A Dissertation
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in History.

By

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Washington, DC
March 20, 2014
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“Pitching Democracy” details how Dominicans used baseball to communicate their expectations for democratic society in their interactions with their government, the United States, other Latin Americans, and each other during the rapid political transitions of the period 1955–1978. Dominicans experienced the full brunt of Cold War politics during this period as their country passed from the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo, through an interim government, to a social democracy under Juan Bosch that fell to a military coup after only seven months. The dissertation explains how Dominicans continued their struggle to create a democracy dedicated to economic opportunity for all even after the fall of Bosch as they rallied around baseball as they pushed against the economic policies of first the de facto military-civilian regime and later the civilian authoritarian regime headed by Joaquín Balaguer.

Secretary of Sports documents, newspapers, and oral history interviews revealed Dominican understandings of social, political, and economic progress as they positioned themselves between the United States and Cuba in the ways they played, talked about, organized, and watched baseball. By examining this positioning and how Dominicans saw their nation’s place in Latin American relations, “Pitching Democracy” demonstrates Dominicans’ engagement with the ideological debates of the Cold War. Their interactions
with baseball representatives from the United States and Cuba influenced the meanings that Dominicans projected onto baseball and democracy. Rather than accept the consumer-based conception of freedom emanating from the United States, Dominicans pushed the Balaguer Government to develop a political and economic third way that avoided both the social revolution promoted by Cuba and the docile mimicking of the United States. Efforts by business leaders in the Cibao region to define a new baseball league as an industry legitimated President Joaquín Balaguer’s development policies while protecting Dominican ownership of the baseball industry—to a degree.

Through this synthesis of political and sports history, we come to see how Dominicans imagined and enacted democracy in counter to and in cooperation with US interests during the Cold War and the deep historical linkages between the favorite Dominican pastimes of baseball and politics.
Acknowledgements

Completing a dissertation is more of an ellipsis than a period to mark the end of graduate school, the beginning of the great unknown that follows it, and the continuation of the many relationships that rose in the process. Without the latter, the process would certainly be less rewarding and for me impossible. My colleagues and friends at Georgetown joined others in pulling me through the struggles of readjusting to academic life and a new place in those early years. Without lunches, poolside study dates, work days at Bentley’s, Thanksgiving, and wine breaks with Larisa Veloz, Libby Bivings, Kathryn Gallien, Sam Sanford, Jaymee Sanford, Javier Puente, Elizabeth Chavez, Oliver Horn, Carrie Crawford, and Nate Packard, I never would have made it. Thank you. My advisors and mentors provided the right mix of intellectual pushing, support, and cheerleading. Thanks, especially, to Bryan McCann, Alison Games, and John Tutino.

In addition, friends I made while in the field in the Dominican Republic enlightened my research with their questions and their own findings, and also provided great personal support. Knowing that I would see Don Leonard, Sabine Cadeau, Hank González, Margaret Entringer, and Raj Chetty in the Archives, or for happy hour or dinner after, increased my enthusiasm even on the slowest days. Everyone at the Archivo General de la Nación in Santo Domingo offered great support and practical knowledge. Without Oscar Feliz, I never would have found the Secretary of Sports documents and would have drowned in newspaper clippings and doubt.

I also thank my parents, sisters, and the rest of my family, who backed me despite their misgivings about more school.
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Politics at the Plate

The carnival-parade dragons decorated in the national colors of Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic had just meandered through the outfield gates of the Estadio Quisqueya as the hosting Dominican team took the field on a beautiful early-February night in Santo Domingo. A commercial came on the screen in centerfield, the classic dun-dun-dun-dun organ music drawing my attention from the Dominican players playing catch with their children to warm up before their first game of the 2012 Caribbean Series. Dominican closing pitcher Francisco Cordero, who would play in his final Big-League game later that year, appeared on the centerfield screen in black-and-white, saying “Yo sé,” Spanish for “I know.” A handful of recent Dominican players flashed on the screen with the same line, “Yo sé,” and then Jorge (George) Bell, the epithet “Dominican Big League Glory” accompanying his name, repeated the same. The dun-dun-dun-dun sped up for the wind-up and a baseball bat flashed on the black screen, quickly replaced by white smoke as the thnock of bat-to-ball contact sounded. I choked up, already moved by what I expected would be a nationalist expression of support for the players gathered to represent the Dominican Republic on their home field. The music changed to a rock beat. Osvaldo Virgil, the first Dominican to play in the Big Leagues, repeated the line “Yo sé.” My heart fluttered.

Players continued to flash on the screen, each repeating the refrain “Yo sé,” and many directing their comments to their hometowns. Cordero, who leads Dominican

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1 Bell earned the American League Most Valuable Player title in 1987 after averaging .308 and earning a remarkable 134 RBI for the Toronto Blue Jays.
pitchers in career saves, reappeared to add a personal touch: “About saves, I’m the one who knows. About governing, I know who knows.” Big-League pitcher Arodis Vizcaino flashed on the screen next, making the letter “L” with his right hand. For any Dominican in the crowd, the “L” revealed the political nature of the commercial. For me, a foreigner familiar with Dominican political history but still green on current Dominican political symbols, it held some baseball-related message that would soon make sense. Ricardo “Rico” Carty, whose smile won the hearts of Braves fans in the 1960s and 1970s, flashed on the screen and repeated, “yo sé.” The outline of a familiar back came on the screen and Juan Marichal, the only Dominican in the Major League Baseball Hall of Fame, turned to face the camera. He repeated, “I know who knows about this,” and made the “L” with the right hand that had won him a reputation for “The Best Right Arm in Baseball.” I sat in awe, impressed by the convergence of Dominican baseball past, present, and future there in the Estadio Quisqueya even before the first pitch of this celebration of Latin American baseball.

And then the stock image of Danilo Medina, presidential candidate, came onto the screen in full color. A narrator summarized the commercial’s point: “The best is with Danilo. Yo sé. Sector Externo [external sector, away from the capital] with Danilo.” As my anger at having my heart strings played by one more instance of the ruling Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD, or Dominican Liberation Party) projecting its candidate into baseball subsided, I realized I should not have been surprised. From my seat on the first-base side, I saw four PLD billboards, three picturing Danilo. Two of those also featured his running mate Margarita Cedeño, who, in addition to campaigning for vice
president, was finishing her third term as First Lady. Two images of Hipólito Mejía, the
candidate for the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD, Dominican Revolutionary
Party), also dotted the stadium walls, but the propaganda in the stadium left no question
about which candidate had the most financial support and had hired the best PR firm to
run his campaign. Danilo Medina won the election with his promise “To continue what is
good, to correct what is bad, to do what has never been done”\(^2\) as he led the nation.

Though his August inauguration was too late to receive the 2012 Caribbean Series trophy
from the champion *Leones del Escogido* (Lions of Escogido), Medina received
representatives from the Dominican team that wowed baseball fans across the world with
their camaraderie, enthusiasm, and *plátano power* on their undefeated march to the World
Baseball Classic championship in March 2013.\(^3\) (Figure 1)

\(^2\) “*Continuar lo que está bien; Corregir lo que está mal; Hacer lo que nunca se hizo.*”

\(^3\) Larger celebrations were planned for after the 2013 MLB season, but Medina received a smaller
delegation comprising Moisés Alou, General Manager of the team, and Robinson Canó, famous
Big Leaguer and MVP of the tournament, along with Canó’s father and Dominican baseball
officials. See, for example, “Danilo Medina recibe campeones del Clásico Mundial de Béisbol,”
Dominican team and their notable enthusiasm—they actually had fun playing baseball—see Tom
idea of what it meant to Dominicans to see their team win what they saw as the world’s biggest
proving ground for national baseball prowess, see Miguel Guerrero, “Panorama: Sobre plátano y
Medina’s reception of the WBC trophy followed protocol for national representatives in international competition, similar to the US President calling the World Series champions to congratulate them on their victory. But, as the campaign commercial in the Caribbean Series attested, the infiltration of politics into baseball in the Dominican Republic goes much deeper. The Dominican popular press defines baseball, or pelota, and politics, política, as the two greatest Dominican passions.\(^5\) Given the fervor with which Dominicans discuss these passions, their melting together in what some call pelótica, is hardly surprising. But the overlap of baseball and politics in this Caribbean country goes beyond campaign signs at baseball stadia, team visits to the Presidential Palace, and journalist shorthand. This overlap has been central to the development of the

\(^4\) Juan Núñez, General Secretary of the Dominican Federation of Baseball and Héctor “Tito” Pereyra, President of the Dominican Federation of Baseball, stand to the left of Moisés Alou, General Manager of the Dominican Republic’s World Baseball Classic (WBC) team, and Dominican President Danilo Medina, who hold the trophy. To the right of Medina stand Minister of Sports Jaime Fernández Mirabal and WBC MVP Robinson Canó.

baseball industry and the operations of electoral politics in the nation. Government investment in the development of baseball on the island since 1943 fostered the rise of Dominican stars in Major League Baseball (MLB) and provided the various regimes of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—dictatorial, democratic, and everything in between—a platform for sharing their views of the nation, for courting favor with the population, and, sometimes for confronting opposing views. Trujillo set the precedent by co-opting baseball into the narrative of progress under his regime. As Dominicans struggled to create the kind of democratic society they imagined after the assassination of Trujillo, baseball continued to serve as a point of unity and a symbol of national potential. Dominicans seized ownership of baseball from the Trujillo family and turned it to their advantage. They learned to assert their demands on the government through baseball.

As Dominicans negotiated the image of a democratic society at home, baseball served a diplomatic purpose as well. Dominicans met representatives from other countries on the baseball diamond, welcomed US and other players to their home fields, and projected baseball and other sporting success as evidence of their rising place in the world. As they battled for hearts and minds, Cold War powers framed success in international competitions in baseball or other sporting events as evidence of the
superiority of their democratic-capitalist or communist systems. Baseball offered a common ground for Dominicans to express their support for or contention with US policies and to celebrate Cuban achievements in amateur sport. Their own successes in baseball gave Dominicans the confidence to borrow from these apparently divergent models as they worked to create a political system and society according to their views that in a democracy everyone had the opportunity to succeed no matter his or her political connections, skin color, or class. They clung to the individual liberties protected by the US electoral system while working to create a system that provided all Dominicans the chance to succeed. Baseball offered a path toward a new society and lent Dominicans the confidence to push forward.

But baseball did not emerge from the struggle unchanged, nor did the meanings that Dominicans and their leaders projected onto their deporte rey (king sport) remain

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6 I take this conception for the Cold War from Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), who defines the Cold War as a competition between the United States and Soviet Union to demonstrate the benefits of their respective modernization ideologies—the capitalist, “liberty-based” model proposed by the United States and the socialist, “justice-based” model promoted by the Soviet Union. Scholars have since approached this understanding of the Cold War through popular culture to understand better the “Latin American Cold War.” Contributors to the edited volume by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounters with the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), embraced popular culture, or “transnational contact zones,” as a lens and subject of study as they examined Cold War interventions and reactions in Latin America. As Joseph explains in his first contribution, “What We Know Now and Should Know: Bringing Latin America More Meaningfully into Cold War Studies” (3–46), these contact zones reveal the ideological drive behind the Cold War more clearly than earlier work that focused on superpower strategy and the causes for the conflict. They also provide a means for scholars to understand how local forces interacted with the superpower ideologies. Democracy and Latin American expectations for it offered one important meeting point for local and global forces, as in Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). As Grandin argues, Latin Americans held onto the conceptions of democracy they formed in the 1940s, specifically social democracy, even after US interventions in the region supported a more procedural version. One of the greatest conflicts between the US and Latin American countries during the Cold War, then, was different expectations behind what each understood “democracy” to mean.
constant. Those shifts in baseball’s meanings and their relationship to Dominican understandings of how democracy should work in their country are the focus of this study. After the US military squashed a popular movement that demanded a return to democracy in 1965 and as Dominicans saw their national baseball league fall into a growing dependence on US Organized Baseball, they stressed sovereignty as the most important aspect of their struggle. They worked to free their baseball and their politics from undue foreign influence as they constructed a “third way” in both politics and baseball. Through baseball, Dominicans expressed their commitment to creating a social-democratic state that guaranteed economic security for all. In this way, baseball functions in this study as a lens for examining the meanings that Dominicans ascribed to democracy and the kind of society they hoped to create.

Baseball is also a subject in this study. As Dominicans used baseball to make demands on their governments, citizens and public officials projected new meanings onto the national pastime. A sign of Dominican potential leadership in the continent in the 1950s and 1960s, by the 1970s baseball became the center of an industry that embodied Dominican national identity, pride, and, often, hope. This dissertation, then, tells three stories: that of the construction of a democratic government in the Dominican Republic,

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of the emergence of a baseball industry, and of how the merging of these two stories—the story of pelótica—affected both baseball and politics.

Others have told the stories of Dominican baseball or Dominican politics individually. Some detailed the path that many Dominican ballplayers follow to Big-League success and the obstacles in that path. Others have explored the historical and cultural roots of baseball in the Dominican Republic and how that history has nurtured the country’s current prominence in Major League Baseball (MLB). Dominicans composed just under 10% of all Big League players on 2014 Opening Day rosters, down nearly a whole percentage point since Opening Day 2013. Still others have examined

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9 Rob Ruck, Tropic of Baseball: Baseball in the Dominican Republic (Westport, CT: Meckler, 1991), republished by University of Nebraska Press in 1999, is the best account of the deep historical, political, and cultural roots of baseball in the Dominican Republic. See also, Mark Kurlansky, The Eastern Stars: How Baseball Changed the Dominican Town of San Pedro de Macorís (New York: Riverhead Books, 2010), though Kurlansky is more adept at conveying the broader cultural context of San Pedro than detailing the facts of its baseball progeny.

the mixture of terror, patronage, and ceremony that buoyed the Trujillo Regime, or the triumphs and defeats after Trujillo’s death as the people struggled for a government that honored their material and social wellbeing. But neither politics nor baseball happened in a vacuum. Politics played a role in the development of baseball in the country, not only through government investment in sport, but in negotiations between the government and the population over what baseball meant. Similarly, baseball has played a role, though perhaps a less tangible one, in the formation of democracy. From the Trujillo dictatorship through the constitutional regime under Joaquín Balaguer, Dominican leaders used baseball to calm tensions and sometimes to distract citizens from abuses of power. Dominicans redirected the political connections in baseball to engage with their government in a measurable way as they tested new political and economic paths toward a democratic society that offered equal opportunities to all.

Government use of baseball and the lingering connections between baseball and politics originated during the dictatorial regime led by Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina

from 1930 through May 1961. As Chapter 1 details, the Trujillo Regime incorporated
baseball into the narrative of national progress. Trujillo pointed to the institutionalization
of sport under the Director of Sport office in 1943, incorporation of the Dominican
Professional Baseball League in 1955, construction of state-of-the-art baseball stadiums,
and support for affiliation with US Organized Baseball as evidence of the benefits of his
great leadership. Even the culmination of Dominican baseball progress, the rise of the
first Dominican to play in the Big Leagues when Osvaldo “Ozzie” Virgil suited up for the
New York Giants in 1956, was attributed to Trujillo.

Trujillo’s relationship with the United States and with US Organized Baseball
buoyed his credentials as a continental champion of democracy—a “democracy” defined
as anti-communist—for a while, but decades into his position his megalomania destroyed
his international and domestic credibility. Chapter 2 details the fall and eventual demise
of the Trujillo Regime through Dominican reactions to the 1960–1961 Winter League
Tournament. Trujillo’s declining international reputation depleted national resources,
forcing the Dominican Winter League to operate with only native players for the 1960–
1961 season. Seeing the baseball season fall prey to politics, and suffering other

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12 Major League Baseball as an entity did not exist during the period covered in this study, so I
use US Organized Baseball, or US Baseball, throughout. Organized Baseball generally refers to
the US National League, American League, affiliated minor leagues, and the Caribbean
Confederation-affiliated leagues. I specify US Organized Baseball or US Baseball throughout to
refer to all of these leagues based in the United States, or all Organized Baseball leagues minus
the members of the Caribbean Confederation.

13 Although Virgil had moved from the Dominican Republic at age 14 and developed most of his
skills in the United States rather than the Dominican Republic, sycophants of the Trujillo Regime
claimed his success for Trujillo. Virgil was Dominican, and everything Dominican belonged to
Trujillo. Felipe Rojas Alou’s longer playing career and great success, along with his status as the
first Dominican signed in the Dominican Republic to play in the Big Leagues contributed in part to
the greater renown he enjoyed in the late 1950s-early 1960s.
economic sacrifices because of OAS sanctions against the country, Dominicans lost faith in their ability to progress under the dictator. A group of former Trujillo allies ambushed the dictator’s car on the road to San Cristóbal and assassinated him. Dominicans’ protests to extirpate everything related to the regime from the country targeted even the 1961–1962 Winter League Tournament, organized by Trujillo’s son Ramfis and Balaguer, as they freed baseball and the nation from dictatorship.

Dominicans succeeded in purging the Trujillo family from the island in late 1961 and installed an interim Council of State to organize elections for December 1962. Chapter 3 describes how Dominicans imagined their country at the forefront of the Global Cold War at the same time the appearance of three Dominicans in the World Series signaled their ascent in professional baseball. An exhibition series between a group of Dominican ballplayers and Cuban professional players exiled in the United States because of Fidel Castro’s prohibition of professional sport gave Dominicans the opportunity to exhibit both their leadership in the continental struggle for democracy and their baseball prowess. Although the simplistic counterposition of communism and democracy in 1962–1963, exhibited through signs that fans carried onto the field to denounce Castro, would cause problems later, Dominicans proved their support for the Cuban exiles and their preference for democracy. The manifestations calmed apprehensions over upcoming elections, which Dominicans successfully completed on December 20, 1962, choosing Juan Bosch as their first democratically elected president.

But Dominicans, like others experiencing democracy for the first time, learned quickly that a society could not be transformed through elections alone and that affiliation
with the United States, whether politically oriented or baseball-centered, required accommodation and struggle. Chapter 4 examines more closely the political tensions and misunderstandings that persisted from the Trujillo Regime to the inauguration of Bosch in February 1963, and into a new period of political turmoil. Conflicts with the industrial elite, accusations of communist sympathies, disenchantment among US State Department officials, and slow progress toward fulfilling his electoral promises for social justice combined with questions over the participation of Dominican Big Leaguers in the 1963–1964 winter tournament to rationalize a military coup against Bosch. The Winter Tournament pushed tensions over the coup below the surface, but as an article written by Felipe Rojas Alou and published in *Sport* magazine in November 1963 confirmed, dangerous problems remained in the US-Dominican relationship around politics as well as baseball. The tensions exploded to the surface in April 1965 when US military forces, later joined by armed OAS peacekeepers, squashed a popular movement to restore democracy by returning Juan Bosch from exile to complete his term. Even after Dominican civilians prevented military forces trained and supported by the United States from taking the National Palace for three days, US-OAS officials refused to concede to Dominicans' demands for the return to constitutional rule.

The negotiated end to the popular movement brought Joaquin Balaguer back to the presidency he had occupied under Trujillo with his promise to lead a *Revolución sin sangre* (Revolution without blood) similar to the democratic revolution promised in 1962 by Bosch and the Alliance for Progress. Chapter 5 examines how Dominicans communicated their expectations for the kind of society created through that revolution in
their debates over amateur and professional baseball. Dominicans continued to support their professional ballplayers as representatives of the best Dominican qualities, but at home they embraced amateur sport as a sign of their solidarity with other Latin American nations and their efforts to assert their sovereignty against the United States. Through their demands for government backing of amateur sport and their cheers for the Cuban selection over the US team in the 1969 Amateur World Series, Dominicans asserted a new understanding of democracy. They understood that their democracy need not fear Cuba’s influence. They could develop a third-way of doing politics, one that melded the the equality of opportunity embodied in Cuba’s amateur baseball system with the individuality and economic freedom embodied in the US system behind professional baseball. Dominicans need not choose; they just had to find the balance.

A shift in US and Dominican policy away from political democracy to economic development as the path to a more just society during Balaguer’s presidency (1966–1978) turned the focus again to professional sport by 1975. Chapter 6 describes how Dominicans applied a “business mentality” sparked by debates over incentives the government offered to industries to create a baseball industry in a “third way” economic model for their nation. The Cibao Summer League, a professional baseball league founded in the Cibao region north of the capital, exemplified the kind of industry that Dominicans believed would develop the nation with the broad economic security and political liberties they demanded. As a counter to the effects of the unrestricted free-market capitalism that underlay US Baseball’s operations in the country, the Cibao Summer League operated as a business concerned with its social impact. The League
represented a Dominican-controlled industry that produced for a local market. Recognizing these benefits, the government offered financial support for the League, thereby connecting its development policies to the national pastime. Baseball was transformed from a symbol of progress to a tool for the economic development on which Dominicans would finally build the democratic society they had imagined in the 1960s. The association of Balaguer’s development plans with baseball and his construction of stadiums to support the Cibao League legitimated Balaguer’s rhetoric for development and boosted his reputation as a democratic leader—at least for those willing to look past the repression and political violence that also characterized this particular presidency.

Dominicans of all ages, classes, and genders embraced baseball as a symbol of their national progress. I must stress here that I use “Dominicans” throughout the text to refer to women as well as men. Baseball games in the Dominican Republic are family events with fathers and mothers sounding their miniature vuvuzelas as enthusiastically as their children. During the 1960s and 1970s women participated in the deporte rey and its political dimensions alongside men, offering their support as fans; as madrinas, or godmothers, for the teams; as players on little league or playground teams; as organizers for charities around baseball games; and as receivers, sometimes with political messages, of foreign delegations. Women’s participation in the national pastime was portrayed through gendered lenses. Their presence on the field as madrinas intended to demonstrate Dominicans’ genteel nature and warm greetings and respect for officials and international delegations. As such, the women chosen were selected from the results of
contests resembling the beauty pageants popular in the country. As the wives of players and political officials, women offered a sense of calm to potentially explosive situations. Today, as the sacrificing mothers of the Dominican prospects who hope to reward their struggles with a new house, women continue to contribute to the narrative of baseball and opportunity. Though few individual women emerge as protagonists in my narrative, Dominican women held baseball as important to their national character as did men and joined their male compatriots in hailing baseball as a magnífico estímulo (magnificent stimulus) around which they would all construct a democratic society.

14 This connection between the beauty pageants and the madrinas follow the common assumption that girls in the Dominican Republic dream of being Miss Universe or supermodels while boys dream of being Major Leaguers. Thomas Carter described a similar phenomenon in Cuba, with girls focusing on dance rather than pageants specifically. See, Thomas F. Carter, The Quality of Home Runs: The Passion, Politics, and Language of Cuban Baseball (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). While in Carter’s analysis only men saw baseball as an integral part of their national identity, connected to their masculinity, I argue that Dominican women identify as strongly with their deporte rey as their countrymen. Popular literature and popular lore recount stories of divided houses when the Águilas from Santiago face their Santo Domingo rivals, Licey, while sportswriters in the 1960s described families divided in their allegiances at the beginning of a season. See, for example, Aquiles Julián, “Tigre y cachorro,” Círculo de espera. II Concurso de Cuentos sobre Béisbol (Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional, Ediciones de Cultura, 2012).
Chapter 1

*Mens sana in corpore sano*: Baseball and Trujillista Politics

With excitement building for the nation’s first season of Winter League baseball in October 1955, Dominicans from the baseball cities of Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo), San Pedro de Macorís, and Santiago lined up in front of the new Estadio Trujillo (Estadio Quisqueya) to buy tickets for what many saw as the most important event of their lives as baseball devotees. For the first time in Dominican history, the four

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professional baseball clubs—*Leones del Escogido* (Lions of Escogido), *Tigres del Licey* (Tigers of Licey), *Estrellas Orientales* (Eastern Stars), and *Aguilas Cibaeñas* (Eagles from the Cibao)—would face off in a winter season affiliated with US Baseball and featuring major- and minor- league players from the United States along with local professionals. Affiliation with Organized Baseball, which included the US major and minor leagues as well as the winter leagues in Puerto Rico, Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama,\(^{16}\) signaled the institutionalization and legitimacy of Dominican baseball. The incorporation of the four professional teams into the Dominican Professional Baseball League earlier in 1955 established a national body to oversee professional baseball and to ensure the organization of regular tournaments. Between 1951 and 1955 the Dominican professional teams had organized *ad hoc* national tournaments and eventually earned financial and moral support from the Director of Sports, a government position under the Secretary of Education. During those years, uncertainty had surrounded the national professional tournament and whether the teams would be able to organize and fund a tournament that filled Dominican expectations. The shift to winter seasons and affiliation with Organized Baseball represented the culmination of a modern sporting structure implemented under the guidance of dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina.

As Dominicans lined up to purchase their tickets, they craned their necks to behold the marvel of modern construction behind them. (Figure 1.1) The Estadio

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\(^{16}\) In 1955, the Dominican Winter League affiliated with US Organized Baseball, which included only the US minor and major leagues. Three years later, in 1958, the Dominican League joined the Caribbean Confederation, which organized the Caribbean Series each year, as a non-participating (in the Series) member—a further signal of the League’s legitimacy, and of the reputation of Dominican baseball in the region. The leagues in the Caribbean Confederation, which included Puerto Rico, Panama, Venezuela, and Cuba, were affiliated with US Organized Baseball, but the Confederation was largely autonomous from US Baseball.
Trujillo, the nation’s first stadium with lights and the most modern baseball stadium in all of Latin America at the time, would be inaugurated with the season, a fitting exclamation point for Dominicans’ excitement about the 1955–1956 season and the future of professional baseball in their country. Based on the designs for the new Miami Stadium, the Estadio Trujillo boasted powerful lights and modern conveniences, all hailed as gifts from Trujillo to the Dominican people. As one article in the newspaper *El Caribe* bragged: “The Estadio Trujillo is a Manifestation of Modernism and Comfort.” Photos that depicted light towers rising above concrete grandstands behind a wide, crisp lawn backed the assertion, as did reports on the drainage system, water heaters for 200 simultaneous hot showers, and enough towers to make the stadium “the best illuminated in all of Latin America”\(^{17}\) (Figure 1.2). The baseball stadium provided a physical reminder of the ascent of Dominican professional baseball in the region and the nation’s rise as a challenger to Cuban and Puerto Rican preeminence among Latin Americans in the Big Leagues. Trujillo’s largesse benefitted Dominicans everywhere and thrust them to the spotlight among their Latin American brothers and sisters, consolidating a connection between professional baseball and the Dominican Government that would endure for decades, even after the death of the dictator.

\(^{17}\) Ph, “Estadio Trujillo es Alarde de Modernismo y Comodidad: Inauguración Tendrá Lugar 7 de la Noche de Mañana En Una Ceremonia Especial,” *El Caribe*, 22 de octubre de 1955, 11.
The incorporation of the Dominican Winter League, the completion of the Estadio Trujillo, and the appearance of rising US baseball stars on Dominican rosters fit into the narrative of national progress under Rafael Trujillo and coincided with the “Year of the Benefactor,” a year-long celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Trujillo Regime. These baseball milestones were the most recent of the national achievements overseen by Trujillo, whose efforts raised the Dominican Republic from ruin to the pinnacle of modernity. After the San Zenón hurricane flattened the capital in September 1930, Trujillo vowed to thrust the Dominican Republic to the forefront of the continent in terms of modernization and industrialization. He rebuilt the capital, Santo Domingo, to restore its prior functions and also gave the city, renamed Ciudad Trujillo in his honor, a gleam and attraction that brought members of the wealthy classes to the streets to see and be

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18 Uncredited photo, El Caribe, 22 de octubre de 1955, 11. The photo accompanied an article signed Ph, “Estadio Trujillo es Alarde de Modernismo y Comodidad; Inauguración Tendrá Lugar 7 de la Noche de Mañana En Una Ceremonia Especial,” El Caribe, 22 de octubre de 1955, 11.
Cosmetic fixes such as statues and parks provided the outward signs of progress, which Trujillo funded by expanding the sugar, mining, and ranching industries and by establishing import-substitution factories that manufactured glass, shoes, and cement for local consumption. Trujillo portrayed himself as a strong leader who sacrificed to ensure the progress of his people, despite the fact that he and his family members owned most of the nation’s wealth and industries. Newspapers defined modernization as a project that Trujillo undertook not for personal gain but to raise the Dominican people. Trujillo’s wise leadership and his concern as the “Benefactor of the Nation” ensured that Trujillo not only led the nation but embodied it.

The 1955–1956 Winter League Tournament and the Estadio Trujillo continued this combination of structural and physical signs of progress to ensure that Dominicans associated baseball with the Trujillo Regime’s pursuit of modernity. Dominicans owed their progress in baseball, as in everything else, to Trujillo.

The celebrations around the “Year of the Benefactor” extended to the rest of the world and especially the American hemisphere with the Fair of Peace and Fraternity in

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the Free World. The Fair displayed the modernization achieved during the Trujillo Regime to the world and projected Trujillo as a leader in the Pan-American fraternity that identified democracy and industrial modernization as inherently American traits. At a time when serious commitments to democracy and criticism against Latin-American dictators grew, Trujillo saw the Fair as an opportunity to project not only his achievements but also the Dominican people’s appreciation for them. Despite his own admiration for the rightest powers of Europe such as Mussolini in Italy, Trujillo saw himself as a leader in the Pan-American movement. International and local visitors to the Fair saw exhibitions of the dictator’s modern accomplishments in health, education, sports, and industry. The inauguration of the Fair included a procession led by Queen Angelita, Trujillo’s daughter, and her court all dressed in expensive Italian gowns. The Fair reminded Dominicans and the world of Trujillo’s great work on their behalf, in part

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22 After the United States entered World War II in 1941, propaganda in Latin America stressed the importance of hemispheric unity against the threat of fascism and, after the war, Stalinism and communism. For a compelling study of US and Mexican propaganda around Pan-American unity, see Monica A. Rankin, *¡México, la patria! Propaganda and Production during World War II* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).

as a counter to growing dissension and efforts against Trujillo in the country and abroad.  

The inclusion of the 1955–1956 Winter League Tournament among these festivities was no accident. Professional baseball brought together the institutional, physical, and human evidence of modernization that supported the narrative of national progress under Trujillo. The foundation of the Dominican Winter League and its affiliation with Organized Baseball signaled the modernization of not only sport but also of the economic and social structures that raised the Dominican Republic to the level of Cuba, a model of progress in the Caribbean, and closer to the United States. The looming Estadio Trujillo, the participation of Dominican ballplayers alongside Big Leaguers and others from the United States on Winter League fields and, later, the rise of Dominicans in the Big Leagues placed baseball achievements among the other indicators of Dominican modernity achieved under Trujillo. The Winter Tournament ensured that Dominicans as well as international visitors to the Fair could experience these achievements. Baseball integrated Dominicans into Trujillo’s modernization project and forever identified baseball with national progress, and with the Dominican Government.

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24 International efforts against the Trujillo Regime began in earnest with the Cayo Confites expedition in early 1947, which led to the foundation of the Caribbean Legion later that year. The Legion included liberal leaders from Costa Rica (José Figueres), Guatemala (Juan José Arvelo), and Nicaragua (Emiliano Chamorro) as well as Dominican exiles such as Juan Bosch. Another expedition, known as “Luperón,” attempted to spark a movement against Trujillo in 1949, and the most famous occurred with the Expedition of Constanza, Maimón y Estero Hondo on June 14, 1959, for which a political party is named in the country today. For an introduction on the various movements organized in the Dominican Republic, often in conjunction with liberal leaders and exiles around Latin America, see “Décadas de Resistencia,” Museo Memorial de la Resistencia Dominicana, [http://www.museodelaresistencia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=278&Itemid=93](http://www.museodelaresistencia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=278&Itemid=93). (Accessed 9 January 2014)
Trujillo and Sport

As the culmination of Trujillo’s project to modernize the structures and people of the Dominican Republic, the 1955–1956 Winter Tournament built on the foundations Trujillo laid over a decade before. The incorporation of sport into the Dominican narrative of national progress, or modernization, officially began with the Sports Law of 1943, which established the office of the Director of Sports (Director General de Deportes). The Sports Law of 1943 created an institutional base for organizing national sport in order to promote the advancement of the Dominican people through the ideology of mens sana in corpore sano, a healthy mind in a healthy body. By organizing sporting tournaments, with a focus on the national pastime of baseball, the Director of Sports not only trained the Dominican people in the values of modern sport—including teamwork, self-sacrifice, respect for authority and rules, physical fitness, and good hygiene—but also integrated Dominicans under Trujillo’s leadership for modernization. Similar to the ideals of Muscular Christianity formed in England and the United States in the nineteenth century, mens sana in corpore sano posed sport as the means to transform the Dominican population of backwards peasants eking out subsistence lifestyles into the productive, modern consumers and producers who would carry the modernization of the

nation. As part of his efforts to train the minds and bodies of the Dominican people for modern society, the Director of Sport helped administer requests for sporting patronage and the construction of national sports installations, the most prominent being the Estadio Trujillo. Through the office of the Director of Sports, Trujillo himself became the Benefactor and teacher for Dominican progress, providing a model modern citizen and the physical and structural necessities for raising all Dominicans in his image.

Dominicans claimed baseball as their national sport long before the Regime created the Director of Sports office, with leaders and business-owners organizing games and tournaments with little official oversight. Dominicans learned baseball by watching and, later, playing alongside Cuban and US merchants, engineers, and sailors for relaxation and recreation in the late nineteenth century. By 1907, Dominicans founded the first professional team, the Licey Base Ball Club based in Santo Domingo, followed by the Estrellas Orientales in San Pedro de Macorís in 1910. Dominican enthusiasm for and organization around the sport increased during the US military government on the island from 1916–1924 as Dominicans saw baseball games as means to assert their

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27 Cuban brothers Ubaldo and Ignacio Alomá are credited as the greatest promoters of baseball in the Dominican Republic, and definitely in Santo Domingo, but the earliest reports of baseball on the island come from a game played between Cuban sailors from the ship María Herrera in San Pedro de Macorís in 1886. The Alomá brothers, mechanics in the US-owned brewery in the capital, played the first recorded game in Santo Domingo in the early 1890s. On the origins of Dominican baseball, see Orlando Inoa, “El Béisbol Dominicano: 70 años de historia 1891–1961,” in *El béisbol en República Dominicana: Crónica de una pasión*, coord. Orlando Inoa y Héctor J. Cruz, Colección Cultural Verizon VII (Santo Domingo: Amigo del Hogar, 2004), 15–22.
physical ability and aptitude for self-government by beating the occupying forces at the
US game. Infrastructure such as highways built during the US occupation combined with
the increased enthusiasm for baseball, or *pelota*, and allowed Dominicans to organize
tournaments against neighboring towns and cities. Enthusiasts tired of Licey’s
dominance over other capital-based clubs founded Escogido in 1921, selecting the top
players, or “the chosen” from three other clubs to challenge Licey. Supporters in
Santiago created the Aguilas Cibaeñas in 1936, in time for the first national tournament.
San Pedro won the 1936 tournament and threatened to put together a strong team for the
1937 edition.

After the success of the San Pedro team against the capital-based Licey and
Escogido in 1936, baseball entered Trujillo’s radar. The national government first
intervened in professional baseball out of Trujillo’s personal, egotistical interests rather
than through institutional means. After renaming the capital for himself in 1936, Trujillo
worked to ensure that the team representing the capital, now Ciudad Trujillo, dominated
the other baseball cities. The 1937 professional baseball tournament, called the “Re-
election of President Trujillo Tournament,” offered the perfect opportunity. Trujillo
combined Licey and Escogido into the Dragons of Ciudad Trujillo to double the team’s
resources.\(^{28}\) As the season progressed and the Dragons failed to dominate the other
teams, Trujillo sent a representative to the United States with a suitcase of cash to entice

Satchel Paige to bring a team of US players to reinforce the Dragons. Paige agreed, and arrived in the Dominican Republic with many of his Pittsburgh Crawfords teammates, including Josh Gibson, in tow. Not to be outdone, the San Pedro and Santiago teams also reinforced their rosters with players from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the United States. By the end of the tournament, Dominicans had seen some of the best baseball played anywhere in the world. But the costs of the reinforcements bankrupted the national tournament, leaving the teams and Dominican professional players to barnstorm for revenue and preventing the organization of another nation-wide professional tournament until 1951.

With the failure of the national tournament after 1937, Trujillo turned his attention to amateur sport. Other countries had centralized sport under the national government in bodies such as the National Sport Commission in Nicaragua, the Sports Federation in Mexico, or the Director of Sports in Cuba. Dominican sports enthusiasts, such as Fernando “Bolo” Vicioso, worked to do the same in their country. The Sports Law of 1943 was the culmination of these efforts, centralizing sport under the national government and using baseball and other amateur sports to integrate Dominicans into the national movement for modernization. Sports leaders and Trujillo saw sport as one

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29 Former Director of Sports Fernando Vicioso recounted to Rob Ruck how the Director of Sports office was formed and its significance for the future of Dominican baseball, and most importantly Dominican baseball players. See, Rob Ruck, *The Tropic of Baseball: Baseball in the Dominican Republic* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1993), 41–46.
means to raise their compatriots to the levels of progressive, wealthy nations. 

Dominicans in the capital and other cities had long scorned those who lived in the countryside as less-civilized and backward. Through their participation in these sporting events, Dominicans from as far as Monte Cristi on the northwestern border with Haiti benefited from the practice of sport and visits to the capital for national tournaments. Baseball trained Dominican campesinos (peasants) not only in the ideals of modern sport but honed their identities as professionals, in baseball as well as in other fields. Baseball, and the national sports institution more generally, united Dominicans all over the country in a more cohesive national community. Baseball provided a commonality, a component of national identity centered on the national pastime and measured in international tournaments.

International amateur exchanges and tournaments, most prominently the Amateur World Series, offered proving grounds for Dominican progress as a “Vanguard Nation before all the civilized Continents” in terms of sportsmanship and civility. Cuba’s international baseball reputation had attracted the Series to the Caribbean for the second edition in 1940. Cuba defeated the US and Nicaraguan sides and sparked interest

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30 Sports, and especially modern sports like soccer and baseball, have long been identified as signals of progress, development, and modernity for elites in societies and the means by which they hope to raise their compatriots, as national identities formed, to an honorable level. William H. Beezley describes this idea of progress through sport as part of the “Porfirian Persuasion,” or attitudes, behaviors, and notions about future progress. Although Beezley described late-19th through early-20th-century Mexico, the idea of sport and progress continued, as did the pursuit of “modernity,” renamed development by the 1960s. See William H. Beezley, Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987).

31 A. Castro Recio, “Con mi Periscopio: Una Actitud Vituperable,” El Deporte al Día, no. 5, 30 de mayo de 1953, 32. The Cuban refuerzo Fermín Guerra evidently suffered some criticism in a Dominican game, leading the sportswriter to criticize the bad sportsmanship of the fans. Castro warned his compatriots that such “bestial” behavior would undo all the “obra de Paz y Progreso obtenida en un [illegible] de 22 años que nos ha identificado de [illegible] gloriosa como Nación de Vanguardia ante todos los Continentes civilizados.”
throughout the continent. Nine nations, including the Dominican Republic, participated in the 1941 Amateur World Series, held again in Cuba. The Dominican team finished fourth, a respectable showing for a nation with no institutional framework for organizing sport. Finishing second the following year whetted Dominicans’ appetite for international baseball competition and undoubtedly inspired the Trujillo Regime to solidify plans in the works since at least 1938 to provide a national structure for sport.\footnote{Ruck 41–46.}

The Sports Law passed early the next year. Amateur baseball tournaments and international exchanges to help prepare Dominicans for the Amateur World Series quickly followed. The efforts paid off only five years later, when the Dominican Selection won the 1948 Amateur World Series held in Managua, Nicaragua.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{The Champions}
\end{figure}

With the streets teeming with people in exultation of the championship, which many followed on the radio, the celebrations of the victory united Dominicans from all
over the country under Trujillo. Alongside front-page honors for the team (Figure 1.3)\textsuperscript{33} and descriptions of the national euphoria over the victory, were homages to Trujillo and his efforts as the “Maximum Protector of National Sport.” An editorial on the front page of the national newspaper \textit{La Nación} called the victory a “happy consequence of the progressive development” that Trujillo had achieved in the past years. Even as Dominicans celebrated the demonstration of Dominican baseball prowess to the world, Trujillo’s sycophants claimed the championship as evidence of the commitment and wisdom behind “the famous leader’s educative policies.”\textsuperscript{34} With the narrative of progress under Trujillo, the Regime co-opted the baseball team’s success for the dictator.

When national celebrations of great achievements were unable to entice Dominicans into the dictator’s modernization project, the Director of Sports remained. Beyond securing access for Dominicans of all ages to participate in amateur sporting competitions at neighborhood, state, regional, national, and international levels, the Director of Sports provided a central office for appeals for sporting assistance and a language for those appeals. These strengthened Dominican ties to Trujillo and consolidated his reputation as the “Maximum Protector of National Sport.” Dominicans wrote to the Director of Sport to request official support for their sporting endeavors in the form of uniforms, travel expenses, or materials for the construction of new

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{La Nación}, 13 de diciembre de 1948, 1.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{34} “El Presidente Trujillo y el triunfo del equipo nacional,” \textit{La Nación}, 13 de diciembre de 1948, 1. “Concretamente, la victoria que han alcanzado los deportistas dominicanos en la décima serie mundial de béisbol amateur, no es otra cosa sino fruto feliz del progresivo desarrollo que, por obra e iniciativa del Excelentísimo Presidente Trujillo, han logrado entre nosotros los deportes en general en estos últimos tiempos, como complemento de la política educativa del ilustre gobernante.”
\end{quote}
installations. To strengthen their appeals, Dominicans relied on the rhetoric of sport as their right and, more importantly, their desire to emulate Trujillo, who distributed assistance according to his will. Through sport, Dominicans could become better citizens, more like the “Father of the New Fatherland” and “Benefactor.” As a military captain in La Vega wrote to the Secretary of Education after a political demonstration in 1960: “This youth is eager to expand themselves in activities that can free them from ignorance and fanaticism and they asked me for equipment to practice sports.”

Sport educated Dominicans for a modern, industrialized nation, by forming Dominican citizens in Trujillo’s image. Any dissatisfaction Dominicans had with the Regime or the concentration of wealth that accompanied it could be solved through sporting patronage. Government patronage for sport would allow youth to become more like Trujillo and affirm the Dominican Republic’s position as the Vanguard Nation under the hemisphere’s best leader.

By the mid-1950s, Trujillo saw an international as well as local audience for his sporting patronage. The Estadio Trujillo represented the largest outlay of the Dominican Government’s support for sport and a testament to Dominican progress received by national as well as international audiences. The baseball stadium was only the first component of a planned Olympic City that would include an Olympic-sized pool, track and field, basketball and volleyball courts, and installations for all Summer-Olympic sports. The Olympic City would affirm the Dominican Republic’s position as a Vanguard Nation in regional sports. Trujillo held nothing back in constructing the Estadio Trujillo,

a near-exact replica of the Miami Stadium constructed for Big-League spring training in Florida in 1949, working to ensure that the stadium that bore his name was the best in the area. Although the only baseball stadium in the Dominican Republic outfitted with lights for night games until the construction of the Estadio Leonidas Rhadámes (now Estadio Cibao) in Santiago in 1958 and the Estadio Oriental in San Pedro de Macorís in 1959, the Estadio Trujillo confirmed the dictator’s position in the hemisphere and competed with stadiums across the continent in terms of modern comforts. The stadium raised Dominican baseball to the same level of its Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Panamanian counterparts and provided physical evidence that the nation could support professional baseball—and the US ballplayers that affiliation with US Baseball would bring.

Although less-than half the size of the Maracaná stadium constructed for the 1950 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, Dominicans saw the Estadio Trujillo as their Maracaná, a monument to their rising place in the sporting world.36

The Estadio Trujillo proved Dominicans’ rise as a Vanguard Nation, evidence not only of Trujillo’s brilliant leadership and achievements to 1955 but also of a promising future. Addressing the sell-out crowd for the inaugural winter baseball game, Secretary of Education Joaquín Balaguer described the Estadio Trujillo as “the facet of [Trujillo’s] work that most directly relates to the physical preparation of the generations that will go raising themselves under the refuge of the Trujillo Era.”37

36 On the significance of the Maracaná stadium in Brazil, see Alex Bellos, “Chapter 3: The Fateful Final,” in Futebol: The Brazilian Way of Life (New York: Bloomsbury, 2002), 43–76.

37 Ph, “Con los Spikes en Alto: Un hermoso espectáculo,” El Caribe, 25 de octubre de 1955, 12. “Hizo un magnífico enfoque del estadista genial y de la faceta de su obra que más directamente se relaciona con la preparación física de las generaciones que se van levantado al amparo de la Era de Trujillo.”
“better than the scholar, better than all the diplomas” earned at the University to educate the youth in the “eternal laws of loyalty and chivalry.” When Trujillo pushed the button to light the stadium, the towers lit up like “giant fireflies and swept away the shadows.” The field bathed in light represented the Dominican Republic and its bright future (Figure 1.4), the shadows of backwardness conquered by the light the dictator provided.

Surrounded by signs of modernity like the stadium, Dominicans would raise themselves to become worthy citizens forged under Trujillo’s watchful eye. The most modern stadium in the Caribbean and the first component of an Olympic Center planned to allow the Dominican Republic to host international events such as the Central American and Caribbean Games, the Estadio Trujillo was both a culmination of Dominican progress through a quarter-century of *trujillismo* and a site for displaying future achievements to the world. Professional baseball in 1955 was the next step toward securing the Dominican Republic’s position as the region’s Vanguard Nation in sport.

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38 Ibid. “Y así lo reconoció el doctor Balaguer cuando afirmó posteriormente que mejor que la cátedra, mejor que todos los pergaminos que refrendan para la capital de la República el título de urbe universitaria, el Estadio Trujillo ilustrará a la juventud en el conocimiento de las leyes eternas de la lealtad y la hidalguía.”

39 The caption noted that the photo was taken during tests on the lights, which hundreds attended. The photo accompanied the article, Arturo Industrios, “Generalísimo Trujillo Lanzará Hoy Primera Bola; Inaugúrase Campeonato con Choque de Licey y Estrellas,” *El Caribe*, 23 de octubre de 1955, 11.
Trujillo and the Return of Professional Baseball

The return of professional baseball to the Dominican Republic for the 1955–1956 Tournament represented a culmination of sporting progress under the Trujillo Regime. Affiliation with US Baseball and the oversight of the Dominican Professional Baseball League (Dominican Winter League) signaled an ascent and assured Dominicans that professional baseball would endure in their country. Dominicans needed this assurance after the competing expenditures on foreign players in 1937 bankrupted the national tournament for more-than a decade. Although slow to respond to popular clamoring for the return of professional baseball after the Amateur World Series victory in 1948 and a repeat in 1950, the Trujillo Regime responded in 1955 with the ostentatiousness expected from the Benefactor. With the incorporation of the Dominican Winter League, the

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construction of the Estadio Trujillo, and financial guarantees for the Winter League
teams, Trujillo soldered the Dominican Government and its oversight of national progress
to professional baseball in a way that would endure for generations. Trujillo responded to
popular demands for professional baseball to further the narrative of national progress
brought through his rule and to prove his interest in the Dominican people.

After the Dominican Selection repeated as Amateur World Series Champions in
1950, sports enthusiasts, organizers, and players like Enrique Lantigua, who had played
in the US Negro Leagues, responded to popular demands for professional baseball.⁴¹
Between 1951 and 1954, a rag-tag group of players, officials, and team representatives
organized professional tournaments and received backing from sportswriters and the
public. After the success of the first season, the group, associated with the Federation of
National Professional Ballplayers started by Lantigua, caught the attention of the four
professional teams—Licey, Escogido, the Aguilas, and the Estrellas—and eventually the
Government. Although the Trujillo Government later controlled the rhetoric around
professional baseball on the island, particularly with the 1955–1956 Father of the New
Fatherland Tournament, the four summer tournaments between 1951 and 1954 were
bottom-up endeavors led by Dominican sports fans, enthusiasts, and writers. This
popular connection and team owners’ awareness of the Government’s populist interest in

⁴¹ The Dominican championship was later revoked after officials discovered that the Puerto Rican
team had played with some professional players. The results of some their games overturned,
including the Puerto Rican team’s defeat of Cuba. The adjusted results gave Cuba a higher
winning percentage, resulting in Cuba being named champion. Although some Cuban sports
officials and writers uphold the original results, with the Dominican Republic as champion, official
results have been adjusted to designate Cuba as first place, with a 10–1 record, and the
Dominican Republic as second, with a 9–2 record.
supporting professional sport set a precedent and expectation of Government patronage for the deporte rey, now identified specifically as professional baseball.

The narrative around Trujillo and the national sports projects changed in the late-1940s and 1950s as calls for electoral democracy following World War II pressured dictatorial leaders to exhibit their populist, nationalist credentials and benevolence. Rather than leading the Dominican people on his own project for modernity, Trujillo claimed to respond to the needs and wants of the Dominican people. The Association of Sportswriters (Asociación de Cronistas Deportivos), a group of some of the most influential sportswriters and promoters in the nation, boosted this narrative. In a 1953 editorial, the Association claimed credit for defining the Director of Sports office founded a decade before, but credited Trujillo for “faithfully interpreting the feelings of his people.” With this interpretation of the people’s will, Trujillo “made himself the greatest supporter of Sport in general, satisfying a necessity that was unprecedented for the habits of healthy and vigorous muscle in benefit of the Fatherland.” As an interpreter of Dominican needs and demands, Trujillo was no longer simply the Benefactor or Father of the country but a leader attune to the needs of his people—even a democratic leader. By

42 Latin American populism has been well-studied in a variety of contexts, including Gertulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Perón in Argentina. Textbooks such as Thomas Skidmore, Peter Smith, and James Green, Modern Latin America, 7th Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) provide a great overview, while works such as Raanan Rein, “‘El primer deportista’: The Political Use and Abuse of Sport in Peronist Argentina,” International Journal of the History of Sport 15, no. 2 (1998): 54–76, provide an example of how populist policies infiltrated sport and other elements of popular culture as nations came to project themselves as such through sport.

43 Nuestros Editoriales, “La ACD en su Vigésimo Aniversario,” El Deporte al Día, no. 1, 23 de marzo de 1953, 3. The editorial celebrated the achievements of the ACD, which organized the magazine, but also honored Trujillo. The ACD claimed credit for the foundation of the Director of Sports office, but did so through Trujillo “quien interpretando fielmente los sentimientos de su pueblo, se convirtió en el máximo exponente del Deporte en general, satisfaciendo una necesidad que era imprescindible para la compleción del músculo sano y vigoroso en beneficio de la Patria.”
1955, the Dominican people saw professional baseball as one of the needs met by the leader.

Political officials in the Trujillo Regime realized the significance of popular demands for professional sport as the teams and officials organized the 1954 season. Organizers requested financial support from the Director of Sports but received it only through Rafael Trujillo’s behind-the-scenes manipulations. Weeks after the Secretary of Education rejected the teams’ requests for financial support—allegedly on the advice of the Director of Sports—the Director of Sports himself appeared to have changed his mind. He wrote to President Héctor Bienvenido Trujillo in support of providing $50,000 to the four professional teams, arguing that the Government should support the baseball teams for the National Baseball Tournament of 1954 “for the convenience that these sporting competitions have from the view of social politics (punto de vista político social) and because of the interest that the masses who love this sport are constantly showing.” Although he and his superior had originally feared (rightfully) that the financial gift would set a precedent of government support for professional baseball, the

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44 The Secretary of Education, on the advice of the Director of Sport refused financial support to the organizers of the 1954 season, but the teams later secured support from the Executive Power. For the denial, see, for example, AS# 3406, 18 de marzo de 1954, Secretario de Estado de Educación y Bellas Artes Lic. Porfirio Basora R., al Señor Presidente, SEDEFIR 16583. The money was granted on the advice, later, to the President from the Director of Sports in the interest of social policy. See, Memorándum, 11 de abril de 1954, Juan I. Vicioso V., Mayor Honorario Ejército Nacional y Director General de Deportes al Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la República, SEDEFIR 16534.

45 Memorándum, [s.f., but referenced AS# 3406 and likely preceded 11 April], Juan I. Vicioso V., Mayor Honorario Ejército Nacional y Director General de Deportes al Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la República, SEDEFIR 16534. “Recomiendo que se conceda la ayuda solicitada por los distintos interesados, a fin de que sea posible la realización del Campeonato Nacional de Béisbol correspondiente al 1954, por la conveniencia que estas contiendas deportivas conllevan desde el punto de vista político social y por el interés que las masas amantes de este deporte están demostrando constantemente.”
Director explained that he would oversee the organization to ensure that it developed with a larger goals of institutionalizing the professional tournament and curtailing the need for future official support. In this particular case, no documents showed Rafael Trujillo’s intervention to change the Director of Sports’ mind, but President Héctor B. Trujillo’s use of a discretionary executive fund that the dictator had used for similar matters suggested that the dictator was behind the decision to grant the teams support. As a national leader “faithfully interpreting the feelings of his people,” Trujillo supported professional baseball.

With construction of the Estadio Trujillo already underway in 1954, the sports advisors behind the Trujillo Regime looked forward to the 1955–1956 Winter Tournament as a make-or-break year for co-opting professional baseball under the Regime. They worked quickly to organize the event under the Government. Government support for professional baseball in 1954 had been relatively minor and forced from the organizers rather than bestowed by the dictator himself. The 1955–1956 Winter Tournament offered the Regime the opportunity to assert Trujillo back to the center of the narrative, posing the resurgence of professional baseball as part of “a quarter century of industrial, scientific, cultural, and political progress” under Trujillo. The Dominican Government acted quickly to prepare an institutional framework for professional baseball, rewriting the standards for Dominican players to pass from amateur to professional baseball and supporting the formation of the national baseball league. The

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46 Ph, “Con los Spikes en Alto, Un Pica en Flandes por los Viejos,” El Caribe, 5 de septiembre de 1955, 8. “Por el año que se conmemora—un cuarto de siglo de adelanto industrial, científico, cultural y político, como un exponente de las realizaciones enmarcadas en la Era.”
separation of amateur and professional players protected the country’s growing reputation in amateur tournaments by requiring government approval for players pass from amateur to professional status and ensured that unprepared Dominican amateurs would not decrease the quality of play in the professional league. The final step in institutionalization came with the incorporation of the four professional teams as the Dominican Professional Base Ball League. In August 1955, President Héctor Bienvenido Trujillo signed the incorporation of the League into law, thereby placing the institutional structure of the deporte rey under the Trujillo Regime.47

With the legal incorporation of the Winter League and affiliation with US Baseball, along with the construction of the Estadio Trujillo, Trujillo claimed responsibility for the return of professional baseball and discredited earlier achievements. Incorporation approved by the Government and affiliation with US Baseball signaled Trujillo’s great efforts to lead Dominicans to progress by legitimizing the Dominican Winter League in international baseball and placing it on par with US Baseball and the

47 See, for example, MEMORANDUM, OM# 7440, Asunto: Projecto de Reglamento de Base-Ball Profesional, 1º de junio de 1955, Secretaría deEstado de Educación y Bellas Artes Joaquín Balaguer al Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la República, SEDEFIR 16567; Oficio 1072, Asunto “Organización definitiva de la 'Liga Dominicana de Base-Ball Profesional’,” 28 de junio de 1955, Director General de Deportes Andrés A. Alba Valera al Sr. Secretaría de Estado de Educación y Bellas Artes, SEDEFIR 16549; Decreto No. 1110, Héctor Bienvenido Trujillo Molina, Presidente de la República, 27 de agosto de 1955, SEDEFIR 16534.
Latin-American members of the Caribbean Confederation. The Director of Sports happily informed President Héctor Trujillo that the incorporation of the League “regulated and organized [professional baseball] in a definitive manner” and avoided the “multiple inconveniences” around the organization of the tournament each year. These inconveniences, which the ad-hoc organizers encountered because of their lack of institutionalization under the Trujillo Regime, had resulted in a bad reputation for Dominican baseball in the Caribbean. As one sportswriter explained, affiliation “eliminated completely the guerrilla and piracy” that had previously characterized Dominican baseball and made it the “‘bad boy of the Caribbean.’” Under the watchful eye of Trujillo, the national pastime acquired new tools to confront difficulties with the organization of the national tournament and the signing of players. One cartoonist celebrated this institutional security with an image of the Dominican League, represented

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48 Although affiliation with US Baseball occurred in 1955, the Dominican Winter League did not join the Caribbean Professional Baseball Confederation, which oversaw the Caribbean Series each year, until 1958. In 1958, the Confederation members, including the winter leagues in Puerto Rico, Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, admitted the Dominican Republic but as a member only and not a participant. The Confederation struggled to balance its interests in protecting the Latin American Leagues against US influence through strength in numbers at the same time it stayed true to its foundational purpose of organizing the Caribbean Series each year. On Dominican admission into the Confederation, see “Informe que la Liga Dominicana de Base-Ball Profesional, Incorporada, rinden los delegados de la Liga Dominicana, Señores Licenciados Manfredo A. Moore R. y Máximo Hernández Ortega, en relación con el resultado de sus gestiones en las reuniones celebrados por la Confederación de Base-Ball Profesional del Caribe, en la ciudad de Caracas, los días 13, 14 y 15 de agosto del año 1958,” SEDEFIR 16567.

