FROM RESISTANCE TO PARTICIPATION?
THE ROLE OF NONVIOLENT MASS MOVEMENTS AFTER REGIME CHANGE

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the role that civil resistance movements play in democratic transitions. It explores challenges and opportunities preventing or enabling these movements to engage effectively in contexts of regime change, using the framework of strategic nonviolence theory and practice. Literature on transitions, civil society, and democratization is discussed to explore ways in which it can complement strategic nonviolence theory. Together, the theories point to three key capabilities that civil resistance movements should try to foster if they are to succeed during periods of political transition: Democratic organizational structures and ideals among all groups constituting the movement; a relationship to the new government that balances sufficient access for participation with necessary autonomy; and the capacity to unite civil society while respecting pluralism.

Three comparative case studies are used to illustrate these challenges and highlight further gaps in research on civil resistance and transitions: the Chilean movement against Pinochet 1983-1989; the Serbian movement against Milosevic 1990-2000; and the Egyptian movement against Mubarak in 2011. A review of historical documents, posters, and resistance groups’ website content, as well as expert interviews and presentations informed the analysis for this project. The research resulted in two main findings. First, the case studies accentuate the difficulties that grassroots groups
face when seeking to remain relevant and influential compared to elite members of the resistance. Second, they demonstrate the importance of building bridges across ideological divides during and after the resistance campaign to defend democratic gains and work toward reconciliation and peace.
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Introduction

“How to topple a dictator” was the title of a Ted Talk given by Srdja Popovic in 2011.1 Srdja Popovic was one of the leaders of the nonviolent Serbian student movement that brought down Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 and then proceeded to teach activists from other countries skills in organizing nonviolent revolutions. He gave the talk in November 2011, at the end of a year that had been shaped by the power of nonviolent popular uprisings and that had shown the possibilities for change at the hands of common people without the use of force. How to topple a dictator? That year, Tunisian and Egyptian resistance movements had shown how, like many others throughout history and across the globe, from India to Chile to the Philippines. Nonviolent resistance had once more succeeded in pushing authoritarian leaders out of office and opened up opportunities for democratic change.

Three years later, however, much of the enthusiasm of 2011 has dwindled. While the success of nonviolent popular movements in ousting authoritarian leaders was remarkable, the transitions that followed have proven to pose great challenges to the movements. Egypt, for example, has returned to de facto military rule, with the opposition currently being silenced or outright convicted and imprisoned. What began as a popular revolution has turned into a power grab between elites claiming to speak and act on behalf of the people and their revolutionary agenda.

Democratization is a complex process and three years is not enough time to judge the success or failure of these movements. Yet the struggles that these movements have

faced are an indication that it is essential to extend analysis and theories on civil resistance to the time period after a regime change has been achieved. Strategic nonviolence theory explores the conditions for and best practices of successful civil resistance movements primarily leading up to the toppling of a dictator or an authoritarian system. Scholars of strategic nonviolence have argued on the basis of both theoretical reflections and empirical studies that nonviolent resistance is strategically superior to violent resistance. Empirical research has supported these arguments through a number of case studies across time and space and through showing a statistically significant correlation between nonviolent resistance campaigns and democratic change as compared to violent campaigns and regime types following them. Yet the focus of these studies, theoretical and empirical, is the manner in which the movements go about their resistance campaigns, culminating in the regime change, not on the transition process following it.

In light of developments in countries of the so-called “Arab Spring” over the past three years, focusing an analysis solely on “how to topple a dictator” appears insufficient without considering the strategies and skills needed after a regime change. Uniting against a regime does not necessarily mean sharing a vision for a new regime. Building coalitions for resistance does not mean that these coalitions will hold in the scramble for power after the regime change. Gaining power vis-à-vis the established political elites does not guarantee that it will be maintained once the new elites take over. A more explicit discussion of these challenges would enrich the existing literature.
Research Question and Structure of the Thesis

This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on civil resistance and democratic transitions by investigating the role that civil resistance movements play in transition processes. It explores the challenges and opportunities for these movements, and civil society more generally, to engage effectively and nonviolently in the transition process in the framework of strategic nonviolence theory and practice.²

Initially, gaps in the strategic nonviolence literature on civil resistance and transitions are identified, followed by a discussion of theoretical approaches to the role of civil society in transition processes other than strategic nonviolence theory and their ability to complement strategic nonviolence theory. Theories on transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule and democratization point to three of the main challenges civil resistance movements have to negotiate in the transition. The first challenge relates to the relationship between the resistance movements and the new government. During democratization, civil society has to manage a tension between its two roles of, on the one hand, continuing to fulfill a watchdog function – which requires a certain distance from the government – and on the other hand, participating in decision-making processes – which demands a sufficient closeness to it. The second challenge concerns the relationship between the resistance movements and the wider society. The movements confront a tension between continuing to forge the necessary degree of unity to effectively continue pressing for change on the one hand, and respecting pluralism and giving room to the diversity of interests and values among the movement and the wider society on the other hand. The third challenge relates to the movements and their degree

² Meanings of “civil society” and “democracy” are discussed in Chapter One, starting at page 18.
of “civicness”, meaning the extent to which the movements support democratic ideals and develop structures and behavior that enable learning and create knowledge of democratic procedures and qualities.

An analysis of three cases of civil resistance follows, examining the challenges experienced by the movements in the transition processes. Chile in the mid- and late 1980s, Serbia in the 1990s, and Egypt since 2011 have experienced the ousting of authoritarian leaders by civil resistance movements. Popular movements aiming for democratic change, a better protection of human rights, and greater social justice, nonviolently removed Augusto Pinochet, Slobodan Milosevic and Hosni Mubarak from power. Analyzing the three cases comparatively based on the theoretical findings from chapter one, the three core challenges faced by resistance movements in transitions are illustrated. Particular attention is drawn to the shifting relationship between the grassroots and the elites within the resistance movement and their relative power and importance in the democratization process as the movement migrates from the resistance to the transition phase.

Methodology

The analysis of the three cases of transitions subsequent to civil resistance movements falls into the category of disciplined configurative case studies. Strategic nonviolence theory and the complementary insights from the literature on transitions, democratization and civil society discussed in chapter one are used to explain the

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3 For a discussion of different categories of case studies and their purposes, see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2005), 75.
successes and limitations that the resistance movements experienced in their respective transition processes. In addition, the case studies serve to highlight theoretical omissions or superficial treatment in the literature on strategic nonviolence. The three cases differ in their historical, political and cultural contexts, thereby limiting the possibility for a clean comparison where all but the independent variable are equal. However, the cases all belong to the same type of phenomenon where civil resistance movements brought about the fall of an authoritarian regime thereby starting a transition process aimed at democratization. This type of phenomenon is precisely what strategic nonviolence theory is concerned with and seeks to explain.

Due to the claim of strategic nonviolence theory that civil resistance has proven to be strategically superior to violent resistance across time and space, the choice of cases from disparate time periods and geographical areas is common in the literature. Furthermore, while the current developments in Egypt triggered this research, the cases of Chile and Serbia (where the transition processes have been completed) enable both greater certainty in assessing their outcome and greater availability and access to data.

The three cases vary in their outcomes. The Chilean movement lost much of its importance briefly after the regime change, yet the democratic system stabilized fairly soon after the transition, even though claims for greater socio-economic equality remain largely unfulfilled. The Serbian movement saw a decline in the importance of grassroots activism after the regime change, yet leading members of the resistance movement

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4 On comparative case studies focusing on same cell of a typology: George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 82.
continue to decisively influence political decision-making, spreading their concerns and goals among the political elite. Lastly, the Egyptian case is still in flux but it appears that much of the democratic project has already been aborted by the July 3rd coup d’état.

The units of analysis in this research are the (former) nonviolent resistance movements, operationalized as the collectives organized around resistance campaigns engaged in nonviolent action, and the civil society organizations that form part of these movements seeking democratic change. Civil society is understood for the purpose of this research as “the arena of voluntary collective actions around shared interests, purposes and values, an ‘intermediate associated realm between state and family populated by organizations, which are separate from the state and enjoy autonomy from the state’”.

Effectiveness on the part of the movements and civil society groups is understood as having affected the desired change. Effectiveness is thus not measured with the same benchmark for all groups but rather relative to their objectives. In the case of Chile, however, where the groups stated that they generally sought democratic change, data from the Polity IV and Freedom House datasets supplement the qualitative data collected.

Regarding the gathering of primary data for the case studies, historical documents, protest posters and slogans, website content of Egyptian resistance groups, as well as four expert interviews (two on the general state of research on civil resistance and transitions, one on Serbia, and one on Egypt) and three presentations at a conference were combined. The expert presentations and interviews followed purposive and snowball

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sampling. For the Chile case study, the data is primarily drawn from an online archive called “Memoria Chilena” by the Chile National Library. The website includes a collection of posters and pamphlets from the period of military dictatorship (1973-1988), many of which are from the resistance movement against Pinochet. For the Serbia case study, an hour-long interview with Ivan Marcovic, a leader of the resistance movement, provides the foundation for the analysis. The analysis of the Egyptian resistance and transition process relies on an hour-long interview with Sherif Mansour, formerly with Freedom House and now with the Committee to Protect Journalists, as well as expert presentations at the February 2014 Georgetown University conference on “Egypt and the Struggle for Democracy”, and website content from the April 6th Youth Movement and the “We are all Khaled Said” group. The primary data gathered for these exploratory case studies is limited in breadth and therefore placed in the context of secondary literature.

Due to the limited number of cases and interviewees, as well as the practical restrictions impeding access to certain documents, the findings of this research can only be tentatively generalized. The relevant factors identified in Chapter One and the data gathered for the case studies, furthermore, point to the likelihood of their affecting the outcome of the movement, rather than establishing definite claims about their necessity or sufficiency. This analysis is designed as an exploratory piece on civil resistance.

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9 Conference on “Egypt and the Struggle for Democracy” hosted by the Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 29 January 2014.
movements and transitions to identify variables, which invite more in-depth research on a greater number of cases.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Foundations

The past three years have been shaped by popular struggles against authoritarian regimes, most prominently in the MENA region, and popular uprisings are also underway in Asia. As the developments in Egypt show, the toppling of a democratic leader does not necessarily mean an end to violence or a fulfillment of the protesters’ demands. It is also in the transition process that lasting change is sought. The literature on strategic nonviolence identifies conditions and directions for civil resistance to illegitimate regimes, yet the role of these resistance movements after a successful regime change remains unclear. Current research reflects that democratization is more likely to occur after nonviolent rather than violent regime change.\(^{10}\) According to one study, countries that experienced nonviolent resistance are greater than 50% more likely to qualify as democracies five years after the conflict than after violent resistance efforts.\(^{11}\) But how does this process unfold and what is the role of the previous nonviolent resistance movements in it? What are opportunities for the movements to engage effectively and

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\(^{11}\) Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 213; the assessment is based on Polity IV scores.
nonviolently in the transition process in the framework of strategic nonviolence theory and practice? Exploring the conditions for successful transition processes after nonviolent uprisings is crucial both for strengthening strategic nonviolence theory and for informing its practice.

