aid toward supporting EU and NATO accession. Despite an overall decrease in funds, as seen in Table 16, external assistance grew increasingly coordinated, leading to the peak of external influence during this time.

### Figure 10: Official Development Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina by Donor, 1996-2007. (Source: OECD-DAC)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>298</td>
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<td>267</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-DAC Countries</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilaterals</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Donors</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>8,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per capita (in $)</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>2,421</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


### 3. Resistance, Bargaining and Trust in Negotiating over Bosnia’s Security Forces

As donors shifted their attention from stabilization to state-building, their efforts took the form of a complex series of four-way negotiations, in which the outcomes depended on the cohesiveness of the major parties, their dependence on external support, and the coherence of the external response. As donors unified around the objective centralizing authority at the State level in a variety of areas – from security to taxation and customs – they had to contend with divergent positions among the major parties. The Bosniak parties generally supported centralized authority...
given their demographic dominance, but they opposed reforms that might undermine their local control through informal networks. Serb parties opposed shifting authority from the Entity to the State as a direct threat to their authority. The Croat parties, which represented the smallest of the three groups, sought to preserve ethnically-based representation and veto power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Force</th>
<th>Political Fragmentation</th>
<th>Revenue Dispersal</th>
<th>External Coordination</th>
<th>Means of Influence</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of BiH</td>
<td>Cohesive but dispersal</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>High Coordination</td>
<td>Trust with key leaders; credible bargaining</td>
<td>Partial Transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Overall - 1996-2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OHR/NATO/US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2002 (pre-DRC)</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Moderate Coordination</td>
<td>Limited trust; credible bargaining</td>
<td>Partial Transform</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE, OHR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2005 (DRC)</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>High Coordination</td>
<td>Trust with key leaders; credible bargaining</td>
<td>High Transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between military &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td>OHR/NATO/US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>civilian leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2008 (implement)</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Moderate Coordination</td>
<td>Trust at working level; Occasional bargaining</td>
<td>Partial Transform</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OHR/UN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police Forces of BiH</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Moderate Coordination</td>
<td>Limited Trust, Failed Bargaining</td>
<td>Limited Transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Overall - 1996-2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UN/OHR/EU/US</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2002 (IPTF)</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Moderate Coordination</td>
<td>Limited trust; credible bargaining</td>
<td>Partial Transform</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>UN/OSCE/US</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002-2005 (PRC)</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>High Coordination</td>
<td>Limited Trust; Failed Bargaining</td>
<td>Limited Transform</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>OHR/EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005-2008 (negotiations)</td>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Moderate Coordination</td>
<td>Limited Trust; Failed Bargaining</td>
<td>Limited Transform</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OHR/EU</td>
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Table 17: Summary of Cases: Armed Forces and Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the context of dependence on external revenue and a cohesive set of external actors, the outcome of these negotiations depended largely on the cohesiveness of political networks in which each institution was embedded. In the defense sector, a split within the Serb ruling party weakened its authority and created an opening for reform, as weakened leaders cooperated with external actors to neutralize a growing internal threat. External actors responded coherently, through a combination of trust-building with key actors and credible bargaining with others. The resulting
reform led to a major restructuring of the force, but it also depended on a series of compromises that cohesive parties used to influence the implementation of reforms and maintain their control. For the police, cohesive political parties on all three sides closed ranks in opposition to reform efforts by external actors, who were unable to generate sufficient leverage to overcome this resistance. In the remainder of the chapter, I trace how local conditions shaped these dynamics for each force to affect the outcome of reform efforts.

4. Defense Reform and the Creation of the Armed Forces of BiH

Despite the dominance of cohesive political parties, fragmentation among civilian politicians and defense leaders within these parties enabled a major reform of the armed forces. Especially in the RS, this fragmentation undermined trust within the ruling party and persuaded party leaders to bring the military under more transparent civilian control by cooperating with externally-driven reform efforts. The OHR succeeded in responding credibly to these incentives, through deliberate trust-building efforts with key interlocutors, and by using the leverage that arose from dependence on external funding and the possibility of NATO accession. Following two rounds of intensive negotiations, a series of agreements committed the parties to unifying the separate armed forces and centralizing authority in the State. Yet this brief opening quickly closed, as the institutional and social context drove leaders back toward ethnically-based politics. Hardline elements within nationalist parties succeeded in manipulating elements of the implementation process and using the compromises inserted into the agreements to maintain their influence over the military. The result was a partial transformation that centralized and unified separate armed forces but preserved the influence of ethnically-defined factions.
4.1. Political and Fiscal Pressures on the Entity Armed Forces

Although the armed forces remained closely tied to nationalist political parties following the war, their political utility gradually declined and they became increasingly dependent on external funding. Initially, the two entity armed forces served as powerful symbols of ethnic identity and security against threats from other ethnic groups. They also generated political and economic benefits for senior politicians and military officers. Informal ties among politicians, active duty officers, veterans and former paramilitaries – like the HVIDRA veterans group linked to the Croat HDZ party and the former Green Berets linked to the Bosniak SDA party – helped politicians mobilize votes and political support, while allowing military officers to control lucrative social funds and commercial properties. As a result, the ruling parties in all three ethnic groups opposed reforms that might undermine these linkages through more transparent oversight structures. Although Bosniak parties were more supportive of centralized authority since they enjoyed a majority within the State, they opposed the abolition of costly but politically lucrative conscription and reserve forces. Serb parties opposed any reform that would reduce the authority of the Entity governments, while Croats sought to preserve ethnic autonomy within the force.

Over time, however, the political value of the military declined. During successive waves of demobilization, former fighters were recruited into the police and private security firms, leading politicians to develop closer ties to the police than to the military. While some politicians benefited from their links to the military, others felt threatened by the autonomy of politically powerful officers who received salaries from Belgrade or Zagreb, and who participated in arms smuggling and other lucrative activities. As early as 1997, Serb president Biljana Plavsic tried to neutralize the power of the military by replacing top VRS generals. The prosecution of top military officers at

431 ESI “Reshaping International Priorities,” 10-15
432 Ibid,12.
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) further weakened the relationships within the ruling parties between military and civilian leaders.

The armed forces also lost much of their utility from a security perspective. Since the armed forces were closely monitored by international forces, politicians could not mobilize them in response to perceived threats. Political leaders came to feel that: “we had an army only in the formal sense, since it was actually under NATO and SFOR control, and commanders of units didn’t have the authority to do anything – not even to mow their own lawn, let alone to deploy.”

As the regional security order shifted toward NATO dominance in the aftermath of the Kosovo campaign, a few Serb party leaders who had been opposed to reform or to joining NATO began to talk about “new approach to security” based on the notion that “security can’t be measured with tanks alone,” and that would benefit from closer ties to NATO and the West. In the FBiH, although the Train and Equip program had failed to integrate the forces, years of interaction with NATO troops and participation in seminars around the region had exposed officers to Western standards of training, doctrine, organization. Among politicians and military officers in both entities, “there was an awareness of using the possibility of NATO to go further faster, that would lead to the use of higher quality resources, have better systems, and we wanted to be part of the process.”

Interaction among officers from all three ethnic groups and foreign advisers also gradually enhanced mutual trust. Through joint trainings overseas and especially following the establishment in 2000 of the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC), which prepared troops to participate in UN operations, officers from both Entities increasingly worked together. This interaction led to a decision to enhance the role of the SCMM from mere information-sharing to

433 Interview with former RS President Dragan Cavic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.
434 Speech by Dragan Cavic to the RS National Assembly, Banja Luka, October 13, 2003.
435 Interview with former Minister of Defense Nikola Radovanovic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.
436 The first contingents were sent to UN missions in Eritrea and the Congo in 2002.
more substantive coordination, and to increase its staff.\textsuperscript{437} According to one senior officer, these activities “created a sense of togetherness that facilitated the defense reform process.”\textsuperscript{438}

At the same time, the defense establishments had become increasingly dependent on external funding. After both Entities abolished their socialist-era financial systems, it became clear that they could no longer sustain their military expenditures. The decline in foreign transfers from Croatia and Serbia, which had accounted for 11\% and 7\% of total defense spending in the Federation and the RS, respectively, added further pressure on the budget.\textsuperscript{439} An audit of military expenditures conducted by the OSCE in 2001 found that both entities had been spending over twice what they had been allocated, while roughly 54\% of FBiH defense spending and 45\% of RS defense spending remained off budget.\textsuperscript{440} The vast majority of this spending was devoted to wages and benefits, while supplies, housing and public utilities were subsidized through informal arrangements that could no longer function under the new treasury system.\textsuperscript{441} The OSCE audit concluded that at the actual rate of spending, the defense budget would be entirely spent halfway through the 2002 fiscal year.\textsuperscript{442} This growing fiscal pressure generated further incentives to cooperate with Western donors, since officers and politicians realized that their militaries were growing increasingly obsolete. As a Serb politician put it,

\begin{quote}
“\textit{The structure had little meaning when we couldn’t even feed the soldiers, when our technical capabilities were totally destroyed, and while explosives, bombs and grenades that were not properly secured and were available for anyone to steal.}”\textsuperscript{443}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{437} This decision was never implemented. See Maxwell “From Three Armies to One,” 5.
\textsuperscript{438} Interview with Senior AFBiH Official, Sarajevo, December 15, 2011.
\textsuperscript{439} World Bank, “From Aid Dependency to Fiscal Self-Reliance,” 50.
\textsuperscript{440} The results of the audit are summarized in World Bank, “From Aid Dependency to Fiscal Self-Reliance,” 50. See also OSCE, \textit{Affordable Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina}, accessed December 2011, http://www.oscebih.org/documents/oscebih_doc_2003032815211560eng.pdf
\textsuperscript{441} Wages and Salaries amounted to 84\% of the entire budgetary allocation in the Federation and 31\% in the RS. World Bank, “From Aid Dependency to Fiscal Self-Reliance,” 50.
\textsuperscript{442} OSCE, \textit{Affordable Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina}.
\textsuperscript{443} Interview with former RS President Dragan Cavic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.
Fiscal pressures also generated new opportunities for external leverage. In August 2002, an $86 million loan package by the International Monetary Fund to cover severe budget deficits was explicitly tied to the demobilization of 10,000 soldiers beyond what was required by the DPA.\footnote{International Monetary Fund, “IMF Approves US$89 Million Stand-By Arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Press Release No. 02/35, August 2, 2002, accessed January 19, 2011 \url{http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0235.htm}.}

Despite this pressure, resistance to further integration and to formal civilian oversight remained strong among most segments of the military and political establishments. The downsizing process had reduced the numbers of troops, but the officers with the deepest ties to political parties had remained in their positions, and many politicians continued to benefit from these ties.\footnote{There was also no legal age limit or other requirement for officers to retire, allowing senior officers to remain in their positions indefinitely. Interview with Senior AFBiH Officer, Sarajevo, December 15, 2011.} Top officers also remained highly suspicious of each other and of the external actors. Despite a growing cadre of younger officers and civilian officials who favored reform, the political and military leadership remained staunchly opposed. In the words of an international official, prior to 2003, “every time there was an agreement at the working level, they would go to the political level and the answer would be no – it was like walking standing still.”\footnote{Interview with OHR Military Adviser, Sarajevo, August 23, 2010.}

\section*{4.2. The Orao Affair and Fragmentation in the Ruling Party}

The crucial opening for defense reform occurred following a scandal known as the Orao Affair that deepened the growing split between civilian and military leaders in the RS. The scandal broke after SFOR troops, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence officials, raided the Orao Aviation Institute, a defense company owned and managed by the RS military. The raid, along with the subsequent interception of a ship carrying fighter jet parts, produced evidence that the RS had been selling military equipment to Iraq in violation of the Dayton Accords and UN sanctions on Iraq. In the wake of the scandal, several senior Serb officials were forced to step down, including Mirko Sarovic, the Serb member of the tripartite presidency of BiH and leader of the ruling SDS party.

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotetext[445]{There was also no legal age limit or other requirement for officers to retire, allowing senior officers to remain in their positions indefinitely. Interview with Senior AFBiH Officer, Sarajevo, December 15, 2011.}
\footnotetext[446]{Interview with OHR Military Adviser, Sarajevo, August 23, 2010.}
\end{footnotesize}
The resulting fragmentation within the Serb ruling party created an opening for reform. For Serb politicians, the scandal highlighted the political liability that stemmed from their inability to control the activities of the military establishment. Dragan Cavic, the president of the RS who took over the party leadership following Sarovic’s resignation, was part of a group of SDS leaders who lacked close ties to military leaders. He saw an opportunity to bring the military under civilian control. In a dramatic speech to a special session of the RS National Assembly the day after Sarovic’s resignation, he complained that “there are no independent military and civilian authorities which are in charge of the Serb Republic Army,” and accused senior army officers of greater loyalty to Belgrade than to Banja Luka, saying “it is time for the Serb Republic Army officers to realize that their fate is here in the Serb Republic.”

Nikola Radovanovic, a Serb defense adviser who later served as the first Bosnian minister of defense, summarized the effects of the scandal:

“The situation with the military facility that had done business in Iraq, along with the fact that Sarovic was forced to leave his position, showed that political leaders can still suffer from activities within the defense establishment that they cannot fully control, and created a strong incentive to establish modern control over the defense establishment.”

The scandal also enabled deeper external influence than had been possible previously, as leaders reached out for external support to manage this threat. After the scandal had been exposed, Cavic sent signals to international officials that he was willing to cooperate on defense reform.

Milorad Dodick, the leader of the main Serb opposition party who lacked ties to the military, similarly saw an opportunity to remove an obstacle to achieving greater political influence. James Locher III, a senior U.S. defense official who was designated to facilitate the subsequent negotiations, described this receptive atmosphere when he arrived in Bosnia in June 2003:

“When I arrived, I went to see Dodick. He said, Mr. Locher, I fully support what you are trying to do, and though the process may get ugly and there will be public opposition, I will be there when you need me. And he...”


448 Interview with former Minister of Defense Nikola Radovanovic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.

was… On the 5th of June I went to see Cavic… he was very, very supportive in private, and though he needed to be careful not to over-expose, he believed that, no matter what they said publicly, they needed to deal with the structure [of the armed forces].

The Orao Affair also created openings for reform within the Bosniak and Croat political establishments. Although international officials had focused on Serb involvement in selling weapons to Iraq, Bosniaks and Croats had also been involved in the scheme. Politicians realized that it was only a matter of time before they were caught up in a similar scandal. Bosniaks and Croats were less concerned than Serbs about abolishing the Entity own military, but they did face strong opposition within their parties to losing control of the patronage networks and symbols of security. In the aftermath of the Orao Affair, however, they realized that they, too, needed to assert control over their powerful and largely autonomous military and intelligence services. They also saw an opportunity to cooperate with external actors to neutralize the threat posed from the continued existence of the Serb military.

4.3. OHR, NATO and the International Response

External actors led by the OHR sought to use the Orao Affair to consolidate the growing unity among external actors and channel it toward increased leverage on defense reform. Although a consensus had emerged that Bosnia should join NATO, progress had stalled as Bosnian leaders and external officials could not agree on the necessary reforms. Recognizing the Orao scandal’s potential as “a stepping stone to wider reform,” OHR personnel reached out to other external actors—often using Ashdown’s personal relationships—to translate this consensus into a concrete, shared objective of unifying the country’s separate armed forces. In January 2002, Robert Serry, NATO’s Director for the Balkans, called for the unification of Bosnia’s defense structure, stating

452 Reform of the intelligence services was carried out simultaneously to the defense reform.
453 Interview with OHR Military Adviser, Sarajevo, August 23, 2010.
454 Ashdown recalled seeing this as an opportunity to gain support for reforms. Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (London: Orion, 2007), 282.
that “it is not possible for us in the Partnership for Peace program to make contact with two Entities within one state."\textsuperscript{455} Ashdown then contacted NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to persuade him to make unification of the armed forces an explicit condition for negotiating entrance into the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Robertson responded by sending a letter to the BiH Presidency that cited the Orao Affair and laid out conditions for PfP, including “effective and credible state level command and control structure for your armed forces” through the establishment of a “State level Ministry for Military Matters and General Staff.”\textsuperscript{456} OHR personnel also reached out to U.S. Government officials, who were particularly “worked up” by the allegations of arms smuggling to Iraq.\textsuperscript{457} The U.S. threw its support behind Ashdown and sent James Locher III – a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and senior Senate staffer who had led the drafting of the Goldwater-Nichols Act – to chair the defense reform negotiations. Ashdown personally cultivated the support of Russia, which had a close relationship with the Serbs, and Turkey, which had influence over the Bosniaks.\textsuperscript{458} As Locher recalled:

\begin{quote}
“I met with the number 2 in the Russian Embassy who would sit on the Defense Reform Commission. I needed the Russians to work the Serbs. I met with the Turkish representative for the OIC. After I built a relationship with a person at the Russian Embassy, he said here in Bosnia you have the support of the Russian government, and at critical moments, the Russians said to the Serbs, you need to agree to this. The Turks did handholding with the Bosniaks.”\textsuperscript{459}
\end{quote}

With external actors unified in support of integrating the armed forces, the OHR announced the establishment of a Defense Reform Commission (DRC) in May 2003. It was charged with identifying the legal and institutional measures necessary to establish “democratic civil oversight of armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina… command and control at the State level…interoperability of defense structures” and other measures that would integrate Bosnia’s

\textsuperscript{455} Quoted in Denis Hadzovic, \textit{The Office of the High Representative and Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina} (Sarajevo: Centre for Security Studies BH, 2009), 47.
\textsuperscript{456} Letter from Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Sec. Gen of NATO to Presidents Sarovic, Covic and Tihic, Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, 11 November 2002.
\textsuperscript{457} Interview with OHR Military Adviser, Sarajevo, August 23, 2010.
\textsuperscript{458} Ashdown \textit{Swords and Ploughshares}, 286.
\textsuperscript{459} Interview with James Locher, III, Washington, DC, January 6, 2012.
armed forces. The commission, which comprised of representatives from each of the three ethnic groups with international officials serving as a secretariat, proceeded through two rounds of intense negotiations in June-September 2003 and in January-September 2005.

4.4. Mutual Coopting, Cooperation and Trust

Fundamental to the negotiation process was the trust achieved among external and domestic actors. Although a small group of leaders from all three ethnic groups supported the reforms, they faced stiff opposition to any decisions that would undermine their faction’s control. Their ability to manage these pressures depended on their confidence that international officials would provide them with the resources – the information, legitimacy and revenue, as well as credible solutions – that would help them respond to domestic pressure. Constant communication and a basic foundation of trust enabled the parties to work through political and technical challenges, and reach consensus on the fundamental goals and details of the reform.

Ashdown, Locher and the DRC staff deliberately invested in cultivating relationships with key politicians to build this foundation. In his memoir, Ashdown recalls how his relationship with Cavic, as well as with Terzic and other senior politicians, led him to accept deals that appeared to undermine aspects of his reform, because “as a politician, I sympathized with his plight.” Several observers recalled observing “a deep understanding” among Ashdown and top Bosnian leaders that facilitated agreement on difficult political issues. Similarly, Locher saw one of his primary roles as Chairman of the DRC to build and maintain trust both within the Commission and with top political leaders. Having discovered receptiveness to reform among top decision-makers, at least in private, he sought to open channels of communication and build a basic level of trust:

461 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 293.
462 Interview with OHR Military Adviser, Sarajevo, August 23, 2010. See also Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 267.
“Every time before the commission met, I went to see every Commission Member one-on-one, the Bosnian politicians, the international officials, and other people to appraise them of what we were doing, and to say, here’s what we will address, here’s what you need to consider.”

Raffi Gregorian, a State Department official who served as co-chair for the second round of negotiations along with Nikola Radovanovic, recounted similar efforts:

“I spent a lot of time on the road, going back and forth between Sarajevo and Banja Luka meeting with all of the key leaders, one after another….I went around to each one of them trying to reassure them, listening to their concerns, saying I am going to work with you, we are going to find a way to do this, looking for positive aspects of things that left openings.”

While building support among top leaders, the DRC chairs also worked to build trust among the members of the Commission. Locher recounted that “at the first meeting of the Commission, I surprised the Bosnians by saying, 'you have no reason to trust me, you don’t know who I am, and I look forward to earning your trust.”

Meetings were held away from the public eye with a strict commitment to confidentiality. Participants were invited to retreats outside Sarajevo where they were able to socialize after the negotiation sessions. During the second round, Gregorian instituted a regular dinner with Commission members where they could discuss challenges in a more informal setting. These meetings enabled the DRC Secretariat to anticipate concerns and seek support from political leaders for solutions that would address them. As one Commission member recalled,

“For some issues we had to go back to the political level. Nine out of ten issues were solved at the technical level, but some would escalate and … we would go to the various institutions [and political leaders] and discuss it, otherwise they would become a problem. Jim Locher would try to identify these issues and try to get agreement.”

This approach contributed to a high level of confidence among Commission members that their constraints were taken seriously. In explaining their ability to reach agreement, most of the

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467 Interview with former Minister of Defense Nikola Radovanovic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.
468 Most of the details of the report were worked out in working groups focusing on specific topics, including Policy, Legal Parliamentary Oversight, Entity, Technical, Implementation and Conscription.
Commission members and staffers highlighted the “climate of compromise and agreement” and the “feeling of trust among the participants.” As one Bosnian staffer described:

“At first, we were working with people from the ethnic armies, who had literally fought each other in the war and would not talk. But gradually they were able to talk openly and work together, it was an amazing process.”

This trust and communication facilitated the development of compromise solutions to thorny political issues. In the first round of negotiations, the agreement was based on a split chain of authority between the State, which would maintain operational command, and the Entities, which would maintain administrative control. This compromise emerged during a retreat in Oberammergau, Germany early on in the process, in which participants engaged in an entire week of intensive negotiations and interaction. Constant communication with key leaders ensured the necessary political backing for these negotiations, and for the compromises that emerged. In one-on-one discussions with Locher, Cavic “indicated privately that the RS would be willing to accept new state-level defense institutions and the transfer of defense competencies from the RS to the state. In return, Cavic was asking that the transfer of competencies take place in phases over the course of four years.” In response, the Secretariat drew up three organizational charts, “one showing a single operational chain of command and dual administrative control that would be adopted in 2003, a second showing a transition to be implemented in 2005, and the third with dissolved entity ministries for 2007.” During the second round, the agreement to unify the armed forces and abolish entity ministries rested on several compromises, including the establishment of the “regiment” system that would allow each ethnic group to maintain nationalist symbols, and the adoption of a “troika” system, in which all senior appointments would consist of a senior official...

469 Interview with Senior BiH Ministry of Defense Official, Sarajevo, December 12, 2011.  
470 Interview with Bosnian staff-member of the DRC, Sarajevo, December 8, 2011.  
471 Interview with Bosnian staff-member of the DRC, Washington, DC January 12, 2012.  
472 Interview with NATO Adviser, December 2, 2011.  
474 Interview with OHR Military Adviser, Sarajevo, August 23, 2010.
and two deputies, each from a different ethnic groups. These compromises required a deep understanding among international personnel of the constraints facing each party, and willingness among the parties to think creatively and adopt difficult compromises.

4.5. External Leverage and Bargaining with the Opposition

As Commission members carefully crafted compromise solutions with the support of key leaders, most of their political establishments remained opposed to reforms that might reduce their authority. As Locher explained, even though “Cavic had given the green light [to compromise], the rest of the political establishment hadn’t done so.” Following the Oberammergau retreat, for example, Serb Commission members were “called before the Defense Committee in the National Assembly and asked why they had not followed the guidance.” In this case, Locher appeared with Serb leaders in front of the National Assembly to explain the new proposals, to show the seriousness of external backing, and to reiterate the requirements for moving toward NATO accession and avoiding sanctions.

Overcoming opposition also required that these threats and inducements be credible. The unified position among external actors to condition PFP on a centralized defense structure helped to ensure this credibility. By reaching out to countries outside NATO – particularly Russia – OHR forestalled the possibility that Bosnian leaders might secure external support without meeting this condition. Especially for Serbs, many of whom were ambivalent about NATO accession due to the possibility that the alliance might pit Bosnia against Serbia or Russia, the threat of losing Russian support proved to be especially effective. As a NATO official recalled, “the international

477 For many Serbs, joining NATO prior to Serbia raised the specter of fighting against fellow Serbs in the case of NATO operations against Serbia.
community was for once in its life organized: the U.S. sent the right person, we had NATO goals, we had the OSCE standards, it suited the Russians and the Turks.”

Coordination among external actors also enhanced OHR’s access to the information needed to effectively monitor the behavior of Bosnian officials. The OHR’s knowledge about the Orao Affair and the links between the RS military and war crimes fugitives was based on intelligence collected and shared by NATO, the U.S., Russia and other bilateral actors. As Ashdown recalled in his memoir, “information provided by a number of international bodies, including, on this occasion, the Russian government” enabled OHR to “build up a campaign of pressure to persuade the RS to fulfill their duties.” Throughout the negotiations, OHR staffers carefully monitored the activities of individual politicians, and used any information regarding noncompliance to exert pressure on them. As one staffer recalled, when the negotiations stalled, they often threatened to bring individual officials “to the attention of the High Representative” for possible sanction or removal if they refused to agree or compromise on a particular issue. As a result of OHR’s robust mandate and his unified support among bilateral actors, these threats were highly credible.

The threat of sanctions played a crucial role at the start of the second round of negotiations. The first round of negotiations had resulted in the establishment of a State ministry of defense and the appointment of Nikola Radovanovic as Minister of Defense. Yet the Entities had retained their separate armed forces, and Entity governments retained substantial authority. In deciding to start a second round of reforms that would create a single military force and oversight structure, Ashdown once again sought to unify external support for conditioning NATO accession on achieving this further reform. He ensured that the Istanbul Declaration of the 2004 NATO summit explicitly mentioned “a single military force” as a condition for Bosnia’s accession to NATO, rather than the

478 Interview with NATO Adviser, Sarajevo, December 5, 2011.
479 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 286, 293-4
480 Interview with OHR Staff, Sarajevo, August 28, 2010
previous declaration’s mention of a single “defense establishment.” Yet Serbs remained ambivalent about joining NATO as long as Serbia was not part of it, and even the most supportive leaders were not ready to move to the next phase of reform. As the OHR launched the second round of talks, the six Serb parties in the RS issued a joint statement opposing the abolishment of the Serb Ministry of Defense and refused to send representatives to the negotiations.

Using its access to information from other external actors, OHR bolstered its leverage through a credible threat to dismiss officials who opposed the reforms. Prior to the second round of talks, Ashdown dismissed 63 officials over allegations that RS authorities had assisted fugitive Ratko Mladic to escape from capture for prosecution at the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He then linked the unification of the armed forces to the requirements of the parties to cooperate with the ICTY, and threatened that he would “not hesitate to take measures that deal, directly and powerfully, with the assets and institutions of the RS” if they failed to comply. According to Gregorian, the “threat of additional sanctions” was “the reason the Serbs started showing up [to the second round of negotiations].” Cavic, who denied the allegations that his government had assisted Mladic, nonetheless agreed that the resulting pressure was crucial for the second round of talks:

“Pressure resulting from the lack of cooperation with The Hague was the main incentive to start the [second round of] reform. Without it, it wouldn’t have started.”

Credible bargaining tactics also served to overcome opposition at the end of both rounds of negotiations. Once the Commission members and key politicians had crafted compromise proposals, they had to overcome opposition among their broader political establishments.

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483 Interview with Former Defense Minister Nikola Radovanovic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.
487 Interview with Dragan Cavic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.
personnel therefore decided that “we had to take it out of [Locher’s] hands, and it had to be bargained among the politicians.” After a public debate over the agreements aimed at building public support, objections from the ruling parties on all three sides had to be overcome at the very end of each round of negotiations through threats to withhold assistance. As one OHR staff member recalled, “at the final instance, when we had to get it agreed, we all met at Paddy’s house with all of the party leaders, and they were refusing, refusing each detail, even down to the title of Defense Minister.” During both rounds, diplomatic officials recalled “explicit discussions” that included threats to individual politicians not to give up benefits promised to their countries by failing to sign the agreement. While the Serb leaders had been persuaded by their Russian counterparts, Bosniak leaders acquiesced only after Turkish and U.S. Embassy officials intervened to condition their aid on accepting the agreement. OHR officials even telephoned the Croat member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle of the night while he was on a trip abroad to exert pressure and secure his agreement. While the agreements had been crafted through extensive communication with vulnerable leaders, the leverage that stemmed from unified external support was crucial for overcoming opposition.

4.6. Renewed Cohesion and the Challenges of Implementation

Following the end of the DRC negotiations, the political opening that enabled cooperation among politicians and external officials gradually closed, and declining attention by external actors weakened the leverage needed to overcome opposition. Within the RS, Cavic and the moderate faction of the SDS party was replaced when it lost the 2006 elections to the SNSD party led by Dodick. Although Dodick had supported the DRC process, he interpreted the political shift as a

489 Ibid. The Serb parties had insisted on not creating a “ministry” of defense, instead seeking to call it a “Secretariat.”
491 Interview with OHR Military Adviser, August 23, 2010.
493 Ibid, 248.
backlash against Cavic’s moderate approach to defense, police and other reforms, and sought to strengthen his political base through ethno-nationalist rhetoric and policy.\textsuperscript{494} In the FBiH, Bosniak and Croat politicians similarly turned toward shoring up their ethnic base. As hardline elements of the parties re-asserted their authority, politicians on all three sides used the compromise provisions in the agreement to maintain their parties’ influence over the military. In some cases, external pressure helped advance the implementation of reforms despite resistance within and outside the military. One Bosnian official described how officials who supported the process used the support of NATO advisers, since “when they say ‘NATO said so’ that gets things to move.”\textsuperscript{495} On the other hand, the influence of these advisers had its limits, especially when it came to politically sensitive decisions. As decisions moved into the details of implementation, external advisers were unable to monitor closed, cohesive networks. They also gradually lost the attention of higher level officials, which prevented them from making credible threats. As a result, key provisions stalled and the influence of nationalist parties on the composition and oversight of the military remained strong.

