A Brief Response

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Aoun and Lightfoot (1984; henceforth AL) claimed that what is governed is not just a phrasal category but its whole projection. Thus, if something governs a phrasal category, it also governs the head of that category. We executed this by adding some italicized material, which Postal and Pullum (1985; henceforth PP) reproduce in their (1). Focusing on one phrase in our definition of government, PP claim that the italicized material is redundant, and they reformulate the definition as their (2). They then proceed to show correctly that by (2) want does not govern to in simple cases like their (3), giving the wrong results for the contraction phenomena. Their mistake is to take our (1) as equivalent to their (2). If we apply (1) to (3), the difficulty disappears. If want is α, to is β, and γ is the maximal projection of to (i.e. S’), then all maximal projections dominating the maximal projection of to (one option provided by (1) but not by (2)) also dominate want, and all maximal projections dominating want also dominate to (or, redundantly in this case, its maximal projection S’). Therefore, in (3) want governs to by the definition of (1) and contraction may take place.

PP define government as x, which appears to them to be equivalent to AL’s definition xy. Noting that x does not capture the facts, they omit to ask whether the xy definition gives the same results.

Bouchard (1985; henceforth B) presents an analysis in which a government relation between want and to is a sufficient condition for contraction, unlike AL’s analysis, which took government to be a necessary but not sufficient condition (so an intervening Case-marked trace also blocked contraction even though the want might govern the to). First, B cites AL, saying that it had “never been challenged” that “claiming that there was a principled difference... between PRO and trace... seemed to avoid the need to postulate unattainable stipulations in the formulation of the [adjunction] rule” (AL, 471). B claims that this is false because his (1984) argues that government is a sufficient condition for contraction. If correct, his alternative analysis would not refute the more limited claim that distinguishing PRO and trace avoided unwanted stipulations in the adjunction rule.

Let us turn to his analysis, whose simplicity would make it preferable to ours if it is empirically sustainable. B finds it noteworthy that AL did not try to generalize the government account because “quite a few authors whose assumptions AL adopt” think that want does not govern a lower to when the local Comp is filled. Unlike the authors that B cites, we take Comp to have head-like properties (but not to be a head) under precise conditions that relate to the percolation of indices to Comp (Wahl (1985)), and we agree that a verb may sometimes govern into a lower Comp; but whatever assumptions we borrowed from others, we do not agree that government of to is blocked if the

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intervening Comp is filled. On the contrary, this view is problematic. B notes that contraction is possible in *Who do you want to see* on the assumption that there is no trace in the lower Comp (although we would like to see how this assumption would be worked out). However, contraction is also possible in *How do you want to do it*, where *how* is interpreted downstairs. This raises a problem because traces of adjuncts such as *how* and *why* must have a local antecedent in their own clause (Wahl (1985)), and so there must be material in the lower Comp, just as B posits material in the lower Comp for *Who do you want to go*. However, contraction is possible if the adjunct but not the subject is extracted. The point here is simply that the possibility of contracting across the trace of an adjunct in Comp shows that it is not enough to say that material in Comp blocks government of *to* by a higher verb.

There is a fundamental difference between the critiques of PP and B. B seeks one principle of Universal Grammar that will give the relevant distinctions, and maybe his account can be made to work by elaborating the relevant PF deletion process(es). PP, on the other hand, claim that the fact that some people accept *Who do you wanna go* shows “that Universal Grammar cannot mandate phonetic effects for traces” and that there is no poverty of stimulus problem involved. The logic of this is elusive, but in any case nothing can be concluded until we know what else might be going on in these “liberal dialects.” It is possible that some speakers allow certain contractions across any non-phonetic material; but that does not entail either that Case-marked traces are always nondistinct, or that the notion of a Case-marked trace is determined for nonliberal speakers by primary linguistic data rather than by Universal Grammar. Again, an analysis is needed rather than a list of speakers.

Finally, a comment on the complaints of both B and PP that we did not cite certain works: AL was written in the summer of 1982, so the fact that we did not cite 1983 and 1984 attempts to account for the contraction facts in terms of government is explained by the time lag between the writing of a paper and its eventual appearance. Furthermore, those attempts are executed in significantly different ways, as we have just seen with B’s analysis. To say that the subsequent material used government to account for the facts may be true but glosses over real differences that we did not feel bound to comment on, partly because the work was not published or in final form. The same is true of the ingenious analysis of Pesetsky (1982), unmentioned by PP and B; this treatment also seeks to make government a sufficient condition for contraction, and we discuss it in Wahl (1985). This point is true a fortiori of what B calls an “implicit” use of government from 1977. As is usual, we cited what was immediately relevant for the points we were making, which in this case related to the limited goal of replying to a specific article.

References


Affect $\alpha$: A Reply to Lasnik and Saito, "On the Nature of Proper Government"

Hubert Haider

The ECP has been at the very center of investigation and discussion for the last few years both because of its undeniable theoretical impact and because of its heterogeneous formulation: under the heading "proper government" are tied together two different notions, the notion of "head government" and the notion of "antecedent government." In view of this dualistic nature, a strategic approach suggests itself: either to reduce one part to the other, or to eliminate one in favor of the other. Lasnik and Saito (1984; henceforth L&S) try to make a case for antecedent government,\(^1\) a move that entails considerable reformulation of standard concepts. However, they leave open the question, without comment, whether a similar reformulation of some other principles might prove head government to be a suitable target for reduction. That this approach is feasible is at least partially proved by Kayne (1983, 239) in his treatment of multiple wh-questions in terms of "connectedness."

I will not evaluate the conceptual merits of L&S's rule Affect $\alpha$, since it will turn out that their proposal lacks the necessary empirical support. I will demonstrate this with data from German, since German belongs to a language type that is crucial for counterbalancing the claims of L&S. It is like Japanese with respect to the syntactic properties of adjunct wh-items and the lack of superiority effects. But it is like English in the sense that a wh-item must move into Comp, if a Comp slot is available (2a–b).

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\(^1\) Actually, L&S do not attempt to reduce lexical government to antecedent government. Instead, they extend the domain of the latter: intermediate traces could be either antecedent-governed or lexically governed. L&S argue for the first option. Lexical government applies to basic A-positions.