The dynamics of political transitions and the role of non-state actors in the transitions have been analyzed and debated for several decades by scholars in comparative politics. Although most of the scholarship has focused either on structural conditions for democratization or on the role of elites, an increasing number of analyses since the “Third Wave” of democratization, thus democratic transitions after 1974, have assessed the role of civil society in democratic transitions. As civil resistance movements can be considered part of civil society – defined above as the realm where collectives (between the levels of the family and the state) act out of their own accord on the basis of shared interests, goals and beliefs – these analyses and the debates surrounding them provide useful insights for filling the theoretical gap confronting strategic nonviolence theory. They point to diverse factors influencing the effectiveness of civil society in democratization. In this chapter, the current state of the literature on strategic nonviolence as it relates to political transitions will be examined, its gaps explored, and missing conditions considered on the basis of a discussion of the literature on civil society and democratization.

Strategic Nonviolence Theory

Strategic nonviolence theory focuses on the behavior of a popular resistance movement and its effect on the regime and the transition. Strategic nonviolence theory (also called civil resistance theory) stipulates that nonviolent resistance to an oppressive regime is strategically superior to violent resistance, inasmuch as nonviolent resistance movements are statistically more likely to lead to democratic change. It differs thus from virtue-based or principled nonviolence, often connected with the Gandhian approach to resisting colonial occupation, that places the emphasis on the human value and role of character related to developing a wise strategy. Proponents of principled nonviolence argue that nonviolence is not only strategically but also normatively favorable to violence. Strategic nonviolence furthermore differs from virtue-based nonviolence by considering the opponent, the regime, as that which needs to be conquered rather than stressing the opponents’ human dignity, which includes attending to their perception, their opportunity for change and participation in a solution. Another key difference between the strategic and virtue-based nonviolence approaches is the latter’s attention to cultivating empathy for all parties and establishing processes for reconciliation before, during, and after the conflict.

Gene Sharp’s works, considered the foundation for strategic nonviolence, highlight three main reasons why nonviolent resistance is preferable over violent resistance. First, the power of the regime depends on the consent of those governed. By withdrawing consent, citizens thus undermine the power of the regime. Second, if the protesters do not use violence but the state responds with violence, the state loses

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legitimacy in the eyes of the people and the international community. Finally, nonviolent protests and actions are available to all and this inclusive character enables a representation of the general citizenry, which in turn supports the legitimacy of the movements.\textsuperscript{14}

Building on Gene Sharp, other scholars have illustrated the theory by pointing at the manifold cases of strategic nonviolence, such as Peter Ackermann and Jack DuVall, Ackermann and Christopher Kuegler, Stephen Zunes, Mary King, Maria Stephan and Kurt Schock.\textsuperscript{15} They have analyzed cases of nonviolent resistance worldwide and assessed their effectiveness, strategies, similarities and differences. These works concur in presenting nonviolent resistance as effective, applicable across cultures and contexts, and more likely to lead to systems of democratic governance than violent resistance. Fewer works have tested the theory. A notable exception is Stephan and Chenoweth’s comparative statistical analysis of violent with nonviolent uprisings and the regime types following the uprisings.\textsuperscript{16} Peter Ackermann and Adrian Karatnycky had previously performed a quantitative study, in collaboration with Freedom House and the

\textsuperscript{14} Gene Sharp, \textit{From dictatorship to democracy: A conceptual framework for liberation}. (Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution: 1994); Gene Sharp, \textit{There are realistic alternatives}. (Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2003).


\textsuperscript{16} Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{“Why Civil Resistance Works”}. 
International Center for Nonviolent Conflict, showing that transitions brought about by nonviolent bottom-up coalitions led to greater freedom in the respective countries than either violent bottom-up or top-down transitions.\textsuperscript{17} Stephan and Chenoweth, as well as Ackermann and Karatnycky, have shown a significant statistical correlation between nonviolent popular uprisings and subsequent democratic rule, as compared to the regime types, which typically follow violent insurrections.\textsuperscript{18}

In this sense, nonviolent movements are on average more successful in achieving democratic change than those using force. Nonviolent resistance is more inclusive and creates fewer grievances than violent resistance, both key factors in enabling democratic governance after regime change. Yet, beyond this correlation between nonviolent resistance and democratic change and insights into the reasons for it, the research does not reveal which role civil society plays in the transition process once the former regime is successfully toppled. The literature on strategic nonviolence is heavily focused on regime change: on toppling authoritarian rule from below. It focuses on the prerequisites for successful nonviolent movements and best practices in terms of nonviolent action, while leaving the open question as to what happens after the regime change.

Advocates of strategic nonviolence focus on achieving justice, not nonviolence \textit{per se}. Nonviolence is neither a motive nor the ultimate goal but rather an instrument that promises greater effectiveness. Civil resistance is opposition to a system considered unjust to its citizens with the hope for a regime change that will bring about greater justice. Democracy is widely considered the most favorable system of governance when

\textsuperscript{17} Ackermann and Karatnycky, “How Freedom is Won”.
\textsuperscript{18} Chenoweth and Stephan, “\textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}”; Ackermann and Karatnycky, “How Freedom is Won”.

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compared with other competing systems for providing justice to its citizens, which is why the connection between nonviolent resistance and democratic change is seen as instrumental in achieving the goal of resistance campaigns.

Justice goes beyond the notion of negative peace – the absence of violence – and is a building block of positive peace. Johan Galtung introduced the notions of positive and negative peace, revealing the limitations of aiming merely at the absence of war or other forms of direct violence to create a situation of negative peace.\(^{19}\) He emphasized instead the importance of overcoming structural and cultural violence to create positive peace. Positive peace entails the presence of structures and processes that allow for the full human development of individuals and groups by protecting and promoting basic human rights and creating constructive relationships among people. Structural violence, one of the key obstacles to positive peace, relates to the systematic inequalities in power and opportunities between groups in a given society. While democracy alone is not an adequate remedy for structural violence, citizenship, which is the defining essence of democracy as it relates to the protection of rights and the possibility for participation, is an essential tool for creating greater equality than is for example provided by authoritarian states.\(^{20}\)

Regime change by itself is insufficient for positive peace. It is in the longer transition process that such peace is sought. This is the paradox facing strategic nonviolence theory regarding democratic transitions. While nonviolent resistance aims at

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a state of society that goes beyond negative peace to include notions of social justice, equality, and participation; in comparison, both theory and practice focus on what the movements are resisting more than on what they are constructing. Positive peace, however, depends on the active construction of a new state of society by overcoming not only direct violence but also structural and cultural violence, thus relating to fundamental reforms of the system and changes in attitudes, perceptions, habits, values and language. As is discussed in Chapter Two, the experience in Egypt exemplifies this challenge. The protesters in 2011 were successful in rallyng around the goal of bringing down the system, exemplified by the slogan, “The people want the downfall of the regime.” They also shared abstract goals, such as bread, freedom and justice for all, yet they did not share a common vision or a plan as to how to achieve positive peace.21

The absence of such a shared vision and framework for better governance by nonviolent resistance movements is arguably due to the very nature of a popular uprising. Such an uprising consists of diverse segments of society representing different ideologies, affiliations and demographics, which makes a shared vision appear virtually impossible. However, the literature on strategic nonviolence neglects the strategies and skills needed by civil resistance movements following a regime change, an omission in analyzing the opportunities and challenges for translating the skills for resistance into skills for peacebuilding and democratization. Maria Stephan points to the fact that skills needed for coalition building in the mobilization phase can be applied to democracy building and

21 Michele Dunne, “Critical Stages of the Egyptian Revolution: Was the Coup Inevitable?” Presentation at the conference on “Egypt and the Struggle for Democracy” hosted by the Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 29 January 2014.
consensus formation in the transition process.\textsuperscript{22} Mobilizing support among the population is similarly a crucial skill for furthering the participation of civil society in democratization. At the same time, the radical shift in the framework, from the common goal of ousting a regime to the diverse ideas about how next to proceed, calls for a more in-depth look at how these skills are transferable, and which additional skills and strategies are needed to address the challenges after a regime change. Since most of the literature on nonviolent resistance aims to be relevant for the practice of such movements, including advice on and advocacy for specific strategies and actions, such a longer-term perspective is crucial.

The prevailing emphasis on resistance poses an obstacle to reconciliation. In a democratic transition, particularly if brought about by peaceful means, the opponent is not eliminated (as might be the case in a traditional war); rather, the leader is typically demanded to resign but much of the \textit{ancien regime} remains imbedded in the political apparatus. After the regime change, the opposition thus needs to negotiate for space with the other political actors, many of whom held positions of power in the previous regime, and negotiate mutually agreeable arrangements.\textsuperscript{23} Otherwise, as O’Donnell and Schmitter warn, and as happened in Egypt, the members and supporters of the previous regime might develop counterrevolutionary policies or even stage a coup.

As mentioned above, strategic nonviolence differs from principled or virtue-based nonviolence by considering nonviolence a means to an end rather than an end in itself. The nonviolent movement is thus unified by its resistance against the regime, and not necessarily by shared values – such limited vision does not provide guidelines for future

\textsuperscript{22} Maria Stephan. Conversation with Berenike Schott, Washington, DC, 20 March, 2014. 
\textsuperscript{23} O’Donnell and Schmitter, \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule}, 83.
action. Furthermore, it often does not offer explicit respect for the dignity of the opponent, consider the opponent as part of the solution nor seeks their transformation to more peaceful persons who respect others’ dignity and rights. The lack of attention to the dignity of opponents can also cultivate habits in the resistance group that tend to undermine the goals to develop a culture of human rights and a substantive democracy. All of this makes it much more challenging for movements based on strategic rather than principled or virtue-based nonviolence to engage with members or supporters of the old regime in the democratic transition process.

As discussed in Chapter Two, reconciliation with and re-humanizing of the opponents is one of the key challenges in Egypt where the aftermath of the regime change and the subsequent coup have brought forth deep divisions between political factions and within society at large. It is crucial to realize the strength but also the limitations of strategic nonviolence theory and practice: although providing unifying tools to struggle against the “other”, it does not transform conflict collectively. Borrowing language from comparisons drawn between violent and nonviolent conflict, nonviolent resistance has for good reason been called nonviolent struggle that is being “waged”.\cite{24} Scholars and practitioners in strategic nonviolence and those in conflict resolution hardly refer to each others’ work, despite the common desire for social justice, as strategic nonviolence seeks to achieve it through intensifying (nonviolent) conflict, while conflict resolution seeks to attain it through diffusing conflict and seeking

compromise. In the aftermath of the regime change, this division is unhelpful and potentially even harmful as democratic transitions depend on both the active representation of interests and the willingness for compromise.

In addition to the obstacle that the focus on resistance poses to reconciliation and compromise, the focus on the idea of resistance can also perpetuate the idea of a zero-sum game where one group, if also nonviolent and representing a much wider segment of society, can only reach its goals if the other group, the former regime, is entirely stripped of its power. This, as mentioned above, is highly unlikely to be an option in a democratic transition and could likely trigger counterrevolutionary action by those who fear loss of more of their established privileges than they consider reasonable in such a transition.

Civil resistance movements after a successful regime change are thus faced with challenges regarding their relation to the state, the attitudes of its members and constituent organizations, and their relation to other segments of civil society. The movements struggle to migrate from absolute resistance to a more participatory and inclusive approach without losing their independence from the state. This makes it difficult to collectively commit to the pursuit of substantive democracy after having removed the previous regime, and to build broad coalitions with other segments of civil society in order to remain relevant and strong through the transition. Amy Hawthorne, in her analysis of civil society in the Middle East, identified as key factors for civil society to further democratization the autonomy of civil society, a pro-democratic attitude, and

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the ability to build coalitions. In the following section, insights from the debate on civil society and democratization for civil resistance movements in transitions will be identified. However, before considering the debate, it is essential to clarify the meanings of the terms civil society and democracy.