The influence of cohesive political parties was most evident in the selection of personnel to constitute the unified force. Following the adoption of the reforms, many of the senior officers who had played leading roles during the war were retired due to new age limits, creating space for younger officers.\textsuperscript{496} All of the remaining soldiers were subjected to a selection process in which boards made up of senior military and civilian personnel reviewed the qualifications of each candidate according to publicized criteria. Faced with continued pressure from nationalist political parties, the Minister of Defense invited international personnel to observe the selection process to ensure that the criteria were observed.\textsuperscript{497} Although NATO personnel tried to monitor the implementation of these criteria during the formal proceedings, many decisions were determined

\textsuperscript{494} This shift and subsequent reaction, which was closely linked to the police reforms, are further described below.
\textsuperscript{495} Interview with Ministry of Defense Official, Sarajevo, August 19, 2010.
\textsuperscript{496} Interview with Senior AFBiH Officer, Sarajevo, December 15, 2011.
\textsuperscript{497} Interview with Nikola Radovanovic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.
through “political haggling” that took place outside the meetings.\textsuperscript{498} A NATO official explained that “observers had no way of knowing what took place outside the room, and were not in a position to have all of the voluminous files translated.”\textsuperscript{499} Pressure from veteran organizations with strong political ties resulted in the retention of many older personnel.\textsuperscript{500} As personnel were selected for the Ministry of Defense, where external actors were much less involved, positions were sometimes allocated for political reasons to individuals who lacked the requisite experience.

Political parties also exploited the compromise provisions in the agreement to solidify their influence. For instance, the “troika” system adopted to secure Croat support, along with the agreement to ethnic balance in every command and at all levels, guaranteed that each ethnic group would maintain a veto over all decisions.\textsuperscript{501} By linking positions to nationality, these provisions created a de facto quota system in which selection for the top positions was based on ethnic loyalty rather than performance and merit. As one senior official explained, since “certain positions are allocated to nationalities, this blocks someone else from allocating a position according to skill or qualification….from a professional point of view, this is a real disaster.”\textsuperscript{502} In addition, the core issues that were deferred for negotiation following the end of the DRC, including how to dispose of military property, have remained mired in controversy.\textsuperscript{503} Other issues that required policy-level agreement, such as a review of the size and structure of the force, have similarly stalled, leaving major gaps in the development of the new force.\textsuperscript{504} As higher level officials turned their attention from defense reform to other priorities, the advisers who continued to support the reform process lacked a means of overcoming opposition. As one adviser explained, “since the end of the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{498} Maxwell, “From Three Armies to One,” 12.
\bibitem{499} Ibid.
\bibitem{500} Interview with Senior BiH Ministry of Defense, Sarajevo, December 13, 2011. See also Maxwell “From Three Armies to One,” 22.
\bibitem{501} Interview with NATO Adviser, Sarajevo, December 2, 2011.
\bibitem{502} Interview with Senior AFBiH Officer, Sarajevo, December 15, 2011.
\bibitem{503} For an in depth discussion of this issue, see, Azinovic et al, \textit{Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence}, 32.
\bibitem{504} Interviews with NATO Adviser, Sarajevo, December 5, 2011 and with Ministry of Defense Official, Sarajevo, December 13, 2011.
\end{thebibliography}
commission, NATO has reverted to a traditional approach. We don’t do politics. We don’t have a political adviser… We have lost the focus of high level people.”

4.7. Outcome: The New Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Defense Reform Commission contributed to a partial transformation in integrating the Armed Forces and centralizing civilian oversight at the State level, while allowing factional influence to remain. The Entity and State legislatures ratified legal and constitutional changes that abolished Entity armed forces and ministries, and created the new Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) under the authority of a Joint Command, a State-level Ministry of Defense and a Joint Committee on Defense and Security in the State Parliamentary Assembly. Five years later, NATO officials continued to refer to the transformation of the armed forces as “the biggest breakthrough since the Dayton Agreement.” Yet overcoming the opposition of cohesive ethno-nationalist networks also required compromises on all sides, some of which have preserved the influence of ethno-nationalist party networks within the military. As the political opening that enabled the reforms closed and cohesive political parties re-asserted their influence, they maintained substantial influence over the force’s composition and behavior.

4.7.1 Composition and Structure

The transformation of the military is most clearly visible in its structure and composition. Separate Entity armies were disbanded and replaced with a single military structure made up of all three ethnic groups. The size of the forces shrank from 400,000 troops following the war to 19,090 in 2002, and further down to 10,000 professional military personnel and 1,000 civilians following the DRC. The State ministry of defense was streamlined to 310 civilians from the roughly 1,100 who had served in the entity ministries. All soldiers and ministry of defense personnel went through a

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505 Interview with NATO Adviser, Sarajevo December 5, 2011.
selection process and older personnel were retired based on the new legal age limit of 35 or up to 15 years in service.\textsuperscript{507} From a top-heavy force comprised of over 80\% officers, the new armed forces adopted a more balanced rank structure consisting of 20\% officers, 30\% non-commissioned officers and 50\% soldiers. The large inactive reserve was replaced with a much smaller active reserve of 5,000 members, and the costly and politically potent conscription system was abolished. By 2011, the AFBiH had begun recruiting a new generation of soldiers, including 1,993 new recruits – of which 140 were women – selected through a highly competitive process with clear, merit-based criteria.\textsuperscript{508} The AFBiH also came to reflect the country’s official ethnic balance of 45.9\% Bosniaks, 33.6\% Serbs and 19.8 \% Croats and 0.7\% others.\textsuperscript{509} Multi-ethnic infantry brigades were distributed across the country, each composed of three mono-ethnic battalions with multi-ethnic command structures from the brigade-level up to the top. From the perspective of Bosnian officials, these changes “interrupted the organizational base and the way things were carried out, which had a huge impact on the way people who worked in the structures were thinking.”\textsuperscript{510}

On the other hand, political factions succeeded in influencing the selection of personnel at all levels through back-room negotiations, as described above, and by maintaining pressure on officers to prioritize ethnic loyalty. The compromises provisions have been useful for nationalist parties to preserve ethnic networks within the military. For instance, the regimental system, which was adopted to secure Serb support for abolishing the Entity armies, has facilitated ethnic divisions within the force. Officially, mono-ethnic regiments were explicitly relegated to “ceremonial, custom, heritage and national or historic events,” through flags, insignia, ceremonies, events, museums and

\textsuperscript{508} Ibid, 17. As of April 2011, 507 out of the 9,073 military and civilian personnel in the armed forces are women. The criteria and process for recruitment are specified in \textit{Law on Service in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina}, PSBiH number 227/05, 5 October 2005, Articles 9-13.
\textsuperscript{509} Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, \textit{Brochure}, 5.
\textsuperscript{510} Interview with senior BiH Ministry of Defense Official, Sarajevo, December 12, 2011.
other symbolic measures.\textsuperscript{511} They were intended to serve “no operational status.”\textsuperscript{512} In practice, however, they have been a vehicle for maintaining ethnic identity and political influence. Immediately after training, new recruits have been pressured to join an ethnically-based infantry brigade, and reprimanded for failing to wear their regimental insignia.\textsuperscript{513} Regiments envisioned in the law for non-infantry, multi-ethnic units like artillery and signals were never established, leaving recruits no option but to join the ethnic regiments. Politicians and veterans groups have pressured regiment commanders to use their regiments for politically provocative ceremonies.\textsuperscript{514} Similarly, the “troika” system has preserved political influence as the parties must negotiate over each position to fill the ethnic quotas.\textsuperscript{515} According to a State Department report, “the deputies are seen to be separate political power centers in their own right, often insisting on approving or co-signing decisions of the Minister rather than carrying out his instructions.”\textsuperscript{516} As one official noted:

“\textit{There are periodic slips that indicate when guidance is being sought from ethnic and political sources rather than from the chain of command. The institutionalized parallel (Bosniak and Bosnian Croat) chains of command that existed in the VF do not exist in the AFBiH, but their shadows, now applicable to three rather than two constituent peoples, remain.}”\textsuperscript{517}

3.4.2 Civilian Oversight

The DRC strengthened civilian oversight at the State level, while eliminating the authority of Entity governments that had been exercised through informal channels. A new Defense Law adopted following the DRC strengthened the role of the tripartite BiH Presidency as commander-in-chief with the authority to deploy the force, alter its size and structure, and appoint and remove the

\textsuperscript{513} Azinovic et al, \textit{Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence}, 23
\textsuperscript{514} For example, military facilities were used for the funeral of Bosniak leader Rasim Delic, who had been convicted of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. In another incident, Serb officers sang the Serb national anthem at an official event. See Azinovic et al, \textit{Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence}, 34.
\textsuperscript{515} Interview with NATO Adviser, Sarajevo, December 2, 2011.
\textsuperscript{516} NATO, “Report to the High Representative on the Work of the Defence Reform Commission by the NATO Co-Chairman,” (Sarajevo, 23 January 2006).
\textsuperscript{517} “From Three Armies to One,” 41.
general officers and top commanders. The State Ministry of Defense was mandated to organize and equip the force, set policies and rules, propose the budget, approve expenditures, and administrate funds and procurement.\footnote{Law on Defense of Bosnia Herzegovina, BiH Official Gazette Nr. 43/03, October 2005, Article 7-8, 13.} A Joint Defense and Security Committee in the State Parliament was established to legislate and oversee “all matters related to the organization, funding, manning, training, equipping, deployment and employment of the Armed Forces,” including appointments of the top commanders.\footnote{Law on Defense of Bosnia Herzegovina, Article 10.} External actors provided technical and financial assistance to implement these provisions, and helped to influence the details of the new structure.\footnote{Interview with NATO Adviser, Sarajevo, December 5, 2011.} External assistance enabled Bosnian personnel to master procedures never practiced before in Bosnia, from defense planning and budgeting to creating personnel evaluation systems. In 2006, the Ministry of Defense became the first State-level ministry to use a programming, planning and budgeting system, and its first budget was commended by Bosnian and international officials.\footnote{NATO, “Report to the High Representative on the Work of the Defence Reform Commission by the NATO Co-Chairman,” Sarajevo, 23 January 2006.}

Nonetheless, elements of civilian oversight have become mired in political divisions and factional pressure. On the one hand, such weaknesses in civilian oversight as “sluggish administration,” “slow written communication between members of the BiH Armed Forces and the BiH Ministry of Defense,” and lack of responsiveness to grievances may have been inevitable growing pains of a fledgling institution.\footnote{Office of the Parliamentary Military Commissioner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “2010 Report on the work of the Parliamentary Military Commissioner of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Sarajevo, March 31, 2011), 11.} However the most “sluggishness” occurred where reforms have threatened core political interests, as in the case of the disposal of excess military equipment and property from the Yugoslav National Army,\footnote{For an in depth discussion of this issue, see Azinovic et al, Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence, 32.} and the completion of a defense review that would re-define the structure of the force.\footnote{Interviews with NATO Adviser, Sarajevo, December 5, 2011 and with Ministry of Defense Official, Sarajevo, December 13, 2011.} As a result of political disagreements, the
defense budget has been consistently underfunded by Parliament precluding investments needed to modernize the force. Although oversight was formally shifted to State authority, in practice political parties continue to ensure their interests are protected.

### 3.4.3 Legal Limits and Discipline

The AFBiH have also improved in their adherence to legal limits, but challenges remain. Unlike the Entity forces, which were known for involvement in human rights abuse, illicit smuggling, poorly paid soldiers and weak supervision, the AFBiH quickly developed a reputation for professionalism. Most of the top wartime officers were removed, and younger officers were promoted. All of the officers were vetted by NATO for war crime allegations, and received extensive training within the country and overseas. Standards of conduct and disciplinary procedures were laid out in the defense law, and include rights to fair trial and appeal, as well as liability to civilian courts in the case of criminal offense. Disciplinary processes were subjected to external oversight by the Office of the Inspector General, and the Parliamentary Military Commissioner was established in 2009 to monitor the rights of military personnel and respond to their grievances. Especially among the rank and file in mono-ethnic battalions, laws were mostly followed, disciplinary issues were addressed routinely, and the armed forces received positive reviews for their professionalism and effective disciplinary system.

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525 The defense budget 1.22% of GDP is below the level recommended level by NATO of 2% of GDP and around 80% of the budget is spent on wages, compared to the NATO standard of 55-60%. Hadzovic, *The Office of the High Representative*, 14, 53.
526 NATO vetting was criticized for being too severe. For example, nearly all of the nominations for top positions by Bosniaks and Croats were rejected by NATO, including the current Minister of Defense, Selmo Cikotic (most Serb generals had already been removed). NATO later apologized after it found that some of those allegations, including those of Cikotic, were unfounded.
527 *Law on Service in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Art. 159-172.
528 *Law on Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Article 53-55.
530 Interview with BiH Ministry of Defense Official, Sarajevo, December 5, 2011.
At the higher levels of the force, however, military officers described difficulties in disciplining soldiers from other ethnic groups, noting that they usually assign such cases to commanders from the same ethnic group of the officer to be disciplined. Allegations have surfaced of politicians interfering of discipline high level officers. Observers have also expressed concern that the mono-ethnic battalions and regiments would quickly dissolve into separate ethnically-based forces in case of political pressure of violence. Despite perceptions of increased professionalism, in a 2009 poll only 17% of Bosnian citizens expressed “full confidence” in the AFBiH, with another 31% expressing partial confidence. These perceptions reflect fundamental disagreements across ethnic lines about the role of the armed forces and their trust in State. As former Defense Minister Nikola Radovanovic put it:

“Defense reform is not isolated from society. If there is no progress in other areas, it will be reflected in the defense process. As long as something is rotten around it, it will get into the security sector.”

5. The Police Restructuring Commission

Efforts to restructure and centralize the governance of the police forces ran aground in the face of concerted opposition by cohesive ethnic parties. Following the success of the Defense Reform Commission, the High Representative launched a similar process aimed at restructuring Bosnia’s thirteen separate entity, canton and district police forces and centralizing authority at the State level. The context appeared to be similar to that of the military, with police forces dependent on external support and a strong incentive in the form of EU membership. Unlike the military, however, links between the police and ruling party networks remained strong and central to political authority. In addition, by the time OHR stepped up its efforts on police reform, the opening that

531 Interview with Senior AFBiH Officer, Sarajevo, December 15, 2011.
532 Azinovic et al, Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence, 34.
533 Ibid.
534 Interview with former Minister of Defense Nikola Radovanovic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011.
had allowed defense reform had largely closed as parties on all sides turned back toward shoring up their ethnic base. The absence of trust among key political leaders and external officials prevented the development of consensus, while external actors failed to achieve sufficient leverage to overcome staunch opposition from cohesive parties. New police forces were created at the State level, and minor changes were achieved to the composition and management structures of the Entity and Canton forces. Yet the overall structure and the control over police by ethno-nationalist parties in the Entities and Cantons remained largely intact.

5.1 Political and Fiscal Pressures on the Police

Deep ties among political parties and police forces persisted long after the end of the war. The use of police forces for political ends was deeply engrained among Bosnian politicians as a legacy of single-party rule and participation in the civil war, and police officers continued to participate in incidents of political and ethnically-related violence.\(^{535}\) Although blatant abuse gradually declined under international supervision, police forces continued to serve political functions. Through their control over the selection and promotion of police officers, politicians allocated positions to loyal supporters to cement their authority. Indeed, most local police officers were recruited not only from within the majority ethnic group in each Entity or Canton, but from politically connected networks within them, leading to frequent complaints of nepotism and cronyism in assignment and promotion.\(^{536}\) The police, in turn, served the interests of politicians by protecting commercial interests and monopolies linked to ruling parties, and by shielding them from prosecution. Several high level corruption allegations ended in the “dropping of charges,” and few


\(^{536}\) Interview with EU Police Mission Officials, Sarajevo, December 18, 2011.
cases were ever prosecuted.\textsuperscript{537} As late as 2000, the U.S. General Accounting Office reported that “police in some areas continued to work for local party officials and were used to protect the business interests of these individuals, intimidate citizens, and prevent the return of refugees.”\textsuperscript{538} Since the control over the police forces thus served as an important pillar of local control and authority, politicians faced a strong incentive to keep these linkages intact.

At the same time, the high level of spending on the police constituted a major burden to fiscally constrained governments. In 2003, after police forces had been downsized by half, spending on police still totaled 9.2\% of public expenditures – amounting to between two and three times the amount spent by other countries in the region.\textsuperscript{539} The burden was especially severe for Canton governments, which spent on average twenty percent of their budgets on police.\textsuperscript{540} Over eighty percent of those funds were spent on salaries, and police forces could not cover basic maintenance costs. Police forces faced constant shortages in equipment and supplies, and they depended almost completely on external financing for capital improvements.\textsuperscript{541} Local-level control also contributed to discrepancies in pay, benefits and conditions of service across Cantons and Entities, fueling discontent among officers.\textsuperscript{542} As a result, the World Bank repeatedly singled out “public order” costs driven by expenditure on multiple and overlapping police forces as a primary driver of unsustainable government spending.\textsuperscript{543} The focus on police only increased with the defense reform, after which the sprawling police budget amounted to double that of the military.\textsuperscript{544}

\textsuperscript{539} ICPMD, “Financial Organisational and Administrative Assessment,” 86.
\textsuperscript{540} Ibid, 87.
\textsuperscript{541} In 2005, salaries and allowances amounted to a total of 83.16\% of expenditures for police forces in the ten Cantons and 79.36\% in the Republika Srpska. Data provided to author by OHR Officials, Sarajevo, December 2011. See also Azinovic et al, \textit{Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence}, 41.
\textsuperscript{542} ICPMD, “Financial Organisational and Administrative Assessment,” 105.
\textsuperscript{544} Ibid, 16.
5.2. The International Police Task Force and the Limits of External Leverage

Despite depending on external financial support, cohesive political parties repeatedly undermined efforts by external actors to restructure the police in ways that would reduce their control. During the first six years after the war, external actors sought to employ a robust multinational force and an intrusive mandate as leverage over local leaders to advance reforms.\(^{545}\)

Under the terms of the DPA and UN Security Council Resolution 1035, a United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) deployed with over 2,000 civilian police officers from 48 countries. The IPTF also had access to a $16.3 million trust fund to finance training courses, equipment and the restoration of police facilities. Initially, their potential for influence was limited by slow deployment, poor coordination with other actors, and a weak mandate that consisted only of “monitoring, observing, inspecting” and “advising” the Bosnian police forces, with little means to secure compliance.\(^{546}\)

Following a set of agreements in 1996 and 1998 with the FBiH and RS governments,\(^{547}\) however, the IPTF mandate was strengthened to include “screening and certifying persons for participation in the restructured police force,”\(^ {548}\) and “de-certifying” individual officers for “failing to cooperate with the IPTF or adhere to democratic policing principles.”\(^ {549}\)

A working group chaired by the OHR contributed to improved coordination with bilateral and multilateral actors involved in police development, including the OSCE, the United States, the European Commission and several European countries.\(^ {550}\)

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545 External assistance to the Bosnian police forces during the first decade after the end of the civil war can be roughly divided into two phases. The first phase, defined by the leading role of the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF), lasted until the IPTF’s departure in 2002. The second phase is marked by the EU’s leading role in police reform starting in 2002.

546 Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 11, Article III.

547 The Bonn-Petersberg Agreement on Restructuring the Police in the Federation of BiH was adopted in April 1996, followed by the Framework on Police Restructuring Agreement, Reform and Democratization in the Republika Srpska in 1998.


This robust mandate and coordination structure provided sufficient leverage for external actors to promote some limited changes to the composition and structure of the force. The IPTF screened, registered and trained thousands of officers, helping to reduce the number of police personnel from 44,000 to 15,786. The IPTF also de-certified over four hundred officers who were allegedly involved in crime or human rights abuse, established new training courses, rebuilt facilities, and recruited and re-deployed officers to fill minority quotas. In collaboration with bilateral donors, the IPTF also used its leverage to achieve structural changes in each Canton and Entity. A new “Director of Police” position was created within each force to shield police from the political influence of the minister of interior. External actors also established independent boards to oversee the selection of police directors and investigate misconduct, re-drafted internal rule books, and created professional standards units. Following the imposition of laws by the OHR creating new State-level agencies, external actors set up a new Border Service, State Investigation and Protective Agency (SIPA), Interpol Office, judicial and financial police, and a State-level Ministry of Security to oversee these forces. The IPTF’s and OHR’s robust mandates – in particular their ability to threaten officers with de-certification – directly contributed to these reforms as officers’ fear of being removed persuaded them to comply with external demands. One former FBiH police official recalled that “senior officers were afraid of the IPTF advisers; when [certain advisers] would tell them what to do on all kinds of issues, they were listened to.”

Nonetheless, the influence of external actors during this period had its limits. The IPTF and other donors struggled to effectively monitor the force to enforce compliance with the measures they instituted. Although coordination with other donors improved, the IPTF continued to face

551 Ibid, 3.
553 Interview with BiH Ministry of Security Official, Sarajevo, December 9, 2011.
“basic organizational problems” ranging from “poor communications” to “insufficient institutional memory due to high turnover in monitors and short assignments.” The IPTF was unable to access crucial information from other actors about police behavior, most importantly from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), or manage information internally to ensure alleged perpetrators were investigated. Even as its organization and access to information improved over time, the IPTF and most other external actors remained unable to penetrate the informal networks in which most decisions were made. As a result, local political forces continued to manipulate operational and personnel decisions, and undermined the limited reforms that were achieved. The de-certification process failed to remove significant numbers of people involved in human rights abuses or with close links to wartime political parties. Many of the new directors and oversight boards were captured by political parties, who succeeded in influencing personnel selection and operations. Political pressure impeded cooperation among police forces in neighboring Cantons and severely inhibited law enforcement, especially on complex crime. Although minor crime decreased as police forces grew more effective, organized crime grew as a threat to public safety and security.

5.3. European Integration and the Police Restructuring Commission

The EU integration process created an opportunity for the High Representative to intensify external efforts to restructure the police forces. The launch of the European Union’s Stabilization and Association Process in 2000 focused international attention on the goal of preparing Bosnia to fulfill the requirements for “integration into European structures.” More effective law enforcement emerged as a top priority, in order to combat the threats of organized crime and illegal

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555 The presence of individuals involved in war crimes has been documented in numerous reports, including by the UN itself. See United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/2002/1314 (2002); Azinovic et al, Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence, 40; Celador, “Police Reform,” Donais, “Political Economy of Peacebuilding”.
migration that might “cross borders and spread throughout Europe” once BiH entered the EU.\footnote{European Commission, \textit{Commission Staff Working Paper: Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Report 2004}, COM(2004)205 (2004).} As the negotiations to begin the accession process took shape, EU officials repeatedly expressed concern that “the complexity of the existing multiple police forces increases costs and complicates co-ordination and effectiveness.”\footnote{European Commission, \textit{Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparadness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union}” BCOM(2003)692 (2004), 26.} Since “police forces in one Entity have no right of ‘hot pursuit’ into another; there is no central data base, different Entity forces use different information systems,” they could not effectively combat organized crime groups that operated across Canton and Entity lines.\footnote{Ibid.} When the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over the policing mission from the IPTF in 2002, it shifted its focus from de-certification toward efforts to “develop an intelligence-led approach to fighting organized crime and to reinforce returnee security.”\footnote{Ibid.} To support the process of EU integration, other donors similarly “shifted gears toward the development of State institutions” to fight complex crime, while “pulling out of the Entities and Cantons.”\footnote{Interview with U.S. Department of Justice Official, Sarajevo, December 1, 2011.}

With police reform recognized as a priority for EU integration, High Representative Paddy Ashdown moved to build consensus among external actors that it would become a condition for EU accession, as he had done with the military in relation to NATO.\footnote{As he described in his memoirs, this was part of Ashdown’s broader agenda to centralize authority in the State relative to the entities and cantons. Ashdown, \textit{Swords and Ploughshares}.} Drawing on his personal relationships, Ashdown secured the agreement of EU leaders to include Bosnian police reform in the 2003 Thessaloniki Declaration, which laid out the conditions for Western Balkan countries to begin the EU Stabilisation and Accession process. According to Ashdown, “this declaration was central to our next three years’ work. It gave us both the destination to head for (beginning the Stabilisation and Accession Process) and the leverage to get there.”\footnote{Ashdown, \textit{Swords and Ploughshares}, 292.} Ashdown then moved to
specify the conditions police reforms would need to meet. He reached out to European External Relations Commissioner Christopher Patten – once again drawing on personal connections – to craft a letter from Patten to the Prime Minister of BiH. The Patten letter laid out three core principles, namely that “political oversight should be exercised by the Ministry of Security at the State level;” that “the size, shape and number of local policing areas…be guided by what makes most sense for effective policing, not by political considerations;” and that the police should “break out of political constraints” and “get politics out of policing.”  These principles were later reaffirmed by the head of the EU Delegation as “minimum requirements” for police reform.

With specific conditions for EU accession in place, OHR established the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) in July, 2004. Like the Defense Reform Commission, the PRC included representatives from the major political parties. It was chaired by Wilfried Martens, a former Belgium Prime Minister, and the EUPM served as secretariat. The PRC aimed to bring the BiH police forces “in line with European best practice” based on the three principles laid out in the Patten letter. With a high level chairman, a clear set of requirements, and a powerful incentive in the form of EU accession, the right ingredients appeared to be in place for the PRC to succeed.

5.4. Cohesive Parties and the Absence of Trust

Despite apparent external unity, the persistence of cohesive ruling parties with strong links to the police undermined both the trust and leverage necessary for OHR to influence the structure of the police. Unlike in the case of the military, where a split within the Serb ruling party between moderate civilian and hardline military officials created an incentive to seek external support, links

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564 Ashdown and Patten communicated frequently, in part due to the presence in OHR of Ashdown’s Chief of Staff, Ed Llewellyn who had worked for Patten previously.
565 Letter from Christopher Patten, External Action Commissioner of the European Commission to Mr. Adnan Terzic, Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 16, 2004.
566 Letter from Michael B. Humphreys, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina to Mr. Martens, President of the Police Restructuring Commission, December 13, 2004.
567 European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision Establishing the Police Restructuring Commission, Sarajevo, July 2, 2004, Article 2.
between senior police officials and civilian party leadership remained strong. The Serbs especially opposed the creation of new police districts that would cross the inter-ethnic boundary lines, since it would dilute their authority over the police.\textsuperscript{568} Croat leaders favored maintaining some measure of autonomy or ethnically-based representation within the police to maintain their influence. Bosniaks favored greater centralization since they believed they would have greater influence at the State level, and saw the continued existence of an RS police force as an existential threat. These divergent positions were perceived as critical for addressing the interests of their ethnic base, especially following defense reform that had cost them an important symbol of their identity and guarantor of their security.

Continued cohesion among ethno-nationalist parties and police forces inhibited the trust and mutual confidence necessary to identify solutions to overcome these differences. Initially, the OHR officials who led the reform efforts believed they had sufficient support and consensus among Bosnian officials. They looked primarily to the senior police officers who had developed relationships with international police advisers over the years of the IPTF intervention. The PRC included several of these officials as Associate Members, and international officials relied on them to develop the technical solutions necessary to implement the EU criteria. According to an OHR staff-member, “we always had good buy-in from the policing establishment…the PRC was full of police heavyweights…who were articulate about how to set up the police.”\textsuperscript{569} Although many of these officials agreed with the core objectives of the PRC and were willing to support the reform efforts, they needed higher level political support. A senior police official who served as an Associate Member summarized their position by stating that “we are all professionals, dedicated to work, we want to communicate at all levels, we want the highest possible degree of coordination, but to make

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{568} Interview with senior Bosnian police official, Sarajevo, December 12, 2011.
  \item \textsuperscript{569} Interview with OHR Official, Sarajevo, August 24, 2010.
\end{itemize}
more progress we needed political changes.” As Martens and the PRC staff failed to secure political support, their proposals were repeatedly rejected by their political leaders. As a result, confidence among these officials in external support frayed. One Commission member recalled:

“We focused on the technical dimensions, but the political buy-in was never there. [OHR officials] were lobbying members of the PRC, but if there were political pressures, they would come back and said, sorry, my superiors said no. The people on the commission understood the problems very well….but not their political masters.”

In the context of continued opposition and declining trust, the PRC failed to reach an agreement. In December 2004, Martens concluded the PRC with the presentation of a detailed report to the OHR outlining the reforms necessary to implement the three EU principles. The report called for a State-level Police Administration Agency that would integrate administrative, policy and political oversight functions at the State level while allowing local Community Oversight Councils to manage local operations and budgets. The plan also outlined new policing districts that crossed inter-ethnic boundary lines (IEBL). In introducing the report, however, Martens noted that although “an acceptable level of professional consensus” was achieved on most of the details of the plan, “political restrictions placed by the Republika Srpska National Assembly on the PRC participants from the RS prevented the full endorsement of the main recommendations.”