49 Oficio No. 1072, 22 de junio de 1955, Director General de Deportes Andrés A. Alba Valera al Secretaría de Estado de Educación Joaquín Balaguer, SEDEFIR 16549. The document referred to three acts, two of which were included with the document (one must have been lost), that described the rules and organization of the League.

50 Ph, “Con los Spikes en Alto, Un Pica en Flandes por los Viejos,” El Caribe, 5 de septiembre de 1955, 8. "La afiliación del BO, sin embargo, quizás sea un gran aproche para el brillo y buen éxito de la temporada, puesto que al eliminar totalmente el béisbol de guerrilla y pirateria, con sus arrebatíñas y locas dilapidaciones en sueldos y viajes, en que nos especializamos durante los últimos años para convertirnos en el 'niño malo del Caribe' en este deporte."
by a dominating pitcher (*Liga D.*), striking out Problems (*Problemas*) while pitching to Organized Baseball (*Béisbol Organizado*). (Figure 1.5) The new league and affiliation, made possible by Trujillo, ensured that professional baseball would dominate any problems that threatened the organization of a national tournament.

By 1955, the Trujillo Regime had built on the foundation of baseball tournaments laid by the ad-hoc organizers to create a new era of Dominican professional baseball and tie the *deporte rey* to the Dominican Government. The government provided institutional legitimacy through incorporation, the structural necessities through the Estadio Trujillo, and financial guarantees. Sportswriters hailed “the unlimited protection that in all moments the Superior Government has provided,” for making the tournaments possible, noting that “the provisions and concessions offered by the Superior Government have

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guaranteed the economic security of the classics.”52 These provisions and concessions included administration of the national stadiums, decreased electricity rates, tax exonerations, and a financial gift that was raised from $40,000 in 1955 to $100,000 in subsequent years during the Trujillo Era.53 The government provided the institutional framework and the financial security necessary to ensure that Dominicans would enjoy professional baseball in their country for decades to come as part of Trujillo’s plan to ensure the well-being and happiness of his people. In his address to the crowd at the inauguration of the Estadio Trujillo, famed writer and Secretary of Education Joaquín Balaguer compared the nation to an immense stadium where a gladiator had realized great feats during the past 25 years. With these feats, Balaguer reminded the crowd, the gladiator, Trujillo, “has not only taught his people to improve themselves and to supersede their destiny; not only has he educated his compatriots in the moral of success, in the motto of victory, and the lesson of the fight; but he is also teaching, in anticipation,  

52 “Pueblo Dominicano Espera La Hora de Iniciar el Clásico,” La Nación, 8 de octubre de 1956, 8. The article offered a brief history of the development of professional baseball since 1951 and attributed these new heights in baseball—signaled by Virgil’s Big League appearance and the number of quality imported players (38 to this point)—to the incorporation of the League and Government support for the national pastime. “La protección ilimitada que en todo momento ha brindado el Superior Gobierno es sumamente notoria, y gracias a ello, se ha podido dar realización a los torneos, pues las aportaciones y facilidades brindadas por el Gobierno Dominicano, han garantizado la seguridad económica de los clásicos.”  

53 See, for example, MEMORANDUM, 6 de septiembre de 1955, Secretaría de Estado de Educación y Bellas Artes, Joaquín Balaguer, al Presidente de la República, SEDEFIR 16567; Carta, 20 de septiembre de 1956, Lic. Jaime Vidal Velázquez, Presidente de la Liga Dominicana de Baseball Profesional, al Generalísimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, SEDEFIR 16545. Vidal thanked Trujillo for his recommendation to Executive Power in support of the $100,000 gift to the League.
the lesson of the triumph for future generations.” Dominicans owed their triumphs, in the stadium and the world, to the lessons of Trujillo.

**Professional Baseball and a New Narrative of Progress**

Trujillo seemed omniscient, omnipresent, and all-powerful even from the grave, but Dominicans took advantage of the dictator’s megalomania and the delicate balance between force and patronage that maintained the Regime to secure benefits for professional baseball, which ultimately destroyed the narrative of progress under the dictator. Trujillo’s populist rhetoric and reputation as the “Benefactor” gave Dominican Winter League officials an entree to secure funding while his conceit demanded flattery that led to more funding. At the same time, Dominicans recognized after the rebirth of professional baseball organized from the ground up that they, not the dictator, owned professional baseball. Although Trujillo likely believed himself successful in controlling the meanings projected onto the 1955–1956 Tournament, the return of professional baseball created holes in his narrative of progress. The incorporation of the Dominican Winter League shifted the narrative from one that saw progress derived from Trujillo to that of progress through baseball, and especially professional baseball. The League, and later professional ballplayers, replaced Trujillo as the dons of progress.

The bottom-up organization of the first professional baseball tournaments from 1951 to 1954 left Trujillo in the position of answering requests for government support

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54 Ph, Con los Spikes en Alto “Un hermoso espectáculo,” *El Caribe*, 25 de octubre de 1955, 12. Ph gave communicated the points of Balaguer’s speech: “no sólo ha enseñado a su pueblo a superarse a sí mismo y a superar su destino no sólo ha educado a sus compatriotas en la moral del éxito, en la consigna de la victoria y en la lección de la lucha, sino que también está enseñando, por anticipado, la lección del triunfo a las generaciones futuras.”
rather than creating them. The return of professional baseball was truly a grassroots
movement, one that eventually required the Trujillo Regime to take notice or tarnish its
carefully constructed reputation for benevolence. Trujillo’s well-known disregard for
baseball likely accounted for this foot-dragging, but whatever the reason, the success of
the 1951 professional tournament and those that followed revealed the power of popular
action to Dominicans. The backlash from attempts to oust the dictator in 1947, 1949, and
1959 demonstrated Trujillo’s willingness and ability to repress dissent, but baseball
allowed Dominicans room to act. Trujillo’s rhetoric of benevolence required him to
respond to popular demands, of which baseball was one of the most popular.

Demands for professional baseball and Trujillo’s populist rhetoric served as bases
for the Dominican Winter League’s appeals for Government funds. Despite guarantees
by the Director of Sports in 1954 that his oversight would prevent the League’s
dependence on public funds, the Dominican Government donated $40,000 to facilitate
the organization of the 1955–1956 Winter Tournament, after spending a million dollars
on the Estadio Trujillo. This financial assistance increased to $100,000 the next year and
continued through the Trujillo Era. League officials learned that securing gifts or loans
(that they never paid back) from the Government required only that they portray the
organization of the next tournament as contingent on government aid. The League
requested $100,000 in 1958 “to make possible the celebration of the tournament”55 while
in 1961 the Secretary of the Presidency reported to interim President Balaguer that the

55 Carta, 10 de septiembre de 1958, Lic. Jaime Vidal Velázquez, Presidente de la Liga
Dominicana de Base-Ball Profesional Incorporada, et al., al Generalísimo Dr. Rafael Leonidas
Trujillo Molina, SEDEFIR 16567.
“Directors of the Clubs are in the best disposition to reconsider their decision to not play the tournament this year if the inconveniences of economic character are attended to.”

The Club Directors requested $200,000 to address these inconveniences. The popular discontent that would arise in the absence of professional baseball was enough of a threat to the Trujillo Regime, and the governments that followed, that Winter League teams secured thousands of dollars in support with no requirements to account for how they spent the money or even to provide balance sheets showing losses. Although Trujillo ultimately decided whether to support the League and how much, the popular appeal of professional baseball and the Regime’s narrative of baseball as a component of national progress, combined with Trujillo’s reliance on the populist rhetoric and patronage to sustain his regime, forced Trujillo to support professional baseball. In many ways, the League controlled Trujillo rather than vice versa.

56 MEMORANDUM, 8 de septiembre de 1961, Antonio Armenteros S. al Honorable Señor Presidente de la República, Dr. Joaquín A. Balaguer, SEDEFIR 16567, my emphasis. Armenteros met with the League on the instructions of then-President Balaguer, whom Trujillo had selected earlier in the year. The economic inconveniences resulted in part from the OAS sanctions that endured as well as the insecurity following the assassination of the dictator in May of 1961. The request for $200,000 likely resulted from these circumstances as well as high losses the previous season. The 1960–1961 and 1961–1962 tournaments will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. “Es de notar que todos los Directivos de los Clubes están en la mejor disposición de reconsiderar su decisión de no jugar el campeonato de este año si son atendidos en los inconvenientes de carácter económico que los obligó a tomar esa medida muy en contra de sus aspiraciones y deseos.”

57 Dominican revolutionary, scholar, and public official Hamlet Hermann described Trujillo’s lack of leadership in the development of baseball in his unpublished paper, under the pseudonym Mariposa de San Juan, “El béisbol se desarrolló a pesar de Trujillo,” (Unpublished Manuscript, Santo Domingo, 2008). The paper focused on an international amateur tournament between the University of Santo Domingo team and teams from Cornell and Yale in 1953, a series in which Hermann participated as a student at the University of Santo Domingo. The event occurred in part as a result of Trujillo’s growing prominence in the United States, after being named the Dominican representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), while the standard of living for the Dominican poor fell. Hermann’s argument hinged on Trujillo’s general lack of interest in baseball and his preference for equestrian sports.
The League also resorted to flattery to secure public support for professional baseball. Much as other Dominicans referred to their desire to emulate the dictator by raising themselves through sport, League officials appealed to the dictator’s high opinion of himself. Baseball tournaments at the amateur as well as the professional levels were always named to honor a member of the Trujillo family, a political event, or as was often the case with professional baseball, to commemorate a moment in Trujillo’s life or leadership.\(^{58}\) Requests for funds for the 1955–1956 “Father of the New Fatherland” Tournament derived from the team officials’ “best interest that the Professional Baseball Tournament this year is the brightest of all, as appropriate for the celebrations of the Year of the Benefactor of the Nation.”\(^{59}\) Officials resorted to the same rationale for the 1958–1959 “Trujillo Era” Tournament, using the coincidence of the dictator’s October 24 birthday with the inaugural ceremonies to bolster their request for $100,000. They asked for the help “as an homage of respect and admiration toward your illustrious person, on occasion of the festivities that will be celebrated all over the country because of your birthday, and recognizing that only to you do we owe the resurgence of professional baseball in the Republic.”\(^{60}\)

\(^{58}\) For example, the amateur tournament in 1956 was dedicated to Trujillo’s daughter, “Her Gracious Majesty Angelita I,” while the 1957 amateur tournament was named “Candidacy Trujillo-Balaguer” to promote the ticket of Héctor Trujillo for President and Joaquín Balaguer as Vice President. The 1960–1961 professional tournament was named “16 de Mayo” to commemorate the election of Trujillo as president while another tournament was named “24 de Octubre” in honor of the dictator’s birthday.

\(^{59}\) Carta, 3 de septiembre de 1955, al President Trujillo vía la Secretaría de Estado de Educación Joaquín Balaguer de Ing. Tancredo Ayubar C., Francisco Martínez Alba, Ing. Juan Sánchez Correa y Dr. José Hazim, SEDEFIR 16567.

\(^{60}\) Carta, 10 de septiembre de 1958, SEDEFIR 16567. Officials requested the money “como un homenaje de respeto y admiración hacia vuestra ilustre persona, en ocasión de los festejos que serán celebrados en todo el país con motivo de vuestra fecha natalicia, y reconociendo que solamente a vos le debemos el resurgimiento del base-ball profesional en la República.”
The Dominican Winter League also challenged Trujillo’s supremacy as the Benefactor. Although the League existed thanks in part to the Regime, League Statutes defined professional baseball as a social good as well as an economic enterprise. The League defined a purpose behind sustaining and developing professional baseball as a means for Dominican youth to “train themselves in the practice of a sport that constitutes a healthy and lucrative profession.”61 The League, rather than the dictator or in conjunction with the dictator, would ensure the professional development of Dominican youth. Professional baseball would further the goals of mens sana in corpore sano by “exhorting Dominican youth to appreciate the sport of baseball, maintain enthusiasm for the game, and sustain a high sporting spirit.”62 Whether they chose to professionalize in baseball or another aspect of their lives, professional baseball as a complement to a healthy mind in a healthy body prepared Dominicans as citizens for a modern nation. Although the narrative of Trujillo as the Benefactor portrayed Trujillo as the mind and financial support behind the League, the League rather than Trujillo administered to the people. The League became the face of Dominican progress.

Dominican Winter League officials and the directors of baseball teams did not intend to replace Trujillo as the face of national progress or to undermine Trujillo’s place in the narrative of progress. In fact, many of the men involved in the Dominican Winter League and others involved in baseball were the same who benefitted from the incentives

61 Estatutos de la Liga Dominicana de Base-Ball Profesional, Decreto Número 1110, 27 de agosto de 1955, SEDEFIR 16534. Under Título I, Capítulo II, the League stated a purpose to help youth “de adiestrarse en la práctica de un deporte que constituye una profesión sana y lucrativa.”
62 Ibid, Art 3, f): “Exortar a la juventud dominicana a apreciar el deporte de Base-Ball, mantener el entusiasmo por el mismo y sostener un alto espíritu deportivo.” SEDEFIR 16534.
Trujillo allocated to selected businesses. Building the narrative of progress and industrialization during the Trujillo Era had required Trujillo to offer incentives to budding industries and businesses in the country. Although he controlled the majority of those industries, members of the established classes who were willing to adhere to Trujillo’s leadership were rewarded with incentives and perks. In the case of the Dominican Winter League, their relationship with the Regime was mutually beneficial: Trujillo administered his patronage through grand spectacles centered on the popular pastime while League and team directors operated in the dual interests of baseball and profit. Years later, when Dominicans worked to define a democratic government’s relationship with the national economy and requirements for the distribution of public wealth, sportswriters criticized the lack of transparency in how the Winter League teams and officials spent public funds. But while Trujillo led the nation, the press emphasized the spectacle and quality of the national professional tournaments and their representation of Trujillo’s support for the popular passions. A nation entertained by baseball and cared for by Trujillo’s benevolence had little time to worry about the dictator’s economic policies and whom they benefitted.

The League benefitted Dominicans beyond cultivating a sporting spirit for healthy living; it also had a material effect and truly trained Dominicans for lucrative professions. The Dominican Winter League provided the basis for expanding the baseball profession in the nation. By 1955, sports and government officials as well as baseball fans imagined a bright future for Dominicans in professional baseball throughout the Americas. Victories in the Amateur World Series and in the 1955 Pan American Games had
suggested that Dominican players had talent equal to the Cuban, Puerto Rican, and other Latin American players in the Big Leagues. With affiliation and the move from summer to winter tournaments, the probability of Dominican players joining Big League teams increased along with the prospects of US stars playing on Dominican diamonds. A few Dominicans had already signed contracts with US teams and it was only a matter of time before one of them “reflected great credit in [his] nation” by impressing “the American people with the similarity of interests and sportsmanship in our country and theirs.” In fact, the famed Brooklyn Dodgers manager Leo Durocher had suggested just that to Trujillo in 1954 when he wrote to the dictator to request help in securing Dominican Garabato Sackie for the Dodgers. As an instrumental part of a budding baseball relationship between the United States and the Dominican Republic, the League represented a means for Dominicans to imagine their countrymen in similar positions. Within a few years, men like Ozzie Virgil, Felipe Alou, Julián Javier, and Juan Marichal would do just that as they came to replace Trujillo and even the Dominican Winter League as the signs of Dominican progress at home and abroad.

**Conclusion**

The 1955–1956 Winter Tournament represented the culmination of Rafael Trujillo’s sporting program and his efforts to incorporate baseball into the narrative of Dominican progress under his Regime. Trujillo worked to modernize baseball and

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63 Leo Durocher to Generalissimo Dr. R. Leonidas Trujillo Molena [sic], 26 April 1954, SEDEFIR 16583. Durocher refers to the player as J.D. Zackie, but was probably referring to the player Jorge David “Garabato” Sackie (signed as George Sackey), who played in the Dominican League from 1953 through 1969. Sackie played in the United States for various teams but never made it to the Big Leagues. The “Z” and “S” make the same sound in Spanish.

64 *Ibid.*
national sports along with the rest of the country by providing physical and institutional structures, following the example of countries like Nicaragua, Mexico, and especially Cuba. Modeled after the Cuban system, the Director of Sports created an office for sport under the national government and provided government oversight for the training of young Dominicans not only as athletes but as modern citizens under Trujillo, a supposed model of a healthy mind in a healthy body. Although not a fan himself, Trujillo included baseball in his modernization project to attract and incorporate Dominicans into it. Dominicans not only participated in the tournaments organized by the Director of Sports but engaged the dictator directly through their requests for sporting patronage. Providing this patronage offered Dominicans material evidence of the benefits of progress under Trujillo and tied them closer to the dictator.

Sportswriters and editors who touted Trujillo’s sporting patronage, annual visits by ballplayers from the United States, and the luminous Estadio Trujillo demonstrated Trujillo’s interest in the Dominican people and their progress to international audiences as well as the Dominican people themselves. Trujillo had always been cautious of his international standing and portrayed himself as a leader in the Pan-American unity that grew amid fears of German attacks during World War II. The performance of the Dominican Selection in the Amateur World Series provided a measure of sporting progress under Trujillo’s leadership to the world, and the Dominican championship in 1948 confirmed Trujillo’s narrative of modernity and progress. He built on this reputation by portraying himself as the continent’s number-one anti-communist and as the Maximum Protector of National Sport, hoping these credentials would counter criticism.
against the dictatorial nature of his Regime. As the next chapter will show in more detail, Trujillo attacked democratic leaders such as Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela in the press and questioned the democratic merits of the United States—he contrasted the experiences of dark-skinned Dominican players in the United States with an alleged racial democracy in the Dominican Republic—to establish the superiority of his style of democratic leadership.

Although Trujillo successfully integrated professional baseball under his narrative of progress and as evidence of the benefits that 25 years of Trujillo’s leadership had brought the nation to 1955, the rise of professional baseball in the Dominican Republic undermined Trujillo’s hold on the Dominican people. Professional baseball, rather than the dictator himself, came to represent Dominican progress and potential in the world. This shift began with the popular movement to reestablish professional baseball in 1951. Through their organization of the Professional Tournament of 1951, Dominicans claimed popular ownership of their national pastime. Although Trujillo purportedly organized the incorporation of the Dominican Winter League, constructed the Estadio Trujillo, and distributed financial gifts to the League, Dominicans came to realize that he did so only in response to their demands. Despite Trujillo’s seemingly supernatural powers and ownership of most of the nation’s material wealth, Dominicans truly owned professional baseball. The Regime, and even the League itself, organized baseball in response to their demands.

Although the realities lay below the surface through the 1950s, the Statutes and operations of the Dominican Winter League further undermined the dictator’s hold on
professional baseball. The Dominican Winter League’s stated purpose of developing professional sport followed the narrative of progress under Trujillo because professional baseball represented the pinnacle of modernity for Dominicans. But the Statutes claimed a larger mission to make baseball a tool for the people. With its promises to help Dominicans “train themselves in the practice of a sport that constitutes a healthy and lucrative profession,”65 the Dominican Winter League offered Dominicans the benefits of *mens sana in corpore sano* that previously only Trujillo provided. With the prospect of Dominicans playing in the Big Leagues nearer a reality because of the Dominican Winter League’s affiliation with US Baseball, Dominicans saw the promises for their future in baseball rather than in Trujillo. The rise of Dominican Ozzie Virgil, an exile of sorts from the Trujillo Regime, to the Big Leagues in 1956 undermined the narrative of Trujillo’s progress further and ultimately led Dominicans to hail ballplayers rather than the dictator as beacons of progress and potential, not only on the baseball diamond but on the political field as well.

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65 Estatutos de la Liga Dominicana de Base-Ball Profesional, Decreto Número 1110, 27 de agosto de 1955, SEDEFIR 16534.
Chapter 2
A Big League Nation Frees Baseball

On September 26, 1956, Dominicans celebrated the nation’s first Big Leaguer with a cartoon that proclaimed: “Virgil Arrived.”66 (Figure 2.1) A man wearing the Dominican shield on his uniform, presumably Virgil, leapt into two rings labeled “Big Leagues” (*Grandes Ligas*), leaving rings representing Triple-A and Double-A leagues and the two previous years behind him. The proclamation “Virgil Arrived” did more than announce Virgil’s call up to the New York Giants on Sunday, September 23. The title conveyed the feeling across the Dominican Republic that Virgil did not arrive to the Big Leagues alone: he carried with him a nation. With Virgil’s climb to the pinnacle of professional baseball, the Dominican Republic achieved the status of a Big League nation, a nation with the capacity to produce the world’s best baseball talent, a nation that had fully realized the ideals of *mens sana in corpore sano*, a healthy mind in a healthy body. Professional ballplayers were the epitome of this ideal, and Virgil’s ascent signaled the culmination of the Trujillo Regime’s modernization project as it affected sport. From the institutionalization of sport in 1943 and of professional baseball in 1955 to the building of infrastructure to facilitate athletic training, exemplified by the Estadio Trujillo, the Regime had embedded sport with the signs of modernity. Common Dominicans, ballplayers like Virgil and those who followed him, came to symbolize modernity and Dominican potential. As Dominicans projected their own success and that

of their nation onto Virgil, ballplayers replaced Trujillo as the embodiment of Dominican progress.

Figure 2.1: Virgil Arrived!

In the hands of Trujillo’s sycophants, Virgil and the Dominican ballplayers who followed him to the Big Leagues owed their achievements to Trujillo’s actions as the Maximum Protector of National Sport. Yet Trujillo’s claim on Virgil’s success was murky, undermining his ability to claim Virgil’s progress as his own. Virgil had signed his first professional contract in the United States, where he moved to reunite with his exiled father at age fourteen. Even the “yes-men” in the sporting press delayed attributing Virgil’s rise to the Big Leagues to achievements of the Trujillo Era until a Dominican rose through the island’s amateur baseball system to the Big Leagues—a

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Octavio, La Nación, 26 de septiembre de 1956, 9.
distinction Felipe Rojas Alou earned when he played for the Giants in 1958. The inability of the Regime to claim Virgil’s successes further distanced Trujillo from the national pastime and the Dominican people who saw the potential of their nation and their citizenry in baseball. By claiming Virgil and his rise to the Big Leagues as their own, and not of Trujillo, Dominicans strengthened their hold on the deporte rey. They expressed their hopes for society and their criticism of economic policies with little fear because they did so through contributions to baseball debates. As in the reintroduction of professional baseball on the island, Dominicans pushed Trujillo to cater to their baseball demands. By 1961, Dominicans extended their claims of ownership from baseball to the nation’s political future as pushing leaders to meet their political needs as well as their sporting demands. A sign of their political consciousness, Dominicans even sacrificed baseball to attain their political goals.

Dominican ballplayers promoted their nation to Big-League status at a time when Trujillo’s international reputation was falling to new lows. The success of the popular movement against Fulgencio Batista in Cuba in 1959, followed by Fidel Castro’s identification as a Marxist a little over a year later, gave new urgency to plans by leaders of the Latin American democratic left to rid the continent of dictatorships. US policymakers and Latin-American advisors decided that dictatorships like that headed by Trujillo left the population susceptible to the promises of communism espoused by the Soviet Union and Castro’s Cuba.\footnote{On this interpretation of the causes for the Cuban Revolution and its longer-term influence on US policy in Latin America, see Thomas G Paterson, \textit{Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).} Trujillo and the sports press in his service
successfully manipulated the Big-League debuts of Virgil in 1956 and Alou in 1958 to boost the perception of US-Dominican fraternity and US support for Trujillo. But the debuts of Julián Javier, Rudy Hernández, Juan Marichal, Diómedes “Guayubín” Olivo, and Mateo Rojas Alou in 1960 occurred in a less-certain international environment. Tensions between Trujillo and Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt, a leader of the democratic left, escalated throughout 1960 to an attempt by Trujillo to assassinate Betancourt. A little over a month later, days before Marichal’s Big League debut, Betancourt convinced the Organization of American States (OAS) to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Trujillo for violating the principle of nonintervention.69

The material effects of the sanctions, felt in the day-to-day life of Dominicans and seen in the lack of US players in the 1960–1961 Winter League Tournament, undermined Trujillo’s manipulation of the \textit{deporte rey} and laid the groundwork for Dominicans to claim the sport as their own. Ostracized from the Pan-American community that he had once claimed to lead as the “number-one anti-communist,” Trujillo turned inward and seized on the success of the newest crop of Dominican ballplayers in the United States to convince Dominicans that his democratic credentials were superior even to those of the United States. Moved in part by material necessity, part by macho one-upism, and perhaps by a sense of nationalism, the Dominican Winter League agreed to organize the 1960–1961 Winter Tournament with only native players and umpires. Framing the decision as an expression of support for \textit{el Jefe}, the Dominican Winter League hoped to

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borrow from the rising domestic and international reputations of native players like the Alou brothers, Marichal, Virgil, Olivo, and Javier to reflect popular enthusiasm on Trujillo. The plan backfired. Dominicans rejected Trujillo’s claim on democracy along with his interpretations of their baseball demands. They voted with their feet to affirm their demand for high-quality baseball, staying home from stadiums despite pleas by sportswriters. With the natives-only 1960–1961 Winter Tournament, Dominicans confirmed that baseball was not a gift bestowed by Trujillo but a pastime owned by the people. In a matter of time, they would claim the same ownership over their democracy and the democratic future they imagined.

This chapter details the decline of the Trujillo Regime by looking closely at sportswriters’ interpretations of the significance of Dominican Big Leaguers alongside Trujillo’s attempts to assert himself as a leader suited to the demands of a uniquely Dominican democracy. After looking at the rising position of Dominican ballplayers and their replacement of Trujillo as symbols of modernity and progress, for sports fans abroad as well as in the Dominican Republic, I will examine how Dominicans’ lack of enthusiasm around the 1960–1961 natives-only Winter Tournament reflected their ownership of baseball and their growing consciousness about the kind of society they hoped to create after Trujillo. This consciousness grew from Dominicans’ projection of their nation onto their baseball heroes and their hopes for baseball in their country.

**A Big League Nation: Ozzie Virgil and the Trujillo Regime**

Dominicans welcomed the return of Ozzie Virgil for the 1956–1957 Winter League Tournament with unparalleled fanfare. Team and government officials planned
receptions and awards to honor the first Dominican to play in the Big Leagues while fans of all the Dominican professional teams followed newspaper reports and eagerly awaited their chance to see the new hero in action. The rise of Virgil served as a beacon for Escogido’s potential and for the entire Dominican Winter League. As one sportswriter explained, the future of the national professional tournament depended on “criollo idols and not luminary foreigners that only care about the mountain of money that they receive for their services and most the time try to earn it in the easiest way possible.”

Though the teams relied on foreign reinforcements, Dominicans trusted only their countrymen to play with the heart their baseball romance required. Leading up to the first pitch in the 1956 season, “the slogan is only one: Osvaldo Virgil.”

Still, as they celebrated Virgil’s achievement and the progress it signaled for the nation, Dominicans remained somewhat weary about their claim on Virgil’s success and his commitment to Dominican baseball. A struggle between the Dominican and Puerto Rican Winter Leagues over the rights to Virgil’s talents in 1955 undermined some of the

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70 Luichi (de la ACD), Molinetes, La Nación, 27 de septiembre de 1956, 9. “Ello comprueba que el triunfo de un evento de la naturaleza del que se avecina y que será iniciado el próximo 24 de Octubre, sólo es posible con ídolos criollos y no con luminarias extranjeras que sólo les importa el montón de dinero que reciben por sus servicios y que en más de las veces tratan de ganárselo lo más fácilmente posible.”

71 Ibid. “La consigna es sólo una: OSVALDO VIRGIL.”

72 Among his taunts against the Escogido fan “Leoncito,” Tigrito questioned Escogido’s faith in Virgil to stand out among their imported players, warning, “Take care with Virgil. That is one very slippery fish (peje),which can only be caught with a hook with many spikes [also, very shiny objects].” Tigrito, “Palos Azules,” La Nación, 29 de septiembre de 1956, 9. “Y a propósito, Leo: Mucho cuidado con Virgil. Ese es un ‘peje’ muy resbaloso, que sólo puede ser pescado con un anzuelo de muchos kilates.” About Virgil’s hesitance to participate in the 1955 Winter League Tournament, another sportswriter said “Never has a dispute longer than the one going on even now about the slippery Virgil [. . .] Born in Montecristi and says that playing in his native land is not his preference.” Ph, “Con los Spikes en Alto; ‘Esta Noche,’” El Caribe, 23 de octubre de 1955, 6. “Nunca se vió una disputa más larga que la que aún se mantiene sobre el resbaladizo Virgil [. . .] Nace en Montecristi y dice que jugar en la tierra nativa no es su preferencia.”
excitement for the season promoted as the biggest event in Dominican baseball history.

Ignoring a ruling by the Commissioner of US Baseball, Virgil had stayed in Puerto Rico well into the 1955–1956 winter season, where he received a salary from the Puerto Rican League’s Indians of Mayagüez despite being ineligible to play. Virgil had good reason. He feared conscription into the Dominican military because service was required of all citizens, and he knew of Trujillo’s tendency to hold grudges and make sons pay for the sins of their anti-Trujillo fathers. Eventually, baseball officials and others convinced Virgil of the safety provided by baseball and he returned to the Dominican Republic in time to help Escogido secure a national championship. But the damage to his reputation was done. Even as they celebrated his achievements in the United States as Dominican achievements, some sportswriters questioned Virgil’s loyalty to their nation.

Questions over Virgil’s citizenship and national identity resounded between the lines of the press coverage of the struggle between the Dominican and Puerto Leagues for Virgil’s talents. For Dominicans who had spent 25 years under the Trujillo Regime,

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73 The question seemed to be whether the US team’s rights of exclusivity over their players outweighed the Mayagüez team’s reserve rights among the Caribbean Confederation teams. The New York Giants organization had ordered Virgil to play with the Dominican League, so he was not allowed to play with the Indians of Mayagüez. The owner of Mayagüez, Alfonso Váldez, allegedly paid Virgil $5,500 to stay in Puerto Rico, in part to protect Virgil from what they feared might happen to him in the Dominican Republic. See, “El Dueño de Mayagüez da $5,500 al Antesalista Virgil Para que no Juegue Pelota; Escogido Espera Reconsidere Paso,” El Caribe, 29 de octubre de 1955, 12.

74 “El Primero Big Leaguer Dominicano Retornará Hoy al País; Preparan Recibimiento al Espectacular Osvaldo Virgil,” La Nación, 10 de octubre de 1956, 8. “En verdad que el muchacho se lo merece [a special reception] por su triunfo rotundo en el Norte, triunfo de un dominicano, que pone muy en alto el nombre del país.” Even though Dominican sports fans organized a special reception for Virgil in early October 1956, in late September the sting of his delay the previous year remained, leaving others to call him “slippery” and doubt his commitment to playing in the nation.
Rafael Trujillo embodied the nation. Could a man who had intentionally severed himself from the body politic of Trujillo be considered Dominican? With baseball, he could. Even before Virgil took the field for the Giants, baseball confirmed his Dominicanness. Dominican sports pages performed their due diligence in investigating his nationality, pointing out in early September 1955, before the struggle with the Puerto Rican League began, that Virgil was indeed “a Dominican ballplayer” (un pelotero dominicano). Virgil never questioned his Dominican identity and, like his compatriots, saw his rise to the Big Leagues as a success for the entire nation. As he told El Caribe’s sports editor Cuchito Alvarez after his Big League debut, “‘in that moment [playing for the Giants], I was the happiest man in the world because I knew that I was the first professional Dominican player to make it to the Major Leagues.’” Just as Dominicans saw themselves arrive to the Big Leagues with Virgil, Virgil saw his personal achievement as one for the nation.

The implicit but very public questioning over Virgil’s nationality served a variety of functions and, ultimately, helped to undermine Trujillo’s position as the head of

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76 “Ofrecen Datos de Antesalista Dominicano Virgil; Y su Abuela en C. Trujillo Tiene Muchos Tíos, Primos,” El Caribe, 2 de septiembre de 1955, 7. The article provided no explicit context of a debate over Virgil’s nationality, but made a case for his Dominicanness from the beginning, noting in the first sentence that he was born and raised in Montecristi. The article relied on testimony from Virgil’s maternal relatives who resided near the capital of Ciudad Trujillo and noted only that Virgil played in the Puerto Rican league as a native. The article did not mention the nationality of Virgil’s father, Enrique Henry Virgil, who was Puerto Rican.

77 Cuchito Alvarez, “Habla Osvaldo Virgil: ‘Me Sentía Muy Confidado y Orgulloso De Ser el Primer Jugador Dominicano En Poder Jugar en las Grandes Ligas’; Robo de su Carro lo Hizo Llegar Tarde a los Gigantes,” La Nación, 14 de octubre de 1956, 10. “En ningún momento me sentí nervioso cuando debuté con los Gigantes de Nueva York en ese momento fui el hombre más feliz del mundo, pues sabía que era el primer jugador dominicano de beisbol profesional en llegar a las Ligas Mayores.”
national progress. On the one hand, the questions had a rhetorical, baseball purpose in affirming Virgil’s Dominicanness: they claimed his playing rights for the Dominican Winter League. Yet, the publicity surrounding the affirmation of Virgil’s Dominicanness hinted at political significance as well. Virgil’s reservations against joining Escogido in 1955 lay in his fear of reprisals from the Regime and being conscripted into the military. Although Dominican sportswriters dismissed his concerns as “false propaganda” spread by Mayagüez owner Alfredo Váldez, airing Virgil’s fears forced the hand of the Regime. Publicity protected Virgil from any repercussions he might suffer from the Trujillo Regime as a result of his father’s exile. That the press contained no mention of the elder Virgil’s actions or feelings against Trujillo added another layer of protection: Trujillo was free to ignore Virgil’s return as the comings and goings of another ballplayer while Virgil was free from any obligations to pledge loyalty to the dictator.

For many Dominicans, just the presence of Virgil, an exile returned, represented a strike against Trujillo. Given Trujillo’s tight control over the number of passports and visas granted to Dominicans—allowing only the very rich to travel abroad without extraordinary effort—most Dominicans likely knew that Virgil’s eight-year absence from the country was politically motivated. Virgil earned his compatriots’ respect and recognition “with his definitive triumph in the North, the triumph of a Dominican, one


79 On the restriction of movement in the Dominican Republic during the Trujillo Era, see Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof, A Tale of Two Cities: Santo Domingo and New York after 1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), especially the first two chapters “From the Burro to the Subway” and “Progreso Cannot Be Stopped.”
that raises the name of the country very high” *(que pone muy en alto el nombre del país)*, and he had done it without Trujillo. In affirming Virgil’s Dominicanness and celebrating him as a national hero, Dominicans acknowledged the possibility of a Dominican Republic divorced from Trujillo. Ballplayers would come to embody this new version of nation, but Dominicans would first have to secure baseball from Trujillo’s grasp.

**Raising the Flag in the United States, Selling Trujillo’s Democracy at Home**

While Dominicans celebrated Virgil’s accomplishments as their own, the ambiguity surrounding his national identity and his poor fit as a representative of the benefits of Trujillo’s modernization plan left members of the sporting press wanting a crop of unquestionably Dominican Big Leaguers. Felipe Rojas Alou’s promotion to the San Francisco Giants on June 8, 1958, and the Big League debuts of five Dominicans in 1960—Julián Javier, Rudy Hernández, Juan Marichal, Guayubín Olivo, and Mateo Rojas Alou—filled the need and turned the narrative of Dominican progress in baseball again to Trujillo. The Big-League status of Felipe Rojas Alou rehabilitated Virgil as a representative of the Dominican nation under Trujillo. When Virgil returned to the Big Leagues in June 1958, this time as an integration pioneer for the Detroit Tigers, any questions over his Dominicanness had been erased. The jump in Dominican Big

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80 “El Primero Big Leaguer Dominicano Retornará Hoy al País; Preparan Recibimiento al Espectacular Osvaldo Virgil,” *La Nación*, 10 de octubre de 1956, 8. “Se está organizando un recibimiento especial para el espectacular jugador dominicano, y en verdad que el muchacho se lo merece, por su triunfo rotundo en el Norte, triunfo de un dominicano, que pone muy en alto el nombre del país”

Leaguers could not have come at a better time for Trujillo. With his international reputation diminished amid a movement to free the American continent from dictatorships, Trujillo used Dominican ballplayers in the United States and at home to promote himself as the legitimate protector of the Pan-American ideals of democracy and non-intervention. As material conditions in the Dominican Republic worsened after the OAS sanctions, Trujillo worked desperately to convince Dominicans who had lost their jobs of his democratic credentials. Ballplayers served as examples of Trujillo’s success in raising the Dominican people and of his democratic ideals.

When Felipe Rojas Alou joined Virgil in the Big Leagues in 1958, Dominicans had no need to assert his Dominican identity. Rojas Alou, as he is known in the Dominican Republic, had signed with the Dominican bird-dog scout Horacio Martínez in 1955, after helping the Dominican Selection win gold at the Pan-American Games in Mexico City. He confirmed Dominican progress in playing as well as scouting, with one sportswriter noting that Alou was “the first Dominican player, discovered by a Dominican” to make it to the Big Leagues. Thus, when Rojas Alou rose to the Giants, by then located in San Francisco, Dominicans pictured his success in nationalist symbols around the nation’s second-favorite sport, and one enjoyed also by the dictator: horse-racing. (Figure 2.2) Two horses relaxed after a hard race and one turned to the other:

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Martínez played on Pómez’s Negro League team, the New York Cubans, in the 1940s. For more on these connections, see Adrian Burgos, Jr., Playing America’s Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), especially “Making Cuban Stars,” 111–140.

Cuchito Alvarez, “El Hombre Más Feliz del Mundo,” El Caribe, 9 de junio de 1958, 16. Alvarez argued that Horacio Martínez, who signed Alou and had played in the United States for Alex Pómez’s Cubans, was one of the happiest guys on earth because Felipe Alou was called up by the Giants, “convirtiéndose en el primer jugador dominicano, descubierto por un dominicano, en llegar a las Grandes Ligas.”
“There’s nothing better than throwing back a morsel of fresh herbs after winning a race.”84 The other confirmed his greater nationalism with his reply: “No, man. What’s better is receiving big news, like that about Rojas Alou, who was promoted to the Giants!”85

Dominicans faced no tensions in celebrating Alou’s rise to the Big Leagues because Alou had developed his skills through the national sporting system developed under Trujillo. In contrast to Virgil, who developed his baseball skills playing high school baseball in the United States, Alou came through the Trujillo system and was undoubtedly committed to Dominican baseball. He played in amateur leagues around his hometown of Haina, starred on the University of Santo Domingo team when he entered

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84 Octavio, El Caribe, 9 de junio de 1958, 14. “¡No hay cosa más rica que después de uno ganar una carrera ‘meterse’ un rico majar de yervas frescas!”

85 Ibid. “No, Macho; Mejor es recibir una gran noticia, como la de Rojas Alou, que fue subido a los Gigantes!”

86 Octavio, El Caribe, 9 de junio de 1958, 14.
college, and represented his country in the Central American and Caribbean Games in 1954 (in track and field) and again in the 1955 Pan-American Games in baseball. Sportswriters and other Dominicans easily attributed Alou’s success to Trujillo. His ascent to the Big Leagues was “a new milestone of the improvement of sport in this Era of Trujillo.”87 All Dominicans could celebrate Rojas Alou’s achievements as an example of the “men of healthy mind and body” that the country produced. This man of humble beginnings, who was forced to sacrifice his parents’ dream that he become a doctor because his family needed the money provided by a professional baseball contract, rose because Trujillo had provided him the structure on which to build a career. Men like Alou brought renown and luster around “the nation aggrandized by the Generalísimo Trujillo.”88 Alou did his part by serving as an example of Dominican greatness abroad, but he owed that ability to the nation’s progress under Trujillo.

Rojas Alou’s rise also facilitated the rehabilitation of Ozzie Virgil as a true Dominican and placed his success at the service of Trujillo. His three championships with Escogido in 1955–1956, 1956–1957, and 1957–1958 certainly helped boost his nationalist credentials, but when Virgil returned to the Big Leagues in 1958, sportswriters again confirmed his Dominicansness. Sportswriters stressed Virgil’s humble beginnings

87 Rafael Martorell, “El Deporte al Día,” El Caribe, 10 de junio de 1958, 19. Rojas Alou was “Un nuevo jalón de superación deportiva en esta Era de Trujillo.”

88 Ibid. “Para todos esos deportistas que sólo anhelan que el país produzca hombres de mente y cuerpo sanos. Atletas de prestigio internacional que contribuyan con su actuación sobresaliente a darle más brillo y renombre en las lides deportivas a la patria engrandecida por el Generalísimo Trujillo.”
and national and Christian morals.\textsuperscript{89} Calling Virgil a “noble representative of Dominican value in the Big Leagues,” one sportswriter stressed his fortitude in succeeding despite being undervalued by managers in the Giants organization.\textsuperscript{90} Like a good Dominican, Virgil’s strong religious faith helped him persevere through these challenges as he prayed to God and the Virgin of Altagracia, the national saint, to guide his pursuit of glory. With his moral character, Virgil proved himself a worthy representative of the Dominican nation despite his mixed identity and ties to the United States and Puerto Rico. With Virgil’s return to the Big Leagues and Rojas Alou’s debut, the two made up a “pair worthy of representing Dominican baseball in the Big Leagues. They constitute two great examples for the youth being raised in the Glorious Era [the Era of Trujillo] in which the country lives.”\textsuperscript{91} With the rehabilitation of his Dominicansness, sportswriters transformed Virgil from a representative of Dominican potential without Trujillo to an example for youth raised in the Trujillo Era.

The return of the narrative of baseball progress to the service of the Regime brought by Dominican Big Leaguers could not have come soon enough for the Trujillo

\textsuperscript{89} Salvador Bernardino, “Baseportivas: Osvaldo Virgil, digno representante del valor dominicano en las Grandes Ligas,” \textit{El Caribe}, 16 de junio de 1958, 19. The article began with a general statement that glory often comes at a cost for those with humble beginnings before elaborating on the Virgil’s story as the first Dominican Big Leager. Bernardino described Virgil’s ups and downs in the Giants organizations before his trade to Detroit and concluded with an assertion that Virgil could serve as an example for all Dominican players because of his high class and elevated morals: “\textit{Osvaldo acaba de demostrar su alta clase como pelotero y su elevado valor moral. [ . . .] Que la voluntad férrea del criollo Osvaldo Virgil, sierva de ejemplo a los jugadores dominicanos que pasen por similar vía-crucis.}”

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid. “\textit{Osvaldo Virgil, digno representante del valor dominicano en las Grandes Ligas}.”

\textsuperscript{91} Martorell, 10 de junio de 1958, 19. “\textit{Virgil con los Tigres de Detroit, en la Liga Americana, y Rojas Alou con los gigantes de San Francisco, en la Liga Nacional, integran un digno binomio representativo del beisbol dominicano en las Grandes Ligas. Constituyen dos grandes ejemplos para esa juventud que se levanta en esta Era Gloriosa en que vive el país}.”
Regime. The rise of Fidel Castro after the revolution against Fulgencio Batista added another outspoken rival to the hemisphere’s conversations about Trujillo. Castro had participated in the Caribbean Legion’s efforts to oust Trujillo in 1949 and since, and as early as June 1959 supported Dominican efforts against the dictator. Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt, against whom Trujillo regularly sparred in the press, continued to antagonize the Dominican dictator. Betancourt’s outspokenness against dictatorships of the left as well as right had earned him the ear of the US political establishment. With Betancourt replacing him as the continent’s number-one anticommunist because of beliefs that dictatorships of the right fomented communist revolution, Trujillo saw his relationship with the United States deteriorating. By the time Julián Javier, Rudy Hernández, and Juan Marichal made their Big League debuts in the first half of the 1960 US baseball season, the implications of Betancourt’s influence over US policy in Latin America were clear. The United States voted with eighteen other OAS countries—the representatives from Venezuela and the Dominican Republic abstained—to consider sanctions against the Dominican Republic for Trujillo’s attempt to assassinate the Venezuelan leader. Trujillo desperately needed a bridge with the United States.

Julián Javier provided an early go-between for the Trujillo Regime, serving as an example of the success promoted by the Regime’s sports policies. His Big League debut on May 28 gave Dominicans an extra reason to be thankful for the sporting program as they celebrated the Day of Sports on June 5, 1960. Javier’s quick hands and base-running impressed fans in St Louis from the beginning and gave resonance to claims in La Nación that “Sport is a physical exercise and a moral practice that contributes to the
perfection of man, both individually and collectively, and that constitutes a powerful force of cohesion and solidarity that reaches beyond territorial limits.” 92 Javier’s distinction as the first Dominican regular, or starter, on a Big League roster demonstrated the unifying power of sports to Dominicans everywhere, reminding them of the political benefits of their compatriots’ successes in “raising the flag high” on US baseball fields. 93 This belief persisted even as pro-Trujillo and anti-Betancourt rhetoric in the press signaled the country’s declining position in the hemisphere. Along with a recent project to integrate sports into public school activities, the participation of Dominican athletes abroad, and especially in US baseball leagues, signaled the nation’s sporting progress. 94 As more of their countrymen gained Big League status, Dominicans felt buffered from the international political context. With sport, Dominicans believed, “we have already ensured our future.” 95

Naturally, Dominicans owed their sporting progress and this feeling of assurance to the peace of the Trujillo Era and the opportunities provided by the “altruistic plans of

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92 Editorial, “Progreso Deportivo,” La Nación, 4 de junio de 1960, 6. “El deporte es un ejercicio físico y una práctica moral que contribuye al perfeccionamiento del hombre individual y colectivamente y que constituye una poderosa fuerza de cohesión y solidaridad que traspasa los límites territoriales, que vence todos los obstáculos y que elimina todos los prejuicios.”

93 Although Felipe Alou and Ozzie Virgil preceded Javier to the Big Leagues, Virgil was up and down between the major and minor leagues while Alou did not become a regular player until 1961. The wealth of talented outfielders on the San Francisco Giants roster, including Willie Mays, Willie Kirkland, and Orlando Cepeda, meant that Alou worked as the fourth outfielder and often subbed into the game or worked as a pinch hitter, as suggested by his 347 plate appearances in 106 games in 1960. Shifting of the roster in 1961 and 1962 with Willie Kirkland’s move to Cleveland in 1961 allowed Alou more playing time. He appeared in 154 games with 605 plate appearances in 1962, his first All-Star year.


95 Editorial, “Progreso Deportivo.” “Si en las aulas se está forjando intensamente el espíritu de las nuevas generaciones, en la arena deportiva se fortalece también intensamente el ciudadano de hoy, como garantía de que hemos asegurado ya nuestro porvenir.”
the Benefactor of the Nation and Father of the New Fatherland.”

Sports programs proved el Jefe’s democratic merits. As Betancourt gathered evidence against Trujillo, the Dominican press, controlled by Trujillo, defined the Trujillo Regime as a democracy uniquely suited to the Dominican Republic and the demands of the people there. A front-page editorial in El Caribe in 1960 defined democracy as popular will in action: “what the people want, what the people support, according to their specific interests and the

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96 “Enfoques: El Deporte Triunfante”, “Uno de los resultados fructíferos de la paz fecunda que disfruta el pueblo dominicano en la gloriosa Era de Trujillo es, precisamente, el florecimiento de los deportes en general. Al mismo tiempo que se diversifican en una proporción progresiva constante, los deportes se perfeccionan también constantemente, al calor de los oportunos estímulos y orientaciones de la Dirección General de Deportes, el organismo oficial que bajo la jurisdicción de la Secretaría de Estado de Educación y Bellas Artes canaliza las iniciativas y medidas del Gobierno dominicano en favor del deporte, siguiendo las normas altruistas del Benefactor de la Patria y Padre de la Patria Nueva, Generalísimo Doctor Rafael L. Trujillo Molina, que con tanta eficiencia interpreta el Honorable Presidente de la República, Generalísimo Héctor B Trujillo Molina.”

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experience of their history and social atmosphere.” Popular manifestations of support for Trujillo in response to the OAS sanctions, the editorial argued, confirmed that “Dominican society,” from industrialists and bankers to workers and farmers, “loves and admires the illustrious Jefe.” Even beyond providing for their national well-being, Dominicans believed that Trujillo “exercises a legitimate act of defense in this time of disintegration and disorientation that punishes humanity and especially America.”

In this climate, Dominican ballplayers in the United States served as a testament to the enduring closeness between the Dominican Republic and United States and evidence of Trujillo’s status as a democratic leader on the continent. Combined with images such as one that portrayed the Dominican Republic and the United States as protectors of democracy against communist incursions (Figure 2.3), Juan Marichal’s Big League debut with a one-hit shutout on July 19, 1960 projected an image of Dominican strength and shared values with the United States—even the day after the OAS considered sanctions. The Dominican Republic and the United States were both targets in the “Communist Strategy” implemented by Fidel Castro and Rómulo Betancourt. Betancourt’s plan to unleash missiles tattooed with the communist scythe

97 “Minutero,” El Caribe, 4 de junio de 1960, 1, 2. “La democracia es lo que el pueblo quiere, lo que el pueblo apoya, de acuerdo con sus intereses específicos, con la experiencia de su historia con las características de su medio social.”

98 Ibid. “La sociedad dominicana—industriales, banqueros, comerciantes, obreros, intelectuales, agricultores—quiere y admira al Ilustre Jefe; pero también sabe que, apoyándole sin reservas, ejerce un acto de legítima defensa en esta etapa de desintegración y desorientación que castiga a la humanidad y especialmente a América.”

and hammer toward Santo Domingo implied that his allegations against Trujillo were not only false but part of a communist plot. His assurances to a frenzied Castro, “You concentrate fire against the United States; I’ll do the same against the island of Santo Domingo,” equated the Dominican Republic and the United States. The communists targeted these countries because they were havens of democracy.

After the United States voted for sanctions against the Dominican Republic, the Dominican press worked to portray Trujillo as the only true democracy in the region. The success of Dominican players in the United States not only evidenced the benefits of Trujillo’s patronage for sports but also proved the superiority of the society he oversaw. Dominican ballplayers’ experiences with US racism provided the primary point of contrast. One sportswriter described the “savagery” (barbaridad) that Licey pitcher Julio Antonio “Toñín” Anglada and compatriot Julián Vicente suffered in south Florida. Sportswriter and official Dr. Manuel Neftalí Martínez followed, reporting that Jesús Rojas Alou and Antulio Martínez Smith, both having exceptional seasons with their

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100 Kin, “La Táctica Comunista,” *El Caribe*, el 1º de junio de 1960, 4.

101 Beyond the immediate experiences of ballplayers, the Dominican press also criticized more specifically political shortcomings in the US system. An editorial from Radio Caribe, associated with the paper, referred to the “Fantasma de la Democracia,” or “Ghost of Democracy” in the United States. The editorial suggested hypocrisy in the US affiliation with the USSR against the Nazis and Fascists during World War II while it is currently identifying with supposed Nazis and Fascists (though specifics on where these parties operate are missing) against the USSR. The editorial pointed specifically to US violations of the United Nations Charter in its treatment of Khrushchev in the USSR and Castro of Cuba, calling them “small demonstrations of the aggressive capacity of the great democracy,” and noted that the aggression turned against US citizens as well. The editorial concluded: “This is democracy. Long live dictatorship!” (“Esa es la democracia. ¡Que viva la dictadura!” Editorial de Radio Caribe, “Fantasma de la Democracia,” *La Nación*, 20 de septiembre de 1960, 6.

102 “Criollos Víctimas Problema Racial En el Sureño Estado de La Florida; Vicente Enfermo Debido a Dificultades Comidas,” *La Nación*, 6 de junio de 1960, 17.
Class-D teams, suffered similar difficulties. Along with being refused service in some restaurants or forced to sleep in unseemly conditions in undesirable parts of town because of their skin color, ballplayers complained that their managers exhibited little concern for their physical well-being. Martínez Smith explained that his manager made him play after a collision on the bases left him with stitches in his leg and injuries to his hand. Still more reports demonstrated that even US citizens suffered these abuses, and worse. Martínez Smith summed up the implications of this treatment: “‘How different all this is from my country, where no prejudices of any kind exist.’” In contrast to the social divisions in the United States, Trujillo had brought equality to the Dominican Republic as the “maximum leveler of values and of the national classes.” Even while the other American countries worked to expel the nation from the democratic brotherhood, the Dominican Republic exhibited more concern for all of its citizens than even the United States.

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103 Dr. Manuel Neftalí Martínez, “Players Dominicanos Dicen Ser Víctimas de Perjuicio Racial en los Estados Unidos; Por Ser Negros: Rojas Alou y Antulio Martínez Tienen que Jugar Aún Heridos; Ahora Ausencia Discrimen En República Dominicana,” La Nación, 23 de junio de 1960, 1, 24. The first part of the title headlined the day’s edition of the paper and directed readers to the Sports Section for details.

104 “Escándalo Por Discriminación Racial En Dogout Indios de Cleveland; Lanzador Grant Dice Tierra De EUA No es Libre para El,” La Nación, 29 de septiembre de 1960, 15. Reprinted from The Sporting News, September 28, 1960. The article reported that Cleveland pitcher Jim Grant was suspended for leaving the bullpen during a game, despite the fact that he did so in response to a racial insult uttered by pitching coach Ted Wilks.

105 Martínez, 23 de junio de 1960, 24. “‘Que diferente es todo esto aquí a nuestro país, donde no existen prejuicios de ninguna especie.’

106 A. Domínguez de la Rosa, “Obreros de DN Repudian Discriminación de los EEUU contra los Atletas Criollos; Destacan Igualdad Imperante en RD,” La Nación, 26 de junio de 1960, 14. The article explained that speakers in the meeting denounced the United States and then honored the “nombre esclarecido” of Trujillo, “máximo nivelador de los valores y de las clases nacionales.”
While Trujillo’s ability to project his own meanings onto Dominican ballplayers after Felipe Alou’s rise to the Big Leagues Dominicans undermined Dominicans’ claims on the national pastime and its heroes, his dependence on ballplayers for his national and international reputation as a democratic leader provided an extra push toward ballplayers’ replacing of Trujillo as symbols of Dominican potential and progress. The 1960–1961 Winter League Tournament revealed the dangers of Trujillo’s political incursions into baseball. When political and material circumstances brought by the sanctions undermined the quality of baseball in Dominican parks, Dominicans wrested the national pastime and the symbols associated with it from the dictator’s control.

**Freeing Baseball: The 1960–1961 Winter League Tournament**

The 1960–1961 Winter League Tournament served as a barometer of Trujillo’s standing in the international community and in the Dominican Republic itself. Preparations for the Tournament projected normality as the teams and sportswriters engaged in the customary debates over the maximum number of foreign players allowed for each team. When the League announced in June that each team could recruit as many as nine foreign players and field as few as two Dominicans at any one time, sportswriters judged the decision as unfortunate for the young Dominican professionals who hoped to hone their skills in the winter but necessary to meet Dominican fans’ expectations for competitive balance and talent on the field. With the sanctions, everything changed. The League announced that the teams would organize the Winter Tournament using only Dominican players and umpires, portraying the action as an expression of the teams’ solidarity with Trujillo and the nationalist policies needed during this time of national
crisis. Although the League downplayed the financial constraints caused by the sanctions, Dominicans understood that their worsening material conditions resulted from Trujillo’s negative reputation in the American community of nations. If they had failed to connect the underemployment, decreased foreign investment, and higher costs for manufactured goods to Trujillo’s actions against Betancourt, Dominicans saw how the sanctions threatened the national baseball tournament.