Defining Civil Society and Democracy

The concept of civil society is contested, as is its explanatory value. The definitions overlap in describing civil society as voluntary associational groups of actors who are above the analytical level of families or clans, separate from the state and the market, and gathered around shared interests and purposes. This rather broad definition of civil society includes groups ranging from loosely organized grassroots movements to highly structured labor unions. For the purpose of this study, the degree of organization of the groups will not be considered a basis for excluding them from the definition of civil society, even though they lack some of the structure of registered non-governmental organizations. Such exclusion would not do justice to the role that more loosely organized groups have played in Chile and Egypt, and thus prove unhelpful in explaining

the developments of those movements. In all three cases, a combination of more organized groups such as labor unions, religious groups, and ad-hoc collectives (such as protest camps and campaign supporters), constituted the movements calling for regime change. Furthermore, as elaborated in more detail below, more formal organizations are at greater risk of being controlled and possibly co-opted by the state than ad-hoc collectives, and such a focus would thus skew the assessment of civil society in its ability to challenge the state. Political parties are generally not considered part of civil society; rather they are part of what has been termed political society since they seek to gain state power and internally participate in political institutions rather than externally influencing and checking the state. However, the line between the civil and the political society is fuzzy, especially in the context of transitions as is apparent in all three case studies. Oppositional groups that were not registered political parties before the regime change sometimes choose to form parties and run for election after the regime change and thus move from the civil to the political society. While political parties are thus generally not considered to be part of civil society, it is important to acknowledge the gray area between civil and political society in the transition process.

Similarly, when considering the literature on democratization in relation to the question of how nonviolent resistance movements can be most effective in the transition process, the concept of democracy requires a definition. Democracy is an even more contested concept than civil society and it is a politically loaded term. Aware of the

30 Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control”; Hawthorne, “Middle Eastern Democracy”.
31 For a distinction between the civil and the political society, see Diamond “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” 7; and Hawthorne, “Middle Eastern Democracy”, footnote 2.
limitations of any definition of democracy, this analysis focuses on several elements that characterize a democratic system and are most relevant to the situation of social movements and civil society. When considering popular movements for regime change, the participants are typically not fighting for a minimalist or “processualist” version of democracy – that is a concept of democracy defined by the procedure of elections; rather, the movements press for freedoms, rights and social justice.\textsuperscript{32}

For the purpose of this analysis, democracy will therefore be understood not merely as “processualist” but as substantive democracy. The core characteristic of substantive democracy most closely related to the situation of civil society is that of participation. Citizens in a democratic state have rights and duties, and among their rights is the right to participate in the political decision-making process by electing representatives and running for offices but also more generally through the freedom of expression and assembly, which are key preconditions for a free and open civil society.\textsuperscript{33} Citizenship, and the civil rights and obligations tied to it, including the right to participation, is a core element of democracy.\textsuperscript{34} Further central elements are the rule of law and the equality of citizens (including minorities and marginalized populations) before the law.\textsuperscript{35} Lastly, equal access to political participation and the ability to


\textsuperscript{34} O’Donnell, “Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics”, 26.

participate fully in the life of the society presuppose a minimum degree of education and welfare of all citizens.\textsuperscript{36} Hence, the notion of democracy grounded in civil and political rights must also include commitments to social and economic rights. Therefore, when assessing the challenges to and opportunities for civil society in political transitions, both civil and political as well as economic and social rights matter. Recognizing the importance of social and economic rights, and the interdependence of all rights, the focus of this analysis, however, remains on civil and political rights. First, increased opportunities for participation can enable citizens to better put forward their demands for greater social and economic equality; second, the analysis draws on the literature on transitions and democratization with its focus on civil and political rights; third, a thorough assessment of the social and economic conditions in the three cases is beyond the scope of this thesis. The analysis of the cases does, however, take into account the shifting power balance between the grassroots and the elites of the resistance movements as they migrate from the resistance to the transition phase and its implications for the ability of the grassroots to press for greater socio-economic equality.

To summarize, in this analysis democracy is understood as a political system built on the idea of citizenship, where citizens have civil, political, economic and social rights and duties including the freedoms of expression, assembly, and participation in the democratic process. It is a system where all citizens, including those with varying degrees of power, are equal before the law, which is constantly beholden to justice, and where the elected political leadership is accountable to the citizens.

\textsuperscript{36} O’Donnell, “Democratic Theory and Comparative Politics”, 54-56.
Theories on Transitions and Democratization

As mentioned above, civil resistance movements in their struggle against authoritarian regimes and for a better protection of civil and political and promotion of social and economic rights typically aim for democratic change. Scholars in the field of Comparative Government have long sought to understand why democratic transitions originate, evolve, and what affects their success or failure. Democratization theory considers a broad range of factors that are required or beneficial for democratic change, such as economic development, factions within the elite, and democratic political culture.\(^\text{37}\)

While civil society is generally considered relevant for democratic consolidation and the long-term viability of a democratic system, in the democratization literature its role is traditionally deemed less important regarding the success of democratic transitions.\(^\text{38}\) The structures of and decisions by elites are considered the determining factors for the success of transitions, a view that manifests itself in political practice in the emphasis on elite negotiations and power-sharing deals to resolve conflict during transitions. The role of civil society has traditionally garnered less attention, although this

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\(^\text{38}\) Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Boussard, “Civil Society and Democratisation”,159.
trend shifted slightly after the fall of the Soviet Union when popular movements were instrumental in challenging authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Africa.\textsuperscript{39} The focus on elite bargaining might also be attributed to the universe of cases shaping the research in the seventies and eighties.\textsuperscript{40} In the transitions before 1989, primarily in Southern Europe and Latin America, elites had been considered the key actors in determining how the transitions would play out. Routinely, a necessary precondition for a democratic transition was a division among the elite between soft-liners and hard-liners. Only then, for example, would soft-liners side with a popular uprising, giving it the necessary power to undermine the old system perpetuated by the hard-liners. In the aftermath, introduction of limited reforms to the system would facilitate a basic democratic system yet leave a reasonable span of privileges and powers enjoyed by the soft-liners untouched.\textsuperscript{41}

A number of foundational works in democratization theory supported and built upon the idea that the onset and success of democratic transitions depended on elite decisions and thereby shaped the debate.\textsuperscript{42} O'Donnell and Schmitter asserted that “an active, militant, and highly mobilized popular upsurge may be an efficacious instrument for bringing down a dictatorship but may make subsequent democratic consolidation


\textsuperscript{41} O'Donnell and Schmitter, \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule}.

Haynes concurred in arguing that mass movements may be effective in overthrowing regimes, yet that such regime change would not necessarily result in stable liberal democracies.\textsuperscript{44} Even when considering more recent transitions (such as in the 2013 reprint of O’Donnell and Schmitter’s \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule}) many authors still hold that the behavior of elites, rather than that of the general public, determines the course of democratic transitions. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, civil society is heavily dependent on the new government in the early transition, and while there might be a “temporary explosion” of civil society formation and engagement following the opening of the public sphere, this politicization of society quickly vanishes once the reality of post-regime change has caught up with society and civil society again depoliticizes, thus leaving no long-term effect on the transition.\textsuperscript{45}

The discussion on the role of civil society, however, is not entirely absent from the debate on democratization and has recently received greater attention. There has not been a large-N study showing systematic empirical evidence of the link between civil society and democratization yet, but both case studies and theoretical considerations emphasize the importance of civil society in the democratization process.\textsuperscript{46} The degree of importance, however, is unclear and, as the analyses of the different democratic “waves” illustrate, might also differ situationally. One consideration, as noted above, is that of civil society as mobilizing in the form of mass movements against the ruling authoritarian regime. Yet, the other way is to look at civil society in its relation to democracy, not only

\textsuperscript{43} O’Donnell and Schmitter, \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule}, 65.
\textsuperscript{45} O’Donnell and Schmitter, \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule}, 7.
\textsuperscript{46} Boussard, “Civil Society and Democratisation”, 157.
democratization, and the role it plays in a democratic system, especially in countries that experience greater volatility. A key analysis of the effect of civil society on democratic governance was Putnam’s case study of Italian regional governments.\textsuperscript{47} He argued that networks of civil society and higher levels of civic engagement were key in explaining the greater effectiveness of Northern Italy’s governance as compared to that of Southern Italy. According to his analysis, civil society thus strengthens democratic governance.

One role of civil society is to support democratic governance in a Tocquevillian way where civil society provides for the socialization of citizens in “patterns of civility.”\textsuperscript{48} In these studies, civil society matters greatly in democratic transitions as it is, in its desired form, democratic itself and thus enables citizens to experience democracy through participation in associations, clubs or other collectives of citizens which seek the public good. In this form, civil society can furthermore cooperate with the state in providing social or educational services, including caring for the citizens in the larger democratic framework of the state.

The other role that civil society has in a democracy – and, if relating it to the ability for mass mobilization, in a certain sense also in a non-democracy – is that of being a watchdog. In this role, civil society is not necessarily opposing the government or the state; rather, at a sufficient distance and with adequate autonomy, it is able to observe, criticize and call out the state when it is perceived to do wrong. This role of civil society is closer to the idea of civil resistance, as was shown above, where society challenges policies or regimes through civil disobedience or other nonviolent action.


\textsuperscript{48} Boussard, “Civil Society and Democratisation”, 161.
Boussard identified three key challenges with civil society in democratization, based on these two roles.49 First, civil society is not necessarily civic. Not all groups and movements support democratic ideals nor are they themselves always democratically organized – both ways in which civil society could support the “patterns of civility” among citizens, according to the Tocquevillian understanding.50 On the one hand, liberal democracy is based on the idea of pluralism and civil society representing the different shades in ideology and political belief, including even undemocratic elements. It could thus be considered a building block for democratic debate and a fair representation of the citizens’ interests and views. On the other hand, groups and movements that, passively, do not support democratic ideals (or even actively disrupt) democratic processes or undermine principles such as non-discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation or gender, constitute a challenge to democratic culture, which is key for durable democracy. This condition is often lacking in the early years after the transition.51

This is a two-fold challenge for civil resistance movements in transitions. First, the movements achieved unity in their struggle against the former regime, a key precondition for a successful nonviolent insurrection, yet not all forces against the former regime are necessarily pro-democratic and thus still on board with a continued struggle for substantive democracy after the regime change. Second, while civil resistance movements depend on unity, a democratic civil society is marked by pluralism. In the transitions, the movements must balance their need for unity to remain relevant, influential, and able to monitor the new political leadership, while respecting the

49 Boussard, “Civil Society and Democratisation”, 156-172.
50 Boussard, “Civil Society and Democratisation”, 163.
51 Almond and Verba, “The Civic Culture”. 
pluralism of a free civil society. Rather than focusing primarily on how to rally everyone around a specific shared goal, the movements need to engage in more complex negotiations and relations with other segments of civil society to build coalitions for their goals in order to have sufficiently broad popular support to influence politics.