As the negotiations continued following the end of the PRC, attempts by OHR officials to cultivate higher-level political buy-in similarly backfired. OHR personnel relied especially on RS President Dragan Cavic – based on his support during the DRC process – to bring the Serbs along. According to an OHR, official:

“There were people who we thought, in the SDS party, understood that there was no long-term viability inside the RS and that actually the interest of the RS was best served by getting into the EU where the importance of

570 Interview with senior Bosnian police official, Sarajevo, December 12, 2011.
571 Interview with senior police officer and former PRC member, Sarajevo, December 1, 2011.
nationhood would be diminished anyway. We basically made a calculated gamble that Cavic understood that and he would work towards assisting BiH in the accession to the EU. That was our basic gamble.”

Initially, this approach appeared promising. Cavic, who generally supported EU integration, seemed willing to compromise. During a round of talks at the mountain resort of Vlasic in May, 2005, Cavic publicly stated that “it is possible to have a joint approach to European standards in BiH” that “would be in line with European standards and principles, but which would also suit the entities and constituent peoples in BiH.” Yet external actors failed to appreciate Cavic’s constraints. Facing pressure from within his party and from the opposition – especially after his support for defense reform – Cavic could not go as far as removing Entity control over the police. Rather than accepting OHR’s conditions, Cavic proposed a compromise to defer the issue of the new police districts to allow agreement on the rest of the proposal. Although the proposal was accepted by all three leading Bosnian parties – despite some reservations – it was rejected by OHR since it did not sufficiently reduce the Entities’ authority. Their apparent failure to understand or address his political constraints severely undermined Cavic’s confidence in external support. Looking back on the process, Cavic lamented that:

“[The international community] had no understanding of how difficult it was to persuade the RS National Assembly to adopt defense reform, and now they expected us to continue to adopt another radical reform. The political receptiveness was stretched to the limit.”

The subsequent events further underscored the depth of opposition within the Serb ruling party, and the consequences for Serb politicians to appear to compromise ethno-nationalist interests regarding the police. Following the Vlasic talks, political leaders in the RS mounted a campaign against the proposed reforms, culminating in a 10,000 person rally urging RS politicians to stand up

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575 Although politicians of all three ethnic groups agreed to defer this one issue in the interest of agreement, OHR rejected such a compromise. Lindvall, “‘The Limits of the European Vision,’” 142.
for their rights. By that point, it had become clear to most Serb politicians that “there was no one who was ready to accept the abolition of the Entity police.” In May 2005, Cavic’s proposal was rejected in the RS National Assembly by vote of 62 to 14, with only the 14 delegates of minority parties voting in favor and all of the SDS delegates rejecting it. In October 2005, Cavic nonetheless arrived at an agreement with Bosniak and Croat leaders that accepted “the basic European principles,” and called for the creation of a “Police Reform Directorate” to negotiate the details of police reform within five years. The October Agreement was portrayed as a victory for the RS since it stated that “this Agreement must be applied in accordance with the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Entity constitutions,” meaning that it would not abolish Entity control over the police. Yet Cavic was punished for his apparent willingness to compromise on core political interests, and, in his own words, he “paid the ultimate political cost.” His government was brought down in a no-confidence vote in January 2006, and after his SDS party lost a significant share of the vote in the 2006 elections, Cavic was ousted from his party. Milorad Dodik, the leader of the SNSD party who became Prime Minister, seems to have drawn a clear lesson about the danger of accepting conditions imposed by the international community at the expense of core nationalist interests. Referring to police reform, Dodik stated that:

“A Serb politician accepting those conditions would not be concerned about surviving the elections, but to keep his life, literally … I think Cavic is one of the most visible examples of a politician destroyed by the international community.”

580 Agreement on Restructuring Police Structures in BiH, Sarajevo, October 5, 2005.
581 Interview with Dragan Cavic, Banja Luka, December 24, 2011.
582 Interview with Milorad Dodik, August 26, 2008, quoted in Lindvall, “The Limits of the European Vision,” 195.
As the OHR continued to push for a centralizing reform, they were also rejected by Bosniak leaders. After the 2006 elections, when it became clear that the Police Directorate established by the October Agreement would not achieve an agreement, the OHR called for another round of negotiations at the political level. During a session at the OHR’s residence that included all of the major parties, Dodik presented a compromise proposal that would have integrated RS police as an administrative unit into unified force, and allowed police areas to cross IEBL in some areas. The proposal was rejected, this time by Haris Slijadzic, the leader of the Bosniak ruling party, the SBiH. The compromise was seen as threatening to Bosniak interests in allowing the RS police to remain even in name, thereby legitimating an institution that was responsible for atrocities against Bosniaks.\(^{583}\) Since gaining a share of seats lost by the SDA party in the 2006 elections, Slijadzic was especially sensitive to maintaining his nationalist credentials, and had criticized the SDA for their willingness to compromise on the police. In other words, Slijadzic delayed movement toward European integration to shore up his political base.

Once again, the failure to achieve a solution can be explained in large part by the absence of trust among political leaders and external actors that could serve as the basis for a mutually acceptable compromise. Following the rejection of the 2007 compromise, a leading SBiH politician remarked that:

\[\text{“I think that the question is trust. And the question is that we have a situation in which political rating is only to be gained by confrontational rhetoric. A person that would depart from this story and say, ‘yes we understand each other, let's not centralise BiH, we will have two entities’—that person will not get more than one percent of the votes…”}\]

\(^{584}\)

The atmosphere of mutual mistrust affected relations among factions as well as with external actors. In his detailed study of the police negotiations, David Lindvall concluded that “the paramount reason for the failure of the talks and the inability to foster open dialogue seems to have been the

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\(^{583}\) Lindvall, “The Limits of the European Vision,” 169.

\(^{584}\) Interview with Beriz Belkić, Deputy President of SBiH party, August 27, 2008, quoted in Lindvall, “The Limits of the European Vision,” 200.
lack of trust between the representatives of the international community and the local political establishment.”

Bosnian leaders grew increasingly frustrated that external actors failed to appreciate their political constraints. External actors grew frustrated, in turn, that leaders refused to compromise despite what they thought to be a compelling set of incentives. The resulting cycle of mistrust inhibited the mutual understanding that was necessary for compromise solutions to emerge.

According to Deputy High Representative Graham Day who observed the police reform negotiations (but not the defense reform negotiations):

“When Cavic or [PDP party leader] Mikerevic would come and tell [Ashdown] about the political reality as they saw it, he would not believe them. He thought they would tell him these ideas to advocate their own political agenda. There was an inherent distrust between them.”

5.5 The Failure of Leverage

The power of cohesive political parties also undermined the leverage of external actors. OHR sought to shore up its leverage with both positive and negative incentives linked to centralizing authority over the police. The promise of EU accession was seen as a powerful incentive, as NATO had been for defense reform. To complement this carrot with the threat of sanctions in case of failure to adopt the reforms, Ashdown also linked police reform to cooperation with the ICTY, and threatened to sanction or remove politicians who failed to accept reforms.

Neither of these incentives was sufficient to overcome the opposition of cohesive parties. As the negotiations repeatedly stalled in the face of concerted political opposition, the unity of external actors steadily declined, undermining their credibility. Despite the agreement in 2003 to make state-level authority over the police a condition for negotiating a Stabilization and Accession Agreement with the EU, as Bosnian leaders repeatedly refused to accept this condition member states began to question the need for a centralized police force. Some countries pointed

587 European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision Establishing the Police Restructuring Commission, Sarajevo, July 2, 2004.
out that several European countries, including Switzerland, Belgium and Germany, functioned effectively with decentralized police. Officials also complained that the criteria in the Patten letter were not rooted in any specific EU standard. Disagreements over the content of reforms worsened as a result of personal and bureaucratic tensions between the OHR and the European Commission representatives in Sarajevo. The lack of unity soon became apparent to Bosnian officials. Referring to the three principles in the Patten letter, BiH President and SDA party leader Adnan Terzic recalled:

“I know for sure that several of the ambassadors were against these principles. The French and the Spanish in particular and they were telling the Serbs that they did not need to do it. Moreover, several of my colleagues in Europe, for instance the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, [Jean-Claude] Juncker, told me in Luxembourg at the time he was presiding over the EU, that I must not accept that these people ask me to make this kind of police reform because when it comes to the police, this is an issue for every individual country and that is why there are no standards.”

Serb officials also realized they could maintain external support by addressing the narrower ICTY issue – which received much broader support among external actors but was perceived as less threatening politically – without moving on police reform. As an OHR official recalled:

“At the same time as he was saying no on the police, [RS Interior Minister] Matijasevic was delivering on the ICTY, buying people off with the support of the international community…During one [PRC] meeting, Matijasevic kept on saying no to everything on the police, but right after the meeting [the SFOR colonel who was an observer on the PRC] went out to dinner with Matijasevic and praised him for his work on the ICTY.”

As unity among external actors frayed in the face of sustained political resistance, and with no clear political basis for agreement, the OHR could no longer credibly enforce its own conditions. The decision to accept the 2005 October Agreement as a basis for starting SAA talks began to undermine its credibility, since the vaguely-worded, two-page document committed only to further negotiations without making progress on the three principles. The agreement was interpreted by

589 Interview with OHR Official, Sarajevo, August 24, 2010. See also Lindvall, “The Limits of the European Vision,” 90.
590 Interview with OHR Official, Sarajevo, August 24, 2010.
592 Author’s Interview with OHR Official, Sarajevo, August 24, 2010.
Bosnian leaders as a major concession on the part of the EU, signaling that they could maintain external support without meeting the conditions. As the negotiations continued, this credibility continued to decline in the face of continued opposition. In 2007, Ashdown’s successor as High Representative, Christian Schwartz-Schilling, announced he would no longer use the Bonn Powers to impose changes – effectively removing the threat of negative sanctions on individuals for failing to agree to reforms. When the 2007 negotiations also failed, external actors merely changed their objectives rather than bolstering their leverage. In July 2007, Miroslav Lajcak, who succeeded Schwartz-Schilling as High Representative, started a new round of negotiations by announcing that “nobody is talking about abolishing the RS Police,” thus shifting OHR’s official position. Yet his compromise proposal that dropped the requirement for police districts that would cross inter-ethnic boundary line was nonetheless rejected by the major parties. The negotiations finally came to an end despite the efforts of the OHR, when Dodick and Slijadzic secretly negotiated their own deal that was accepted by OHR and the EU parties in October, 2007 as a basis for continuing the EU accession process.

The final agreement in 2007 reflected an absence of trust and leverage by external actors that undermined their influence. The Mostar Agreement and Action Plan in no way fulfilled the original conditions for police reform. It consisted of a broad but seemingly contradictory set of provisions that stated the three EU principles, along with the stipulation that “the structure of the single police forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be in line with the constitutional structure of the country,” which granted authority for law enforcement to the Cantons and Entities. The accompanying Action Plan committed the parties to adopting a new Law on Police Service and Law on Police

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593 This statement was given after a meeting in Trebinje with the Chief of the Public Security Centre. Quoted in Lindvall, “The Limits of the European Vision,” p. 173.
594 The Agreement was accepted as a way out of a broader political crisis between the parties, seen as the only basis for agreement. See Venneri, "Beyond the Sovereignty Paradox."
595 The agreement also committed the parties to begin the process of constitutional reform, stating that the “relevant provisions of the Constitution of BiH [would] take form during the process of constitutional reform. Mostar Declaration on Police Reform, Mostar, October 29, 2007. Available at http://www.eusrbih.eu/Print/?cid=2109,1,1.
Officials and to establishing seven new police agencies at the State level, without modifying the structure of the Entity or Canton police. The agreement was adopted as a “face-saving way out for the international community” to enable accession negotiations to advance. Yet certain EU member states rejected it as a failure to meet the original conditions. The Dutch representative, for example, complained that “you cannot reward someone for doing nothing. If you do not pass your exams you cannot go to another level of class.” Nonetheless, with the majority of EU member states anxious to get the accession process back on track, efforts to reform the structure of the police largely ended.

5.6. The Limited Transformation of the Bosnian Police Forces

After nearly five years of negotiation and ten years of assistance efforts, the Bosnian police forces remained divided, unable to cooperate, and largely controlled by local nationalist forces in the Entities and Cantons. The three principles put forth by the OHR as conditions for EU accession were never adopted. Instead, the 2007 Mostar Agreement created seven new State agencies with overlapping functions and little authority over local forces, while leaving the structure of Entity and Canton police forces intact. The failure of these reform efforts stemmed from the deep opposition by cohesive political parties that relied on the police for local control, authority and legitimacy. In the words of one senior police officer, “the police are protected as a national treasure,” and politicians have consistently blocked reforms that undermine their authority. In the face of this opposition, external actors failed to build sufficient trust among their counterparts to influence their thinking, or to achieve the unity necessary to credibly condition their assistance.

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596 The seven agencies included the Institute for forensics; Institute for education and professional upgrading of personnel; Police Support Agency; Independent Board, Citizens Complaint Board; and Police Officials Complaint Board. Action Plan for Implementation of the Mostar Declaration, Mostar, November 22, 2007. Available at http://www.eusrbih.eu/Print/?cid=2205,1,1
597 Muehlmann, “Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”
599 Interview with senior Federation of BiH police officer, Sarajevo, December 6, 2011.
Following the failure of these negotiations, external actors led by the European Union have shifted to a more functional approach to police assistance that has aimed to improve performance while leaving the structure intact. This “bottom up” approach has focused on encouraging practical cooperation among the various forces, while enhancing the technical tools necessary to fight organized crime.\textsuperscript{600} External actors have also strengthened State-level agencies, like the State Border Service and the State Information and Protection Agency, which have taken on the mission of combatting organized crime and illegal migration. Having largely depended on external support for their establishment, function and political backing, the structure and composition of these State-level forces more directly reflected external goals. Most police forces in the Entities and Cantons, meanwhile, remained largely unchanged. I describe this limited transformation in the composition of the forces, the nature of civilian oversight, and the enforcement of legal limits and discipline.

\textbf{5.6.1. Composition and Structure}

Although the police forces drastically fell in size early on, their ethnic homogeneity remained largely unchanged. The IPTF helped to reduce the force from 44,000 to 15,786 officers and decertified over 400 officers responsible for human rights abuse or criminal violations.\textsuperscript{600} Yet a 2003 assessment commissioned by the European Commission found that the number of police officers across BiH, which averaged one officer per every 400 inhabitants, remained over twice the European average. Despite pressure to further downsize, by 2011 the number of uniformed officers had increased to 16,542 and civilian employees increased from 6,000 to 8,000, as a result of political pressure to hire politically connected individuals.\textsuperscript{602} In addition to being overstaffed, most of the local police forces remained dominated by a single ethnic group. As shown in Table 18, although

\textsuperscript{600} Centre for European Perspectives, “Seminar on Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Security Sector Reform and the Stabilisation Process, Seminar Report,” (Sarajevo, June 4-6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{602} Statistics provided to author by the EU Police Mission, Sarajevo in December 2011. See also Azinovic et al, \textit{Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence}, 41.
agreements with the IPTF had called for increasing minority representation to 20% in the RS and 28% in the Federation, by 2009 the RS had barely reached eight percent minority representation, and many Federation forces remained between 80% and 90% mono-ethnic. Formally, new legislation adopted in each of the Cantons and Entities required transparent and open personnel selection processes, through selection commissions, performance evaluations, promotions and appointments based on transparent criteria. In practice, however, selection, appointment and promotion procedures were routinely manipulated by local political parties through their control of the selection boards. The EU Police Mission received frequent complaints from police officers of nepotism, corruption and political party favoritism in decisions regarding rank, promotion and selection.  

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<th>Serbs (%)</th>
<th>Croats (%)</th>
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Table 18: Ethnic Composition of BiH Police Forces (percentage by force)( Source: IPMD; EUPM)

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603 Interview with EUPM Officials, Sarajevo, December 8, 2011.
At the state level, greater influence of external actors resulted in a more balanced ethnic composition. The State Border Service (SBS) and the State Investigative and Protection Agency (SIPA), established through legislation imposed by OHR, have been highly dependent on technical, material and political support of external actors. Nonetheless, these forces have also responded to pressure from nationalist parties.\textsuperscript{604} The SBS, which was initially starved of resources by the government and survived only as a result of external support, consistently fulfilled its legal requirement to maintain a composition of 45% Bosniak, 31% Serb, 24% Croat and 3% other minorities. The leadership of SIPA, meanwhile, was more closely tied to political party networks and struggled with internal factionalism. Officers in both forces complained that as a result of informal ethnic quotas, qualified officers are frequently overlooked for positions.\textsuperscript{605}

5.6.2 Civilian Oversight

The development of civilian oversight mechanisms also fell short of the objectives set by external actors and enabled continued influence of local political factions. The three principles advanced by OHR and the EU to shift legislative and budgetary oversight to the State level, eliminate local political interference, and territorially reorganize the police agencies remained unfulfilled. State institutions did not achieve greater authority over the local forces, and the seven new agencies created under the 2007 Mostar Agreement struggled to coordinate with local forces. According to a 2008 EU evaluation, the new agencies “have no coordination role vis-à-vis the Entities', Cantonal and Brčko District police forces” and “cooperation and information exchange between law enforcement agencies remain weak.”\textsuperscript{606}

At the local level, factional control over local forces remained strong. The effects of the new structures created under the IPTF, including the police commissioners, selection commissions and

\textsuperscript{604} Interviews with Senior SBS and SIPA Officials, Sarajevo, December 2011.
\textsuperscript{605} Interview with Senior Police Official, Sarajevo, December 6, 2011.
oversight boards, have been uneven and subject to political changes. While in some cases active police commissioners managed to resist political pressure when they could rely on public support, in other cases they facilitated political influence. Even independently-minded police commissioners and directors complained that their independence is incomplete, due to control by the minister over budgets and support services. In some jurisdictions, political parties even succeeded in reversing these provisions through legislative amendments that shifted control over appointments, promotion and discipline back to the ministry of interior. Both the effectiveness and the durability of these structures depended on the nature of political forces. In the RS, the dominance of the cohesive SNSD party since 2006 resulted in more centralized control and repeal of several measures instituted by the IPTF. In the FBIH opposition parties succeeded in opposing efforts to repeal the laws put in place during the IPTF, in part due to the strengthen of the political opposition in a more fragmented political environment. In all of these cases, external actors achieved limited influence. When asked about their role in influencing legislative changes, one EUPM adviser lamented that “we are a monitoring, mentoring and advising mission, so there is not much we can do beside advise, provide technical expertise for drafting, monitor and write reports.”

Police officers at the local level also routinely faced political pressure not to cooperate with colleagues across Entity and Canton lines, leading to communication gaps and law enforcement failures. Efforts by external actors to improve this coordination at a technical level, for example by building a joint database on criminal files, have run into repeated delays and obstruction, and left telecommunications systems, databases, computer-based investigation, and criminal analysis systems highly fragmented. As a EU report summarized it, “operational cooperation between law enforcement agencies has continued on a case-by-case basis,” while “the lack of institutionalised

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608 Interview with EUPM Official, Sarajevo, December 8, 2011.
609 Interview with EUPM Official, Sarajevo, August 18, 2010; Interview with senior Federation of BiH police official, Sarajevo, December 6, 2011.
cooperation between all law enforcement agencies and the limited strategic guidance remain challenges to achieve more efficient policing." 610 Where cooperation does occur, it is usually in the interest of the political forces who dominate the police. As an EUPM official remarked, “the system has not created the links between the technical level and the political/ministerial level… where it has worked, it is due to politics.” 611

5.6.3. Enforcement of Legal Limits

The application of legal limits similarly varied as a result of political imperatives. Reforms to legal mandates and disciplinary procedures were adopted on paper but applied inconsistently in practice. The IPTF helped to set up Professional Standards Units in each police force, and created uniform disciplinary procedures and practices. The law on Police Officials, harmonized with the assistance of the U.N., U.S. and E.U., included provisions specifying limits to the use of force, search seizure and arrest, as well as ethics rules and rights and responsibilities of police officials. The 2007 Mostar Agreement also resulted in the establishment of a Public Complaints Board for State-level police forces, which, along with similar boards at the Entity and Canton levels, was empowered to investigate complaints and recommend disciplinary sanctions. In practice, however, each of these mechanisms came to reflect the influence of local political forces. In some jurisdictions, the Professional Standard Units were reconfigured to enable direct intervention by the minister. Top police officials with records of human rights abuse and political ties routinely obstructed disciplinary cases, resulting in numerous dropped investigations. 612 As of 2011, out of 200 cases received by the Public Complaints Board at the State level, none had resulted in disciplinary sanctions. 613 Of the

611 Interview with EUPM Official, Sarajevo, August 18, 2010.
612 Azinovic et al, Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence, 44.
2,700 complaints filed by citizens against the police every year throughout the country, few ever result in sanctions.\footnote{614}{Center for Investigative Reporting, “Internal Affairs System Rarely Curbs Bad Officers,” http://www.cin.ba/Stories/P14_Police/?cid=722,1,1, accessed January 15, 2012.}

As a result, ten years after the conflict most Bosnians believed that their police forces are corrupt and abusive, and confidence has steadily declined. According to a regular poll commissioned by the United Nations Development Program, the percentage of people expressing confidence in the work of the police declined from a high of 81\% in 2002 to 68\% in 2006.\footnote{615}{United Nations Development Program, \textit{Early Warning System: Bosnian and Herzegovina, Annual Report 2002} (Sarajevo: UNDP, 2002), 10; United Nations Development Program, \textit{Early Warning System: Bosnian and Herzegovina, Annual Report 2008} (Sarajevo: UNDP, 2008), 64.} This drop was especially pronounced in Bosniak majority areas where confidence declined from 81\% to 34\%, and in Croat majority areas where the percentage declined from 72\% to 39\%, while in Serb areas confidence in the police remained steady around 70\%. The same survey found that in 2008, 60\% of Bosniaks, 23\% of Croats and 40\% of Serbs believed that corruption, meaning taking bribes or abuse of office for personal gain, was “very” widespread in the police, a sharp increase from a similar survey in 2002.\footnote{616}{In 2000, 18\% of Bosniaks, 16\% of Croats and 36\% of Serbs believed corruption was widespread.}

6. Conclusion

The evolution of the military and police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates the role of political cohesion in explaining changes to security sector governance, and in shaping the role of external assistance in these changes. Variations in the cohesion of ruling parties help to account for why one of the largest post-conflict interventions failed to achieve its objectives in the police but resulted in a restructuring of the military. Neither the size or coordination of international intervention, nor the depth of hostility can explain this variation alone, since the same leaders who supported defense reform chose to oppose police reform despite significant benefits in both cases.
Rather, understanding for this outcome requires a more fine grained analysis of political pressures that faced decision-makers. While dispersed revenue and dependence on external funding created the potential for external influence, politicians’ reliance on cohesive, ethnically defined constituencies created a stronger set of political incentives than the promise of external assistance. Only when that cohesion fragmented, and Serb leaders saw the political need to collaborate with external actors to manage domestic challenges, did an opening for reforms emerge. Although other variables also mattered, conducive political conditions remained crucial. For example, the depth of hostility affected the cohesion of ethnically-based parties, but shifts were still possible as politics evolved over time and spaces for fragmentation emerged. While cohesive ethnic politics blocked police reform, temporary fragmentation created sufficient space for defense reform. Similarly, the size of intervention was helpful in increasing external leverage, but only to the extent that it responded to political conditions and was coordinated effectively. Without some opportunity within the political context, even the most intensive and coordinated intervention could achieve only limited influence.

Understanding the evolution of governance and the role of external actors also requires a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through which external actors influence decisions. The Bosnian case shows how external influence arises through both bargaining leverage and mutual confidence and trust, and how the potential for both forms of influence depend in part on the cohesiveness of the ruling party and the coherence of the external response. Much of the literature on post-conflict state-building has focused on bargaining among external and domestic actors, and the leverage that arises through effective coordination. In Bosnia, the High Representative appears to have paid special attention to this mechanism of influence, by seeking to create both positive and negative inducements through the promise of NATO and the EU and the threat of individual sanctions, and by working to unify external actors around common objectives. Although this
mechanism played an important part in explaining the extent of external influence over security governance, it only tells part of the story. The agreements on defense reform depended in large part on the trust and mutual understanding achieved among the factions and external actors, which enabled the parties to reach difficult compromises. Key players including Locher, Gregorian and Radovanovic understood the importance of communication and trust, and deliberately aimed to foster it. Their efforts would not have been successful without the political fragmentation that encouraged Bosnian leaders to cooperate. Nonetheless, their experience sheds light on an important but underexplored mechanism of influence.

The interaction between external and domestic actors also occurs on multiple levels, complicating the impact of external assistance and contributing to unintended consequences. On one level, decisions emerged directly from negotiations among external and domestic actors. The effects of interaction also emerge at a deeper level, as external actors affect the political conditions that shape their leverage. In some areas, external intervention contributed to facilitating influence and opportunities for reform, notably by dismantling the financial structures that concentrated control over revenue among local political parties. In other areas, external actors undermined the potential for influence. The Constitution that was adopted as part of the Dayton Peace Accords helped to achieve peace by separating the warring parties, but it also created a governance system which reinforced the power of ethnically-based political parties. External actors also affected the cohesion of political parties through the interaction process itself. By pressuring relatively moderate Bosnian leaders to go beyond what their establishments and constituencies were willing to accept, they fueled a political backlash that renewed the strength and cohesion of ethnically-based parties. The process of success in defense reform thus helped to breed the failure of police reform. Given these multiple levels of interaction, understanding the effects of external intervention on post-conflict governance and state-building requires a deep look at these interactions.
CHAPTER VI

THE INFLUENCE OF RICHES: RISING OIL WEALTH AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE TIMOR LESTE NATIONAL POLICE

Barely four years after Timor Leste secured its sovereignty as an independent country, a violent conflict involving the police and defense forces triggered a second international intervention in less than a decade. In 1999, a historic referendum led to the end of Indonesian rule after a decades-long independence struggle. Following a wave of violence, an international intervention force deployed to stabilize the country, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) assumed temporary sovereignty, and donor countries contributed over $500 million in aid to build the state and prepare the country for independence in 2002. As part of the intervention, a UN Police force of 1,640 officers and several donor countries deployed to build a new police force. By the time the UN handed control over the Policia Nacional de Timor Leste (PNTL) to Timor Leste’s government in 2004, however, it had only partially achieved its objectives. Although the new police force conformed to international standards in its structure and form, it remained plagued by internal factionalism and politicized oversight that contributed directly to the violent crisis that consumed the country in 2006. The second intervention of UN Police and donor aid that followed the crisis achieved even less influence over the governance of the police, despite efforts to strengthen its mandate and coordination. When the UN once again handed sovereignty over the PNTL to the Timorese government in 2011, the country had achieved stability and peace, but its police force remained internally divided and politicized as the UN had failed to meet many of its core objectives.

This chapter explores why two of the most intensive international state-building interventions ever conducted achieved limited influence in shaping the police. Prior to 2006, the intervention in Timor Leste was seen as a major success, explained in large part by its size and
intensity as “the best resourced of any UN or U.S.-led nation-building effort to date,” as well as by its intrusive mandate and strong international backing.\textsuperscript{617} The conditions within the country also appeared favorable, as a result of its small size and population of roughly one million, the broad consensus among a people that had achieved independence after a long struggle, and the apparent “blank slate” in terms of prior institutions. Although external actors did shape the structure and composition of the police early on, the two interventions ultimately failed to meet most of their objectives for structuring the police, and left the force deeply factionalized and plagued by weak management, oversight and discipline. In addition to explaining why such apparently favorable conditions resulted in relative failure, this chapter also explains why the second intervention achieved even less influence than the first, despite attempts to enhance its organization.

This outcome can be explained in large part by the changing composition of revenue to the Timor Leste state, combined with political fragmentation and uneven coordination by external actors, which shaped the interaction and relative influence of Timorese leaders and international officials. During the first intervention, Timorese leaders depended on financial and political support as a result of severe fiscal constraints and a fragmented political environment. These conditions generated opportunities for external influence beyond its formal authority as Timorese political leaders and police officials relied on external backing to manage internal challenges. Yet the UN and bilateral donors suffered from coordination challenges that gradually undermined the confidence Timorese counterpart and weakened their leverage in negotiating over key decisions. Although they shaped the structure of the force early on, Timorese factions gradually gained the upper hand over external actors in driving decisions over composition and civilian oversight, leading to only a partial transformation. During the second intervention, the landscape had shifted due to increased oil wealth that led to a tenfold rise in government spending by 2009. Instead of relying on external

\textsuperscript{617} Dobbins et al, “Congo to Iraq,” 176.
support, leaders consolidated their authority by distributing oil wealth through state spending. External assistance served limited utility both politically and financially, leaving external actors with limited influence. Only when individuals who faced political challenges turned to external actors for support, and individual donors responded coherently, did donors exert even partial influence over specific decisions. Reforms during this period may have contributed to greater stability, but they most often diverged from external recommendations and allowed factional influence to prevail.