After the League’s decision in early September to field only Dominican players, sportswriters and fans continued to debate the appropriate number of imported players. Their continued engagement was exceptional. Generally, the baseball-viewing public accepted the League’s decisions as final and would evaluate their merits in the days immediately after their announcements but ultimately defer to the officials. Estranged from the inter-American community, baseball fans and sportswriters saw debates over imported players and the 1960–1961 Tournament as an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with the Trujillo Regime. For some, the material hardships brought by the sanctions awakened this dissatisfaction. For others, the question of reinforcements mingled with larger problems with the Trujillo Regime. The Regime’s economic policies, which favored large foreign and domestic industrialists over working Dominicans, served as one target of the criticisms. Trujillo’s personalist dictatorship served as another. Leading up to and during the 1960–1961 Tournament, Dominicans and the Regime negotiated the significance and ownership of baseball in the nation. These negotiations, and their successes in achieving their ends, later encouraged Dominicans to claim ownership of their political system as well as their national game.
The Dominican Winter League framed the 1960–1961 Winter Tournament as an attempt to provide the “genuinely Dominican professional baseball” that sportswriters had hoped for since the return of professional baseball. The announcements to the public and to President Joaquín Balaguer emphasized the League’s solidarity with the “nationalist policies implemented by the Benefactor of the Nation and Father of the New Fatherland,” and called on fans to support the tournament as an expression of their own nationalism. The all-Dominican tournament would offer the nation’s next generation of professional ballplayers opportunities by opening for them positions that had gone to more experienced US players in previous seasons. Rather than asking Dominicans to sacrifice their expectations to see some of the best local and US talent on Dominican fields, the Dominican Winter League asked fans to express their support for their countrymen who aspired to baseball stardom. League Secretary Dr. Aristides Alvarez

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107 Ramón Alberto Ferreras, “Al Margen del Deporte,” El Caribe, 11 de junio de 1958, 13. Ferreras defended the suggestion by Escogido President Francisco Martínez Alba, also father-in-law to the dictator, that the League allow only 6 reinforcements per team for the 1958–1959 tournament as nationalist, saying that Dominican fans saw the proposal as “un nuevo y acertado paso de avance hacia la conquista del logró [sic] de un beisbol profesional netamente dominicano.”

108 “El Campeonato ‘16 de Mayo’ Será con Peloteros Criollos: Liga Dominicana se Solidariza Con la Política Nacionaliza,” La Nación, 9 de septiembre de 1960, 15. “La decisión fue tomada como una medida de solidaridad con la política nacionalista implantada por el Benefactor de la Patria y Padre de la Patria Nueva, Generalísimo Doctor Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, Máximo Protector de los Deportes Nacionales.” Also, see MEMORANDUM, 9 de septiembre de 1960, Secretario Dr. Aristides Alvarez Sánchez y Presidente Hipólito Herrera Billini, Liga Dominicana de Base Ball Profesional, Incorporada, al Señor Secretario de Estado de la Presidencia, SEDEFIR 16518. The League wrote the MEMORANDUM to accompany a letter received from National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues President George Trautman, which officials apparently believed required a nationalist reaction. The MEMORANDUM said they were sending the letter for the administration’s information and “con información de que este organismo resolvió en reunión celebrada ayer tarde, jugar el próximo Campeonato a base de peloteros y árbitros criollos, como una forma de solidarizarse con la política nacionalista del momento y que encarna Su Excelencia el Generalísimo Dr. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina [. . .] frente a la injusta condenación de Organización de los Estados Americanos, como resultado de una errada e intervencionista política internacional encabezada por el Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos de Norte América.”
Sánchez predicted that the Tournament would “crumble the complex that believes that if that native player is not already ripe to play, he cannot act in our professional baseball.”

Young players just needed the chance, and the League’s decision would break sports fans’ dependence on US players. “‘With the stimulus of the public and the propaganda by those who are called to do it (sportswriters),’” Alvarez Sánchez argued, “‘the hoped-for reduction of reinforcements is closer than ever.’”

Alvarez Sánchez’s points did little to quiet opposition to the League’s decision. Weeks after the announcement that the League would allow only native players, sportswriters suggested that the Dominican professional teams look to leagues in Mexico, Colombia, and Japan to fill out their rosters. They even suggested that Cuban professionals, many of whom stayed in the United States because of US Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick’s prohibition against US players traveling to Cuba, might reinforce Dominican teams. No matter Alvarez Sánchez’s assurances, or their own

José A. González, “Doctor Alvarez Sánchez Dice Son Atinadas Las Declaraciones de los Cronistas Deportivos; No se Está en Condiciones De Prescindir de Importados,” La Nación, 17 de septiembre de 1960, 15. “Terminó diciendo el doctor Alvarez Sánchez que ‘la oportunidad que se le va a dar este año al criollo, con el estímulo del público y la propaganda de los que están llamados a hacerla, la esperada reducción de refuerzos está más cerca que nunca, pues se romperá en mucho el complejo de que el jugador nativo si no está ya bien maduro, no puede actuar en nuestra pelota profesional.’

“Cronistas Deportivos Opinan Que 5 Importados Son Buenos; Hernández Llaverías Dice Pueden Venir de Otras Partes,” La Nación, 21 de septiembre de 1960, 16.

Ibid. “También pueden actuar en nuestro premio invernal los players cubanos que esta temporada no actuaran en su país.”
nationalist aspirations, sportswriters agreed that “we still lack sufficient ballplayers to form four good teams.”

Explanations for this lack of ballplayers centered on a lack of preparation in the League given the numbers of imported players in previous years. Sportswriters were up in arms against the natives-only tournament not because they wanted to see US players replace Dominicans but because they believed that the heavy reliance on imported players in the past had hindered the development of Dominican players, especially in pitching and other key defensive positions. One sportswriter explained, “If a system of gradual reduction of imported players had been adopted since the 1955 season, when we integrated with US Organized Baseball, the policy adopted by the Dominican Professional Baseball League this year would not have produced the confusion noted among national fans, and more still among the directors of our teams.” Neither fans nor team directors could judge the merits of young Dominican professionals whom imported players had kept benched in previous years. The League’s nationalist hiring practices were not bad; they had simply come too late. The decision in June to allow teams to import up to nine players revealed that even League officials were aware of this

112 Broadcaster Billy Berroa en “Cronistas Dicen Importación Players Debe Hacerse Este Año; Expresan Importados Deben Limitarse a Cinco por Team,” La Nación, 16 de septiembre de 1960, 18. “Por su parte, Billy Berroa, narrador y comentarista de Radio Caribe, se mostró de acuerdo en que los refuerzos sean reducidos a cinco, como mínimo, pero ‘que el campeonato no se haga a base de criollos porque todavía no tenemos peloteros suficientes para formar cuatro buenos equipos.’”

113 Fidencio Garris en “Cronistas Dicen Importación Players Debe Hacerse Este Año; Expresan Importados Deben Limitarse a Cinco por Team,” La Nación, 16 de septiembre de 1960, 18. “Si se hubiera adoptado el sistema de la reducción gradual de importados desde el año 1955, cuando ingresamos en el beisbol organizado la medida adoptada por la Liga Dominicana de Beisbol Profesional en este año no hubiera producido la confusión que se advierte en la fanaticada nacional, y más todavía entre los dirigentes de nuestros equipos.”
fact, to which sportswriters had resigned as “the best that can be done [. . .] until, within four or five years more, some native ballplayers come forth with the capacity to occupy some of the reinforced positions.”

The unequal distribution of Dominican talent among the four teams exacerbated the problem of a general lack of players ready to perform to the expectations of Dominican baseball fans. In fact, sportswriters emphasized a lack of competitive balance among the teams rather than a lack of Dominican talent as the primary deterrent to a natives-only tournament. Escogido boasted four of the seven Dominicans on Big League rosters as well as a majority of the 30 ballplayers who played in the United States, including top prospects such as Manuel Mota. The Aguilas had two Big Leaguers while Licey, Escogido’s “eternal rival,” had only one. Often the basement dweller, the Estrellas lacked Big Leaguers all together. Fans and sportswriters charged the League with ensuring competitive balance as the most important value in the national baseball tournament. Advocating for fans, long-time sportswriter Fidencio Garris explained that “‘What gives brilliance and enthusiasm to our tournaments and what can maintain that enthusiasm in the fans is the balance of the clubs.’” Teams relied on imported players to maintain that enthusiasm because “some [teams] have done more than others to form

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114 Salvador Bernardino L, “Basedeportivas; Facetas del Deporte,” El Caribe, 3 de junio de 1960, 17. Even given the costs of imported players and their assumed lack of commitment, “Lo mejor que se puede hacer, y no es lo más conveniente, es aceptar la inevitable solución de los nueve refuerzos, hasta que, dentro de cuatro o cinco años más, surjan algunos peloteros nativos con capacidad para ocupar algunas posiciones de refuerzos.”

115 Ozzie Virgil, Felipe Rojas Alou, Juan Marichal, and Mateo Rojas Alou all belonged to Escogido while Rudy Hernández and Julián Javier played with the Aguilas and Guayubín Olivo played for Licey. Virgil and Hernández decided soon after the US season that they would not return to the Dominican Republic, but their absence did little to mitigate the problem of Escogido’s glut of talent compared to the other teams. In fact, Escogido won all but one of the national championships organized by the League during the Trujillo Era.
players or have had better luck in getting valuable players that have already proved their quality within and outside of the country.”

Dominican fans demanded balanced teams. Given Escogido’s “better luck,” only imported players could provide that balance.

Under sportswriters’ rationale for reinforcements lay criticisms of the League’s earlier “complex” that foreign players were better than native ones and widespread discontent with the Regime’s apparent preference for foreign capital. Since the 1940s, the Trujillo Regime had incentivized import-substitution industrialization to benefit a business class centered near Ciudad Trujillo. Industrialists developed contracts directly with the Trujillo Government to secure tax exonerations on imported machinery and materials, tax holidays on profits, and protections from domestic and foreign competitors. The Dominican State essentially subsidized companies that hoped to profit by manufacturing goods such as cement, chocolate, and soap for everyday, domestic use.

Trujillo himself was the primary beneficiary of these policies, but he also included foreign partners and Dominican industrialists who pledged political support. But just as the Winter League’s abundance of US players slowed the development of young Dominican prospects, the drive for industrialization displaced Dominican businesses and,

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116 “Cronistas Dicen Importación Players Debe Hacerse Este Año: Expresan Importados Deben Limitarse a Cinco por Team,” La Nación, 16 de septiembre de 1960, 18. “Lo que dá [sic] brillantez y entusiasmo a nuestros torneos y lo que puede mantener el entusiasmo en la afición es el equilibrio de los clubes. Pero como unos más que otros se han preocupado más por hacer jugadores o han tenido mejor suerte para conseguir valores que han sentado su calidad dentro y fuera del país.”


118 Moya 86–94.
with the expanding sugar industry, Dominican farmers in particular. Given the nationalistic claims behind the natives-only tournaments and the restraints on free expression because of the dictator’s secret police, criticisms about imported players provided a convenient proxy for complaints about the national industrial policies.

Sportswriters’ resignation about Escogido’s great advantages in native talent reflected another complaint against the Trujillo Regime: personalism. Becoming an entrepreneur in the Dominican Republic depended on the whim of the dictator himself. The one-on-one, ad-hoc development of industrial contracts reflected this personalism, which also invaded professional baseball. Although sportswriters referred to the “luck” some teams had in securing players, the interest that the dictator’s son Ramfís had in Escogido raised suspicions about the team’s uncanny ability to sign the best Dominican talent. Juan Marichal and Manuel Mota had both signed with Escogido after playing with the Dominican Air Force team, Aviación, which was run by Ramfís, the nation’s highest ranking general after his father. In another suspicious maneuver, Escogido barely earned the rights to Felipe Rojas Alou, who signed with Horacio Martínez just after the scout had

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119 As Richard Lee Turits explained, Trujillo supported farmers early in his Regime to earn their support by helping them to gain legal titles to their land. By 1955, however, Trujillo’s own business aspirations overwhelmed his earlier populist efforts and he began to displace the same farmers he had helped acquire land to build his sugar plantations. See, Richard Lee Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
been fired by Licey. Although few suspected that the dictator or his family interfered with games, few doubted that they influenced the distribution of Dominican talent. Sportswriters conveyed their concerns about Escogido’s advantages in native players as matter-of-fact, but all baseball fans saw the influence of the nation’s first family. By using Escogido’s advantage as part of their rationale against the natives-only tournament, sportswriters and fans told the Trujillo Regime that it could not have it both ways. Dominicans would not allow the Regime to use “nationalism” to secure another ill-gotten victory for Escogido.

Despite the long debates between League officials, sportswriters, and fans, the inauguration for the 1960–1961 Winter League Tournament followed the usual script, with some extra hammering for the League’s nationalism in hiring only native players, umpires, and scorers. Twelve thousand fans flocked to the Estadio Trujillo to witness the opening ceremonies. After Dominican President Joaquín Balaguer “threw” the symbolic

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120 Cuchito Alvarez, “El Hombre Más Feliz del Mundo,” El Caribe, 9 de junio de 1958, 16. Alvarez called Horacio Martínez “the happiest man in the world” after the Giants promoted Felipe Rojas Alou and noted that Licey claimed that Rojas Alou signed with them. Without denying that Rojas Alou signed with Licey, Alvarez defended Alou’s joining Escogido, noting that “The truth of the matter is that the firing of Martínez from Licey was what cost that club the services of Rojas Alou and of other criollo players.” The dismissal seems odd given Martínez’s connections with some of the top native talent as a manager and coach for the amateur team representing the University of Santo Domingo and the connections he had formed during his playing time in the United States. “Lo cierto del caso es, que el despido de Martínez del Licey fue lo que costó a ese club los servicios de Rojas Alou y de otros players criollos.”

121 Luichy Sánchez, Tertulia sobre la expansión del beisbol profesional otoño-invernal, en la ocasión de la clausura de la exposición, ¡Nos vemos en el play! Beisbol y Cultura en la República Dominicana, Centro León, Santiago, República Dominicana, 11 de mayo de 2008, Video Recording. In response to a question from the audience about whether Rafael Trujillo ever interfered directly in professional baseball, Mr. Sánchez, who has been a regular in the offices of the Águilas Cibaeñas since childhood, when his father helped administer the team, responded that the dictator and his family did not interfere with on-field play—with the notable exception of Petán Trujillo slapping Andre Rodgers of Escogido after a fight with Licey—but did influence the behind-the-scenes efforts to sign players. Mr. Sánchez is too young to remember the Trujillo Era, but he has studied baseball throughout his life and has certainly spoken with many who experienced the Trujillo Era first-hand.
first pitch, handing the ball from his seat in the Presidential Box to Escogido catcher
Rene Marté, League President Hipólito Herrera Billini spoke to the crowd, cheering the
“illustrious Benefactor of the Fatherland” for making the tournament possible not only
with his recommendation for a Government gift of $100,000 but also his wise leadership
in creating the sporting policies that helped over 100 Dominican ballplayers develop into
professionals.122 Referring to the rosters filled with only native players, Herrera Billini
defended the decision to baseball fans: “We did it persuaded that this is the conduct
required, in the current circumstances, by the dignity, patriotism, and loyalty to the
politics and the person of our distinguished leader, the Generalísimo Trujillo.”123 The
League had answered political and financial necessity with what many deemed an
appropriate, nationalist response in defense of Trujillo.

For Dominican baseball fans, it seemed that Trujillo had finally usurped baseball.
Since the incorporation of the Dominican Professional Baseball League and affiliation
with US Baseball in 1955, Dominican baseball fans tolerated the dictator’s forays into the
national pastime. Trujillo took credit for the establishment of the League, affiliation with
Organized Baseball, construction of the Estadio Trujillo, and success of Dominican Big
Leaguers. Even as some struggled to feed their families or to buy shoes to send their
children to school, Dominicans accepted the Regime’s interpretation that baseball was

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122 Félix Acosta Núñez, “Rivas Poncha Doce y Gana Partido Inaugural Ante 12,000 Fanáticos;
Presidente de la República Hace Lanzamiento Honor,” La Nación, 23 de octubre de 1960, 49. Balaguer
replaced Héctor Trujillo as President in August 1960.

123 Ibid. “Si resolvimos prescindir este año de los servicios [sic] de los extranjeros, lo hicimos
persuadidos de que este es el proceder que exigía, en las actuales circunstancias, la dignidad, el
patriotismo y la lealtad a la política y a la persona de nuestro insigne líder, el Generalísimo
Trujillo.”
one of the advances of the Trujillo Era. They did so with the expectation that baseball’s relationship with the Regime be symbiotic. So long as the Regime supported the Winter League financially and provided modern stadiums, fans could tolerate homages to Trujillo in the opening ceremonies, the title “Maximum Protector of National Sports,” and stadiums and tournaments named in honor of the dictator and his family.

The natives-only tournament upset this symbiosis: politics threatened baseball as Dominicans had grown accustomed to enjoying it. As Winter League officials explained their decision to forego US players as a point of solidarity with the dictator against an “erred and interventionist international policy headed by the Department of State of the United States of North America,” baseball fans realized that showing their nationalism and support for the dictator required them to sacrifice the quality of their national tournament. The narrative of Trujillo as nation and the wellspring of national progress and pride crashed against Dominicans’ identification with their deporte rey and the Big Leaguers that had brought them such pride.

124 Editorial, “El Campeonato 16 de Mayo,” La Nación, 22 de octubre de 1960, 6. After a statement that the “brilliant surge” in Dominican baseball to the protection the sport had received from the “distinguished Benefactor of the Nation,” the editorial explained that sport has been part of Trujillo’s “policies for national progress.” “Y es obvio que ese brillante surgimiento del pelotero dominicano se debe, principalmente, a la protección que ha recibido, año tras año, del ilustre Benefactor de la Patria. / En efecto Trujillo ha desarrollado una política de progreso nacional en lo que no ha quedado sin el estímulo necesario ninguna de las manifestación del espíritu.”

125 MEMORANDUM, 9 de septiembre de 1960, Secretario Dr. Aristides Alvarez Sánchez y Presidente Hipólito Herrera Billini, Liga Dominicana de Base Ball Profesional, Incorporada, al Señor Secretario de Estado de la Presidencia, SEDEFIR 16518. The League wrote the MEMORANDUM to accompany a letter received from National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues President George Trautman, which officials apparently believed required a nationalist reaction. The MEMORANDUM said they were sending the letter for the administration’s information and “con información de que este organismo resolvió en reunión celebrada ayer tarde, jugar el próximo Campeonato a base de peloteros y árbitros criollos, como una forma de solidarizarse con la política nacionalista del momento y que encarna Su Excelencia el Generalísimo Dr. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina [. . .] frente a la injusta condenación de Organización de los Estados Americanos, como resultado de una errada e intervencionista política internacional encabezada por el Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos de Norte América.”
As sportswriters and fans weighed in on the natives-only tournament, they debated over the source of national pride and nationalism. The League claimed that nationalism in the sense of support for the national government, or Trujillo, moved teams to renounce imported players for the season. “An ideological-political current that gives the most preference to everything national (lo nativo),” nationalism as defined by the Dominican press was part of “the struggle against the imperialist aggressor.” For Dominicans in 1960, this struggle came against the United States, its “interventionist policies” in the OAS, and the misguided actions by US Baseball officials. While the League supported the natives-only tournament “because we consider it the most beneficial for the Fatherland and the most appropriate for our popular ideas,”

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126 Editorial de Radio Caribe, “Triunfos del Nacionalismo,” La Nación, 22 de septiembre de 1960, 6. The editorial started with a definition of nationalism and its significance before moving to the role of Radio Caribe in supporting the movement in the Dominican Republic: “El nacionalismo, una corriente ideológico-política, que tiende a dar el máximo de preferencia a lo nativo, está en sus mejores tiempos actualmente. [. . .] Esta Radio Caribe, que en tan poco tiempo ha ganado tanto cariño en el pueblo dominicano, se ha convertido en un baluarte de nuestro nacionalismo, en un terreno de combate, en la lucha contra el imperialismo agresor, que es el peor y más fuerte enemigo del nacionalismo.”

127 League officials took offense to National Association (minor leagues) President George Trautman’s request for guarantees of player safety if he granted permission for US players to participate in the 1960–1961 Winter Tournament despite the breach in diplomatic relations and attached Trautman’s memo to the League regarding such protections in the memo to the President informing him of their decision to organize the tournament with only native players. See, MEMORANDUM, 2 de septiembre de 1960, George Trautman, President, National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues to Hipólito Herrera Billini, President, Dominican Republic Professional Baseball League. League Secretary Alvarez Sánchez responded to this concern in his explanation to sportwriters by mentioning that everyone knew of the security in the country and that the lack of racial discrimination in the country made the security even more prevalent in the Dominican Republic than in the United States for black players. See, José A. González, “Doctor Alvarez Sánchez Dice Son Atinadas Las Declaraciones de Cronistas Deportivos; No se Está en Condiciones de Prescindir de Importados,” La Nación, 17 de septiembre de 1960, 15. Ford Frick also received his share of admonitions from Dominican sportwriters, particularly around his help securing Virgil’s rights for Puerto Rico. See, Cuchito Alvarez, “El Caso Hernández-Virgil; Puerto Rico Tiene la Razón, Pero Frick es un Cínico,” La Nación, 28 de octubre de 1960, 16.

128 Editorial de Radio Caribe, La Nación, 22 de septiembre de 1960, 6. “Nuestra lucha seguirá adelante. Respaldaremos siempre al sistema Trujillista porque lo consideramos el más benéfico para la Patria y el más ajustado a nuestras ideas del tipo popular.”
fans saw nationalism as tied to the quality of baseball performed on Dominican fields. Nationalism was tied to baseball, not Trujillo. They took pride in the exploits of their baseball players abroad and enjoyed watching them play next to rising US stars on their home fields. The all-natives tournament took some of that pride away and placed politics above baseball. Dominicans had built a positive international reputation in baseball, not politics. The all-natives tournament threatened that national identity rather than boost it.

Dominicans expressed their discontent with baseball’s subservience to politics with their feet. Perhaps in part because of the deteriorating economic conditions caused by the sanctions and in part because of the decreased prospect of seeing future Big League stars, Dominicans stayed home from the ballpark. Attendance figures were notable only for their vagueness, with sportswriters dismissing falling numbers as natural. The presence of only twelve thousand fans in the inaugural game, in contrast to the 16,000 at the inauguration of the Estadio Trujillo in 1955, revealed the truth. Sportswriters committed to promoting the tournament despite their earlier protests—or perhaps hoping to regain the favor of teams and officials—noted that attendance had declined since the previous year. They hoped that the “sincere and spontaneous applause of the public could end up being a decisive factor in the tournament” and inspire better quality of play and a true expression of Dominican baseball unity. Unsatisfactory attendance for the 1960–1961 season became truly evident later in 1961 when team officials, usually amenable to the desires of the politicians who provided them the capital to organize the tournament, told President Balaguer in early September that “the

129 Ibid. “El aplauso sincero y espontáneo del público, puede resultar un factor decisivo en el torneo.”
possibility of playing with Dominicans has to be absolutely discarded in view of
Escogido’s superiority over the other teams.” Here, they echoed the arguments of
sportswriters and fans in 1960: Escogido’s advantages “would make the Tournament
unappealing, and as such, lacking the economic stimulus of the public.”¹³⁰ Voting with
their feet and their money, Dominicans had made their wishes for baseball known. They
proved to the League that baseball in the country depended more on the fans and the
players than Trujillo.

By voting with their feet and showing their willingness to demand baseball on
their terms, Dominicans re-claimed baseball and the source of their national pride from
the dictator and projected baseball players as the best image of the nation. In sacrificing
the quality of baseball in defense of his “nationalist policies,” Trujillo had failed as
“Maximum Protector of National Sport.” The sanctions made Trujillo’s declining
international reputation clear and undermined his ability to uphold his role as “Benefactor
of the Nation.” Dominicans felt the material effects of the sanctions and realized that
they could no longer derive their national pride from the dictator’s plans for national
progress. Dominican ballplayers easily stepped into that role. As the numbers of
Dominican major- and minor-league ballplayers in the United States rose from about 30

¹³⁰ Antonio Armenteros S., MEMORANDUM, al Honorable Señor Presidente de la República, Dr.
Joaquin A. Balaguer, 8 de septiembre de 1961, SEDEFIR 16567. Armenteros, part of a well-
established industrialist family in the capital, wrote to Balaguer after carrying out his instructions
to meet with the League officials and the directors of the four professional teams to discuss the
organization of the 1961–1962 Winter Tournament. Armenteros reported that the teams claimed
that economic difficulties prevented them from organizing a tournament and that even a
Government loan of $100,000 would be insufficient even for a tournament with only native
players. They added, “agregando, por otra parte, que la posibilidad de jugar con criollos hay que
darla absolutamente por descartada en vista de la superioridad del Escogido sobre los otros
equipos que harían el torneo sin interés y, por tanto, sin el estímulo económico del público.”
in 1960 to hundreds by 1970, Dominicans came to see ballplayers as the country’s best diplomats and the best indicators of the nation’s economic and political progress. Often rising from humble conditions—both Julián Javier and Felipe Rojas Alou cited buying a home for their parents as their primary motivation in professional baseball—to comfortable lives in the world’s exemplar democracy, Dominican ballplayers served as proxies for Dominicans everywhere who dreamed of opportunity brought through democracy. Ballplayers, not politicians, represented the best image of the Dominican people both at home and abroad. They no longer needed Trujillo or the rest of the Regime.

**Conclusion**

When Ozzie Virgil stepped behind third base for the New York Giants in September 1956, the Dominican Republic became a Big League nation. More significantly, the Dominican nation gained this status without Trujillo. A Dominican who had severed himself from Trujillo’s body politic made Dominican baseball talent visible. Carried with Virgil as he stepped to the plate in Polo Grounds, the Dominican nation had achieved something on its own, independently from Trujillo. Baseball freed Dominicans from a quarter century of being equated with Trujillo as ballplayers came to represent Dominican ability and potential for progress.

By the time Felipe Rojas Alou debuted with the Giants in 1958, the Regime had gained leverage in claiming ownership of the *deporte rey*. Sportswriters attributed baseball success to Trujillo’s sporting policies, hailing Rojas Alou, Julián Javier, Mateo Rojas Alou, Juan Marichal, and other Dominican Big Leaguers as the highest examples
of *mens sana in corpore sano*. Dominican Big Leaguers represented the success of Trujillo’s modernization program as it related to the Dominican people. Alongside modern stadiums and sporting institutions like the Director of Sports and Dominican Winter League, ballplayers signaled the benefits of the Trujillo Era.

The 1960–1961 Winter Tournament and the international context in which it occurred destroyed that narrative. Although the Regime’s sycophants tried to portray the League’s decision to hire only native players as a nationalist policy that would ultimately benefit Dominican ballplayers and baseball fans, Dominicans rejected what they perceived as a step backwards for the deporte rey and a failure by the dictator to protect their national sport from his bad decisions. They understood the loss of imported players as the result of OAS sanctions and Trujillo’s declining reputation in the international community. And through their debates over the proper number of imported players, they expressed their opposition to Regime policies that concentrated wealth in the hands of a few foreign and domestic industrialists—much as personal favors had left Escogido with a wealth of native baseball talent. Despite the dictator’s attempts to portray himself as a democratic leader specially attuned to the needs of the Dominican people, the 1960–1961 Winter Tournament showed otherwise. The natives-only tournament represented a broken contract between the Dominican people and the Regime, an agreement that Dominicans would tolerate Trujillo’s incursions into baseball so long as baseball benefitted. In 1960–1961, Trujillo negatively affected baseball. Dominicans stayed home from the stadiums to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the Regime and their rejection of Trujillo, reserving their limited funds for special occasions, such as a
pitchers’ duel between Guayubin Olivo and Juan Marichal. Dominicans went to the ballparks to see their potential in their ballplayers.

The substitution of ballplayers for Trujillo or the national government as the source of and target for nationalist sentiment inspired acts of bravery from Dominicans just months after Dominican ballplayers returned to the United States. On May 30, 1961, three cars ambushed the dictator’s vehicle as he rode from Ciudad Trujillo to his hometown of San Cristóbal, riddling the car with bullets. The dictator was dead.

Miscommunications and likely disbelief in the success of initial stage of the plot ruined plans to overturn the existing government, headed by puppet President Balaguer, and direct the future toward democracy. Balaguer remained in power with Ramfis heading the military as preparations for the 1961–1962 Winter Tournament began. The OAS sanctions still in place, the United States and others in the international community pressured Balaguer and Ramfis to implement democratic reforms. They did, but not to the satisfaction of the Dominican people, who demanded a clean start, one free from the Trujillo family and Balaguer. Even with the 1961–1962 Winter Tournament underway, Dominicans remained in the streets, determined to oust the rest of the Regime. In November 1961, the members of the Trujillo family who remained in the country boarded a ship for Europe, and the baseball season faltered. By mid-January, Balaguer was gone, too, exiled to the United States. For the first time since 1951, Dominicans did not see a complete professional tournament. They sacrificed baseball to free their nation, believing that democracy held more promise for the deporte rey than dictatorship.
On November 7, 1962, Cuban pitcher Pedro Ramos warmed up on the mound at the Estadio Quisqueya for the top of the fifth inning in an exhibition game against Dominican professional ballplayers. A group of young Dominican fans took to the field carrying banners reading “Fidel ‘K’astro ¡Asesino!” (Fidel Castro, Murderer) and “Cuba será Libre” (Cuba will be free). The crowd erupted as another group of Dominicans—all part of the Juventud Dominicana Cristiana (Dominican Christian Youth)—made its way to the pitcher’s mound and handed Ramos a Cuban flag. Filled with emotion, Ramos waved his cap above his head to acknowledge the gift and to thank

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131 La Nación, 9 de noviembre de 1962, 10. The photo comes from Game 5 of the Dominican-Cuban exhibition series the night of November 8, 1962, at the Estadio Oriental in San Pedro de Macorís.

132 The fans changed the “C” in Castro to a “K” as a play on the use of a “K” to signal a strike in baseball scoring, symbolizing their feelings that Castro was a strike against the Cuban people.
the youth while the crowd escalated its applause for the solidarity and support the young Dominicans demonstrated for the exiled Cleveland Indians hurler and his countrymen.\textsuperscript{133}

This scene interrupted the fourth installment of an 8-game exhibition series in Santo Domingo, Santiago, and San Pedro de Macorís, Dominican Republic, through early November 1962. Organized by the \textit{de facto} Council of State, the series substituted the usual winter season, canceled because of the political unrest still plaguing the nation after the assassination of Rafael Trujillo in 1961. Part tension-relieving device to establish a sense of normality as Dominicans prepared for the first free elections in more-than three decades, part goodwill gesture toward the Cuban professional ballplayers exiled in the United States, the Cuban-Dominican Series brought together representatives of two countries on opposite ends of Cold War politics. The Dominican hosts felt their country on the ascent. The Council of State was organizing elections after a group of heroes assassinated dictator Rafael Trujillo and Dominicans had responded by demanding democracy through public demonstrations and general strikes, forcing the Trujillo family and the puppet President Joaquín Balaguer into exile. Dominicans were building a democratic society. The Cubans, on the other hand, were victims of communist revolution. Cubans had united in late 1958 to oust their own dictator, Fulgencio Batista, but the advances that the Cubans achieved against dictatorship were moot because of Castro’s radical communist reforms, and most damning, his alliance with the Soviet Union. The Cuban exiles longed to return home and that meant defeating Castro and the

communist system in Cuba. They traveled to the Dominican Republic’s baseball fields to recoup some of the funds they lost from the shutdown of their country’s Winter League, salaries on which many young professional ballplayers depended to support their families, and, for the more experienced players like Ramos, to earn money for the anti-Castro Cuban Freedom Cause.¹³⁴

Though no US ballplayers took the field in the Cuban-Dominican Series, the United States remained present in the minds of players and fans alike. The United States was the home to which the Cuban exiles would return after the series; the site of the major- and minor-league teams where most of the participants earned their salaries; and the supposed model for the American hemisphere in the quest for democracy during the Cold War. In the eyes of many officials, Castro had betrayed the American fraternity institutionalized in the Organization of American States (OAS) by aligning with the Soviet Union. The evidence had come in late October, days before the Series, when Castro, the Soviets, and US officials kept the world on edge for thirteen days over the real prospect of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The exiles, portrayed as the true representatives of “Cuba libre,” worked with the United States to destroy the Castro regime, first with the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, then with the sabotage missions

¹³⁴ “Cuban Freedom Has Inning As Stars Play Here Sunday,” The Miami Herald, October 12, 1962; Bill Braucher, “Ah, Baseball, Cubans Love It as Always,” The Miami Herald, October 15, 1962, 3-D; Especial para El Diario, “Histórico Ríales Frente a Frente: Habana Empata a Dos Con Almendares En Miami,” El Diario de Nueva York, 16 de octubre de 1962, 34. Neither The Miami Herald nor the Spanish-language El Diario de Nueva York mentioned the series in the Dominican Republic, but many of the same players, including the stars Orlando Peña and Camilo Pascual, played in both exhibitions.
supported financially by organizations such as the Cuban Freedom Cause.\textsuperscript{135} For Cuban exiles, the United States was an ally in the battle against communism. Though the US side of the ideological Cold War battle defined democracy and capitalism as antidotes to the squashed liberties of Soviet communism, US actions emphasized destroying and preventing communism in the hemisphere over building democracy.

In 1962 the US emphasis on preventing communism over building democracy was unclear. Policies such as the Alliance for Progress portrayed the United States as a partner to help nations like the Dominican Republic build new societies through a “democratic revolution,” a peaceful transition to the social reforms that Castro implemented through bloody revolution and leftist dictatorship. In the words of future US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Bartlow Martin, the United States would help Dominicans “create a showcase of democracy alongside Castro’s dismal Cuba.”\textsuperscript{136} Martin described a “special obligation” that the United States felt toward democracy in the Dominican Republic because of the history between the two countries, including “the Marine occupation, the close vote on annexation, our past relations with Trujillo.”\textsuperscript{137} The Alliance for Progress defined democratic political reforms paired with social and economic reforms as the means for raising the standard of living for Latin

\textsuperscript{135} For an overview of the events related to the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent interventions in Cuba, see “Chronology” in “Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After,” An International Conference, March 22–24, 2001, Havana, Cuba, The National Security Archive, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/index.html.


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid. Martin referred to the US military occupation of the Dominican Republic which lasted from 1916–1924, the vote in the US Congress over whether to annex the Dominican Republic in 1870, and US support for Trujillo throughout much of his regime.
American people so they would not be tempted by the promises of communist revolution. As they prepared for elections in 1962 and through the presidency of Juan Bosch, Dominicans believed in the Alliance for Progress. Successful elections would prove their readiness for democracy, their commitment to the ideals of a democratic revolution, and assure their “place in the sun among the advanced nations of the Americas.”  

The anti-Castro banners carried onto the field of the Estadio Quisqueya on November 7, 1962 and during subsequent games reflected Dominicans’ alliance with the United States, the Cuban exiles, and many others in the American hemisphere during the Cold War. They joined the United States and exiles in their stance against communism and denounced the curtailing of civil liberties by the Castro regime—the end of professional baseball on Cuba being one of the most damning violations in the eyes of many Dominicans. Most Dominicans saw the threat of communism as real, and they celebrated the arrest and exile of the leader of the insurrectionist arm of the Dominican Communist Party, Máximo López Molina, shortly before the beginning of the exhibition series against the Cuban exiles. With the Cubans in town for the baseball exchange, and with hopes already raised for the return of Winter League baseball after elections 

Juan Bosch vowed during his inaugural address on February 27, 1963, to devote his administration to policies that would raise the nation to a “place in the sun among the advanced nations of the Americas.” The idea of a “place in the sun” as an outcome of democracy was common in the Dominican Republic and in other Latin American countries during this period and even US Ambassador Martin made reference to it in his communication with Dominican and US leaders. For Bosch’s inaugural address, see “Ejecutivo Lee Discurso Tras su Juramentación,” El Caribe, 28 de febrero de 1963, 10. Bosch promised that “el Gobierno que se inicia hoy espera un trabajo continue para darles a los dominicanos un puesto bajo el sol entre los países avanzados de América.” On Martin, see, Memorandum: “Political Reconstruction of the Dominican Republic,” January 30, 1962, John Bartlow Martin Papers, Manuscript Divisions, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
established a democratic government, baseball provided a means for Dominicans to express their anti-communism and hopes for democratic society.

Yet anti-Castroism was only part of the story of Dominican visions for democracy. As they proved with their demonstrations against the Trujillo Regime and the continued strikes throughout the country, Dominicans saw democracy as the foundation for a new society that would raise the nation through equal access to economic opportunity, social justice, and political participation for all citizens. While the Cuban exiles defined their struggle as one against communism, Dominicans were struggling against three decades of dictatorship. They had ousted the Trujillos, even sacrificing professional baseball seasons to do so. But Trujillo’s stamp remained on society. Free elections were the next step to building the kind of society Dominicans imagined, but elections were only part of the journey. Democracy offered a path to progress and peace, a path that would ensure “not only political democracy, but also economic democracy and social justice.”139 For Dominicans, the struggle for democracy was more than a struggle against communism. Dominicans worked to create a democratic society, one where the government ensured equal opportunities for all Dominicans in their access to political participation, dialogue, fair working conditions, and economic opportunities.

The appearance of three Dominicans for the San Francisco Giants in the 1962 World Series signaled for many Dominicans that this ascent was near, reinforcing their

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139 “Ejecutivo Lee Discurso Tras su Juramentación,” El Caribe, 28 de febrero de 1963, 10. Bosch promised that “el Gobierno que se inicia hoy espera un trabajo continué para darles a los dominicanos un puesto bajo el sol entre los países avanzados de América.” Reaching this place in the sun would require cooperation between the President and Congress to form a legal basis for a democratic society: “Solicitamos del Congreso Nacional las leyes indispensables para afirmar en este país no sólo la democracia política, sino también la democracia social y la justicia social.”
faith in the Dominican Republic’s position as a “showcase for democracy.” As they prepared for and carried out elections, Dominicans used baseball to demonstrate what they expected from democracy, to express their solidarity with countries across the hemisphere to consolidate democracy over communism, and to unite Dominicans across political and social divides. The exhibition series that brought Ramos and other exiled Cuban ballplayers to the country provided an example of democracy’s superiority over communism: communism had estranged the Cuban ballplayers from their homeland while the Dominican Republic supported the exiles in baseball and democratic fraternity. The Series brought Dominicans peacefully together for the celebration of their national pastime and confirmed their participation in the continental struggle for democracy. Most of all, baseball provided Dominicans with hope that they could build a democratic society in their nation, beginning with successful elections in 1962.

¡Magnífico Estímulo! The 1962 World Series and Inspirations for Democracy

Before the Cuban Missile Crisis awoke the hemisphere to the very real and very hot dangers of the Cold War and before Dominicans lifted the ball-playing Cuban exiles in democratic fraternity, Dominicans spent the end of Summer 1962 enraptured by the San Francisco Giants and their exciting pursuit of the National League pennant. With a lineup boasting African Americans Willie Mays and Willie McCovey; Puerto Ricans Orlando Cepeda and José Pagán; Dominicans Felipe Alou, Matty Alou, and Juan Marichal; and Jim Davenport, Don Larsen, and Jack Sanford, the Giants were one of the most talented and most diverse teams in baseball. After the team failed to meet
expectations in the previous two seasons, whispers in the US sporting press and in the stands tried to explain their regular underperformance by pointing to the Giants’ diversity, blaming a lack of cohesiveness on the attempt by owner Horace Stoneham to mix black, hispanic, and white players on the same team.\textsuperscript{140} The dramatic fashion with which the Giants seized the National League pennant in 1962, forcing and winning a playoff against their Los Angeles rivals after trailing the Dodgers by four games through much of September, vindicated the team. Baseball fans in the United States and the Dominican Republic were glued to their televisions and radios from the playoff run in September through the longest World Series in history, which ended the same day the US military informed US President Kennedy of the Soviet missiles assembled in Cuba.

Dominicans followed the Giants with special attention as not just one but three of their countrymen represented them in the World Series. The Giants’ climb to the World Series suggested that Dominicans, too, might unite for success. For Dominicans, elections and the sprouting of a democratic society embodied that success. The propitious timing of starting pitcher Juan Marichal, All-Star outfielder Felipe Alou, and promising outfielder and younger brother to Felipe, Matty Alou on US Baseball’s largest stage coincided with the Dominican Republic’s Alliance for Progress with the United

\textsuperscript{140} See, for example, Roy Terrell, “Old Pals In a Cold Wind,” \textit{Sports Illustrated}, September 26, 1960, SiVault, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1071797/index/index.htm. Terrell dismissed the notion that the Giants lost the “pennant that couldn’t be lost” because of “too many Negroes,” but his diagnosis that a lack of cohesiveness and team spirit accounted for the Giants losses suggested that a lack of cohesiveness, stemming perhaps in the team’s racial and cultural diversity, was to blame.
States and seemed to promise peaceful elections.\textsuperscript{141} The performance of the Dominican Giants in the 1962 World Series united Dominicans across the country and eased their fears over the political uncertainty in their nation.\textsuperscript{142}

The day after the San Francisco Giants beat their National League (NL) rival to win the pennant and face the New York Yankees in the 1962 World Series, the editors at the Santo Domingo newspaper *El Caribe* distinguished the Dominican ballplayers for their positive representation of and stimulus to Dominican society. Titled “*Estímulo Deportivo*” (Sporting Stimulus), the editorial went beyond celebrating the individual accomplishments of the Dominican Big Leaguers to stress how Dominican participation at the pinnacle of professional baseball projected the greatness of Dominican sport. For those back home, the Rojas Alou brothers and Marichal also signified the Dominican Republic’s commitment to constant improvement. The editorial charged future governments with the obligation to intensify sporting practice, arguing that “For any country, the practice of sport has significant importance in the health of the individual and for general health, a requirement without which no people [*pueblo*] can aspire to

\textsuperscript{141} The given names of the men known in the United States as the Alou brothers are Felipe Rojas Alou, Mateo Rojas Alou, and Jesús Rojas Alou. When Felipe, the eldest, arrived in the United States he was listed as “Felipe Alou” because of a lack of familiarity with Dominican naming practices. “Alou” is actually the maternal last name of the brothers, who were known in the Dominican Republic as the “Rojas Alou brothers.” I will use both names interchangeably, though I will generally use the name appropriate for the context—the Dominican names for the Dominican context and US name for the US context. For nicknames, such as using “Matty” for Mateo, I will do the same.

\textsuperscript{142} I borrow the term “Dominican Giants” from Rob Ruck and Daniel Manatt, *The Republic of Baseball: The Dominican Giants of the American Game*, Documentary Film, September 2006, which details the stories and struggles of the first generation of Dominican ballplayers, many of whom debuted with the New York/San Francisco Giants. The term “Giants” plays on the enormous influence this generation of ballplayers had on their nation and future generations of Dominican ballplayers and on the fact that they played for the Giants.
reach goals of perfection.”143 Sports in general, and in the Dominican Republic baseball in particular, were essential to national progress. In 1962, Dominicans believed that only democracy would provide the conditions for that sporting progress.

Baseball success seemed to predict Dominican success with democracy. The “Estímulo Deportivo” editorial fit the teaching tone of El Caribe’s editorials through 1962 as editors offered advice to the Council of State and to Dominican citizens on how to prepare the country for democracy and on the roles of government and citizens in a democratic society. Progress was on everyone’s mind, and as the country moved toward elections, its ascent seemed inevitable. Amid reports of communist plots, armed hooligans in the streets, and strikes at sugar mills and even at the democratized newspaper El Caribe, baseball provided a base of unity in chaos and good news about compatriots who elevated the name of the Dominican Republic on foreign shores. When they heard that Felipe Alou made a great play in Candlestick Park or that Juan Marichal silenced the New York Yankees bats for four straight innings, Dominicans forgot about differences that divided them and the obstacles that surrounded them. They knew that Felipe, Mateo, and Juan had not risen to the echelons of baseball without some struggle, and that, like the Giants’ surge at the end of the season to beat the Dodgers, success in any struggle, whether a National League pennant or democratic society, required more than unity. The Giants had made it to the World Series. Dominicans would achieve their goals, too.

143 Editorial, “Estímulo Deportivo,” El Caribe, 4 de octubre de 1962, 8. “Para cualquier país, la práctica deportiva tiene señalada importancia en el logro de la salud del individuo y por tanto de la salud general, requisito sin el cual ningún pueblo puede pretender alcanzar metas de perfeccionamiento.”
Figure 3.2: ¡Magnífico estímulo para la juventud criolla!\(^{144}\)

An Editorial cartoon the day after Felipe Alou robbed Roger Maris of a homerun in Game 1 of the World Series illustrated the hopes that Dominicans placed on their baseball heroes.\(^{145}\) (Figure 3.2). Two arms, one tattooed with “Hermanos Alou” (Alou brothers), the other with “Marichal,” raised a trophy inscribed with “Rep. Dominicana” (Dominican Republic) over a baseball stadium labeled “Serie Mundial 1962” (1962 World Series). The inscription at the bottom of the cartoon hailed the ballplayers “a magnificent inspiration to Dominican youth.”\(^{146}\) Stars like the Rojas Alou

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\(^{144}\) “Magnificent inspiration for Dominican youth,” my translation. *El Caribe*, 5 de octubre de 1962, 8. All translations are my own, unless otherwise specified.

\(^{145}\) *El Caribe*, 5 de octubre de 1962, 8.

\(^{146}\) Dominicans, and from the Puerto Rican and Cuban sources I’ve read, Cubans and Puerto Ricans, too, use “criollo(a)” to designate nationality. In other Latin American nations, and particularly during the colonial and nationalist periods, “criollo(a)” referred to American-born people of Spanish descent. The term was usually both racial and economic, describing higher-class people of European (or sometimes mixed) descent. For an overview of race in the Dominican Republic, see Silvio Torres-Saillant, “The Tribulations of Blackness: Stages in Dominican Racial Identity,” *Callaloo* 23, no. 3, Dominican Republic Literature and Culture (Summer 2000): 1086–1111.
brothers and Marichal inspired Dominican youth to play sports, but as the previous-day’s editorial had made clear, the significance of sport reached beyond the chalk lines of the baseball diamond to unite society for progress.

The achievements of the Rojas Alou brothers and Marichal demonstrated Dominican potential to US baseball fans and other US citizens whom Dominicans imagined as partners in building democracy in their country. For Dominicans, the ballplayers represented the best face of the country and convincing examples of why Dominicans deserved the support of the continent in their struggle. That the Rojas Alou brothers and Marichal had achieved such greatness in the United States lent the ballplayers a mystique in their own country that furthered their inspiration of Dominican hopes for their future. Despite the questions about the liberties squashed by racist policies in the United States, Dominicans saw the ballplayers as beacons of democracy.\footnote{I refer to the same newspaper reports cited in the previous chapter that tried to attack the United States in defense of Trujillo and the sanctions against him. See, “Criollos Víctimas Problema Racial En el Sureño Estado de La Florida; Vicente Enfermo Debido a Dificultades Comidas,” \textit{La Nación}, 6 de junio de 1960, 17; Dr. Manuel Neftali Martínez, “Players Dominicanos Dicen Ser Víctimas de Perjuicio Racial en los Estados Unidos; Por Ser Negros: Rojas Alou y Antulio Martínez Tienen que Jugar Aún Heridos; Añora Ausencia Discrimen En República Dominicana,” \textit{La Nación}, 23 de junio de 1960, 1, 24. See also, Felipe Alou with Arnold Hano, “Latin-American Ballplayers Need a Bill of Rights,” \textit{Sport} (November 1963): 20–21, 76–79.}

They had lived in the north and they knew how democracy was supposed to work. After overcoming the challenges of racism and the long journey to the Big Leagues, the Dominican Giants rose to the highest levels of US Baseball. Their compatriots expected to follow their path. They expected obstacles, but they were resigned to rising above them.
Throughout September and October, Dominican baseball fans welcomed
Dominican ballplayers home with a national celebration of sport that extended to the
Cuban-Dominican Series and even to cheers for Dominican players who spent the winter
season working in Puerto Rico. A mass of Dominicans crowded onto the airport
platform on the afternoon of October 17, 1962 to applaud the return of the National
League champions Felipe Alou, Matty Alou, and Juan Marichal, and of Licey veteran
Diómedes “Guayubín” Olivo, who had just completed his second Big League season with
the Pittsburgh Pirates. The baseball celebration flowed from the airport to the center of
Santo Domingo as the crowd carried the ballplayers en carrovan on a victory tour through
the city. Dominicans of all political stripes came together to acknowledge the
accomplishments of their Big League heroes and to welcome them home. The players
were models for all Dominicans to emulate. As the pro-government newspaper La
Nación declared on welcoming the ballplayers home: “Hopefully many youth imitate
their example and also make it to the Big Leagues, so that the name of our country
resounds in all the World.”

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148 Pin Aguayo, “Fanáticos Viajan para Aplaudir a los Criollos,” La Nación, 29 de octubre de 1962, 10. Federico “Chichi” Olivo (brother to Guayubín), Amado Samuel, Pedro González, and Manny Jiménez were the Dominicans present. Though González and Jiménez sat out the first game because they had arrived in Puerto Rico that same day, Pin Aguayo assured fans that “on the shoulders of these two representatives of the Dominican Republic rests the faith of some of the greatest fans in Puerto Rican baseball, that of the San Juan Senadores.”


150 Editorial, “Bienvenidos,” 17 de octubre de 1962, 4. “Ojalá que muchos jóvenes imitan su ejemplo y al igual que ellos lleguen a las Grandes Ligas, para que el nombre de nuestro país resuene en todo el Mundo.”
and progress. They were models for Dominicans at home and signs of Dominican potential in the world.

Director of Sports Bienvenido Hazim Egel gave official sanction to the national celebration of the baseball heroes and defined the significance of their achievements in the United States. Hazim recognized the stars for their work “to cultivate baseball, making the deporte rey (king sport, baseball) a true apostolate,” a mission to the nation. As the Dominican Republic started down a new path for the future with the embrace of democracy and the Alliance for Progress, the country relied on its baseball stars to serve as representatives to the world. Felipe Alou’s catch in Game 1 of the World Series, Marichal’s four hitless innings in Game 5, and Matty Alou’s pinch-hit single in the bottom of the 9th inning of Game 7, which later put him within 90 feet of a Giants World Series Championship, all projected Dominican potential to US baseball fans. As Hazim said, the players’ “excellent labor” in the United States “raised the name of the Dominican Republic.” Dominican ballplayers represented the nation’s best face to their partners for democracy in the United States and across the hemisphere.

As the pride of the nation and the country’s best face abroad, the ballplayers lent credibility to anyone associated with them. The Council of State seized this opportunity

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151 “Agasajan Peloteros Criollos Actuaron en Grandes Ligas,” La Nación, 22 de octubre de 1962, 12. Among those that Hazim received were Felipe Rojas Alou; Juan Marichal; Guayubín Olivo; Mateo Rojas Alou; Manuel Emilio Jiménez, a rookie and starting outfielder for the Kansas City Athletics; Amado Samuel, Milwaukee Braves rookie; the St Louis Cardinals’ regular second-baseman Julián Javier; and Manuel Mota, who appeared with the San Francisco Giants before being sent down to the double-A El Paso team.

152 Ibid.

to associate with the ballplayers and direct the unity they provided toward boosting public faith in the elections the Councilmen were organizing. Marichal, the Rojas Alou brothers, and Olivo ended their caravan celebration at the National Palace, where the councilmen welcomed the national heroes. *La Nación* rushed to press to ensure that a photo of the ballplayers standing alongside Council President Rafael Bonnelly and Councilmen Nicolás E. Pichardo and Dr. José A. Fernández Caminero ran on the front page of the next morning’s edition (Figure 3.3). Usually an afternoon paper but running extended coverage, including a morning edition, because of the strike at *El Caribe*, the writers and directors of *La Nación* ensured that when baseball fans opened the morning paper, they saw that the Council members had participated in the national reception of the “world famous Dominican ballplayers Juan Marichal and Felipe and Mateo Rojas Alou, glories of national sport and those who have known to raise our name in the exterior.”

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Figure 3.3: Players at the Palace\textsuperscript{155} Pictured from left are Juan Marichal, a Council member, Guayubín Olivo, President Rafael Bonnelly, Mateo Rojas Alou, two other Council members, and Felipe Rojas Alou.

The Council of State knew that the Dominican Republic’s democratic future and international reputation as a participant in the American democratic brotherhood was at stake. The Council members needed the popular connection that only the country’s baseball heroes could provide to ensure that the elections they were organizing would be successful. Formed through an agreement between the United States; Trujillo puppet president Joaquín Balaguer; and the leaders of the Unión Cívica Nacional (National Civic Union, UCN), the most prominent political force after the assassination, the Council’s legitimacy was constantly under attack. Bosch’s PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, Dominican Revolutionary Party) had refused to participate in the formation of a de facto government, leaving the UCN to fill the majority of the spots. Despite an

\textsuperscript{155}“Players en Palacio,” La Nación, 18 de octubre de 1962, 1.
early alliance with the left-leaning reformist group, Agrupación del Movimiento del 14 de Junio (Group of the Movement of the 14th of June, 1J4), the UCN lacked the mystique of reformism attributed to the PRD because its membership overlapped with the conservative oligarchy in the country. With political tensions mounting as the December 20 elections drew near, front-page photos of councilmen alongside Dominican baseball heroes whose actions had ensured that “the name of our country resounds in all the World” provided a popular basis for the Council. The Council did not govern by a popular, democratic mandate, but it understood the importance of baseball in creating the illusion of a government attuned to popular sentiment.

The Council’s popular appeal was particularly important as the de facto government balanced escalating demands for democratic progress and its primary responsibility to oversee elections. The Council had to ensure not only that elections would happen on December 20 but that Dominicans, who continued to express their demands for rights and democracy in popular demonstrations and strikes like those they had used to expel the Trujillo family, would participate in those elections and adhere to their results. Editorials and radio broadcasts reminded Dominicans that the Council and the political parties shared the goal of creating a democratic society. Portraying the strikes and protests as signs of crisis, editors tried to calm tensions by defining elections

156 US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, John Bartlow Martin refers to the criticisms of the Council as the “do-nothing Council” in his memoir, Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Death of Trujillo to the Civil War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). For Juan E. Bosch’s reflections on the fall of his democratically elected government and the future of democracy in the Dominican Republic, see, Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana (México, DF: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Sociales, A.C., 1964).

157 Editorial, “Bienvenidos,” La Nación, 17 de octubre de 1962, 4. “Ojalá que muchos jóvenes imiten su ejemplo y al igual que ellos lleguen a las Grandes Ligas, para que el nombre de nuestro país resuene en todos el Mundo.”
as a national goal. As one editorial told readers: “there will be elections because Dominicans are anxious, for the first time in many years to be able to elect with serenity a Government that, representing their wishes, drives the sad reality of the country toward goals of authentic social, economic, political, and moral recuperation.” The leaders of the political parties had shown their commitment to elections by holding conventions to nominate their candidates. The Council had done its part by keeping the peace and creating enough security that the surviving Heroes of May 30, Antonio Imbert Barrera and Luis Amiami Tio, came out of hiding and even served as advisors on the Council. The Council had also moved toward economic recuperation by raising wages for public employees. Photos of Council Members next to National League champions and its efforts to bring professional baseball back to the island, if briefly, supported the narrative that the de facto government was doing its part to bring democracy and progress to the nation.

In the narrative of progress and recuperation, patriotic Dominicans embraced elections as the means to democratic society. Those who did not support elections, or who sought to force change through protests, had more malicious intents. Editorials defined protests as the work of communists or innocent Dominicans influenced by

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158 Editorial, “Hacia las elecciones,” La Nación, 31 de octubre de 1962, 3. “Habrá elecciones porque los dominicanos están ansiosos, por primera vez en muchos años, de poder elegir con serenidad al Gobierno que representando su voluntad conduzca la triste realidad del país hacia metas de auténtica recuperación social, económica, política y moral.”
Castro’s attempts to destabilize the “electoral climate” budding in the nation. Only Dominicans too inexperienced with democracy to wait patiently for it to work or troublemakers influenced by Castro participated in “illegal strikes” and demonstrations. A cartoon just before the ballplayers arrived in the country illustrated how these troublemakers threatened to disturb the elections being prepared by the Council, the Electoral Board, and the political parties. (Figure 3.4) A man representing el Pueblo, the Dominican people, sat at an outdoor table with a waiter representing the Election Board (Junta Electoral) stretching to reach a plump fruit labeled Elections (Elecciones). About to enjoy “The First Dinner” (La Primera Cena) of democracy, el Pueblo asked the waiter if it was safe to eat the fruit while it was still green. The waiter replied that eating the green fruit will do no harm, he just had to be careful that the snake, or “Troublemakers” (Perturbadores), slithering toward the end of the branch did not poison it. With the waiter standing on top of a stool labeled “Political Parties” (Partidos Políticos) to reach the fruit, the cartoon confirmed that the general population wanted

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159 The “Hacia las elecciones” editorial credited the political party conventions with building a “truly electoral climate” (un clima realmente electoral) in the country. Ibid. Other editorials urged Dominicans to have patience and allow elections to bring about the changes they expected democracy to bring rather than believing the false promises of Castro and communists. See, for example, Editorial, “Debemos Estar Alertas,” La Nación, 1 de noviembre de 1962, 1; Editorial, “Voces de Sensatez, La Nación, 27 de octubre de 1962, 1. Other reports and editorials described Castro’s efforts against the country. See, “RFB Señala Peligro Ofrece Cuba; Expide Comunicado Pueblo Dominicano,” La Nación, 24 de octubre de 1962, 1; Editorial, “Un amenaza continental,” La Nación, 24 de octubre de 1962, 1; Editorial, “Castro y Nuestra Democracia,” La Nación, 14 de noviembre de 1962, 1.