The second and third challenges presented by Boussard relate to the autonomy of civil society from the state, a character that is crucial in enabling civil society to play the role of the watchdog.\(^5^2\) It appears evident that civil society needs sufficient autonomy from the state to be able to check and challenge it if necessary. The dilemma, however, arising from this is that civil society simultaneously needs to have sufficient access to and voice in the political decision-making process to enable it to shape policy. It is thus caught in a tension between being close enough to influence and distant enough to check policy-making. States can easily take advantage of this dilemma by providing access solely to groups that are regime-friendly or using them as extended social service providers.\(^5^3\) Inclusion of groups into the political process furthermore promises moderation, as they have to comply with the rules of the game, a principle that can be used for or against democratic ends.\(^5^4\)

A helpful path out of this tension appears to be external funding, which enables groups to be independent from the state while strengthening its capacities and reach. Yet, as Boussard notes, this third challenge easily undermines the credibility and legitimacy of civil society in representing the citizens of that country rather than the political agenda of

\(^5^2\) Boussard, “Civil Society and Democratisation”, 165.
\(^5^3\) See for example Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control”; Hawthorne, “Middle Eastern Democracy”; Oxhorn, “Where Did All the Protesters Go?”
a foreign state or other entity.\textsuperscript{55} As was discussed above, strategic nonviolence theory emphasizes the point that much of the power of resistance movements, as compared to that of an authoritarian state, lies in its greater legitimacy in representing the people – a power that can be undermined rather than strengthened by external support. In the case studies in Chapter Two, the role of external support is not analyzed, since such support can be overt and covert and an assessment would be beyond the scope of this thesis.

**Three Core Challenges for Civil Resistance Movements in Transitions**

While the potential of civil society to press for a transition through mass mobilization and be the key driver of the regime change – if also necessitating cooperation by parts of the former regime – is thus fairly widely acknowledged, the role that civil society plays in the subsequent transition process and its degree of importance is less agreed upon. The challenges to civil society are manifold, with the above discussion pointing to three core challenges likely facing civil resistance movements in transitions.

The first challenge relates to the relationship between the resistance movements and the new government. During democratization, civil society has to manage a tension between its two roles of, on the one hand, continuing to fulfill a watchdog function – which requires a certain distance from the government – and on the other hand, participating in decision-making processes – which demands a sufficient closeness to it. Moving from complete resistance to the old regime to these two complementary roles of civil society in relation to the new government, the movements similarly must reflect upon their changing purpose and on the optimal way to manage this tension inherent in the relation to the new government. In addition, former members of the resistance

\textsuperscript{55} Boussard, “Civil Society and Democratisation”, 169-170.
movement may assume positions in the new political system and entire groups of the
movement may become political parties. This development can weaken civil society as
these individuals and groups move into the political realm and as the focus shifts back
from grassroots mobilization to elite negotiations.

The second challenge concerns the relationship between the resistance
movements and the wider society. Leading up to the regime change, the movements unite
a significant portion of the society around the common goal of ousting the present
regime. After the regime change, the movements need to continue building bridges
among various societal groups and forging unity in order to advocate for their demands to
be heard and realized by the new government. At the same time, however, a democratic
civil society is characterized by the presence of and respect for a diversity of values and
interests. The newly created open space after the regime change provides an opportunity
for such pluralism as civil society is then allowed to voice these diverse interests and
advocate for their realization. This tension for the former resistance movements between
keeping the necessary degree of unity to effectively continue pressing for change post-
regime change and giving room to the diversity of interests and values among the
movement is difficult to navigate.

The third challenge relates to the movements and their degree of “civicness”,
meaning the extent to which the movements (a) support democratic ideals and (b)
develop structures and norms that enable learning and create knowledge of democratic
procedures and qualities, such as consensus formation, coalition building, deliberation,
accountability, transparency, rotating leadership and representation. The concept of civeness does not consider perceptions, attitudes, habits, language or capacities for empathy, which – as discussed above – are important for positive peace and reconciliation, as an analysis of these factors is beyond the scope of this thesis. Based on the concept of civiness, civil society is conducive to democratization if its goals and structures are more civic, thus enabling a democratic learning process on the organizational level and suggesting efforts for further democratization of society and politics. If, however, the groups and organizations are less civic, they are not necessarily conducive to democratic change. Resistance movements are typically made up of a variety of different participating individuals and groups, with potentially differing degrees of civiness. After the regime change is achieved, a lack of or difference in civiness by the movement and its participants can present an obstacle to achieving democratic change, as is apparent in the Egyptian case. Since the degree of civiness is tied to a learning process and the creation of knowledge and habits, the length of the resistance movement and political context of each case have great influence on it, as the case studies below show.

Chapter 2

Cases of Civil Resistance Movements in Transitions

In this chapter, three cases of civil resistance and transitions are analyzed: The movement against Augusto Pinochet in Chile from 1983-1989, the movement against

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Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia from 1991-2000, and the movement against Hosni Mubarak in Egypt cumulating in the January 2011 revolution. These movements are examined through the lens of the three core challenges that crystallized in the theoretical discussion above – their degree of civicness, their relation to the new government, and their relation to other segments of civil society – and to the ways in which the management of these challenges influenced the overall effectiveness of the movements after the regime change. Each case study consists of a description of key historical developments and events, of the main oppositional organizations and alliances, and of dynamics of the transition process, as they relate to the role of the resistance movements. This is followed by an assessment of the role of the movement in the transition, the challenges it faced, and the successes it achieved.

Case Study I: The Chilean Struggle against the Pinochet Regime

Background

Pinochet had ruled Chile for a decade when the first widespread protests against the military regime took place. In 1973, Pinochet had ousted the elected president Salvador Allende in a military coup and established a military dictatorship that ruled the country with terror. Oppositional parties were banned, labor unions suppressed and the general public prevented from voicing criticism through intimidation, kidnappings and torture. The oppression of civil society thwarted open protests, and most oppositional organization was in the hands of established oppositional parties and unions, which operated underground.
In 1983, however, the Copper Workers’ Confederation, which had previously called for a national strike, shifted its strategy and called for a protest instead. In order to ensure the safety of the participants, the protests were largely not open demonstrations but rather consisted of people boycotting stores, skipping work, walking excessively slowly, keeping their children at home, and banging on pots and pans at night. The protest, despite appearing low-key, was a crucial sign of how widespread the dissatisfaction was with the military rule and its political, social and economic consequences.

Alliances and Organizations

Following this first national protest in 1983, similar protests took place monthly and resulted in the formation of alliances between oppositional parties and other oppositional actors to combine forces against the dictatorship. The Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática) and the subsequent Concertación (Concert of Parties for Democracy) were coalitions of political parties, including parties from the left as well as the Christian Democrats. The Concertación was initially called the Concertación de Partidos por el No and focused on encouraging people to vote No in the 1988 plebiscite that had been designed by Pinochet to outwardly legitimize his rule as he counted on the

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majority of the population to vote for the continuation of his rule.\textsuperscript{60} When this goal of the \textit{Concertación} was achieved and Pinochet successfully voted out of office, the \textit{Concertación} continued as a political alliance and until today functions as a center-left coalition in parliament. Different from these alliances, the \textit{National Accord for a Transition to Full Democracy} was initiated by the Catholic Church in 1985 and included parties to the right of the political spectrum as well as those from the left, excluding the Communists.\textsuperscript{61} By its stature, the Catholic Church was able to give the movement greater credibility.\textsuperscript{62} While the Catholic Church had hoped that this broader alliance might enable more effective cooperation for a successful transition, the differences turned out to be too divisive to be overcome.\textsuperscript{63}

In early 1986, at the height of the national protests, the Civic Assembly (\textit{Asamblea de la Civilidad}) was founded, an alliance that consisted of labor unions, social organizations such as small economic cooperatives, and student and women’s groups.\textsuperscript{64} In the 1980s, 9\% of the Chilean workforce was organized in labor unions and approximately 20\% of the poorer population living in or close to Santiago was engaged in small cooperatives, called \textit{organizaciones económicas populares} (popular economic organizations).\textsuperscript{65} Due to its extensive network the Civic Assembly had a greater ability to mobilize the masses than the alliance of political parties, and spread the protests across

\textsuperscript{60} Kurtz, “Chile: Struggle Against a Military Dictator (1985-1988)”.
\textsuperscript{61} Garretón, “The Political Opposition and the Party System under the Military Regime”, 223.
\textsuperscript{62} Sharon E. Nepstad, \textit{Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} Century} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 84.
\textsuperscript{63} Nepstad, “\textit{Nonviolent Revolutions}”, 83-84.
\textsuperscript{64} Oppenheim, \textit{Politics in Chile}, 156.
\textsuperscript{65} Oppenheim, \textit{Politics in Chile}, 155-156.
the country even into the southernmost tip of Chile, the Magallanes. Yet, the Civic Assembly also had to cope with internal tensions between the extreme left and its more centrist members; it finally dissolved in the same year it had been founded when the armed opposition, supported by the extreme left, grew in strength and attempted to assassinate Pinochet.

The opposition against Pinochet was divided between (1) the political parties between the far Left and the Center-Left, (2) those favoring nonviolent and those advocating violent resistance, and (3) the elites who focused on avenues for negotiation with the regime and the grassroots who sought to overthrow the regime.

The Transition Process

The mass movement against Pinochet and for democracy from 1983 to 1988 relied on the mobilization of the wider public for nonviolent action to break the fear of the military dictatorship, to undermine Pinochet’s attempt to legitimize his rule by claiming public support, and to encourage people to voice their opposition and vote “No” in the 1988 plebiscite. Yet, while the faces of the protests had been the grassroots made up most notably of shantytown dwelling pobladores, students, and women, the decision to attempt a democratic return through the plebiscite meant a return to a focus on the

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68 Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 144 & 153.
established political parties. The oppositional parties would try to mobilize the population to vote against the continuation of Pinochet’s rule in the plebiscite and vote for them in the subsequent elections. As Lois Hecht Oppenheim explains, “Although civil society had led the struggle in the streets against the dictatorship during the mid-1980s, its role had diminished significantly as politics as usual reemerged after 1990 (...) Over time, this style of governance led to a lack of connection between the grass roots and party and governmental elites.” In the transition process, the power of the elites from the former resistance movement thus increased as compared to the power of the grassroots members whose voices quickly lost relevance.

Chile had been a democracy with established parties across the political spectrum before the military coup d’état. The suppression of the parties under the military dictatorship made it difficult for them to stay connected to their bases since (a) the parties had to operate underground and (b) the population was wary of openly identifying with oppositional parties for fear of retaliation. When electoral politics resumed, the parties had not yet rebuilt their connection to the population but rather stayed focused on elite negotiations to bring the transition process forward. These negotiations were crucial to reform civil-military relations and re-establish democratic institutions and processes. Yet, what was the role of the wider civil society in this process and to what extent was what they had struggled for in the protests prioritized in the transition?