This chapter compares the evolution of the Timor Leste National Police (PNTL) during the two periods of intervention, from 2000-2005 and from 2006-2011. Comparing a single force over two distinct time periods focuses attention on one crucial condition that varied between the two, the concentration of revenue. This chapter does not specifically examine the Timor Leste Defense Forces, although it is influence over the PNTL is discussed. The analysis is based on research conducted in Timor Leste in 2010 and 2011 that includes extensive documentation, a large number of published and unpublished accounts by individuals involved, and over 100 interviews with Timorese, UN, Australian, New Zealander, Portuguese, American officials, activists and observers. The chapter begins, in the next section, with a baseline analysis that focuses on the precursors to the Timorese police and security forces, the FALANTIL resistance force, the Indonesian police (POLRI), and the East Timor Police Service as it was originally constituted by the UN. The second section lays out the conditions that shaped the evolution of these forces, including political fragmentation, a changing revenue base, and uneven external coordination. In the third section, I trace the evolution of the PNTL during each of the two time periods, describing how conditions shaped the pressures facing Timorese leaders as well as the trust and leverage among domestic and external actors that affected their relative influence over decisions. The final section summarizes the argument and concludes.
1. The Timorese Security Sector Prior to Independence

Since the PNTL came into existence at the beginning of the period under examination, the baseline begins with all of the security forces that existed prior to and following the country’s formal independence and contributed people, norms and practices to the new force. Members of the FALANTIL resistance force and its associated clandestine networks formed the core of the new security sector in contributing both police personnel and key decision-makers. Other officers in the new police force had served in the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) which operated in East Timor under Indonesian rule. Finally, the PNTL itself began its existence as the East Timor Police Service (ETPS), which was created by the UN Police mission first to assist it in carrying out its own stabilization mission and then as the nucleus of the force that was renamed the Policia Nacional de Timor Leste that was established at independence. Measured according to the three core elements of security force governance – the composition, civilian oversight and respect for legal limits – all three forces were to some degree internally factionalized and governed through informal channels by politically partisan forces, resulting in poor discipline and professionalism. The effects of international assistance starting with the establishment of the PNTL can thus be measured by the changes in each of these elements over the course of the two interventions.

1.1 The FALANTIL Resistance Force

The Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Timor Leste (FALANTIL), the resistance force that had opposed Indonesian rule for nearly three decades, exerted the dominant influence over Timor Leste’s post-independence security forces. Although FALANTIL transitioned into the Timor Leste Defense Forces (F-FDTL) following independence, many of its members joined the police forces or influenced the development of the police as politicians or security officials. From its early days, the force reflected the divisions that defined Timorese politics and society. FALANTIL was created as the armed wing of the ASDT political party (later renamed FRETELIN), one of the three parties
formed in 1974 as Portugal began to relinquish its control over its colonies. The FALANTIL forces were first mobilized for internal, partisan conflict when the ASDT opposed a coup attempt by the UDT party in August, 1975. During the brief civil war that followed, FALANTIL forces allegedly committed serious human rights abuse against UDT supporters. Following Indonesian occupation later that year, its focus shifted to fighting Indonesian forces and eventually garnered the support of other political parties. Yet its violent, partisan beginning was nonetheless reflected in its composition, civilian oversight and discipline for most of its existence.

1.1.1 Composition and Structure

The composition of the FALANTIL force emerged from its partisan formation, and evolved to reflect the segmented social structure of Timorese society. In the words of its former commander-in-chief (and later Timorese Prime Minister and President) Xanana Gusmao, FALANTIL was “born under the umbrella of a political party, FRETILIN, to fight another political party, UDT.” Over time, it took on a more national character and incorporated fighters from across the political and social spectrum of Timorese society to fight Indonesian forces. It further broadened its base after 1987, when Gusmao decided to sever the connection between FALANTIL and FRETELIN, and instead re-oriented the force as the armed wing of a multi-party coalition known as the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM). As the legitimacy and representativeness of FALANTIL broadened, however, it grew increasingly fragmented internally. Made up of small cells of fighters, it focused on guerilla warfare in localized areas with limited

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618 On the formation of Timorese political parties see Geoffrey Robinson, If You Leave Us Here We Will Die: How Genocide was Stopped in East Timor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 32.
movement among them, especially after the death of its first commander Nicolo Lobato in 1979. These local units received support from the local population through an organized, clandestine network known as the *Rede Clandestina*. Recruitment, as well as command, operations and discipline, took place on the basis of local family and clan networks managed by local commanders. Although this structure ensured cohesion and discipline at the local level, it also strengthened local over national solidarities as FALANTIL evolved more as a loose collection of units than a unified force.

1.1.2 Civilian Oversight

The oversight and leadership structure also emerged from FALANTIL’s evolution as a decentralized guerilla force. Although the force was initially controlled by civilian leaders of the FRETELIN party, their influence eroded as they were mostly forced into exile, captured or killed. The leadership that replaced them operated on the basis of personalized authority and highly opaque decision-making. The process through which Xanana Gusmao rose to the position of commander-in-chief, following Nicolo Lobato’s death, generated considerable controversy among FRETELIN leaders. Most of the hardline leaders who opposed him were captured, killed or succumbed to internal power struggles under circumstances that remain unclear. Rival leaders who remained alive in exile could do little to challenge his authority. Although overall authority was centralized in the hands of the commander-in-chief, due to the challenges of mobility and communication each commander exercised a high level of autonomy, with little oversight or direction from civilian leaders abroad. By the time of independence, FALANTIL fighters had little experience with a formal, force-wide hierarchy or civilian control.

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626 Ibid, 41
1.1.3 Discipline and Legal Limits

In the absence of civilian oversight, FALANTIL also operated outside of any formal legal framework, although its fighters developed a high level of discipline within each unit. Its history was spotted with human rights abuses, starting with its alleged abuses during its fight against the UDT party and continuing through its internal struggles during the 1980s – although such abuses paled in comparison to those of the Indonesian forces. At the same time, FALANTIL developed a high level of discipline, which contributed to broad-based support and cooperation among the Timorese population. In the run-up to independence, FALANTIL demonstrated its capacity for internal discipline as they remained cantoned despite increasing violence perpetrated by Indonesia-backed militias. UN military liaison officers who visited the camps were impressed both by the force’s logistical capability in establishing the camps and by their professionalism.

1.2 The Indonesian Police

Although never part of the Timorese state, the Indonesian Police (POLRI) also contributed personnel and practices to the PNTL. Recruited by the UN as the core of the new force due to their prior experience, Timorese who had served in the POLRI quickly rose to leadership positions. Although none of its formal structure or hierarchy remained, the norms, values and practices of the POLRI influenced the PNTL through these individuals. Although its composition as a broad-based Indonesian force did not directly affect that of the PNTL, the nature of civilian oversight, level of professionalism and application of legal limits undoubtedly filtered into the new force.

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627 Rees Under Pressure, 40-42.
628 Weinstein finds that such support is associated with a high level of cooperation and integration with the population and a low level of abuse. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion.
630 Robinson, If You Leave Us Here We Will Die, 146.
1.2.1. Civilian Oversight and Legal Limits

The POLRI formed part of the Indonesian military, and its governance reflected its ties to political and military authority in Indonesia. Although this structure evolved after 1999 in the context of Indonesia’s transition to democracy, those changes took effect after the Timorese officers left the POLRI and joined the PNTL. Since it operated under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, top POLRI officers were often drawn from military ranks, and the police worked closely with the armed forces on internal security. Its leadership and operations were also influenced by internal patronage networks and external political influence that operated outside formal legal channels. Military and police leaders maintained an extensive network of commercial, real estate, mining and other enterprises that benefited from their privileged role in society. Police officers also received gifts in the form of houses, land, cars, education and jobs, based on their ability to influence the outcome of judicial cases, provide physical protection, and extort on behalf of politically connected people. These internal and external networks served as the basis for the selection and rotation of police personnel. To advance in their careers, officers had to cultivate the support of a patron inside or outside the force, respond to factional pressure, and often pay substantial bribes to secure positions. As a result, police operations responded as much to the needs of individual politicians or the private interest of senior officials than to the needs of policing. Within this context, corruption, abuse of authority and human rights abuses were rampant.

1.3 The East Timor Police Service

The East Timor Police Service was the direct precursor to the PNTL prior to independence. Although recruitment and training began in 2000 under the authority of the UN Police, it was only formally established until 2001, through a decree that laid out its structure and criteria for

632 Ibid, 11.
recruitment. This structure and the initial rounds of recruitment that occurred prior to independence served as the nucleus from which the police force would evolve as it gradually transitioned to Timorese authority after 2002.

1.3.1 Composition

Even before formal recruitment criteria were adopted in 2001, the composition of the ETPS began to reflect Timorese political divisions. Formally, requirements for recruitment into the new force conformed to international standards, as laid out in the 2001 decree. Recruits had to be over 18, have a high school education and basic reading, writing and speaking skills, and pass physical and medical examinations and a selection interview that rated candidates based language ability, past work experience and physical fitness.\textsuperscript{634} Each candidate then went through a three-month training course at the National Police College, which was established run by the UN Police, followed by six months of mentoring by UN Police in the field. According to the decree, the force was to be multi-ethnic in composition, and a 20\% quota for women officers would be applied to the recruitment process. By 2002, over 1,700 officers had been recruited, just over half of its target of 3,200.\textsuperscript{635}

Despite these formal criteria, the new force began its existence divided among two main factions. The core of the force consisted of roughly 350 ex-POLRI officers who had assisted UN Police officers in the early stages of the mission, along with a few individuals who had served as translators and gained the confidence of the UN Police.\textsuperscript{636} These officers were regarded suspiciously by other recruits who had served in FALANTIL or in the Clandestine forces regarded ex-POLRI officers with deep suspicion. Tension between these two groups had already taken root by the time of independence.

1.3.2 Civilian Oversight and Legal Limits

The oversight structure and legal limits were under development at the time of independence. The 2001 Decree clarified the force’s structure, mission and recruitment procedures, but it provided little detail on governance and oversight structures. Authority formally resided entirely with the UN Police Commissioner, and oversight exercised by a member of the UNTAET Administrator’s cabinet, although the content of oversight was not specified. Since the UN remained in control prior to independence, little effort was devoted to building a civilian oversight structure in the Timorese state.

In practice, authority over the PNTL officers was exercised primarily by individual UN Police officers through informal “mentoring” and formal supervision relationships, with the UN Police Commissioner holding ultimate authority. Although UNTAET exercised some oversight, its nature was not formalized. The new police also relied primarily on UN trainers and mentors to instill professional values and discipline. Prior to independence, oversight and discipline thus depended almost entirely on the personal efforts of individual UN Police officers. Formal structures for oversight and discipline would evolve under a sovereign Timorese state.

2. Conditions for State-Building in Timor Leste

The new Timorese state evolved in the context of a fragmented political landscape, in which a change in the revenue base during the first decade of its existence altered the opportunities for external actors to influence its new institutions. Initially, vulnerable leaders faced a challenging political environment as the ruling FRETELIN party shared the scene with several rival parties and leaders and suffered from internal competition and division. The state also lacked any significant source of domestic revenue and relied on funding by international donors. These conditions

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favored a high level of external influence over key decisions as external actors first led then assisted the process of building state institutions. Although external actors succeeded in defining the structure and composition of the police forces, however, coordination challenges gradually undermined their influence over time. By 2005, the landscape had begun to shift as revenue from offshore oil fields flowed into the state. Following the crisis in 2006, the increased oil revenue had altered the landscape. Timorese leaders could manage the fragmented environment by strategically allocating funds rather than rely on external support, leaving external actors with little means of leverage. This section describes the fragmented ruling parties, changing revenue sources and uneven external coordination that leaders faced as they took key decisions regarding the police.

2.1 Internal Struggles and the Fragmentation of Political Authority

The fragmentation of the Timorese political landscape shaped state-building efforts since long before Timor Leste’s independence in 2002. On the surface, political groupings appeared to have largely consolidated by the time of independence, with FRETELIN having achieved a dominant position as the ruling party. Yet a closer examination reveals a fragmented and shifting landscape of political competition within and outside the FRETELIN party, based on a patchwork of individual rivalries and divisions rooted in language, geographic and family affiliation.

This fragmentation originated, on the one hand, in the country’s political party structure that emerged during the country’s first brief period of independence in 1974-75. When political parties were first allowed in the Portuguese colony in 1974, five parties immediately formed. The three largest parties, the Associação Social Democrata Timorense (ASDT) - later renamed the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETELIN) – the União Democrática Timorense (UDT) and the Associação Popular Democrática de Timor (APODETT) diverged primarily over their positions vis-à-

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vis external rule. The ASDT party advocated a radical path of immediate independence, UDT favored a gradual transition under Portuguese tutelage, and APODETI preferred to join Indonesia. Tensions boiled over during a brief but violent civil war in 1975 sparked by APODETI’s refusal to cooperate in a transitional government with FRETELIN, followed by a coup launched by UDT against FRETELIN. The resulting instability helped to justify the Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor in December 1975, and Indonesian authorities continued to exploit internal divisions. Timorese supporters of Indonesia – many of who were APODETI partisans – were favored with local administrative positions and contracts with Indonesian businesses. Meanwhile, FRETELIN came to achieve a dominant position as a result of its opposition to Indonesian rule and effective mobilization strategies. It eventually joined with UDT and smaller parties in the Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense (CNRT) coalition to unify anti-Indonesian resistance. Yet tensions continued to simmer, and came to the surface again during the violence that consumed the country prior to the 1999 referendum. They also emerged around the first elections in 2001 as FRETELIN left the CNRT grouping to complete against its former allies, and when those parties were excluded from the post-independence government.

Within the FRETELIN party, rivalries among individuals and factions fueled further tensions that spilled over into broader conflict. From the founding of the party, ideological differences emerged between moderate social democrats and more militant Marxists among the party’s top leaders. The tensions worsened when Xanana Gusmao, one of the only leaders who remained in the country, decided to pursue a cease-fire with Indonesia without the permission of

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639 Robinson, If You Leave Us Here We Will Die. 2010 UDT was led by wealthy landowning families and civil servants; ASDT was led by students, teachers, low level civil servants and successfully mobilized much of the country’s rural peasantry; APODETI was comprised primarily of wealthy landowners who had opposed Portuguese rule who pushed for East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia. Two smaller parties, Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain (KOTA), and Trabalhista, represented traditional authority systems and workers respectively.


exiled FRETELIN leaders, separate the FALANTIL resistance force from FRETELIN, and bring it under the umbrella of the multi-party CNRT coalition. By the time of the Indonesian withdrawal, FRETELIN “was defined by two main poles, represented by the resistance hero, Xanana Gusmao, who had led the internal resistance and forged a broad political coalition, and the Secretary-General of FRETELIN, Mari Alkatiri, who had led the party from exile.”642 The division between these two poles was driven in part by ideological differences, but it was muddied by inter-personal tensions. Other figures, most notably Rogerio Lobato, did not fit neatly into either ideological camp, but pursued their own personal and political ambitions within the party.

Each of these leaders drew support from a complex set of social and political networks that further contributed to political fragmentation. East Timor was home to more than thirty distinct language groups, with the largest group comprising no more than 200,000 people and the smallest as few as 6,000. Historical competition among highly autonomous local linrais (kingdoms) and sucos (princedoms) continued to play out in rivalries between families, clans and villages that lined up in favor of one party or another.643 Local affiliations also served as the basis for recruitment by resistance networks during the Indonesian occupation, as individual commanders built their own centers of power on the basis of local family and clan affiliations.644 As the country moved toward independence, top party leaders built cultivated the allegiance of these local leaders and their networks. For instance, Gusmao drew support from the commanders who had served beneath him in FALANTIL.645 Other local leaders who had broken with Gusmao and formed their own “security groups” made up of loyal former fighters, such as the Conselho Popular de Defesa da Republica Democratica de Timor Leste (CPD-RDTL) and Sagrada Familia network, mobilized in

644 Ibid.
645 Top FALANTIL commanders included Taur Matan Ruak, Lere Anan Timor, Falur Rate Laek and Ular Rihik.
favor of rival politicians. Politicians also drew support from Martial Arts Groups, highly organized groups of youth that had formed during Indonesian rule, as well as villages and clans. This “rich array of often overlapping clan, political, administrative, educational, economic, religious, and security networks” provided ample opportunities for political entrepreneurs to build their base of supporters by exploiting and exacerbating existing cleavages.

Leaders of the ruling parties in both periods therefore faced challenges from both within and outside their parties. Although FRETELIN appeared to dominate the political scene, having won 57% of the country’s first vote for the Constitutional Assembly in 2001, the remaining 43% represented powerful constituencies that were divided into three main opposition parties and a range of smaller parties. In addition, President Gusmao, who won 83% of the presidential vote, operated outside the FRETELIN party and frequently challenged Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and other FRETELIN leaders. Other rivals stayed within the FRETELIN umbrella but continued to challenge it. Most notoriously, Rogerio Lobato cultivated the support of powerful “security groups” to challenge the authority of party leaders and influence key decisions. The attempt by Lobato and others to mobilize their networks against each other led directly to the 2006 crisis.

Although the conflict appeared to consolidate along an “East” vs. “West” divide, these labels obscured a much more complex set of divisions between individual leaders and rival “security groups” that sparked

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646 The CPD-RDTL was led by Ologari Aswain and the Sagrada Familia was led by Foho Rai Bo’ot, also known as Elle Sette. See Ree, Under Pressure, 42.
647 On the role of Martial Arts Groups, see James Scambury, A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor Leste (Canberra: Australia’s Agency for International Development, 2006).
648 Goldstone, “Building a State and ‘Statebuilding’”, 212.
simmering tensions among rival villages, clans, language groups, many of whom competed for resources in Dili's dense urban neighborhoods.651

By the 2007 elections, this fragmented landscape had become evident as no party achieved an outright majority. As shown in Table 19, FRETELIN’s share of support dropped to 29%, while no other party gained more than 25% of the vote. The government formed by Gusmao was comprised of five different parties, and FRETELIN continued to pose challenges from the opposition.652 The results revealed the malleability of the country’s political groupings, as well as the need for the ruling party to address the demands of rivals in order to govern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Vote</td>
<td>Number of Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Fretilin)</td>
<td>57.53</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congresso Nacional de Reconstrucuo de Timor-Leste (CNRT)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (PD)</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (PSD)</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timorese Social Democrat Association (ASDT)</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union (UDT)</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Timor (PST)</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Unidade Nacional (PUN)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidade Nacional Democratica de Resistencia Timorense (UNDERTIM)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianca Democratica (AD/KOTA)</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Party of Timor (PPT)</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party (PDC)</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Party of Timor (PNT)</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party (PL)</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party of Timor (UDC/PDC)</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Results of Parliamentary Elections in Timor Leste, 2001 and 2007 (Source: Timor Leste National Elections Commission)

652 The AMP coalition comprised CNRT, PSD, ASDT, PD and a small FRETELIN breakaway party named FRETILIN Mudanca.
2.2 From Dispersed to Concentrated Revenue

A shift from dispersed to concentrated revenue during Timor Leste’s first decade of statehood created a changing set of opportunities for political leaders to manage this fragmented political environment. The Timorese state began its existence bereft of revenue and highly dependent on external financial support. East Timor had been one of the most impoverished jurisdictions within the Indonesian state, with a per capita GDP that amounted to a third of the Indonesian level and dependent on transfers from the Indonesian government for 85% of expenditures. When the province came under the control of the UN Transitional Administration in 1999, GDP had dropped 33% as a result of the destruction sustained during the transition. The country’s primarily agricultural economy could not sustain the new state. Domestic taxation accounted for less than 20% of government spending, while 40% was directly funded by external donors and much more donor funding bypassed the budget entirely. The state budget was itself managed initially by the UN Transitional Administration as the Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET) and only slowly transitioned to Timorese control. Even where funds were nominally overseen by Timorese officials, expatriate advisers served as gatekeeper and defined how budgets were formulated, allocated and spent.

Between 2004 and 2007, the increase in oil sales shifted the composition of the government’s revenue. The country inherited substantial off-shore oil fields within its territorial control, although initially control was disputed with neighboring Australia, and Timor Leste lacked the infrastructure to exploit them. In 2002, petroleum production accounted for only $26 million – a substantial portion of the country’s small budget but vastly insufficient for the country’s

655 Interview with former World Bank official, Dili, Timor Leste, May 5 2012.
656 The dispute between Australia and Indonesia was based on conflicting interpretations of international law that drew the border either at the continental shelf or halfway between the two countries.
development needs. In 2003, Timor Leste and Australia ratified the Timor Sea Treaty that divided the revenue from a portion of the disputed area. One year later, oil revenue increased to $205 million and, as illustrated in Figure 11, increased to $438 million in 2005-6 and $2.1 billion by 2010. By 2008, government spending had increased tenfold, and 80% of it derived from oil revenue. As the state found a new source of funding, the proportion of donor funds decreased substantially, from a high of 40% of the government’s budget in 2002 to 1% in 2005.

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenue</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Gas Revenue</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nontax Revenue (fees, service charges &amp; other)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Retention Agencies (power, aviation, port)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants &amp; Contributions (aid)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Sources of Revenue to the Timor Leste Government, millions of USD (Source: Timor Leste Ministry of Finance)

The establishment of a Petroleum Fund partly moderated some of the possible perverse effects of this concentrated revenue by limiting discretion over its collection. The Petroleum Fund Law adopted in 2005 required all oil revenue to be deposited directly into a dedicated account maintained offshore in the New York Federal Reserve, invested according to strict guidelines, and reported upon transparently and regularly. The amount that could be transferred to the government each year was limited to the “estimated sustainable income” (ESI), an amount

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657 World Bank, World Development Indicators.
658 The treaty established a Joint Petroleum Development Area from which 90% of oil revenue would accrue to Timor-Leste and 10% to Australia, although it left substantial reserves to be negotiated in the future. See Mats Lundahl, and Fredrik Sjöholm, "The oil resources of Timor-Leste: curse or blessing?" The Pacific Review 21, no. 1 (2008).
659 Initially, 100% in US Treasury Bonds, with a gradual increase in the amount in equity up to a maximum of 10%.
calculated to ensure the perpetuity of the fund. Expenditures greater than the ESI required debate and approval by the legislature. As one expatriate adviser noted, “Due to the impact of the oil fund, the revenue side is airtight; all money goes directly to the government, there is no leakage in getting it in.”660 The government had very little discretion to allocate oil revenue before its entry into the budget. Yet, the same adviser noted “leakage in expenditure” that provided significant opportunities for manipulating the allocation of funds.

![Figure 11: Revenue as a Percentage of Budget, 2001-2010 (Source: Timor Leste Ministry of Finance)](image)

Timorese leaders exercised considerable discretion over expenditures and succeeded in directing funds for political ends. After 2007, the government utilized two primary modalities to distribute revenue to politically important constituents.661 The first involved direct transfers to specific segments of the population. Payments and food assistance were provided to socially vulnerable groups, including the elderly and school children, as well as to individuals and groups who were considered politically important or volatile. The “petitioners” whose dismissal from the military triggered the 2006 crisis received a lump payment of $8,500 each; 12,000 veterans of the

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660 Interview with former World Bank Official, Dili, Timor Leste, June 2, 2010.
661 For an analysis of these spending modalities, see Naazneen H. Barma, “Pathways from Petroleum Dependence to Conflict in Rentier States: A Case Study of Timor-Leste” (Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, California, April 3-6, 2013).
resistance received a monthly stipend whose size depended on their years of service; and ex-fighters began to fill the ranks of a vastly expanding civil service and receiving salaries and benefits. A second spending modality involved procurements that quickly transferred resources to politically important groups. This modality was first established as the *Pakote Referendum* in 2010, and renamed *Pakote Desenvolvimentu Decentralasaun* in subsequent years. The Fund was set up to overcome bottlenecks in government systems that were unable to spend the growing budget, finance the rapid construction of small-scale infrastructure projects, and create jobs. Although it achieved limited success toward its stated objectives – in the first round of the *Pakote Referendum* over 50% of projects never completed – it was highly successful in distributing funds to influential players in order to “keep people happy and buy off potential spoilers.” In addition to this fund, 70% of overall government expenditure went to procurement, and contracts were allocated to key constituents across government agencies.

These modalities enabled the ruling party to overcome the challenges of the fragmented political environment by coopting rivals and cementing loyalties through access to funds. Individuals from around the country and from across the political spectrum benefited from this spending, including prominent supporters of the FRETELIN party and other potential spoilers. In a 2010 speech to a conference of donor countries, Prime Minister Gusmao explicitly summarized this strategy and its success, stating that the peace achieved since 2007 was “because there was a greater focus on public investment, from infrastructure to social services….included paying pensions to veterans and providing subsidies to the elderly... and subsidizing the sale of rice.” An observer put it more bluntly: “Prime Minister Gusmao sought to centralize power at the top, even at the expense

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663 Interview with former World Bank Official, Dili, Timor Leste, June 2, 2010.
664 Interview with UN Political Officer, Dili, Timor Leste, May 18, 2010.
666 Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste, *Speech by His Excellency the Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusman at the Start of the Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting,* Dili, Timor Leste, 7 April 2010.
of so called allies, while delivering more to a wider set of supporters at the base.” The influx of revenue enabled leaders to manage the challenges of a fragmented political environment without relying on external support.

2.3 External Intervention and the Challenges of Coordination

Intensive international interventions that struggled to coordinate effectively constituted another important part of the state-building landscape in Timor Leste. The sovereign authority invested first in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and later in the UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) enabled centralized decision-making and coordination in some areas, but the UN and bilateral donors struggled to manage information and achieve unified objectives in other areas, including in the security sector. Coordination challenges gradually undermined the leverage and trust necessary for external actors to influence key decisions.

During the first round of external intervention that lasted from 1999 until 2005, external actors executed a highly intrusive mandate with centralized decision-making. The United Nations Transitional Administration was empowered by the Security Council to “exercise all legislative and executive authority” over the country, to “provide security and maintain law and order,” to “establish an effective administration” and to “ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance.” UNTAET included a police contingent of 1,640 officers and a military component of 8,950 troops, while donors mobilized funds totaling $500 million in the first three years and $3.6 billion in the first decade – one of the highest levels of per capita assistance anywhere. At the policy level, UNTAET’s highly centralized structure facilitated coherent decision-making and effective relationships with Timorese leaders. Its top official, Special

Representation of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator Sergio Vieira de Mello had the sole authority to issue “regulations” as national legislation and personally signed all major decisions. Although UNTAET’s authority enabled it to govern on its own, de Mello consulted regularly with Timorese leaders through the eleven-member National Consultative Council (NCC), and later through a joint cabinet that included five Timorese members. Although the NCC had no formal decision-making power, it facilitated close cooperation between de Mello and a small group of Timorese leaders led by resistance leader Xanana Gusmao.670 Most key decisions of this phase were based on constant communication and discussion that fostered consensus among these leaders.671

Beyond this policy role, however, UNTAET’s struggled to coordinate donor assistance. Especially early on, its geographic reach was limited and it was slow to mobilize officials around the country. As late as January 2000, 174 professional-level UNTAET staff sat in Dili while only 17 had been deployed to the remaining thirteen districts.672 This limited presence severely inhibited the collection and analysis of information about conditions on the ground. Several observers of this period noted the failure of UN officials – most of whom were civil servants with little political training – to grasp the basic political reality.673 In addition, although UNTAET could set policy and legal decisions, it struggled to achieve consensus with other donors on most funding decisions. While UNTAET administered the Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET) which spent nearly $175 million in its first three years, a roughly equal amount was spent through a separate fund, Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) managed by the World Bank.674 Management of the CFET and TFET

671 Caroline Hughes, Dependent Communities: Aid and Politics in Cambodia and East Timor” (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
672 Chopra “Building State Failure,” 988.
engendered bitter disputes between the UN, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. An even larger amount was spent outside either of these two funds through bilateral donor programs. In 2002, for example, donor funds amounting to $419 million dwarfed the $75 million budget CFET budget. Between 2002 and 2006, 82% of aid was funded by bilateral actors, most of which was divided among five large donors. As a result, major funding decisions were taken by at least five different bilateral donors, each with their own priorities, funding modalities and, in the security sector, approaches to policing. As shown in Figure 12, this division among donors continued throughout the decade.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilaterals</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>2,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DAC Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilaterals</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Donors</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>2,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, per capita ($)</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>2,472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Total Official Development Assistance to Timor Leste, 2000-2010 (Net Disbursement in $ million. Source: OECD-DAC)

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This funding structure contributed to an uneven pattern of coordination that excluded many Timorese from decision-making and undermined mutual trust. At the policy level where decision-making was more centralized, many Timorese leaders – including many FRETELIN leaders – felt left out of the small group of leaders who were part of the Transitional Administrator’s inner circle. At one point, these leaders forced de Mello to expand the National Consultative Council from eleven to twenty-six members to ensure broader representation. Yet he continued to consult with the same handful of trusted Timorese leaders. At the same time, UNTAET decisions rarely influenced the multitude of funding programs taken by other donors and agencies with even less consultation. The combination of centralized decision-making with limited coordination among the broader set of donors undermined trust among Timorese leaders. As one senior Timorese official recalled, by the time the new government took office in 2002, “the huge stock of goodwill that had existed between Timor-Leste and the international community had largely dissipated, with profound consequences for future development efforts.”