160 Asociación de Industrias de la República Dominicana, “A la opinión pública,” ¡Ahora!, 1º de junio de 1962, 48. The paid space in the news magazine read like an admonition directed to the “public” and called on workers to accept the conditions of their labor out of their patriotism because “a sense of fraternity among the most important sectors of the economy of a country, capital and labor.” “[. . .] Un ambiente de confraternidad entre los sectores más importantes de la economía de un país, el capital y el trabajo, derivan el progreso y la prosperidad nacionales.”

elections and that the parties and Election Board were working together to bring them.

The threat came from those who demanded too much, the *perturbadores*. Elections were the first dinner of democracy and all patriotic Dominicans would protect them.

The threat of *perturbadores* to elections became real just days before the Cubans arrived in Santo Domingo after investigators under the direction of the Council of State found and arrested Máximo López Molina, leader of the armed wing of the national communist party, the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD, *Movimiento Popular Dominicano*). The editors at *La Nación* brought together Dominicans’ anticipation for the upcoming series—heightened by that day’s report from Dominican baseball great Horacio Martínez that the Dominican Selection was “showing great hitting power and

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pitchers are in good condition”\textsuperscript{163}—and lessons about democracy’s superiority over communism. A cartoon titled \textit{“Un No Hit, No Run”} (A No-Hit, No-Run, referring to a no-hit shutout) pictured a showdown between the pitcher, wearing a jersey labelled \textit{Libertad} (freedom), and the hitter, labelled \textit{Comunismo} (Communism), while the catcher, \textit{Democracia} (Democracy), pounded his mitt in anticipation (Figure 3.5).\textsuperscript{164} In the caption \textit{Comunismo} lamented: “What a shame! The only run that could have scored was López Molina and they trapped him at third!”\textsuperscript{165} López Molina made the recent out for the team of \textit{Comunismo} with his arrest on October 28 or 29 under the Emergency Law, which allowed the Council to deport those suspected of communist or \textit{trujillista} sympathies.

When authorities arrested López Molina, who had evaded police for months, they allegedly found a stash of weapons and books by Lenin and Marx, along with maps outlining an MPD-Communist plan to attack more than 40 areas in the country.\textsuperscript{166} The pitcher’s cool windup and easy smile contrasted with the batter’s look of concern and the beads of sweat jumping from his forehead to demonstrate the significance of the arrest:

\begin{quote}
\textit{La Selección Dominicana Demuestra Poder al Bate Durante las Prácticas; Jugarán Contra Conjunto De Estrellas Cubanas}, \textit{La Nación}, 30 de octubre de 1962, 8. Martínez, who at the time worked as a scout for the San Francisco Giants and had signed the Alou brothers and Marichal, played all over the Americas, including the US Negro Leagues, in the 1930s and 1940s. He and José Saint Claire (Pepé Lucas), who managed the \textit{Selección}, formed part of the earlier generation of Dominican baseball greats who originally gained regional fame for the country's baseball.

\begin{quote}
\textit{La Nación}, 30 de octubre de 1962, 4.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. \textit{“Comunismo: \textit{¡Qué calamidad, la única carrera que podía empujar era la de López Molina, y lo atraparon en tercera!”}}

\textsuperscript{166} Reginaldo Atana, “Detienen a López Molina; Policía Captura Armas. Persiguen Otros Compañeros Suyos,” \textit{La Nación}, 29 de octubre de 1962, 1. The lead story in \textit{El Caribe} in the first edition after the strike focused on the plot and included photos of the hand-drawn maps outlining the plot. See \textit{“Hallan Mapas de Sitios a Sabotear; Extremistas Planeaban Atentados Contra Empresas,” El Caribe}, 3 de noviembre de 1962, 1, 12.
with López Molina caught and democracy projected onto the familiar territory of the baseball diamond, the team of Libertad and Democracia would clearly win.

![Figure 3.5: A No Hit, No Run](image)

Figure 3.5: A No Hit, No Run

On the baseball field, whether caricatured in an editorial, featuring three Dominicans lined up on the base paths for the US national anthem in the World Series, or continuing historical trends of Cuban-Dominican baseball exchanges, democracy reigned. The Dominican Giants—Felipe, Mateo, and Juan—gave Dominicans faith that they might raise the name of their nation as much in democracy as with baseball. The Council’s photos next to the Dominican Big Leaguers and its support for the upcoming Cuban-Dominican Series confirmed that Dominican ballfields would remain safe for democracy. Baseball legitimized the national project for elections and united Dominicans behind it. Lest any Dominicans mistakenly believe that they could create a better society...
with communism, the “No Hit, No Run” cartoon illustrated those consequences. Libertad and Democracia dominated the baseball diamond; Comunismo was out. The continued rise of Dominican players to the Big Leagues and the eventual resurgence of professional baseball on the island, while the Cuban Stars relied on the goodwill of others to play winterball, furthered the projection of democracy onto the baseball field. During the Cuban-Dominican Series, a reminder just before elections that communism killed professional baseball, Dominicans would express what they expected democracy to bring to their nation.

**Teaming Up for Democracy, Teaming Up Against Comunismo**

After welcoming the Alou brothers and Marichal home from the World Series, the Council and sportswriters fanned excitement and expectations for the Cuban-Dominican Series as an opportunity to test the country’s stability leading up to elections. The Series and Dominicans’ welcoming of the Cuban exiles would also demonstrate the nation’s commitment to the democratic cause in the Global Cold War. Baseball fans, players, and sportswriters used the series against the Cuban Stars to express their hope for the project of democracy in their country; the democratic unity among Dominicans, Cuban exiles, and the rest of the hemisphere; and Dominican ideas of what democracy meant for their society. On the baseball field and in the stands and newspapers Dominicans demonstrated the hopes they had for democracy and contrasted that optimism with the misery they imagined in Cuba—especially after the Missile Crisis—and with the injustices they suffered during the Trujillo Era.
The peaceful gathering of Dominicans in the Estadio Quisqueya on the night of November 1, 1962, signaled that Dominican faith in baseball was well-placed. They had sacrificed baseball seasons to expunge dictatorship from their country, but now, as they prepared to establish democracy in their country, Dominicans celebrated their achievements by crowding into the stadium. The 17,000 paying fans filled the stadium beyond capacity while at least 2000 were sent away for lack of space. *La Nación* featured a photograph of the “great multitude” of baseball fans (Figure 3.6) that cheered the Dominican Selection to victory and applauded the Cubans’ efforts in a climate of “frank camaraderie,” which overflowed to the striking workers and owners at *El Caribe*, who settled the strike just in time to devote a full page to the game. *Guayubín* Olivo gave the hometown fans a reason to cheer as he held the Cubans to one run during his five innings on the mound and the concordance of Dominican bats, led by Felipe Alou’s two doubles and a single, carried the Dominican Selection to a 4–1 victory.

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168 “Selección Dominicana Vence Al Conjunto Cubano 4 x 1; Partido Se Desenvuelve Sin Alterarse el Orden,” *La Nación*, 2 de noviembre de 1962, 10.

169 Rafael Martorell, “Criollos Ganan en Inauguración Serie: Asistencia Record Colma Instalaciones de Estadio,” *El Caribe*, 3 de noviembre de 1962, 18. *El Caribe* reported attendance of 19,000 while *La Nación* (*ibid*) reported 17,000 in paid tickets and another 2,000 fans who had to be sent away because they arrived late, though it is unclear whether they were sent away for arriving late—perhaps because of one of the measures by the Council to ensure order—or for lack of space. Capacity for the Estadio Quisqueya was projected as 16,000 in 1955.
The multitude of fans gathered in the Estadio Quisqueya and the camaraderie among Dominicans evidenced the Council’s good work in maintaining order and supporting unity over political divisions. Baseball was the tool of choice. As Felipe Alou remembered in his 1966 autobiography, the Council saw baseball as “the best tension-reliving device” amid the political unrest that plagued the nation in the winter of 1962. The reasoning, according to Alou, was that “a few hours at the ballpark would

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170 *La Nación*, 2 de noviembre de 1962, 10.

171 I have come across little primary-document evidence of the specific efforts by the Council of State to organize the tournament, but secondary sources, including Alou’s autobiography and a note about the tournament in Rafael Emilio Yunén, ed., ¡Nos vemos en el play! Béisbol y cultura en la República Dominicana (Santiago de los Caballeros: Centro Cultura Eduardo León Jimenes, 2008) define the Series as a Council project. Documentary evidence shows that the Council offered the Series similar support to that Dominican Governments offer to the Winter League, but provides little insight into the Council’s role in actually organizing the tournament. See, Núm. 24935, 27 de octubre de 1962, el Presidente Rafael Bonnelly a la Secretaría de Estado de Finanzas, SEDEFIR 16572, which authorized the Secretary of Finance to exonerate the series from all federal and municipal taxes.
divert the minds of the Dominican people from thoughts of revolution, riots, and mayhem.”172 The national ballplayers as well as the Cuban exiles backed the Council’s plans by playing in the series, despite objections by US Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick, and continued to build on their promise to their compatriots “to continue fighting to raise the Dominican flag to the highest pedestal of history.”173 Baseball provided peace as “those heavily armed men and boys apparently figured that they could have a revolt any ol’ time, but a baseball game, well, that was something else.” Baseball provided a moment of normality amid chaos. At the same time, the presence of the Cuban professional ballplayers in Santo Domingo, Santiago, and San Pedro rather than Cienfuegos, La Habana, and Mariano furthered the message of democracy’s superiority over communism. Democracy, even a budding democracy, allowed professional baseball to flourish; communism uprooted it.

The focus on the order and camaraderie at the first game of the series and La Nación’s credit to the Council’s good measures to ensure peace brought the government into the fraternity among players and fans. El Caribe’s full-page spread on the inauguration of the series included a photo of Director of Sport Hazim throwing the first pitch while team directors and players—including Dominican Selection manager baseball legend Pepé Lucas, Cuban Big Leaguer Camilo Pascual, and Dominican pitcher Guayubín Olivo—smiled in the background. (Figure 3.7) Similar photos, subbing Hazim with local governors or mayors, accompanied briefings on the games played in


San Pedro de Macorís and Santiago: government officials of all levels sought to associate themselves with the series. As an editorial on the front page of *La Nación* after the Council spoiled the plot by López Molina declared, Dominicans relied on the Council to protect them from those who wanted to hand them over to the Soviets. The Council could not forget its responsibility to investigate insidious forces as it pursued its mission to lead Dominicans to elections and to “preserve democracy and liberty, achieved by great sacrifices by the Dominican people, at all costs.” Dominicans would achieve elections and later democracy under the leaders who wisely used baseball to unite Dominicans and quell disorder.

![Figure 3.7: Pitch of Honor.](image)

Director of Sports Bienvenido Hazim Egel is throwing the ball. The identities of the other men in suits is unknown. The ballplayers looking on appear to be Pepe Lucas in the Escogido uniform, Camilo Pascual in the Washington jersey, and Guayubín Olivo in the Licey uniform.

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175 *El Caribe*, 3 de noviembre de 1962, 18.
The real victory for Dominicans was the proof that the sporting ideal could be achieved at home, despite the tensions and instability caused by the assassination of Trujillo and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Cuban-Dominican Series not only united Dominicans in baseball fellowship, but it demonstrated their embrace of the American democratic fraternity in their support for the exiles and their cause. Columnist Salvador Bernardino declared the baseball series evidence of the power of sport to bring people together as he distinguished “the culture that these ballplayers demonstrated on the field of play” and the players and fans’ signs of caring as they “moved from one side to another, applauded their spectacular plays, and listened to the notes of the anthem of [the Cubans’] beloved country with the same reverence with which they listened to the Dominican anthem, that of the liberated country (patria liberada).”\(^{176}\) The game and the solidarity that he saw the Dominican fans and players offer the Cuban exiles inspired Bernardino to declare “Bendito Sea el Deporte” (Blessed Be Sport) with the title of his column. Dominicans may have gone to the game with “thoughts of revolution, riot and mayhem,”\(^{177}\) but they left the Estadio Quisqueya with a spirit “free from polarizing problems, from bickering, and full of solidarity.”\(^{178}\) Sport had achieved its end.

\(^{176}\) Salvador Bernardino L., “Facetas del Deporte: Bendito Sea el Deporte,” La Nación, 6 de noviembre de 1962, 11. “Lo importante es adquirir la cultura que da conocer estos peloteros en el terreno de juego y la satisfacción de confraternizar hoy más que nunca con hermanos que necesitan recibir muestras de cariño como las que esa noche les prodigó aquella muchedumbre que los vió moverse de un lado a otro, que aplaudió sus jugadas espectaculares y que escuchó con reverencia las notas del himno de su patria amada, con la misma solemnidad que oyó el himno dominicano de la patria liberada.”

\(^{177}\) Alou with Weiskopf 119.

\(^{178}\) Bernardino, 6 de noviembre de 1962, 11.
Though Dominicans had to wait three days for their next baseball installment, Game 2 in the Estadio Cibao in Santiago continued the celebrations of baseball fraternity and Dominican baseball prowess. After a fairly easy victory over the Cuban Stars in Game 1, the Dominican Selection entered the ninth inning of Game 2 trailing 6–3. A hit by Yankees farmhand Elvio Jiménez scored Pirates minor leaguer Félix Santana, who led-off the inning with a pinch-hit walk, and brought the score to 6–4 with the tying run at the plate in Felipe Alou. Alou connected his first hit of the evening to move Jiménez to third. Ricardo Joseph, who played in the Giants’ minor league system before his Big League debut with the Kansas City Athletics in 1964, earned his third hit of the night to score Jiménez and Alou and bring Julián Javier to the plate with the game tied at six. Hailed the hero of the game, particularly in front of the home-town crowd of his Winter League Aguilas Cibaeñas, Javier singled, scoring Joseph and bringing the Dominican Selection its second consecutive victory.179

The first two victories helped fuel enthusiasm for Game 3 as newspapers hyped the pitchers’ duel expected for the next night between Marichal and Minnesota Twins ace Camilo Pascual.180 The matchup was a truly special occasion, a product of the times in the sense that the cancellation of professional baseball in Cuba had sent Pascual to the Dominican Republic to face Marichal. Not even in the United States, where Pascual


played in the American League and Marichal in the National League did these two meet. Dominicanas eagerly anticipated seeing Pascual, coming off his first 20-win season, against hometown hero Marichal, whose 18–11 record helped the Giants to their National League Pennant. The pitchers did not disappoint. Though the underdog in the matchup, Marichal outshone Pascual, leading the Dominicans to their third-straight win over the Cubans with a 5-inning, 7-strikeout, 1-hit performance. The rare matchup was truly legendary, as one column described the scene at the Estadio Quisqueya, where “Stars of the great pastime [. . .] walked the lawn.”

“There was light and liberty,” the columnist noted, as the fans came to the stadium to see “the duel they only dreamed of.” The columnist expected that Dominicans would remember the duel and the camaraderie and sportsmanly anticipation that surrounded it for the rest of their lives: “Years will pass. Baseball, as is logical, will produce episodes ten or one-hundred times—to be exaggerated—better than the other night.” Yet, the columnist imagined that decades later the baseball fans of the present would sit on rockers, recounting Marichal’s great feat “with a placid smile, eyes closed by the pious hand of memory” as their

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181 Ph, “Con los Spikes en Alto: Marichal frente a Pascual,” El Caribe, 8 de noviembre de 1962, 14. “Estrellas del gran pasatiempo, encabezadas por el dominicano Felipe Rojas Alou y los cubanos José Azcue y Leo Posada, pisaban la grama del estadio.”

182 Ibid. “Había luz y libertad. Pero los fanáticos allí reunidos sencillamente habían ido a ver el duelo jamás soñado por ellos.”

183 Ibid. “Pasarán los años. El beisbol, como es lógico, producirá episodios diez o cien veces—para ser exagerados—superiores al de anteanoche. Quizás jóvenes dominicanos con ambición y talento, lleguen en mayor número que ahora a las arenas de la Gran Carpa y quizás—¡Ojalá!—alguno de ellos logre superar la hazaña de Marichal.”

184 Ibid. “Y se quede dormido con una plácido sonrisa, cerrados los ojos por la mano piadosa del recuerdo.”

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grandchildren fall asleep in their laps.\textsuperscript{184} Marichal’s victory over Pascual would transcend the times as part of the story of Dominicans’ ascent in baseball and democracy.

Marichal on the mound and the Dominican Selection’s third-straight victory over the Cuban Stars gave Dominicans faith in a peaceful future, but dangers—and not just the threat of communism—lurked, threatening even the sanctity of baseball. Political and sports commentator Max Alvarez in his column \textit{Paliques Deportivas} and sportswriter Tirso A. Váldez hijo reacted to what they imagined as vestiges of the Trujillo Era infiltrating the Estadio Quisqueya in columns formatted as open letters to Council President Rafael Bonnelly.\textsuperscript{185} During the pitchers’ duel Alvarez had witnessed an usher refuse a group of journalists entry to the press box, saying that a high government official had directed him to reserve the seats. Evoking images of the Trujillo Era, Alvarez described the official as someone who “presented a disconcerting and bewildering image, the same as yesterday: pistols, iridescent guayabera, and a lack of respect for the norms that regulate the interiors of sports stadia.”\textsuperscript{186} Váldez clarified Alvarez’s allusions, identifying the group as \textit{La Cofradía}, a club of ruffians and enforcers led by Trujillo’s youngest son Rhadamés, and the uniform of brightly colored guayaberas and pistols they donned while doing the bidding of the dictator or committing other acts of mischief. Although Váldez’s response was more of a personal attack against Álvarez, whom he


accused of participating in the *Cofradía*’s unscrupulous acts, the exchange reminded Dominicans that some elements in society wanted to maintain the privileges they had enjoyed under Trujillo. Not everyone saw elections as a path to a democratic society of economic opportunity and political participation for all. Some saw elections as a means for maintaining and even institutionalizing their privileges. Still, Dominican baseball stadia would be havens for democracy.

The reappearance of the *Cofradía* in the Dominican press reignited efforts that equated communism with *trujillismo* to raise Dominican awareness of the dangers of communism during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Baseball united Dominicans not just for elections but in the struggle against communism. Just after the Cubans arrived in Santo Domingo, *El Caribe* explained in an editorial titled “The Extremes Touch” (*Los Extremos se Tocan*) that the *Cofradía*, the same youth who had cried over the dictator’s corpse, had been involved in a late-October uprising that involved pro-communist slogans in San Pedro de Macorís. As with articles about Castro during the Missile Crisis, the editorial saw the threats posed by Castroism and by Trujilloism as equally dangerous to the Dominican efforts to create a democratic society. The day before Álvarez and Váldez

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188 Editorial, “Castro como Trujillo,” *La Nación*, 7 de noviembre de 1962, 1; Editorial, “Los Extremos Se Tocan,” *La Nación*, 31 de octubre de 1962, 1. The earlier editorial, applied the term “Los Extremos Se Tocan” to the current situation in the Dominican Republic, because of an alleged secret meeting between representatives of *trujillismo* and communism in the country. The editorial cited recent disruptions in Puerto Plata and San Pedro de Macorís, promoted by former *trujillistas*, some of whom belonged to the “sadly famous gang” *La Cofradía*, that now belong to another gang under another leader but with similar ends—presumably destabilizing the government. While the “Castro como Trujillo” editorial sought to discredit Castro and communism as ruthless dictators, “Los Extremos Se Tocan” discredited communists operating in the country as self-interested pretenders.
lamented the presence of the Cofradía in the Estadio Quisqueya’s press booth, La Nación had warned that Castro and Trujillo had similar objectives to “dismember democracy [. . .] in order to supplant it with a dictatorial regime that will annul all liberties.”

Later, an editorial titled “Castro and Our Democracy” reported that Trujillo and Castro had a deal against attacking each other on the radio, where their citizens might become enamored with the other leader’s promises. Trujillo and Castro were both to blame for the instability that threatened democracy in the Dominican Republic, but with the Dominican dictator dead, Castro was free to attack democracy on his own. Castro “constantly incited the commission of violent acts, strikes, etc., [. . .] to benefit the plans of the continental communist subversion.” Dominicans understood that the battle against Trujillo continued, but the arrival of the Cuban exiles, and growing concerns over

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189 Editorial, “Castro como Trujillo,” La Nación, 7 de noviembre de 1962, 1. “El propósito es el mismo aunque sean distintos los caminos que llevan a él: Desmembrar la democracia venezolana para suplantaría por un régimen dictatorial, en el cual quedarían anuladas todas las libertades.” The editorial compared Castro’s alleged incursions in Betancourt’s Venezuela in 1962, denounced by the OAS, to Trujillo’s attempts on Betancourt’s life, which resulted in the sanctions against the Dominican Republic in 1960 (see Chapter 2). Earlier editorials had also equated Trujillo and Castro, defending Dominican support for the blockade against Cuba during the Missile Crisis against accusations of interventionism by comparing the blockade to the OAS sanctions against Trujillo in 1960. The sanctions and blockade, the editor argued, were not against the people, but supported by them. “Por lo contrario. El pueblo aprobó y defendió el mantenimiento de esas sanciones, que indudablemente contribuyeron al desmoronamiento de la tiranía.” See, Editorial, “La Actitud Dominicana,” La Nación, 26 de octubre de 1962, 1.

190 Editorial, “Castro y Nuestra Democracia,” La Nación, 14 de noviembre de 1962, 1. The editorial appeared at the bottom of the front page, which featured the headline “Bonnelly Denuncia Campaña Subversiva Castrista en el País.” The lead story of the day reported on the reactions of various Council Members to their realization that Radio Habana was actively calling on Dominican military members to leave their positions in the blockade against Cuba to join the “Movimiento de Liberación Dominicana,” presumably a communist insurrection led by Cuban troops.

191 Ibid. Cuban radio stations, the editorial explained, “incite constantemente la comisión de actos de violencia, huelgas, etc., y que tergiversa, en provecho de los planes de la subversión comunista continental.”
communism in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis shifted their attention to communism.

By Game 4 of the series with the Cuban exiles, with Pedro Ramos on the mound and the banners denouncing Castro and communism, Dominicans had largely accepted communism as their primary foe. Salvador Bernardino, the same sports columnist who had hailed “Blessed Be Sport” after experiencing the fraternal camaraderie among Dominicans and Cubans during Game 1, denounced the slogans on the field. Such slogans, Bernardino charged, divided society, which detracted from the purpose of sports.¹⁹² Yet by Game 5, the anti-Castro demonstration was integrated with the pre-game ceremonies. The banners peeked through from behind San Pedro Governor Juan Manuel Ortiz Acevedo as he threw the first pitch. The caption explained that the youth later walked to the Cuban team and offered its members a Dominican and a Cuban flag, “telling them that Dominican youth share the pain of the exiled Cubans in seeing Cuba under the bloody claws of Communism.”¹⁹³ (Figure 3.8) The appearance of the “Fidel ‘K’astro ¡Asesino!’” banner behind the Governor of San Pedro de Macorís and Director of Sport Hazim implied official sanction of the youth’s demonstration and projected their solidarity as the national feeling. The baseball field reaffirmed the Dominican Republic’s anti-Castro and pro-democracy stance.

¹⁹³ La Nación, 9 de noviembre de 1962, 10. These photos accompany the article, San Pedro de Macorís, SEN, “Estrellas Dominicana [sic] Obtienen 4ta. Victoria Frente a Cubanas.”
The political expression and the Dominican bats forced Ramos out of Game 4 after the Dominicans rallied for six runs during the fifth inning. Vicente López, who replaced Ramos, allowed the Dominicans to score another two runs, but the Cuban bats were perhaps inspired by the camaraderie. The Cubans took their first victory of the series, beating the Dominican Selection 10–8. Lest the failure of the Dominican team to complete their comeback after forcing Ramos from the game give credit to Bernardino’s warning about the divisive effects of politics on sport, the confidence Dominicans had in their ballplayers manifested itself in San Pedro de Macorís for Game 5. Nine thousand Dominicans crowded into the Estadio Oriental, the smallest baseball stadium in the country with a capacity listed as eight thousand, for what *El Caribe*’s San Pedro correspondent Rafael Martorell declared “the most hard-fought of the games celebrated to this point.” Felipe Alou pushed in the winning run on an error after consecutive

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194 *La Nación*, 9 de noviembre de 1962, 10.

singles by pitcher Simón Pérez, Julián Javier, and Elvio Jiménez, to solidify a 4–3 victory
to the Dominican team. Though anyone who saw Game 2 in Santiago’s Estadio Cibao
might have disagreed with Martorell that the victory in San Pedro was the hardest fought
of the Selection’s four victories, the exciting Game 5 victory raised the Dominican lead in
the Series to 4–1, leaving the country electrified for the three final games.

Game 6 did little for Dominican nationalism as the Dominican Selection fell
victim to an outstanding complete-game performance by Cuban pitcher José Ramón
López. López dominated batters, holding the Dominicans to only one run while his
compatriots nailed the Dominican starter, Julio César Imbert, for four runs in the first
inning and another in the second. Dominican relievers Octavio Acosta and Simón Pérez
had little more luck as the Cubans posted a total of eight runs. Despite two hits each by
Julián Javier and Roberto Peña and other contributions, the Dominican team saw their
lead in the Series fall to 4–2.196

With little good news to report after the stomping the Dominican Selection
received at the hands of the Cuban Stars in Game 6, the newspapers the next day looked
ahead to the final two games of the Series, proceeds from which would go to charity. The
Dominican team put forward its strongest pitchers for the final games of the series and
expected to see Marichal on the mound to face Pascual again in Game 7 and Guayubín
Olivo against Pedro Ramos in Game 8. Along with promoting the excitement expected
by the showdowns between the Big League pitchers, La Nación and El Caribe also

196 For results of the game, see Ezequiel Casas, San Pedro de Macorís, “cubanos Superan a
Dominicanos en Partido Beisbol: Se Enfrentan Esta Noche en el Estadio Quisqueya,” El Caribe,
10 de noviembre de 1962, 17; San Pedro de Macorís, “Estrellas Cubanas Apabullan Equipo
Estrellas Dominicanas,” La Nación, 10 de noviembre de 1962, 9.
sought to draw attention to the games for the goodwill expected. The opening sentence of La Nación’s report in anticipation of Game 7 reported that this Marichal-Pascual meeting would benefit a campaign for social assistance while El Caribe included a small headline that offered more detail on the group of women leading the efforts to have a percentage of gate receipts donated to “various groups in charge of realizing works of social assistance in this city.”

A true expression of fraternity, Emilia S. De Tavarez, Esther Sturla, Nora S. De Hernández, and other middle- and upper-class women had worked with Director of Sports Hazim to have the players of both the Cuban Stars and the Dominican Selection agree to give up a portion of their pay to help the cause. As expected from the camaraderie that characterized the entire Series, “the Cuban as much as the Dominican players proved pleased to be able to contribute to good work of this magnitude.”

The generosity of the players and the efforts of the women in charge of the social assistance campaign derived from the democratic spirit and Dominican ideas of what a democratic society meant. For many Dominicans, the society they wanted to build required that the men, women, and organizations that had benefitted from the clientelistic policies of the Trujillo Era help those who had been left behind. And they responded.

The same day that Dominicans welcomed their World Series representatives home, La

197 “Campaña Asistencia Social; Criollo Juan Marichal Lanzará Contra Cubano Camilo Pascual; Guayubín Vs P. Ramos Mañana en Estadio Cibao,” La Nación, 10 de noviembre de 1962, 9; “Dedicarán Obras Sociales Porcentaje de Juegos,” El Caribe, 9 de noviembre de 1962, 12.

198 “Dedicarán Obras Sociales Porcentaje de juegos,” El Caribe, 9 de noviembre de 1962, 12. “Las gestiones de las damas ante los representantes de los equipos fueron realizadas por intermedio del director general de deportes, señor Bienvenido Hazim Egel, quién expresó tanto los jugadores cubanos y dominicanos se mostraron complacidos de poder contribuir a una obra de bien de esa magnitud.”
*Nación* reported that two prominent Dominicans, George Chottin and Dr Juan Luis Castellanos, had donated land to the Director of Sports to be used for baseball, basketball, and tennis practice. Located in the Ensanche Ozama, a working-class development on the east side of the River Ozama, the new installations would reach the youth who needed sport to help them break the cycle of poverty. The article declared that Mr. Chottin and Dr. Castellanos “have joined the national sporting spirit in ceding land for the construction of sporting installations that our country needs so badly,” and then recognized similar donations by the Camisas Cub factory in the María Auxiliadora sector, where a stadium now stood, and by Radio Santo Domingo for the construction of two volleyball-basketball courts.\(^{199}\) By donating land and raising money, men and women like Chottin and Emilia de Tavarez and businesses like Camisas Cub contributed to the “Estímulo Deportivo” led by the Dominican National League champions and other ballplayers. The sporting spirit supported the Council, which unified Dominicans for elections by first bringing them together in sport.

The night of November 10, 1962, Guayubín Olivo took center stage in the Estadio Quisqueya instead of Juan Marichal to face Camilo Pascual to try to ensure a series victory for the Dominican Selection. Both teams batted well: the Cubans earned 11 hits to the Dominicans’ 10. The Cuban Stars, though, did a better job of hitting with runners on base and took the game by the lopsided score of 9 to 3. Sportswriters found little to say about the crowd at the game and little to report aside from the plays leading up to the runs scored by each team. *El Caribe* included a photo of students with the “Cuba será

\(^{199}\) “Ceden Terrenos Para Construcción De Instalaciones Deportivas,” *La Nación*, 18 de octubre de 1962, 11.
“Libre” banner and explained that “sympathizers with democracy exhibited this banner in which is reflected the Cubans’ anxiety for liberty” but the scene came from Game 5 in the Estadio Oriental and the report on the game mentioned no demonstration in the Estadio Quisqueya. The photo simply continued the narrative of anti-communist-solidarity. As the Series drew to a close, sportswriters worked to embed the spirit of democratic camaraderie in the consciousness of Dominican baseball fans everywhere.

Game 8 of the Series brought Marichal to the mound against Pedro Ramos in the final exhibition of Dominican-Cuban democratic solidarity, this time held in Santiago. Puerto Rican sports commentator Rafael Pont Flores, who was familiar to many Dominican baseball fans, greeted those at home on the radio and exulted in his opportunity to see Marichal and Ramos pitch for the first time. The two-week celebration of Caribbean unity culminated in an exciting game that saw the Dominicans score two runs in the third inning while Marichal stayed true to form to hold the Cubans run-less. The Cubans bounced back to tie the game in the fourth, with a well-aimed throw by Felipe Alou preventing the Cubans from taking the lead by getting Hilario “Sandy” Valdespino out at the plate. Alou stepped up with the bat in the next inning as he doubled to push in Roberto Peña for a run. The Dominican lead did not last as the Cuban bats forced Marichal from the game in the bottom of the fifth, when the Cuban Stars scored a run and threatened more. Though the Dominican Selection took the lead again in the top

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200 “Cubanos Obtienen Tercer Triunfo en Serie de Beisbol; Marichal y Pedro Ramos Lanzan Hoy en Santiago,” El Caribe, 11 de noviembre de 1962, 15. The caption read: “Simpatizadores de la democracia exhibieron esta pancarta en la que se refleja el ansia de libertad de los cubanos, momentos antes de iniciarse el partido de beisbol profesional entre Estrellas Cubanas y Estrellas Dominicanas en el Estadio Oriental, de San Pedro de Macoris. El partido fue ganado por los criollos 4 a 3 carreras.”
of the sixth with Julián Javier’s RBI-double pushing in the pitcher Rolando Rivas and Roberto Peña, who made it to base on singles, the Cuban team continued its hit parade in the bottom of the inning and scored two. The bats on both teams were silent for the final three innings with the game ending in a 5–4 victory for the Cubans and the Series tied at four games apiece.

The “Cuba Será Libre” and “Fidel ‘K’astro ¡Asesino!” banners present for Game 8 punctuated the Series with a clear expression of Cuban-Dominican unity against Castro and communism. Although Dominican sportswriters conveyed their surprise at losing the final three games after defeating the Cubans “easily” in the first half of the Series, the 4–4 series tie seemed appropriate for the manifestation of democratic unity. Dominicans pausing to read El Caribe’s lead Editorial before passing to the second section for the results of the game extended the fraternity at the game throughout the continent. The editorial defined Castro as the loser of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which showed him to be “a poor puppet of Soviet imperialism” rather than a “heroic revolutionary with an intrepid vision of social justice.”

Most importantly, the Missile Crisis strengthened the ties of solidarity among the democratic nations of the American continent and united them to call for the elimination of Castro. A report that a group of Cuban exiles, known as Alfa 66, was prepared to enter Cuba to destabilize the Castro government as soon as the naval blockade ended seemed to answer the call and implied Dominican support for the group. Meanwhile, the Dominican and Cuban Stars demonstrated Dominicans preference for

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201 Editorial, “Debe Ser Liquidado,” El Caribe, 12 de noviembre de 1962, 6. “Castro ya no luce como un heroico revolucionario con una audaz visión de la justicia social, sino simplemente como un pobre títere del imperialismo soviético.”

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democracy over communism. Dominicans had gathered peacefully in baseball unity and
donated funds in the democratic spirit while others throughout the Americas felt
threatened by communism. Baseball left no questions over the future of democracy in
the Dominican Republic—at least not until after elections, when Dominicans had to work
out the specifics for achieving the democratic society they imagined building through a
democratic revolution.

On December 20, 1962, just over a month after the Cuban exiles returned to the
United States, Dominicans fulfilled their duty as democratic citizens and cast their votes
for one of the presidential candidates and for their selections for representatives to the
Constitutional Assembly that would create a new constitution as the basis of a democratic
society. Juan Bosch, a social democrat with ties to liberal Latin-American democrats like
Venezuela’s Rómulo Betancourt and Costa Rica’s José Figueres, won 60% of the vote
and enjoyed a PRD majority in the Congress as well. After months of uncertainty and
more-than 30 years of dictatorship, Dominicans were back on the path toward progress
and civilization. As the El Caribe cartoon labeled “Our Example to America!” (¡Nuestro
ejemplo a América!” Figure 3.9)\textsuperscript{202} symbolized, the Dominican Republic would be
known for democratic leadership as well as its baseball prowess.

\textsuperscript{202} “Our example to America!” El Caribe, 22 de diciembre de 1962, 6.
The success of elections confirmed the place of the Dominican Republic as the “showcase for democracy” that US Ambassador Martin had promised and democratic leaders from across the Americas gathered in to the Dominican Republic to celebrate the inauguration. In the days leading up to Juan Bosch’s swearing-in, held on February 27, 1963 to correspond with the 129th anniversary of Dominican Independence, the front page of *El Caribe* reported on the arrival of democratic leaders such as Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt, Puerto Rican Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, and former Costa Rican President José Figueres. Just as baseball had brought the Cuban exiles to the country to celebrate American fraternity months before, democracy provided an occasion for celebration in February. For Dominicans and others in the Americas, these events were connected. Dominicans inaugurated their first democratic president amid a

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*Editorial, “¡Nuestro ejemplo a América!,” El Caribe, 22 de diciembre de 1962, 6.*
nationalist celebration of sport in the Sporting Week (*Semana Deportiva*) organized by the Director of Sports. The sporting spirit reached the United States, too. Robert Cantwell’s “Invasion from Santo Domingo” article in *Sports Illustrated* two days before the inauguration described Dominican unity behind baseball and in carrying out elections. Baseball and democracy were both parts of the continental unity and plan for progress. Cantwell’s article and the reiterations of support for democracy by Latin American leaders and US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson brought US sports fans and supporters of democracy throughout the Americas into the Dominican cause.

The “‘spirit of cooperation and mutual respect among nations of our hemisphere’” that Johnson attributed to the Alliance for Progress predominated Cantwell’s report on Dominican baseball fraternity to US audiences. With more than fifty Dominicans expected to play in the United States in the 1963 season, Cantwell described a “wholesome satisfaction that the rest of the world has at last awakened to a knowledge of how good the local players really are” buzzing through Dominican society. Cantwell traveled to the Dominican Republic to fuel US baseball fans’ respect for Dominican ballplayers, whose efforts were making the island “a major producer of per capita baseball talent.” For US readers, Cantwell created a mystique around Dominican ballplayers as he described an “intangible element, a legendary quality” behind their


205 Henry Raymont, “Vicepresidente Johnson Ofrece Apoyo a Bosch,” *El Caribe*, 28 de febrero de 1963, 1. “Johnson señaló que él programa patrocinado por Estados Unidos es para desarrollar el ‘espíritu de cooperación y respeto mutuos entre las naciones de nuestro hemisferio.’” Raymont’s article appeared in *El Caribe* with no attribution to his employer, though he had been working with the *New York Times* since 1962 and was likely in the country to cover Johnson’s visit for that paper.
success that even Dominicans were unaware of. Cantwell portrayed Dominican accomplishments in the Big Leagues and US Baseball more generally as success against the odds, “something like the achievement of Jim Thorpe and Chief Bender and the Carlisle Indians in the days of Pop Warner,” or a kind of noble quality that US readers attributed to First Peoples who assimilated through baseball and other sports. Baseball brought Dominicans into their company.

Cantwell’s description of the baseball fraternity between Dominicans and US Americans echoed the “special obligation” that US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Bartlow Martin had described as reason for the US backing to the Dominicans, who “rightly” looked to the United States for help in creating a new

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206 By the “achievement” of Chief Bender (Charles Albert “Chief” Bender) and Jim Thorpe, Cantwell referred to their ascent to the Big Leagues in the early 20th century and their general assimilation to European-American, US society. Glenn Scobey “Pop” Warner was a college and high-school football coach at the turn of the twentieth century and a founder and namesake for the Pop Warner youth football league. Warner is perhaps most famous for coaching at the Carlisle Indian Industrial School from 1899–1903 and 1907–1914, where he coached Thorpe. Bender, who also attended Carlisle, and Thorpe are among the best-known Native American athletes and were among the first non-white players to break into US professional baseball. The Carlisle Indian Industrial School was the first boarding high school for Native American children, founded on the belief that Native American children needed to be immersed in European-American society to gain the skills to advance in society. Though well-intentioned in its hopes to educate children in the skills they needed for success in US society, the Indian Schools have been controversial for their emphasis on assimilation at the cost of children’s native culture, including religion, language, and even their names. The controversy was lost on Cantwell here.
society. Baseball ties went back decades, predating the recent prominence of Dominicans in US Baseball. The story of Horacio Martínez, the bird-dog scout (buscón) who signed Felipe Alou and Juan Marichal for the Giants, intimated the depths of these connections. A father, or “Pop Warner of Dominican baseball,” Martínez symbolized the intimacy of baseball connections between the United States and Dominican Republic.

Martínez played for Licey in exchanges against visiting US teams, who were attracted to the Dominican Republic in part by the reputation that he and others like his good friend Enrique Lantigua had created while playing in the Puerto Rican and US Negro Leagues.

Martínez lived in the United States during his time as part of the New York Cubans team in the Negro National League. His positive experiences in the United States, even when traveling to southern cities, where Cantwell implies that Martínez experienced Jim Crow Laws and racism, left Martínez with a great impression of the United States: “‘I loved the United States. [. . .] I am a Dominican, and I am a citizen of the Dominican Republic, but I still loved the United States, too.’”

As Cantwell reflected on Martínez’s role in fomenting baseball in the Dominican Republic and in building the baseball connections between the Dominican Republic and the United States.

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207 Martin shared this perspective with US officials during his assignment as an advisor about the situation in the Dominican Republic to the Kennedy Administration leading up to elections. “Memorandum: Political Reconstruction of the Dominican Republic,” January 30, 1962, 1, in Box 44, Folder 2: Ambassador’s Journal January–December 1962, John Bartlow Martin Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Martin argued for full-US backing to the Dominican Republic: “Today, for the first time in a generation the Dominican people have an opportunity to create a free society. It is the duty of the United States to help them. We wish to assist people everywhere that are choosing liberty. History—the Marine occupation, the close vote on annexation, our past relations with Trujillo—lays on us a special obligation to the Dominicans. Rightly, they look to us for help. And if we succeed here, where Trujillo fell as Batista fell next door, if we can prevent a Castro-esque betrayal of the Dominican people’s revolution, if we can create a showcase of democracy alongside Castro’s dismal Cuba, we will have won a diplomatic victory that will resound not only throughout Latin America but around the world.”
the United States, he also revealed the long histories behind the two nations’ baseball
fraternity and the lengths to which this fraternity stretched. Baseball united the countries
of all of the circum-Caribbean. Cantwell recounted one origin myth for Dominican
baseball that attributed the first baseball game to a Puerto Rican teacher living in the
country and told readers that a Venezuelan, Numa Parra, came up with the idea of putting
together an all-star selection to challenge the powerful Licey Baseball Club—the
selection that became Licey’s rival, Escogido, or “The Chosen” in 1921. After the
Almendares visited from Cuba in 1920, the continental connections behind Dominican
baseball deepened. The first visit to the country by a US Big League team happened in
1936 when the Cincinnati Reds played a series. A team known as Concordia (Concord),
which featured Luis Aparicio, the father of the Chicago White Sox star of the same name,
and Josh Gibson of Negro League fame, visited the country regularly beginning in 1934.
The flow of talent between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico was such that before
the foundation of the Dominican Winter League in 1955, Dominican players such as
Guayubín Olivo and his brother Federico “Chichi” played as natives on Puerto Rican
teams. Dominican teams returned the favor as they organized the return of professional
baseball, and professional sportswriting.208 This exchange of talent, players, and
strategies created a transnational baseball circuit that brought together ballplayers,

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208 As an example of the baseball ties between the Puerto Rican and Dominican Leagues, see
Juan E. Gautreau’s condemnation of Dominican teams for not choosing enough Puerto Rican
players as reinforcements in “Es Atentado Contra Criollos Exclusión Players Boricuas,” El Caribe,
20 de abril de 1951, 10. Max Alvarez announced the visit by the Puerto Rican sportswriter Guido
Ortiz in his November 11, 1962 column, Paliques de Actualidad, in El Caribe, saying “The veteran
writer is one of those men who know how to tend bridges of fraternity between peoples (pueblos)”
(2). Ortiz contributed to the same edition of El Caribe as with the publication of a column,
Bombones, in which he quipped about Dominican baseball and the Selección-Estrellas series, 11.
coaches, and fans from Canada to the coasts of Venezuela. Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Venezuelans, united in baseball fraternity along with US Americans, Canadians, Panamanians, Nicaraguans, Costa Ricans, and others. Baseball united the Americas.

The Cuban-Dominican Series continued this transnational baseball fraternity. The competition between all-star rosters representing their respective countries harkened back to the first visit by Almendares while the presence of Puerto Rican Roberto Clemente at some of the games, and Puerto Rican sports broadcaster Rafael Pont Flores’ greeting to Dominican fans during the Marichal-Ramos showdown reminded Dominicans of the strong baseball ties among the nations of the Spanish Caribbean. The arrival of representatives from democratic countries across the Americas for the inauguration in February demonstrated that this unity extended to politics as well as baseball.

Cantwell was careful to show that this fraternity extended to politics for Dominican baseball fans as well. After explaining that the Dominican Winter League season was suspended because of fears of revolt given that “even in ordinary times the tumult during a close game can be astonishing,” Cantwell informed readers that “baseball could have been played daily without disturbing public safety in the slightest.”

209 Adrian Burgos, Jr., describes this transnational baseball circuit and argues for its influence in the social and cultural history of the nations involved. See, Playing America’s Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

210 Originally, Puerto Rican players like Clemente and Pagán were slated to reinforce the Dominican team, though they sat—likely because Frick denied permission for Big Leaguers to participate. See, “Team Estrellas Dominicanas Es un ‘Hueso Dur de Roer,” La Nación, 27 de octubre de 1962, 6; “La Selección Dominicana Demuestra Poder al Bate Durante las Prácticas; Jugarán Contra Conjunto De Estrellas Cubanas,” La Nación, 30 de octubre de 1962, 8. El Caribe reported on Clemente’s presence at the inaugural game and noted that he originally wanted to play with the Dominican side but was held back because of an injury, see “Clemente Observa Juego Inaugural Serie Beisbol,” El Caribe, 3 de noviembre de 1962, 18.
than endanger peace, baseball created a sense of calm that contrasted with the tensions in
the rest of the hemisphere around the Missile Crisis. “There was quite a bit of tension
that night in Cuba” as the Dominican and Cuban teams took the field for the first game,
but “in the superb Quisqueya Stadium in the first city in the Western Hemisphere there
was nothing but good baseball, noisy relaxation and cheers.” The calm that had
permeated the baseball stadium reached through society with elections: “Just before
Christmas more than a million previously voteless citizens went quietly to the polls [. . .]
without fights, riots or disorder, as if the entire nation had decided to give a
demonstration of democratic goodwill in action.” Society shared the legendary quality
that Cantwell attributed to ballplayers like Manuel Emilio Jiménez, who worked for three
years at the Santa Fe sugar mill before rising as a star for Kansas City. Dominicans
had risen from relative obscurity and dictatorship to set an example of democracy for the
Americas much as their ballplayers had risen from sugar mills to baseball’s biggest stage.
The calm of elections and baseball had made the Dominican Republic “the sanest place in
the Caribbean.”

Martínez’s professed love for the United States and Cantwell’s treatment of his
story exemplified the complexities of the US-Dominican political and social relationship
as Dominicans worked to rebuild their nation. Just as Cantwell ignored the controversy
and racism behind the Carlisle Indian School, he dismissed Dominican experiences with

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211 Cantwell says that Jiménez came from the “little sugar-mill town of Consuelo,” but Jiménez
and his family, including his younger brother Elvio Jiménez, came from the Santa Fe mill.
Cantwell’s confusion is understandable given that the mills were relatively close to each other in
the city of San Pedro de Macorís. Elvio Jiménez, interview with the author, June 16, 2012, Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic.

212 Ibid.
US racism and, even more shocking, those of African Americans in the United States.

During his playing days, Martínez had traveled throughout the United States, including cities known for their adherence to Jim Crow. Cantwell emphasized the positive as he explained: “Like most Dominicans, who do not experience racial segregation at home, Martínez did not share the sense of exclusion—or the bitterness—of many US Negro ballplayers, and places like Savannah and Charleston, as well as New York, were romantic and hospitable for him.” Such an observation likely warmed white US readers to Martínez and other Dominican ballplayers, but it dismissed black Americans’ real struggles against racism and segregation by portraying their demonstrations and protests as originating in bitterness, or bad attitudes, rather than structural issues in US society. Dominicans, in contrast to black US Americans, celebrated US society and the opportunities it afforded, even if their skin color limited their access to all those opportunities.

The parallels that Cantwell drew between Dominicans and First Peoples such as Jim Thorpe and Charles Albert “Chief” Bender continued the narrative of the United

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213 The experiences of black Americans from the United States and other countries has been documented well in popular media and scholarly work about the US Negro Leagues. A striking scene in the movie 42 pictured Jackie Robinson being refused entry to the restroom in a rural gas station where his Negro League team, the Kansas City Monarchs, had stopped to refuel. After Robinson told the attendant that they would purchase their 100 gallons of gasoline at a more accommodating location, the attendant complies. For more scholarly approaches to the US Negro Leagues and black baseball more generally, see Robert Peterson, Only the Ball Was White: A History of Legendary Black Players and All-Black Professional Teams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Rob Ruck, Sandlot Seasons: Sport in Black Pittsburgh (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993). On the experiences of Latin-American ballplayers in the United States, in the Negro Leagues as well as US Organized Baseball, see Adrian Burgos, Jr., Playing America’s Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). On the New York Cubans, see chapter 6, “Making Cuban Stars: Alejandro Pompez and Latinos in Black Baseball,” 111–140. Martínez appears in a photo of the New York Cubans in this chapter, see p125.
States as a hospitable land of opportunity and hinted at the importance of white, US American men as the gatekeepers to these opportunities. Through the coaching and leadership of men like Pop Warner, Jim Thorpe and other Native Americans successfully became part of the US sporting fraternity. But the implication was that these men had relied on the benevolence of white men and US leaders like Warner to shake off their backward culture and rise to the place in the sun of mainstream America. Dominicans had proved their competence and democratic credentials with the baseball successes of men like Martínez, Alou, and Jiménez, and with the legendary qualities of their “demonstration of democratic goodwill in action” in the December elections. But to men like Cantwell and US Ambassador Martin, achieving a democratic society to withstand the challenges of communism required US leadership—and a society that fit US objectives for democracy in the region. Cantwell hinted at some of the tensions that would arise as a result of this insistence on US leadership when he shared Dominicans’ obsession with the origins of baseball on their island—and especially their insistence that baseball predated the US occupation in 1916–1922—and when he described the $250 fine that Commissioner of US Baseball Ford Frick imposed against Felipe Alou and other Big Leagues who participated in the Cuban-Dominican Series. But in February 1963 those tensions were submerged below the inaugural celebration and the start of the 1963 US baseball season. Dominicans and US officials seemed in the same mind about these tensions as Horacio Martínez was about the fines: “something can be worked out.”

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214 Cantwell, “Invasion from Santo Domingo,” SI Vault.
Conclusion

The San Francisco Giants’ rise from seasons of disappointment and underperformance to a World Series berth culminated in Game 7 at San Francisco’s Candlestick Park, the Giants down 1–0 at the bottom of ninth inning. Matty Alou, pinch hitting in the pitcher’s spot, gave the Giants hope with a bunt-single to lead off the inning. The next two batters, Felipe Alou and Chuck Hiller, struck out and brought up Willie Mays, who was robbed of an extra-base hit in the seventh by Tom Thresh’s one-handed catch in the left-field corner. Mays hit a crucial double to the right field corner to move Matty Alou to third and give Willie McCovey, who had tripled against pitcher Ralph Terry in the seventh, the chance to be a hero. McCovey got Giants fans out of their seats with a strong fly ball that looped foul. The bullet line-drive that McCovey hit on the next pitch may have been a hit in other games, but it was an easy catch for Yankees second-baseman Bobby Richardson, who remembered in 2007 that had moved to his left after McCovey’s foul because he expected Yankees pitcher Ralph Terry to throw a curveball. Richardson’s heads-up play secured the World Series victory for the Yankees and left Matty Alou stranded ninety feet from home.

In the Dominican Republic the welcome reception for the World-Series runners-up and the country’s other baseball ambassadors to the United States made no distinction

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between first and second. Whether they ended as World Series Champions or National League pennant-winners, Dominicans had played at the highest echelons of world baseball. This success, and later the camaraderie, sportsmanship, and fraternity in the Cuban-Dominican Series, ensured that Dominicans would cling to professional baseball as a way to exalt the name of their nation both at home and abroad.

As Castro’s denunciation of professional baseball as “enslaved baseball” (béisbol esclavo) in 1961 and the exile of Cuban ballplayers to the United States made clear, communism endangered professional baseball. Dominicans who had also seen how dictatorship, embodied by the atrocities committed by Ramfis Trujillo in the wake of his father’s assassination and the resulting terror and curfews that undermined the 1961–1962 Winter League season, limited the celebration of professional baseball. Democracy was the only way to ensure that professional baseball would flourish on the island and remain under the ownership of the people.

Baseball united Dominicans in the pursuit of a democratic revolution, placing the nation at the forefront of a continental struggle for democracy that promised to make the Dominican Republic a showcase for democratic revolution. The problem, however, was that, as in all revolutions the common cause of democracy and baseball brought together factions with conflicting and sometimes outright oppositional views of the details of the democratic society created through the revolution. Wealthy Dominicans such as George Chottin and Dr Juan Luis Castellanos could demonstrate their sporting and democratic spirit by donating baseball fields, but achieving the ideals of “not only political democracy, but also economic democracy and social justice” that Juan Bosch promised in
his inaugural address would test the spirit of Chottin, Castellanos, and other privileged Dominicans.\textsuperscript{217} Baseball obscured the tensions within Dominican society and those between the United States and the Dominican Republic to allow for elections. Though “a few hours at the ballpark would divert the minds of the Dominican people from thoughts of revolution, riot and mayhem,”\textsuperscript{218} Dominicans could not escape the political realities of the Cold War or their own political uncertainty. As long as the politics were confined to the baseball field, where the expressions focused on unity and camaraderie, Dominicans could remain positive about the future of their democracy. When Dominicans stepped off the field or out of the stands, however, they confronted the political and social divisions that had threatened their democracy from the beginning.

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\textsuperscript{217} “Ejecutivo Lee Discurso Tras su Juramentación,” \textit{El Caribe}, 28 de febrero de 1963, 10. Bosch promised that “\emph{el Gobierno que se inicia hoy espera un trabajo continue para darles a los dominicanos un puesto bajo el sol entre los países avanzados de América}.” Reaching this place in the sun would require cooperation between the President and Congress to form a legal basis for a democratic society: “\emph{Solicitamos del Congreso Nacional las leyes indispensables para afirmar en este país no sólo la democracia política, sino también la democracia social y la justicia social}.”
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\textsuperscript{218} Alou with Weiskopf, 119.
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Chapter 4
Debating Democracy: The Triumvirate, the United States, and the Limits of Baseball

On Wednesday, October 23, 1963, the front-page headline “Olivo Guides Team Licey to Triumph” greeted Dominicans as they drank their morning coffee or picked up a newspaper on their way to work. The night before, Licey’s veteran southpaw Diómedes “Guayubín” Olivo dominated the Estrellas Orientales hitters and even batted in the winning runs as he led the Tigers to a 2–0 victory in the 1963–1964 Dominican Winter League opener. Sportswriters invested the game with Biblical proportions, likening Guayubín’s two-RBI hit against his younger brother Federico “Chichi” to the fatal blow that Cain gave his brother Abel.219 (Figure 4.1)

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219 See, Ph, Con los Spikes en Alto, “¿Cain, que has hecho con tu hermano?” El Caribe, 23 de octubre de 1963, 6.
Though Dominican sportswriters often used Biblical or other allegories in their descriptions of baseball games, the Biblical proportions with which they invested the 1963–1964 Dominican Winter League season went beyond mere exaggeration. The 1963–1964 season represented a return to normality less-than thirty days after a military coup replaced the first democratically elected government in more than thirty years, presided by Juan Bosch, with a de facto civilian government. Knowing that Dominicans were eager for the return of the deporte rey after political turmoil caused the two previous

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220 Miche Medina, *El Caribe*, 24 de octubre de 1963, 6. The crow in the bottom, who often carried the punchline to Medina’s cartoons, said “The story is repeated with Guayubín and Chichi. Cain killed his brother Abell!” The Tiger in the cartoon congratulated Olio: “Oh, Guayubín, how tastily you cook elephant in sauce! I can’t complain about your service!” Guayubín, holding a pack of cigarettes made by the company sponsoring the ads, responds “That’s not all! Here I have the best.”
winter seasons to be truncated and canceled, Bosch had started working with League officials as early as July 1963 to prepare for the nation’s first professional baseball season under a democratic government.221 Though more a literary than athletic man himself, Bosch understood that Dominicans looked to the professional baseball season in their country as a measure of their modernity and, since the end of the Trujillo Regime, their progress to democracy. Under Bosch, preparations for a professional baseball season beaconed Dominicans’ return to peace.

But in 1963, that beacon was extinguished before the season began. As Dominicans turned from the front page to the continuation of the report on Guayubín’s fratricide on page 6, they were reminded that this baseball season signaled anything but peace and political stability. The military had trampled Dominicans’ voices by ejecting Bosch, whom Dominicans had elected with 60% of the votes, and then handing the reins of the country to a civilian government headed by members of the very party that Dominicans had voted against. Police guarded a fence outside the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD, Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo) to prevent violence and protests among the students, who organized regular demonstrations to denounce the coup and demand a return to constitutionality. Meanwhile, editorials in El Caribe and other papers warned Dominicans to accept the new government, known as the Triumvirate, as protection against dictatorships of the extreme right or the extreme left. As the Triumvirate sought to establish control and assert its legitimacy, baseball

221 Documents about the 1963–1964 campeonato are scare, though there is evidence that Bosch met with Dominican League representatives early and made arrangements for concessions such as exonerations for baseball equipment. See, EX 9689, 23 de julio de 1963, Vice Ministro de Finanzas Dr. Luis María Guerrero G., al Director General de Deportes via el Ministro de la Presidencia, SEDEFIR 16567.
served as a lid to contain disorder. But the Triumvirate would learn after the 1964–1965 season that even baseball had limits.