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69 Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 145.
70 Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 244-245.
71 Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 157.
Evaluation

The popular resistance movement in the 1980s included a diverse set of social organizations, unions, faith-based groups, and parties, with overlapping but also diverging interests and visions. The groups concurred in advocating democracy and an end to Pinochet, human rights abuses and the suppression of the opposition by the regime. The campaign for ¡Democracia Ahora! (Democracy Now) and the campaign to vote “No” in the 1988 plebiscite by groups across the opposition spectrum is exemplary of this common goal and concerted efforts to achieve democratic change.72

The transition process in Chile has been successful in these aspects: Pinochet was pushed out of office, electoral democratic politics resumed, the state institutions took up their functions again in checking each other’s powers, the government commissioned investigations into the human rights abuses under Pinochet, and more than two decades since the resumption of democratic politics, Chile is still democratic. According to the Polity IV rating from 2010, Chile scored 10 points, thus considering Chile a consolidated democracy.73 Freedom House in 2013 similarly assigned Chile the best possible score, a 1 in all three categories: Freedom, civil liberties and political rights.74

However, not all of the major demands of key civil society groups have been met since the regime change. The Polity IV narrative report highlighted the persisting socio-

72 See Appendix One for posters by various groups advocating voting “No” compiled from the repository “Memoria Chilena” by the Chile National Library.
73 The Polity IV rating of countries’ regime types on a scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) is widely used, considered reliable, and a helpful addition to the Freedom House ratings, which focus more heavily on the protection of rights while the Polity IV ratings focus more on checks and balances and other intra-state variables; “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Chile”
economic inequalities and the dissatisfaction and occasional protests, especially among
the marginalized population.\textsuperscript{75} In 2006 and 2007, unions and students organized major
protests pointing to the government’s failure to adequately remedy inequalities. In the
course of the past three years, Chilean students organized widespread protests for free
higher education and greater economic equality. In 2011, Chile had the highest Gini
coefficient of all OECD member countries indicating inequality, surpassing Mexico,
Turkey and the United States.\textsuperscript{76}

As mentioned above, the first mass protest in 1983 was orchestrated by one of the
most powerful labor unions. The subsequent national protests, peaking in 1986, were
carried out primarily by members of small economic cooperatives, \textit{pobladores}, students,
and women’s groups. Besides the call for an end to the military dictatorship and a return
to democracy that would protect civil and political rights, many protest participants also
demanded greater protection and promotion of social and economic rights. Chile under
the military dictatorship had experienced an economic crisis and the leadership had
undone socialist policies put in place by former President Salvador Allende to support
workers and the poor. In particular, workers and the poor thus not only resisted the
dictatorship in hope for a return to procedural but also to substantive. They protested for
“a fair salary,”\textsuperscript{77} for “bread and jobs,”\textsuperscript{78} and “against misery and hunger.”\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{75} “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Chile”
\textsuperscript{76} The Gini coefficient indicates intra-state income inequality, with higher coefficients
indicating greater inequality; \textit{OECD “An Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in
OECD Countries: Main Findings”}, \textit{Divided We Stand – Why Inequality Keeps Rising
\textsuperscript{77} “Por el derecho al trabajo, 7 de octubre 1987,” Archivo Fotográfico y Digital, Memoria
Chilena – Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, accessed April 18, 2014,
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77729.html.
With the transition in the hands of established political elites and minimal involvement by the unions or grassroot social organizations, its primary focus was (unlike the broader civil resistance movement) primarily on restoring procedural democracy. Politics after the elections in 1990 had immediately returned to negotiations between the different elites – civil and military, right and left – with the former oppositional parties aiming to restore a minimum degree of functional democracy while meanwhile resisting asserting more substantive demands. More than two decades after the transition, and in the wake of the widespread student protests of the past three years, the center-left government under President Michelle Bachelet now aims to focus more on social justice issues.80

The protests against Pinochet and the subsequent return to democracy are generally considered a success story. The opposition remained largely nonviolent, was constituted of a broad coalition of societal groups, ended a brutal military dictatorship without spilling blood on either side, and enabled the return to democracy. All of these factors are remarkable and their significance should not be understated. The civicism of the movement was helpful in this regard. The Chilean opposition had experienced democratic politics before the military coup, most of the oppositional parties stemmed

from that time and, on the basis of that experience, also had a shared idea of the democratic system they sought to return to. While the parties had lost much of the contact to their bases during the military dictatorship, they still had their internal democratic structures and traditions. Similarly, the labor unions and many of the grassroots groups, especially those representing the poor, had supported the socialist policies of the Allende government before the coup and were thus committed to returning to a democratic system as they had experienced before. The main challenge within the opposition was the struggle between the extreme left that advocated violent resistance, and the other parties and groups supporting nonviolent resistance. The nonviolent resistance movement eventually overcame this conflict by way of its success in bringing Pinochet down.

The acceptance of pluralism among civil society in the transition process was similarly aided by the country’s democratic history as well as the considerable length of the struggle against Pinochet with its many efforts of building coalitions among parties and groups with varying ideologies, priorities and values – from the Catholic Church to socialist parties, from women’s groups against torture to economic cooperatives of pobladores. Building bridges with the wider society to gain broad support for democratic change and enable reconciliation and positive peace, the reforms of civil-military

relations and the formal truth and reconciliation process under the post-1990 government (made up of parties of the *Concertación*) facilitated further efforts to overcome divisions from the time of the dictatorship.\(^83\)

While the Chilean resistance movement against the Pinochet regime thus did not face fundamental obstacles in terms of its civic character or relations with the wider society after the regime change, the relation to the new government deserves closer attention. In particular, the relation between former oppositional parties that came to power through the transition and civil society groups that formed part of the resistance movement provides interesting lessons for other cases of civil resistance movements in democratic transitions. While the popular movement played a crucial role in mobilizing the wider public leading up to the regime change, its comparative role in the transition process was marginal. It served to strengthen the legitimacy of the opposition and help the population overcome their fear of regime repression before the regime change.

Yet, when the transition process began and was based on elections – first in the plebiscite and then in parliamentary elections – this work creating the preconditions for regime change was no longer needed. Instead, the goals of political elites overrode those of civil society and grassroots groups felt left out of the decision-making processes.\(^84\) The shared goal to depose Pinochet and his military dictatorship and return to a democratic system with respect for civil and political rights was achieved. The demands for greater socio-economic equality, however, have not been fulfilled; to the contrary, the return to democracy has meant a turn to neoliberal economic politics and the persistence of great

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\(^84\) Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile*, 225; Urzúa, “State, Civil Society and Public Policy in Chile Today”, 122 & 129.
socio-economic inequalities. More than two decades after the transition, Chile still struggles to effectively address these inequalities and reconcile the continuing demands for greater equality by students and unions with the interests of political and economic elites. The Chilean case of civil resistance in bringing about a democratic transition, simultaneously encourages other movements regarding its success in overcoming a dictatorship, while it cautions concerning their ability to play an effective role in the transition process in advocating for interests not shared with the elite.

Case Study II: The Serbian Struggle against Milosevic

Background

The 1990s were a tumultuous time in the former Yugoslavia. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, in 1991 and 1992, Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The two remaining republics, Serbia and Montenegro, subsequently formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which subsequently dissolved in 2006. In Croatia, and even more so in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the declaration of independence brought about lengthy civil wars between different ethnic and religious groups. After the wars in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended in 1995, a new conflict arose in Kosovo in 1998 as it sought to secede from Serbia.

85 Urzúa, “State, Civil Society and Public Policy in Chile Today”, 123.
87 “What is the former Yugoslavia?” International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia.
Analyzing Serbian internal political developments in the 1990s, and particularly the protests against the rule of Slobodan Milosevic (later charged with war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity), requires attention to these regional developments. Resistance by Serbs against Milosevic’s rule lasted an entire decade (1990 to 2000), contemporaneously to the conflicts following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. The protests were closely tied to the conflicts, which initially demanded an end to Milosevic’s war politics, hate speech and the drafting of Serbs into the armed forces. Only after the end of the wars did the focus shift mostly to internal affairs.

The first public protests, in March 1991, were primarily directed at the head of the national television, accusing him of inciting hate and using war-mongering language.\(^8^8\) In the same year, members of the resistance began to occupy Terazije, the main square in Belgrade; founded an independent radio station; boycotted the draft; and established various anti-war civil society organizations.\(^8^9\) From the onset of the protests, some participants asked for the downfall of Milosevic; yet, this demand did not have popular support until the wars ended and Milosevic’s regime engaged in elections rigging.\(^9^0\) Due to the brutal responses by security forces to the protests, and the repression of oppositional movements by the Milosevic regime, most of the organizational work done by the resistance groups was underground.

\(^8^9\) Vejvoda, “Civil Society versus Slobodan Milosevic”, 298-299.
\(^9^0\) Vejvoda, “Civil Society versus Slobodan Milosevic”, 298, 300-301.
Milosevic had denied the victory of oppositional parties and people were ready to go to the streets to demand recognition of their votes, which was eventually achieved with additional pressure by election monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).\textsuperscript{91} The protests lasted for three months and provided a space for oppositional groups – especially students – to build networks, become engaged in the opposition, and prepare for a nonviolent movement directed to not merely challenge specific policies but ultimately, to push Milosevic out of office.\textsuperscript{92}

The war in Kosovo (1998-1999) further intensified the efforts of the democratic opposition to remove Milosevic from power. Milosevic had led the country into yet another war while his regime repressed any critics, including the assassination of independent journalist Slavko Curivija.\textsuperscript{93} The opposition following the Kosovo War was divided with the nationalists supporting Milosevic, who had in their view defended Serbia against outside powers, and the civic opposition intimidated by the increasingly repressive way the regime dealt with opponents.\textsuperscript{94} Yet, at the same time, many realized that the need to remove Milosevic from power had become even more urgent. A student movement called Otpor! was formed and became instrumental in mobilizing the resistance leading up to the September 2000 presidential elections.

Just a few weeks before announcing early elections, Milosevic had amended the constitution so that the people would directly vote for the presidential candidate who

\textsuperscript{91} Vejvoda, “Civil Society versus Slobodan Milosevic”, 301.
\textsuperscript{92} Vejvoda, “Civil Society versus Slobodan Milosevic”, 307 ff.
\textsuperscript{94} Cevallos, “Whither the Bulldozer?”, 3.
would be able to run for two terms rather than, as was done previously, to vote for parties who would then select a president for one term. This was seen as a clear move to consolidate his power and thus increased suspicion among the opposition of the elections to come.95 When the Federal Electoral Committee announced the election results, Vojislav Kostunica from the Democratic Opposition was leading, yet he did not cross the fifty percent threshold, which meant in the new electoral system that he would have had to run against Milosevic in a runoff election. Because the results did not match the results gathered by the Democratic Opposition and evinced various irregularities, the opposition called for protests. A variety of oppositional groups mobilized for the protests, such as oppositional political parties, labor unions, the Otpor! student movement, and other NGOs.

Building on the networks and skills they had developed for over a decade of operating underground, the organizers were able to mobilize large numbers of people from all strands of the opposition for nonviolent protests, and exerted enough pressure that Milosevic resigned two days after the culmination of protests on October 5th, only nine days after the election results had been announced. Following his resignation, the Federal Electoral Committee announced the corrected election results and declared the leader of the Democratic Opposition President. Through concerted strategic nonviolent action, the resistance movement had been able to fight for the recognition of their votes and to oust Milosevic, who was subsequently tried by the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia for war crimes.

95 Ivan Marcovic, Interview by Berenike Schott, via Skype, April 1, 2014
The best-known organization from the resistance movement in Serbia is Otpor!, Serbian for “Resistance!” It was initially founded by students in response to a higher education law passed by Milosevic in 1998 that increased governmental control of universities and restricted academic freedom. Soon, however, the organization took on the more general struggle against Milosevic’s increasingly repressive regime that was restricting both civil and political rights as well pursuing war policies that had left the younger generation with few economic and social opportunities. The Otpor! leadership had participated in the 1996-1997 protests and subsequently became politically involved. According to Ivan Marcovic, one of the Otpor! leaders, these protests provided a crucial space for a new generation not yet engaged in the 1990-1991 protests to build networks and become involved in activism.