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678 Shoesmith, “Divided Leadership.”
679 Pires and Francino “National Ownership and International Trusteeship.”
680 Ibid, 128.
Mutual confidence continued to decline over time, especially after 2002 when UNTAET transitioned to the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and its presence and mandate shrank considerably. UNMISET’s mandate shifted from sovereign authority to assistance and advice. Staffed primarily by technical advisers with varying skill levels, UNMISET’s ability to coordinate decisions among donors and with the Timorese leaders further declined. Positions in the Timor Leste government that had been occupied by expatriates were filled by politically appointed or low level functionaries with limited qualifications, leaving external actors with little remaining involvement or influence in decisions.\(^{681}\) The relative role of bilateral aid – and the resulting fragmentation – increased.

After 2006, the size and scope of external intervention increased once again and external actors took steps to improve coordination. The Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) consisted of 1,608 police personnel, 34 military liaison and a large contingent of civilian personnel with a mandate of restoring stability and building capacity of state institutions.\(^{682}\) The UN also negotiated and signed a Supplemental Agreement with the Timorese Government that granted the UN partial authority over the PNTL. The agreement set out specific objectives and benchmarks intended to focus the attention of the government and donors on unified goals. Bilateral donors took steps to improve responsiveness, through improved training, longer deployments and carefully planned programs. Nonetheless, coordination once again remained uneven.\(^{683}\) The UNMIT mission struggled with personnel from multiple countries with uneven skill levels and frequent rotations. Most funds continued to be disbursed by bilateral actors, led by Australia and Portugal, but with a multitude of countries – including China, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, the United States, New Zealand, Brazil, Indonesia, the Philippines and

\(^{681}\) Telephone interview with former World Bank official, April 26, 2010.


Mozambique among others – providing various forms of assistance. Attempts to achieve unified donor objectives through an “international compact” failed as only Australia participated.\textsuperscript{684} Especially in the security sector, each country brought its own doctrine, philosophy, techniques and knowledge.\textsuperscript{685} As a result, external actors struggled to rebuild the trust with local officers that had declined during the first period.

3. From Aid to Oil and the Evolution of the Timor Leste National Police

The combination of fragmented political landscape, a changing source of revenue and uneven coordination by external actors shaped the opportunities and constraints facing Timorese leaders as they made choices regarding the governance of the security sector. Although the police operated under UN authority for its first five years, Timorese leaders nonetheless exerted pressure and took decisions that would shape its composition, civilian oversight and discipline. During the first intervention in 1999-2005, leaders within and outside the FRETELIN party faced a fragmented political environment and dispersed revenue, and relied on external support to broaden their authority. This environment afforded a high level of influence to external actors, as key decisions were taken by a small cadre of external officials with input from domestic leaders based on a high level of trust and consensus. Within the police, vulnerable leaders relied especially heavily on external support, and collaborated closely with external backers. As time went on, uneven coordination among external actors undermined their credibility and trust among domestic officials. As a result, while the UN defined the structure and legal framework for the force, many decisions on implementation were made informally, outside UN control. At the end of this period, the police met external standards formally, but also reflected factional divisions and pressures.

\textsuperscript{685} Interview with senior PNTL Officer, Dili, Timor Leste, June 1, 2010.
During the second phase of assistance following the 2006 crisis, the influx of oil revenue changed the political landscape as Timorese leaders no longer relied on external support to confront political challenges. Instead, the ruling party allocated revenue strategically to build a coalition of support, while frequently ignoring external advice. Although external actors sought to improve coordination, they lacked leverage over decisions, and often struggled to achieve communication and trust. For some specific reforms, donors succeeded in developing effective relationships with individual leaders who benefited from their support to manage factional pressure. These cases were relatively sporadic, however, since most external actors struggled to achieve the necessary coherence, and many officials could ignore external recommendations with little cost. During this period, the government achieved stability and the PNTL did adopt governance reforms, including a new legal framework and promotion regime, yet these changes diverged from external recommendations and factional influence remained strong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Force</th>
<th>Ruling Party</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>External Actors</th>
<th>Means of Influence</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNTL (2000-2005)</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Uneven Coordination (UN + Donors)</td>
<td>High Trust with key leaders; high but declining leverage</td>
<td>Partial Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL (2006-2010)</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Concentrated (oil)</td>
<td>Low Coordination (UN + Donors)</td>
<td>Some Trust with individual leaders; low leverage</td>
<td>Limited Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: Summary of Cases: Timor Leste National Police, 2000-2005 and 2006-2010

4. The Evolution of the PNTL from Independence to the 2006 Crisis

Prior to 2006, the PNTL developed in the context of a fragmented politics and dispersed revenue that facilitated influence by a highly intrusive external intervention. From 2000 until 2004, the UN Police exercised formal control over the police, but Timorese leaders nonetheless sought to shape the force’s composition, structure and operations in line with their own interests. Initially, as Timorese leaders relied on external financial and political backing, foreign advisers played a central role in defining new structures, procedures and investments. Many of the top police officers who
had served in the Indonesian police and were regarded suspiciously by the ruling party benefitted especially from external support for measures that would limit factional control. These officers cooperated closely with UN advisers, who helped keep political pressure at bay while shaping the new force.

As the mission progressed, however, UN advisers struggled with coordination challenges that undermined their coherence and understanding of the context. Especially as the UN mission decreased in strength, confidence in external support declined among Timorese leaders and external influence waned. While the UN had succeeded in instituting formal procedures for merit-based recruitment, civilian oversight and discipline, in practice these procedures increasingly reflected the pressure of political factions. From a weak force with an emerging factional division and limited civilian oversight and discipline at its creation, the PNTL had achieved only partial transformation.

4.1 The Pressures of Revenue Dependence and Political Fragmentation

Especially in the early days of the PNTL’s development, reliance on external political and financial support afforded the UN and bilateral donors broad influence. Most fundamentally, the Timorese police depended on external support to finance virtually all of its equipment, infrastructure and operational costs. While the Timorese state budget allocated $33 million to the police between 2000 and 2004 – much of those funds provided by donors – the UN devoted $173 million during the same period and donors provided considerable funds outside either of these channels.\(^{686}\) As salaries and recurrent costs gradually shifted to the Timorese budget, the PNTL continued to depend on external donations for investments in new capacity, from the purchase of equipment and the construction of infrastructure, to the development of new procedures. Police officers also depended on UN vehicles and radios for transportation, communication and other basic functions.

\(^{686}\) Pires and Francino “National Ownership and International Trusteeship,” 145.
on a daily basis. Since this assistance invariably came with technical advice, external actors could seek to shape virtually all aspects of the force’s development.

The fragmentation of Timorese politics also favored external influence as senior officers who were politically vulnerable relied on external support to manage political pressure. The initial leadership cadre of the PNTL was drawn largely from a group of 350 Timorese who had previously served as officers in the Indonesian Police (POLRI). These officers had been handpicked by the UN Police in the early days of the mission to assist them in reaching crimes scenes and conducting investigations.\footnote{Hood, “Security Sector Reform in East Timor,” Peake, “Difficult Do-Over.”} Apparently unaware of the political implications, UN Police fast-tracked their recruitment into the new police force by allowing them to follow an abbreviated, 4-week training rather than the 9 months prescribed for other recruits, and quickly elevated them to senior positions. As recruitment expanded, these top officials faced suspicion from former members of FALANTIL and clandestine resistance networks who joined the force, and who resented that ex-POLRI s who had served the oppressive Indonesian regime occupied the top positions. Tensions also took root among recruits based on local and regional affiliations and rivalries.

As factionalism grew within the force, political pressure mounted from outside it as politicians sought to recruit or promote members of their factions. As the recruitment process progressed, “each group came with their own candidates and their own interests and goals.”\footnote{Interview with Civil Society Activist, Dili, Timor Leste, May 19, 2010.} Members of the ruling FRETELIN party were especially active in seeking to incorporate members of the clandestine resistance network whom they saw as a core constituency, in order to “repay them for their kindness and for the hardship and dangers they endured on our behalf and on behalf of the struggle.”\footnote{Letter from Taur Matan Ruak, Commander of FALANTIL to Ian Martin, 9 November 1999, cited in Kings College, \textit{Independent Study on Security Force Options for East Timor.} (London: Kings College, London Centre for Defense Studies, 2001), 10.} Politicians put pressure on the police leadership, complaining that “the PNTL was
commanded by ex-POLRI, who had cooperated with Indonesia to fight and torture us… [while] former guerilla fighters from the resistance movement who had no role to play and nothing to do, while the police were doing everything.” This pressure, coming both from within and outside the force, became increasingly difficult for senior police officers to manage. Paulo Martins, who had been the highest ranking Timorese officer in the POLRI and became first Timorese commander of the PNTL recalled: this pressure

“There were POLRI, veterans, [members of the] clandestine networks, people with university degrees... Every group wanted a higher rank and position. Combatants said ‘we fought for 24 years, and now I am a [low-ranking] Agent – I don’t agree. Also, all three groups didn’t accept the ex-POLRI. And the Government supported the former [resistance] combatants.”

4.2 UNTAET, UNMISET and the External Response

The responsiveness of the UN and other donors to these challenges varied over time. Initially, the UN Police’s position as formal authority and primary source of technical advice allowed it to ignore factional pressure in defining the structure, composition and operations for the new force. Through their authority to approve all police operations and regulations, the UN Police Commissioner and UNTAET Administrator could over-ride politically-motivated objections. The UN Police also supervised the implementation of these regulations. As mentors assigned to all levels of the force, they monitored recruitment, training and operations to ensure they complied with regulations.

Despite substantial influence in shaping the force from the beginning, coordination problems within the UN and with other donors gradually undermined their credibility. Slow to deploy and understaffed for its first year of operation, the UNPOL mission suffered from severe

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690 Interview with Member of Parliament, FRETELIN Party, Dili, Timor Leste, June 2, 2010.
691 Paulo Martins, Former PNTL Commander, Interview with author, Dili, Timor Leste, June 7, 2010.
informational constraints that it was unable to fully overcome.\footnote{Only 400 officers had arrived in Timor-Leste by the end of January 2000, and by July of that year, nine months after the establishment of UNTAET, the figure was still only 1,270 out of a target 1,640. Hood, “Hood, “Security Sector Reform in East Timor,” 149.} For most UNPOL officers, language barriers, a dearth of suitable translators and insufficient knowledge of the historical or political context impeded their ability to communicate with Timorese counterparts.\footnote{Ronald West, “Lawyers, Guns and Money: Justice and Security Reform in East Timor,” in \textit{Constructing Justice and Security After War}, ed. by Charles T. Call (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 336.} Management gaps contributed to “problems with information flow within the CIVPOL structure” that prevented the information that was collected from being transmitted to leadership or applied to decision-making.\footnote{West “Lawyers, Guns and Money,” 334.} Frequent rotations, and different lengths of mission, the absence of formal hand-over procedures, and the lack of uniform data collection methods led to contacts being lost, information being mislaid, and a general absence of continuity.\footnote{Peake, " Difficult Do-Over," 150; West, “Lawyers, Guns and Money,” 334.} As a 2003 joint UN and Timor Leste government assessment noted:

\begin{quote}
"there is no apparent deployment strategy and handover between in-coming and out-going officers does not seem to occur… It was also indicated that in some cases, departing UNPOL officers took with them materials used during their tour including the removal of computer files and CDs…. In other words, all institutional memory may be lost to the in-coming UNPOL."
\end{quote}

The UN Police mission also failed to achieve consensus either internally or with other donors on key aspects of the force’s development. The only official guidance for UN Police officers were their mandate and rules of engagement, which did not cover how they should conduct training, advising or mentoring. Although approved by the UN Police Commissioner in writing, procedures and policies were rarely disseminated to the UN Police officers. Instead, officers from 37 countries promoted their own policing philosophy, doctrine and procedures.\footnote{Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), \textit{Report of the Joint Assessment Mission carried out by The Government of Timor-Leste, UNMISSET, UNDP and Development Partner Countries for the Timor-Leste Police Service} (2003), 22. Available at http://www.unrol.org/files/JAM_PNTL_UNMISSET_UNDP_2003.pdf, accessed August 1, 2011.} A former UNTAET official noted that:

\begin{quote}

\footnote{The top five contributing countries were Malaysia, Portugal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines. See http://unmit.unmissions.org.}
“there was no coherent, structured strategy, no comprehensive pedagogy, and no uniform, measurable methods of testing the skills learned by the Timorese police, let alone cogent agreement on what those professional skills were in any substantive sense.”

Bilateral donors also promoted their own doctrines and priorities, adding to the confusion, while crucial elements fell through the cracks. Among the most neglected areas early on was attention to building up internal management and external oversight structures. As one member of the UN mission noted, “of an approved complement of 1,250 personnel, only two posts were dedicated to institutional and organizational police service development: a training adviser and an institution and capacity building adviser, who was altogether unqualified for the position.” Other donors, consumed by their own equipment, infrastructure and training priorities, did not begin to address the issue until after 2003 when a joint donor mission identified this and other critical gaps in the force’s development, directed resources toward addressing them. By this time, with only one year left in the UNMISET mission and donors looking to exit their state-building role, influence over the development of the force had declined substantially.

4.3 Uneven Coordination Leads to Declining Confidence and Trust

Effective communication and collaboration among senior police officials, political leaders and external actors early on enabled a high level of consensus and trust that gradually declined. Initially, UN police officials worked effectively with the small group of ex-POLRI and former translators who had helped UNPOL navigate the local environment in the early days of the mission. As they took on leadership positions, these officers relied on their UN mentors to help them navigate the challenges of managing the force. In the words of the first PNTL commander, they

699 Ibid, 152.
700 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), Report of the Joint Assessment Mission (see fn 696, above), 53.
“worked closely with UN advisers and the UN Police Commissioners” to develop and implement the initial recruitment, training and operational procedures.\textsuperscript{701}

As the force expanded however, reliance on this small group of officers combined with the inability to build broader relationships alienated other members of the force and undermined trust. The Timorese officers who did not form part of the trusted core, along with the politicians who supported them, began to feel that decisions were “formulated and implemented without any meaningful collaboration with East Timorese officials, and without reference to the needs of Timorese society, or its values, customs, and traditions.”\textsuperscript{702} One politician lamented that “the UN made decisions with high level consultations, but they didn’t go further down” to other members of the force.\textsuperscript{703} These officers and their political backers grew increasingly resentful of the dominant role played by the ex-POLRI. As the UN struggled with internal coordination challenge to build relationships and to understand these pressures, confidence further declined in their support within the force declined. A former UNTAET official recalled that:

\begin{quote}
“Foreigners didn’t interact with local counterparts – they talked to them, not with them. They didn’t understand their history, culture and so forth. Foreigners were not trusted.”\textsuperscript{704}
\end{quote}

The effects of this uneven trust and declining confidence emerged clearly in the recruitment process. Formally, UN officials defined the standards and procedures that governed the recruitment and composition of the Timorese police in the 2001 regulation that established the East Timor Police Service.\textsuperscript{705} The UN Police also defined the organizational structure, which “roughly mirrored the UNPOL structure and reflected generic police organizational models.”\textsuperscript{706} When it came to the implementing these standards, however, informational constraints and limited trust undermined

\textsuperscript{701} Interview with Former PNTL Commander Paulo Martins, Dili, June 7, 2010.
\textsuperscript{702} Hood, “Security Sector Reform in East Timor,” 151.
\textsuperscript{703} Interview with Member of Parliament, FRETELIN Party, Dili, June 2, 2010.
\textsuperscript{704} Interview with former UNTAET Official, Dili, April 25, 2010.
\textsuperscript{705} Recruits were required to be over 18, to have a high school education and basic reading, writing and speaking skills, and to pass physical and medical examinations as well as a selection interview. UNTAET, Regulation On the Establishment of the East Timor Police Service, UNTAET/REG/2001/22 10 (2001).
\textsuperscript{706} Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), Report of the Joint Assessment Mission (see fn 694 above), 18.
their influence. Although the UN Police conducted interviews and background checks themselves, they did not possess sufficient information about the individuals involved, many of whom had multiple names, and whose communities often protected their identity from UN inquiries. They were forced to rely on the ex-POLRI officers and former translators whom they trusted, who could use this brokerage position to privilege their own family, regional and political networks in the recruitment process. As a former member of UNTAET observed:

“\textit{A select group of Timorese leaders were the only constituency with which the UN consulted on the formation of the PNTL, despite CIVPOL’s stated objective of undertaking recruitment in an impartial and apolitical fashion.}”

The former resistance fighters who felt excluded from decision-making regarded the recruitment process as biased in favor of ex-POLRI and against those who had struggled for Timorese independence. One PNTL officer summarized this widespread perception:

\textbf{“The recruitment was not based on anybody in Timor. The UN just took people and recruited them. There was no background check. Some people were pro-Indonesia, but they were still recruited.”}

As a result, factionalism deepened within the force. Many police officers felt excluded from decision-making and looked to external political support. Political leaders sought to incorporate members of their own networks into the force, fueling further factionalism internally. For the UN Police, declining trust with the majority of the force limited their access to information about new recruits, leaving them unable to understand or react to these pressures.

Poor coordination and declining trust further undermined external influence over the development of civilian oversight and management structures. During the first years of the intervention, UNTAET retained sole authority over the force. According to the 2001 Police Organic Law, the UN Police Commissioner commanded the force while a “Cabinet Member” provided

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{707} Interview with Senior PNTL Officer, Dili, June 9, 2010; See also West “Lawyers, Guns and Money,” 322.
  \item \textsuperscript{708} Interview with former UNTAET Official, Dili, May 18, 2010.
  \item \textsuperscript{709} Hood, “Security Sector Reform in East Timor,” 149.
  \item \textsuperscript{711} Interview with Senior PNTL Officer, Dili, June 9, 2010.
\end{itemize}
oversight.\textsuperscript{712} The Cabinet Member was in practice a UN Officials who formed part of the Cabinet of Timorese and UN officials who advised the UNTAET Administrator.\textsuperscript{713} As UNTAET moved closer to independence and transitioned to UNMISET, UN Police officers sought to put in place a management and oversight framework by drafting regulations and procedures on everything from human resource management to procurement and logistics. The top police officials who depended most on UN support inevitably approved these procedures — though often no more than as a “rubber stamp” and without meaningful consultation.\textsuperscript{714} UN Police continued to exercise supervisory and formal decision-making authority, while the procedures they developed were poorly understood and most often ignored.

As external actors increasingly recognized this weakness, several donors sought to step up their joint efforts to address these gaps. In 2003, a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) comprised of the UN and several bilateral donors highlighted the weakness in management and oversight mechanisms as one of the primary challenges facing the PNTL: “there has been little attention paid to strengthening the key management and administrative support areas such as human resources management and finance. Equally, there is little or no planning and policy development capacity within the TLPS.”\textsuperscript{715} Another report funded by the UK government pointed to a deficiency in “institution building, strategic planning and budget development,” resulting in “an institution that is unsustainable and weak.”\textsuperscript{716} In the absence of clear oversight structures, the JAM report cited several incidents of politicization of the PNTL in which “politicians had sought to direct District

\textsuperscript{713} UNTAET, “Regulation on Transitional Cabinet Approved,” UNTAET Daily Briefing, Dili, 12 July 2000.
\textsuperscript{714} Hood “Security Sector Reform in East Timor,” 151.
\textsuperscript{715} Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), Report of the Joint Assessment Mission (see fn. 696, above).
TLPS Commanders to take certain arbitrary actions against individuals.” To address these challenges, an Australian AUS$40 million program focused on policy development, financial and human resource management, while World Bank consultants began to advise Ministry of Interior and PNTL leadership on planning and budgeting issues. To strengthen coordination, several donors adopted shared objectives and milestones for the force’s development. These efforts bore fruit. By May 2004, the Timorese government finally adopted the PNTL Organic Law that formally established the structure of the force, and defined management and oversight mechanisms.

Despite these formal changes, uneven coordination continued to undermine influence over the implementation of these measures, and allowed factional pressure to deepen. The procedures put in place with Australian and World Bank advice were formally adopted, but never fully incorporated into the UN Police training and mentoring programs. Instead, the UN Police continued to try to influence operations through personal mentoring and advising relationships, which by this time remained effective with only a few members of the force. UN Police Officers repeatedly complained of their inability to “participate in discussions of the Government’s Committee on Internal Security when policy-related issues are being discussed.” As oversight transitioned to the Ministry of Interior, which still lacked structure, policies and procedures, the Minister and other party members exercised authority through informal channels. Authority was shared between UN Police who could influence only a few favored officers, and the Ministry of Interior which lacked any capacity to do so. This dual authority confused lines of authority, while leaving a “void in the management and hierarchy levels of the TLPS” that encouraged senior officers

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717 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), Report of the Joint Assessment Mission (see fn. 696, above), 24.
719 Ibid.
to rely on informal channels to exert authority.\textsuperscript{722} As the UN’s role declined, only informal channels remained. As one Timorese official noted, “after 2004, Timor took over the police and politicians wanted to use them for their own benefit – there was no opposition.”\textsuperscript{723}

4.4 The Limits of External Leverage

As the UN and other donors struggled to influence decisions through collaborative relationships, coordination challenges also contributed to declining leverage. Early in the mission, UNTAET imposed international standards through its direct authority over the force and its ability to impose decrees. Collaborative relationships with top officers enabled UN Police officers to monitor implementation and performance. As relationships with the majority of police officers increasingly frayed and perspectives on how to govern the force diverged, the UN and other donors were forced to negotiate over elements of the structure and composition. Although the UN retained formal authority over the police until 2004, the coordination challenges that inhibited their access to information and prevented unified objectives undermined their leverage in negotiating key decisions.

The shift from collaboration and consensus to bargaining occurred in the context of growing assertiveness by Timorese leaders combined with weakening resolve by the UN as it looked toward the end of its mandate. As FRETELIN leaders sought to consolidate their authority, rivalries among factions within and outside the party manifested themselves in efforts to exert control over the security forces. While President Gusmao was securing his influence over the F-FDTL based on this prior leadership of FALANTIL and alliance with top leaders, rival FRETELIN politicians asserted their influence over the police.\textsuperscript{724} Within FRETELIN, Rogerio Lobato – a former resistance leader who had served as a commander of FALANTIL

\textsuperscript{722} Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), \textit{Report of the Joint Assessment Mission} (see fn 694 above), 24.
\textsuperscript{723} Interview with Member of Parliament, FRETELIN Party, Dili, May 28, 2010.
\textsuperscript{724} For an account of these tensions prior to the 2006 crisis, see Rees, “Under Pressure.”
before going into exile – made a bid for control of the Ministry of Interior and the police by
drawing on support among veteran fighters and threatening to mobilize them against the
government. 725 Once in this position, Lobato made several key decisions that deepened his
control by empowering certain factions within the force.

Lacking sufficiently clear goals or the consensus of other donors, the UN repeatedly gave
in to decisions that undermined its state objectives. For instance, when Lobato moved to bring
into the police a group of 100 loyal veterans who had failed to meet the recruitment criteria, the
UN initially opposed this move but eventually compromised.726 He also sought to establish
heavily armed “special units.” He elevated politically vulnerable ex-POLRI officers to lead these
units in order to secure their loyalty.727 As a UN official put it, “Lobato wanted people loyal to
him and since former POLRI had no political friends, Lobato could rely on their loyalty.”728
Once again, the UN and other senior diplomats initially “raised a lot of complaints” regarding the
creation of these additional units, but the UN compromised, and even helped to equip and train
the new units in order to ensure that it was “done properly.”729 Despite the police dependence
on the UN for training and equipment, the absence of consensus and increasing focus on
departure allowed decisions that undermined their governance objectives. The former veterans
that Lobato recruited into the force along with the heavily armed units played a central role in the
2006 crisis. 730

As their credibility and leverage waned, the UN and other donors also failed to support their
counterparts in the face of factional pressure. In 2003, PNTL Commander Martins, agreed to

725 Before he was appointed, he mobilized a march of several thousand fighters on a march on Dili that put pressure on
the government to appoint him. For an account of these events, see Rees, “Under Pressure,” 49 at fn. 146; International
726 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), Report of the Joint Assessment Mission (see fn. 696, above), 15.
727 Goldstone, “Building a State and Statebuilding,” 221.
728 Interview with UNMIT Political Officer, Dili, May 18, 2010.
729 Interview with senior, PNTL Official, Dili, June 9, 2010.
730 Interview with UNMIT Political Officer, Dili, May 18, 2010.
organize a merit-based promotion process to populate the higher ranks of the force.\textsuperscript{731} Although the UN had populated the senior ranks, it had not paid attention to promotions. The 2001 police law did not set out a clear process for promotion, other than recognizing the “efficiency” of candidates, as well as their “leadership and executive management skills” for senior ranks.\textsuperscript{732} In collaboration with Martins and other senior police officers, UN Police officers worked with the support of the U.S Department of Justice to select candidates for promotion and organize leadership courses. They immediately faced political resistance as officers who were likely to be disadvantaged sought support from political leaders, leading to the cancelation of the promotion.\textsuperscript{733} In the absence of a formal promotion, factionalism deepened as top officers and politicians used the promise of a promotion or movement from one unit or another to build loyalty. As one senior officer described:

“They started moving commanders appointed by UNPOL. Politicians would say ‘I don’t like this guy’ and move people around. The impact was felt in 2005 and 2006. Politicians intervened into the police – they didn’t want this guy to be commander of this unit or district – followed by negotiations. This was followed by nepotism, they put relatives and friends in place. The General Commander couldn’t do anything because at least 50% of people were appointed directly by the MOI.”\textsuperscript{734}

As trust with their counterparts declined, information asymmetries and incoherent objectives increasingly undermined the ability of the UN and donors to oppose any decisions by Timorese leaders. Lobato and other politicians took decisions that clearly strengthened their own factions within the force, but the UN was too preoccupied with handing over power, and suffered from information asymmetries and inability to take coherent decisions or react to local conditions. Factionalism deepened and those who had supported external efforts grew increasingly weak.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Interview with Former PNTL Commander Paulo Martins, Dili, June 7, 2010.
\item UNTAET, Regulation On the Establishment of the East Timor Police Service, UNTAET/REG/2001/22 10 (2001), Section 15.
\item Interview with member of PNTL promotion commission, Isabelle Fereira, Dili, June 1, 2010.
\item Interview with senior. PNTL Official, Dili, Timor Leste, June 9, 2010.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
4.5 Outcome of the PNTL Development from 2000-2006

By the time UNMISET formally departed in 2005, external actors had contributed to a partial transformation of the PNTL. From a not-yet-functional force that remained to be fully constituted, lacked management and oversight structures, and had begun to reflect internal factionalism, the PNTL had evolved into a force that was fully constituted but remained plagued by internal factionalism and politicized oversight. On the one hand, new laws and procedures formally spelled out a clear structure, a recruitment process resulted in a diverse force, and a new Ministry of Interior exercised oversight. On the other hand, formal rules were manipulated in practice, and internal factionalism had deepened. An initial period of strong external influence had given way to limited leverage and trust. As factional fights escalated in the context of fragmented politics, a new pressure from rapidly expanding oil wealth eventually fueled a crisis that tore the police. The roots of the 2006 crisis can be traced to the evolution of the composition, civilian oversight and application of legal limits of the PNTL up to that time.

4.5.1 Composition and Recruitment

On the surface, the UN Police had achieved most of their objectives in recruiting and training a new Timorese police force according to international standards. By the time the UN handed authority over the PNTL to the Timor Leste government, 3,021 officers had passed through the police academy run by UN Police trainers, just short of the original target of 3,200.735 On paper, all of these officers met the criteria adopted by UNTAET, including educational, physical and psychological requirements, a clean human rights record, and a 20% quota for women.736

In practice, however, the force was deeply factionalized, reflecting the prevailing political divisions that fueled the 2006 crisis. According to observers, by 2006 the police included at least

three clearly defined factions: the ex-POLRI, ex-FALANTIL fighters, and former members of the clandestine resistance network, as well as those who did not fit into any of these categories. Each of these factions built its own internal network of trust and loyalty, rooted in personal, family, regional or language ties or experience in FALANTIL or POLRI, and often affiliated with particular politicians. While they may have contributed to cohesion within each faction, a near complete absence of trust between the different factions – especially between the ex-POLRI and the former members of the resistance – severely undermined cohesion and discipline within the force. These factions also facilitated political influence through informal ties to political parties and politicians.

Key decisions toward the end of this period further contributed to internal divisions and the roots of the 2006 crisis. The decision to cancel the proposed promotion process resulted in a flat hierarchy that included only 4 ranks and 95% of officers in the bottom rank. In the absence of a transparent promotion process, movement through the ranks or between positions became entirely dependent on factional allegiances. The Minister of Interior’s appointment of 100 veterans outside the formal recruitment process and creation of multiple special armed units further contributed to the growing factional pressure, as they each owed their loyalty primarily to the minister rather than their commanders. Officers sometimes prioritized loyalty to other politicians, or to their local clans or villages. As one senior PNTL Officer noted, “in 2006 there was nepotism and corruption in the deployment to some districts, such that people were primarily loyal to their own districts and not to the force.”