Members of the Triumvirate Government knew that Dominicans looked forward to the 1963–1964 baseball season and moved quickly after the coup to assure their countrymen that the season would continue as planned. Juxtaposing their success in organizing the season and in expanding professional baseball with an interleague tournament against Bosch’s pleas to Big League team presidents, the Triumvirate demonstrated its competence and concern for the Dominican people. The credits to the Triumvirate government for its baseball support contrasted with regular paid spaces in El Caribe that denounced Bosch and many members of the PRD as communists and incompetent leaders for a national development project. The Triumvirate demonstrated its leadership in international relations by winning permission for US players to participate in the Winter League season and securing arrangements for an Inter-League Series with the Venezuelan League—despite the suspension of diplomatic relations between the Triumvirate Government and the governments of the United States and Venezuela. Through baseball, the Triumvirate government hoped to establish a feeling of normality and stability to garner Dominicans’ faith in the unelected government.

At the same time, baseball provided Dominicans a space to express their concerns with the Triumvirate and to assert their own ideas for the government they wanted to see in their country. Baseball fans expressed their expectations for the baseball league and for players through their attendance at baseball games—or by staying home. Sportswriters interpreted these actions for other baseball fans and for Dominicans less engaged in the national pastime. They projected political implications onto these events
as they saw fit, even communicating Dominican suspicions of the Triumvirate’s use of baseball for political objectives and of the Winter League’s manipulation of games for financial profit. As Dominicans grew more disillusioned with the promises of democracy that had united them for the Cuban-Dominican Series in 1962, not even baseball could unite them. Fans and sportswriters criticized their national baseball heroes for a perceived lack of loyalty and attacked a delegation of Big Leaguers from all over the Americas with stones and insults. The baseball fraternity and democratic solidarity that had united the hemisphere for the *Semana Deportiva* and Bosch’s inauguration unraveled as the Triumvirate continued in power and consistently delayed Dominican hopes for a new, democratic society.

Just as Bosch enjoyed a honeymoon period after his inauguration of baseball and democracy, baseball held the nation together through most of April 1965. But when Dominican ballplayers returned to the United States, Dominicans went to the streets as they had in 1961 and again demanded a government that would build a democratic society. The civil war that resulted revealed just how deep the divisions that underlay the 1962 elections were. The military was divided. Some supported the Triumvirate for its US support, stance against communism, and incentives to business leaders. Others demanded constitutionalism and the return of Juan Bosch as the means to honor the people’s right to choose their leaders. The Triumvirate’s continued policies in favor of foreign and national business interests while the material conditions of the masses deteriorated with high food costs, low wages, and continued unemployment exacerbated these divisions. After Bosch’s inauguration in February 1963 through the civil war and occupation in 1965–1966, Dominicans who expected democracy to raise their nation to a
“place in the sun” realized just how many visions of that place and the path to it existed. Bosch’s ideals of a nation where the majority of the population had economic security, education, and a political voice required changes to the nation’s political and economic structures—such as the government’s relationship to private enterprise—that powerful Dominicans were unwilling to give up. These men and women embraced a more conservative view of a democratic revolution, one that raised citizens through a government-supported model of private industrialization. Hopes for a democratic society that provided all citizens political participation and economic security persisted, but Dominicans were no longer united on how to proceed in creating that society.

**Understanding Democracy: Bosch and the Opposition**

The baseball festivities and hope that united Dominicans for the 1962 elections and the *Semana Deportiva* leading to Bosch’s inauguration had pushed competing conceptions of democracy below the surface through the first month of the new presidency. The rhetoric of a democratic revolution united Dominicans across their social divides and allowed them to look to the United States as a partner in their project to raise their nation to new heights through democracy. Early in the Bosch presidency, however, the tensions and conflicts obscured by the baseball fraternity of the Cuban-Dominican Series and inauguration revealed themselves. After a brief honeymoon period when editorials continued their pleas that Dominicans wait patiently for democracy to work, criticism against the Bosch Government and its policies surfaced. Baseball continued to provide a platform for Dominicans on both sides of any issue to express what they imagined for the future of the nation and what “democracy” would look like in the
Dominican Republic. The debates centered on the place of private property and private enterprise in Dominicans’ democratic future and the government’s role in supporting industry, commerce, and business—especially as that role related to efforts against communist organizers. Along with cartoons and editorials, reports through mid-September 1963 about preparations for the Winter League Tournament scheduled to begin in late October provided a measure of Dominicans’ faith, or lack of faith, in Bosch as a leader for the democratic revolution.

Juan Bosch enjoyed a honeymoon period with newspaper editors and columnists during the campaign and the first month of the new government. Drawing on Dominicans’ enthusiasm for baseball, their faith in the sport as an omen of national progress, and the camaraderie of the Cuban-Dominican Series, editors projected their support for democracy and for Bosch through baseball. The ebullient celebrations of each achievement on the way to elections advantaged Bosch and his PRD. After Bosch and Buenaventura Sánchez were chosen as the party’s presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the PRD’s October 1962 convention, La Nación printed the “PRD Line-up” (Figure 4.2) depicting them as pitcher and catcher. The publication of such a cartoon for the PRD but not for the UCN, the other leading political party, or any of the smaller parties celebrated the progress represented by the first electoral convention and furthered the PRD’s leadership in democratic practice. Bosch’s speeches against the privileged classes and campaign trips to the interior had already earned him the title of

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222 Bosch was unhappy with the selection of Sánchez at the Convention because of his suspected ties with strongman (and Trujillo assassin) Antonio Imbert, so Sánchez was later replaced by the young physician Armando González Tamayo.
candidate of the popular classes, but the cartoon went further, portraying him as the Dominican nation’s pitcher months before he took the mound as President-elect in the *Semana Deportiva*.

Bosch’s reputation carried over into the inauguration celebration and the *Semana Deportiva* (Sports Week) that brought athletes from across the nation together in the capital. Sport, and especially baseball, provided a language of political debate that Bosch seized in his speeches to all classes to rally his popular base. Sport was the perfect site to bring Dominicans together for the celebration of the country’s independence and the inauguration of the first democratic president in three decades. As still President-elect Bosch stood on the mound to throw out the first pitch in the opening game of a Babe

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Ruth League series, he recounted pitching eight scoreless innings as a youth in La Vega. This glorious experience, he hoped, would inspire Dominicans in the crowd to withhold their criticism of the bad throw he was about to make from the mound. His baseball glory was confined to youth. Although he likely had not attended a ballgame in decades, his prior participation in the national pastime confirmed Bosch’s credentials as a good Dominican. Bosch assured Dominicans that he was confident of the nation’s future success with the Dominican people catching the pitches he would make from the National Palace. Bosch was the pitcher; the Dominican people would be the catcher, telling him which pitches to throw and receiving his attempts to comply.

The baseball-laden images and metaphors around democracy and its meanings continued during the Bosch Government and reflected the new boundaries of political debate set by the rhetoric of a democratic revolution, or the idea that democratic reforms would undo the existing social inequities and economic divisions without bloody civil war. Political opinion and civic education would have to appeal to public sentiment, and baseball provided that appeal. As criticisms against Bosch and the PRD government rose in the first months of democracy, columnists and editors focused on Bosch’s actions to improve conditions in the nation. Just as they had with the Council of State, editors cautioned patience. They also expressed support for Bosch against his critics (Figure

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4.3). Another example of Biblical metaphors, editors showed Saint Juan Bosch, a comparison to Saint John the Baptist, at bat while two pitchers, one labeled generally as “Opposition,” the other “UCN,” prepared to hurl baseballs at the batter. The dialog at the bottom of the cartoon—“Let he who is without sin throw the first ball!”—responded to advertisements and radio announcements denouncing Bosch that were paid for by the defeated UCN presidential candidate Viriato Fiallo and other members of the opposition. The editors at La Nación conceded that the new President would make mistakes, but they reminded Dominicans that the first democratic president in three decades was ready to go to bat for his team, the Dominican public.

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225 See, for example, Mario Bobea Billini, “Un Hecho Positivo en los 30 Días del Gobierno” El Caribe, 28 de marzo de 1963, 7; J.H. Hernández, “Fe y Confianza,” El Caribe, 28 de marzo de 1963, 6; Figure 4.3, “La Oración,” La Nación, 21 de marzo de 1963, 4.
Eventually, Bosch’s honeymoon with the press ended and tensions that existed before elections bubbled to the surface. The first break in the calm came from reactions by the business class to the Constitution of 1963 promulgated in April. Germán Ornes, the owner-editor of *El Caribe*, had congratulated the Congressional Assembly in early March for “acting more like Dominicans than like party-men” and endorsed the first fifteen constitutional articles. His congratulations extended to confidence that the Assembly would promulgate “a document that at the same time that it guarantees all the benefits of culture, liberty, and social justice to the Dominican people, ensures that the same are realized in a framework of economic progress for all the classes that make up

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Dominican society.” Yet the final version of the Constitution disappointed Ornes and his confidence in the Assembly disappeared. The Constitution of 1963 included provisions, known as the Confiscations Law (Ley Confiscaciones), for government expropriation of land attained through extralegal means, such as the favors that prevailed during the Trujillo Regime. The law outlined the means by which the government could confiscate and reimburse land from large holdings (latifundia) to provide land for the Agrarian Reform that Bosch planned as part of the Alliance for Progress. Although landowners would be compensated for confiscated land, Ornes and others argued that the Confiscations Law countered the protections for private property inherent in an economic democracy. For businessmen like Ornes, an economic democracy provided political protections for capital. Dominicans of the popular classes saw no need to distinguish among types of democracy, however. For them, a democratic society should offer economic security for all, just as the Agrarian Reform was designed to do.

To gain popular support against the Confiscations Law, El Caribe turned to baseball. (Figure 4.4) A man dressed in a baseball uniform, representing the “Diputados” (congressmen), took cover as a furious bat labelled “Opinión Pública” (Public Opinion) swatted a baseball labelled “Ley Confiscaciones” back to the pitcher. An analogy to the diputados pitching the law to the public and having it rejected, the cartoon suggested a common, popular front against the law. Baseball projected a

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227 Editorial, “Signo Reconfortante,” El Caribe, 10 de marzo de 1063, 6. “Es muy posible que si ese espíritu de comprensión se conserva a lo largo de todos los trabajos de la Asamblea Revisora llegue a lograrse felizmente la estructuración de la carta fundamental que la nación realmente necesita: un documento que al tiempo que garantice todos los beneficio de la cultura, la libertad y la justicia social al pueblo dominicano asegure que los mismos serán realizados en un marco adecuado de progresos económicos para todas las clases en que se divide la sociedad dominicana.”
common voice for what democracy meant and the government role in protecting it despite deep differences. Businessmen like Ornes saw the Law as a threat to private property, which went against their understanding of democracy as the protection of individual property for industry. In their minds, confiscations threatened the wealthy individuals who would lay the foundations for an economy that would raise the whole of society. Meanwhile, supporters of the Confiscations Law saw it as a means to redress the personalism and favors of the Trujillo Era and to adjust the structures that continued to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few. The Confiscations and Agrarian Reform would give Dominican with less an opportunity to rise on their own. Society would progress by extending access to more citizens. In presenting his own views of Bosch’s economic plan as “Public Opinion” while obscuring the others, Ornes raised doubts even among those who hoped to benefit from PRD policies. Seeing no benefits from democracy thus far because of Bosch’s refusal to spend public funds as he tried to balance the budget, Bosch’s supporters started to listen to such criticisms.  

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Reactions against the Confiscations Law were only the beginning of the conflicts between the PRD government and the national and foreign business interests in the nation. The tensions manifested during the organization of the 1963–1964 winter season and undermined Bosch’s efforts to ensure the return of the deporte rey. Winter League and team officials habitually requested funding from the government to underwrite their relationship with US Organized Baseball for which they paid $6000 annually. Bosch put up no resistance and pledged the government’s financial backing as early as July 1963, more-than three months before the start of the tournament. And he went further. A little more than a month before the start of the winter season, Bosch wrote to the

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230 Documents about the 1963–1964 campeonato are scare, though there is evidence that Bosch met with Dominican League representatives early and made arrangements for concessions such as exonerations for baseball equipment. See, EX 9689, 23 de julio de 1963, Vice Ministro de Finanzas Dr. Luis María Guerrero G., al Director General de Deportes via el Ministro de la Presidencia, SEDEFIR 16567. *El Caribe* referred to the financial backing in the report on Bosch’s letter to the team presidents. See, “Presidente Bosch Pide Dejen Jugar a Nativos En Próximo Campeonato; Petición es Hecha a Ligas Mayores,” *El Caribe*, el 10 de septiembre de 1963, 10.
presidents of four Big League teams to confirm their permission to allow top Dominican players, including the Rojas Alou brothers, Juan Marichal, Julián Javier, and Ricardo Carty, to participate in the tournament.\footnote{In reports summarizing the letter, \textit{El Caribe} demonstrated the President’s commitment to the national pastime and his recognition of baseball’s importance to Dominicans. Bosch imagined a continuation of the baseball fraternity from the Cuban-Dominican Series and inauguration when he announced plans for inter-league tournaments against the Puerto Rican and Venezuelan Leagues in addition to the four-team Dominican League Tournament. But Bosch understood that Dominicans expected the best players to participate. As he told the team presidents: “‘With the help of the Government, four teams from this country will start a national tournament in the coming month of October, but it is indispensable that the Dominican people see their best ballplayers participating in this tournament.’”} Knowing the faltering enthusiasm for his administration, Bosch tried to rekindle the sporting spirit that had united the nation for elections.

The conflict came in what appeared to be foot-dragging on the part of Winter League and team officials, many of whom were part of the industrial and business classes. Despite Bosch’s pledges of government financial support and his instructions to the Ministry of Finance in July that funds be sent to the Winter League, US Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick claimed in mid-September that he had not yet received the

\footnote{“Presidente Bosch Pide Dejen Jugar a Nativos En Próximo Campeonato; Petición es Hecha A Ligas Mayores,” \textit{El Caribe}, 10 de septiembre de 1963, 10.}{Ibid. “Con la ayuda del Gobierno, cuatro equipos de este país iniciarán un campeonato nacional en el próximo mes de octubre, pero es indispensable que el pueblo dominicano vea jugando en ese campeonato a sus mejores peloteros.”}
Winter League’s dues. Without the fee, no Big Leaguers, regardless of their nationality, would be allowed to play in the Dominican Winter Tournament. Without Dominican Big Leaguers, the tournament would be pointless. The Winter League and team officials appeared to support the tournament under Bosch in July, when Bosch agreed to exonerate the tournament and any necessary sporting equipment of all taxes. Still, the Dominican Winter League directorship had many holders on from the Trujillo Era, including League Secretary Dr. Arístides Alvarez Sánchez and League President Julio Cuello. Perhaps Winter League officials distrusted Bosch’s pledge of support and delayed paying the fee to US Baseball to protect their losses; maybe they knew of plans for Bosch’s ouster. The disjunctures between the government and the League in the organization of the tournament suggested that politics were behind the tournament and the perceived inability of Bosch to ensure it. The desperation that many likely perceived in Bosch’s appeals to Big League teams and the persisting questions over whether they would see national stars like Juan Marichal in the tournament undermined Dominicans’ faith that Bosch could lead the democratic revolution they expected.

The business class was not against democracy. In fact, many actively supported the ouster of the Trujillos and celebrated the return of democratic governance. The tensions between Bosch and his active opponents centered in differences in what they imagined from the democratic revolution. Ornes’ congratulations to the Constitutional

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233 Domingo Saint-Hilaire hijo, “Comisionado de Beisbol Dice Virgil y Hernández Pertenecen a Puerto Rico; Aguilas Buscan Dos Sustitutos,” El Caribe, 19 de septiembre de 1963, 18.

234 EX 9689, 23 de julio de 1963, Dr. Luis María Guerrero G., Vice Ministro de Finanzas, al Director General de Deportes via el Ministro de la Presidencia, SEDEFIR 16567.
Assembly after the initial 15 articles offered a glimpse of these tensions. He appropriated the language of the “democratic revolution” fomented by the Alliance for Progress in his call for a “revolutionary Constitution,” calling on the Assembly to create “a document that at the same time that it guarantees all the benefits of culture, liberty, and social justice to the Dominican people, ensures that the same are realized in a framework of economic progress for all the classes that make up Dominican society.” His caveat that the document focus on all classes reflected the suspicions that his class held against the PRD government and its view of Bosch as an “impractical dreamer and dangerously leftist liberal, if not worse.” The words “if not worse” suggested that a lack of support for privileges for the business and industrial classes such as those that Trujillo had exercised for his own industries would reveal Bosch as a communist. Ornes and his associates believed that the best way to ensure the nation’s democratic, political stability lay in economic progress and development. Development required government incentives for industrialists. Bosch’s hesitation in granting those privileges reflected, in the minds of the industrialists, “disorientation which is translated into a notable absence of information regarding what can be expected for the Dominican government in relation

236 Ibid, my emphasis.
238 For analysis of Bosch’s relations with the Dominican business and industrial class, see Rafael Francisco De Moya Pons (Frank Moya Pons), “Industrial Incentives in the Dominican Republic 1880–1983,” PhD diss., Columbia University, 1987. I have not checked the membership in the Asociación de Industrias, Consejo de Hombres de Empresas, or the political group Acción Dominicana Independiente for Ornes’ name, but Moya notes in his dissertation that El Caribe represented the interests of the industrial class in Santo Domingo during this period.
to capital investment." The industrialists saw only these incentives as evidence of a legitimate government policy toward capital. Any other policy they saw as communist-inspired.

The lack of clarity that Ornes perceived resulted from differing objectives. While men like Ornes who profited from industrialization believed that industry was inherently good, Bosch wanted to ensure that the country’s development benefitted “the great masses.” As a social democrat like leaders in Venezuela and Costa Rica, Bosch saw reform of the nation’s economic and social structures as his primary objective. The redistribution of land and wealth, as laid out in the Alliance for Progress and its support for democratic political reforms and socio-economic policies such as Agrarian Reform, were essential. Bosch’s reluctance to approve an Industrial Incentives Law designed by groups of industrialists reflected his understanding of the conflicting interests over which he presided. He hesitated to approve the incentives because he recognized the likelihood that they would undermine his commitment to the popular classes, many of whom suffered low wages and poor treatment as a result of prior government favors to the industrialists. At the same time, Bosch needed the support of these industrialists and

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241 Rafael Francisco de Moya Pons, “Industrial Incentives in the Dominican Republic, 1880–1983” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1987), 146–162, argued that groups of industrialists actively worked to discredit and, later, overthrow the Bosch government in 1963 because of their perception of his disregard for their interests. According to Moya, Bosch’s hesitation in granting them the same privileges that Trujillo had provided for his own industries combined with their distaste for redistributionist policies like the Confiscations Law to push them to organize the September coup.
other traditional powerholders in the Dominican Republic, including the military and Catholic Church, to pursue the public-private partnership at the backbone of the Alliance for Progress development programs. Bosch’s belief in the rhetoric of the democratic revolution as a true revolution, one that would bring structural change and redress decades of inequity, likely placed him in opposition to the incentives as written. But his understandings of the political power behind those economic interests caused him to delay—perhaps until he could design a reasonable alternative. Meanwhile, the popular classes grew disillusioned over the President’s promises to lead the Dominican Republic to a place in the sun.

The confrontation between Bosch and the industrialists began just five weeks into the administration and escalated throughout his coup-shortened presidency. As the conflict mounted, the industrialists attacked Bosch’s democratic credentials by portraying him as too easy on communism and suggesting that perhaps he harbored communist sympathies of his own. The propaganda derived from Bosch’s belief that in a democratic society all citizens, even those with communist leanings, had the freedom to publish and participate in the national dialogue and debates about society. Allowing the Dominican Communist Party and its sympathizers to exercise these civic freedoms, Bosch reasoned, would prevent its members from radicalizing and challenging the government through armed conflict as was happening to Betancourt in Venezuela.242 Bosch’s opponents, including the Council of Businessmen, which, as one member told Dominican historian

Frank Moya Pons “‘was created to overthrow Juan Bosch,’” argued that Bosch’s policies were bad for business. An Open Letter published in mid-September 1963 warned Dominicans that the government’s permissiveness toward communism and “just its presence in our Fatherland” had already limited employment by disuading capital investments and contributing to the loss of international credit, “which is the fortune of all.” The letter demanded that Bosch act quickly to prohibit the existence of “Parties that are not organized ‘for peaceful and democratic means.’” If the President refused to take prompt action, the signees warned, they would be forced to “take our own, efficient, and definitive actions.” Seven days later, a group of military officers emboldened by faltering popular enthusiasm and the successful propaganda campaign barricaded Bosch in the National Palace and forced his resignation. The national camaraderie exalted

243 Moya Pons 151, especially note 8.

244 Espacio Pagado, “Carta Abierta al Señor Presidente de la República Profesor Juan Bosch,” El Caribe, 12 de septiembre de 1963, 15. The signees rejected Bosch’s platform to allow communists freedom of expression: “Lisonjear al comunismo, temporizar con él, con el propósito de desbravarlo, de neutralizarlo, de lograr que no haga daño, equivale al absurdo de cebar la fiera selvática en la cándida esperanza de que nos prodigue caricias.” And then they recounted the damage the just the presence of communism had already caused and would lead to in the future: “Su sola presencia en nuestra Patría, no ha ocasionado ya irreparables pérdidas y males. Si la economía pública y privada padecen, y en algunos casos orillan la bancarrota, obra es de los frenéticos asociados al Kremlin. El más osadom el más temerario inversionista se guarda mucho de ofrecernos su valioso concurso. Hemos pues perdido el crédito internacional que es la fortuna de todos, no hemos podido abrir fuentes de trabajo, que es el pan de cada dominicano, y la miseria, hermanada a los reclamos de la justicia, amagan con desatar una conienda en que no habrá ni vencidos ni vencedores, sino sangre, escombros y ruina total.” Luckily, the letter argued, the President had the tools to end this threat at his hands: “Por suerte, Señor Presidente, usted tiene en sus manos los medios eficaces para extirpar de cuajo el mal. El Artículo 67 de nuestra Ley Fundamental, desautoriza la existencia de Partidos que no estén organizados ‘para fines pacíficos y democráticos.’”

245 Ibid. “Si nuestra esperanza de una rápida respuesta nos defraude [the letter said that the urgency of the request and Bosch’s upcoming departure for Mexico required a response the next day], contra nuestro querer, por encima de nuestros deseos, nos veremos forzados, obligados, constreñidos, a interpretar so silencio como una negativa, y a tomar nuestras propisa, eficaces y definitivas medidas.”
during the Cuban-Dominican Series and the Semana Deportiva had endured less-than seven months.²⁴⁶

**Bosch, the United States, and Fractures in American Fraternity**

The US-Dominican fraternity surrounding the Dominican Giants and US Ambassador Martin’s pledge to uphold a “special obligation” to Dominican democracy crumbled along with the national sporting spirit and democratic unity. The fines that US Commissioner Ford Frick charged against the Dominican and Cuban players for participating in the exhibition series, to which *Sports Illustrated*s Robert Cantwell referred at the end of his February article, sparked criticisms against structural issues in the US-Dominican and US-Latin American baseball relationships. Felipe Alou explained the extent of the discrimination, misunderstandings and cultural adjustments that Latin-American players suffered in their journey to the Big Leagues in an article published in *Sport* magazine in November 1963. Dominicans who read the article focused on Alou’s criticisms of the undue influence of the US Baseball Commissioner in their country and on the disrespect they perceived Latin-American players falling victim to while in the

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²⁴⁶ Most scholars agree with the contemporary US government evaluation of the reasoning behind the coup as centered in the assumption that Bosch had communist ties—in part because of their reliance on US documents such as the Briefing Papers from October 10, 1963, Box 5, 3151: Records Relating to the Dominican Republic, 1956–1966, RG 59, NARA. Still, Piero Gleijeses, who used Dominican sources as well, emphasized the importance of the lack of popular support Bosch could rely on after almost seven months in office because of his austerity as well as poor administration, disorganization, division in the PRD, and a lack of full US support. Others, such as Dominican scholar Frank Moya Pons, emphasized the tensions with the business class—the perpetrators of the coup. See, Piero Gleijeses, *La Esperanza desgarrada: La rebelión dominicana de 1965 y la invasión norteamericana* (Santo Domingo: Editora Búho, 2012); Rafael Francisco De Moya Pons (Frank Moya Pons), “Industrial Incentives in the Dominican Republic 1880–1983” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1987). Bosch himself blamed the business classes, or the “tutumpotes,” and the Church, all who saw the privileges they had gained during the Trujillo Era ended by the 1963 Constitution. See, Juan Bosch, *Crisis de la democracia de América en la República Dominicana* (México: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Sociales, A. C., 1964).
United States. These issues and their parallels in the larger US-Dominican relationship rose to the fore after the military ousted Bosch and undermined the democracy that Dominicans had imagined and displayed through their collections and goodwill in the baseball stadiums.

Fissures in the US-Dominican baseball relationship started in early February when Dominicans read that Ford Frick imposed $250 fines on the Dominican Big Leaguers who had participated in the Cuban-Dominican Series: Felipe Rojas Alou, Guayubín Olivo, Julián Javier, and Juan Marichal. All the players were angered by the fines; Felipe Alou was the most vocal. Calling the fine an outrage (*arbitrariedad*), Alou told Dominican baseball fans that he would not pay because “‘We, as Dominicans, have the right to play in our country.’” After Alou signed his contract with the Giants, which offered him a raise of $8000 to bring his salary to $25,000 for the season, he continued his stance against the fine. An Associated Press report communicated Alou’s refusal to fans in the United States and the Dominican Republic and added Commissioner Frick’s assurances that Alou would pay the fine. Frick explained to sports fans that because the Cuban-Dominican Series was sponsored by a private promoter rather than the US Baseball-affiliated Dominican Winter League, the games were unauthorized. Perhaps trying to quell the nationalism of Alou’s argument that Dominicans had the right to play in their own country, Frick added that the Cuban players received heavier fines. Alou

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247 Rafael Martorell, Editor Deportivo, “Alou, Marichal, Javier Y Olivo Multados por Comisionado de Beisbol; También Cubanos Que Jugaron Aquí,” *El Caribe*, 5 de febrero de 1963, 12.

248 Ibid. Martorell quoted Alou, “‘Eso era una arbitrariedad,’ ya que nosotros, como dominicanos, tenemos derecho a jugar en nuestro país.”

continued to stand against the fine even after he arrived in Arizona for the Giants’ spring training.

Alou’s anger at the situation surrounding the fine continued, even after someone—reports conflicted over whether it was the Giants or Alou—paid the fine and Alou was allowed to suit up for practice. The issue, Alou explained, was not the fine or the money but what he interpreted as Frick’s assumed authority over baseball and ballplayers in the Dominican Republic. As Alou Sport magazine readers in November 1963: “Mr. Ford Frick is the Commissioner of baseball—even in my country, although he has never set foot in my country.”

The relationship between the Dominican Winter League and US Baseball, and the participation of dozens of Dominican ballplayers in US Baseball gave Frick greater influence over professional baseball in the Dominican Republic than even the acting President, Rafael Bonnelly. Alou defended his participation in the Cuban-Dominican Series by telling US readers that the government in the Dominican Republic “‘asked’” him to play, adding that “In 1962 my country was ruled by a military junta. When the military junta ‘asked’ you to do something, you did it.” Although Frick sent word the day before the series prohibiting the Big Leaguers from playing, Council President Rafael Bonnelly overrode the US Baseball official, telling the players: “‘I am

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Ibid 21. Alou’s description of the Council of State as a “military junta” was an exaggeration, but communicates the de facto status of the regime as well as the charged atmosphere in the country. Although most of the Council’s leaders were civilians, it had close relations with the National Police and military, especially through the Emergency Law, which allowed it to deport citizens suspected of having communist or trujillista ties.
the president of the Dominican Republic and I say that it is all right to play.”252 Alou reasoned that the highest executive of a sovereign nation had greater authority over the actions of citizens of that nation, and visitors to it, than a foreign business official.

Alou and the other ballplayers likely knew that Frick would fine them for playing, but they also understood the political and economic implications the Series had for the Dominican Republic and for the Cuban players visiting the country. The Series calmed political tensions in the Dominican Republic, gave all players the opportunity to recoup some of the wages they lost because of the cancellation of the Dominican and Cuban Winter League seasons, and represented a partnership for democracy between Dominicans and the Cuban exiles. With the Cubans already in the country and the Dominican players gathered, the Council backing, permission from Bonnelly, and Dominican fans excited to see their national heroes on their home fields, Alou explained that “We could have been threatened with $1,000,000 fines by Frick and there still would not have been any way for us to have avoided playing—unless we were willing to risk bodily harm.”253 The Cuban and Dominican players and the Dominican government officials knew what was at stake with the games. On the other hand, “Frick, who never understood Latins and their problems, had no concept of the political consequences of the three-game [sic] series, nor did he have any idea that once the games had been set up there was no way the Dominican people would have permitted big leaguers from their


253 Ibid 120.
country not to compete.”

Dominican ballplayers felt an obligation to their fans, one that Dominicans expected them to uphold.

Alou’s condemnation of the negative effects that Commissioner Frick’s lack of familiarity with the realities of Latin America caused for players from that region paralleled similar situations in the political realm. While the fine “brought to a head the problems facing Latin-American ballplayers in [the United States],” the coup and other tensions in Dominican politics revealed a gap in US understanding of Dominican realities. Although US officials, like Ambassador Martin, pledged to create a partnership with Dominicans through the Alliance for Progress, their perceptions of Dominicans as somehow backward or less-sophisticated caused them, like Frick, to treat Dominicans and their government and baseball officials as junior partners. Alou’s descriptions of the harmful and hurtful effects of misunderstandings of the “Latin temperament” echoed problems in the US-Dominican political relationship. Many of the hardships, particularly those surrounding the need to learn English and the lack of opportunities for Spanish-speaking Latin-American players on off-season speaking tours, were structural, but those that most bothered Alou centered on beliefs that Latin-American players “don’t care,” “don’t hustle,” are lazy, or have “no guts.” These stereotypes centered on beliefs, often

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254 Ibid. Reports about the series in the United States, often after the fact, varied on the number of games. Alou’s article in Sport described a 7-game series while the Cantwell article rightly reported on the 8-game series. Perhaps the discrepancy in Alou’s 1966 autobiography resulted from mis-remembering the details as Alou recounted the situation to Weiskopf.

255 Alou with Hano 76.


257 Alou with Hano 77–78.
repeated in the US press, that Latin-American players, and often African-American players, too, lacked an appreciation for the benefits of teamwork and individual sacrifice for the good of the team. Managers, the press, and even other players interpreted the sometimes-cheerful demeanor of Latin American players in the locker room, even after a loss, and their fraternization, often in Spanish, with Latin-American players on other teams as evidence that they did not play to win.

Alou explained the effects of these stereotypes to *El Caribe*’s Sports Editor Rafael Martorell just after Dominicans became aware of the *Sport* article. He shared an example of these “misunderstandings” in recounting that Giants Manager Alvin Dark told his team before the start of the 1963 season that he would expel all Latin-American players, except for Juan Marichal, if the Giants did not win the 1963 pennant. In targeting the Latin-American players, many of whom had made key contributions to the 1962 pennant race, Dark intimated to his team that a lost pennant could result only from the failure of players such as the Alou brothers and Puerto Rican Orlando Cepeda to play up to expectations. Alou defended himself and Cepeda against Dark’s accusations, citing their performances in 1962 as evidence of their commitment. Alou accumulated a 316 average, 99 runs batted in, and 25 homeruns while Cepeda hit above-300 with 35

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*Rafael Martorell, Editor Deportivo, “Felipe Alou Anuncia su Retiro del Beisbol; Relata Discriminación Contra Jugadores Latinos,” Caracas, El Caribe, 1º de enero de 1964, 12. Fears that Alou would retire soon likely resulted from his assertion in the *Sport* article that he planned to retire before he turned 32, maybe even as young as 30. Alou told readers that he turned 28 in May 1963. He intimated that he wanted to earn enough money to retire from baseball and return to the Dominican Republic: “I want to own a farm and have some cows. That is the life I want, not playing baseball at night, away form my home and family, in a country where I must resign myself to being an outsider.”*
homeruns and 114 runs batted in. To Alou, their performance on the field attested to the commitment of Latin-American players to the game, no matter how jovial they were in the clubhouse after a loss. The prevalence of the stereotypes that Latin-American players did not care and did not hustle caused managers like Dark to overlook or underappreciate Latin-American players’ contributions to team successes and the fact that they performed exceptionally well despite the struggles they faced learning a new language and living in a new culture.

US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Bartlow Martin and other US officials revealed a similar lack of respect or compassion for Dominicans’ everyday struggles. Although he understood that Trujillo’s personalism had stunted national development, Martin blamed Dominicans’ poverty on their lack of initiative, or a conception that they “don’t hustle” or “are lazy.” Martin’s visit to Neyba, a state in the southwest of the country, revealed this attitude. Seeing the alligators roaming the nearby Lago Enriquillo, Martin asked a man who lived there why he and his family did not to sell alligator hides for profit. When the man replied that the alligators in the Lago Enriquillo were more fierce than elsewhere, Martin dismissed his explanation as a mere excuse, or lack of initiative. He then wondered if the Dominican people had indeed tried everything, or had displayed hustle, to develop their country. Martin’s perception of their lack of hustle or effort led him to question whether Dominicans were able to rule themselves and lead themselves through democracy: “The trouble was that the

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259 Alou referenced stats for the 1962 season for both players. He cited his own stats in Martorell, *El Caribe*, 1 de enero de 1963; Cepeda’s stats are cited in Alou with Hano 78.

Dominicans didn’t seem very capable of ruling. People were always saying, ‘They must help themselves, we can’t do it for them.’ But could they? And if not, what then?”

Martin’s fatalism regarding Dominican capacity for self-rule led him to dismiss the prospects for a dynamic democracy in the Dominican Republic. Martin’s view that Dominicans lacked hustle and did not care informed his recommendations for “large-scale [US] American intervention in Dominican affairs.” He reasoned in January 1962, “If we do not intervene politically as well as economically now, we may some day be forced to intervene militarily.”

Bosch himself fit into Martin’s conception of Dominican men as “vain and proud and sometimes absurd,” many of them “only spoiled brats grown up.” While immediately after the coup Martin had defended Bosch’s commitment to the popular classes and the limits placed on his efforts by the structural legacies of dictatorship, Martin turned critical in his memoir, describing Bosch as “emotionally unstable, given to wild emotional swings.” A spoiled brat like other Dominican men, Bosch was a “reckless political plunger, willing to risk everything, including the democratic system itself, to gain a personal political objective.”

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262 John Bartlow Martin, Memorandum: Political Reconstruction of the Dominican Republic, January 30, 1962, 5, John Bartlow Martin Papers, LOC.

263 Martin, Overtaken, 205.

264 Martin defended Bosch to Chicago Sun-Times report William Braden in early 1964, saying that those Bosch had some personal “handicaps” as president, “the worst handicap was the condition of the country after more than 30 years of dictatorship. There was a lack of experienced people to help him. And, as a consequence, the government didn’t carry out the reforms he had promised and he lost a lot of popular support. It wasn’t lack of trying.” See, William Braden, “Dominicans Praised by Ex-Envoy Martin,” Chicago Sun-Times, January 19, 1964, John Bartlow Martin Papers, LOC.

265 Martin, Overtaken, 179.

266 Ibid 201.
stereotypes that Dominicans did not care, that “the vast mass neither knew it was
suffering [under Trujillo] nor cared if it was freed,” affected US policy in the Dominican
Republic. These misperceptions caused US officials to lower their standards for
democracy in the Dominican Republic and other Latin American countries. In their view,
the Dominican Republic lacked strong leaders for a democratic revolution, the legacies of
dictatorship were too strong, and the people were too inexperienced with freedom to
expect a vibrant democracy to boost the nation to the promised “place in the sun.”
Especially after the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy, US policy focused on
the electoral process and economic reform to attract investment. The Triumvirate
Government implanted by the military coup provided the leadership to attain those
objectives in a manner favorable to domestic and foreign business interests.

**Baseball, Normality, and the Triumvirate**

The coup revealed deep divides among Dominicans and their conceptions of
democracy in the 1960s, but baseball-starved Dominicans pushed those debates aside in
1963 while Guayubín Olivo prepared to wow fans in the Estadio Quisqueya. The
military had quickly transferred power to a group of three civilian leaders chosen through
negotiations among the six parties of the PRD’s opposition, ushering Emilio de los Santos,
Manuel Tavarez Esplaillat, and Ramón Tapia Espinal to the head of the nation. This
civilian government eased fears of a military dictatorship of the extreme right and calmed
Dominicans as they quickly finalized preparations for the 1963–1964 Winter League
Tournament. They hoped that a baseball season would erase political tensions and raise
Dominicans’ spirits, which had been deflated by the end of democracy in their nation.
Students and others demanded a return to constitutional government, specifically through the transfer of the presidency from the military to Senate president Juan Casanovas Garrido, as outlined in the 1963 Constitution. But the Triumvirate, military, and national press dismissed these demands because the military had abrogated the Constitution of 1963 during the coup. As in the lead up to the 1962 elections, editorials in *El Caribe* warned that demonstrations endangered the political stability and national security that the military had tried to impose by ousting Bosch. Democracy and constitutionalism would return to the Dominican Republic, the editorials assured them. In the meantime, there would be baseball.

In the days and weeks between the September 25 coup and the start of the baseball season on October 22, 1963, the sports pages in *El Caribe* showed few signs that the military had just ousted the first democratically elected president in three decades. Preparations for the winter season continued as usual, with sportswriters promoting the tournament with little reference to the current political atmosphere or the experiences that had prevented the organization of the previous two professional seasons. As the trash talking of baseball rivalries replaced political debates, baseball boosted the Triumvirate’s standing in the country. At the same time, the success of the season raised questions about Bosch’s weaknesses as a national leader. The Triumvirate’s successful organization of the Winter Tournament added to its legitimacy and aura of competence that contrasted with portrayals of Bosch as an unsuitable leader and possible communist sympathizer. Interleague competitions against representatives from the Venezuelan and Puerto Rican
Winter Leagues added to this contrast as the Triumvirate was permitted into the American sporting fraternity despite its *de facto* status.

The cast of characters from *El Caribe*’s “Cartoon of the Day” (*La Caricatura de Hoy*) marched triumphantly to their position on the sports pages just over a month after the coup. (Figure 4.5) They assured Dominicans that winter baseball had returned to their country despite the political tragedy that had occurred. Sponsored by E. León Jiménes, a tobacco company based in the Cibao region, the cartoon featured the mascots of each team along with the guardian of the cellar, the *Fucú*, or curse, and the Crow, who provided the punchline for the cartoons. The Crow’s announcement, “‘Greetings, Fans! Here we are again, ready for the fight!’” projected normality to Dominican readers and the confidence that the baseball season would provide the same intrigue that Dominicans expected from the *deporte rey*. The partisan cheers emanating from the ballpark would replace the debate over the violation of constitutionalism perpetrated by the military and the new government.
The return of Dominican ballplayers from the United States helped project feelings of well-being and national pride. Juan Marichal returned to the country a national hero again, his 25–8 record placing him among the best Latin-American pitchers of all time. With Marichal in the lineup, Escogido fans were confident that they would make good on their strut as the Dominican League’s Eternal Champion (Campeón Eternal). Marichal’s Winter-League debut proved them right: he carried a no-hitter into the seventh inning against the Estrellas Orientales, represented by the Elephant. Striking out nine in a complete-game shutout, Marichal confirmed his dominance with a

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268 See, for example, “Marichal Mejor Lanzador Latino en Mayores; F. Rojas Alou Finaliza Campaña con Marca 281,” El Caribe, el 1 de octubre de 1963, (AP, NY, 30 sept), 13.
performance that one sportswriter described as masterful, meriting a title of “honorary doctor.”

Marichal’s performance, like the Winter League standings, fulfilled Dominicans’ expectations: born rivals Escogido and Licey were tied for first place as they prepared for their first encounter. The baseball season was unfolding as fans expected and the trash talk between Licey and Escogido proceeded as usual. (Figure 4.6) The day before the season’s first matchup between the rivals, Escogido’s Lion taunted the Licey Tiger with a photo of Marichal, telling him, “Look, Rat Hunter, you know this guy, the one pictured here, eh? That’s your daddy . . . The one who will give you a pow-pow tomorrow!” The Tiger could only gulp and ask the Lion to stop scaring him. All Dominicans respected Marichal’s dominance.

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269 Ph, “Marichal pinta elefantitos blanco,” Con los Spikes en Alto, El Caribe, 26 de octubre de 1963, 18. “De no haberse graduado ya en el Big Show anoche se hubiera ganado la toga y el birrete de doctor honoris causa.”

270 Miche Medina, “La Caricatura de Hoy,” El Caribe, 28 de octubre de 1963, 14. “Mira caza ratas, tú conoces este que está retratado aquí . . . Eh? . . . Ese es tu papá . . . Él que te va a dar pau pau mañana! . . .” The “pau pau” to which the Lion refers is the spanking the Tiger will receive, as if being punished by his father.
The successful start for the Winter Classic likely eased the reservations that many Dominicans held over the Triumvirate’s legitimacy and its ability to govern as a *de facto* institution after the high hopes for democracy that had brought Bosch to power. Sportswriters tried to calm these reservations by stressing the Triumvirate Government’s actions to arrange the baseball season while overlooking Bosch’s prior efforts. In his column “Around-the-Clock Sports” (*El Deporte al Día*) a few days before Olivo’s first pitch, *El Caribe*’s Rafael Martorell credited the “good understanding of the men who direct the destiny of the country” and the work of league officials for organizing the

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Winter Classic. The Triumvirate demonstrated its familiarity with the Dominican people by offering its “best economic cooperation” to provide an extraordinary winter season. Not only did the Triumvirate’s economic support ensure that Dominicans would see the fierce battles they expected among the four traditional teams and their national baseball stars but it also secured “international repercussions” for the tournament. The Dominican Winter League and Venezuelan Winter League had negotiated an Inter-League Series that would bring the four Venezuelan teams to the country to compete against the Dominican teams and send the Dominican sides to compete in Venezuela. The political stability projected by the Triumvirate and its economic assistance for the League ensured that the 1963–1964 season was a “great sporting reality.”

Reports of the Triumvirate’s efforts to organize the Winter Tournament contrasted with the pleas Bosch had made to presidents of Big League teams in early September. The circumstances of the article in which Bosch explained that “‘One of the things [. . .] that we have to do in the Dominican Republic is initiate a baseball tournament in which our best players compete,’” suggested the Dominican executive’s desperation. The President of the Dominican Republic asked the presidents of four baseball teams, essentially four companies, to allow Dominican citizens to play baseball on their home fields.  

272 Rafael Martorell, Editor Deportivo, “El Deporte al Día,” El Caribe, 18 de octubre de 1963, 19. Martorell credited the efforts of team presidents in organizing the tournament, and continued, “gracias también a la buena comprensión de los hombres que dirigen los destinos del país.”

273 Ibid.

274 “Presidente Bosch Pide Dejen Jugar a Nativos En Próximo Campeonato; Petición es Hecha A Ligas Mayores,” El Caribe, 10 de septiembre de 1963, 10. “En las peticiones dirigidas hoy a los directivos de los citados clubes de las Grandes Ligas, el Presidente Bosch señala que ‘El pueblo dominicano es muy adicto al beisbol y nada lo prueba mejor que el hecho de que tengamos grandes jugadores de ese deporte.’ [. . .] ‘Una de las cosas—dice Bosch—que debemos hacer en la República Dominicana es iniciar campeonato de beisbol en que figuren nuestros mejores peloteros.’”
diamonds. The Triumvirate, by contrast, had secured the participation of the national Big Leaguers with no such pleas, or at least not public pleas. And this despite the fact that the United States had broken relations with the Triumvirate Government. Although Bosch had secured Government funding for the 1963–1964 season and even arranged the interleague games against teams from the Venezuelan and Puerto Rican Leagues, his efforts were forgotten by early October. Rather, the “good understanding of the men who direct the destiny of the country,” not Bosch, made the tournament extraordinary.

Bosch could receive no credit for his efforts in organizing the baseball tournament because the Triumvirate Government’s legitimacy required that the PRD Government led by Bosch be discredited. Along with its efforts to return professional baseball to the island, the Triumvirate’s Press Director published regular denunciations against the Bosch regime. Dominicans who wanted to follow the story of Guayubín Olivo’s Opening Day dominance of the Elephants encountered a full-page announcement “to public opinion” paid by the Press Director of the National Palace as they turned to the Sports Section from *El Caribe*’s front-page.275 The article mocked those who lamented the fall of Bosch and backed its hostility with supposed evidence of Bosch’s interactions with Cuban communists and communist literature in the late 1950s. These interactions between Bosch and supposed communists, which included contacts with Fidel Castro before the Cuban Revolution, led the author to conclude that “The Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic did well to take the grave decision of expelling from Power a leader

275 Dirección de Presnsa del Palacio Nacional, Espacio Pagado, “Juan Bosch es Comunista,” *El Caribe*, 23 de octubre de 1963, 11. The message explained that the National Palace Press Director was reprinting an article by journalist Carlos Siso Maury in the Miami newspaper *Patria*, no. 191, 11 de octubre de 1963.
that permitted, with his impassibility, communist penetration in the country.”

Rather than criticize the military for violating its constitutional subordinance to civilian rule, the article praised the military as “the safeguard of the Fatherland, of its Institutions, that would disappear if the Nation fell into the hands of a communist dictatorship.” This article and others like it turned questions about the Triumvirate’s legitimacy on their head. The military had indeed ended a democratically elected, constitutional government in ousting Bosch. But that government, not the de facto government that now ruled, had threatened Dominican interests and Dominican institutions. According to the publications, the Bosch Government was illegitimate.

The Triumvirate’s attempts to delegitimize the elected PRD Government and the assertions of its own legitimacy were also directed to international audiences. Baseball offered pro-democratic governments a politically correct solution to their conflicting objectives of upholding democracy and opposing communism. The Venezuelan and US governments denounced the Dominican military’s breach of democratic practice in line with a decision by OAS member states to break relations with de facto governments. Still, neither government, and especially the United States, had agreed with Bosch’s policies toward communists. They rationalized the coup even if they did not directly support it. Baseball agreements, such as those around the Inter-League Series between the Venezuelan and Dominican Winter Leagues offered a way around politics. Arguing

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276 Ibid. “Hicieron bien las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Dominicana al tomar la grave decisión de expulsar del Poder a un gobernante que permitía, con su imposibilidad la penetración comunista en el país.”

277 Ibid. “Las Fuerzas Armadas recordaron a tiempo que entre las funciones específicas que les corresponden están las de la salvaguardia de la Patria, de sus Instituciones, que desaparecerían si la Nación cayera en manos de una dictadura comunista.”
that the Inter-League Series was a “merely sporting competition that has nothing to do with politics,” the Venezuelan Winter League threatened to boycott exchanges with the other national circuits if Venezuelan officials did not concede travel permissions.\textsuperscript{278} The United States, or at least the US major and minor league officials, likely followed a similar policy. In contrast to Bosch’s pleas to Big League team presidents, the Triumvirate gained permission not only for Dominican Big Leaguers to play in the Winter League but also for US players such as Willie Stargell.\textsuperscript{279} Although neither the US nor Venezuelan government officially recognized the Triumvirate before the start of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{278} Mario Almonte, Especial para \textit{El Caribe}, Caracas, “Liga Venezolana Decidida A Celebrar los partidos De Beisbol con Criollos; Esperan Decision De Liga Beisbol,” \textit{El Caribe}, 6 de octubre de 1963, 12. The article explained that the Venezuelan League had decided to start arrangements for the Inter-League competition after a pause in negotiations arose from the “recent political happenings” in the Dominican Republic. The Venezuelan League was working with the national governments in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic as well as the Dominican Winter League to look for a solution to any problem that might arise around the baseball exchanges. Almonte stressed throughout the League’s view that the games would have no political implications, noting: “\textit{si es que en verdad existen problemas tratándose de una competencia meramente deportiva que nada tiene que ver con la política}.” Almonte continued with the League’s threat to sacrifice exchanges with other national circuits, including the Liga Occidental, if “problems” arose in the Dominican exchange: “\textit{En un presunto caso de que los juegos interligas internacionales no puedan llevarse a efecto, la entidad venezolana aprobó, asimismo, no efectuar juegos con ningún otro circuito, ni siquiera con los clubes que compone la Liga Occidental en el Estado Zulia}.”

\textsuperscript{279} Stargell, who belonged to the Pittsburgh Pirates, played with the Aguilas Cibaeñas during the 1963–1964 season. The Pirates and Aguilas had a working agreement to gain access to each other’s players. Stargell returned to the Dominican Republic with the Pirates in 1967 to participate in a 5-game exhibition with a group of Dominican stars to benefit the Dominican Development Foundation. See Chapter 5.
\end{footnotesize}
the 1963–1964 Winter League season, baseball exchanges offered the Triumvirate the semblance of legitimacy in the international community.

The continuation of the US-Dominican and Venezuelan-Dominican baseball relationships while the political relations ceased revealed the influence of business interests on national government, or the greater breadth in political relations allowed to international businesses compared to national governments. The Venezuelan League, like the US major and minor leagues, were private enterprises bound to norms for international travel. Yet, threatening the national baseball tournament, as the Venezuelan League did, seemed effective for gaining the government permissions necessary for representatives to travel to and receive teams from the Dominican Republic. The same was true of the United States. Despite the absence of diplomatic relations with the country, US Baseball officials permitted players to travel to the Dominican Republic for the baseball season and Government officials did nothing to stop them. In reality, US Baseball and the Venezuelan League were “doing” politics. By pushing forward with their baseball exchanges for the 1963–1964 season, these private entities condoned the

Triumvirate Government. The argument that the exchanges had nothing to do with politics provided a convenient excuse for their actions, but Dominican sportswriters who credited the “men who direct the destiny of the country” for making the Winter Tournament not just a reality but extraordinary with “international repercussions” revealed the lie. Baseball in the Dominican Republic was inherently political. The engagement of the US and Venezuelan Baseball Leagues with the Dominican Winter League in 1963–1964 either led government policy on the Triumvirate or revealed the contradictions behind it. While the Venezuelan and US Governments refused and delayed recognition in defense of democratic principles—and in their adherence to the Betancourt Doctrine that forbade relations with any government imposed by military coup of the right or the left—business interests in the nations preferred the Triumvirate Government to the Bosch Administration and lent a sheen of legitimacy to the Triumvirate.

The 1963–1964 Winter Tournament was not the first time that US Baseball officials pushed or anticipated US international policy with the Dominican Republic. A similar situation had occurred for the 1961–1962 season. After prohibiting US players from traveling to the Dominican Republic for the 1960–1961 Winter Tournament, allegedly because of a lack of guarantees for the players’ safety given the OAS sanctions against the Trujillo Regime, US Baseball officials allowed US players to participate the next year, before official relations were restored. The political situation in October 1961 was much more dangerous than that in October 1960, before the death of Trujillo, but the

US Baseball officials granted permission because of the changing political climate in the Dominican Republic following the dictator’s death. US interactions with the Dominican Republic had warmed and, though Ramfís Trujillo remained, Balaguer’s willingness to reform indicated a move toward democracy. US Baseball officials knew that the restoration of complete diplomatic relations was only a matter of time. For the United States, the same reasoning held in 1963–1964. In mid-October, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk actively quieted discussions over whether the coup was “necessary” given Bosch’s “fumbling mismanagement” and the freedom he allowed to communists. According to Rusk, the coup “seriously set back [the] cause [of] democracy throughout [the] hemisphere.” After the assassination of US President Kennedy in November 1963 and amid mounting fears of communist threats after a guerrilla force led by Manolo Taveres of the June 14 Movement in the Dominican countryside, US officials waivered on their democratic principles. The US Government recognized the Triumvirate and reinstated military and economic aid to the Dominican Republic on December 14, 1963. The Triumvirate Government, US officials feared, needed US aid to ensure that communists did not take advantage of the instability caused by the coup. They had to secure the Dominican Republic against communism before troubling themselves with helping Dominicans build a democratic society.

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Debating Democracy and the Limits of Baseball

US recognition of the Triumvirate Government revealed how US misunderstandings of the Dominican situation and the stereotypes that Dominicans did not care about democracy or did not recognize its benefits affected policy. US policymakers who analyzed the coup and its causes relied on informants from the Dominican business classes, including Donald Reid Cabral, who became head of the Triumvirate in January 1964. The US accepted these businessmen’s interpretations and plans as the best for the nation and the hemisphere. As a result, the United States came to define the same business interests that had threatened Bosch’s ouster days before the coup as the only legitimate Dominican desires, despite the Kennedy Administration’s observation after the coup that the Triumvirate represented only a minority of Dominicans.283 US informants and editorials in papers such as El Caribe portrayed the demands for constitutional government expressed in popular protests held near the UASD and a guerrilla movement led by June 14th Movement leader Manolo Tavarez as illegitimate. As in the drive for elections, editorials and men like Reid defined popular demonstrations as communist-inspired. Meanwhile, the coup had been in the best interests of the nation’s future. US interests thus formally aligned with those of the

283 Regarding planned discussions between the US Embassy and Reid Cabral, who was acting as a liaison between the two governments, Under Secretary of State George Ball instructed Embassy officials to “state clearly and emphatically that USG will not recognize or deal with this regime as it stands. This regime and the politicians who named the cabinet represent a minority of the Dom people.” Document 359, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, Washington, October 4, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States Vol. XXII: American Republics (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), 741. Ambassador Martin helped draft the telegram, which was to be received by CIA official Colonel J.C. King and Foreign Service Officer Harry W. Shlaudemann. The telegram laid out US objectives in the Dominican Republic and advised “open informal negotiations with representatives of present regime” through Reid as a means to achieve those objectives.
Dominican business class, represented by the Triumvirate, and their pursuit of industrialization at all costs.

Yet, Dominicans had taken to the streets despite the threat of repression by Ramfís Trujillo in 1961 and would struggle for democracy as they envisioned it. After a brief reprieve, criticism against the Triumvirate and the interests it represented mounted. While Dominicans relished the return of professional baseball to their island in the 1963–1964 Winter Tournament, they turned to baseball again to express their discontent. Rather than Trujillo, their discontent was directed at the Triumvirate Government and the limited democracy it and the United States supported as a bulwark against communism. Tensions boiled over on the baseball field as Juan Marichal and Julián Javier received suspensions from the Winter League after confrontations with a US umpire and manager. While fans held mixed views over what sportswriters interpreted as a lack of sportsmanship and disloyalty to Dominican fans, their discontent with the national tournament and their suspicions over the financial and political interests were clear in their criticisms of players and officials alike. An incident in which Dominicans threw rocks at a delegation of professional ballplayers from the United States demonstrated growing discontent with the Triumvirate and the US policies that backed it. Editors and sportswriters gave these actions voice with their articles. They criticized the Triumvirate Government’s support for private enterprises like professional baseball teams and demanded that public funds be invested where they might benefit the masses, such as in amateur baseball. The actions of Dominican baseball fans and the words of sportswriters revealed a gap between the Triumvirate’s economic policies embedded in the “economic
democracy” proposed by men like Ornes and popular views of what an economic
democracy entailed for the Dominican public. Despite the Triumvirate’s public relations
campaign to discredit it, Dominicans supported Bosch’s view that industrialization should
benefit the masses.