While originated in Belgrade, the center of most oppositional activism, Otpor! intentionally established offices outside of the capital to reach populations traditionally supportive of Milosevic such as older member of society, police forces and the army. The offices opened a space where dissent could be voiced and community established. Otpor! furthermore built coalitions with various non-governmental organizations and labor unions that were also in opposition to the regime, yet were not powerful enough to challenge Milosevic on their own. In 2000, when the elections provided the necessary momentum and once again showed the opposition that Milosevic was not going to accept a defeat on the basis of vote counts, Otpor! used this network, which it had established in

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96 http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/otpor/otpors-origins.php
97 Ivan Marcovic, Interview by Berenike Schott, via Skype, April 1, 2014
the two years prior to the elections, to mobilize for the mass protests leading up to the October 5th Revolution.

As Ivan Marcovic notes, this “revolution” was in fact a defense of democratic election results rather than a revolution in the classical sense. Thus, the protests in 2000, different from those in 1991, were not only directed against Milosevic but also demanded the respect for democratic processes. While focused on ousting Milosevic (as exemplified by slogans such as “He is finished”), by 2000 the resistance movement was also bound by democratic values, valuing democratic institutions over personal leadership as Marcovic explains. Civic resistance against Milosevic had increased over a decade and moved from particular concerns of the various groups to a common aim of defending the 2000 elections, a factor that would become crucial in the transition phase after the revolution.

Yet, despite being internally most known and having played a key role in organizing civil resistance against Milosevic in the two years leading up to the October 5th Revolution, Otpor! was only one of many civic organizations in the opposition. Since 1990, when the former Yugoslavia disintegrated and political rhetoric foreshadowed the violence that would come to the region, resistance groups, especially anti-war activist groups, were founded. For example, the Women in Black in Belgrade advocated for peace and nonviolence, pointing at the manifold negative consequences of war for women in particular. They held weekly vigils starting in 1991, showed solidarity with

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100 Ivan Marcovic, Interview by Berenike Schott, via Skype, April 1, 2014
101 Ivan Marcovic, Interview by Berenike Schott, via Skype, April 1, 2014
men boycotting the draft, and disseminated anti-war educative material.\textsuperscript{102} In 2000, the Women in Black joined the nonviolent movement against Milosevic, mobilizing their members and supporters for the protests. While the group had been too small and focused on a particular issue to be considered a true challenge by the Milosevic regime, it then added its part to the movement that would bring Milosevic down.\textsuperscript{103}

While the focus of Women in Black was on the war politics of Milosevic, other nongovernmental groups had different reasons to resist his rule and demand respect for democratic institutions and procedures. For example, the G17 Plus were a group of economists with a liberal agenda for the country, which had been governed by Milosevic’s socialist party since the break-up of the Soviet Union.

In addition to these civil society groups, oppositional political parties, several of which merged into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), played a crucial role in organizing the resistance and mobilizing for the protests in 2000. Similar to the resistance movement in Chile, a variety of political and civil society groups participated in the mass protests, but political parties took on a principal role in organizing the protests that led to the ousting of the leaders and in leading the opposition thereafter.

\textit{The Transition Process}

Soon after the successful October 5\textsuperscript{th} Revolution and the announcement of the corrected election results by the Federal Electoral Committee, the resistance movement fell apart. According to these updated results, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia had


\textsuperscript{103} Cevallos, “Whither the Bulldozer?”, 8.
won the election and was thus taking over the governance of Serbia from Milosevic. G17 Plus and Otpor! decided to become political parties after the success of the October 5th Revolution.\textsuperscript{104} G17 Plus was relatively successful for a small party in the parliamentary elections of 2003 and participated in the subsequent governing coalition. It has since merged into the United Regions of Serbia and continues to primarily pursue economic reforms.\textsuperscript{105} Otpor! was not successful as a political party but several of its leaders continue to be involved in civil society or politics. Srdja Popovic, for example, founded the Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies to educate activists from Serbia and around the world about strategic nonviolence. Ivan Marcovic first ran as an MP for the Democratic Party and now consults political decision-makers, including recently a minister of the Progressive Party, the former Radical Party, which used to support Milosevic but adopted a conservative democratic agenda since the revolution.\textsuperscript{106}

Yet, besides these successes of oppositional political parties, Marcovic says, “[t]he civil society that was born out of the struggle against Milosevic died. They just have no potential to mobilize people anymore. Because this story that they were using to mobilize people, preventing backsliding into dictatorship, is not a story somebody would buy today.”\textsuperscript{107} Some civil society groups that formed part of the resistance movement continue to exist and perform important work on the particular issues they are concerned with, such as the Women in Black who still educate about the adverse effects of war on women. Yet, the movement as a unified voice against the abuse of governmental power

\textsuperscript{104} Cevallos, “Whither the Bulldozer?”, 10.
\textsuperscript{106} Ivan Marcovic, interview.
\textsuperscript{107} Ivan Marcovic, interview.
has ceased to exist. “[T]hey lost their legitimacy because the enemy has changed and you cannot say that these people [current conservative politicians] want to bring back the isolation and the war, so nobody would buy that anymore.”

At the same time, the connections between the various individuals who took part in the resistance movement remain strong. Assessing the general state of civil society in Serbia, Ivan Marcovic describes it as “very vibrant” and assigns this strength above all to the length of the resistance and the skills and networks that the members of the opposition developed over that time. Tied by the common struggle against Milosevic and for democracy, these networks crossed ideological, generational, socio-economic, and gender lines.

After the successful October 5th Revolution, these networks provided the former members of the resistance with two important abilities: First, they were able to use these established informal networks to mobilize for nonviolent action when the country was in danger of devolving into conflict or abuse of power. For example, when Prime Minister Dindic was assassinated by members of the secret police in 2003, they organized a vigil and lit candles at the site where he was killed. This act of peacefulness and courage was a sign that the population would stand behind the elected government even in the face of such attacks on the new order.

Second, the connections between former resistance members, coupled with the fact that since the revolution some of them work for political parties or in other positions of political leadership, have provided access points to political power for other

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108 Ivan Marcovic, interview.
109 Ivan Marcovic, interview.
110 Ivan Marcovic, interview.
individuals from the resistance. It is, as Ivan Marcovic describes, an “informal network
where I can actually call somebody who is in [an important] position and just because we
went to something together I can actually have 5 minutes.” What he jokingly calls an
“infiltration” of the political institutions by former resistance members is indeed a
powerful way for (former) activists and civil society members to influence political
decision-making. It exemplifies the blurred line between civil society and political
society, thereby challenging the definition that seeks to delineate the two. It furthermore
complicates arguments claiming that the transition is driven either primarily by civil
society (with its potential to mobilize the masses) or solely by political elites. Rather, in
the case of Serbia, a central factor seems to be the access of civil society to the elites and
their power, and thus their ability to influence the transition process by way of
influencing elites. Interestingly, the global Civil Society Index Project notes that in Serbia
in 2007, the term “civil society” was mostly understood to refer to the progressive elite of
the 1990s rather than to a wider range of civil society actors, thus emphasizing the
importance of the elites who originated with the resistance and the declining role of the
grassroots.

According to Marcovic, the strength of the pro-democratic civil society that came
out of the decade-long struggle against Milosevic has, in addition to the prospect of
future European Union membership, been decisive in affecting overall democratic change
in Serbian politics. While the individuals and groups that formed part of the movement
differed in their ideologies and motivations for opposing Milosevic, over the decade of

111 Ivan Marcovic, interview.
112 Heinrich, V. Finn (ed.) CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society, Volume I,
resistance they developed a shared appreciation for democratic institutions and considered democratic change the best path to counter Milosevic.

Since the revolution in 2000, even political parties that had previously been part of Milosevic’s government, such as the Progressive Party that developed out of the former right-wing Radical Party, now affirm and promote democratic values, meaning first and foremost the respect for democratic institutions over personal leadership. The spread of democratic values beyond the former resistance movement, and across society and the political spectrum, can be considered an even greater achievement than ousting Milosevic, as it forms the foundation for long-term democratization and takes away the fear of backsliding into dictatorship.

While there has been no formal reconciliation process, the growing cooperation between former resistance members and conservative political groups as well as the overall consensus on democratic governance are a sign that coalitions are being built across the former dividing lines between the opposition and the incumbent government. Importantly, this was likely aided by the fact that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted Milosevic and other individuals for war crimes who played leading roles in the wars. Yet, as in every repressive state, the political leadership is but one part of the apparatus, in addition to second-tier politicians, political parties, and implementing organs such as the army and police forces. Having built connections across the political spectrum and affirmed a common desire for democracy, however, enabled the young democratic state to survive cases such as the assassination of Serbia’s prime minister in 2003 by members of Milosevic’s former secret police.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{113} Ivan Marcovic, interview.
Evaluation

Regarding the three challenges confronting nonviolent resistance movements in a democratic transition process – the relation to the new government, the management of diversity of values and interests in the wider civil society, and the degree of civicness of the groups constituting the movement – the Serbian movement was chiefly shaped by the length of the struggle. According to Marcovic’s narrative, the various groups that came together over the course of the decade to protest and organize against Milosevic had diverging ideologies, priorities and motivations. Sharing the common opposition to Milosevic and operating under repressive conditions for years, these groups formed coalitions and built relationships across ideological, party, generational and other lines, as elaborated above. After the revolution and through the transition, these strong ties prompted them to support civil society. Since they worked together in an ideologically diverse resistance movement for a substantive length of time, this made it easier to deal with diverse interests and values among the wider society in the period after the revolution.

Parallel to this learning process of how to form a cohesive resistance movement out of diverse groups was the crystallization of common values, namely to value democratic institutions over personal leadership as opposed to the focus on the person of Milosevic by his supporters. “Over the years, because you are forced as an opposition party or as an NGO or as a trade union to work under repressive conditions and to build your organization slowly and to reach out to other organizations for coalitions, you
slowly start to embrace these kinds of [shared democratic] values.” Unlike Chile, Serbia had not had a democratic history but had rather, since 1994, as a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continuously been ruled by the communist party under the lead of Marshall Josip Broz Tito. Intentionally building up a common commitment to democratic values and institutions as a resistance movement and spreading it after the revolution to other groups in society and politics is thus a remarkable achievement.

Concerning the relation of the movement to the post-revolutionary government and the importance of the grassroots vis-à-vis the elites, the Serbian case is intriguing. On the one hand, the resistance movement has brought forth a strong civil society with networks and skills. This civil society has been able to become engaged when the new democratic order was threatened, such as through the assassination of the prime minister. It has experienced a government composed of former opposition parties – including currently one led by a party formerly supportive of Milosevic – and has throughout supported the democratization and state-building process. At the same time, as elaborated above, the parts of the former resistance that continue to be active appear to be the elites as well as the mid-range leaders with access to the elites, rather than the grassroots. Through their networks they have been able to shape political decision-making and thereby promote their democratic and nonviolent agenda. With the absence of new cycles of popular mobilization, there has not been a new generation of young Serbs engaged in political activism; instead, the more established leaders and participants of the resistance in the 1990s continue to leave a mark on politics.