4.5.2 Civilian Oversight

The management and civilian oversight of the PNTL also reflected uneven external influence. On the one hand, regulations, structures and procedures conformed to external standards

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738 Interview with former UNMIT Official, Dili, May 19, 2010.
739 Interview with senior PNTL Officer, Dili, June 9, 2010.
in writing. Although the UN Police mission devoted limited attention to internal management and external oversight, a coordinated effort by donors later on resulted in the passage of the 2004 Organic Law that laid out a democratic civilian oversight structure.\footnote{Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), \textit{Report of the Joint Assessment Mission} (see fn. 696, above).} Along with the Law on Internal Security, this legislation granted the Parliament and Executive formal oversight roles, and established an Inter-Ministerial Committee to oversee security policy.\footnote{Government of Timor Leste, \textit{Decree Law 08/2003: Law on Internal Security}, Law 08/2003 (2003).} The UN Police also drafted hundreds of regulations and procedures for application by the police in its day-to-day operations.

On the other hand, both the law and practice diverged from external objectives in significant ways. Most strikingly, the 2004 law explicitly rejected the influence of external actors, in stating that prior structures set up by UNPOL “were not in tune with the national reality and not conducive to the involvement of the community in the process of forming such an important institution as the PNTL” and that “this undeniable fact requires a process of restructuring the PNTL and its capabilities in a more effective way, with due caution to make this institution more aligned with the characteristics of our society.”\footnote{Government of Timor Leste \textit{Decree Law 8/2004: The Organic Law of the National Police of Timor Leste}, Decree Law 8/2004 (2004), Preamble.} The law was also criticized by external officials for failing to conform to their recommendations in several ways, including the poor specification of civilian oversight structures, the vague role of the Ministry of Interior, and confused lines of authority. Parliamentary oversight, although laid out in the Law on Internal Security, was not recognized in the Police Organic Law, and no explicit provision was made for civil society oversight.\footnote{For an analysis, see Bu V.E. Wilson, “Smoke and Mirrors: Institutionalising Fragility in the Policia Nacional Timor Leste,” in \textit{Democratic Governance in Timor Leste: Reconciling the Local and the National}, edited by David Mearns (Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press, 2008).} Beyond the law, few of the internal regulations and procedures drafted by UN Police officers were ever applied in practice. According to PNTL officers, none of the “manuals or job descriptions” drafted by the UN ever made it to the district stations.\footnote{Interview with senior PNTL Office, Dili, June 9, 2010.} Instead, authority operated primarily outside of formal
channels. In the absence of clearly specified oversight mechanisms, the Minister of Interior and other politicians regularly influenced operations through their relationships with particular officers and factions.

4.5.3 Legal Limits and Discipline

The legal limits on the use of force and disciplinary structures also reflected external standards only partially, with limited implementation in practice. On paper, the PNTL conformed to many of the standards promoted by international actors. The Law on Internal Security included the principle of “respect for the fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees of the citizens” and specified policing roles, while the Police Organic Law prescribed limits on the use of force to that which is “strictly necessary” in the performance of their duties. The Organic Law also established a Professional Ethics Office to handle disciplinary processes, under the supervision of a Superior Police Council. By 2006, the PNTL had adopted additional disciplinary structures, mostly at the behest of external actors, like the Inspectorate in the Ministry of Interior and the Ethics Code.

At the same time, both the normative framework and its application diverged from the standards promoted by external actors. The 2004 Organic Law concentrated authority over the disciplinary process in the hands of the General Commander, without any external oversight other than that provided by the Superior Police Council that was made up entirely of active police officers. The law also blurred the distinction between internal and external security that the UN sought to maintain, by assigning the PNTL the mandate “to collaborate with and assist FALINTIL-FDTL in the defense of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” while giving the F-FDTL a

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747 Ibid, Article 13
substantial role in internal security.\textsuperscript{750} In addition, several heavily armed paramilitary units were established against the recommendations of the UN, including the Police Reserve Unit (URP) and Border Patrol Unit (UPF) and the Rapid Response Unit (UIR), mostly at the personal initiative of Interior. In 2002, the UN Police commissioner noted that most of the “complaints against the police… are not against the regular police officers in their blue shirts but the SPU.”\textsuperscript{751} The structures that were put in place, such as the Professional Ethics Office and the Inspectorate in the Ministry of the Interior, were “undermined by a lack of resources and through political interference.”\textsuperscript{752}

Limited respect for legal limits resulted in frequent episodes of abuse by Timorese police officers. Both prior to and after independence, the UN repeatedly pointed to “limited professional skills and experience, and misconduct,” by members of the PNTL, including “include assaults, arbitrary arrest and detention, and ill-treatment during detention,” as well as “disturbing reports of excessive use of force, assaults, negligent use of firearms, criminal activities and corrupt practices.”\textsuperscript{753} A 2004 UN Secretary General Report referred to these issues as “fundamental problems” fueled by “disturbing reports of excessive use of force, assault, negligent use of firearms, criminal activities, corrupt practices and violations of human rights.”\textsuperscript{754} Most significantly, the lack of discipline or respect for legal limits contributed directly to the violent crisis in 2006.

\section*{4.6 Factionalized Police and the 2006 Crisis}

Factionalism, politicized oversight and persistent lack of discipline within the PNTL contributed directly to the 2006 crisis. Although the crisis emerged from multiple factors that are

\textsuperscript{750} Ibid, Article 2
\textsuperscript{751} UNMISET, \textit{Press Conference with UN Police Commissioner}, Dili, December 2, 2002
\textsuperscript{754} Ibid.
discussed elsewhere, the factionalized and politicized police took center stage.\textsuperscript{755} In April 2006, a
dispute within the F-FDTL over perceived discrimination and conditions of service led to the
dismissal of 600 soldiers. The incident escalated in the context of rivalries among factions vying for
political control – which became even more competitive following the government’s announcement
in April 2006 of 218\% increase in the national budget as a result of oil revenue.\textsuperscript{756} In response to
political mobilization, factions within the PNTL quickly joined the fray and participated in a series of
shootings, armed confrontations and other incidents of violence among members of the PNTL and
F-FDTL. Weapons assigned to the PNTL were distributed to groups of civilians to fight rival
factions, reportedly under the instructions of the Minister of Interior. Elements of PNTL special
units, including the UPF and URP, departed from the chain of command to participate in the
fighting.\textsuperscript{757} The wave of violence subsequently spread to youth groups in and around Dili, leading to
dozens of deaths, the displacement of approximately 150,000 people, and destruction of 1,650
houses.\textsuperscript{758} The crisis led directly to the fall of the government and a new international stabilization
and peacekeeping intervention.

The failure of the PNTL chain of command to withstand political pressure contributed
directly to the escalating crisis. Efforts by Lobato and other political leaders to politicize the force
succeeded, as factions within the police and the F-FDTL mobilized against each other. As the crisis
escalated, UN Officials and weak PNTL leaders lacked sufficient information or authority to
monitor or stop these events. Instead, authority was exercised through the informal channels that

\textsuperscript{755} For an account of the crisis, see United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for
Timor-Leste (Geneva, October 2, 2006); Democratic Republic of Timor Leste National Parliament, Ad Hoc Parliamentary
Commission to Study the Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor Leste: Report, (Dili,
\textsuperscript{756} Rees, “Subnational Spending Mechanisms.”
\textsuperscript{757} United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste
\textsuperscript{758} Ibid, 41.
had developed from within the Ministry of Interior and special units.\textsuperscript{759} According to the UN Commission of Inquiry report that analyzed the crisis, “PNTL had become divided and politicized as a result of the actions of the Minister of the Interior. These actions were said to have taken the form of issuing operational orders (including for personal or party political purposes), undermining the chain of command and selectively handling disciplinary processes. As a result, a parallel command structure emerged.”\textsuperscript{760} Formal command structures became irrelevant as Police Commander Martins fled the capital and the “the national and Dili district headquarters disintegrated.”\textsuperscript{761} Although in many parts of the country the PNTL remained intact, in Dili and in other districts the structure that had been put in place by external actors melted away in the face of political pressure, leaving little of what they have constructed.

5. The PNTL after the 2006 Crisis

As the Timor Leste government and external actors picked up the pieces following the 2006 crisis, police reform emerged as a top priority once again. In this phase, however, increased oil revenue fundamentally re-shaped the relationship among domestic and external actors and altered the trajectory of security sector governance. As revenue from off-shore oil increased nearly twentyfold between 2002 and 2007, leaders of the still fragile state gained access to a powerful new means to broaden their authority. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, who led a coalition government after the 2007 elections, used this revenue to “buy the peace” by allocating funds to potential rivals and spoilers. Concentrated revenue also reduced the potential for external influence, and another robust UN mandate with sovereign authority over the PNTL failed to achieve most of its stated

\textsuperscript{759} Several top officials including the General Commander were apparently unaware of the arming of civilians or the break away of certain factions. Interview with Paulo Martins, Former PNTL Commander, Dili, June 7, 2010. See also United Nations, \textit{Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste}.


objectives. The reforms adopted by the government diverged significantly from external recommendations, reflecting the government’s concern with coopting potential opponents rather than reducing factional influence. Although this approach arguably contributed to stability and peace, it preserved factional influence while oversight remained personalized and prone to political influence. Only in isolated cases, in which individual leaders facing factional pressure relied on external support, did donors succeed in influencing reforms even partially. While stability improved and abuse by the police declined, internal factionalism continued to deepen, civilian oversight remained personalized, and discipline limited, resulting in a limited transformation overall.

5.1 The Effects of Political Fragmentation and Concentrated Oil Wealth

Fragmentation within and outside the ruling party continue to pose challenges for the ruling elites following the 2006 crisis. Although the violence appeared to consolidate along an East-West divide, this cleavage masked a more complex set of divisions that pitted individuals and groups against each other on the basis personal, ideological and regional differences. Some of the worst incidents occurred between people who originated from neighboring villages, or between individuals who were suspicious of each other’s roles during the Indonesian occupation. This fragmentation was visible in the results of the 2007 elections. FRETELIN lost a substantial share of seats, and no party gained more than 40%. Xanana Gusmao’s CNRT party formed a ruling coalition that included five minority parties that represented a broad range of constituencies. To pass any new legislation or policy reform, Gusmao would be forced to seek the support of other parties. He also needed to overcome the divisions that had developed among groups who saw each other as ideological, regional or political opponents.

762 For instance, in 2007 following the elections a spate of house burnings occurred as a result of political rivalry between two neighboring villages in the Eastern district of Viqueque.
Top police and security officials acutely felt the challenge of this fragmented political environment. Recognizing the vulnerability of the security forces, Gusmao chose to personally take on the ministerial portfolios governing the PNTL and F-FDTL, and appoint two Secretaries of State, Francisco Guterres and Julio Pinto, who would oversee the forces under his supervision. Both were technically proficient, having been educated and worked abroad, but they lacked their own constituency or political weight. Observers saw this as a distinct disadvantage for managing the members of factionalized forces, many of whom remained deeply suspicious of each other and their leaders. One politician explained that “because of Guterres’ background, he has no influence – you need former resistance guys with influence.”

Indeed, Guterres faced suspicion from the various factions within the PNTL, including supporters of FRETELIN, Easterners and former resistance fighters who did not trust his resistance credentials, as well as rival politicians and local officials. During visits to FRETELIN strongholds, he would bring police officers from other areas of the country to protect him from PNTL officers who identified with rival factions and did not respect his authority.

Guterres also had to manage an uneasy division of authority with Police Commander Longuinhos Monteiro who was appointed in 2009. Although Monteiro also lacked a deep political constituency, he had some sway within the bureaucracy since he had previously served as Attorney General, and had built a network of political supporters in Dili. Yet all three leaders relied on the authority of the Prime Minister to resolve contentious issues. Recognizing their limited political clout, Guterres and Pinto even chose not to be promoted to the rank of Minister in order to preserve the backing of Gusmao, who had “more weight with the veterans.”

Yet new opportunities emerged from the increased oil wealth. Strategic allocation of revenue not only succeeded in coopting political rivals, it also helped to stabilize the security sector. Direct

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763 Interview with Member of Parliament, FRETELIN Party, Dili, May 28, 2010.
764 Interview with UNMIT Political Adviser, Dili, May 28, 2010.
765 Ibid.
766 Interview with senior defense officials, Dili, October 30, 2010.
transfers to veterans and petitioners helped to reduce pressure by those who had been clamoring to be included in the force. Powerful veterans also received benefits through a defense services contract to the Veterans Foundation – controlled by both retired veterans and active duty military officers – for procurement of ammunition, rice importation, vehicle maintenance and other activities.\textsuperscript{767} Within the PNTL, procurement of uniforms, vehicles, weapons and other equipment increased dramatically, especially for the special units or those with politically connected leaders. Senior officials and department heads used their authority to “get contracts for their constituencies, and abuse the powers of police to get benefits individually or for their factions – their clan, gang, Martial Art Group, economic activities, organized crime, ex-POLRI, new generations, ex-FALANTIL – there are many networks within the police.”\textsuperscript{768} The strategic allocation of rents ensured that all of the factions received a share of the benefits, and satisfied important constituencies.

5.2 Return of the UN and Bilateral Donors

The increase in concentrated revenue limited the influence of external actors despite an expanded presence, robust mandate and efforts to improve coordination. Following the 2006 crisis, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) deployed 1,608 UN Police officers. Their mandate included “the restoration and maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste” and to “assist with the further training, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL as well as the Ministry of Interior.”\textsuperscript{769} The UN and the Timor Leste government signed a Supplemental Agreement that transferred authority over PNTL operations to the UN Police.\textsuperscript{770} According to the

\textsuperscript{767}Rees, “Subnational Spending Mechanisms.”
\textsuperscript{768}Interview with Member of Parliament, National Unity Party (PUN), Dili, May 30, 2010.
agreement, authority would be handed back to the Timor Leste government once the UN certified that it had met certain benchmarks, including the vetting and certification of all PNTL officers, and reforms to the management, administration, civilian oversight and discipline of each unit and district.

Bilateral donors also stepped up their efforts to reform the PNTL. The Australian Government launched the Timor Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP) with a budget of $55 million over four years.\textsuperscript{771} Staffed mostly by Australian Federal Police officers, the TLPDP focused on supporting the institutional development, governance and operational competency of the force.\textsuperscript{772} The Portuguese government increased its support in the context of a bilateral agreement in force since 2002. Three units of the Guardia Nacional de la Republica (GNR), Portugal’s paramilitary police, along with a handful of police and civilian advisers mobilized with the dual mission of maintaining stability and providing technical assistance to the PNTL and oversight ministries.\textsuperscript{773} Several other countries including the U.S., New Zealand, Japan and Malaysia and others provided personnel and funds to train the PNTL on specific topics like gender-based violence or community policing.

The UN and bilateral donors took steps to deepen their influence and to overcome the coordination failures had plagued the earlier mission. The Supplemental Agreement between the UN and Timor Leste contained two distinct strategies for achieving influence. On the one hand, it sought to create an incentive for adopting reforms by conditioning the resumption of Timorese authority over the police on the completion of specific benchmarks. On the other hand, it called for the “co-location” of foreign advisers with their Timorese counterparts to facilitate the individual relationships and trust necessary to influence those reforms. Bilateral donors largely pursued the

\textsuperscript{771} Interview with Australian Police Official, Dili, Timor Leste, May 27, 2010.  
\textsuperscript{772} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{773} Interview with Portuguese Police Official, Dili, Timor Leste, June 8, 2010.
latter strategy, and took deliberate steps to improve relationships and foster trust with their counterparts. Australian police advisers were required to complete language and cultural awareness classes, and to stay in Timor Leste for longer periods.\textsuperscript{774} Portuguese officials sought to improve relationships by avoiding generic “packages of training or assistance” and embedding advisers in government institutions in order to improve their responsiveness to Timorese priorities. As one Portuguese official put it, “we make ourselves available to help in ways they see as most useful and that the Portuguese can provide…basically we come and ask how we can help.”\textsuperscript{775}

Despite these efforts, information asymmetries and competing objectives once again resulted in uneven coordination that varied by specific reform and over time. The UN Police mission once again struggled to manage information as a result of short deployments, language barriers and poor internal management. Most advisers had little preparation for mentoring or training and rarely developed effective communication and relationships with Timorese counterparts. The UN sought to clarify common objectives and benchmarks through the Supplemental Agreement, but in practice officers from 43 countries applies their own policing doctrines and approaches to achieving those objectives. Bilateral donors further added to the confusion by promoting inconsistent policing approaches based on their own philosophies. Most significantly, Australia and Portugal, the two largest and most active donors to the police frequently clashed over their different approaches. While Portugal’s GNR favored a paramilitary approach based on hierarchy and discipline, Australia favored a community-oriented approach focused on building relationships to the public. An Australian official described the resulting tension between the two donors:

“Mutual incomprehension between Australia and Portugal that no amount of meetings can erase, due to cultural differences, style, and language that contribute to a lack of communication. There is a lot of suspicion of others’ intentions and motivation and we won’t improve it. Timorese use it to their advantage.”\textsuperscript{776}

\textsuperscript{774} Interview with Australian Police Official, Dili, Timor Leste, May 27, 2010.
\textsuperscript{775} Interview with Portuguese Embassy Official, Dili, Timor Leste, June 2, 2010.
\textsuperscript{776} Interview with Australian Police Official, Dili, Timor Leste, May 27, 2010.
In addition, several other countries sent trainers and advisers with their own approaches. One PNTL Officer counted at least nine countries providing assistance to the Training Academy alone.\(^{777}\) As a result of this diversity of approaches, achieving common objectives or unified decisions became increasingly difficult. Although many looked to the UN to coordination, the UN Police Commissioner limited the scope of that coordination short of shared decision-making, since “formally, we want the Secretary of State to coordinate, though we are always ready to assist.”\(^{778}\) The weekly coordination meetings held by the UN Police to coordinate police assistance were limited to information-sharing rather than decision-making, and many of the smaller donors did not even bother to participate. As one UN official summarized it, “There is mistrust between the Anglos and the Portuguese, and no one trusts the Chinese – they don’t go to meetings and have a different mindset and culture.”\(^{779}\)

While individual officials sometimes succeeded in establishing effective relationships when their own efforts were coordinated, overall influence remained highly uneven. In some areas, the proliferation of donors around a single issue or organizational unit – like the training academy – made coordination virtually impossible. In other areas, individual advisers and donors who invested in building relationships with counterparts sometimes achieved influence. Yet the influence even well-coordinated external actors depended on the openings created by domestic conditions, notably the vulnerability of individual leaders around specific issues. The resulting variation can be observed in the level of trust and the leverage achieved by external actors, as well as the outcome of individual reform efforts.

\(^{777}\) They included Australia, Portugal, Mozambique, Indonesia, Thailand, China, Malaysia, the Phillipines, and the United States. Interview with senior. PNTL Officer, Dili, Timor Leste, June 1, 2010.

\(^{778}\) Interview with UNMIT Police Commissioner Luis Carilho, Dili, May 28, 2010.

\(^{779}\) Interview with UNMIT Political Adviser, Dili, Timor Leste, May 28, 2010.
5.3 Limited Opportunities for Leverage

Overall, the presence of a concentrated revenue source limited opportunities for external actors to exert leverage, since Timorese leaders had access to an alternative means to finance the police force and to overcome political pressure. The absence of leverage was especially evident in the implementation of the UN Supplemental Agreement. The agreement reflected an understanding of reality in which the Timor Leste government remained dependent on UN backing, and would be forced to accept the UN’s conditions for continued assistance. Under such conditions, the Supplemental Agreement may have provided the basis for influence since it specified clear benchmarks and credible consequences. Once the 2006 crisis had passed, however, it became clear that the reality had fundamentally changed as the country’s new found wealth reduced its reliance on external actors. As a result, the UN largely failed to enforce the benchmarks and standards contained in the agreement. Instead, the Timor Leste government succeeded in renegotiating the terms of the agreement in its favor and restoring its authority over the police despite failing to meet even the renegotiated conditions.

The absence of external leverage was clearly visible in the UN vetting and certification process. Although UN and Timor Leste officials generally agreed on the need to address lack of discipline within the PNTL as a top priority, they disagreed on how to do so. The UN sought to improve discipline by removing individuals from the force who had been involved in criminal activities and human rights abuses. The Supplemental Agreement therefore required all PNTL officers to submit to certification that included an investigation of their human rights record followed by training and mentoring, both conducted by UN Police Officers. Final certification depended on PNTL officers’ “satisfactory completion of training activities, their satisfactory performance of their duties and their proven respect for human rights, their demonstration of gender sensitivity and their proven adherence to standards of democratic policing and international
and national criminal justice norms and standards.”

Those who failed the certification would be “terminated forthwith and…precluded from service.”

Timorese security leaders, meanwhile, preferred a more forgiving approach. The government that assumed power in 2007 sought to overcome internal tensions and consolidate its authority by coopting potential rivals rather than eliminating them, using the resources at its disposal. As Secretary of State Guterres explained:

“The UN wants us to dismiss everyone, but that doesn’t make sense since a lot of people were manipulated by politicians in 2006, and there are different levels of offense. I told the UN, if you agree with me, it is kind of amnesty to them, because they were part of the system, but from now on, if you continue you will be punished severely.”

When the UN chose to ignore this perspective and pursue a strict vetting approach, Timorese leaders used their newly found leverage to reject and ignore the UN requirements. After the UN drafted the Reforming, Restructuring and Rebuilding (RRR) Plan that specified the criteria and vetting procedures, it was quickly rejected by Timorese leaders. Minister of Interior Alcino Barris harshly criticized it in a letter to UNPOL Commissioner Rodolfo Tor, alleging that it was not oriented to the local context and that much of it had been lifted from Wikipedia and other sources. The government then challenged the foundation of the Supplemental Agreement by arguing that it could not be the basis for expelling officers. Rather, since the PNTL actually remained under government sovereignty, each officer who failed the UN vetting would need to be processed through the Timorese legal system.

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780 UNMIT, *Arrangement on the restoration and maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste* (see fn. 768 above), Annex 1 Part C.

781 Ibid, Sections 2.2, 11.10, and Annex 1 Part C.

782 Interview with Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres, Dili, Timor Leste, June 8, 2010.

783 Interview with Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres, Dili, Timor Leste, June 8, 2010.


785 A 2008 Court of Appeal Decision (Case no. 95/CO/2008/) found that since the Supplemental Agreement did not have the force of law in Timor-Leste, the UNPOL Commissioner did not have the power to suspend officers from the PNTL. The implication was that any suspensions would need to be processed through the PNTL Disciplinary System, which required review by the Justice Department, and many cases went beyond the Statute of Limitations. Interview with Legal Adviser to the President of Timor Leste, Dili, June 10, 2010.
since most cases ran up against insufficient evidence or the statute of limitations on their crimes.

When the UN began registering officers through its process, the Secretary of State ignored it and began a parallel registration process for PNTL officers while ignoring many of the UN’s findings.\textsuperscript{786} Although the UN discovered sufficient evidence not to certify roughly 275 officers, by mid-2011 199 of those cases remained pending, including 52 cases of serious disciplinary or criminal charges.\textsuperscript{787} Most of the officers who were not certified remained in their positions and many were eventually promoted. When the UN chose to impose its authority rather than find a mutually acceptable solution, it found it lacked the leverage to do so. In the words of one UN Official:

“\textit{We were a little too directional instead of partnering in the beginning. We drafted the RRRD plan, and handed it to the government. They said ‘fuck off.' We got off on the wrong foot.}”\textsuperscript{788}

Insufficient leverage similarly undermined the other major pillar of the Supplemental Agreement that aimed at revising the management and oversight of the PNTL. The agreement called on UNMIT to assess the PNTL and Ministry of Interior’s “internal accountability mechanisms, its external oversight and support structures, its human-resources management systems and procedures, its internal discipline system and its institutional arrangements for coordination with the defence sector” and to draft a plan aimed at “rationalizing” and “strengthening” these systems.\textsuperscript{789} The handover of authority over each district and unit would be contingent on meeting the benchmarks and performance targets set out in the plan for each unit.\textsuperscript{790}

Here, too, UNMIT failed to achieve much influence over either the content of new regulations or their implementation. The Timorese government rejected the benchmarks and standards incorporated into the RRR plan by refusing to approve the plan and instead forced the UN to renegotiate the criteria for determining eligibility for handover. The re-negotiated criteria

\textsuperscript{786} Wilson and Belo, “UNPOL to PNTL ‘Handover,’” 8.
\textsuperscript{788} Interview with UNMIT Police Adviser, Dili, May 28, 2010.
\textsuperscript{789} UNMIT, Arrangement on the restoration and maintenance of public security In Timor-Leste (see fn. 770, above), Section 11.4.
\textsuperscript{790} Ibid, Section 8.
reduced the number of PNTL who had to be certified in each district and unit to 80%, and replaced any specific reference to specific governance and oversight measures with vague requirements that included “the ability of PNTL to respond appropriately to the security environment,” “availability of operational logistical requirements” and “institutional stability, which includes the ability to exercise command and control and community acceptance.” In addition, the compliance of each district and unit with the criteria would be assessed by a joint team of Timorese and UN officials rather than the UN alone. The handover process improved communication between individual PNTL and UN Police officers as they collected detailed information about the logistical capacity and internal management systems within each district and unit. Yet the vagueness of the criteria prevented a definitive assessment and the Timor Leste government lacked the incentive to comply with adverse decision. Districts were routinely handed over that lacked basic requirements such as radios, vehicles and other logistical capability as well as basic rules and procedures or disciplinary mechanisms. Top officials in the PNTL routinely ignored the process, with the PNTL General Commander even claiming “that the handover had nothing to do with him.”

As a result of the UN’s limited leverage, the outcome of the handover process responded to Timorese government’s political imperatives more than to external standards and objectives. Facing its pressure from UN Headquarters to complete the process, UNMIT had little choice but to oblige. On March 27, 2011, the parties officially completed handover process despite recognizing that the PNTL remained far from meeting the agreed-upon criteria. An exchange of letters between UNMIT and the Timor-Leste government papered over the difference by stating that “any remaining gaps and weaknesses identified in the assessments of all districts and units would be fully

792 Interview with UN Police Officer, Dili, May 25, 2010.
793 Wilson and Belo, “UNPOL to PNTL ‘Handover,’” 11.
794 Ibid, 11.
addressed within a reasonable time.” The relationship between the UN and the PNTL shifted to an advisory role under the PNTL Joint Development Plan that reflected the UN’s limited influence over the PNTL. A UN official summarized this absence of leverage relative to other peacebuilding operations:

“In Kosovo the UN had influence, because Kosovo wanted to join the EU. Here, there is no leverage, and everybody is falling over each other to give them stuff.”

5.4 Pockets of Influence in Individual Trust Relationships

Despite the absence of leverage, the fragmented political environment generated opportunities for influence through the development of trust among donors and leaders who struggled to manage internal political pressures. Despite their access to resources, leaders continued to struggle with factional pressure, and looked to external support to build structures that might neutralize that pressure. External actors sometimes succeeded in responding with sufficient credibility and coherence to develop relationships of trust and influence decisions, while at other times they failed to respond coherently even to vulnerable leaders. The combination of limited opportunities and uneven coordination resulted in pockets of external influence amidst an overall landscape of limited trust and leverage. Even the cases of deepest influence resulted in mixed outcomes that adapted external standards to local political imperatives. While often appropriate to the context, these outcomes were often criticized for failing to meet external objectives.

The absence of trust most directly undermined the UN “co-location” program. As part of the Supplemental Agreement, UN Police officers deployed to mentor and advise individual officers, while working to revise procedures and regulations. Yet the short deployments, poor understanding, lack of language skills and inability to share information internally most often inhibited the development of trust among UN advisors and their counterparts. Many of the advisers also lacked

796 Interview with UNMIT Security Adviser, Dili, May 28, 2010.
the skills necessary to provide input on such core issues as budget, finance, procurement, logistics and personnel where most assistance was needed. Although the UN Security Council called on member states to provide advisers with such specialized skills, it took until 2011 for these advisers to be identified and deployed.footnote{797} Even where they did have the technical skills, UN Police officers often lacked the communication and mentoring skills. As one UN Police Adviser recounted:

“Our advisors at headquarters level ‘co-locate’ with counterparts, develop short courses based on identified needs, but there is little coordination overall...UNPOL Officers do not speak Tetum, so can’t really communicate with PNTL Officers. Even people with experience need to build trust and relationships, they need to know the local context and what is feasible. But short term deployments get in the way. By the time they get here, and start understanding the local context, it’s time to leave.”footnote{798}

As a result, UN Police officers contended with suspicion among PNTL officers that they were there to monitor their work or impose their ideas, while UN Police officers often failed to understand the constraints faced by their Timorese counterparts. The co-location effort suffered from “failures on both sides to engage each other and develop the relationships which would be a pre-requisite for this kind of security sector reform work.”footnote{799} To be sure, this trust and resulting influence depended in large part on the individual advisers, and the extent to which they could develop a relationship of trust. As one PNTL officer recalled:

“When I wanted to do something, I would call the [Australian advisers], and ask them to help on a specific case. But the UNPOL advisers kept changing, so I didn’t work with them.”footnote{800}

As a result of the UN Police internal coordination challenges, in most cases, their advice was ignored, and UN Police officers themselves performed the duties they were trying to teach.footnote{801}

As a result, efforts by the UN to revise the PNTL’s policies and procedures produced little impact. After drafting over 200 Normal Operation Procedures (NOPs) to establish clear protocols and procedures, UNMIT officials realized that “the PNTL was flooded with these


footnote{798} Interview with UN Police Officials, Dili, May 21, 2010.

footnote{799} Wilson and Belo “UNPOL to PNTL ‘Handover,’” 2.

footnote{800} Interview with senior PNTL Officer, June 8, 2010

footnote{801} Interview with UNMIT Security Adviser, Dili, May 28, 2010.
papers, without any background or involvement in them,” and few of them were adopted or implemented.802 In some cases, individual advisers failed to coordinate and drafted NOPs that conflicted with each other.803 To overcome this failure, donors created a working group of PNTL officers and advisers that prioritized 67 NOPs and worked together on their revision. Although most of these were eventually adopted with the signature of the UNPOL Commissioner, PNTL officials largely ignored them as they developed their own policies, budgets and strategies without external input. Eventually, they discovered that “[the PNTL Commander General] had directed other [PNTL Officers] to write NOPs” without reference to the efforts of external advisers.804 As one adviser involved in the process described:

“I had a weekly process with all of the Commanders and two international advisers but the house was already built. We tried to suggest objectives and results, but the advice wasn’t accepted, not taken up.”