As the Triumvirate consolidated its power after gaining US recognition,
Dominicans enjoyed the close competition among the Aguilas, Lions, Tigers, and
Elephants in the Dominican Winter League Tournament. Fans flocked to the stadiums
despite high unemployment, a guerrilla movement in December, strikes in January, and
generalized political insecurity. They expected to celebrate the deporte rey along with
their national baseball heroes. But personal slights, exhaustion, feelings they were taken
for granted, and perhaps the politically charged atmosphere itself caused even the most
heroic of ballplayers to disappoint fans. In December, Big Leaguers Juan Marichal and
Julián Javier were suspended on the requests of their teams. Marichal had refused to
dress for any Escogido games in which US umpire Paul Kelly officiated after he and
Kelly argued over a call in an earlier game.284 Javier had disagreed with fines imposed
on him for “alleged disciplinary infractions” by Aguilas manager Gene Baker and refused
to play for a manager who undermined his reputation to Dominican fans and who “lives
accusing me of indiscipline.”285 Other players had disappointed, too. A group of Aguilas

284 See, for example, “Liga de Beisbol Impone Multa a Juan Marichal,” El Caribe, 20 de diciembre
de 1963, 21. The suspension came later.
Javier argued that he preferred to support his pregnant wife to “actuar al lado de un manager
que, como Baker, solo vive acusándome de indisciplinado.” Baker had charged Javier fines of
$25, $45, and $100, “alegando faltas indisciplinarias,” but the article did not specify the reason for
the fines. See also, Domingo Saint-Hilaire hijo, “Aguilas Piden Suspensión Julián Javier; Directiva
Norteña Alega Incumplimiento Contrato,” El Caribe, 26 de diciembre de 1963, 10.
players were involved in a bar fight during the Final Series, which the team lost after leading the Licey Tigers three games to none. After the embarrassing defeat by Licey, the disgrace of the bar fight, and even a bench-clearing brawl between Licey and Aguilas players (Figure 4.7), native and imported players from both teams had the nerve to petition the Winter League for a guaranteed salary rather than a percentage of gate receipts for an Inter-League Series Final with the Venezuelan League champions. Abandoning their teams and demanding more money was hardly how Dominican fans expected ballplayers to reward their support.

Figure 4.7: Police had to step in to calm a fight between players from the Aguilas Cibaeñas and Licey Tigers during the third inning of Game 5 of the 7-game Final Series. The fight started after

286 “Domingo Saint-Hilaire hijo, “Exigencias de Jugadores Amenazar Frustrar Serie; $16,000 Exigen Players De Aguilas Para Jugar,” El Caribe, 5 de febrero de 1964, 14. Native and US players from Licey and the Aguilas original made the request in January, which resulted in the Dominican Winter League appealing to US Commissioner Ford Frick for advice on how such matters are handled in the United States. See, “Players Licey y Aguilas Piden 50.000 Pesos Para Jugar Frente Venezuela; Liga Dominicana Envía Cable Frick,” El Caribe, 26 de enero de 1964, 9.
Aguilas pitcher Steve Blass collided with Licey infielder Pedro González while fielding a blooper that González hit toward the first-base side. Both fell from the collision and got up fighting.\textsuperscript{287}

Although Dominican criticisms against the Triumvirate went largely unheard through the end of 1963 and early 1964, sportswriters and cartoonists expressed the ire and betrayal that Dominican baseball fans felt toward ballplayers and Winter League officials. In a column summing up fans’ frustrations with player behavior during the 1963–1964 season, one sportwriter described the ballplayers as “Our Frankensteins.”\textsuperscript{288} Most of all, he described a “mental state” among national celebrities, directing his criticism at ballplayers in particular: “There is nothing as temperamental and hard to manage as the idols, be they in art, film, or sports. [. . .] In our baseball history the examples abound.”\textsuperscript{289} Fans expressed their distaste for the unsportsmanly behavior and salary demands of the ballplayers in the Inter-League Series with their feet: fewer than 1000 fans attended. To ensure their message was heard, those 1000 fans booed when the Aguilas took the field, “as a demonstration of the disgust of the fans after the historic defeat of the Aguilas in the final of the Dominican tournament.”\textsuperscript{290}

Marichal was signaled out for his share of criticism as well. Escogido fans blamed Marichal for the team’s first absence from the Final Series since the incorporation of the Dominican Winter League in 1955. In one cartoon, the Aguila, who dominated the

\textsuperscript{287} Pérez Terrero, Photo. The photo appeared with Game 6 results, \textit{El Caribe}, 31 de enero de 1963,14. For Game 5 results and details on the play that sparked the fight, see “Licey Obtiene su Segundo Triunfo en Serie Final; Azules Disparan 15 Hits; Torneo Sigue Esta Noche,” \textit{El Caribe}, 30 de enero de 1964, 17.

\textsuperscript{288} Ph, “Con los Spikes en Alto; Nuestros Frankensteins,” \textit{El Caribe}, 13 de febrero de 1963, 12.

\textsuperscript{289} Ibid. “No hay nada tan temperamental y de difícil manejo como los ídolos, sean del arte, del cine o de los deportes. [. . .] En nuestra historia basebolera abundan los ejemplos.”

regular season, walked the three other mascots on leashes. (Figure 4.8) The Elephant, the perpetual basement-dweller and favorite of the Fucú, lamented his luck while the Lion had a more direct explanation: “The blame for my disgrace, that goes to Marichal.”

The same man whom Escogido fans had celebrated in October for the fear he inspired in opposing hitters had disgraced the team. The Triumvirate had secured the return of professional baseball, but after the coup, baseball lacked the hope and promise it held in 1962. Marichal and the other national baseball heroes no longer represented the “magnífico estímulo” they embodied the previous year.

Baseball fans’ criticisms against the national ballplayers accompanied growing disillusionment with the business interests behind professional baseball. A cartoon

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292 Miche Medina, “La Caricatura de Hoy,” El Caribe, 10 de enero de 1964, 16.
published in late January 1964, after Licey tied the Final Series against the Aguilas at three games a piece, depicted fans’ frustrations with what they perceived as players’ lack of commitment and suspected as Winter League, or Government, tampering with game results. (Figure 4.9) A man in a baseball cap chastised the Tiger, Aguila, Fucú, and a catcher—probably Licey’s rookie Juan García Carmona, who committed uncharacteristic errors in the first three games. Using his support throughout the season as the grounds for his complaint, the fan warned the teams to be very careful and to clean up their acts (‘‘cuelen su maldito café claro’’). The Crow echoed the fan’s sentiments: “Good thing I bought my flashlight because this play-off is getting shady.” The Fucú, who sat beside the Tiger in prior cartoons, had noticeably shifted and now stood near the Aguila. But who controlled the Fucú? Fans understood that team officials and the Triumvirate Government had business and political interests in extending the season. More games meant more revenue for the baseball teams. For the Triumvirate, more games distracted Dominicans from its inaction in subsidizing the soaring costs of food and basic commodities while proving industries with tax breaks and credits. Fans could not help but wonder whether they were being manipulated.
Fans allowed sportswriters and their own dropping attendance in the Inter-League Finals to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the 1963–1964 season and the circumstances that surrounded it, but many, especially in the capital, proved unwilling to stand for another season of the same as preparations began for the 1964–1965 season. 

After editorials and cartoons between the September 25 coup and US recognition on December 14 criticized the US refusal to recognize the Triumvirate Government, Dominicans remained suspicious of US intentions in their country—and backing for the de facto Triumvirate government. Knowing that US recognition offered the Triumvirate a semblance of international legitimacy, Dominicans blamed the United States in part for

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294 Editors illustrated many of these messages in the Editorial Pages cartoons, too. See, Frank, Editoriales, El Caribe, 17 de octubre de 1963, 8; Editoriales, “No Debe ser Arma Política,” El Caribe, 23 de octubre de 1963, 12; Frank, Editoriales, El Caribe, 24 de octubre de 1963, 12.
the Triumvirate’s slow progress toward elections. After the anniversary of the coup passed and Dominicans prepared for another baseball season under the Triumvirate, their hostilities toward the United States and the business interests behind professional baseball mounted. A clinic held by seven Big Leaguers at a Santo Domingo high school offered the scene for some Dominicans to express their growing animosities toward the United States, the Triumvirate, and those whom they perceived hindered their progress toward democratic leadership.

In late October 1964, the US Department of State sponsored a goodwill tour of seven Big Leaguers through Latin America. Santo Domingo was one of the first stops, and World-Series Champion Julián Javier, whose participation with the St Louis Cardinals that summer had earned him distinction as the first Dominican to win a World Series, composed part of the delegation. Cuban Mike de la Hoz was another Latin-America native represented on a group with a mission to spread baseball good cheer through the hemisphere. Members of the Triumvirate celebrated the visit with a photo at the National Palace and the delegation visited the US Embassy to show US backing for this incidence of baseball diplomacy. Fans in the Estadio Quisqueya cheered the visiting

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The initial article on the clinics made no mention of US sponsorship. The participants included: Julián Javier of the St Louis Cardinals, Cuban Mike de la Hoz and Lee Maye of the Milwaukee Braves, Chuck Cottier and Ron Kline of the Washington Senators, Charley Lau of the Los Angeles Angels, and Dick Hall of the Baltimore Orioles. American League umpire Frank Umont directed the team while the sports trainer-masseuse Bob Bauman accompanied them. See, “Players Mayores Darán Clínicas en País; Dominicano Julián Javier Figura Entre Entrenadores,” El Caribe, 29 de octubre de 1964, 14. After spending a week in the Dominican Republic, the group was scheduled to go on a goodwill tour through other parts of Latin America as well. In an interview, Javier recounted staying home after the initial incident, alleging that his daughter took ill. Interview with the author, April 17, 2012, San Francisco de Macorís, Dominican Republic.
players at a game between Escogido and the Aguilas on November 4. Baseball goodwill seemed to overflow.

The next morning, however, as the group worked with aspiring Dominican ballplayers, the mood changed. Students at a Santo Domingo high school, the same that Felipe Alou had attended, threw rocks and hurled insults at the Big Leaguers. They targeted Julián Javier in particular, calling him a vendepatria (traitor) and yanquista (a derogatory word for someone who is pro-US). Coverage of the incident made no conjectures as to why the fans targeted Javier, likely to dismiss the event as a one-off occurrence. The treatment of Javier, a stark contrast to the heroes’ welcome for Marichal and the Rojas Alou brothers just two years before, perhaps resulted from his delay in joining the Aguilas Cibaeñas while he participated in the tour, possibly from his suspension the previous year, or simply because he played for the Aguilas and not a capital team. Fans likely felt betrayed to see Javier on the field supporting a US diplomatic gesture after announcing just two weeks earlier that he needed a month to recover from the grueling US season before suiting up for the Aguilas. No matter the reason, the treatment of Javier reflected the hardening divisions in Dominican society and growing disenchantment with the country’s alliance with the United States and the US Embassy’s influence in national politics.

*El Caribe* acted quickly to reframe the outburst as a symptom of “immature confusion” on the part of a “certain youth sector” that naively believed it acted on

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democratic principles rather than a legitimate protest against US influence in the Dominican Republic. Describing the slogans as “of well-known origin” (*de manufactura bien conocida*), a reference to Cuba, *El Caribe* attributed the protests to a lack of civic education and pernicious foreign—read “Cuban”—influence. They were illegitimate. The editor even questioned whether the protestors were truly students or organizers who had infiltrated the school grounds, noting that they were not dressed in school uniforms. The cartoon the next day further discredited the protests (Figure 4.10) by labeling the stones thrown at Big Leaguers “savageness,” or barbary (*salvajismo*) and expressing shock at the incident: “It cannot be true!” (*Parece mentira*). The fact that Felipe Alou remembered the event with embarrassment three years later lent some credibility to the anti-US feelings behind the actions. The visit by the US delegation carrying friendship (*amistad*) to the Dominican Republic failed to recreate the inter-American solidarity that had characterized the Cuban-Dominican Series. Baseball was no longer free from the fissures in Dominican society or in the hemisphere at large.

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298 Alou with Weiskopf 131–132. Alou said “The team travelled all over South America and wherever they went they were greeted warmly—until they got to Santo Domingo. [. . .] The incident was an outbreak of anti-American feeling and the players had to leave the school grounds as fast as they could.” Though the incident likely struck Alou more than others because he had attended the school as a youngster, the embarrassment of the anti-US hostilities stuck with him.
The differing interpretations of baseball fans’ reactions to the Dominican Winter League and the embarrassing “savageness” with the US baseball delegation reflected the growing contentiousness over Dominican visions for the nation’s future. In contrast to the excitement for democracy surrounding the 1962 Cuban-Dominican Series, the US-sponsored delegation came amid growing disillusionment as the Triumvirate delayed elections and demonstrated its favoritism for industries over workers. Criticisms of government investment in professional baseball reflected popular sentiments. At the end of 1964, one columnist made explicit the suspicions of political interests behind the 1963–1964 Winter Tournament to which the cartoon of fans’ admonitions that the League, teams, and players clean up their act had alluded (Figure 4.9). Dripping with sarcasm and underhanded compliments, the ¡Ahora! contributor waxed on the importance

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299 Frank, Editoriales, El Caribe, 7 de noviembre de 1964, 6.
of Donald Reid Cabral, who became the Chairman of the Triumvirate after Emilio de los Santos resigned, allegedly in protest to the handling of the December guerilla movement that resulted in the death of Manolo Tavarez. The columnist measured Reid along with the “successes” of 1964: “Above all in a year in which politics was substituted with baseball, planning for technicians, savings for taxes, quality for propaganda, justice for amnesty, the burning of cane for strikes, strikers for presidents, and the standard of living for the standard of agony,” the presence of Reid was the most important happening in the nation. At a time when the nation should have been preparing an exciting new society and the Triumvirate organizing elections, the Triumvirate brought only baseball and Reid Cabral. By hailing Reid as the nation’s greatest achievement in 1964, the columnist intimated his disappointment, likely shared by many Dominicans, for the lack of progress since Dominicans had ousted the Trujillo Regime.

Calls for the Triumvirate to invest in amateur baseball rather than professional baseball were another popular representation of the debates over the direction of the Dominican political and economic future. Sportswriter and columnist Tirso A. Váldez hijo carried these debates through his column “Sports Quarter” (Cuadrante Deportivo) with reasoning similar to that behind Bosch’s ideal that industrialization benefit the masses. Moved by Dominican teams’ claims that they had suffered financial losses in the 1963–1964 and 1964–1965 seasons and the Winter League’s recent appeal for year-round administration of the national stadia, Váldez demanded that public, government support

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300 “Esa Cosa tan sería . . . que se llama Política,” ¡Ahora!, no. 91, 16 de enero de 1965, 11. “Sobre todo en un año en el cual se sustituyó la política por la pelota, el planamiento por los técnicos, el ahorro por el impuesto, la calidad por la propaganda, la justicia por la amnistía, la quema de caña por las hueglas, los huelguistas por presidiarios y el nivel de vida por el nivel de agoneia; Sí, en un año como ese tuvo más importancia su presencia en el acontecer dominicano.”
for professional baseball be redirected toward amateur baseball. Teams acted
disingenously in reporting losses after the seasons, Váldez argued, and he called on team
directors to publicize financial records. The public who sponsored the teams deserved to
know how government money was spent. Furthermore, the Dominican Republic was
the only country whose government supported professional baseball, and though Váldez
acknowledged the national pride in the professional game, the government did too much:
“The Government protects in an almost-excessive form the celebration of these
tournaments, promising even to cover possible economic losses that the teams could
suffer.” Governmental support permitted teams to take risks and add great players,
including the likes of Willie Stargell, to their rosters. In turn, these players attracted fans
and increased revenue. But public benefits for private profits, such as those Váldez
argued teams like Escogido and Licey earned in the 1964–1965 season, went against the
interests of the nation.

In the context of uncertainty and mistrust as portrayed by the cartoon fan’s
demand that the teams clean up their acts, Váldez’s criticisms of government investment
in professional baseball resonated. Big Leaguers such as Felipe Alou inspired Dominican
youth and represented the nation on foreign fields, benefitting the nation indirectly. Yet,
Váldez rejected the notion that the Government should use public funds to support

301 Tirso a. Váldez hijo, “Cuadrante Deportivo,” ¡Ahora!, no. 93, 30 de enero de 1965, 56;
“Cuadrante Deportivo,” ¡Ahora!, no. 95, 13 de febrero de 1965, 48. Váldez was not alone. See
also, Deportes, “Nuestras Necesidades Deportiva,” ¡Ahora!, no. 86, 12 de diciembre de 1964, 21.
302 Ibid. “Y esto [making financial records public] debe de hacerse, más que nada en razón de
que el Gobierno protege en forma casi excesiva la celebración de esos campeonatos,
comprometiéndose, inclusive a cubrir hasta posibles pérdidas económicas que puedan sufrir los
conjuntos.”
endeavors, like professional baseball, whose primary objectives were to provide material benefits to private enterprises. The argument paralleled debates between Bosch and men like Ornes. Váldez perhaps was responding to the Industrial Incentives Law passed by the Triumvirate on October 9, 1963—just two weeks after the coup. Váldez argued that the government should show favor to amateur instead of professional baseball because such investments benefitted the athletes of tomorrow who would rise to compete in international exchanges, and “they will know how to bring glory to the nation.” Democratic governments built nations by investing in people through social policies. They invested in business only when such backing benefitted the people. The question of private enterprise, including professional baseball, and debates over its role in a nation aspiring to political participation and economic security divided Dominican baseball fans from the government officials who organized the annual tournament. As demonstrated by an ¡Ahora! cartoon, the attempts by the Oligarchy (Oligarquía), or powerful wealthy families, to combat communism by influencing government policies (Politica Social) only harmed the Pueblo, or the Dominican people (Figure 4.11). By the end of the 1964–1965 Winter Tournament, the pueblo’s plans to return to the streets to build democracy rather than oppose communism were a well-known secret (secreto a voces).

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304 In his synthesis of Dominican history Dominican scholar Eduardo J. Tejera, Cincuenta años de democracia y desarrollo dominicano 1961–2011; Logros y fracasos (Santo Domingo: Fundación Dominicana de Estudios Económicos, 2012), 114, described the uprising against the Triumvirate as a known-secret from January through April 1965.
Popular Democracy and Baseball for the People

On April 24, 1965, Santo Domingo exploded in a popular uprising to expel the Triumvirate and to demand the return of a constitutional government—even against US wishes and threats to internal stability. Dominicans had given the Triumvirate a chance to build the institutions for democracy that they wanted, but the leaders delayed too much. Led by junior military officers who identified themselves as Constitutionalists, the uprising succeeded in overturning the Triumvirate, and nearly succeeded in taking over the National Palace to prepare for Bosch’s return to complete his constitutional term. Combatants stood on the Duarte Bridge armed with personal weapons, the few arms

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305 JOH, “El Mundo en Caricaturas,” ¡Ahorat!, no. 87, 19 de diciembre de 1964, 26. The text at the bottom of the cartoon reads “To Baseball.”
handed out by the military leaders, and rocks. With these weapons, they prevented loyalist forces armed with tanks and artillery from entering the main section of Santo Domingo for five days, from April 24 to April 28, remembered as the “five glorious days.”

On April 28, 1965, the United States Marine Corps entered Santo Domingo on the request of the loyalist military, allegedly to prevent communists from overtaking the popular uprising and, though they would not admit it publically, to prevent the return of Bosch. The next day, April 29, forces from the US Army joined and kept watch along with a body of soldiers from the Organization of American States sent at a US request. US officials, led by ex-Ambassador Martin, arbitrated between the Constitutionalist and Loyalist forces to end the conflict. The negotiations ended with the installation of Provisional President Héctor García Godoy on September 3, 1965; the promise for elections in June 1966; and the withdrawal of the final US and OAS forces a little over a year later in September 1966.

Dominicans’ frustrations had overflowed to violence as they demanded that their voices be heard. These frustrations undoubtedly reached Dominicans abroad, most famously represented by Juan Marichal. On the night of August 22, 1965, Marichal was on the mound for the San Francisco Giants against Sandy Koufax of the long-time rival Los Angeles Dodgers. Competing in a tight pennant race, both pitchers were aggressive, but in the third inning when Marichal came to bat he felt Dodgers catcher John

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Roseboro’s returns to the mound dangerously close to his head, with one allegedly nicking his ear. The two men exchanged words, and when Roseboro stood and removed his helmet and mask, Marichal hit him over the head with his bat. The benches cleared. The intensity of the game, the rivalry, and the pennant race certainly played a role in the incident, but the rebellion and US-OAS invasion in what many saw as Dominicans’ claiming their political destiny had their role, too. Now part of a baseball legend of reconciliation after Marichal and Roseboro became friends in the 1980s and Roseboro appealed personally to the Baseball Writers of America to vote Marichal into the Hall of Fame, the Marichal-Roseboro incident manifested the political tensions of the time.

Marichal struggled with the political crisis in the Dominican Republic while Roseboro, a native of Los Angeles, dealt with the messages of the Watts Riots that had occurred in his hometown in the weeks prior to the game. The baseball diamond could hold politics off for only so long.

**Conclusion**

After Dominicans and representatives from across the hemisphere celebrated baseball and democracy in the *Semana Deportiva* and the inauguration of Bosch in February 1963, the competing images of democratic society rose to the surface. Moved by the rhetoric of a democratic revolution—the destruction of old, unequal social, political, and economic structures led by a constitutional president—Juan Bosch and those who followed him believed that Dominican society would be transformed to provide political participation and economic security for all citizens. But the reality was much more complicated. Though united behind the promise of change and progress, and
even the Alliance for Progress’s support for democracy and development, Dominicans were divided on the specific images of the society that would result from the democratic revolution. Dominicans in the business class, such as Germán Ornes, emphasized the development aspect of the Alliance and called on the Bosch Government to support incentives for industrialization. Bosch and others wanted to be more selective about industrialization to break the inequities of the Trujillo Era. The clash of interests led to the September 25 coup that ended the first freely elected constitutional government in Dominican history.

The Triumvirate Government that replaced the PRD Government led by Bosch favored business interests in the country, and, like Ornes, emphasized the development aspect of the Alliance for Progress. They placed hope for the nation’s democratic future in industrialization, which they argued would create new wealth that would trickle down to the popular classes. The trickle-down model worked in professional baseball, where Dominican ballplayers made careers on baseball diamonds at home and in the United States. But workers continued to strike in the mills and on the country’s roads to demand a greater share of the wealth created by their labor and more respect. Meanwhile, Felipe Alou’s address to Ford Frick and assertion that “Latin-American Ballplayers Need a Bill of Rights” revealed inequities inherent even in the baseball model for society. The relationship with the United States in sports, business, and, as demonstrated by Ambassador Martin’s interpretations of Dominican reality, even politics was plagued by similar inequities and competing visions of what reaching a “place in the sun” meant for Dominican society. Felipe Alou and other Latin-American ballplayers likely expected
that the highest echelons of baseball in the world’s democratic superpower would provide the equal participation, economic security, and justice that Dominicans imagined for their society. Instead, they encountered prejudices and discrimination that they never experienced before, even under Trujillo.

After the Triumvirate’s successful organization of the 1963–1964 Winter Tournament so soon after the coup deflated hopes for democracy, Dominicans grew suspicious of even their deporte rey. The magnífico estímulo (magnificent inspiration) that baseball provided after Dominicans freed sport from the Trujillos dissipated when the military muted the voices of the Dominican majority who had selected Bosch as their leader. Perceptions of players’ greed and excessive behavior revealed fans’ frustrations. They had demonstrated their loyalty to the game and to society with their attendance and votes while those in power, from ballplayers and Winter League team owners to military officers and Government officials, skirted responsibilities in their self interest.

The United States and other nations of the hemisphere—or at least the business interests they represented—contributed to Dominican frustrations. The US recognition of the Triumvirate Government revealed the limits of US democratic ideals. Concerns that popular unrest brought on by the coup and installation of the de facto government would lead to a dictatorship of the extreme right or extreme left caused US officials to support the Triumvirate Government despite its constant delaying of elections. In the US mindset, preventing communism in the Dominican Republic was more important than building democracy. As Martin implied, Dominicans were not yet ready for a true democracy. Although the adherence to the Betancourt Doctrine prevented Venezuela
from having official diplomatic relations with the Tríumvirate Government, business interests in the country—represented by the Venezuelan Winter League—lent the *de facto* government an aura of legitimacy by supporting the Inter-League Series. The business interests behind professional baseball influenced politics. Boosted by the support of the Venezuelan League and US Baseball, the 1963–1964 Dominican Winter Tournament normalized the Tríumvirate’s rule. The business interests in the hemisphere were united against communism. So long as democracy worked as an antidote to communism, members of the business classes supported it. But they were also willing to squash democracy, and the *Pueblo*’s pursuit of it, to prevent communism—or at least to protect their capitalist business interests from social and economic reforms.

The anticommunist business interests continued to dominate society after these competing visions of democracy erupted in the April War. US-led negotiations ensured that business interests would be protected. Members of the Dominican oligarchy, like the United States, believed industrialization was the best path for the nation. Peacekeeping forces from the OAS and United States ensured the free exercise of elections prepared by a provisional government. On June 1, 1966, Dominicans returned to the ballot boxes to elect a president, choosing former Trujillo president Joaquín Balaguer to lead the country. Balaguer ran with strong US support, more financial resources, and a willingness to fight dirty: his allies intimidated voters and PRD candidates with a terror campaign that confined Bosch to his home. He defeated Bosch easily and took office the next month.

The election of Balaguer did not signal the end of Dominicans’ pursuit of the “place in the sun” promised by Bosch in 1963. Rather, Dominicans found a new path to
the society they imagined. In taking to the streets and forcing the Triumvirate out of power, Dominicans told the world that they would accept a *de facto* government no more. They demanded constitutionalism, or the semblance of a social contract—even a flawed one. Although business interests continued to influence politics and to secure rights for industries over people, Balaguer relied on elections to maintain his power. Again, baseball would perform an important political role as it became a language of interaction between the Balaguer Government and the Dominican people. Dominican demands for public support for amateur over professional baseball would again reflect Dominican frustrations with industrial incentives and public investment in private enterprise. As they negotiated their and the government’s roles in a democratic society, Dominicans would look to their Latin-American brothers and sisters, even Cuba, for examples, as they redefined what democracy and baseball meant for their country.
Chapter 5

Así se hace Patria, or Baseball: The Revolution without Blood

On Tuesday, August 26, 1969, just over 18,000 baseball fans, mostly Dominican, crammed into the Estadio Quisqueya to watch the final game of the XVII Amateur World Series.\textsuperscript{307} The enthusiasm of the near-record crowd cheering a common team on a Tuesday night derived as much from the political tensions surrounding the game as the baseball drama of two undefeated teams facing off in a decisive battle for world baseball supremacy.\textsuperscript{308} The players for the Dominican team crowded next to their compatriots in the stands, content with their third-place finish,\textsuperscript{309} as the state amateurs from Cuba met a group of university students from the United States on the field. The mostly-Dominican crowd remained relatively quiet throughout the game, emitting shouts of “¡Cuba, Sí! ¡Yankees, No!” (Cuba, Yes! Yankees, No!) only intermittently as the US team carried a 1–

\textsuperscript{307} Known alternatively as the Campeonato Mundial de Béisbol de Aficionados or the Serie Mundial Amateur [or de Aficionados] in Spanish, the Amateur World Series is more commonly know as the Baseball World Cup today. Originally organized by the International Baseball Amateur Federation (IBAF), or as is more commonly known internationally, FIBA (Federación Internacional de Béisbol de Aficionados), the Amateur World Series has taken place 38 times with Cuba dominating with 25 titles.

\textsuperscript{308} As sportswriter Alvaro Arvelo hijo, a self-described devoted marichalista (supporter of Juan Marichal), noted in his column that the match-up was expected to break the previous attendance record of 18,992 on the occasion of a winter-league game in which Juan Marichal started. Though the attendance fell far short of the record, the 18,032 fans officially in attendance filled the seats and then some in the Estadio Quisqueya. In making his prediction, Arvelo expected the crowd to be attracted by the political implications in the US-Cuba face off rather than their hopes for a great baseball matchup. He complained about scheduling the US-Cuba game for the final night, calling it “anti-economic” because the Series would “almost certainly” be decided before the final game. See, Alvaro Arvelo hijo, “Temas Deportivos: Notas de la Serie,” El Caribe, 26 de agosto de 1969, 17; “Efectivo Relevo,” El Caribe, 27 de agosto de 1969, 1, 15; “Temas Deportivos: Notas de la Serie,” El Caribe, 16 de agosto de 1969, 14.

\textsuperscript{309} The Dominican team completed only nine games because the game against Mexico was rained out. The missed game did not affect the standings: Cuba (10–0), United States (9–1), Dominican Republic (7–2), Venezuela (6–4), Colombia (4–6), Nicaragua (4–6), Puerto Rico (4–6), Panama (4–6), Mexico (2–7), Guatemala (2–7), and Dutch Antilles (1–8). See, Alvaro Arvelo hijo, “Efectivo Relevo,” El Caribe, 27 de agosto de 1969, 15.
0 lead into the 8th inning. The Cuban and US teams had faced and defeated representatives from nine other American countries over the past two weeks. Yet this game, the first time a US amateur team faced a team of revolutionary Cuban players in this international event had special significance for Dominicans in the stands, US and Cuban players on the field, and sportswriters and fans across the continent. More than a competition between two teams on a baseball diamond, the US-Cuban showdown tested the US models of government and baseball against the Cuban revolutionary models. The political implications of the game resonated particularly with Dominicans, who were still reeling from the US-led intervention and occupation that crushed their popular movement for democracy three years earlier. Memories of the intervention were tangible as Dominicans worked to create a new democratic society, one that offered economic security and political participation to all while maintaining enough stability to prevent US intervention.

Throughout the Cold War, officials from the across the world, and most prominently from the United States and the Soviet Union, framed international sporting events like the Amateur World Series as stages to display the benefits of their respective systems for development and as proxies for more violent confrontations on the

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310 In fact, the United States had not sent a representative to the Amateur World Series since 1942, when the US team left the field over a contested call while playing against the Dominican selection in Cuba. The US team left the tournament after that game, forfeiting four games to finish last with a 1-11 record. See, Peter C. Bjarkman, *Diamonds Around the Globe: The Encyclopedia of International Baseball* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 419.
battlefield.\textsuperscript{311} Organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Baseball Amateur Federation (IBAF), which organized the Amateur World Series, attempted to prevent politics from undermining the sporting spirit of these events. Nations earned the honor to host such events by demonstrating their sporting spirit and political neutrality. Yet the politics of the Global Cold War engulfed all interactions.

Cuban leader Fidel Castro repudiated professional baseball in 1961 and founded the National Institute of Sports and Recreation (INDER,\textit{ Instituto Nacional de Deportes, Educación Física y la Recreación}) on the Soviet amateur model, projecting his socio-political ideology onto national sports. Castro credited the amateur-only sports system supported by communism for Cuban dominance in international sporting events, a dominance that led Cuba to an undefeated record in all Amateur World Series in which it

participated from 1969 through the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{312} For the United States, the 1969 Series marked its first foray into this competition since withdrawing from the 1942 tournament held in Havana after a dispute with an umpire in the game against the Dominican side. The US decision to return after 27 years lent credit to Dominican sportswriters’ views of the game as “an encounter between teams representing radically antagonistic systems of government.”\textsuperscript{313} The United States and Cuba engaged each other on the baseball diamond, where each team would demonstrate the benefits that its government system held for sport and where cheers could be manipulated to mean political support.

Dominicans, who were working out their own ideas for how democracy would function in their country, were particularly receptive of the political messages behind the US-Cuba showdown. Their “¡Cuba, Sí! ¡Yankees, No!” cheers represented Dominicans’ support for the equal access provided by Cuba’s state-sponsored amateur sports system. Yet, the relative quiet in the stands, the security forces on the field, and the newspaper coverage around the Cubans’ visit reflected the ambiguous feelings most Dominicans held about Cuba. On the one hand, Dominicans craved the international reputation Cuba had made for itself on the baseball field and in other amateur athletic events. On the other, Dominicans were not ready to reject professional baseball, or the democracy that

\textsuperscript{312} In 1973 political maneuvers involving Nicaragua, the United States, and Cuba resulted in two Amateur World Series tournaments, one organized by the IBAF and held in Cuba, with the US abstaining, the other organized by FEMBA (Federación Mundial de Béisbol Amateur) and held in Managua, Nicaragua. FEMBA organized the tournament again in 1974, this time in St Petersburg, Florida, where Cuba again abstained. Cuba also sat out the 1982 Amateur World Series, this time in Seoul, South Korea. See, Bjarkman,\textit{ Diamonds}, 415–439.

\textsuperscript{313} Alvaro Arvelo hijo, “Temas Deportivos: Notas de la Serie,”\textit{ El Caribe}, 26 de agosto de 1969, 17. “Una prueba del poderoso vínculo que es el deporte, se demuestra hoy con el encuentro entre equipos representantes de sistemas de gobierno radicalmente antagónicos.”
protected it. Dominicans had retained their international reputation as a powerhouse in professional baseball even as the 1963 coup crushed their status as a “showcase for democracy.” Professional baseball, and particularly the success of Dominican players in US Organized Baseball, still symbolized Dominican progress and potential. After seeing their baseball pride and progress curbed by US dominance of commercialized baseball, the same way they saw their hopes for democracy stunted by US-led negotiations to end the civil war of 1965–1966, Dominicans wanted a third way. They embraced amateur baseball as a part of that path. Though professional baseball remained the deporte rey, Dominicans defined state support for amateur baseball, as in Cuba, as an obligation of a democratic government. Taking from President Balaguer’s promise to lead a Revolución sin Sangre, or a Revolution without Blood, Dominicans saw their political system as one that balanced the individualism of capitalist, electoral democracy, symbolized by professional baseball, and the equity and social justice embodied by Cuba and its state-supported amateur sports system.

The ambivalence Dominicans felt toward both Cuba and the United States reflected the divisions that endured in their own society since the civil war and the return of Joaquín Balaguer to the presidency in 1966. The experience of the civil war and US-OAS intervention radicalized many Dominicans, including Francisco Caamaño, one of the leaders of the Constitutionalist movement who left his exile in London in 1967 and
led a guerrilla cadre trained in Cuba to the Dominican Republic in 1973. Other Dominicans just wanted stability, and Balaguer offered that. Though elected in a process that OAS observers deemed fair, Balaguer was a compromise candidate. Dominicans had forced Balaguer into exile because of his ties to Trujillo a few years earlier, but US support for his candidacy made him the lesser of two evils next to a US-supported military regime like the one that took power in Brazil in 1964. Even with his electoral victory, Balaguer knew that staying in power depended on subduing the military, pleasing the business classes that had organized to oust Bosch, and controlling the politically engaged middle and popular classes who unseated the Triumvirate and demanded democracy. Balaguer’s promise to lead a Revolución sin sangre (Revolution without blood), which echoed the plans by Bosch and the US Alliance for Progress for a democratic revolution to bring economic security and political representation to all in the

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315 Though the organization of the elections and counting of votes were technically fair, the terror campaign that secret police allegedly working for Balaguer perpetrated against Juan Bosch, Balaguer’s opponent, and other members of the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, Dominican Revolutionary Party) is widely known. See, for example, Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A National History (Princeton: Marcus Wiener Publishers, Inc., 1995). Originally published in 1994 by Hispaniola Book Corp.
country, offered at least lip service to the concerns of all these groups. Balaguer’s policies to support powerful business interests, foreign and domestic, earned him firm US backing, which boosted military support. Through baseball, he incorporated the others into his *Revolución sin sangre*.

Dominicans’ ambivalence about both Cuba and the United States mostly quieted their cheers through the first seven innings of the Series final as US pitcher, lefty Larry Osburn, dominated the Cuban batters and held them scoreless. With the Cubans at the plate in the bottom of the 8th, Dominicans unleashed their enthusiasm for the Cuban underdogs. After giving up a single to the lead-off man, who advanced to second on a sacrifice, Osburn tried to overpower Cuban relief pitcher Gaspar Pérez. Pérez seized the opportunity by hitting a single to center field that scored the tying run from second. He then advanced on a sacrifice by Félix Isasi and scored the winning run on an RBI-single by Rigoberto Rosique. The crowd’s “explosion in favor of the islanders” after Pérez put the Cubans ahead 2–1 sent Osburn to the bench; the small-ball, team-centered approach of the Cubans had worn down the dominating pitcher. Though reliever Steve Rodgers stopped the Cuban battery, the US bats could not respond with a charge of their own,

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316 The next day, two reports of the final game and the crowd appeared on the front page of *El Caribe* under the large page-topping headline “Ofrecen Demostración de Civismo en Estadio Quisqueya.” Lower on the page, above the two articles, the headline announced that “Cuba es Campeón” [Cuba is Champion] above the two articles: Alvaro Arvelo hijo, “Efectivo Relevo,” and Miguel A. Reinoso Solís, “Buena Labor PN.” While Arvelo’s article focused on recounting the game, Reinoso’s “color” piece centered on the security measures taken by the National Police, the behavior and sympathies of the fans, the teams’ behavior, the award ceremony, and the greater significance of the game and Cuba’s victory. I have taken the details of the play-by-play from the Arvelo piece while much of my analysis and details about the crowd derives from that by Reinoso.
leaving the team short of the country’s first Amateur World Series title. As Castro shared in a radio interview heard in Miami the next day, the Cuban victory was a moral triumph, validating Cuba’s system in which baseball is “‘no longer a form of getting rich.’”

Dominicans agreed with Castro that the Cuban defeat of the US amateurs was a moral victory over commercialized baseball. After taking to the streets in 1965 in part because of the Triumvirate’s economic policies that favored powerful business interests over workers, Dominicans saw the Balaguer Government extend those favors to industrialists with the Industrial Incentives Law of 1968. Their “¡Cuba, Sí! ¡Yankees, No!” chants represented demands for a change from Balaguer’s policies, which often concentrated wealth in the hands of already-powerful industrialists and favored US

317 The United States won its first Amateur World Series in 1973 in Managua, finishing ahead of 10 other teams. However, the Managua series was organized by FIBA-rival, the Federación Mundial de Béisbol Amateur (FEMBA), and was held a couple weeks before the FIBA-organized Amateur World Series, which took place in Havana. After FEMBA and FIBA reconciled in the 1980s, the two decided to recognize both series, naming the Managua-based series the XXII Amateur World Series and the Havana-based series the XXI Amateur World Series. Along with American competitors—United States, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Colombia, Canada, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Mexico—Taiwan and Germany participated in the Nicaraguan campaign. Mexico and Puerto Rico also sent a team to Havana, to compete against Cuba, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Panama, the Dutch Antilles, and the Netherlands.

318 “Veras Favorece Club Dominicano Viaje a La Habana; Aclara Primero Necesita La Invitación Oficial,” El Caribe, 29 agosto 1969, 16. In the second column of the article, under a section titled, “Habla Castro,” the paper borrows from an AP report datelined Miami, 28 agosto. “Castro manifestó que no quería introducir la política en el deporte pero que la victoria del equipo cubano fue ‘una victoria moral’ porque en Cuba el beisbol es ‘una actividad que ya no es una forma de enriquecernos.’”
companies like Nestle and Falconbridge over national industries and workers.\textsuperscript{319} Debates over the relative benefits of professional versus amateur baseball paralleled discussions over these incentives. Dominicans who understood equal opportunity as the cornerstone of democracy wanted capitalism to operate in their country as it was intended to, according to \textit{impersonal} market forces, rather than with the Government bolstering its political interests through incentives for powerful industrialists. Government support for the Dominican Winter League did not fit the model of democracy that directed public resources to ensure broad economic security over that of private enterprises. Amateur baseball, for which players trained to represent the nation, proved more reliable and a more accurate representation for the democratic nation Dominicans imagined for themselves. As one sportswriter argued about amateur baseball: “This is how you make a Nation” (\textit{Así se hace Patria}).\textsuperscript{320}

Dominican calls for amateur baseball were not a rejection of professional baseball nor were the “\textit{¡Yankees, No!}” cheers a rejection of democracy. Rather, these chants

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\textsuperscript{319} On public debates over the Industrial Incentives Law of 1968, see Rafael Francisco De Moya Pons (Frank Moya Pons), “Industrial Incentives in the Dominican Republic 1880–1983” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1987). Arguments against the original plan for the incentives in 1968 divided between industrialists in the capital who wanted to maintain their dominance on the nation’s industry and economists trained in the Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (UCMM) located in Santiago. These Santiago-based intellectuals and businessmen argued for more support for agro-industry, emphasizing the need to focus on using local primary resources rather than imported inputs and heavy-labor processes over mechanized ones. See also, Bernardo Vega, \textit{Evaluación de la política de industrialización de la República Dominicana} (Santo Domingo: [s.n.], 1973); Fabio Herrera Miniño, \textit{Una estrategia para el desarrollo dominicano} (Santiago: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra [UCMM], 1977). For a foreign perspective on Dominican development, see Claudio Vedovato, \textit{Politics, Foreign Trade & Economic Development: A Study of the Dominican Republic} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).
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\textsuperscript{320} Tirso A. Váldez hijo, “Cuadrante Deportivo,” \textit{¡Ahora!}, no. 96, 20 de febrero 1965, 54. “\textit{Así se hace Patria. Porque esas obras serán las que servirán para la forjación de los atletas del mañana. De los que luego, en competencias internacionales, sabrán darle gloria al país. Una gloria sin fines lucrativos como en el besibol [sic] profesional.”}
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represented a turn toward Latin American models of government and Dominicans’ projection of their nation as a leader in debates about democracy happening across the region. As nascent democracies fell to military regimes throughout Latin America and US military or political interventions squashed hopes for economic security and political participation, Latin American nations looked to each other for governing models that would allow them to build societies that put economic security and political participation within the grasp of all. The solidarity behind the Alliance for Progress and the Punta del Este Charter faltered as the Alliance fell short of promises and Latin Americans saw their own conditions deteriorate. Latin American people worked to create their own paths to modernity and political stability and embraced a more pluralistic approach that promoted a “constructive revolution” along the justice-based model, as promoted by Cuba and the Soviet Union, within the democratic-capitalist structure supported by the United States.\textsuperscript{321}

With Balaguer’s dictatorial intentions still subdued—in August 1969 he had just committed to running for a second term in the 1970s elections—and the incorporation of baseball into the Revolución sin sangre, Dominicans imagined themselves at the forefront of this movement. Rather than fear communism, they applied their understandings for why communism arose and integrated some of Cuba’s programs with their own democratic systems to provide a bulwark against infiltration and to protect national sovereignty from both US and Soviet influence.

\textsuperscript{321} Alberto Baeza-Flores, Paris, “Ahora internacional: La encrucijada de América Latina,” ¡Ahora! No. 45, 30 de noviembre de 1963, 13–14. Baeza-Flores condemned the fear of communism while defining the “oligarchies of the right” as the true enemies of democracy. The oligarchies ensured their positions at the head of society by fueling fears of communism while they and members of the “false left” further paralyzed progress with their talks of US imperialism. He proposed a “third way,” an “authentic” democracy that worked for economic, social, and political changes in a revolution that respected the dignity of people and nations.
The so-called Revolución sin sangre was hardly bloodless—police and military forces committed more political murders and excesses during the Balaguer regime than during any other regular government in Dominican history, even the Trujillo Era—yet baseball offered Balaguer a means to assert his democratic credentials by incorporating Dominicans into his project through support for baseball teams and the construction of baseball fields and stadia. During the first few years of his doce años (twelve years), Balaguer manipulated Dominican pride in baseball to quell popular unrest and establish the legitimacy of his regime through patronage and displays of US backing, such as a visit by the Pittsburgh Pirates in 1967. Well aware of Dominicans’ pride in their Big League players and Big-League aspirants, Balaguer directed support to the spectacle of professional baseball, and, incidentally, the powerful business interests behind the Dominican Winter League. The Amateur World Series in 1969 signaled a turning point in the distribution of government support from professional to amateur baseball.

Amateur sport would build a nation by training youth into healthy citizens free from vices like drugs, alcohol, and politics. Dominicans participated in the construction of their

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322 The violence and excesses of the Balaguer regime persist along with his good works in the popular memory, though these two narratives rarely coexist in the same works. Probably the most popular and widely known account of Balaguer’s 1966–1978 presidency (he served again from 1986–1996), René Fortunato’s DVD documentary, La violencia del poder: Los doce años de Balaguer (Santo Domingo, Videocine Palau, S.A., 2003), recounted the excesses committed during the regime and framed itself as the counter-narrative to a more mainstream interpretation that emphasized public works and government largesse. However, given the familiarity of many Dominicans with the documentary and other accounts of atrocities committed during the doce años—including a prominent billboard commemorating the lives of four students killed by police forces on the only highway that goes east of the capital—an investigation of the history textbooks most widely used in schools and perhaps the sales of other work on the regime (there are few) is necessary to determine which is the “mainstream” view of the Balaguer years. The Fortunato DVD is available in most bookstores and prominently advertised, along with other DVD documentaries on Trujillo and Bosch, on lampposts and other sites throughout Santo Domingo and Santiago, including in the Ministry of Culture bookstores.
nation through their requests to the government for baseball fields and stadiums and backing of the national sports program. This participation reinforced Balaguer’s position as the “patrón” of sporting events and the Revolución sin sangre as he led the nation to hosting the XII Central American and Caribbean Games in 1974, the institutionalization of sport as a cabinet-level position in 1975, and the nation’s first democratic transition of power in 1978.

**Professional Baseball**

With the nation still divided, his legitimacy unsettled, government coffers empty, and hostilities toward the United States high after the civil war and US-led intervention, President Joaquín Balaguer embraced professional baseball as the means for easing relations between the Dominican government and the population and between Dominicans and the United States. Dominican ballplayers aided in this process through their record-setting achievements in the United States and their commitment to playing in the Winter League tournaments. They presented an image of “Dominican” in both nations of which anyone would be proud. A visit by the Pittsburgh Pirates in 1967 projected a more palatable image of the United States to Dominicans than the tanks and infantry that had roamed the island two years before. The Balaguer Government’s investment in these projects and the ceremonies surrounding them projected the baseball glory onto Balaguer as well. Photos of Balaguer embracing World-Series champion Julián Javier or greeting the Pirates in his office portrayed a government interested in the national pastime, and thus willing to invest in the people. Dominicans were proud of the
image they projected through baseball, both at home and abroad, so government investment supported that image.

Just three months into the Balaguer regime Dominicans predicted the rebirth of their nation from the ashes of civil war onto the performance of Dominican ballplayers in the United States, hailing the distinguished performances by Mateo and Felipe Alou, Ricardo Carty, Manuel Mota, and Juan Marichal during the 1966 Major League season as a “glorious triumph.” For the first time in baseball history three foreign players from the same country, the Dominican Republic, led the Major Leagues in hitting. Mateo Alou’s .342 average won him the National League batting crown over the second-place .328 average shared by Felipe and Carty. Juan Marichal continued to put up Hall of Fame numbers, leading Time magazine to name his “The Best Right Arm in Baseball.” By the end of the 1966 season, Marichal had brought his total consecutive 20+ win seasons to four, posting a 25–6 record and 2.23 ERA in 307.1 innings. For Dominicans these performances signaled more than their countrymen’s baseball skills. Marichal’s dominance on the mound and the feats of the Alou brothers and Carty at the plate seemed to signal that reconciliation was possible. After all, Felipe Alou had found his swing with the Atlanta Braves after his public critique of Major League Baseball in 1963 and

323 Suárez del Solar, “Hazaña Players Criollos Será Difícil de Igualar,” AP, New York, El Caribe, 3 de octubre 1966, 14, reported these statistics, though Baseball-Reference.com reported slightly different numbers for both Felipe Alou (.327) and Ricardo Carty (.326).

324 Time 87, no. 23, June 10, 1966. The cover named Marichal “The Best Right Arm in Baseball” and pictured Gerald Gooch’s 6-step storyboard rendition of Marichal’s famous high-kicking motion. The feature story, “Baseball: The Dandy Dominican,” referenced Marichal’s more widely known nickname, “The Dominican Dandy.” Sandy Koufax who won his third unanimous National League Cy Young Award in 1966 finished the season with a 1.75 ERA in 323 innings and a 27–9 record.
Marichal had regained his swagger after the shameful incident with John Roseboro the previous August.

Newspaper editors, sportswriters, and officials fueled the good feelings of reconciliation and unity as they welcomed the Big Leaguers home with an eagerness resembling that of 1962, and with similar hopes of projecting the nation’s success from their baseball feats. An early-October editorial in *El Caribe* claimed these performances a “glorious triumph” by the nation’s “Good Ambassadors.”

Beyond crediting the ballplayers’ performance in the United States for “raising the colors of their country,” editors in 1966 celebrated Dominican ballplayers as the country’s best diplomats. Other diplomats lived lavishly in the United States at the state’s expense and relied on formalized, perhaps disingenuous strategies in their negotiations. Ballplayers, on the other hand, earned their own livings, invested in their country, and represented the nation through the purity of sport: “They have been diplomats on a pure field, clean, crystalline” and “Their language has been sport.”

Though the editorial distinguished the performances of the Alou brothers, Carty, Marichal, and Manuel Mota—who built his .332 average (second behind Mateo) on only 359 plate appearances, falling short of the 400 necessary to qualify for official standings—all Dominican ballplayers consecrated

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326 Ibid. “Han sido unos diplomáticos en un campo puro, limpio, diáfano. / Su idioma ha sido el deporte.”
327 Though Mota would play in the Big Leagues for 19 seasons, he reached the minimum of 400 at-bats only once, hitting for a .305 average in 417 at-bats in 1970. Currently, a minimum of plate appearances (502) are required rather than at-bats for a batting title, though this requirement possibly changed in the early 1970s. Some people still cite the incorrect statistic that 400 at-bats are required for the title. Mota’s 162 game average is .304 in 399 at-bats and 446 plate appearances. Although his number of plate appearances falls below the minimum of a “regular” player, Mota is still remembered in Los Angeles for his impressive pinch hitting during his 13 seasons with the Dodgers from 1969–1980, and for one at-bat in 1982.
the country’s victory, “demonstrating, once again, why Santo Domingo is considered the
Mecca of Latin Baseball today.”328

Figure 5.1: Triunfo Consagrador: Peloteros Dominicanos en Grandes Ligas329

In the eyes of Dominicans reading El Caribe, the feats of Dominican ballplayers
consecrated not only the reputation of the Dominican Republic as a “mecca of Latin
baseball,” but more importantly, the ballplayers presented an image of Dominicans to US
Americans of which Dominicas back home could be proud. The cartoonist Almonte
shared this image with Dominicans (Figure 5.1): A ballplayer in uniform stood in front of
a suitcase labeled “Dominican ballplayers in Big Leagues,” holding a bat in one hand and
a sign reading “Triunfo Consagrador” (glorious, or sacred, triumph) in the other.330 On
the hallowed ground of the baseball diamond and through the language of sport, the
ballplayers showed US fans what Dominicans were really like. Images of Marichal’s

vez más, por qué a Santo Domingo se le considera en la actualidad como la meca del béisbol
latino. / Ellos, todos pusieron en alto los colores de su país.”
329 Almonte, El Caribe, 4 de octubre de 1966, 6.
330 Almonte, El Caribe, 4 de octubre de 1966, 6
high kick or Mateo Alou’s unconventional swing replaced those of gun-toting revolutionaries and radical politicians in the US press.

Balaguer ensured his part in the “glorious triumph” achieved by Dominican ballplayers on the nation’s behalf by working with Winter League officials to ensure that the ball-playing ambassadors could direct their diplomatic efforts toward their own people during the 1966–1967 Winter League Tournament. With the Estadio Quisqueya in disrepair from the civil war and misuse, the government dedicated just under $23,000 (US$163,000 in 2012) for repairs, nearly $18,000 of which was diverted from a fund to repair a hospital. Knowing the interest that the professional season held for Dominicans from every social and political stripe, Balaguer also went beyond the usual tax breaks and administration of the stadia to offer financial assistance to all of the Winter League teams, including buying their debts with the Bank of Reserves. The government offered each team a donation of $12,500 (US$88,000 in 2012) to prepare the tournament and, before the start of the 1967–1968 season, bought debts that the teams

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331 This figure represents the 2012 equivalent of US$23,000 in 1963 (equivalent to RD$23,000) according to the Simple Purchasing Power Calculator based on the US Consumer Price Index (CPI). Although the Dominican peso was pegged to the US dollar in 1963, the CPI likely varied greatly because of different items considered in the computation of the consumer bundle. However, these figures provide a frame of reference for today's US figures. For conversions and explanation of the comparative figures, see, MeasuringWorth.com.

332 MEMORANDUM No. 140, 22 de septiembre de 1966, Director Técnico de la Oficina de Fiscalización de Obras é Inversiones del Estado, Ing. Bienvenido A. Martínez Brea, al Sr Presidente de la República, SEDEFIR 16579. Minister of Public Works Ing. Luis Mauricio Bogaert originally estimated the costs of repairs at $52,706.94, according to MEMORANDUM 3830, 12 de septiembre de 1966, SEDEFIR 16579. Martínez Brea, who build the Estadio Quisqueya, included only the essential repairs that could be completed in time for the 1966–1967 winter season in his quote of $22,697.70. The official exchange rate of the Dominican Peso was equal to the US dollar in official policy through 1978, although a parallel market did exist. I have used the official 1:1 rate throughout.

claimed had been guaranteed by the Triumvirate government in 1963 and 1964—debts that totaled $19,000 each for the Estrellas and Escogido alone. Vice President Francisco Augusto Lora stressed the political and social importance of this financial support, reminding Balaguer in 1967 that “Independent of the legal considerations, I believe it is also in our political interest [to pay the debts] because it will facilitate the celebration of the next baseball tournament, which is always a sporting event of great interest for the Dominican public.” Balaguer and those involved in his regime understood that consolidating control over the Dominican population would require that they, too, speak the language of sport—or support ambassadors who would do so on their behalf.

The next year the success of the role of baseball as a language of interaction with the United States would reach its heights with Julián Javier’s brilliant contributions behind the plate, including a game-sealing 3-run homer in Game 7; on the base paths; and in defense to the St Louis Cardinal’s World Series victory. Javier’s performance in the World Series and National League pennant race had united people across the globe, bringing “St Louisans and Dominicans to shake excitedly in unison with Javier’s displays

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334 Carta, 31 de enero de 1967, Dr. A. Álvarez Sánchez, Secretario de la Liga Dominicana de Baseball Profesional, Inc., al Señor Doctor Joaquín Balaguer, SEDEFIR 16583. Veras had indicated in his undated Memo that the Aguilas owed $40,000, but by January 1967, the Estrellas and Escogido distinguished themselves for carrying debts just under $19,000 each from the 1963 and 1964 seasons.

335 “Independientes de las consideraciones legalistas, creo además de interés político aceptar la reclamación del Dr. Kasse Acta, pues de esa manera se facilitaría la mayor celebración del próximo campeonato de Base-Ball que es siempre un evento deportivo de gran interés para todo el pueblo dominicano.” “Memorandum,” 28 de junio de 1967, SEDEFIR 16583.
of aggression and courage over his brilliant spikes.”

This excitement reached throughout the baseball world: “Since the last out of the 1967 World Series fell, the champagne running on the floors in the visitor’s locker room at Fenway Park, in English, in Spanish, in Japanese, and in all the languages in which the fall classic is reported, they are talking about Julián Javier.”

Despite this international attention, Javier was proud to be Dominican. Inés de Javier told El Caribe that when she greeted her World Series champion husband back in St Louis, she “received him ‘with a kiss and a Dominican flag.’”

Even amid the celebration of the highest distinction in what was still the American pastime, the Javiers had kept their country and their dominicanidad visible through this concrete gesture of national pride. Javier, whom Dominicans had received with hurled stones and accusations of “yanquista” in 1964, served as further evidence of the healing powers of baseball.

As they celebrated the return of their ambassador to St Louis, Dominicans also eagerly anticipated the arrival of the first coalition of US baseball diplomats to arrive on their island since 1948. The Dominican Foundation for Development, a nonprofit founded in 1966, welcomed the Pittsburgh Pirates for a 5-game exhibition series with proceeds from the games going to a project allegedly directed toward Dominican farmers.

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336 Ibid. Garris described the significance of the 1967 season for Javier as a “culminación gloriosa de esta atleta con su extraordinaria actuación el la recién finalizada Serie Mundial, donde sanluisiños y dominicanos fueron puestos a vibrar con emoción al unísono con las demostraciones de agresividad y coraje con que se elevó Javier en repetidas ocasiones sobre sus brillantes spikes.”

337 Ibid.

The series united Dominican ballplayers, government, and citizens with the Pirates players in the baseball fundraiser for development. Dominican ballplayers, like those from the Pirates, participated in the Series for free, offering their support to the event that had official sanction from the Balaguer Government. Balaguer granted the concessions habitually offered to the Dominican Winter League and attended the inaugural game.