114 Ivan Marcovic, interview.
Case Study III: The Egyptian Struggle against the Mubarak Regime

Background

On January 25, 2011, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets to peacefully protest the regime under Hosni Mubarak. The protests quickly swelled in size and once the military sided with the protesters and put pressure on the president, Mubarak announced his resignation on February 11, 2011.\textsuperscript{115} Egypt had been a ‘hegemonic electoral authoritarian’ regime, as classified by Larry Diamond.\textsuperscript{116} The regime had held seemingly democratic elections, which, however, were not competitive and were primarily used as a façade to legitimize continued rule by the same authoritarian ruler.\textsuperscript{117} As Diamond notes, the majority of states claiming to be democracies are in fact hybrid regimes with certain democratic features, such as elections, but lacking open, free and fair contestation and the protection of the rights of their citizens.\textsuperscript{118}

In an assessment of the state of Egyptian civil society before the transformations of 2011, Mustapha al-Sayyid argues that while the quantity of organized civil society groups is remarkable, civil society suffers from a lack of respect for pluralism both by the state and the citizens themselves.\textsuperscript{119} While broad coalitions would be needed to challenge the state collectively in its restrictive policies, Al-Sayyid saw few signs for the possibility

\textsuperscript{117} Diamond “Thinking about hybrid regimes,” 31.
\textsuperscript{118} Diamond “Thinking about hybrid regimes,” 24 & 32.
of such coalitions in 2005. The challenge to accept diversity among civil society and work toward better cooperation despite the differences, has also been a major obstacle since 2011, as is elaborated below.

Different from Chile in the 1980s, Egypt was not a military dictatorship that openly opposed democratic procedures and values but rather, typical for third wave democracies, democratic on paper yet authoritarian in practice. This factor is important concerning the way the Egyptian revolutionary movement promoted democratic change. The Egyptian protesters in 2011 called for the downfall of the regime ("al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nazam"), as they did not believe that reforms beneath the existing regime would be feasible and sufficient to end the human rights abuses, corruption and nepotism, and the destitute economic situation faced by the majority of the population. In comparison to the protests in Chile, the Egyptian protesters were not explicitly calling for democracy but they similarly protested against the abuse of civil and political rights and called for bread, freedom and social justice ("aish, huriyya, adala ijtima'iya").

This decision not to demand democracy, which is often restrictively used in its narrow sense and equated with holding elections to legitimize the power of elites, is logical considering Diamond’s discussion of hybrid regimes and the various meanings of democracy discussed in the previous chapter. If a country is governed by a “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” regime that misuses democratic procedures to perpetuate its rule, such as through rigged elections, the protesters will certainly not protest for democracy, since they would consider it a shallow concept. Yet, the absence of explicit calls for democracy does not necessarily indicate that the movement did not desire democracy, but

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rather that it prioritized the protection and fulfillment of both civil and economic rights – the core of substantive democracy – over the procedural aspect of democracy. As elaborated below, however, the transition has this far fulfilled neither of these aspects of democracy as the current leadership continues to restrict and abuse civil rights and has thus far not promoted social and economic rights better than the Mubarak regime.

Alliances and Organizations

Dissatisfaction with the Mubarak regime had increased over years and the first most prominent attempt to mobilize for change was undertaken by Kifaya, the Egyptian Movement for Change. Founded in 2004 by of a number of well-known opposition party leaders from both the liberal left and Islamist parties, Kifaya organized demonstrations and condemned the widespread government corruption, the extension of executive powers through the continued use of emergency laws, and the prospect of Mubarak prolonging his term in office and potentially passing it on to his son Gamal. Kifaya was not able to mobilize a great number of people for its demonstrations since it was mostly confined to the intellectual upper middle class. Kifaya did, however, succeed in building bridges across the political and ideological spectrum among the

opposition, including the Islamist opposition, in an unprecedented manner.\textsuperscript{124} Furthermore, its open accusations against the Mubarak family constituted a remarkable step in voicing dissatisfaction with and opposition to the status quo which then initiated a wider debate about the shortcomings of the regime and the need for change.

Yet, established elites were not alone in mobilizing against the Mubarak regime and its policies prior to the uprisings of 2011. The April 6 Youth Movement is an example of a group of young adults who showed solidarity with the workers who went on a strike in April 2008. As many as four million workers participated in strikes and other forms of collective action over the decade preceding the revolution.\textsuperscript{125} While workers and unions did not lead the protests of 2011, they mobilized for them and participated in great numbers, thus contributing to the revolution both through their participation and through their history of nonviolent action.\textsuperscript{126} Following the strikes in 2008, the April 6 Youth Movement continued to draw attention to the economic destitution faced by many Egyptians and criticized the regime for not improving the situation but rather oppressing the opposition. On its current website, the movement describes its aim before January 25, 2011, as the nonviolent overthrow of the Mubarak regime.\textsuperscript{127} It sought the building of a democratic political system to enable true independence for Egypt and protect the basic


\textsuperscript{126} Beinin, “The Rise of Egypt’s Workers”, 3.

economic and social rights of its citizens.\textsuperscript{128} For the transition period since the successful ousting of Mubarak, the movement points at three main goals: that the aims of the revolution will be fully met, that Egypt will arrive at political and economic stability, and that the country will undergo democratization and be under elected civilian rule.\textsuperscript{129} Although the April 6 Youth Movement played a key role in mobilizing for the protests in 2011, since the elections that brought President Morsi to power and through the military coup that removed him, it struggled to effectively influence politics outside of the powerful Islamist and military blocks.

Other than the April 6 Movement, young Egyptians have organized and mobilized for change, especially closer to the protests of 2011. In June of 2010, the police beat to death Khaled Said, a young Egyptian critical of the police forces. His face became the symbol for police brutality that could confront Egyptians even slightly oppositional to the regime. Wael Ghonim, who was working for Google, created a Facebook page called “We are all Khaled Said” (“Kullena Khaled Said”) to express that anybody could have experienced the same brutal treatment that led to Khaled’s death.\textsuperscript{130} Through using this page and inspired by the protests that had been organized in Tunisia after Mohamed Bouazizi’s death, Ghonim created a Facebook event to call for protests on January 25, 2011, the National Police Day. Yet, rather than celebrating the police that day, the

\textsuperscript{128} “6\textsuperscript{th} of April Youth Movement – Official Website”, Facebook.
\textsuperscript{129} “6\textsuperscript{th} of April Youth Movement – Official Website”, Facebook.
protests were designed to expose the issues of “torture, poverty, corruption, and unemployment” (“al-t’adhib, al-faqr, al-fasad wa al-batala”).  

Although the protests were initially called for through the Khaled Said Facebook page, the majority of participants spontaneously joined, rather than members of established oppositional groups (like in the case of Chile). However, not long after the protests had started, an increasing number of people joined in, and the Muslim Brotherhood also decided to participate in the protests. For several decades, the Muslim Brotherhood criticized the regimes and, through the weight of its many members and sympathizers, negotiated access to political decision-making. While the Brotherhood had been repressed by the ruling authorities for much of its history, it had participated in elections under the Mubarak regime since 1984. When its leadership decided that the Brotherhood would join the protesters in 2011, they were able to draw upon an extensive network and established support base among the population. This was a crucial factor in the transition process that followed the successful ousting of Mubarak.

The Transition Process

After Mubarak was ousted in February 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took over the power until a civilian government was elected. Elections were quickly called for to move from the military control of the state to civilian control and were held at the end of the same year. This rapid move from resistance to the old regime

133 Carrie Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 47.
to new elections constituted various obstacles to the resistance movement. First, since the initiators of the protesters and many of its participants were not organized in major established groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood or liberal political parties), the period between the resignation of Mubarak and the elections was much too short to organize and mobilize for viable alternative options for the elections. Consequentially, the primary oppositional power to the ancien regime following the elections was Moreno longer in the hands of the resistance movement but rather with the more established groups who could readily run for elections, in this case the Muslim Brotherhood.

Second, while the protest movement had univocally called for the downfall of the regime, the many participants to the protests did not automatically share the same vision of an alternative Egypt. Instead of collectively deliberating the various visions for a post-Mubarak Egypt, the elections transferred the power away from civil society to the then elected political party representatives with their priorities for change. The political realm thus immediately took over the civil realm regarding voice opportunities and agenda-setting for the opposition. Third, while the protest movement had aimed to mobilize as many people as possible from all different societal and ideological backgrounds to collectively achieve the downfall of the regime, the fast move to electoral

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134 Sherif Mansour, interview by Berenike Schott, via Skype, 26 March, 2014.
135 Sherif Mansour, interview.
136 Michele Dunne, “Critical Stages of the Egyptian Revolution: Was the Coup Inevitable?” Presentation at the conference on “Egypt and the Struggle for Democracy” hosted by the Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 29 January 2014
137 Sherif Mansour, interview.
politics meant that coalitions only needed to be built by the political parties with other select parties to achieve a majority, not with groups across society.\textsuperscript{138}

When the new government took over power, many of the activists who had brought about the revolution yet did not sympathize with the Muslim Brotherhood or other established parties therefore quickly felt disenfranchised.\textsuperscript{139} They had not fought for a procedural democracy but for better protection of civil rights and better promotion of economic rights. That the main outcome of the revolution had been elections that put in place a new political elite who prioritized their vision for the country was therefore deeply disappointing. The constitutional declaration in November 2012 was a tipping point for many non-Islamist groups who saw Morsi as grabbing power and undermining the democratically mandated checks on the executive.\textsuperscript{140} Mohamed El-Baradei, chairman of the Al-Dostour party and the most prominent face of the liberal opposition groups, criticized the declaration heavily, warning of the direction that Morsi was leading the country toward under the pretense of fulfilling the goals of the 2011 revolution.\textsuperscript{141} In the view of his critics, Morsi neither respected democratic procedures nor promoted the aims of the revolution as those related to substantive democracy. Regarding the demands of workers, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood continued Mubarak’s neoliberal

\textsuperscript{138} Sherif Mansour, interview.
\textsuperscript{139} Sherif Mansour, interview.
economic policies and even increased the repression of trade union members and activism.\footnote{Joel Beinin, “Workers, Trade Unions, and Egypt’s Political Future”, \textit{Middle East Research and Information Project} (January 18, 2013). Accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011813.}

Dissatisfaction with the new government culminated in protests in the spring of 2013, yet this time the population was divided between supporters and critics of President Morsi and his government. The military took advantage of the renewed uprising and staged a coup to oust Morsi and again take over power. The prospects for substantive democratization and the better protection and fulfillment of rights of all Egyptian citizens have since worsened and a new period of “hegemonic electoral authoritarianism” seems to have begun.

\textit{Evaluation}

The transition process following the ousting of Mubarak has been challenging to the resistance movement of 2011. First the newly elected party representatives and then the military claimed to speak for and act on behalf of the revolutionaries, thereby co-opting the movement’s goals and spirit in order to advance their own agendas and increase their power bases. Asked whether the entire story of the transition is one of power grabbing, Sherif Mansour replies positively, arguing that all elites – including those from the liberal camp who supported the military coup in July 2013 – have focused on increasing power over working toward democratic change.\footnote{Sherif Mansour, interview.} Mansour attributes this to the fact that there has not been sufficient time for democratic learning, that the deep state has not been reformed, and that the elites were shaped by living and working under...
a authoritarian regime: “There is a small Mubarak in every person who has lived long enough under his rule.”