On the other hand, donors did achieve some influence in individual cases of reform, usually based on effective relationships with individual officials. The most significant example during this period was undoubtedly the establishment of a new promotion process for a force that had never gone through a formal promotion in eight years of existence. The process emerged largely from Secretary of State Guterres, who lacked his own political constituency or loyal network and sought to overcome factionalism within the force. As Guterres recalled:

“When I began, the PNTL were divided into factions: nationalist, ex-POLRI, Westerners vs. Easterners; intellectuals. All distrusted each other, suspicion among each other was widespread. I decided to have a dialogue to listen to the PNTL. I invited all factions to that they could tell us their problems. I came to the conclusion that the structure did not provide incentives to work. There was no structure, they were fighting for jobs, influence and power within the PNTL.”

802 Interview with UN Police Officials, Dili, May 21, 2010.
803 Interview with Australian Police Adviser, Dili, Timor leste, June 7, 2010.
804 Ibid.
805 Ibid.
806 Interview with Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres, Dili, June 8, 2010.
He therefore aimed to establish “a solid system for promotion, so police are not dependent on politicians for their careers and discipline.” His technocratic background may also have predisposed him to this approach. Yet establishing a promotion process after several years without a formal process would inevitably run into political resistance, especially since it would advance some officers who were better qualified above those who were better connected politically.

To develop and implement the promotion process, Guterres sought internal and external backing. He appointed an independent commission led by Isabelle Fereira, wife of the Chief of Staff of the F-FDTL Taur Matan Rauk, who was politically influential and an ally of the Prime Minister. He also sought external assistance, and worked especially closely with Australian advisers from the TLPDP program who had established an effective relationship with Guterres – in part due to his Anglophone background, and were involved in all aspects of the reform. These advisers provided technical input on the details of the new rank structure, salary levels, and evaluation procedure and helped to manage political challenges. Anticipating efforts to manipulate the process at the higher levels of the force, the Commission asked external advisers to serve on an interview and selection board for higher ranking promotions. The board included advisers from Australia, Portugal, Singapore and New Zealand, as well as a Timorese priest, a legal adviser and two Timorese officials. The Commission also sought to ensure that the “PNTL would have no role in the promotion process” to guard against manipulation from within the police. The resulting process, implemented in early 2010, consisted of a written test and series of interviews taken by all PNTL officers regardless of current rank.

Even when external achieved the greatest influence, the outcome only partially reflected the objectives of external actors. On the one hand, the promotion process exemplified the close

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807 Interview with Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres, Dili, June 8, 2010.
808 Interview with member of PNTL promotion commission Isabelle Fereira, Dili, June 1, 2010.
809 Ibid.
810 Interview with Australian Police Adviser, Dili, Timor Leste, June 3, 2010.
cooperation that emerged when individual leaders sought external support and those actors responded credibly. The assistance of external actors helped to largely insulate the process from political pressure. According to international officials involved, “the process was totally respected, except for 2 or 3 cases.”

Among the biggest criticism was that it was too insulated and ignored the valuable perspectives of police officers, and that “the civilians and the Secretary of State do not know what experience is necessary for being a commander.”

Facing disgruntlement from officers, officials later recognized that “we didn’t socialize it enough with the police officers” and that they should have “considered years of service and good performance” in addition to individual test scores. On the other hand, the process was also criticized for bending to Timorese political considerations. Over three hundred individuals with pending criminal or disciplinary investigations were promoted, along with certain individuals who were known not have passed UN certification. These decisions were justified on the basis of their cases being dismissed from disciplinary proceedings due to lack of evidence, or because the “files seemed to be lost.”

More importantly, the process responded to the imperative of being as inclusive as possible rather than eliminating officers with political connections.

5.5 Outcome: Limited Transformation with Locally Driven Reform

The second international intervention aimed at restructuring Timor Leste’s police and security sector yielded a limited transformation as external actors failed to achieve their core objectives for the police and factional influence remained prevalent. Although the intervention was

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811 Interview with Portuguese Police Official, Dili, Timor Leste, June 8, 2010
812 As one police officer put it, “We didn’t want to sit for the test, because we thought we would be demoted…We saw the test as a political issue, and that the government would promote who they wanted to.” Interview with Senior PNTL Officer, Ossu, Timor Leste, June 5, 2010.
813 Interview with Senior PNTL Officer, Dili, Timor Leste, June 1, 2010
814 Interview with Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres, Dili, June 8, 2010.
815 Many cases had been dismissed from the disciplinary system due to lack of evidence. According to one advisor, “neither the Prosecutor nor the PSDO or courts had any files on [a certain officer] – nothing could be found, so they were promoted.” Interview with Australian Police Adviser, Dili, Timor Leste, June 3, 2010.
launched in an atmosphere of intense weakness by a fragmented Timorese government, access to oil revenue created a new opportunity to manage political challenges while ignoring external advice. This context limited influence by external actors while fostering an atmosphere in which factional influence was tolerated. The government did adopt legal and institution reforms that likely contributed toward maintaining peace, including a new legal framework and a promotion process for the PNTL, but these reforms did not directly challenge factional influence and failed to conform to the objectives of external actors. Instead, the composition, civilian oversight and application of legal limits continued to reflect the Timorese political reality.

5.5.1 Composition and Structure

The composition of the PNTL remained largely intact, although the Timorese government adopted reforms to improve personnel practices. On the one hand, the UN-led process to certify all PNTL officers resulted in limited change to the composition of the force. By mid-2011, 199 of the 275 cases that the UN recommended removed from the force remained at their posts, including 52 cases of serious disciplinary or criminal charges.\(^{816}\) On the other hand, the PNTL adopted a new promotion system, a new salary regime increased salaries from $85 to $205 per month at the entry level, and a new rank structure increased the number of ranks and instituted salary increases every three years as long as officers maintain a solid record. Following eight years without an official promotion process, 62% of officers were promoted from the basic rank, and the higher ranks were populated with officers with greater experience and education and who had passed a series of written and oral tests.\(^{817}\)

While much of this reform reflected substantive input by Australian, Portuguese and other advisers, other elements of the personnel system, notably assignment,

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\(^{817}\) Interview with member of PNTL promotion commission Isabelle Fereira, Dili, June 1, 2010.
transfers, job descriptions and performance evaluations remained opaque and subject to manipulation.

The preference for coopting factions by allocating rents and privileges, combined with the limited influence of external actors over most decisions, resulted in continued factionalism within the PNTL. The absence of clear job descriptions and performance evaluations, along with frequent transfers and rotations without clear criteria, enabled senior officers to exert their authority arbitrarily. Reports of factional pressure on the police and telephone calls by politicians remained common. Most police officers still saw themselves as loyal primarily to sub-groups within the force, including political parties, martial arts groups, or regional networks, and some officers continued to reject the authority of senior leadership. In 2010, PNTL officers continued to point to “tension between ex-POLRI and others who don’t want to work with ex-POLRI,” while a politician noted that “ex-POLRI and former resistance can’t submit to each other’s authority.”

These tensions occasionally escalated, sometimes even leading to fights among police officers. In other cases, police exercised favoritism, for example in repressing demonstration of support for or against the government, or taking sides in fights between Martial Arts Groups. Still, according to many within the PNTL, the reforms put in place constitute crucial building blocks for slowly overcoming these pressures. As one senior PNTL officer put it, “we still have factions but we are working on it, slowly, developing norms and internal procedures.”

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818 Interview with Australian and UN Police Advisers, Dili, May 19, 2010.
819 Interview with senior PNTL Officer, Dili, June 9, 2010.
820 Interview with Member of Parliament, FRETELIN, Dili, June 2, 2010.
821 In one incident, local police officers in Baucau, a province in the east, were accused of threatening police officers from Ermera, a province in the west. In another incident in 2010, a fight broke out in the police training academy between people perceived to have supported Indonesian authority and those who had resisted it. Interviews with UN and Australian police advisers, Dili, June 7, 2010 and May 28, 2010.
822 In a series of incidents in Viqueque, a FRETELIN stronghold in the East, PNTL officers were accused of facilitating attacks against CNRT supporters following the 2007 elections and of preventing celebrations during a visit by the CNRT Prime Minister in 2010. Interviews with local government and civil society leaders, Viqueque, Timor Leste, June 4, 2010.
823 Incidents of individual police officers taking sides in fights between Martial Arts Groups were discussed during several interviews with several human rights observers and civil society leaders in Dili and Baucau in June 2010.
824 Interview with senior PNTL Officer, Dili, May 26, 2010.
5.5.2 Civilian Oversight

The PNTL also adopted limited changes to its management and oversight structures. The benchmarks set out in the UN RRR plan to strengthen governance and oversight were largely ignored, as the UN and Timor Leste focused instead on completing the handover as rapidly as possible. The Final Handover Report found that the most units and districts lacked basic operating procedures for everything from procurement and resource management, to personnel and operations. Over 200 Normal Operation Procedures drafted by the UN were never adopted, while the 67 priority NOPs that were adopted with external assistance were rarely applied. According to several advisers and PNTL officers, “procedures were routinely ignored and manipulated, especially in the area of procurement, where tenders manipulated, or jobs given to supporters outside of formal tenders.”

Most district, units and departments lacked operational manuals, job descriptions or any of the policies and procedures that the UN and other donors had sought to put into place. Instead, authority remained highly personalized and politicized. Top leaders were accused of favoring certain units and individuals within the force, including those accused of committing crimes in 2006, and of channeling resources to businessmen. Civil society activists have documented “more and more stories about police involved in getting contracts for their constituencies, abusing the powers of police to get benefits individually or for their factions.”

Oversight by institutions outside the police also remained weak and politicized. Although the Secretary of State established new structured including a policy office, a procurement unit, an inspectorate, and audit offices, the capacity of these offices remained limited as the ministry struggled to gain access to decision-making or even monitor the force. Legislative oversight

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825 Wilson and Belo, “UNPOL to PNTL Handover.”
826 Interviews with Australian police advisers, Dili, June 7, 2010 and June 3, 2010.
827 Interview with Australian police advisers, Dili, June 3, 2010.
828 Interviews with senior PNTL Officer, Dili, May 26, 2010 and June 9, 2010.
829 Interview with human rights activist, Dili, May 27, 2010.
830 Interview with Member of Parliament, National Unity Party (PUN), Dili, May 30, 2010.
remained incipient due to the limited experience and language barriers faced by most legislators.  

When key laws were adopted for the security forces, the Parliamentary committee charged with overseeing security issues barely met or contributed to the debate. Several politicians also complained of not being consulted regarding key decisions, such as the PNTL promotion process. On the other hand, they faced frequent allegations of “picking up the phone and calling” individual officers to influence police actions.

5.5.3 Legal Limits

The PNTL adopted significant legal changes, although the impact on discipline and professionalism remained limited. A major set of reforms nominally strengthened civilian oversight and discipline. The 2009 Organic Laws for the PNTL for the Ministry of Defense and Security strengthened the oversight role of the Ministry of Defense and Security in granting it authority over “designing, executing, coordinating and evaluating the policy,” as well as over budgetary, financial, human resources and procurement. Within the PNTL, an “efficient chain of command, based on a clearly defined hierarchy” was intended to strengthen internal discipline. An Office of the General Inspectorate was established to “conduct internal audits into operational, administrative, financial, disciplinary and technical matters and to verify, evaluate, investigate and report on the performance of all services and activities of PNTL.” Within the PNTL, the “Department of Justice” was established provide legal support, including on disciplinary matters. The new framework also sought to strengthen discipline, and reduce tensions with the F-FDTL, by

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831 Most laws were written in Portuguese, even though many Timorese legislators do not speak it.
832 Interview with Member of Parliament, National Unity Party (PUN), Dili, May 30, 2010.
833 This sentiment was described in interviews with Members of Parliament from both the ruling CNRT and opposition FRETELIN parties, Interviews with Members of Parliament, Dili, Dili, , June 6, May 28, June 2, and June 7, 2010.
834 Interview with Member of Parliament, National Unity Party (PUN), Dili, May 30, 2010.
836 Ibid.
837 Ibid.
838 Ibid, Articles 14 and 24.
integrating the police with the military in times of crisis and establishing a military-style hierarchy. These provisions were heavily criticized by external actors for blurring the lines between the police and military, and for creating a militarized police. Nonetheless, these were seen as critical steps for improving discipline within the local contexts.

Despite these measures, the application of legal limits remained weak and inconsistent. Despite efforts by the UN to strengthen internal investigation within the police, the function remained plagued by insufficient clout and resources, staffed by “low level agents who have little real authority and are beholden to the District Commander.” A 2011 UN Secretary General, drafted in the context of the Handover Process, recognized limited improvements as a result of “better documentation of complaint processes, upgrades to the database used to register complaints, the initiation of investigations on the basis of reports from sources other than the victim, and stronger enforcement measures to ensure the implementation of disciplinary decisions.” Yet these technical improvements did not result in major improvements in performance. As of mid-2010, of 273 cases recommended for disciplinary actions, 6 resulted dismissal, 3 more were in process, and the rest were outstanding. PNTL commanders and external advisers at all levels described a general reluctance to deal with disciplinary cases, and the tendency for many files to get “lost.” Instead of being sanctioned, officers were more likely to be re-assigned or pressured through informal networks, a system that fostered continued factional pressure. One PNTL unit commander attributed the reluctance of commanders to discipline their officers to cultural challenges, since “we are a new country, not used to being part of the security forces, it is a different

839 For instance, the PNTL Organic Law stated that “the nature of PNTL will be identical to that of a military institution.” Government of Timor Leste, Decree Law No. 9/2009: Organic Law of Timor Leste’s National Police. Decree Law No. 9/2009 (2009), Preamble.
842 Interview with Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres, Dili, June 8, 2010.
843 Interview with Australian police adviser, Dili, Timor Leste, June 3, 2010.
844 Ibid.
mentality, and it takes time to change mentality.  Yet human rights observers expressed frustration in the continued prevalence of cases of abuse of authority, in which police officers intervened in favor of one political party or Martial Arts Group against another, or “abuse their power, violate rates, use abusive force when they are arresting people.” They perceived the response by the PNTL or oversight institutions to have been absent. As one observer described,

“The police use a show of force to get citizens to respect the law. This doesn’t work, people just run away or defend themselves. They have tried to change the internal policy of the PNTL, to get them more disciplined, to respect hierarchy, but they have become militaristic.”

6. Conclusion

The evolution of the Timor Leste National Police reveals the effects of a concentrated revenue source on security sector governance. In the first phase of assistance from 2000 to 2005, a fragmented political environment and lack of revenue sources enabled substantial external influence over the development of its police force. During the second intervention from 2006-2011, the ruling party’s access to rapidly growing oil wealth undermined external influence. Rather than adopting reforms to limit faction control, the government used its oil revenue to coopt rivals, allowing factional influence to remain strong. With little need for external financial support, the government could ignore the attempts by external actors to condition their support on achieving certain reforms. Opportunities for external influence nonetheless arose as individual leaders sought support for specific reforms in the face of political pressure. In an overall context of limited external leverage, these opportunities remained limited in scope and dependent on individual relationships.

In both phases, the responsiveness of external actors also mattered. While conditions created the opportunity for influence during the first phase, coordination challenges contributed to

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845 Interview with senior PNTL Officer, Dili, June 1, 2010.
846 Interview with civil society activist, Baucua, Timor Leste, Jun 5, 2010.
848 Ibid.
declining trust and undermined external leverage. Plagued by internal management challenges, the U.N. Police struggled to gather and manage the basic information necessary to understand and respond to local constraints and to monitor the implementation of reforms. Donors and advisers from multiple countries failed to achieve coherent objectives, leading to confusion and frustration among local actors, and inability to set clear and enforceable conditions. These problems deepened as the mission drew down and moved toward its final stages, and further undermined leverage and trust. As a result, external actors failed to influence decisions that could have limited factional control. In the second phase, uneven coordination once again limited the development of effective relationships and trust even where it could have contributed to influence on an individual level.

Like other security forces in post-conflict environments, the trajectory of the PNTL emerged out of the interaction of domestic factions and external actors. In the Timor Leste case, this interaction was especially salient, as the force functioned under nominal authority of external actors. The composition, oversight and legal limits grew out of constant negotiations among external actors and individual leaders and officials who had the authority and influence to shape them. Understanding these changes thus requires examining the relationships among decision-makers and how they evolve in light of the pressures and constraints in their political contexts.

Finally, the Timor Leste highlights how feasible reforms may be shaped by the combination of external influence and domestic pressure rather than either one or the other. Outcomes of several attempted reforms failed to reflect external objectives but responded to the political constraints faced by Timorese decision-makers. Especially in the second phase as politicians deliberately sought to foster peace and stability, they used revenue and authority in ways that were highly criticized by external actors, but nonetheless maintained the stability that they sought. Even in the areas where external actors achieved some influence, as in the promotion process, outcomes reflected a balance between external standards of professionalism and the political imperative of integrating rather than
excluding individuals despite their prior history. Ultimately, the failure of external influence may thus have generated an outcome that was more rooted in the context and more durable in the face of local pressure.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION:
TENSIONS, TRADE-OFFS AND THE LIMITS OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

One of the surprising features of international assistance programs aimed at state-building and governance is the minor role assigned to politics. In interacting with policymakers, planners and practitioner,\textsuperscript{849} I found numerous individuals with impressive skills in formulating and advancing policy in complex bureaucratic environment, designing programs with clearly defined objectives, and understanding the technical complexities of the police, military, and security. Yet in donor capitals to country offices, managing political challenge rarely emerged as a central concern. Many donor officials could not name the parties, factions or individual leaders, let alone their positions and relationships, even when they lived and worked in the country. In contrast, the most effective practitioners I encountered were those most keenly aware of politics and most comfortable navigating political challenges. In Monrovia, Liberia, a retired police chief from a mid-size city in the U.S. who was serving as an adviser to senior Liberian police officials explained to me that since dealing with politics – in the form of pressure from the mayor, the city council, the media and all manner of interest groups – formed a central part of his previous job, he quickly understood the pressures his Liberian colleagues faced.\textsuperscript{850} He viewed his central task as helping Liberian police officers manage the organizational and political pressures as they arose, drawing from his experience dealing with similar challenges in a different context. Other officials who had contributed to successful reform efforts highlighted the importance of organizational change management, of building relationships and trust with counterparts, and understanding local politics. They seemed to intuitively grasp the political challenges, and knew the right questions to ask, the way to build

\textsuperscript{849} In addition to the research conducted for this dissertation, the author has worked for several years in the U.S. Agency for International Development, United Nations Development Program, and World Bank on these issues.

\textsuperscript{850} Interview with UN Police Adviser, Monrovia, Liberia, January 22, 2010.
relationships, and the assistance needed to help overcome obstacles. Yet little of this knowledge or understanding appeared to make it into the documents, training or skills of most donor officials.

I have tried to capture a slice of that knowledge as it relates to building a core set of institutions in countries emerging from conflict. I have shown that the outcome of efforts to reform security sector governance depends largely on the political constraints faced by leaders and the way they work with external actors to manage them. Although identifying all of the political challenges in such a complex and multi-layered arena of state-building is probably not possible, I have presented a set of pathways toward institution-building outcomes based on responses to two core pressures present in post-conflict contexts: the fragmentation of political coalitions and the concentration of revenue sources. The more leaders must rely on other factions and parties to build political support and revenue, the greater their incentives to adopt reforms that reduce factional influence over the security forces and the more useful the role of external assistance for managing political challenges. These conditions thus determine the potential for external influence by shaping leaders’ dependence on external support. The resulting influence depends, in turn, on the coherence of the external response and external actors’ ability to coordinate objectives and manage information challenges. As the decisions and processes unfold that shape recruiting and training, laws and procedures, organizational systems and discipline, other challenges and trade-offs arise that go far beyond these pressures. Nonetheless, the combination of these political and revenue pressures with the credibility of external response constrain key decisions and shape the evolution of security sector governance.

In this concluding chapter, I summarize the key findings and insights and draw out implications for future research and policy. I focus on each of the major components of my argument: the conditions in post-conflict countries and among external actors that structure constraints and pressures for post-conflict leaders; the pathways of external influence and how they
are shaped by local conditions through domestic incentives, bargaining leverage and trust; and the paradoxes and trade-offs that emerge as external actors sometimes undermine the conditions necessary for their success. For each point, I review the evidence that supported and challenged my argument, as well as additional insights that emerged from the case study narratives as they relate to current debates on the role of external actors in post-conflict state-building. I conclude by highlighting areas where further research and attention by policymakers could contribute to deeper understanding of these processes and to better outcomes both for interveners and for the people in post-conflict countries these interventions are intended to benefit.

1. **Reform as a Survival Strategy: Conditions for External Influence**

Reforms that reduce factional control over security forces occur where leaders are weakest politically. This central finding departs from much of the literature on post-conflict peace-building and state-building that points to internal destruction, hostility and state weakness as constraints to achieving peace, and to the role of external interventions in filling those gaps.\(^{851}\) Although this logic may apply to short-term outcomes like stability and peace, the role of external actors in helping to build institutions goes beyond filling capacity gaps, reducing information asymmetries or persuading factions to lay down their arms. Restructuring security forces and other state institutions requires managing the complex political and organizational pressures involved in changing deeply rooted authority structures, organizational structures and norms. Assistance succeeds only to the extent that it serves and influences leaders as they face challenges that they could not otherwise overcome. Transformations in security sector governance arise out of the struggles by post-conflict leaders to survive politically, and from the use of external assistance to overcome domestic challenges.

This finding shifts the focus of research on post-conflict state-building from the inputs, strategies and dilemmas of external actors to the internal politics of recipient states. In doing so, it turns toward a rich body of research on the development of state and institutions in other contexts, while elucidating the role of external actors in those processes. The primary explanatory variables, political fragmentation and concentration of revenue, feature in accounts of state formation in other contexts that focus on the nature of political coalitions and their basis of revenue in accounting for the strength and the orientation of institutions. This research suggests that understanding the evolution of state institutions in post-conflict contexts requires looking beyond the organization and approaches of donors and devoting deeper attention to the conditions in which they operate. At the same time, state-building processes cannot be understood in post-conflict contexts with large international presence without examining the role of external actors, as a key influence and opportunity that alters political calculations. The effectiveness of aid is determined neither in donor capitals alone nor those of recipients, but in the interaction of external actors and recipients within particular contexts.

Through cross-country comparisons and detailed case studies, I showed how each set of conditions generates a particular set of pressure on leaders as they take decisions that affect the nature of security forces, in part by shaping the role of external actors. First, I showed that fragmented political coalitions force ruling parties to incorporate other factions, and often grant these factions influence over the security forces in exchange for political support. To manage the resulting risk that the security forces might turn against them, leaders might either seek to build their own loyal force – with sufficient revenue or a loyal network – or they might adopt institutional rules and oversight mechanisms that limit factional influence over the forces and enhance their

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852 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States. For contemporary accounts, see for example, Slater, Ordering Power; Bates, When Things Fall Apart; North et al, Violence and Social Orders.
professionalism. External backing can help to neutralize opposition, monitor forces to avoid manipulation, and provide technical input to build the organizational structures of civilian oversight.

All three cases provide evidence for the effects of political fragmentation on security sector governance. In Liberia a multitude of factions with shifting alliances generated pressure first on the transitional government and then on the ruling party following the elections. In the transitional government, a weak Minister of Defense whose faction had disintegrated relied on U.S. backing to neutralize political and security threats from other factions, leading to a controversial decision to disband the existing military and recruit new soldiers from scratch. The subsequent elected government also relied on U.S. support to pressure from factions seeking to integrate their fighters into the force, and supported a merit-based recruitment as part of a complete re-building of the military. In Timor Leste, the former Indonesian Police officers who were placed in senior police positions sought U.N. support to manage pressure from factions within and outside the police that questioned their loyalty and leadership. During the second intervention in Timor Leste, the Secretary of State who lacked his own political base sought external support to establish a promotion system that would neutralize factional pressure within the police. Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, illustrates the effects of cohesive ruling parties that benefited from continued control over the security forces and resisted reform efforts in both the military and police. Only when a split in the ruling party in one of the country’s entities, Republika Srpska (RS), generated an internal challenge for the Serb president did he cooperate with external actors to restructure the defense forces.

The central role played by specific leaders in each case raises the question of whether their decisions emerged from not the political reality they faced, but from their personal convictions. Put differently, is the notion of “political will” merely a function of individual agency based on personal views, or is it somehow shaped or constrained by political conditions? All three of these leaders expressed personal commitments to visions of reform, from RS President Cavic’s belief that “we
needed a new approach to security” in the Balkans to Timor Leste’s Secretary of State Gutierrez’ efforts to build “a career regime to provide a future” for the police of Timor Leste. Although their personal convictions undoubtedly affected their decisions, the cases suggest that their decisions would not have resulted in substantial reform without a conducive political environment. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the same Serb president who oversaw the defense reform expressed support for police reform but could not advance it in the face of a more cohesive political establishment that relied on its continued control of the police. In Liberia, two successive Ministers of Defense and their heads of state supported the defense reform process and participated fully with the U.S. despite widespread political opposition, since both benefited politically. Moreover, the cross-case comparisons in the third chapter showed that fragmented political coalitions are not only correlated with defense reform, but necessary for reform to occur in post-conflict countries with large external interventions.

The second condition, the concentration of revenue sources, also affected the outcome in all three countries. Consistent with literature on the “rentier states” and the resource curse, as well as previous findings on post-conflict state-building, a concentrated revenue source like oil, minerals or a concentrated private sector can free leaders from the need to rely on external financing. My research further showed how it provides a means to overcome factional pressure through the strategic allocation of resources without adopting reforms. During the second intervention in Timor Leste, the ruling party distributed its oil wealth strategically to coopt potential spoilers, including powerful veterans who had sought to politicize the security sector. Relying on allocation of resources ensured stability, but it also fueled factionalism within the police as individual officers channeled resources to their own supporters and networks. The ruling party also depended less on

853 Interview with Dragan Cavic, Banja Luka, December 14, 2011
854 Interview with Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres, Dili, June 8, 2010.
855 On the effects of resources on post-conflict state-building, see Girod, “Effective Foreign Aid.”
external support and succeeded re-negotiating or ignoring the terms for police reform set by the U.N. According to the cross-country comparisons, oil wealth was negatively correlated with reforms to the defense sector, and no major reform occurred in a country with oil wealth after intervention.

On the other hand, the absence or dispersal of revenue forces the ruling party to negotiate with other factions in exchange for influence over security forces, and increases dependence on external financial support. Dispersed revenue contributed to enhancing external influence in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Liberia. In Liberia, limited access to revenue that was dispersed among various factions and warlords persuaded both the top leaders and the political opposition of the need to adopt U.S. conditions to finance the military. The U.S. government also successfully conditioned its assistance on expanding the recruitment process for the police. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, fiscal pressure enabled the first step in defense reform as an IMF loan was conditioned on demobilization of military personnel, and a fiscal audit that revealed the government’s inability to maintain defense spending served as a strong justification for further reforms. Yet in both of these cases, financial dependence only contributed to partial reforms. Although leaders were sometimes willing to adopt limited reforms under fiscal constraints, only when political fragmentation created domestic incentives and opportunities for trust with external actors did they adopt and implement reforms that significantly restructured the forces.

The case studies suggest additional insights regarding the role of revenue sources in shaping governance. First, the comparisons help to distinguish the effects of different types of resources on governance outcomes. Concentrated revenue source like oil that can be allocated with discretion enables the ruling party to maintain patronage networks and ignore external pressure. On the other hand, natural resources that are easily dispersed like diamonds or forestry can actually enable reform, since leaders must negotiate with the factions that control them. The virtuous effects of dispersed
resources on governance in the post-conflict period differ from the more deleterious effects of “lootable” resources that can be easily extracted and transported on the onset of conflict. Second, the effects in post-conflict environment also depend on the modalities through which revenue is extracted, managed and expended. On the one hand, changes in the management of revenue that shift authority away from ruling parties and introduce measures of transparency can enable external influence, as in the dismantling of socialist payment bureaus in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the Timor Leste cases suggest that managing expenditure can be as important as managing revenue. Although the oil fund established in Timor Leste may have moderated some of the negative macro-economic effects of the rapid increase in oil wealth and encouraged some investment, the fund also left considerable space for the ruling party to manipulate expenditures. Even where limited discretion over revenue limits effects on governance upstream, control over expenditures can limit external influence, undermine incentives for reform, and potentially fuel competition over resources. This finding could inform the design of facilities to manage revenue in other post-conflict, oil rich countries from Libya to Iraq.