Serving as good baseball ambassadors for the Untied States, the Pirates also expressed their support for the Dominican development by offering free baseball clinics to aspiring ballplayers in Santo Domingo, Santiago, and San Pedro de Macorís. Dominicans showed their appreciation by supporting the players on both sides and the Dominican Foundation for Development with their pesos and their enthusiasm. Before the first group of Pirates arrived from Puerto Rico, El Caribe reported that all the tickets for the Pirates-Dominican All-Stars game in the Estadio Cibao had been sold out, adding that “Never before has such extraordinary enthusiasm been seen in this city, and it’s for nothing less” because of the great stars about to play there.339

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339 Domingo Saint-Hilaire hijo wrote three separate reports on the status of the tickets in the Estadio Cibao. See, Domingo Saint-Hilaire hijo, "Venden en Santiago todas Entradas Juegos Piratas," El Caribe, 16 de octubre de 1967, 18; "Inician Venta de Entradas Juego Piratas en Santiago," El Caribe, 18 de octubre de 1967, 17; “Fanáticos Región Cibaeña Darán Bienvenida Piratas," El Caribe, 19 de octubre de 1967, 18. The first reported that all the tickets had been sold out in the headline, but in the article explained that only the Preferred [preferencias] tickets (the grandstand) had been sold out and palcos (box seats) remained while bleachers and standing room had not yet been released. Saint-Hilaire hijo reported that an estimated 10,000 who wanted to would be unable to find tickets to the game, adding that “ya desde hace tiempo está resultando demasiado pequeño para alojar a los miles de fanáticos que gustan del deporte favorito del pueblos dominicano,” most likely a subversive means of requesting a renovation for the stadium, which would happen in 1976. In the last of the three articles, Saint-Hilaire commented on the enthusiasm for the visit—"Jamás se había notado en esta ciudad un entusiasmo tan extraordinario y no es para menos"—as well as some of festivities that officials from the Aguilas planned to greet the team while also explaining that all the tickets had been sold out, save for some of the bleacher seats.
Dominicans’ warm reception for the Pirates undoubtedly derived from their baseball obsession. But the visit proved an important diplomatic success for the United States. Even considering a lack of official US support for the Pirates visit, the team represented the United States and US Organized Baseball. The image of these baseball ambassadors, invited to take the field along with a team of Dominican stars, would, the US and Dominican governments hoped, replace the image of US soldiers invading the country to squash a semi-spontaneous popular movement. With the tourist industry still in the planning stages in 1967, the only US Americans most Dominicans had ever seen had been soldiers or the individual US ballplayers who reinforced Dominican teams each winter. The series placed a group of US representatives, dressed in baseball flannels rather than military fatigues, on a Dominican baseball field where everyone played by the same rules. The exhibition with the Pirates did not silence the anti-US or anti-imperialist sentiments that buzzed around the Dominican Republic at the time, but the US baseball ambassadors represented another side of the United States.

Beyond the exchange of military for baseball uniforms, the Pirates reminded Dominicans that their struggle for a democratic society was a hemisphere-wide fight, one that reached into even the United States, the purported model of democracy. The Pirates of 1967 looked much different from the Brooklyn Dodgers and Montreal Royals that had visited in 1948. Back then, Jackie Robinson and Roy Campanella were the only black

\[\text{I have found no evidence of official US Government support for the Pirates' trip, aside from the presence of US embassy officials at the event. When I was in the US National Archives and Records Administration in 2010 the Dominican Republic the unclassified documents were not available. I plan to return soon to access those records, if they are available or to file a FOIA to attain access.}\]
players in the Dodgers and Royals (respectively) spring-training lineups for exhibitions against Dominican teams. The Pirates on-field delegation in 1967 included only six white, non-Latino Pirates, including manager Danny Murtaugh and coach John Pesky. They presented an image of racial inclusion and diversity—and most of all of progress—for the United States and US Organized Baseball. From the composition of players on the field, Dominicans watching the games could imagine themselves at Winter League games, a mistake made even more understandable by the fact that many of the Pirates players, black, white, and Latin-American, had played in the Dominican Winter League. In addition to Manny Sanguillén’s plans to join the Aguilas for the 1967 winter season and André Rodgers’s time with Escogido in 1959–1960, Bill Mazeroski had played with the Aguilas for two seasons (1955–1956, 1956–1957) and Willie Stargell and Bob Veale played with the Aguilas in 1963–1964. That Dominicans could see themselves in a (mostly) intact Big League team made the United States seem more familiar, a little less like the monolithic power that had squashed Dominican popular aspirations. The Pirates represented what Dominicans had in common with the people in the United States, especially as both societies struggled against the confines of structures from less-tolerant eras.

Media coverage surrounding the event stressed the message of government backing to Dominican baseball fans. Dominicans flipping through El Caribe to the

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The visits occurred within hours of each other, just before the players met on the field for the final time. They met first at the US Embassy from 12–2 pm, and then headed to the National Palace around 5. On the US Ambassador’s luncheon, see “Alvaro Arvelo hijo, “Embajador de EU Agasaja A Piratas de Pittsburgh,” El Caribe, 24 de octubre de 1967, 4. On the reception at the Palace, see “Ejecutivo Califica Valioso Aporte de Piratas de Pittsburgh,” El Caribe, 24 de octubre de 1967, 6.
results for the final game passed through the Social Pages, where a three-photo series (Figure 5.2) showed Balaguer embracing Julián Javier, shaking hands with Dominican pitcher Danilo Rivas, and posing with Pirates manager Danny Murtaugh during a reception in his office for both teams.\textsuperscript{342} Though the Dominican Foundation for Development had organized the Pirates visit and approached Balaguer about hosting a reception for the players,\textsuperscript{343} the photos created a visual association between Balaguer and Dominican baseball heroes. Reports on Javier’s recognition with the Order of Duarte, Sánchez, and Mella for his World Series championship had mentioned an exchange of embraces with the country’s top executive. Here, Dominicans witnessed Javier’s personal connection to the President for themselves. The photo of Balaguer and Rivas, who never played in the Big Leagues but whose Minor League and Winter League numbers earned him a place in the Dominican Sports Hall of Fame, extended Balaguer’s baseball connections to Winter League stars, and tied Balaguer to the Dominican side against the Pirates. Dominicans who had followed the exhibition series knew that Rivas had combined with the young Pedro Borbón to blank the Pirates in the Dominican team’s only victory in the 5-game exhibition. Now, Dominicans could associate Balaguer with the flash of pride over the defeat of a Big League team as well as with the returning hero Javier. While Balaguer lavished the Pirates and their executives with diplomatic niceties,

\textsuperscript{342} Uncredited photo, \textit{El Caribe}, 24 de octubre de 1967, 6. The photo accompanied an unsigned article titled “Ejecutivo Califica Valioso Aporte de Piratas del Pittsburgh.”

\textsuperscript{343} Carta, 3 de octubre de 1967, José Armenteros, Presidente, Fundación Dominicana de Desarrollo, Inc., al Dr. Joaquín Balaguer, Hon. Señor Presidente de la República, SEDEFIR 16583.
Dominican ballplayers connected Balaguer to the population through the national pastime.

Figure 5.2: On the left, President Balaguer embraces World Series champion Julián Javier in a reception at Balaguer’s offices in the National Palace before Game 5 against the Pirates. Center, in the waiting room outside of Balaguer’s office, some of the players, officials, and their wives wait their turn as Balaguer greets Dominican pitcher Danilo Rivas. Right, Balaguer and Pirates Manager Danny Murtaugh embrace and pose for the camera alongside Vice President Francisco Augusto Lora.344

The third photo in the series, which pictured Balaguer and Danny Murtaugh with their arms on each other’s backs, emphasized to Dominicans and any fans in the United States Balaguer’s good relationship with the United States and confirmed the diplomatic success of the visit. Murtaugh, the leader of the diplomatic baseball delegation from Pittsburgh, presented a baseball autographed by the Pirates to Balaguer and expressed his sadness at being unable to thank the Dominican people for their hospitality in Spanish. Speaking on behalf of the entire delegation through a translator, Murtaugh told Balaguer that all were “very well impressed with this country.”345 After thanking Murtaugh for his

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345 “Ejecutivo Califica Valioso Aporte de Piratas de Pittsburgh, *El Caribe*, 24 de octubre de 1967, 6. Murtaugh, speaking through José Armenteros who acted as translator, said that “todos se sentían ‘altamente complacidos de la hospitalidad dominicana’ y ‘muy bien impresionados de este país.’”
kind words, Balaguer, whose view of the visit’s success headlined the article

—“Executive Qualifies the Support of Pittsburgh Pirates as Valuable”—expressed his
hopes that “the Pirates visit to the country stretches even more the sporting relations
between Dominicans and US Americans.”346

The Limits of Professional Diplomacy

The Pirates’ visit was a resounding success in terms of generating goodwill and
redefining negative reputations. But the showing by the Dominican All-Stars against the
Pittsburgh Pirates revealed the limits of professional baseball as a level playing field.
The Dominican All-Stars 1–4 record during the Series exposed how the personal interests
that drove professional baseball undermined its effectiveness as the heart of Dominican
national pride. The Pirates’ domination on the field reminded Dominicans that the best
baseball talent in world played US Organized Baseball, leaving the source of their
national pride dependent on a US business. Dominican baseball fans and sportswriters
saw these limitations and were quick to criticize them, but until the Balaguer regime
stabilized and the Dominican people moved beyond the divisions of the civil war,
Dominicans celebrated what they had, and that was professional baseball. They clung to
their pride in Dominican achievements in the United States, despite perceived injustices,
until they could build their nation on the amateur field.

The Dominican All-Stars comprised a hodgepodge of some of the best current and
rising Big League and Winter League ballplayers that the country had to offer, but the
team struggled to compete with the Pirates and elicited few poetic sporting flourishes like

346 Ibid.
those that accompanied the Selección-Estrellas Series in 1962. Established Big Leaguers like Ricardo Carty and Jesús Rojas Alou participated in the exhibition, along with Julián Javier, who had just been hailed a “money player” by the Dominican sporting press.\footnote{Fidencio Garris, “Javier ‘Jugador de Dinero,’” \textit{El Caribe}, 17 de octubre de 1967, 16.}

Still, two of the brightest names in Dominican baseball—Felipe Rojas Alou and Juan Marichal\footnote{Felipe Rojas Alou was recovering from elbow surgery that he underwent at the end of the 1967 season; however, he had intimated to the Atlanta press that he would fulfill the Braves’ orders that he take 20,000 flies over the summer to prepare for his move from first base to center field for the 1968 season. See, Bob Speer, AP, “Felipe Rojas Alou Jugará Bosque Central de Bravos,” \textit{El Caribe}, 21 de octubre de 1967, 14.}—were missing from the lineup while three other Dominican Big Leaguers and winter stars—Mateo Rojas Alou, Manuel Mota, and Manuel Emilio Jiménez—played for the Pirates. The biggest weakness in the Dominican All-Star lineup came at the pitching position, where 39-year-old Federico “Chichi” Olivo, who retired from US Baseball the previous season, complemented a roster of minor leaguers ranging from the experienced Danilo Rivas to the rookie Santiago Guzmán. While Dominicans excited in the opportunity to see their ballplayers match up against a Big League team, watching a minor-league rookie pitch to National League Batting Champion Roberto Clemente hardly inspired the same exaltations of national glory as a 20-win season by Marichal or a World Series homerun by Javier. The losses by their All-Stars to the Pirates reminded Dominicans of their subordinate position next to the United States in professional baseball.

The personal interests driving professional baseball accounted in part for the relative lack of competition between the Dominican All Stars and the Pittsburgh Pirates and inhibited Dominicans from making their nation on professional baseball fields. No
matter how much they loved their sport or their country, professional ballplayers, managers, team owners, and league directors competed out of personal, economic interest first and national solidarity second—if at all. Baseball was their business, their job, and for most of them, US Baseball their primary employer and the source of livelihood for their families. The Dominican sports press criticized their national ballplayers for their claims of exhaustion after the US season or their desires to rest or spend time with their families rather than participate in the Winter League. Juan Marichal received much of this criticism, with one sportswriter contrasting Felipe Alou and Manuel Mota’s eager participation in the Winter League with what he imagined for Marichal “to play in his country is a type of imposition.” Other fans and sportswriters understood that their baseball heroes sat out a winter for self-preservation or professional obligations rather than because “the greatness of their triumphs had gone to their heads.” In the Pirates exhibition, their contractual obligations with Pittsburgh, rather than a lack of patriotism, placed Mateo Alou, Manuel Mota, and Manuel Emilio Jiménez on the Pirates side of the diamond against the All-Star team of their compatriots. Limited by the self-interests that permeated it, professional baseball proved an inadequate basis of national pride and prosperity for Dominicans.

The economic interests of Dominican baseball teams and the Winter League itself lay behind the limitations that professional baseball imposed on Dominican baseball

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349 Indalecio Lora Gómez, Especial para ¡Ahora!, “Dejemos Tranquilo a Juan Marichal,” ¡Ahora!, no. 96, 20 de febrero de 1965, 55.

350 Ibid. Speaking about national sporting icons more generally, Lora Gómez suggested that “Pero muchas veces los ídolos no quieren que el fanático los vea en acción, sea porque sus condiciones físicas no se lo permitan, o sea porque la grandeza por los triunfos alcanzados les haya invadido sus mentes.”
sovereignty. On this point Castro’s declaration on Miami radio that the Cuban amateur’s victory over the US team was a moral victory of “sport without mercantilism,” or sport without commercialism, grasped Dominican hearts and minds. Dominicans sportswriters commented on the falling attendance at Dominican Winter League games during the Balaguer Government and attributed Dominicans’ faltering interest in the national pastime to teams’ tendency to bench Dominican legends like Danilo Rivas or young prospects like Santiago Guzmán to give playing time to North American rookies. Working Agreements with US teams, such as that the Aguilas Cibaeñas had with the Pirates, left Dominican teams to balance their interest in pleasing crowds by hiring rising young US Big Leaguers with supporting national pride by providing opportunities to Dominican prospects. Dominican teams depended on these Working Agreements to facilitate permission for even Dominican players to play in the Winter Tournament. Dominican and foreign Big Leaguers generated ticket revenue, which the teams needed to pay talent and the League used to organize the yearly tournament. This business rationale in the Winter League teams’ decision-making reflected the infusion of capitalism into the Dominican national pastime and exposed how capitalism, or “mercantilism” as Castro called it, inhibited Dominican baseball sovereignty. The economic weakness of Dominican baseball alongside US baseball meant that Dominican players, teams, and league directors had to bend their ideals to meet US demands.

351 Details about Castro’s reception of the 1969 Amateur World Series champions appeared under the heading “Habla Castro” (Miami AP) in the article, “Veras Favorece Club Dominicano Viaje a La Habana; Aclara Primero Necesita La Invitación Oficial,” El Caribe, 29 de agosto de 1969, 16.

Though their nation boasted some of the best baseball talent, their country’s economic weakness next to the United States meant that Dominicans could never fully express their identity and sovereignty through commercialized baseball. In this international context, Castro’s embrace of state-supported amateurism made sense.

Since the Trujillo Era, the Dominican Government had been the primary supporter and organizer of sports of all levels—from the Little Leagues to the Winter League—and heavily regulated athletes’ passing from amateur to professional baseball. This centralization of resources caused sportswriters to see investment in professional versus amateur sport as a zero-sum decision, leading one sportswriter to observe: “The decline of amateur baseball and the continual progress of professional baseball are two undeniable truths.”

This view of the realities of the national sport and government support combined with their disillusionment over professional baseball to lead sportswriters and officials such as Director of Sports Horacio Veras to initiate a new campaign for amateur sports in the country. Professional baseball diverted both financial and human resources from amateur leagues and teams that would represent the nation in international competitions. These amateur leagues and teams, not the local Winter League, would train young Dominicans in the democratic values of sport and bring glory to the nation on international fields. After a poor performance in the XVI Amateur World Series in 1965,

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353 Tirso A. Váldez hijo, “Cuadrante Deportivo,” ¡Ahora!, no. 103, 10 de abril de 1965, 55. Váldez began an article that examined how the number of professionals going to the United States has robbed amateur teams of talent with his observation that: “A decadencia del béisbol aficionado y el continuo progreso del béisbol profesional son dos verdades innegables desde diversos puntos de vista en la República Dominicana.”
Dominican sportswriters asked the government to restrict professional scouts from signing Dominican amateurs leading up to the next Amateur Series. They agreed: “‘In the next World Series, as host country, the Dominican Republic ought to present a powerful team, one that dignifies the quality and tradition of Dominican amateur baseball. Yes, it is a matter of native honor, of national pride.’”

The regeneration of a national project in support of amateur sports derived from Dominicans’ lasting dream of the nation’s rise to a “place under the sun among the advanced nations of America” that Juan Bosch promised in his 1963 inaugural address. Dominicans saw baseball as integral to that dream, both as a means and an end. The limits that professionalism imposed on Dominican baseball sovereignty and Cuba’s dominance in amateur competition pushed Dominican sportswriters to refocus their attention from professional to amateur baseball. In order to direct the Revolución sin sangre toward the “place under the sun” that Bosch projected for its future, Dominicans would have to bring up the downtrodden, specifically the campesinos. Most Dominicans imagined their campesinos stuck in shacks on their plots in the interior and subject to the

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354 Ibid. Váldez reiterated the argument of Listín Diario sports editor Félix Acosta Núñez that “‘Precisa de una reglamentación inmediata’—continúa [sic] diciendo Acosta Núñez—‘que tienda a que los escuchas profesionales respeten el beisbol amateur dominicano hasta la celebración de la serie.’[. . .] ‘En la próxima serie mundial, como país-sede, la República Dominicana debe presentar un equipo de poder, que dignifique la calidad y la tradición beisbolera amateurista dominicana. Es un asunto, ya, de honor patrio, de orgullo nacional.’” The Amateur World Series was originally scheduled to be held in the Dominican Republic in the fall of 1965, but the outbreak of the popular rebellion in the country, and political issues in other IBAF member countries, and the IBAF itself, led to its delay to 1969.

355 In his inaugural address on February 27, 1963, President Juan Bosch promised to work continuously to give Dominicans the place under the sun among the advanced nations. US officials such as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Bartlow Martin echoed the rhetoric of a “place under the sun” for democratic nations in their writings as well. For Bosch’s inaugural address, see “Ejecutivo Lee Discurso Tras su Juramentación,” El Caribe, 28 de febrero de 1963, 10.
influence of extremists who wanted to duplicate Castro’s guerrilla campaign in Cuba’s Sierra Maestra mountains. Extending baseball to these areas through the construction of new installations and the incorporation of new regions into the national amateur baseball tournament would integrate campesinos into the nation by teaching them the democratic values embodied by sport. From government investment in fields and youth sports leagues throughout the country would rise the athletes of tomorrow who “will know how to bring glory to the country [in international competition], a glory without regards to profit as in professional baseball.” Professional baseball like the Pirates exhibition could raise thousands of dollars to provide campesinos with land, seeds, or credit, but Dominicans embraced amateur baseball as the means for remaking their nation to achieve its full baseball glory.

**Making the Nation Abroad and at Home**

Recognizing the limited audience of professional baseball as one of its most damning limitations in participating in debates over the best practices for democracy, Dominicans embraced amateur baseball and its continental audience. Professional baseball allowed Dominicans to speak only with the United States. Amateur baseball proved more effective for a hemisphere-wide dialogue as national teams from countries

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356 Tirso A. Váldez hijo, “Cuadrante Deportivo,” ¡Ahora!, no. 96 (20 de febrero de 1964): 54. Váldez’s article began with a criticism that despite record-breaking attendance in most the parks the Winter League teams claimed losses for the season, which the government had agreed to back to ensure the season would take place. Váldez argued that the government should invest in amateur sport instead, pointing to Triumvirate leader Donald Reid Cabral’s investment in the Parque Metropolitano (which became the Olympic Center) as an example of what the government should be investing in to support sport. He said: “Así se hace Patria. Porque esas obras serán las que servirán para la forjación de los atletas del mañana. De los que luego, en competencia [sic] internacionales, sabrán darle gloria al país. Una gloria sin fines lucrativos como en el beisbol [sic] profesional.”

357 Ibid.
with divergent political systems met in international amateur competitions. Cold War politics had unsettled the fraternity of American nations by dividing the OAS and other regional organizations, putting a wedge between Latin American countries united by culture and long histories of cooperation. By 1969 Latin American nations recognized that this wedge divided them and pushed each one toward isolation with the United States. Latin Americans reasserted their voices in the region by promoting reconciliation and individual paths to healthy societies. Dominicans positioned themselves as a leader in the reconciliation of these divisions through sport, signaling the nation’s ability to reach new levels of organization, investment, and cooperation in sport. By hosting international events, Dominicans projected their nation as a friend to all athletes and a leader in upholding the fraternity of sport, sending amateur baseball delegations to Castro’s Cuba and Somoza’s Nicaragua, and welcoming all to their country for the 1969 Amateur World Series and the 1974 Central American and Caribbean Games. Even as Cold War politics divided international athletic associations between friends of Cuba and friends of the United States, the Dominican Republic participated in both worlds, demonstrating the nation’s commitment to sports unencumbered by politics and its desire to forge its own political path.

The XVII Amateur World Series served as the Dominican Republic’s reintroduction to the competition for regional baseball supremacy and projected the nation’s budding democracy onto the world stage. At the same time, Dominican sports officials, especially Dominican Olympic Committee President Juan Ulises García Saleta and Director of Sport Horacio Veras, worked to turn the American sport fraternity on the
international stage inward to build national solidarity through sport. They promoted sport as an obligation of the Government and incorporated Dominican athletes into a national project of sport for human development and political progress. Sport would create citizens for democracy—specifically for democracy as defined by the Balaguer Government. As a leader in building international solidarity on the sports field, these Dominican officials emphasized the Olympic spirit of sport without politics, and even sport as a cure for oppositional politics, as necessary for creating a democratic society in the Dominican Republic.

**The American Sports Fraternity**

After the last out in the Amateur World Series final, the Cubans took a victory lap around the field to a standing ovation as Dominicans joined their nationalist cheers reverberating through the Estadio Quisqueya. Dominican Director of Sports Horacio Veras congratulated INDER Director Jorge García Bongó on the team’s victory as he handed him the trophy, concluding that “once again it is demonstrated that sport unites populations and men.” García Bongó showed that the sporting ethic extended to questions of victory and defeat as well, noting that “the prize obtained by Cuba ‘belongs

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\(^{358}\) The chants were reported as part of the celebration after the Cubans beat the US team. See, Miguel A. Reinoso Solís, “Buena Labor PN,” *El Caribe*, 27 de agosto de 1969, 15.

as much to the Dominican Republic and all of Latin America as to Cuba.” The American sporting ethic meant that the Cubans would share their victory with even the least successful of the Latin American teams; they measured victory in terms of Latin American fraternity, not on-field performance.

García Bongó’s sharing of the “prize” with all of Latin America reflected an important exclusion in the American Fraternity around amateur sport: the United States. The prize of which García Bongó spoke was not the Series championship but beating the United States. The “¡Cuba, Sí! ¡Yankees, No!” chants coming from the stands had been both a critique of US policy and an expression of Latin American and Caribbean solidarity, a solidarity that required returning Cuba to the Latin American brotherhood. As one broadcaster noted, the chants “‘reflect the discontent of Latin Americans against the policies followed by the United States toward our continent, and that does not occur only here [in the Dominican Republic], it occurs in any part of the hemisphere.’”

Cold War politics and resentment toward US interventions in Latin American affairs left the

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360 Veras: “‘una vez más queda demostrado que el deporte une a los pueblos y a los hombres.” García Bongó: “el galardón obtenido por Cuba ’es tanto de Cuba como de la República Dominicana y toda América Latina.’” García Bongó likely included the Dutch Antilles, though not technically part of Latin America because of its lack of latino heritage, in his offer of the prize as belonging to all of Latin America. In earlier newspaper articles around the Series, sportswriters often explicitly included the Dutch Antilles in their references to Latin America—probably because of their shared histories as part of the formerly colonized Caribbean island and perhaps more administratively because of their association through the Central American and Caribbean Sports Organization, which oversees the Central American and Caribbean Games.

361 Ibid. “‘Las protestas,’ dijo uno, ‘reflejan un descontento de los latinoamericanos contra la política seguida por los Estados Unidos hacia nuestro continente y eso no ocurre sólo aquí, ocurre en cualquier parte del hemisferio.’” An Editorial in El Caribe on August 22 expressed discontent with US policies, though the accusations centered on the Nixon administration’s lack of urgency in devising policy toward Latin America rather than a fear of imperialism. Titled “Lentitud,” the Editorial expressed confusion at the “inertia” of the Nixon administration to speed up in looking for “new formulas” to help focus and resolve the many complex economic, social, political, and diplomatic problems in the region that “dismay those who know that there’s not much time before a crisis comes upon us.” Editorial, “Lentitud,” El Caribe, 22 de agosto de 1969, 10.
United States as an outsider. The United States could field a team and participate in the baseball festivities alongside its Latin American and Caribbean brothers, but its superpower status, cultural differences, and well-known superiority in professional baseball would confine it to the fringes of a Latin American fraternity.

The push of a Latin American fraternity that excluded the United States became more prominent in the years following the 1969 Series as Latin American nations joined together to ensure their voices were heard in conversations with the wealthier and mightier United States. In 1973, Latin American Chancellors met in Bogotá, Colombia to refine OAS strategy to forge “new paths of equality and of justice for the relationships between people of the Hemisphere with the United States of America.”

Dominican Chancellor Víctor Gómez Bergés defined what he saw as the core values for the institution in a letter sent to his peers just before the meeting. He called for the “establishment of mechanisms that consolidate development, liberty, and self-determination” for all countries in the Americas. Given US assistance to the Chilean military coup against democratically elected President Salvador Allende two months before and the OAS-supported intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965–1966, the Dominican chancellor stressed sovereignty and nonintervention as the key to the success of the OAS. They held the continental organization to its objectives to ensure that all American citizens, no matter their country, enjoyed the benefits of these core values.

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363 Ibid.
Latin American nations met to present a united front in their interactions with the United States.

Reports of the OAS meeting reflected a shift in Latin American objectives for the international union. Rather than stressing democracy, member nations stressed pluralism and sovereignty. They recognized that each country might follow a different path as they all built more equitable societies. Discussions to expel Cuba from OAS proceedings began at the same 1960 meeting where member nations voted for sanctions against the Trujillo Regime; Cuba was officially suspended from the OAS in 1962 on the basis that its relationship with the Soviet Union disqualified Cuba from the hemispheric brotherhood. For the purposes of US policy and OAS perspectives, both of which had been influenced by the Betancourt principle that forbade relationships with totalitarian governments of the right or the left, the world had been divided into pro-democracy and pro-totalitarian (of the right or left) sides. By 1973, however, Latin American member nations asserted the need for more nuance in their actions. In the Dominican Republic, for example, promises that the nation would reach “the place in the sun” alongside the developed nations of the west raised popular expectations for a participatory democracy and economic security for all. But powerful economic interests in the nation were not willing to loosen their state-guaranteed benefits no matter the outcome for the nation—and their interests were often supported by the United States. Balaguer’s reliance on violence, organized by him or not, was one means to balance these demands. Latin American leaders recognized that the path to the kinds of societies their populations imagined differed for each one. They rallied again for a guarantee of sovereignty because
they believed Salvador Allende’s socialism within Chile’s constitutional democracy might work as a counterexample to the military regimes or other forms of state-supported violence that functioned in other countries—or at least deserved a chance to try.

The emphasis on plurality and a respect of sovereignty had emerged already in 1969 as Dominicans exalted the Amateur World Series as evidence that nations under various forms of government could coexist in the hemisphere. The eleven teams that participated in the Series represented governments of various political stripes, with the United States accepted by many as a model between the anti-communist military dictatorships of the right represented by Nicaragua and Guatemala and the leftist dictatorship represented by Cuba. Puerto Rico, a Commonwealth of the United States, and the Dutch Antilles, an independent country under the Kingdom of the Netherlands, operated within constitutional structures but with some level of political and economic dependence on distant heads of states. The political systems in Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic, were similar to each other in the sense that constitutions guaranteed basic civil liberties and provided the structures for elections, but that the governments in all three countries faced challenges from oppositional groups and sometimes violated the constitution to squash them. This new openness to dialogue among Latin American and Caribbean nations of various backgrounds, right or left, military or civilian, represented a shift toward a more pluralistic approach that allowed for gradual reform. Rather than emulate the US path to democracy and development, Latin American and Caribbean nations looked to borrow ideas from each other.
Sport provided the best base for this new American fraternity. The presence of the Cuban delegation in the Dominican Republic in 1969, the first time a sporting delegation had visited the nation since Trujillo and Castro broke relations in January 1959, served as “the most reliable evidence” of sport’s power to unite countries across the continent.\textsuperscript{364} The presence of teams representing the United States and Cuba in the country attested to sport’s superiority over politics. As sportswriter and political commentator Alvaro Arvelo hijo noted after the Series final: “Cuba cannot sit at the bargaining table of hemispheric organizations [the Organization of American States, for example], but [here] it coexists among eleven countries from the continent. And this we owe to sport, which supersedes political passions.”\textsuperscript{365} Sport provided opportunities for Latin American reconciliation during the Cold War and the inclusion of Cuba in the Latin American brotherhood. Dominicans also saw it as a sign of their leadership in continental matters.

Despite mounting violence after Balaguer’s announcement that he would run for reelection in 1970, Dominicans felt secure in their path toward democracy and a “place in the sun” by 1969. The Amateur World Series boosted that confidence, proving that the nation could organize a tournament of this caliber, compete for the championship, and

\textsuperscript{364} As Cuquí Córdova told Alvaro Arvelo hijo’s readers during the Series: “Los clásicos amateurs han llevado y seguirán llevando la comprensión entre los hermanos países del nuevo continente. La muestra más fehaciente de lo que decimos es el arribo a nuestras tierras del conjunto representativo de Cuba.” “Temas Deportivos: Escribe Cuquí Córdova,” El Caribe, 23 de agosto de 1969, 19.

\textsuperscript{365} Alvaro Arvelo hijo, “Temas Deportivos: Notas de la Serie,” El Caribe, 27 de agosto de 1969, 16. Arvelo had dedicated his column to a series of articles focused on the Amateur World Series, all titled “Notas de la Serie,” throughout the event and its termination. Throughout the 1960s, Arvelo focused on sports, adding commentary on political events from time to now. He has since swung the other way in his focus and considers himself a public intellectual in his role at the head of the popular Dominican radio program “El Gobierno de la Mañana,” commonly heard in taxi cabs, gua guas (mini-buses), and living rooms throughout the country. “Cuba no se puede sentar a la mesa de deliberaciones de los organismos hemisféricos, pero convive con once países continentales. Y esto se debe al deporte, que está más allá de las pasiones políticas.”
ensure the safety of all teams involved. Cuba, of course, was at the center of the latter question, and Dominican officials provided individual security details, including plain-clothes body guards and medical professionals for each delegation. Particularly after the military government in Colombia had refused the Cuban team visas in the 1965 edition of the Amateur World Series, Dominicans worked to ensure that the Cuban delegation “will participate here as the other foreign visitors, with liberty and without problems of any kind.” The lack of serious incidents during the visit led Dominican sportswriters and sports officials to call for future exchanges, with *El Caribe* reporting that “[Director of Sport] Veras Favors Dominican Club Trip to La Habana.” Dominicans would continue to exemplify the values of plurality through a new relationship with Cuba, which would also offer guidance for how to build their nation through amateur sport. At the same time, Dominican sport officials would maintain their existing relationships with other regional characters, including Nicaraguan dictator General Anastasio Somoza Debayle,

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366 Arturo Industrios, “Llega Grupo,” and Rafael A. Rodríguez G., “La Seguridad,” *El Caribe*, 13 de agosto de 1969, 1, 16. These articles appeared under the headline “Cuba da Crédito Dirigentes de RD.” Rodríguez quoted an un-named sports official who said “‘El deporte,’ se indicó, ‘no tiene fronteras ni ideologías y las autoridades dominicanas nos han prometido todo su concurso para que los cubanos actúen aquí como los otros visitantes extranjeros, con libertad y sin problemas de ninguna especie.”

367 “Veras Favorece Club Dominicano Viaje a La Habana; Aclara Primero Necesita La Invitación Oficial,” *El Caribe*, 29 de agosto de 1969, 16
who used exchanges between the two countries’ military teams to boast about his friendship with President Balaguer.368

Building on the success of the Amateur World Series as a sign of the nation’s leadership in this era of political plurality and sports fraternity, Dominican Olympic Committee President Juan Ulises García Saleta bid to host the XII Central American and Caribbean Games for 1974. As the nation prepared for the Games and demonstrated the Olympic spirit that held sport above politics, Dominican delegations participated in international sporting exchanges no matter the politics of the host. García Saleta engaged in the Olympic rhetoric frequently, using the possibility that absence from an international event, such as the XIX Amateur World Series in La Habana in 1971, might be interpreted as politically motivated and result in the Dominican Republic losing the honor of hosting the XII Games. The sporting fraternity the nation exhibited in preparation for the XII Games confirmed its leadership in continental solidarity and offered a basis for its embrace of plurality in its sports program as Dominicans balanced their interests in developing amateur baseball with their reputation as a “mecca” of

368 Throughout the early 1970s at least, Dominican delegations, usually comprised of primarily military teams, participated in baseball exchanges in Nicaragua, and on at least one occasion, Nicaraguan teams came to the Dominican Republic for Friendship Tournaments that included other nations as well. Dominican Ambassador to Nicaragua José Angel Saviñón was particularly impressed with the niceties offered by the Nicaraguan dictator to the Dominican delegation and credited Balaguer. See, for example, No. 617–72, 24 de septiembre de 1972, Managua, José Angel Saviñón al Señor Secretario de las Relaciones Externos, “Homenaje,” SEDEFIR 16572. The historic relationship between the two presidents was not enough, however, for the Dominican sporting officials to break protocol established by international sporting institutions to send a delegation to Nicaragua for the Amateur World Series organized there in 1973 under a new organization as a counter to the FIBA-sanctioned event held in Cuba. Even after Dominican Ambassador to Nicaragua Saviñón appealed to Dominican compassion for their Nicaraguan brethren who were suffering in the wake of the 1972 earthquake, Dominican sporting officials confined their Olympic spirit to events sanctioned by IOC-affiliated bodies such as FIBA. See, for example, No. 393–73, 16 de octubre de 1973, Embajador Saviñón, Nicaragua, al Secretario de Relaciones Externos Dr. Víctor Gómez Bergés, SEDEFIR 16543.
professional baseball. To uphold their budding reputation as a purveyor of hemispheric solidarity, Dominican sports officials would have to build the same respect for pluralism and sporting ethic at home.

**The Politics of Sport**

Political realities in the Dominican Republic quickly deflated the sporting ethic bolstered by the Amateur World Series after the visiting delegations returned to their respective countries. Even during the Series, newspapers warned Dominicans to control their demonstrations lest violent reactions attract foreign invaders to the country on the pretense of keeping the peace—a clear reference for any Dominican to the US-OAS peacekeeping forces that occupied the country after the 1965 April War. The baseball exchange had quieted debates over whether Balaguer should seek reelection, but after the final out, political tensions, divisions, and even violence erupted. Just a month before the 1970 elections, *Time* magazine described a revival of “old-style political killings and repression” after Dominican police “machine-gunned” striking dock workers in Puerto Plata, killing four and wounding eighteen. The country, *Time* said, was “Closer to Chaos” than any time since the 1965 uprising. When the violence continued after elections, editors at *El Caribe* and

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369 As early as August 1969, *El Caribe* expressed this concern, calling on Dominicans to be vigilant “in order to avoid the series of acts that in other times have dragged the country toward the loss of its independence of its liberty.” President of Santo Domingo’s council, Dr. Rafael Vidal Martinez shared this warning with Santo Domingo residents on 15 August in the Parque Independencia to commemorate the celebration of the Restoration of the Republic from Spain in 1865, which falls each year on August 16. “Exhota Evitar Que el País Vuelva Perder su Libertad,” *El Caribe*, 16 de agosto de 1969, Segunda Sección. Vidal cautioned Dominicans to take care “para evitar al encadenamiento de hechos que en otras épocas han arrastrado al país hacia la pérdida de su independencia o su libertad.”

370 “Closer to Chaos,” *Time* 95, no. 15, April 13, 1970, 36. The police killed four and injured 18 in that incident.
¡Ahora! wondered who was responsible: the opposition or the government. Though charges that Balaguer supported or at the very least turned a blind eye to police violence earned the PRD some sway during the campaigns, Balaguer deflected guilt from himself by turning it to the Dominican people and the divisions remaining from the civil war. Balaguer explained that “the terrorist deaths and disappearances derive from [...] a state of collective malice.” To combat the violence, Dominicans must build a sense of community and trust Balaguer to lead them.

Director of Sport Horacio Veras and Dominican Olympic Committee President Juan Ulisés García Saleta looked to sport to rebuild that sense of community and to turn the sporting ethic from the Amateur World Series inward. During the Series, Dominicans of the left and right, communists and national police, united to “Offer a Demonstration of Community Spirit in [the] Estadio Quisqueya.” Hosting the XII Central American and Caribbean Games in 1974, Veras and García Saleta hoped, would reignite that spirit by uniting the country in a national project. Soon after Balaguer was reconfirmed as the national leader in the 1970 elections, sportswriters called on Dominicans to come together behind what they described as an “Extraordinary National Responsibility” of organizing the Games, the largest sporting project in national history. An article in the

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373 ¡Ahora!, no. 371, 21 de diciembre de 1970. The Editorial just inside the front cover noted that the Dominican Government had accepted the responsibility of organizing the Games and expressed ¡Ahora!’s hope that the Government and national sporting organizations realized the huge commitment they were making. The real significance, as they made clear at the end came in the ability to mobilize “all Dominicans committed to ensuring that the youth have the opportunity to develop healthfully.”

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reputed democratic and often critical magazine, ¡Ahora!, argued that the success of the XII Games depended on the support and cooperation of all Dominicans, and especially among all the sporting federations and the national government. Veras and García Saleta took the lead in this project. They would build the nation by preparing Dominicans for democracy through construction projects, regional competitions, and support for laws that facilitated sports practice. United in their love of sport, Dominicans worked along with President Balaguer, the military, sports officials, and athletes to “create a sports mystique that will constitute permanent progress.” In short, the national sporting project would create the Revolución sin sangre that Balaguer promised to lead in his campaigns. Dominicans would project the successes of that revolution to the world in the XII Central American and Caribbean Games in 1974. Through sport and Balaguer’s leadership, Dominicans would unify the nation and end the violence.

The national project for sport defined provision of the resources for sport as an obligation of the Government, and specifically Balaguer, who would lead the Dominican people to progress and democracy. The feeling that Dominicans were not ready for democracy, that they lacked the civic education to participate and honor the results of democracy, endured from the 1960s. Dominicans required a strong leader, and Balaguer, as the “Leader of the Revolution without Blood” was, as the 1970 campaign ads noted, “the Only Person Capable of Directing and of Continuing to Lead the Country along the

374 Ibid.
375 Pedro Caba, Editor Deportivo, “XII Juegos Centroamericanos y del Caribe; Extraordinaria responsabilidad nacional,” ¡Ahora!, no. 371, 21 de diciembre de 1970, 74. “Y algo muy importante: se crea una mística deportiva que se constituiría en motivo de permanente progreso.”
Path of Peace, Harmony, and Development.” 376 On behalf of Balaguer and under the pretense of Government largesse and interest in educating Dominicans in the values of a democratic society, Veras and García Saleta wrote legislation that defined support for sports and physical education as an obligation to the people. Sport was the means to “the betterment and moral, intellectual, and physical improvement of Dominican youth.” 377 Because of the evident collective and individual benefits that sports provided, the law reasoned, “it is a duty of the Dominican State to guide and provide its moral and economic support to Dominican youth, providing the technical and material resources necessary for said practices.” 378 Raised in the values of sport, men and women like Veras and García Saleta believed, Dominicans would learn to live “physically balanced,

376 The specific province varied by day, but all included at least three pages listing the names of Reformist Party supporters of Balaguer by section or area in the specific state. See, for example, Espacio Pagado, “Directorios Provinciales y Municipales Partido Reformista en la Provincia De San Juan de la Maguana Apoyan La Postulación del Doctor Joaquín Balaguer en 1970,” El Caribe, 13 de agosto de 1969, 6–8. The smaller heading read: “Consideran Líder de la Revolución sin Sangre es la Única Persona Capaz de Conducir y de Seguir Conduciendo al País por el Sendero de la Paz, la Concordia y el Desarrollo.”

377 “Proyecto de Resolución, Creación de los Juegos Deportivos Nacionales,” Director General de Deportes Horacio A. Veras, [s/f], SEDEFIR 16545. The draft Resolution in the SEDEFIR file had no date, but accompanying documents dated as far back as May 21, 1968, when the DGD submitted the project to the Executive branch for approval. The second rationale behind the law read: “CONSIDERANDO; que son evidentes los beneficios, tanto colectivos como individuales, que proporcionan las prácticas ordenadas y sistemática de los Deportes y la Educación Física.”

378 Ibid. “CONSIDERANDO; que entre los fines del Gobierno está el propender al mejoramiento y superación moral, intelectual y física de la juventud dominicana”; “CONSIDERANDO; que son evidentes los beneficios, tanto colectivos como individuales, que proporcionan las prácticas ordenadas y sistemática de los Deportes y la Educación Física;” “CONSIDERANDO; que es deber del Estado Dominicano orientar y prestar su apoyo moral y económico a la juventud dominicana, aportando los recursos técnicos y materiales necesarios para dichas prácticas.”
efficient, and satisfactory” lives. Along with integrating youth into a national sporting program that hoped to create the heroes of tomorrow—those who would represent all Dominicans in international competitions or in the Big Leagues—the program would ensure that all Dominicans developed for the good of the nation. The Government would provide these resources to ensure that Dominicans could sustain democracy; Dominicans were obliged to lift themselves through sporting practice.

The Balaguer Government backed the legislation promulgated by Veras and García Saleta with economic support. Along with symbolic gestures such as designating 1971 the “Year of Sport,” the government created a special fund in the budget dedicated to the promotion of sport. Though the initial designation of just-over $15,000 in 1971 was relatively modest, the budget more than tripled the next year and rose to almost

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379 A group of athletic federation presidents and young men volunteering their time to work on the Olympic Center wrote a message of encouragement to Olympic Committee President García Saleta. Though not addressed to the Director of Sports or the President and not accompanied by any oficios or cover sheets, the message was filed in the SEDEFIR documents along with letters and Oficios directed to the President as well as the Director of Sports. See, “Un Mensaje Deportivo que Todos Debemos Leer,” 28 de octubre de 1968, SEDEFIR 16545. They argued that sports were no longer a hobby of the minority, but had become “una parte integral de la formación del hombre, físicamente educado, para lograrse estabilizar en el individuo mismo una vida física equilibrada, eficaz y satisfactoria.” They continued, “Alguien escribió que ‘Los productos incidentales de la recreación son de gran trascendencia en la preservación y desarrollo de la democracia y en el control o reducción de la conducta delictiva.’”
$54,000 by 1974. In addition, the government increased funding for Veras’ plans for the development of sports in both physical education and other amateur venues. The overall budget for the development of sport, including school programs for physical education, increased by more than $100,000 between 1970 and 1971. Before the “Year of Sport,” more funding had always been allocated to physical education programs than the development of other sport programs. That, too, changed by 1972, when the budget for sports development increased by nearly $200,000 to $521,716. In 1974, the year of the Games, the program received almost $900,000 in funding. These budgets and “the interest that the Honorable Mr. President of the Republic has shown in offering all his cooperation for the increase and development of national sport” attested to the Government’s willingness to invest in the formation of Dominican citizens through sport,

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380 Banco Central, *Ejecución del Presupuesto* (Santo Domingo: Banco Central, editions from 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974). The line item for Special Fund 1676, Iniciativa Práctica Deportes, appeared for the first time in the 1971 budget and steadily increased through 1976, when it more or less stabilized. The amounts quoted above refer to the resources collected in the fund while another line item recorded the amounts designated for a regular disbursements from the fund, probably as monthly allotments to sports federations or to clubs for equipment and coaches. Even with these numbers, the resources allotted to the organization of the XII Games and sports more generally lack transparency because of flexibility the regime exercised in allocating funds to different projects. Other funds, especially fund 1469 for “Atenciones Especiales de la Presidencia,” increased dramatically, with more than $1 million disbursed in 1972 and nearly $2.8 million in 1975. Balaguer appears to have exercised his own discretion in allocating these funds, as suggested by his awarding of $40,000 from this fund to the Director of Sports to help send a team to the 1970 Central American and Caribbean Games. See, Núm 6887, 20 de febrero de 1970, Presidente Balaguer al Director Nacional del Presupuesto, SEDEFIR 16534.


382 Oficio Núm 19641, 4 de julio de 1972, Secretario Administrativo de la Presidencia, Dr. J. Ricardo Ricourt, al Director General de Radio Televisión Dominicano, Asunto: Concesión del Centro Social Obrero a la Dirección General de Deportes, SEDEFIR 16572. Ricourt recommended that Radio Television contact the Director of Sports to ensure that they organize “un acto en el cual se demuestre el interés que tiene el Honorable Señor Presidente de la República de ofrecer toda su cooperación al auge y desarrollo del deporte nacional.”
and earned Balaguer the nickname formerly held by Trujillo of “Maximum Protector of National Sports” and designation as the “*patrón*” of the XII Games.\(^{383}\)

The regulations devised by Veras and García Saleta incorporated Dominicans from the heart of the capital to the deepest backwaters into the sporting project. The project, still in the planning stages in 1969, peaked with the XII Games and lasted through much of Balaguer’s Government to 1978. These efforts united Dominicans with their President, sports officials, and even military in a project to build the nation and its reputation in the sporting ethic that reigned during the Amateur World Series. A cartoon printed on Independence Day (February 27) in 1975 showed the benefits of this sporting progress (Figure 5.3). A boy representing youth from the interior (*juventud campesina*, or farmer youth) expressed his joy at new Olympic Committee regulations that would make it easier for him to participate in sport. As he stood before a tall tree labeled “Amateur Sports” (**Deporte Aficionado**) he saw the ladder to the top provided by the new Olympic Committee resolution (**Resoluciones del COD**) and said: “I believe that now, yes! I am

\(^{383}\) On the responsibility of the Government to support sport and the organization of the XII Games, see Caba, “XII Juegos,” *¡Ahora!*, 73–76. On Balaguer’s titles and designation as the “Maximum Protector of National Sport” and other titles, see, for example, *Carta*, 7 de marzo de 1972, Gustavo Carmona, Presidente del Equipo y Miembros, sección Jíneva, al Señor Dr. Joaquín Balaguer, SEDEFIR 16572. A letter from members of a youth team in Jíneva, San Juan de la Maguana, asked Balaguer for sports equipment, signing off “With the security that you, as a good man and Maximum Protector of National sports, will leave us satisfied in this request, we say goodbye to you.” The final paragraph read: “En la seguridad que usted, como hombre de bien y máximo protektor [sic] de los deportes Nacionales, nos dejará complacido en esta solicitud, nos despedimos de usted.” Similarly, a celebration at the Worker’s Social Club recognized President Balaguer for his support for national sport, as in Oficio Núm 19641, 4 de julio de 1972, Secretario Administrativo de la Presidencia, Dr. J. Ricardo Ricourt, al Director General de Radio Televisión Dominicano, Asunto: Concesión del Centro Social Obrero a la Dirección General de Deportes, SEDEFIR 16572. Ricourt recommended that Radio Television contact the Director of Sports to ensure that they organize “*un acto en el cual se demuestro el interés que tiene el Honorable Señor Presidente de la República de ofrecer toda su cooperación al auge y desarrollo del deporte nacional.***
going to be able to eat from the fruits of this tree." Government backing for sport gave even the most backward Dominicans the tools for their ascent and incorporated them into the project defined by the Government through their requests. Sport made the nation.

Dominicans accepted their responsibility to prepare the XII Games as a means to raise the nation through sport and to carry the sporting spirit in their nation. Embracing legislation as part of the sporting ethic that would unite all Dominicans and other Latin Americans, they wrote letters to President Balaguer or Director of Sports Veras to request assistance for their sporting aspirations, adopting the rhetoric of national sports fraternity in their requests for new baseball diamonds, volleyball and basketball courts, or

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384 Teddy, El Caribe, 27 de febrero de 1975, 18. “Creo que sí, voy a poder comer de los frutos del árbol este.”

385 Teddy, El Caribe, 27 de febrero de 1975, 18.
equipment and uniforms. A letter from a group that called themselves the “legitimate representatives of the entire Azua community” asked Balaguer for “moral and economic support” so they could construct a Sports Center.\(^{386}\) The Sports Center, the letter explained, would help the entire southern region fulfill the “need that we have to develop ourselves morally, culturally, and physically through sport.”\(^{387}\) Their request promised full integration into the national project to solidify the Olympic spirit: the Azuanos wanted the Sport Center so they could “assimilate to the preparation of the XII Central American and Caribbean Games.” Athletes would train for the Games in the Sports Center and the pre-selection tournaments there would create “a very necessary permanent closeness among all in the southern community, as has already been demonstrated that only sport and culture can unite peoples permanently without political, racial, or religious problems.”\(^{388}\) All would subvert their individual aspirations as they joined other Dominicans in building a national community through sport.

\(^{386}\) Carta, 20 de marzo de 1973, Gaspar L [Vilchez] Suero, José Maria D'Soto Sánchez, Dr. Felipe Ant. Moquete C., y demás, Azua, al Dr. Joaquín Balaguer, Presidente Constitucional de la República Dominicana, SEDEFIR 16528. Balaguer’s Administrative Secretary, Dr. J. Ricardo Ricourt, forwarded the letter to Ing. Bienvenido Martínez Brea, who was serving as President of the Organizing Committee for the XII Games, for his knowledge and for actions he saw fit (fines procedentes) in Núm 8464, 30 de marzo de 1973, SEDEFIR 16528.

\(^{387}\) Ibid. “Los abajo firmantes representativos legítimos de toda la comunidad azuana, con todo el respeto que Ud. nos merece solicitámosle a Ud. todo el apoyo moral y económico para que se construya en la ciudad de Azua (Centro del Sur), el Centro Deportivo programado por la Sección Técnica del Comité Olímpico Dominicano, ya que llenará un vacío en toda la región del Sur de la necesidad que poseemos de desarrollarnos moral, cultural y físicamente a través del deporte.”

\(^{388}\) Ibid. The letter thanked Balaguer ahead of time for his support, noting that the Center “situará a la región del Sur en capacidad de asimilarse a la preparación de los XII Juegos Centroamericanos y del Caribe,” adding that they would hold all the “eliminatorias” for the region there and that, it would keep their youth engaged in constant activity and that “habrá su acercamiento perturbante muy necesario entre toda la comunidad sureña, ya que, está demostrado que sólo el deporte y la cultura unen a los pueblos en forma permanente sin problemas políticos, ni raciales, ni peligrosos.”
Yet the role of Dominicans in defining the ultimate goals for this unity—the democratic society the *Revolución sin sangre* was to create—was limited to requests for patronage. Building the national community through sport required all Dominicans to integrate into the project of the XII Games and quiet any opposition or criticism to protect national unity. Sportswriters contributed carefully worded criticisms about preparations for the Games in their columns, but they framed these criticisms as advice to the organizers lest real criticism upset the order. Rather than the pluralism advocated by the rhetoric of fraternity and reconciliation with Cuba during the Amateur World Series, making the Dominican nation in sport required consensus behind Balaguer and his leadership. Balaguer confined the role of the Dominican people in the sports project and in the *Revolución sin sangre* to making requests for patronage rather than active dialogue. Dominicans could develop themselves for democracy through sport and participate in democracy by voting. Balaguer would take care of the rest.

In confining Dominicans’ role in the *Revolución sin sangre* to requests for patronage, the Balaguer Government criminalized opposition or protest and delegitimized those who participated in demonstrations by portraying them as bored teenagers. Sport served as a means of social control, integrating Dominicans into Balaguer’s project and dismissing detractors. The sporting project facilitated these definitions with the rhetoric that sport would save and unite the nation by proving Balaguer and his government’s investment in the future of Dominican youth. A plan designed by Veras in late 1969 to build installations throughout the country, and in rural areas in particular, was essential for incorporating campesinos, who lived in the worst conditions that made them more
prone to communist promises, into the national sporting ethic. Facilitating their organization into baseball tournaments would “fill [campesino youth] with a message of true interest from the Government,” and prevent them from joining the seditious political groups that wrecked havoc on the national peace. After all, “No one knows which ones could come out of these tournaments for professional baseball, or which ones could be leaders of groups . . .” —groups that supporters could not bear to mention by name, but that letters from the offices of Balaguer’s Reform Party in other cities defined as “seditious, ex-PRD youth.” Sport would bring together the nation in the revolución sin sangre and end political violence by “join[ing] the binds of friendship and understanding among the youth [los jóvenes] and the people [pueblo] themselves” Those who did not join the revolución sin sangre were part of “seditious” groups bent on disturbing the national peace.

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389 Carta, 14 de noviembre de 1973, Héctor Bullo Steffani al Apreciado Dr. Balaguer, SEDEFIR 16578. “Quizás mi deseo de contribuir a la estabilidad emocional y tener apartada de todo vicio la juventud campesina, como parte de su obra de Gobierno, no ha sido bien vista por algunos de sus auxiliares que ha [sic] lo mejor han creido que deseo convertirme en ‘hombre de su confianza y distinción o en líder político.’”

390 “Informe Deportivo que Envia el Sr. Héctor Steffani al Dr. Quezada, Secretario Administrativo de la Presidencia,” 30 de septiembre de 1969, SEDEFIR 16545. “Nadie sabe cuales podrían salir de esos campeonatos para el beisbol profesional o cuales podrían ser líderes [sic] de grupos . . . . . .”

391 MEMORANDUM, 13 de marzo de 1973, Dr. José S. Ginebra H., Secretaría de Estado, y Rafael Balbuena Farnington, Diputado, al Sr Presidente Joaquín Balaguer, SEDEFIR 16516. The two officials requested two sets of baseball equipment, one destined for Batey 3 in Puerto Plata, where these seditious youth had requested it so they could train for the competition to select the representative to the XII Central American and Caribbean Games. The other set would go to the Liga del Atlántico, which organized amateur competitions in the state. I was unable to trace the government reply to this letter, but it was not the only letter using partisan arguments to attract government largesse to a specific project, whether for the construction of a sports field, uniforms, or equipment, but a postscript at the bottom of the document offers authorization to give an unspecified object—the equipment or the letter—to the gentlemen.

392 Ibid.
Balaguer saw the opportunity to put his government’s achievements on display and to further those achievements with the XII Games. Balaguer and members of his government saw an increase in national production (GDP) by 7.5% in 1971 and 12.5% in 1972 as evidence of “one of the most profound revolutions that any county in Latin America has achieved in recent times within a constitutional order of liberty and respect for the human dignity of people.” Along with bragging rights about the economic growth and constitutional order, the Games would demonstrate the stability that reigned in the Dominican Republic under Balaguer’s leadership and the security of financial investments and foreign factories. Above all, Balaguer viewed government financial support for the XII Games as an investment. He balanced his willingness to support the games with attention to the nation’s financial well-being. Government support for the infrastructure, training, and organizing costs of hosting the XII Games remained contingent on both a “clean budget” from the Central American and Caribbean Sporting Organization (CACSO) and a plan from the Organizing Committee, headed by Veras, that

393 Gómez Bergés, “La RD Favorece Consolidación De la Libertad,” 15. Citing figures from the International Committee for the Alliance for Progress, Gómez Bergés noted that the Dominican Republic’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increased by 7.5% in 1971 and 12.5% in 1972. This progress, in Gómez Bergés’s opinion, signaled “una de las más profundas revoluciones que ha realizado en país alguno de América Latina en los últimos años dentro de un orden constitucional de libertad y respeto a la dignidad de la persona humana.”
ensured the event would bring profits in tourism and infrastructure development.\textsuperscript{394} This caveat made clear Balaguer’s stance on sport. He agreed that the human development offered through sport was important, not least of all for integrating Dominicans into his project, but he was not willing to sacrifice the economic well-being of his still-recovering nation without the promise of economic benefits.