Through this power game among the elites, the transition process has increased rather than decreased societal divisions. While a broad-based popular nonviolent movement brought about the regime change, many of the groups participating in this movement have in the transition process been alienated from each other as they have aligned themselves with the antagonistic political factions that have emerged (pro-Morsi or anti-Morsi; pro-military or anti-military). Sherif Mansour speaks of a polarization and political fight that, in combination with the violence committed by the military and some Muslim Brotherhood supporters, have poisoned the civil sphere and undermined opportunities for nonviolent concerted action. This development constitutes a great challenge to achieving the objectives of the January 2011 revolution as well as to reconciliation. Not only is there thus a need for reconciliation between the former regime supporters and opponents in order to move forward peacefully, as is typically the case after a regime change, but also between the different oppositional factions that became driven apart in the course of the transition process.

Preserving their own voice while simultaneously building bridges with various groups across society is an enormous challenge for the revolutionary movement of 2011. At the same time, the situation in Egypt is still in flux and groups like the April 6 Youth

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144 Sherif Mansour, interview.
145 Emad Shahin, “Restoration of Democracy and the Rule of Law in Egypt: The Roles of the Pro-Democracy Groups and the International Community”, Presentation at the conference on “Egypt and the Struggle for Democracy” hosted by the Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 29 January 2014
146 Sherif Mansour, interview.
Movement continue to press for the fulfillment of the original goals of the 2011 revolution. The movement has, together with other groups, formed a so-called “third square” that is explicitly neither pro-Morsi nor pro-military and seeks to establish that a significant portion of the opposition remains outside of these two factions. Whether the revolutionary movement manages to resist being co-opted by those in power and continues to challenge them while working toward the construction of a common vision for and strategy towards a democracy in substance rather than merely in form thus remains an open question.

Regarding the three core challenges to former resistance movements in transitions presented in the previous chapter, the Egyptian 2011 revolutionary movement is confronted with all three of them. The movement as a whole appears to lack a solid democratic consensus and practice, which, especially as compared with the cases of Chile and Serbia, is complicated by a missing democratic tradition and the short length of the collective resistance period. Due to the brevity of the revolution, the movement did not have the time to practice democratic methods such as lasting coalition- and consensus building among the various groups constituting the movement or to develop a common vision for a post-revolutionary democratic system. The divergent understandings of democracy were visible soon after the revolution when the Muslim Brotherhood-founded Freedom and Justice Party won the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections in the run-off against the candidate of the old regime. It then interpreted this success to be a carte blanche by the people to implement the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda for society rather than continuing dialogue with other groups of the revolutionary movement or the opposition.
The two other challenges – the relation to the new government and the acceptance of pluralism within society – are even more pertinent to the Egyptian case. As is clear from the above description, the relationships between the revolutionary youth and labor unions and the Morsi government (as well as the current military-led government) has been highly problematic. The youth has been largely disempowered by the respective elites who have pushed them to align themselves with either side. Leading up to the election of the Morsi government in 2012 and the military coup in July 2013 respectively, the Muslim Brotherhood and the military benefited from the support of (parts of) the revolutionary youth, yet in both instances did not grant them opportunities for participation in subsequent political decision-making.\footnote{Sherif Mansour, interview.}

The growing divide within Egyptian society especially since the 2013 coup, furthermore hinders the effective building of broad coalitions among civil society and the acceptance of pluralism.\footnote{Emad Shahin, “Restoration of Democracy and the Rule of Law in Egypt: The Roles of the Pro-Democracy Groups and the International Community”, Presentation at the conference on “Egypt and the Struggle for Democracy” hosted by the Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 29 January 2014} While the majority of the population supported the 2011 revolution, the 2013 movement against Morsi that cumulated in the coup split the population evenly in terms of their support for it.\footnote{Nathan Brown, “Restoration of Democracy and the Rule of Law in Egypt: The Roles of the Pro-Democracy Groups and the International Community”, Presentation at the conference on “Egypt and the Struggle for Democracy” hosted by the Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 29 January 2014} In addition, the violence committed by security forces against Muslim Brotherhood supporters as well as the allegations of violence committed by the Muslim Brotherhood against opponents of Morsi and
supporters of the coup, has exacerbated the division and makes dialogue, let alone reconciliation, even less likely.\textsuperscript{150}

Those in turn who do not consider themselves to belong to either of these factions have not yet found a voice loud enough to drown out these polarized factions and seek common ground. At the same time, these individuals and groups – particularly the revolutionary youth – seem to still carry the hope for a fulfillment of the goals of the revolution of 2011. Yet, on this path, they will have to continue to deal with the three challenges – the civicness of the revolutionary movement itself and its visions for a democratic system in Egypt, their relation to the government consisting of checking its power while aiming to gain opportunities for participation, and lastly acceptance for pluralism and attempts at consensus-building and dialogue across civil society. The revolution of 2011 was fast and thus did not provide much time for developing common strategies and visions for the time after the “downfall of the regime” that the resistance movement targeted. The current situation does provide more time and thereby an opportunity for various resistance groups who seek to reclaim the revolution to develop such strategies and visions in order to confront and potentially overcome these challenges.

**Conclusion**

Over the past three years, the MENA region experienced both the power of nonviolent strategic action – when revolutions like the one in Egypt promptly led to the resignation of long-term authoritarian leader Hosni Mubarak – and the manifold

\textsuperscript{150} Sherif Mansour, interview.
challenges that confront successful resistance movements after the downfall of the regime. Despite increasingly insistent calls for democratization in the region, the role of civil resistance movements in transitions is understudied. Strategic nonviolence theory focuses primarily on the ways in which movements build up to and achieve regime change. Meanwhile, literature on transitions focuses on pacts among elites, and democratization literature considers mostly in general terms civil society and its relation to democracy. This thesis has aimed to contribute to filling this gap by distilling key variables from these different fields of literature and, in a second step, exploring their relevance and nuances in three cases of civil resistance.

Together, the theories point to three key capabilities that civil resistance movements should try to foster if they are to succeed during periods of political transition: Democratic ideals as well as democratic organizational structures and behaviors among all groups constituting the movement; the capacity to unite civil society while respecting pluralism; and a relationship to the new government that balances sufficient access for participation with necessary autonomy.

Regarding the challenge of developing civicness among the movement, the case of Chile points to the positive effect of a democratic tradition and of established democratic structures and goals in oppositional parties and civil society organizations. Simultaneously, the Serbian case demonstrates that even without the previous experience of a liberal democratic system, the length of the organizing phase of the resistance movement itself provides opportunities to learn, practice and adopt democratic procedures and goals, such as consensus formation across diverse groups and the respect for democratic institutions over personalities. The Egyptian case exemplifies the
challenge of lacking sufficient degrees of civicness among the groups constituting the revolutionary movement, and highlights the obstacle that a long tradition of authoritarianism poses to learning and adopting democratic values and practices.

However, as noted above, civicness concerns a learning process rather than being a static characteristic, thus pointing toward the opportunities of developing and strengthening civicness among civil society groups despite a history of authoritarianism.

In terms of the movements’ ability to forge unity among civil society while respecting pluralism, both the Chilean and Serbian cases again highlight the value of the length of their organizing phases. Over the course of the years of organizing and mobilizing, groups from different ideologies backgrounds learned to unite behind the common goal of regime change, to identify common interests and goals, while acknowledging and respecting differences. In addition, the Serbian case shows that the former resistance members continued in this practice of identifying and spreading shared democratic values and goals across the political spectrum after the regime change. In Egypt, the relationship between the groups that made up the revolution in 2011 as well as with the wider society remains a core challenge. Egyptian society has been polarized through the politics of elites – first the Morsi government and then the military under al-Sisi – who claim to possess the revolutionary mandate without including or even respecting the voices of groups with different visions for post-revolutionary Egypt. A dialogue between the societal factions and attempts by the groups who participated in the 2011 revolution to develop a consensus about shared goals for the new Egypt appear essential for a positive turn of the transition process. Drawing from the experience in Chile and Serbia, a long-term process of interacting across groups, actively identifying
interests, goals and visions, and forming alliances across ideological or other divides, can provide the foundation for more successful organizing as civil society while acknowledging differences.

Regarding the relationship between the former resistance movements and the new governments, the cases of Chile and Serbia illuminate the challenges that grassroots groups face in striving to remain relevant and continue promoting their interests as compared to elite or middle-class members of the resistance. While elite members of the resistance movements are better able to form part of or influence the new government after regime change has been achieved, the grassroots in Chile and Serbia quickly lost their power and influence after the mass mobilization phase was over. In Egypt, particularly the youth feels robbed of the revolution by the elites. While the Muslim Brotherhood and the military have claimed to continue the revolutionary agenda, the revolutionary youth has not been granted avenues for participation. This finding in all three cases about the shifting relative power of elite groups versus grassroots of the resistance complicates the notion that entire resistance movements can succeed and rather calls for an analytical distinction between the different parts of such movements.

The insights on these three challenges for civil resistance movements in transitions are valuable both for research and practice as civil resistance movements continue to struggle with these challenges. Future movements would benefit from strategizing to overcome these obstacles.

This thesis is exploratory in nature and, rather than providing definitive answers, it raises questions for further research. When interviewed for this thesis, experts echoed the need for a systematic examination of the role civil resistance movements play in
democratic transitions. The literature on strategic nonviolence would greatly benefit from such an extension of theory and empirical research. Both the theoretical discussion in Chapter One and the three case studies in Chapter Two offer starting points for such research and can be extended in breath and depth. The extension of the empirical work could for example be done through a large-N comparative study or a more detailed process-tracing analysis of the cases.

Strategic nonviolence theory is marked by the imperative for advocacy it espouses. A majority of strategic nonviolence scholars uphold civil resistance as a successful strategy. Activists in the field of strategic nonviolence, such as Srdja Popovic through CANVAS or his Ted Talk on “How to topple a dictator”, furthermore teach about the advantages of nonviolence and encourage civil resistance. This call for civil resistance by both scholars and practitioners brings with it the responsibility to truthfully explore the limitations and challenges to civil resistance movements as they relate to transition processes, while research best practices for these challenges to be overcome. This thesis is a small contribution to both of these causes. Proponents of strategic nonviolence should advocate civil resistance not only because it is effective leading up to the regime change, but also define the conditions under which it can fortify the longer-term transition process.
Appendix 1: Chilean Protest Posters

The National Chilean Library provides an online repository of historical documents and images online, called “Memoria Chilena”.\(^{151}\) The website includes a collection of posters and pamphlets from the period of military dictatorship (1973-1988), many of which are from the resistance movement against Pinochet.\(^ {152}\) Below is a selection of posters from the “No” and the “Democracy Now” campaigns from a diversity of groups, thus exemplifying the support for them across the movement: The Democratic Party, Christian-Democratic Party, National Party, Radical Party, Workers’ United Center of Chile, Social Accord for the No (a group made up of former Civic Assembly members for the purpose of the No campaign)\(^ {153}\), women’s groups, feminists, and the Popular Democratic Movement.

![Poster Image](http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77732.html)

Partido por la Democracia
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77732.html


Partido por la Democracia
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-86167.html

Partido Democrata Christiano (PDC)
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77911.html
Partido Nacional
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77909.html

Partido Radical
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77914.html
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile (Workers’ United Center of Chile)
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77818.html

Acuerdo Social por el No
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77932.html
Anonymous “women”
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77899.html

Juliette Kirkwood (feminist)
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77900.html
Movimiento Democrático Popular
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-77766.html
Bibliography