Finally, coordination among external actors also affected the outcome, although its effects are less straightforward. On the one hand, coordination emerged as an important factor in explaining the extent of transformation to the security forces. In Liberia, variation between the police and military in the extent of restructuring can largely be attributed to the difference between the U.S. government as a single, dominant donor in the defense sector and the U.N. Police’s struggles with internal management and coordination with a multitude of donors. On the defense side, constant communication and interaction with U.S. helped two Ministers of Defense manage factional pressure and enabled substantial U.S. influence. U.N. Police, meanwhile, struggled to establish relationships with counterparts in senior police officers due to constant personnel changes.

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856 Ross, “Oils Drugs and Diamonds,” Auyt and Le Billon, “Managing Revenues.”
857 For an analysis of these dynamics in Timor Leste see Barma, “Pathways from Petroleum Dependence.”
rotations, numerous and disparate objectives, and weak information systems. In Timor Leste, uneven coordination by the UN and multiple bilateral donors similarly eroded trust and undermined influence over time. On the other hand, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, coordination efforts by the Office of the High Representative between 2000 and 2006 bolstered its influence, at least over the defense sector.

Yet both the level of coordination and its effects appear to vary over time and in response to changes in other conditions. Although effective coordination made a difference in the level of external influence where dispersed revenue or fragmented politics create an opening for influence, even the most coordinated actor failed to influence the decisions of a cohesive ruling party with concentrated revenue. Coordination also varied over time and around specific issues in ways that appeared to interact with local conditions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the unity of external actors waned as the cohesion of political parties deepened in reaction to the proposed police reforms. In Timor Leste, external influence declined during the first phase as a result of changes in the mandate and increasing pressure by UN member states to complete the mission and hand over authority.

Donor coordination also presents measurement challenges. Donor coordination has been referred to as a “convenient catch-all” to describe all of the failures of donor intervention. Studies of peace-building have nonetheless pointed to specific elements of coordination that affect peace-building outcomes, including contradictory goals and priorities; flexibility to respond to changes on the ground; and skewed organizational incentives. Building on this literature, I have identified specific aspects of coordination that affect the influence of external actors over governance reform, including unified objectives among donors; the ability to gather and share relevant information about changing conditions on the ground of information; and the capacity to

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858 Paris, “Understanding the Coordination Problem,” 58.
859 Ibid.
860 Howard, UN Peacekeeping.
861 Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy.
respond flexibly and coherently to these conditions and to constraints faced by leaders. Yet these elements are difficult to capture and measure, as they often vary even within a single organization between issues and over time. The measured used in the quantitative analysis, the percentage of overall aid disbursed by a single donor, focuses on the presence of a dominant donor as one means of coordination. Consistently with the qualitative findings, both Liberia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had higher scores on this measure than Timor Leste. Yet this measure does not capture the role of a coordinating actor like the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or a powerful external incentive like NATO and EU accession. As a result of these measurement challenges and the interactive effects of coordination, the cross-country analysis failed to detect a systematic correlation with governance reforms. Yet these interactive and varying effects are crucial to understanding the role of external actors in these contexts.

2. Intervention as Interaction: Mechanisms of Influence

The findings from this research go beyond identifying conditions that shape the impact of assistance, to clarifying how external actors influence key decisions for security sector governance. In the first chapter, I identified three ways external assistance might affect institution-building outcomes: by filling gaps in revenue and capacity; by altering payoffs and bolstering the leverage of external actors in persuading reluctant actors to adopt institutional changes; and through a process of normative diffusion that causes new actors to emerge and existing ones to modify their preferences and values regarding how institutions should be managed. Through the case studies, I traced the causal mechanisms through which conditions within the country affected the impact of assistance, by changing domestic political incentives; by affect the information available to external actors and exacerbating or relieving information asymmetries; and by enabling or limiting the communication and interaction that foster mutual trust and norm diffusion. Understanding these
causal mechanisms enabled more precise testing of both the argument and the different roles of external assistance through evidence of the observable implications associated with each causal mechanism. They also help to elucidate the processes through which external actors affect state-building, which may be relevant to a broader range of sectors and objectives. These causal mechanisms thus provide a crucial set of building blocks for understanding state-building outcomes in post-conflict environments and the role of external actors.

The case studies yielded evidence for all three roles of external actors, and elucidated the conditions under which each of these roles is most likely to materialize. The first role, in which external actors fill gaps in revenue or capacity, generated the least impact and faced the highest barriers to success. This role appears most commonly in the literature, both in research on peace-building that focuses on providing the right level and type of assistance to fill financial, information or technical capacity gaps;\textsuperscript{862} in the policy literature on security sector reform that explores the laws, procedures and skillsets that advisers should convey;\textsuperscript{863} and in guidance for development practitioners that focuses on filling financial or technical gaps as the primary role of external actors.\textsuperscript{864} Although all of the cases involved foreign advisers, trainers and funders addressing specific technical and financial gaps, these efforts rarely contributed to security governance changes on their own. Technical inputs were often ignored when leaders’ interests were not aligned with reforms as a result of a cohesive political coalition, or if they had access to a concentrated revenue source and could ignore the recommendations of external actors. Only where they were persuaded due to external leverage, their interests were aligned, or they achieved consensus on the basis of trust and communication were technical inputs successfully applied to advance reforms. In all three countries, local actors sometimes picked up individual skills, but most advice, training and even laws

\textsuperscript{862} Doyle and Sambanis, \textit{Making War and Building Peace.}
\textsuperscript{863} See, for example, OECD, \textit{Handbook on Security System Reform.}
\textsuperscript{864} Collier et al, \textit{Post-Conflict Risks.}
and procedures that were drafted by external actors were ignored when they were not perceived as useful. In short, this role only appeared to be successful in combination with others.

The second role of external actors, the use of aid or threat of force to persuade leaders with divergent interests, played a greater role in contributing to changes in governance – but only resulted in partial transformation on its own. On the one hand, leverage depended in large part on coordination among external actors, as recognized by other scholars.\(^{865}\) Coordinated actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Liberia set unified conditions, reacted flexibly to enforce them, and collected and shared information to overcome information asymmetries. Yet leverage also depended more on domestic context than often recognized, and on political as well as economic conditions. Most directly, the presence of a concentrated revenue source directly undermined relative dependence on external support and undermined leverage.\(^{866}\) The presence of oil wealth in Timor Leste created opportunities to manage political challenges without external resources, and allowed the government to ignore external conditions without meaningful consequences. In contrast the Liberian government was forced to accept the terms of external actors as it sought to re-build infrastructure and institutions with virtually no resources of its own. The Bosnian governments were forced to adopt reforms in the hopes of reaching the benefits of EU and NATO accession.

The fragmentation of the ruling party also affected the potential for leverage by shaping external actors’ access to information. In Liberia, the Minister of Defense relied on foreign advisers embedded into the ministry and the defense force to monitor his own personnel, since he lacked sufficient disciplinary structures and loyalty within the force. The U.S. also helped to overcome

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865 This is consistent with much of the literature on peacekeeping and peacebuilding that focuses on the organization of external actors to account for their leverage. See Howard, *UN Peacekeeping*, Paris, “Understanding the Coordination Problem.”

866 The impact of revenue sources has been documented elsewhere, see for example Girod, “Effective Foreign Aid; Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work*; Barma *Pathways from Petroleum Dependence*.”
information asymmetries around the recruitment of personnel, by deploying teams of foreign and Liberian officials around the country to gather information about each recruit – at considerable expense. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, cohesive ethnic networks were more difficult for external actors to penetrate and understand. Cohesive networks undermined external influence over the recruitment of the new army when ethnic groups traded positions beyond the earshot of foreign advisers. On the other hand, sufficient personnel, effective intelligence gathering and robust coordination could sometimes overcome these challenges, as in the discovery of the Orao scandal that triggered the defense reform negotiations. The effects of fragmentation on leverage can thus be overcome, although such efforts required significant resources and attention that donors are not always willing to expend.

On the other hand, external actors could only partially achieve their objectives through the application of leverage. Even in the most fragmented environments, external actors could never fully understand the various factions and relationships and faced the risk that one faction or another would manipulate their assistance. In Timor Leste, reliance on a small group of ex-Indonesian police officers blinded external actors to the political minefields and the hostility among other factions, and allowed them to secure positions and resources for members of their own social and family networks. Similarly, in Liberia despite the close relationship between senior defense leaders and U.S. officials, the Minister of Defense was accused of channeling positions and resources to a close circle of supporters and thereby building up his base. In the face of more cohesive parties, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaders adopted decisions to secure external funding but often failed to comply in the implementation phase as external actors struggled to monitor their performance. Even where leverage was high, external actors could rarely ensure that all decisions and their implementation complied with their objectives.
Perhaps the most surprising finding involved the role of communication and trust among external actors and domestic leaders in explaining the impact of assistance. While the literature most often emphasizes the effects of aid in filling gaps and contributing to leverage, the case studies suggested that the role of external actors in altering norms and values may be necessary for institutional change. Where the greatest transformation to security governance occurred, both external actors and domestic leaders spoke of a high level of trust and communication, as well as consensus on core objectives. This consensus resulted in reforms and implementation that reflected the deepest level of external influence.

Although scholars have described the role of promoting liberal or other values in enabling democratization and peace, the processes and conditions for such change are rarely specified. The case studies revealed that trust and consensus emerged most often from fragmented political conditions that forced leaders to rely on external actors to help them manage domestic threats. In these cases, frequent interaction and communication fostered consensus around the responses to factional challenges as well as the priorities for further reform. In Liberia, the threat generated by factions seeking to integrate their fighters into the force led Ministers of Defense Chea and Samukai to work closely with the U.S. officials to neutralize factional pressure. They described close cooperation and mutual understanding. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the leaders of the Serb ruling party decided to collaborate with OHR officials in an effort to neutralize a threat within his own party, creating an opening for a process that cultivated relationships. In Timor Leste, Secretary of State Guttierez worked with Australian advisers to craft solutions to politically thorny problems like the factionalism within the ranks and promotion system. While domestic conditions created the incentives to pursue reforms, the content of reforms and their implementation were shaped through this interaction. The fact that some of the individuals involved had been educated abroad or

socialized in international organizations – like Liberian Minister of Defense Brownie Samukai who had worked in UN peacekeeping, Bosnian Minister of Defense Nikola Radovanovic who had studied in the UK, and Francisco Gutierrez who had studied and worked in Australia – facilitated this process as they already shared a common set of values. Yet in some cases leaders without those credentials – Bosnian Serb President Dragan Cavic and Timor Leste President Gusmao – nonetheless cooperated closely with external actors to help manage factional pressure and internal threats.

Rather than wholesale adoption of liberal norms, however, these interactions resulted in hybrids of domestic and external norms, standards, conceptions and interests. Responding to critiques that have pointed out the tensions involved in advancing liberal norms in many post-conflict countries, scholars have explored the concepts of “hybrid political orders” and the “hybrid peace.” This research attempts to move beyond dichotomies between democratic/liberal and violent/illiberal orders by exploring the “hybridity along the continuum between an ideal type liberal state and illiberal institutions, norms and practices.” The case studies suggest that this type of hybridity occurs frequently in the security sector even where external influence appears greatest. They also clarify the processes through which hybrid orders develop. Through frequent interaction, discussion and negotiation within the framework of trust-based relationships, external and domestic decision-makers achieved consensus on solutions that adapted external standards to local constraints. For example, the compromises that enabled Bosnian defense reform reflected creative attempts to address international standards while preserving domestic symbols and interests, for example through the creation of ethnically based regiments. Similarly, in Liberia Minister of

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Defense Samukai altered elements of the U.S. program, such as the appointment of senior officers, despite their outsize influence. The Timor Leste National Police sought to re-negotiate and revise external attempts to deal with the legacies of violence, by adapting reforms to the cultural and political imperatives to include and coopt rather than vet, prosecute and exclude. Although these adaptations were not accepted by the U.N. as consistent with external standards, they nonetheless sought to address the primary concerns of external actors with locally appropriate responses. Moreover, those reforms that appeared to completely reflect external standards without adaptation could rarely be sustained or implemented. The recruitment process designed by the U.N. during the first intervention was never fully implemented in Timor Leste. Similarly, the Ministry of Defense structure designed by U.S. advisers in Liberia was significantly scaled back, and the government continues to struggle with fiscal and political sustainability of the armed forces.

Understanding the roles of external actors and causal mechanisms of influence thus points to the inherent limits of external influence. In the cases of greatest influence achieved through consensus and changes in norms and values, external standards were nonetheless adapted to local constraints and conceptions through a process of discussion and negotiation. Since external actors always faced the risk of manipulation by other factions or sub-factions, and since the timeframe of their interventions was limited, external actors had to address local political considerations if reforms had a chance of enduring. Where external actors relied on leverage to persuade reluctant decision-makers to adopt reforms, they often struggled to monitor and enforce their conditions through the implementation process as their ability to monitor effectively declines. In most cases of post-conflict state-building external actors simply lack the influence to advance their standards, hampered by poor coordination or unfavorable conditions. In the best cases, external actors achieve results that look far different from what they expected. Yet such results may ultimately be more durable than their original objectives.
3. Paradoxes of Post-Conflict State-Building

In pointing to new ways to understand role of external actors in state-building processes, this research also highlights fundamental paradoxes involved. Over the last decade, the literature on post-conflict peace-building and state-building has moved from describing its elements and approaches, to evaluating its effects, to exploring the trade-offs and tensions inherent in external involvement. Recognizing the mixed impacts of intervention, some scholars have focused on the tensions and contradictions among such objectives as peace-building and state-building, stability and broad participation, and short-term stability and long-term development. Others have focused on the contradictions inherent in the intervention of external actors who seek to promote local accountability and participation through the promotion of external norms and institutional forms. The research presented here suggests that these dilemmas are neither inevitable nor identical across contexts, but that they arise from particular political conditions that shape both the pressures on the development of institutions and the role and effects of external actors. My findings also highlight two additional paradoxes that shed light on the tensions explored in the literature, while further illustrating the depth of the challenges facing external interveners.

The central paradox that emerges from this research is that reforms intended to strengthen the governance of security forces advance in conditions of political weakness, in which these reforms are most difficult to achieve. In the case studies, the reforms proposed by external actors advanced only in cases where the political leadership was faced with internal challenges to its authority, and used external assistance to help build its authority. Yet these are precisely the

871 For an overview of this evolution in literature on peacebuilding and state-building, see Fortna and Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects” and Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding.
872 Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy: Call Building States to Build Peace; Jarstad and Belloni, “Introducing Hybrid Peace.”
conditions in which such reforms are most difficult to achieve, due to the pressure of multiple factions, internal information asymmetries and monitoring challenges, and insufficient resources. In the cases of substantial or partial transformation, support by external actors helped to overcome – at least to some extent – this pressure to enable reforms to advance. The credibility and coherence of external assistance proved to be crucial, suggesting that external actors cannot hope to achieve success without significant investment. Even in the most conducive conditions, however, they face constant risks of manipulation and adaptation to local constraints that undermines the extent of reform its conformity with external standards. Moreover, where the domestic conditions do not create the incentives for reform or opportunities for influence, the potential to transform the governance of the security forces remains limited.

This leads to a second paradox that highlights the deeper role that external actors can play in influencing governance, by altering the domestic conditions within post-conflict countries. In addition to directly influencing decisions through negotiation and persuasion, the actions of external actors can alter the fragmentation of the ruling coalition or the concentration of revenue sources. In most cases, external actors have negatively affected their potential for influence in this way. In the interest of promoting stability or strengthening the state, external actors have enabled weak ruling parties to consolidate their authority in ways that reduced incentives to negotiate with other factions, thereby undermining both the incentives for reform and the opportunities for external influence. As a result, in many countries reforms that have appeared promising have lost steam as a result of a backlash or decreased interest in reform.

The case studies suggest two ways in which external actors tend to undermine the conditions necessary for security governance reforms. In some cases, exclusive support to weak leaders – usually while ignoring opposition and civil society – enables those leaders to use external resources to strengthen the position of their own network within the state. In Liberia, the president and
Minister of Defense have been accused of channeling resources and positions to members of their close inner circles, while excluding others. Meanwhile, the exclusion of civil society and opposition groups from most of the process has limited their capacity to monitor or react to such developments. While undoubtedly a rational means to consolidate authority in a fragmented environment, to the extent that external backers enable the consolidation of one political network to the exclusion of others, they undermine the very basis on which external influence is built and incentives to constrain factional influence emerge. In other cases, exclusive support to one party, or pushing a party beyond its bounds, can lead to a backlash to reform. In Timor Leste, the FRETELIN party initially felt excluded by external support and later rejected external assistance, which contributed to the declining trust over time. In Bosnia and Herzegovina deeper cohesion appeared to stem from a backlash against international reform efforts in the defense sector, as politicians and their constituents rallied around ethnic symbols that appeared to be threatened by police reform. Where influence depends on weakness, strengthening the party, without necessarily strengthening the state, can undermine state-building objectives.

By shifting attention of state-building from the institutions themselves to their political underpinnings, these paradoxes help to clarify some of the core tensions discussed in the literature. Research that has considered strengthening capacity as an essential element of state-building has pointed to a tension between the need to consolidate authority and broaden participation, and between broad accountability and state effectiveness. Yet state-building requires more than strong institutions, it requires the base of political support that underpin them. Weak leaders facing fragmented coalitions have incentives to build inclusive state institutions, while strong leaders do not. While the institutions may be strong in either case, their responsiveness and orientation varies

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874 Hughes, *Dependent Communities*, Chopra, “Building State Failure.”
876 See especially, Call, *Building States to Build Peace*, and Jarstad and Sisk, *From War to Democracy.*
with the political incentives faced by leaders. Shifting the focus from state capacity to the underlying political bargains also helps to inform debates about the effects of different forms of conflict termination on post-conflict peace and state building. While the variables most commonly used, including whether the conflict ended in victory by the rebels or government or in a peace agreement, do not have a strong effect on security sector governance outcomes, my findings suggest that the nature of the coalition and its source of authority are more significant in shaping governance outcomes – though this variable may be shaped in important ways by the way the conflict ended. Understanding the nature of political bargains also helps move beyond the trade-offs between including groups that may have been responsible for violence and legitimating the settlement, and between recruiting officials inclusively to maintain the peace or based on merit. Instead, the evolution of the institutions depends largely on the nature of the political coalition and the constraints it faces in a fragmented or cohesive political environment. While broadening a fragmented coalition can strengthen incentives to limit factional influence and strengthen institutions, cohesive coalitions are unlikely to respond, and likely to resist reforms. The appropriate response by external actors would then be to seek to influence the basis of the coalition and its revenue sources rather than imposing a set of institutions that do not respond to the political reality.

This approach further clarifies tensions involving the role of external actors. A lively debate has arisen regarding the appropriate role of external actors in these contexts and the tension involved in trying impose liberal norms of participation and “local ownership” from the outside. Understanding how political constraints faced by leaders shape the role of external assistance helps to cut through this tension. Under conditions of political fragmentation and dispersed revenue,

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877 Toft, Securing the Peace.
878 Consistent with my findings, Fortna and Huang, “Peacekeeping and Democratization,” find no long-term evidence of the way a conflict ends on democratization.
879 Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy.
880 Call, Building States to Build Peace.
political leaders and individual officials benefit from assistance for their own reasons, leading to cooperation among elites and external actors but often greater tension among elites and their constituents – in which external actors play a critical role. At least with respect to elite-level decision-making, the process can then be analyzed as one in which external actors respond more or less effectively to these particular constraints, or shore up the role of one set of actors vs. another to affect the basis of the coalition and the governance outcomes. Where the ruling coalition is more cohesive or revenue sources more concentrated, the interaction appears more as one of resistance and imposition, as a result of specific political incentives and constraints that might evolve over time. In both cases, the interaction among the individuals involved shapes the outcome, rather than the clash between any predetermined set of norms or interests. Moreover, the resulting outcomes inevitably end up looking like hybrids of domestic and external conceptions that reflect the balance of influence among domestic factions and external actors.

Further research could clarify these deeper-level effects, while exploring these dynamics in other areas of state-building, security and development. Indeed, the key findings presented here should be tested in other areas of state-building to determine whether they arise only in the security sector, or affect outcomes in other areas of state-building. These dynamics could also be explored in settings beyond post-conflict, where the weakness of domestic actors and the footprint of external assistance are less dramatic. The fundamental dynamics, in which political and financial weakness spur external influence and reform are likely to apply to a range of areas of state-building, from delivery of public services to local governance, in a variety of contexts. More fundamentally, more research is needed on the effects of external actors through their impact on domestic conditions. The case studies suggest ways in which external actors undermine state-building objectives, as well as ways in which they strengthen them. For example, dismantling wartime financial structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina and imposing sanctions on Liberia contributed to the dispersed revenue that
enhanced leverage, while the oil fund in Timor Leste undoubtedly moderated the effects of oil revenue. Yet effects on the nature of the political landscape and coalition are less clear. Where external actors tried to weaken the dominance of political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they achieved limited effect on their underlying cohesion, either by brokering moderate political coalitions or fostering grassroots reconciliation. The longer-term effects of external actors on the conditions within countries have yet to be fully explored.

4. Implications for Policy and Practice

This analysis has yielded rich material regarding the ways in which the policies, strategies and tactics of external actors affect governance outcomes under different conditions. Beyond clarifying the conditions and mechanisms of state-building, this case study and cross-country comparisons suggest concrete ways in which policymakers and programmers might re-think their approaches to assistance and intervention in post-conflict environments. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, many of these suggestions are well-known by the advisers and practitioners in the field who have achieved some of their objectives in building more responsive security forces and contributing toward peace. I turn now to distilling a few of these suggestions as they relate to the findings and evidence I have presented.

Gathering and applying local knowledge

The importance of local knowledge for external interveners has been emphasized consistently in literature on security sector reform and on peace-building and state-building. I have pointed to specific types of knowledge that are relevant for security sector governance and state-building in shedding light on the prospects for success of various efforts, and on the potential

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for leverage, trust and influence. Understanding the nature of political coalitions and sources of revenue can point to where success is more or less likely, as well as the types of efforts and approaches that more or less likely to succeed. This knowledge also provides a useful background for the types of pressures that decision-makers and officials might face in adopting and implementing reforms. Effective assistance requires constant attentiveness by donor officials and advisers to these pressures as they evolve and confront individual decision-makers. Although expertise for specific fields like security sector governance or police and military operations is also critical for the effectiveness of external assistance, such technical knowledge may provide little benefit without an understanding of the context and needs in which it is delivered.

Knowledge of local political and financial constraints also serves as the basis for the leverage and trust that enable external influence over state-building processes. In all of the cases, international officials who understood and responded to local political constraints grained greater credibility among local counterparts that contributed to confidence and trust. Understanding local political and coalitions facilitates the monitoring to enable enforcing conditions on assistance. The case studies provide numerous examples of external actors squandering opportunities for influence as a result of their failure to develop this type of knowledge and responding appropriately.

*The right mix of personnel and skillsets*

The need for deeper knowledge leads to a dilemma for interveners regarding the type of personnel to deploy to post-conflict state-building missions. Although outsiders in any society can never hope to understand all of the intricacies of local politics, much more can be done to raise the level of local knowledge. Recruiting the most qualified and experienced personnel can be challenging in these environments, but international and bilateral organizations can work to relieve the problems of short rotations, poor language skills and limited preparation that have plagued these missions. More fundamentally, a shift in emphasis in the type of knowledge and skillsets required
could pay dividends. International organizations and bilateral donors have tended to focus on recruiting large numbers of personnel with generic skillsets like “policing” or “legal skills.” While large numbers of troops may be useful for peacekeeping, the evidence suggests limited returns on institution-building outcomes. Instead, a few well-placed individuals with the background, ability and timeframe to build relationships, understand local conditions and react appropriately have played a more vital role by identifying the appropriate set of strategies and tactics to pursue. Experts with technical skills should also be recruited based on their experience managing political challenges and ability to form effective relationships – a set of skills that is rarely prioritized in peacekeeping missions. With sufficient space to gather and analyze data – drawing on local and international experts when appropriate – and to develop effective responses, a few such individuals could eventually link local officials to the precise skills and knowledge that appear most useful, thus targeting resources more effectively. Gathering and using appropriate local knowledge requires a shift in the way international interventions are staffed and conducted.

*Trust, leverage and the conduct of assistance efforts*

An overlooked area of post-conflict intervention involves the development of the relational tools of influence, including credibility, trust and leverage. In all of the case studies, the ways in which individual diplomats, aid officials, advisers and mentors behaved vis-à-vis their counterparts and delivered their assistance more deeply affected the outcome than the substance or content of the assistance they brought. A recent review by the OECD-DAC on security and justice assistance in conflict-affected countries emphasized the role of “process,” “politics” and “change management,” focusing on the role of assistance officials in building relationships and working through the processes of change.883 By looking beyond correlation to the mechanisms for how conditions and inputs affect outcomes, this research has pointed to specific means through which

external actors achieve influence over state-building outcomes. Critically, they involve paying attention to individual relationships and how those relationships are embedded in the broader political landscape.

Achieving influence requires investing in relationships with decision-makers, officials and constituents at all levels. These relationships serve as the foundation for consensus and norm diffusion as well as for leverage and persuasion. The OECD-DAC review recognized that developing such relationships takes time, and that this time must be built into the process and timeframe of projects. External actors must be careful not to invest all of their efforts into relationships with one or two potential “champions” who may be too vulnerable to advance reforms, or may manipulate assistance and undermine them. Instead they must build relationships with a broad range of actors, in the ruling party and opposition. These individual relationships must further be embedded in broader institutional relationships among states and international organizations. Individual relationships are only effective to the extent that they translate local knowledge into effective policy responses, by ensuring that they can influence the flow of resources. Yet individual relationships nonetheless remain a crucial building block for influence.

Exploring hybrid outcomes

Even with all of the ingredients for influence, external actors cannot— and should not – hope to completely define the institutional architecture in post-conflict countries. Where they have come close, they have run into challenges of political and financial sustainability. Where they achieved more durable influence, the laws, procedures and practices emerged out of discussion, consensus and negotiation among external and domestic actors, and the outcomes reflected neither set of priorities entirely. The best institutional outcomes are not those that directly reflect the standards and “best practices” elsewhere, but that address basic principles while responding to the political reality. Donor policy and guidance increasingly points to the concept of “good enough” governance
to justify “best fit” approaches, yet practice continues to rely on generic models of best practice. Rather than focusing exclusively on achieving such practices international actors might shift their objectives explicitly toward developing such hybrid approaches as they emerge in specific contexts. Such an approach requires careful, time-consuming and thoughtful negotiation that can ultimately lead to more durable effects of assistance.

*The importance of leadership*

One of the most under-emphasized elements of institutional change from the perspective of external actors in post-conflict settings is the role of individual leadership. Even where decision-makers agree on a set of reforms, implementing them in the context of fragmented institutions, factionalism and limited capacity requires careful strategies for managing opposition to achieve organizational change. Several of the officials who were involved in successful reform efforts focused in interviews on the need to incorporate change management concepts like building coalitions of support and communicating effectively, or on the importance of leadership as the “golden thread” necessary for building institutions. For these successful reformers, external actors saw their central role as identifying and cultivating the leadership potential of individuals and teams who could take reform efforts forward and embed them in institutional contexts. A Bosnian Ministry of Defense summarized this approach:

> “You really need to find 50 people who can think positively and walk the extra mile to find solutions. Then it’s possible. But it is important to support them in a political manner, for the OHR to support them. The critical part is to find these people, then you can support the process.”

This insight implies that supporting leadership relies less on instilling certain skills and practices than on enabling potential leaders to manage the political environment. Enabling institutional changes entails supporting leaders “in a political manner”—helping to identify and respond

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885 Interview with Bosnian Ministry of Defense Official, Sarajevo, December 13, 2011.
political challenges, and providing the right type of political backing, whether through leverage, communication with top leaders or other forms of support. More research is needed to better understand the role of external actors in this respect, especially in the face of fragmented political and organizational environments.

5. Looking Ahead

Efforts to restructure institutions in post-conflict environment inevitably confront contradictions, challenges and tensions inherent in both the political environment and the response of donors. Both central to power and necessary for peace, the security forces highlight particular challenges and illustrate the deeply political nature of the process. As long as external actors intervene in states to promote stability, peace and other objectives, these efforts will continue. Pursuing a more politically informed approach can elucidate these contradictions and eventually help to resolve them.

I have elucidated one set of dynamics that emerge in post-conflict environments with a large international presence. The research has clarified how external actors can best contribute toward state-building processes that lead to more responsive security forces. It has also highlighted the paradoxes, tensions and trade-offs, as well as the inherent limits of external influence in these environments. Engaging in these processes require extreme caution and deep understanding of politics – probably beyond what donors can ever hope to achieve – as well as greater flexibility and responsiveness. Nonetheless, investments in understanding political and financial constraints and cultivating individual relationships can deepen the impact of intervention, and contribute to enabling those leaders who are committed to change to achieve their own objectives.
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