The national sporting project allowed Balaguer to pursue economic development and industrialization while relishing in the rhetoric of a government concerned with the development of his people. Government investment in sporting projects, particularly those directed at reaching \textit{campesino} youth, offered proof of the Balaguer Government’s concern for the poor even as it faced accusations of favors for private enterprise. An editorial published in early 1975 criticized a statement by Balaguer that called private enterprise “a pillar in a representative democratic society” on the grounds that the government had too often sacrificed the interests of the popular classes in favor of those

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{394} Caba, “XII Juegos,” \textit{¡Ahora!}, 74, lays out Balaguer’s requirements. Balaguer’s support for the XII Central American and Caribbean Games was contentious because of the costs involved. Though most of the national sportswriters and officials were taken in by the honor of hosting the event, outsiders warned Balaguer about the lack of return on investment and the Cuban’s use of the event to further Castro’s cause. Part of these agreements resulted, it seemed, from continued suspicions about García Saleta’s left-leaning tendencies. Director of Sports Veras ultimately led the Organizing Committee for the XII Games, but initially passed excerpts from a letter from Julio Machado, a Cuban exile living in Miami whom Veras described as a “good friend,” that warned Dominican officials against investing in the XII Juegos. Machado diagnosed leftist incursions, including wins by Christian Democratic Parties, as part of the infiltration of a “Communist System” that threatened the entire region. The Games, Machado said, would only provide the Cuban delegation a means to win over Latin American supporters with their sporting triumphs and distraction from “the Tyranny that exports its communism” while leaving the Dominican Government to foot the bill in exchange for a few photo ops whose message of Dominican progress would be heard only in the Caribbean. Memorándum 01151, 25 de junio de 1970, Dirección General de Deportes al Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la República, SEDEFIR 16545.}
of the powerful. Labor laws limiting the right to strike, frozen wages during the years of austerity, and financial incentives for wealthy industrialists benefitted foreign and national investors at the cost of the wellbeing of the Dominican working classes. This favoritism, the editor wrote, prevented democracy in the Dominican Republic from meeting the “classic definition” of democracy: “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” In economic policy and development, the Balaguer Government was not fulfilling its democratic objectives. But Dominicans’ letters to Balaguer leading up to and following the Games legitimated Balaguer’s portrayal of himself as a leader in tune with the people. In sports, at least, the Dominican Republic functioned as a government should, according to the “classic definition” of democracy. With sport at the core of a unified national project, government of the people, by the people, and for the people coexisted within a civilian-led bureaucratic authoritarian government. Exultations of Dominicans who “Offer a Demonstration of Community Spirit in Estadio Quisqueya” ran alongside articles touting the “Good Work [of the ‘National Police” while others diagnosed a return to “old-style political killings and


396 “Ya sabemos que la clase de democracia que nos hemos gastado no se ajusta a la clásica definición. Por regla general, los gobiernos han sido representantes de la clase poderosa y no del pueblo. Por eso, la mayoría de las leyes y medidas han sido dadas para favorecer el pequeño clan de los favoritos, que con su poder económico han asegurado a los gobernantes su permanencia en el poder político.” After asserting that democracy is not the same as capitalism, the Bazán criticized the system as it existed in the country: “Si eso es la democracia entonces no la podríamos definir como ‘el gobierno del pueblo, por el pueblo y para el pueblo,’ según la famosa frase de Lincoln.”
repression.” Buoyed by baseball, Dominican aspirations for a truly democratic society and the Balaguer regime coexisted as a less-than-ideal third way.

After Dominicans successfully fulfilled their “extraordinary national responsibility” of the Central American and Caribbean Games in 1974, Balaguer fulfilled a campaign promise and further institutionalized the national sporting project with the foundation of the Secretary of Sports, Physical Education, and Recreation. The new Secretary of Sport elevated sport from a directorate under the Secretary of Education to its own cabinet-level position, establishing a national system for sport in the country similar to Cuba’s INDER and consolidating Balaguer’s position as patrón of national sports. As the patrón, Balaguer led Dominicans to progress through sport much as a parent or teacher might guide a child. Sportswriters and the officials embraced this paternalism rather than criticize it, as one cartoon published in April 1976 made clear (Figure 5.4). A boy in short pants representing “Dominican children” grasped the fingers of a man in a suit labeled “Sports Plans of the Secretary of Sports.” The boy gazed up at the man, whose head extended beyond the frame to stress his stature. His eyes shining with gratitude, the boy commented, “It is good to know that one is not so alone.” The foundation of the Secretary of Sports to lead Dominican youth on the path to progress and well-being completed the message of Balaguer’s concern for the Dominican people and his leadership in their path to peace, harmony, and development. With political

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397 Reinoso Solís, “Ofrecen Demostración Civismo,” 1, characterized the good nature of Dominicans during the US-Cuba game in the Amateur World Series along with the control maintained by security forces, who maintained order without committing excesses. The other, “Closer to Chaos,” Time, 95, no. 15 (April 13, 1970): 36, described for US readers the atmosphere in the Dominican Republic leading up to the 1970 elections.
violence and oppositional forces quieted after Caamaño’s coup attempt ended in 1973, by 1975 Balaguer not only answered Dominican calls for self improvement and national progress through sport, he defined the path to progress and led them on it.

Figure 5.4: Secretary of Sports Plans, Lending a Hand to the Youth

Conclusion

During the period of rebuilding in the Dominican Republic from Balaguer’s inauguration in August 1966 through the first democratic transition in August 1978, sport, and baseball in particular, served as a rallying point for national unity, a way of quelling oppositional forces, and evidence of government interest in the Dominican people. The national sports project built on the pride that Dominicans felt for their Big League ambassadors and their desires for a democratic society to incorporate them into the revolución sin sangre led by Balaguer. The rhetoric of revolution and financial backing for sport coexisted relatively peacefully with Balaguer’s policies in favor of economic

Teddy, El Caribe, 21 de abril de 1976, 17.
development. Balaguer had it both ways. He maintained the interests of the economic classes, as evidenced in his support for professional Winter League seasons and the visits by the Pittsburgh Pirates in 1967—and the Industrial Incentives Law of 1968—and also spent millions on public works projects including baseball fields, outdoor courts for basketball and volleyball, and even the multiplex Juan Pablo Duarte Olympic Center. By responding favorably to requests for sporting patronage, Balaguer created an image of a government that catered to the demands of its people. He countered criticisms that his favoritism toward private enterprise prevented the Dominican Republic from operating as a “classic democracy.” Those who criticized Balaguer’s leadership and the direction of the revolución sin sangre were discredited for their lack of participation in the project to raise the nation through sport.

International events such as the Amateur World Series in 1969 and the Central American and Caribbean Games in 1974 put Dominican successes since the Trujillo Era on display and returned the Dominican Republic to the prominence it enjoyed briefly in 1962–1963 as the “showcase for democracy.” Times had changed. In the wake of the 1965–1966 civil war and occupation, the Dominican Republic stood as one of the few Latin American nations run by a civilian leader. Rather than the rushed implementation of electoral democracies that had characterized many nations in the post-World War II period, bureaucratic authoritarian regimes took over to foment development and to squash communism, often at the cost of human rights. The Amateur World Series had provided an arena for Latin Americans to express their discontent with the US Cold War division of the world into “anti-communist” and “communist” sides with their “¡Cuba,
“Sí! ¡Yankees, No!” chants. US Cold War policies had protected authoritarian governments such as the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, squashed popular movements such as the April War in the Dominican Republic, and, later, supported a coup against a democratically elected government in Chile in 1973. Cuba remained a beacon of Latin American sovereignty that had some success, and in the minds of many Latin American countries, had honored the rights of those who remained in the nation. Castro’s version of communism was no longer the scariest threat to Latin American people.

Boosted by the national sporting project, Balaguer represented a third way. Dominicans would not stand for a *de facto* government such as the one that replaced their first democratically elected president, Juan Bosch. Though Balaguer bent to the demands of foreign and domestic industrialists at the cost of the well-being of Dominicans, he was a civilian leader who responded to Dominican needs through a national sports program modeled, at least in spirit, on the Cuban amateur system and its ideals of sport as the right of the people and the means to create new men and women for a progressive society. As a constitutional government confident in its abilities to maintain order, the Balaguer Government could allow for relations with Cuba without fear of a communist insurrection. The Dominican people were committed to democracy and the Balaguer Government would train them to participate in that democracy through sport.

The third way democracy represented by the Balaguer Government provided an uneasy balance between authoritarianism, populism, and constitutionalism. Balaguer relished his title as “Constitutional President” and stressed the freedom of the press, speech, and assembly that he allowed throughout most of the *doce años*. Yet not all
Dominicans were satisfied with these rights and their conscription in their democracy to voting and requests for patronage. They wanted to live in a democratic society rather than a democratic system. In the society they imagined, the government ensured that the human development of its citizens would not be subverted to the profits of a few. A partnership between sportsmen and industrialists, rather than the Balaguer Government, found the answer by turning again to professional baseball with the foundation of the Cibao Summer League in 1975. Associating baseball with industrialization promised to balance human and economic interests more fairly and boosted Dominican pride while protecting the sovereignty of their deporte rey.
Chapter 6

Sliding into Third: The Cibao Summer League and Baseball as Development

Julián Javier smiled as he stood in centerfield of La Vega’s new stadium holding the banner for his team, the Northeastern Rice Farmers (Arroceros del Nordeste) from San Francisco de Macorís, as the inauguration ceremonies for the public stadium and the new Cibao Summer League (Liga de Verano del Cibao) unfolded. Javier and business and sport leaders from the Cibao region north of Santo Domingo organized the Cibao Summer League in April 1975 to increase opportunities for ballplayers to play professional baseball on the island, to extend professional baseball to cities in the interior of the country, and to establish the heart of a baseball industry in the Cibao region. A sign of support for the league and the Dominican Government’s program to expand the national sports program, a capacity crowd of more than 10,000 people cheered as President Joaquín Balaguer announced that Phase Two of construction in La Vega would begin, adding a covered court for basketball and volleyball alongside the million-dollar baseball stadium. As he looked to his side at Félix Santana, the manager-player for La Vega’s Valley Indians (Indios del Valle), Javier no doubt felt good about the opportunity the league offered to men like Santana, who had bounced around the minor leagues for the entirety of his 14-year career in US Baseball and saw his earning potential dwindle as
he entered his thirties. Even after his team fell 20-1 to the Indians, Javier proudly witnessed “what was called an adventure yesterday started off on the right foot,” or “a dream come happily true,” for himself, his cibaeño (from the Cibao) business partners, and baseball fans across the region.

To the south, in the capital, Felipe Alou and the directors of the competing Dominican Republic Summer League made the final preparations for the inauguration of their own tournament. When President Balaguer spoke at their inauguration the next weekend at the Capital Savages’ (Fieras) home field Estadio Quisqueya, the crowd of nearly 3000 applauded his announcement that the government would begin construction for a new baseball field in San Cristóbal, the home of the visiting Twins of the South (Mellizos del Sur). Like the Cibao Summer League, the capital-based league defined its role as one of providing employment to ballplayers dismissed from Organized Baseball. Unlike the Cibao League, which pursued more experienced players from home and abroad to attract crowds, the Dominican Republic League focused on restarting the careers of young prospects. Committed to signing only Dominican players, the Dominican Republic League officials saw their primary responsibility to the young men aspiring to follow the examples of Dominicans like Felipe Alou and Epifanio “Epy”

399 In contrast to Javier, whose 13 seasons in the Big Leagues qualified him for a pension, Santana had no pension to rely on after his career in the United States ended. Currently Major League Baseball Players qualify for the minimum pension of around $35,000 annually after just 43 days on a Big League roster. After 10 years of service, those benefits increase substantially, to up to nearly $200,000 annually. Osvaldo Virgil explained that this versatility as a player and baseball know-how allowed him to qualify for a pension by coaching despite a relatively short career as a player in the Majors. Interview with author, June 4, 2012, Mets Dominican Baseball Academy, Boca Chica, Dominican Republic.

400 Domingo Saint-Hilaire hijo, “President Balaguer Inaugura Estadio LV,” La Información, 14 de abril de 1975, 7.
Obdulio Guerrero who had built careers in baseball. Guerrero, then a scout for the New York Yankees, joined the Dominican Republic League in its inaugural season as the manager for the San Cristóbal-Bani Twins. The position nicely complemented his work as a scout by offering the prospects he trained and signed for his Big-League employer game-time experience before they traveled abroad.

The Cibao Summer League and the Dominican Republic Summer League represented new development models with which Dominicans experimented as part of their efforts to establish new industries on the island. The existing model for baseball industrialization, that of the unfettered capitalism practiced by Big League teams and scouts on the island—what one US sportswriter described as “a glorious anachronism and a last hurrah for the baseball regulars who were brought up in that wheeler-dealer world” 401—had deleterious consequences for Dominican baseball institutions and culture. The US model undervalued Dominican players and Dominican baseball history, both in discarding young men from the US system before they had a chance to acclimate to life abroad and in interfering with the Winter League’s hiring of native players. Before the foundation of the summer leagues in 1975, some Latin-American scouts had already attempted to protect Dominican prospects from hurdles such as cultural adjustment, language barriers, and their smaller statures and a lack of coaching. While these efforts, most notably Epy Guerrero’s foundation of the nation’s first baseball training academy, buffered Dominican boys from some of the obstacles and abuses that players suffered in US Organized Baseball, they accommodated the US system rather than offering

alternatives to it. The Dominican Republic and Cibao Summer Leagues presented alternative paths of capitalism that favored native baseball talent and valued the nation as the base for a market able to support summer baseball.

Rather than replacements for the Big-League, capitalist model, the summer leagues emerged as alternative, Dominican-led development models that would facilitate a baseball industry that ran parallel to, and sometimes in cooperation with, the US system. Both the Dominican Republic and Cibao League models were capitalist in nature, though they differed in the role each imagined for the government, the thrust of their objectives, and their levels of independence from US Baseball. The Dominican Republic Summer League operated as a social institution with the objectives of preparing young Dominican ballplayers for success in US Baseball and of providing employment for players rejected by US teams. The emphasis on player opportunities rather than on revenue forced the league to depend on government funds, promoting a model of state professionals similar to the “state amateurs” winning international tournaments for Cuba. The Cibao Summer League directors had more ambitious business goals: they imagined the League as a component of a new baseball industry, one that refined baseball talent and produced a spectacle for local markets. They modeled the Cibao League on the Mexican League, which though recognized by and affiliated with US Organized Baseball,
retained primacy in its contracts and exercised full control over its rosters. Though capitalist and operated for-profit, like US baseball, the Cibao League directors imagined theirs as an organization that nourished the nation’s baseball talent rather than harvesting it for overseas markets. The Cibao League represented a third way, one that towed the line between the state-supported social agenda of the Dominican Republic Summer League and the profit-centered operations of the US major leagues.

The Cibao League’s definition as an industry and the explicit social agenda behind both of the summer leagues legitimized the government’s focus on development even as the nation debated the merits of industrialization and the best plan for development in the country. After seeing nascent democracies squashed by military coups throughout Latin America over the past decade, US policies had shifted from an emphasis on political democracy to one on development. Balaguer’s compliance with this strategy earned him US backing in the 1966 elections. Seeing only constrained and personalized benefits from the laws implemented for development, Dominicans engaged

in public debates over best practices to ensure that industrialization would lead to a “just society for all to live, not just a few.” The widespread hopes for industrialization and the public debate created what Dominican historian Frank Moya Pons described as a “business mentality” in the country, inspiring Dominicans to contribute to national progress by establishing their own businesses, with government support. Baseball, long a point of national pride and symbol of Dominican potential, was a target for this mentality. With opportunities for employment and the emphasis on training local materials, baseball and the Cibao League in particular, proved a “strategic industry,” one that would generate revenue using local resources to produce for a local market.

Both summer leagues benefitted from an overlap between sports and the Balaguer government’s development program. The Cibao League embraced the rhetoric of industrialization as its rationale and, combined with the construction projects outlined in the previous chapter and new stadiums, reinforced the Balaguer Government’s rhetoric.

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403 The quotation comes from Fabio Herrera Miniño, *Una estrategia para el desarrollo dominicano* (Santiago: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra [UCMM], 1977), 10. “No pretendo que todo se cambie de la noche a la mañana, pues se trata de una labor de todos, unidos por el deseo de convertir a nuestro medio en un lugar justo para vivir todos, no unos pocos.” On the debates over development in the Dominican Republic, see Rafael Francisco De Moya Pons (Frank Moya Pons), “Industrial Incentives in the Dominican Republic 1880–1983” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1987). Arguments against the original plan for the incentives in 1968 divided between industrialists in the capital who wanted to maintain their dominance on the nation’s industry and economists trained in the Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (UCMM) located in Santiago. These Santiago-based intellectuals and businessmen argued for more support for agro-industry, emphasizing the need to focus on using local primary resources rather than imported inputs. See, Bernardo Vega, *Evaluación de la política de industrialización de la República Dominicana* (Santo Domingo: [s.n.], 1973), in addition to Fabio Herrera Miniño. For a foreign perspective on Dominican development, see Claudio Vedovato, *Politics, Foreign Trade & Economic Development: A Study of the Dominican Republic* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).

404 Moya Pons, “Industrial Incentives,” 358.
about the benefits that development would bring the people. Dominicans experienced the benefits of new sports installations and other construction projects and bought into development. With these projects and others for both leagues, Balaguer demonstrated his commitment to baseball as part of his development project, and to the model proposed by the Cibao League in particular.

Balaguer supported the Cibao Summer League because of its industrial merits, and likely because his support quieted complaints by many Santiago-based businessmen and economists that the Industrial Incentives Law of 1968 favored existing industries located in the capital over budding industries in the Cibao region. As Moya Pons explained, Balaguer’s favors to Santo Domingo-based capitalists translated into political support for his regime that enabled him to maintain power despite denunciations of human rights abuses and other injustices. By investing in the nascent baseball industry in the Cibao region, Balaguer offered an olive branch to cibaeño business people. He

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405 Antonio Sotomayor Carlo detailed a similar process in Puerto Rico with the incorporation of what he called “Operation Sport” as part of the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) development project in the 1940s and 1950s. Sport programs such as Un parque para cada pueblo (A park for every town) complemented economic programs such as “Operation Bootstrap” to win support for the PPD modernization program by improving the standard of living for the Puerto Rican popular classes. See, Antonio Sotomayor Carlo, “Playing the Nation in a Colonial Island: Sport, Culture, and Politics in Puerto Rico” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2012).

406 Moya Pons, Chapters V and VI, “Towards a New Law of Industrial Incentives” (207–252) and “The Debate on Industrial Incentives” (253–371). Moya examined government economic projects from the early years of the Dominican government through the 1983, with a particular emphasis on the political-economic policies of the Trujillo Regime and subsequent governments. The benefits Trujillo offered to industrialists in the capital bolstered their success and tied them to the Regime while the threats they perceived from the Bosch administration undermined his presidency. Balaguer, who served under Trujillo, continued and expanded the incentives codified during the Triumvirate government that replaced Bosch. The incentives were central in a public debate in which economists trained at the Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (UCMM) in Santiago were particularly vocal in their criticisms that the policies benefited existing industries that imported raw materials or heavy-capital machinery under the ISI model over the agro-industrial businesses budding in the Cibao region. On Trujillo’s industrial policy, see Chapter II, “Trujillo’s Industrial Policy,” (40–145).
also appealed to the larger population in the region who supported the economic and social benefits promised by baseball industrialization. That *cibaeños* were establishing their region as the heart of a new baseball industry just as the Aguilas Cibaeñas rose as the prominent rivals for the capital-based Licey Tigers further confirmed the region’s ascent.

As a third way of development, a Dominican model that explicitly saw economic security as the result of industrialization, the Cibao Summer League worked within a capitalist model while asserting Dominican economic independence and sovereignty. The baseball industry already existed on the island, embodied in the Dominican Winter League and its ties to US Organized Baseball. But as the first section of this chapter demonstrates, Dominicans recognized the limited benefits this model offered for national players and sports leaders. Though scouts such as Epy Guerrero worked to increase the Dominican competitive advantage within this model, Dominicans saw the inequities inherent in their role as raw materials (talent) and low-level managers (scouts) in the production of a baseball spectacle in the United States—the same inequities described by

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407 US scholars Alan Klein and Rob Ruck, as well as Adrian Burgos, Jr., have criticized this model as “neocolonialist underdevelopment,” basing their analysis on the ideas of dependency theory. This model is accurate to a point, but it overlooks the continued Dominican ownership of baseball and local attempts to industrialize baseball, or otherwise incorporate it into a national development model. The phrase “neocolonialist underdevelopment” comes from Alan Klein, *Sugarball: The American Game, the Dominican Dream* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). Burgos includes this analysis as part of his chapter on the growing predominance of Latin-American players in the Big Leagues in *Playing America’s Game: Latinos, Baseball, and the Color Line* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 227–260, while a similar perspective can be found in Rob Ruck, *Raceball: How the Major Leagues Colonized the Black and Latin Game* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2011). For analyses more focused on the effects on players, see Arturo J. Marcano Guevara and David P. Fidler, *Stealing Lives: The Globalization of Baseball and the Tragic Story of Alexis Quiroz* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002) and Samuel O. Regalado, *Viva Baseball! Latin Major Leaguers and their Special Hunger* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998).
dependency theory. For Dominicans, more than money was at stake: they were industrializing the national pastime, *el deporte rey*, a key component of their national identity. The social model embodied by the Dominican Republic Summer League bolstered national pride, but it did too little to build a fan base to generate revenue. It failed to produce a commodity of comparable quality to that offered abroad (Big League baseball) at a lower price for the internal market—the key to a successful new industry under the import-substitution model supported by Balaguer. By operating for profit in ways similar to the Winter League and US Organized Baseball while staying close to the social obligations that Dominicans expected their industries to fulfill, the Cibao League would create a viable alternative to US Baseball for local markets. The Cibao League gave Dominicans confidence that their nation would develop and progress, and that they would do so through baseball.

**Unfettered Capitalism and the Deporte Rey**

A baseball industry, or at least part of one, had operated in the Dominican Republic for two decades or more before the rise of the new summer leagues. Affiliation with US Organized Baseball in 1955 brought the Dominican Republic into the US model of capitalist baseball. As chapter 1 detailed, Dominican sportswriters and fans saw affiliation as a great opportunity to legitimize the Dominican Professional Baseball

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409 Vega and Herrera Miniño both argued that industrial incentives should favor industries that used locally produced raw materials to produce for the internal market. While Vega emphasized the use of local resources, Herrera stressed building the internal market. Vega, *Evaluación*. Herrera Miniño, *Una estrategia*.
League, or the Winter League, and to increase enthusiasm for the game by bringing the most famous players and future stars to the island. This relationship with US Baseball also facilitated the sharing of Dominican players and protected their contracts against competition from other Latin-American winter leagues. But as US Big League teams and Dominican Winter League teams formalized their relationship, Dominican baseball fans saw the winter game suffer. US teams preferred to sign young Latin-American players, robbing the once-famous Dominican amateur leagues of talent while also shifting the responsibility for training young Dominicans to US ballparks. Scouts and the US teams they represented saw Dominican players as raw talent that would be finished in the United States to perform on US diamonds, and then, with permission, on Dominican fields. This view of Dominican baseball players undervalued the work and training that they participated in to hone their skills at the same time it undermined the stability of the Dominican baseball system. Aware of the ideas in the larger political-economic context, sports leaders described a relationship with US Organized Baseball that resembled the relationship described by dependency theory. These sportswriters saw that providing raw talent, or raw materials, to US Baseball for training, or manufacture, subjugated Dominican baseball to the US organization. As the nation provided more talent to the United States, Dominican baseball institutions became increasingly dependent on US Baseball for their own continuation and lost hold over even some of the lower levels of the national pastime.

Following reports of tens of thousands of dollars lost during the 1975 Caribbean Series, sportswriters throughout Latin America identified a crisis in their local leagues as
the public stayed home.\textsuperscript{410} The Dominican side in the 1975 Caribbean Series, the Aguilas Cibaeñas, reportedly lost the most at $23,000.\textsuperscript{411} Dominican sportswriters blamed the Winter League teams and the nature of their relationship with major league organizations for alienating local baseball fans. In the view of men like Dominican sportswriter Tirso A. Valdez, Big League teams had undue influence on Winter League team rosters. They disregarded native players to accommodate the interests of their US partners, benching veteran baseball heroes like Manuel Mota and Jesús Rojas Alou to allow up-and-coming US players to gain additional at-bats or innings. This favoritism for foreign players had become so ridiculous that the Aguilas had traded Ricardo Carty, the “most consistent native batter in the tournament,” to their rivals at Licey to make room for foreign reinforcements.\textsuperscript{412} The agreements that Dominican teams had formed with Big-League teams had brought popular US players to the country. But the agreements also gave US teams influence over Dominican line-ups. Teams limited playing time for veterans like Carty and could even withhold permission for some players altogether, while they pressured their partner Dominican teams to play top prospects. As Valdez and others

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\textsuperscript{410} On the crisis, see Frank A. Estrada, “La Sexta Serie del Caribe Resulta Fracaso Económico,” UPI, San Juan, PR, \textit{El Caribe}, 8 de febrero de 1975, 16. As a response to this crisis, sportswriters from across the Caribbean voted in support of the summer leagues developing in the Dominican Republic at a meeting during the Caribbean Series. See, Johnny Méndez, “Cronistas Favorecen Ligas Verano en RD,” \textit{Listín Diario}, 8 de febrero de 1975, 11.
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\textsuperscript{411} Estrada, “La Sexta Serie.” The official exchange rate of the Dominican Peso was equal to the US dollar in official policy through much of the 1980s, although a black market did exist for exchange, where a US dollar cost about RD$1.18 in 1975. I have used the official rate in this chapter. For a table of costs on the parallel market for 1972–1983, see, Claudio Vedovato, \textit{Politics, Foreign Trade & Economic Development: A Study of the Dominican Republic} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 130. Vedovato relied on figures from the Banco Central, Departamento de Estudios Económicos.
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argued, Dominican fans would continue to avoid the local ballparks—and the Caribbean Series—if their local heroes were replaced by foreign rookies. Quoting a Puerto Rican sportswriter living in New York, Valdez lamented “‘We no longer have Caribbean baseball. Now it’s North American baseball in the Caribbean with native reinforcements.’”

Other sportswriters decried the same lack of respect for local players, but they blamed the Winter League teams themselves rather than their relationships with US teams. In a letter to Listín Diario’s sports editor, sportswriter Elio Vega accused the Winter League of using public funds for profits while insulting Dominican fans and players. Finding only negatives such as strangling the amateur leagues and “throwing glorious players from this country to the street without contemplation” as the answers to his own question of “in what way does professional baseball benefit Dominicans?,” Vega called on the Dominican Government, and particularly the new Secretary of Sports, Justo Castellanos Díaz, to end incentives for the Winter League. In his opinion, shared by many others and examined in more detail in the previous chapter, the Government should invest in amateur sport instead. No matter how desperately they wanted baseball and development, Dominicans were unwilling to fund industries that brushed aside their national baseball heroes and the league that nurtured them.

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413 Ibid. Valdez cited Don Manolo Rodríguez, “De Todo Un Poco: Peloteros de Santo Domingo, Venezuela y Puerto Rico Son Ignorados por Refuerzos,” El Diario La Prensa, Nueva York. Sportswriters representing all the countries in the Caribbean Professional Baseball Confederation shared this feeling that US Baseball was overtaking local baseball leagues—whether through the lack of nationalism of the league directors or the imperial motives of US Baseball—and expressed their support for the Dominican summer leagues, and the Cibao Summer League in particular, during a meeting in 1975. See, Johnny Méndez, “Cronistas Favorecen Ligas Verano en RD,” Listín Diario, 8 de febrero de 1975, 11.
The benching of national baseball glories that so frustrated Vega and Váldez signified a lack of appreciation for Dominican baseball skill and effort in the capitalist model, and a disregard of the rich baseball history that existed in the country before affiliation with US Organized Baseball. US scouts and teams’ perspectives of Dominican ballplayers as raw material to be fine-tuned through US training contributed to this attitude. The narrative promoted by US sportswriters and baseball officials that contrasted the opportunities that US Baseball provided with the sometimes-dire poverty in the Dominican Republic rationalized treatment by US teams that would not be tolerated for US prospects and hopefuls.

Frank Deford’s feature on the already-legendary Pittsburgh Pirates scout Howie Haak in 1973 offered an early contribution to this narrative through his attempts to show the conditions that had toughened Haak and earned him a reputation for scouting innovation. Deford’s article stressed the poverty in which many baseball hopefuls lived and portrayed Haak’s own hardships, made palpable in his descriptions of the shrapnel lodged in Haak’s knee from war and scar tissue persisting from his days as a professional catcher, as a possible point of understanding that he shared with the boys eager to sign. Haak had overcome these difficulties thanks to baseball—he drove a Cadillac, had $300,000 in the bank, and merited the title “Liege Lord of Latin Hopes”—and now served as a gatekeeper for young Dominicans aspiring to similar success. Yet, with his descriptions of “luxury” hotels with mosquito nets and the fields that “if there are ball fields in hell, surely they must resemble this one on its cooler days,” Deford alluded to greater desperation for the Dominican hopefuls. Deford conveyed this point poetically as
he described the boys watch Haak drive away after a tryout. While aspiring players in the United States “just rev up and drive away when they are rejected,” Deford noted, in the Caribbean countries hopefuls can only watch, “seeing their dreams recede down the road while they stand rooted to the ball field, because there is no place else for them to go and no way for them to get there.” In this narrative, US Baseball and its representatives in Latin America and the Caribbean were saviors for the young boys made desperate by poverty.

This narrative of Baseball’s opportunities perpetuated false assumptions in the United States about Dominican values and the lack of opportunities. Portraying baseball as the only way out, the narrative offered a rationale for practices that some saw as exploitative. Education and the ever-younger ages at which players signed were two of the biggest points of contention (and remain so today). For US scouts and readers the lack of educational opportunities in many Latin American countries legitimized the signing of prospects as young as 15, even if it meant pulling them from school. As one administrator in the Office of the Baseball Commissioner told Sports Illustrated’s Bill Brubaker in 1981: “‘We’d rather see kids in school, if that’s the pattern in their country. But if most of them are not in school anyway and they want to play ball, then we’re giving them an opportunity to earn some money.’”

If Baseball was an escape from the hellish, hopeless conditions these boys lived in, the sacrifices scouts asked them to make when they signed were justified. Rather than taking advantage of these boys, the scouts were offering them an opportunity.

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Deford’s story of boys lined up to show off their skills to Haak was accurate in its reporting but wrong in its interpretation. Yes, many Dominicans were poor, and yes, baseball offered economic opportunities they barely dared to dream of. Yet, baseball was a career they pursued not out of desperation but of national pride and the desire to continue the narrative of Dominican baseball potency exhibited by “models of success” like Juan Marichal and Julián Javier. These baseball role models had risen from humble circumstances to a steady job, national fame, international glory, and relative wealth. They had achieved a dream that boys in the Dominican Republic shared with boys across the Americas: making a career in baseball.

As increasing numbers of scouts crowded Dominican ballfields looking for an advantage after the leveling effects of the US Amateur Draft implemented in 1965, Dominican boys made their own opportunities. Javier, signed by Haak for the Pirates, told Deford: “‘They [Dominican boys] don’t play ball like we used to. [. . .] They play because maybe they’ll get something out of it.’” What Javier criticized as a lack of love for the game, Deford interpreted as a lack of opportunity in the nation. The reality was in between. Dominicans had embraced a new role for baseball. No longer merely a pastime, or even a projection of Dominican potency in the world, baseball was a career option, and a career option accessible to all boys. The business mentality created by debates over industrialization had set in and Dominicans applied it to baseball. Over the

415 Andrés L. Mateo, “Dominican Republic: Baseball and Culture,” in Yuñén, 237, described how baseball success stories reinforced this narrative, leading more and more young Dominicans to pursue careers in baseball. Even as he celebrated the economic opportunities offered by careers in baseball, Mateo criticized the more pernicious effects the presence of Major League Baseball has had in the country. Cuban scout for the Dodgers, Preston Gómez, described a similar phenomenon of examples of success inspiring future ballplayers in Frank Finch, “Dodgers Will Re-Work Rich Latin Mine,” Los Angeles Times, 11 June 1967, B4.
next two years, Javier and his business partners in the Cibao region would take the career opportunities offered by baseball a step further as they transformed the sport into a national industry, one that, they hoped, would reverse Dominican baseball’s increasing dependence on US teams and scouts and improve the career opportunities for Dominican players.

**Latin American Scouts in the US Capitalist System**

By focusing on the narrative of US Baseball as an escape from poverty, men like Deford overlooked important contributions that Latin-American scouts like Dominican Epy Guerrero made to the Dominican baseball industry and the US baseball model in particular. Guerrero grew up surrounded by baseball, dividing his time among playing on an amateur team sponsored by his father, school, and working in his father’s grocery store. He later applied this baseball know-how, eye for talent, and commitment to developing ballplayers to increase the Dominican Republic’s competitive advantage in the baseball industry and to buffer Dominican prospects from the capitalist model that treated them as raw materials rather than young men eager to establish careers in baseball. Familiar with the vibrant baseball histories of the Spanish Caribbean and the harsh realities of life in baseball, Guerrero developed and fine-tuned the baseball academy system. In the process, he innovated the workings of the baseball system in the Dominican Republic.

After spending two seasons in the Milwaukee Braves organization in 1960 and 1961, Guerrero bounced around Mexico and Canada playing ball until he gained a full-time scouting position in 1967. Guerrero’s help in securing César Cedeño for the
Houston Astros caught the attention of Astros executive Pat Gillick, initiating a relationship that would take Guerrero with Gillick from the Astros to the Yankees in 1973, to the Blue Jays in 1975, and later to the Milwaukee Brewers. Boasting 52 Big Leaguers over a 40-some year career, Guerrero was one of the most successful scouts of all time. He owed his success in equal parts to his tireless work ethic—when I met Guerrero in February 2012 he refused to let his 70 years prevent him from hitting fungoes and barking advice to future shortstops on a 90-degree day—and his commitment to his players. Along with the famous story of how he paid for an operation to remove bone chips from Tony Fernández’s knees, Guerrero’s commitment manifested in his foundation of the first baseball academy in the Dominican Republic: the Epy Guerrero Complex.

Part dream come true and part savvy business move, the Epy Guerrero Complex opened in 1973 on 18 acres with three baseball fields along with a batting cage, dormitory, weight room, and house where Doña Rosario, Guerrero’s wife, served three meals a day. Nourished by three squares and the comfort of their own beds, young baseball hopefuls worked on their hitting, running, and fielding under Guerrero’s advisement, which often included the recommendation that they become infielders and switch hitters because of their smaller physiques. Guerrero ran the year-round academy to introduce young Dominican prospects to the rigors of professional baseball on familiar

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turf. At the Complex, Dominican youngsters—some as young as 13—refined their raw athletic ability into baseball prowess before they moved on to training camps in the United States. Guerrero’s complex, then, provided him time to mold his signees and prospective signees into ballplayers at the same time that it allowed the hopefuls to adjust to some of the demands that would be placed on them in the United States. Guerrero initiated the training process on Dominican fields, adding value to the raw materials and helping the boys refine their talent before they ever left the island. Working within the capitalist system, Guerrero upped the players’ competitive advantage in the US marketplace and raised the status of the Dominican Republic as a baseball factory.

Guerrero’s personal baseball academy exemplified the innovations that Dominicans and other Latin-Americans, like Cuban Ralph Avila, made as part of their working relationship with US Baseball. With the foundation of his academy, Guerrero formalized practices that Dominican scouts had used to prepare signees since the days that Horacio Martínez coached Felipe Alou. He built on techniques employed on the island throughout its long baseball history and utilized his local contacts to build a successful career while also facilitating the interests of his employers and his talented young clients. Guerrero knew that Dominican ballplayers were smaller than many of

418 When I visited Epy’s complex in March 2012, his prospects worked out on a plot close to the house while he rented two nicely manicured fields, dormitories, and a weight room to the Seattle Mariners. By the time I returned in mid-July, the Mariners had moved their academy to a new site closer to the other academies in Boca Chica, leaving Guerrero without the assurances of their rent money to sustain his independent operations. Though Guerrero had not housed prospects since 2003, when his contract with the Milwaukee Brewers ended or possibly 2006 when he allegedly retired, he continued to make smaller investments in young prospects who worked with another independent scout on his grounds. Along with offering the grounds and facilities, Guerrero gave the prospects bus fare to and from school and sandwiches for the trip. Along with my interview with Guerrero, I have relied on other sources for descriptions of the complex in Epy Guerrero’s heyday in the 1980s, including Plummer, “Baseball Scout Epy Guerrero Looks for Rough Diamonds Amid Hunger and Poverty,” People; Rob Ruck, The Tropic of Baseball.
their US counterparts, so he drilled them on the basics of fielding at second base or shortstop and provided them with weights and nutrition. Everybody won: more Dominican boys achieved their dream of playing in the Big Leagues, US teams saw their investments pay off in successful teams, and Guerrero built a reputation as the scout with “the eyes” that even People magazine celebrated.419

Building such a reputation and a long career in baseball required Latin-American scouts to participate in the “scuffle and con” tactics of the “wheeler-dealer world” of the US scouting system.420 Some of these tactics, such as dressing up like a guerrilla soldier to sign a player in Sandinista Nicaragua, won Guerrero admiration for his pluck. Others sparked protests. In 1984 Guerrero inspired US Baseball to establish a minimum signing age of 16, popularly known as The Jimy Kelly Rule, after he signed the then-13-year-old namesake to a contract for the Toronto Blue Jays.421 Guerrero, like Avila and even Haak, bought into the narrative of Baseball’s opportunities for poor Dominicans, allowing the narrative to validate actions that caused others pause. Avila’s explanation to Sports Illustrated’s Bill Brubaker when asked if his signing of then-14-year-old pitcher Rafael Montalvo might be exploitation exhibits this acceptance:

419 Plummer’s piece in People magazine compared Guerrero’s talent to a poet: “They say now that Epifanio ‘Epy’ Guerrero has ‘the eyes’—that he can see the future major leaguer in a young ballplayer the way the visionary poet claimed to see a world in a grain of sand.”

420 These references occur in Deford, “Liege Lord of Latin Hopes,” in reference to the way scouting operated in the United States before regulations and the implementation of the Amateur Draft in 1965. In Deford’s article he expresses nostalgia for that system and describes the Caribbean as “the last place for scouts and their teams to find unknowns, to put their ken and pride on the line in a free-bid market, to scuffle and con, even deceive on another. It is a glorious anachronism and a last hurrah for the baseball regulars who were brought up in that wheeler-dealer world.”

'Exploiting them? No, helping them. [. . .] I took this kid to Santo Domingo, put him in a boarding house, paid his rent, gave him clothes and taught him everything. [. . .] Some day soon, after he reaches the big leagues, he’ll become a free agent and try to make a million dollars. That’s exploitation? No way. I’m proud to say I’ve given this kid a chance to have a better future.'

Though dedicated men like Guerrero and Avila took a genuine interest in their players and supported institutions that offered prospects more solid footing in their dealings with US teams, the profit-driven business of baseball caused some misjudgments and missteps.

While some scholars viewed their work with US teams and their reliance on US resources as evidence of US Baseball’s colonization of Dominican baseball, men like Guerrero and Avila buffered the colonization, or dependency, of the Dominican game. Dominicans and other Latin-Americans ensured that the Dominican baseball industry would stay in the country and would adapt to realities that originally hindered young prospects from achieving their Big-League dreams. Men like Guerrero and Avila worked within the US capitalist model and were driven as much by their own professional interests and the success of their teams as the plight of prospects. Yet, at the same time these men implemented a system that brought the relationship between US Baseball and the Dominican Republic a little closer to a mutually beneficial one. Even within the US

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422 Avila in Brubaker, “Hey, Kid,” SIVault.
423 Ruck, The Tropic of Baseball; Klein, Sugarball.
system, and sometimes with the resources it provided, Guerrero and Avila enacted new systems, like the academy, and continued local practices as they exercised ownership of baseball on the island. They ensured that Dominicans had more control over the development of baseball talent, working through local contacts and enlisting the financial support of Big League franchises, as Guerrero did with the Blue Jays and his other employers. Their valuing of ballplayers as human capital and their knowledge of the national baseball lore pushed the innovations of men like Guerrero and Avila and led them to support developments such as the Dominican Republic Summer League.

The Dominican Republic Summer League: A Social Model to Ease the Ills of Capitalism

As part of his commitment to giving Dominicans a competitive advantage over other Latin American countries in the signing of players, leveling the playing field between Dominican and US baseball hopefuls, and buffering young players from the negative consequences of teams viewing them as raw material, Epy Guerrero joined Felipe Alou and others in developing the Dominican Republic Summer League. The Dominican Republic Summer League defined itself as a social institution dedicated to providing employment and training for Dominican ballplayers. The directors emphasized the success of the League above all because the employment of hundreds of baseball hopefuls jamming the country after their release from US baseball depended on it. Rather than profit, or install a new, independent national industry in the country, the Dominican Republic Summer League rose as a nationalist, social institution to counter the negative consequences of the US capitalist baseball model. Alou and other directors
imagined this social model of baseball run by Dominicans as a parallel to US Baseball and the Winter League. The Dominican Republic League would operate alongside the capitalist model to provide a safety net for Dominicans trammled by the “wheeler-dealer world” of unrestricted capitalism. In offering contracts only to Dominican players and only to those already professionalized, usually with US teams; committing to protect—or at least not harm—the amateur leagues; and refusing excessive government incentives like exoneration of the 5% ticket tax destined to amateur sport, the Dominican Republic Summer League responded to criticisms against professional baseball such as those levied by Vega and Valdez. They worked to create an alternative to the US-led capitalist model of professional baseball.

José Abreu, the uncle of now-former Major League pitcher José Rijo, was one of those trammled by the capitalist model. As Abreu told *Sports Illustrated*’s Bill Brubaker in a feature on Latin-American players in the US Baseball system, he dropped out of school during his first year of high school to sign with the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1971.\(^{424}\) Abreu had been a good student, telling Brubaker that he may have been a doctor if he had stayed in school. But the scout’s enthusiasm about the possibilities that awaited this “helluva prospect” persuaded Abreu to leave school behind to pursue a career in baseball. He thought he could always go back to school, so he gave baseball a try. Summer vacation would have lasted longer than his first attempt. The Dodgers released Abreu after three weeks in their camp in Vero Beach, Florida. He eventually found another position with the Twins and spent parts of two seasons in minor-league ball

\(^{424}\) Brubaker, “Hey, Kid,” *SI Vault.*
before returning to San Cristóbal for good. With little education, and by then married with two children and helping to support his 10 nieces and nephews in addition, Abreu’s only source of income in 1981 was a job with the Dominican Republic Summer League.

The social objectives of the Dominican Republic Summer League in providing security for men like Abreu were obvious from the beginning. In reports leading up to the inauguration of the first tournament in 1975, sportswriters and directors stressed the League’s commitment to benefitting as many Dominican players as possible. The League introduced *El Caribe* readers to the teams located in Santo Domingo, Baní-San Cristóbal, San Pedro de Macorís, and La Romana and their directors in a February article that made explicit their commitment to Dominican players above all else. The League refused to reinforce its rosters with foreign players in order to “give room to the greatest number of Dominican players.” For Dominican baseball fans accustomed to Winter League teams arguing that as many as ten imported reinforcements were necessary for competitive balance, the Dominican Republic League’s commitment to hiring only Dominican players seemed like a sacrifice, but one a long-time coming for professional baseball.

The focus on the League’s social agenda became even clearer when the League ran into financial trouble in early June. Sportswriters called on Dominican fans to


426 Ibid. “*Para darle así cabida a mayor número de jugadores dominicanos.*” See also, Tomás E. Montás, “Liga Verano Beisbol RD Anuncia Contrata Jugadores; Ratifica Comenzará Torneo Día 19 del Mes de Abril,” *El Caribe*, 15 de marzo de 1975, 18. “*Pidió la colaboración de todos los ciudadanos para devolverle la confianza a un grupo de jugadores jóvenes que todavía pueden tener una oportunidad de jugar en liga grande.*”
support the League out of solidarity with its players. The League put the employment of
players above all else, and as *El Caribe* contributor Humberto Andrés Suazo stressed, had
been “founded on Biblical principles of protecting the hundreds of Dominican players
prematurely retired from organized baseball in the United States.” In this reasoning,
Dominicans could count only on each other to restore confidence to men like Abreu who
had the talent to play in the Big Leagues but had not received a fair chance. Rather
than emphasize the great sporting spectacle that the Savages, Twins, Canecutters, and
Sugarmen would bring to the fields of their respective cities, league directors and
sportswriters asked Dominicans to support the League out of their nationalist solidarity
with the baseball players and their hopes for the players that these young men might one
day become.

The League’s social objectives also determined its structure. The four teams
operated as a cooperative under the auspices of the League President and all proceeds
went to a common fund, at least for the first two seasons. The common fund and
cooperative structure promoted competitive balance among the teams, the most important
determiner of the success of a Dominican baseball league. This structure aligned with the
emphasis on the interests of the players and the League above those of the individual

427 Humberto Andrés Suazo, “Creen Positiva Liga de Verano,” *El Caribe*, 4 de junio de 1975, 13. Suazo noted that President Balaguer “prometió cooperar con el sostenimiento de la organización fundada en principios bíblicos de proteger a cientos de jugadores dominicanos retirados a destiempo del beisbol organizado de los Estados Unidos.”

428 See, for example, Arturo Industrioso, “Liga de Verano No Ha Licenciado Ningún Jugador; Dicen es Difícil Reunir Fondos Para Pagar Servicios; Cuatro Equipos Tienen 22 Peloteros Cada Uno,” *El Caribe*, 6 de junio de 1975. Industrioso appealed to fans also on the basis of the directors’ passion for baseball, perhaps as a way of romanticizing the social purposes over the material realities.
teams. The League organized events for public consumption, but buffered teams and players from the blind pursuit of profit.

The Dominican Republic Summer League also saw itself as a buttress against professional baseball’s stripping of the once-powerful Dominican amateur leagues. As Felipe Alou told Brubaker: “‘There was a time when the Dominican Republic was a power in amateur baseball. Ever since the indiscriminate signings started, that hasn’t been the case.’” The League vowed to protect the amateur leagues in two ways. First, the summer league teams promised to hire players only from the “‘kids who have already been to the States and been released’” whom Alou described jamming the country and the Winter Leagues. They would not ask any Dominican ballplayer to give up his amateur status. The Dominican Republic Summer League also protected the amateur leagues through a cooperative attitude regarding the sharing of public stadia and through public funding. Early on Alou promised that the League would schedule its summer games around the amateur league’s summer schedule—an accommodation that recognized the public ownership and administration of the stadia in a way that contrasted with the Winter League teams’ administration of the stadia during their season. In an even more telling gesture, the Dominican Republic Summer League excluded from its list of requested tax exonerations the 5% tax on the purchase of all tickets for professional sporting events.431 The Dominican Winter League had received this tax break, or one similar to it, since

430 Alou in Brubaker.
1955 and struggled violently against its application in 1966, even delaying the inauguration of the tournament to work out an accommodation.\textsuperscript{432} As an expression of their support for the reasoning that professional sport should support amateur sport, the Dominican Republic Summer League willingly included this tax in its still-low ticket prices.

The Dominican Republic Summer League survived its inaugural season to see the Sugarmen of La Romana sweep the Capital Savages led by Felipe Alou in the tournament finals. Sportswriters acknowledged the successes of the League in terms of giving Dominican players the opportunity to demonstrate and refine their skills in front of local fans.\textsuperscript{433} Despite the financial difficulties caused in part by a lack of public backing, the Dominican Republic Summer League completed its tournament. The League had to scale back on its goal of providing secure employment for more-than 100 players, likely by cutting salaries or numbers of players, but it survived.\textsuperscript{434} Sportswriters looked forward to a new season the following year, and even hoped that the two summer leagues might organize a Fall Classic similar to the US World Series.\textsuperscript{435}

After rocky seasons in 1975, 1976, and 1977, the Dominican Republic Summer League modified its structure and conception for the 1978 season. The League acquired new, business-savvy owners and a more industrial framework. Owner of the Winter-

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\textsuperscript{434} Industrioso, “Liga de Verano No Ha Licenciado Ningún Jugador.”
\textsuperscript{435} Arvelo, “Temas Deportivos,” 21 de agosto de 1975.
\end{flushright}
League Leones del Escogido, Félix Mario Aguiar, bought the Capital Savages and renamed them the Grey Monks of Santo Domingo, while a company, Apolo Productions, purchased the Twins, then based solely in San Cristóbal and positioned to ignite a rivalry with the new team in its twin city of Bani. Baseball fans saw some of the effects of this shift in emphasis even before the inauguration of the 1978 when former Secretary of Sport Justo Castellanos Díaz used his column “Variedades” in El Caribe as a platform to back Aguiar’s idea to bring foreign players to the Dominican Republic Summer League for the 1979 season. If the Cibao Summer League had profited in all but its inaugural year with the use of imported players while the Dominican Republic League suffered losses without them, Aguiar and Castellanos reasoned, the Dominican Republic League should embrace foreign reinforcements as well. “So thinks a person with a true business sense of professional baseball,” Castellanos said: “One has to exercise commerce without sentimentalism.”

The explicit commercialization of the Dominican Republic Summer League under the leadership of Santo Domingo-based industrialists redefined the purposes of the League in a way that would help guarantee its financial success. While sportswriters sympathetic to the League and its social agenda backed its requests for government aid, businessmen like Aguiar addressed the reasons behind the government’s lack of commitment to the League. Though Balaguer supported the “Biblical principles” on which the Dominican Republic Summer League was founded, the League demonstrated

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437 Ibid. “Así piensa una persona con verdadero sentido empresarial del beisbol profesional. El comercio hay que ejercerlo sin sentimentalismo.”
no signs of longevity or independence. Restricted by the objectives of the Secretary of Sports established in 1975, which favored investment in noncommercial, amateur sport, in part as a response to the criticisms against the Winter League, Balaguer found it unpoltic to sponsor a new professional sport league with funds earmarked for sports. Professional leagues were commercial enterprises. After winning his third election in 1974, Balaguer felt secure enough in the stability of his regime that the patronage benefits of supporting the social agenda of the Dominican Republic Summer League were insufficient. Dominicans and their government wanted new, Dominican-led industries, and the Dominican Republic League had not demonstrated its contribution to that cause. Rather than lead an offensive to found a new, independent industry on the island, the Dominican Republic Summer League depended on the existing baseball industry led by US Baseball for its players and saw itself as a parallel and eventual feeder into the US industry rather than an industry of its own. Though its social agenda was admirable and made sense in the context of the US industry, the Dominican Republic Summer League did not offer Dominicans a new path of development through baseball.

**A Third Way: The Cibao Summer League**

While the directors of the Dominican Republic Summer League saw the increasing numbers of Dominican professional ballplayers returning home from too-brief careers in US Baseball as an indicator of crisis, the Cibao Summer League directors saw an opportunity to retool and Dominicanize the baseball industry with their region at the center. Rather than raw materials prematurely discarded by the US system, the Cibao League directors and supporters viewed the released and retired ballplayers as human
capital whose skills would build a vibrant national industry. A true collaboration among
retired ballplayers like Julián Javier, sports journalists like Rubén de Lara, and
businessmen like Salvador Sadhalá, the Cibao Summer League operated with the dual
purposes of 1) offering ballplayers opportunities to extend their careers, and 2) laying the
groundwork for a new industry in the Cibao. The owners operated in a friendly
environment, sharing dinner and drinks as they discussed regulations and logistics, and
saw the league as a benefit to the players. But the Cibao Summer League would go
further than hobbies for rich businessmen and béisbol romántico (romantic baseball), or
baseball free from concerns with profits.\(^\text{438}\) The League operated within a social-business
framework that would demonstrate the industrial might and innovation of the region
while benefitting players and asserting Dominican claims on the deporte rey.

In pursuit of these purposes, the Cibao Summer League operated under a
capitalist model with an eye on the community, developing a third way between the
unregulated, “scuffle and con” capitalism of US and Winter League Baseball and the
social model of the Dominican Republic Summer League. League officials embraced
capitalism but rejected the neoliberal model emerging out of the Chicago School of

\(^\text{438}\) Julián Javier described the collegial atmosphere of the Cibao League, noting that “Everything
was very united. We’d all go to a meeting, drink a few tragos (drinks), a little dinner, from there
came everything. [. . .] It went very well because there were very good friendships, a tremendous
group.” “Todo era muy unido, todos habíamos una reunión y tomamos traguitos, una cenicita,
una era muy bien, de allí salió todo. [. . .] Pero salió muy bueno porque había muy buena
amistades, tremendo grupo.” Interview with the author, April 17, 2012, San Francisco de Macorís,
Dominican Republic. Jesús Rojas Alou had a similar perspective on the way teams operated
during the 1970s. He rejected the notion that the Cibao League operated as a business and
claimed that the owners saw the teams more as toys, something to occupy their time and earn
them the renown that went along with ties to baseball. Interview with the author, May 10, 2012,
Boston Red Sox El Toro Complex, Dominican Republic. Still, the Cibao League directors made
business decisions that preserved the League and increased the status of the Cibao region as a
host to professional baseball, all while providing employment for hundreds of Dominican
ballplayers and cibaeño service providers.
Economics and implemented in Chile under Augusto Pinochet. Instead, they pursued an industrial model led by Dominicans who recognized that local players, coaches, and managers added value to baseball. They wanted to protect Dominican baseball by creating an alternative that operated independently from US Baseball and bolstered national baseball institutions. The Mexican League served as a model. The explicit definition of the League as an industrial enterprise won the Cibao League government support in the form of tax exonerations, new stadiums, and other incentives regularly conceded to the Winter League. A true example of the direct and indirect social benefits of capitalism, support for the Cibao League also legitimized Balaguer’s pursuit of industrialization as part of a democratic government’s response to popular needs. Through its melding of deporte rey and business, the Cibao League demonstrated that industry was good for the Dominican people.

Observers in the region saw the business rationale behind the Cibao Summer League early on and appealed to the Balaguer Government for support on the basis of the League’s merits as an industry. The political commentator for the Santiago-based La Información devoted his column to the Cibao League’s cause, defining the League as a baseball industry and focusing on its dual purposes. His description of the Cibao League as an “entity that counts among its intended developments many social facets, along with

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439 Augusto Pinochet ruled Chile from 1973–1990, after ousting the democratically elected socialist-party President Salvador Allende from power with a CIA-supported military coup. Pinochet’s bloody regime was credited for uplifting Chile’s economic future through the structural adjustments and austerity advised by the neoliberal ideologues who gained prominence in the 1970s and 1980s. Pinochet’s economic advisors, Chileans knowns as the “Chicago Boys,” were trained at the University of Chicago School of Economics under Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger. Friedman himself visited Chile a hand full of times during Pinochet’s reign.
its principal economic structure” reflected Dominican views that industry should bring social benefits to the nation. Yet the columnist emphasized the League’s economic structure and business orientation rather than its social virtues in arguing for its qualifications as an industry. The rhetorical question—“Who doubts that the Summer League will produce optimum athletes, in line with a budding industry?” (una industria sui generis)—confirmed the Cibao League’s productive capacity. The League worked on the “rehabilitation” of a distinguished group of ballplayers who, “despite their high professionalism, were unjustly rejected by organized baseball.” It produced ballplayers, one of the nation’s most prized exports and a popular commodity in local baseball markets.

Beyond producing athletes, the Cibao Summer League also produced managers, coaches, and successful scouts by offering Dominican ballplayers experience in these positions. The League trained more valuable human capital, or skilled workers, for the national baseball industry. Félix Santana, who had played in Pittsburgh’s minor league system for a decade while making a name for himself in winter ball with the Aguilas and the Estrellas, found the opportunity to apply his 14 seasons of experience as a player to become a manager for the Cibao League-champion Valley Indians. He played and managed in the Cibao for at least three seasons, and went even further to support baseball in the country by working as a designated hitter for the Capital Savages in the Dominican Republic Summer League. Although he did not find a playing position on a Winter

440 “Minicosas de un Latidesorden,” La Información, 3 de mayo de 1975, 3. “El campeonato de Verano de la Liga del Cibao es ente que coteja entre sus devenires muchas facetas sociales, como también es total su vertebralización económica.”

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League team roster, Santana’s success with the Indians landed him a job as a coach for the Winter League Estrellas that lasted at least two years. Elvio Jiménez, who played in the Dominican Republic Summer League in 1975 and worked with the Cibao League in subsequent seasons, benefitted from the leagues in the same way, and even used the relationships he developed with young players in these leagues to boost his career as a scout. In both cases, the Cibao Summer League produced more valuable workers for the baseball industry rising in the country while also extending the careers of Dominican ballplayers beyond their playing days.

In the process of producing players and managers, the Cibao Summer League created a spectacle for local consumption that reinforced the social-economic benefits of the baseball industry. Being consumed at home, in the same communities where it was produced, the spectacle extended the opportunities for employment beyond those working on the field. As La Información’s column explained, ball games opened “countless economic resources” for a large sector of the Cibao population by creating jobs in the stadiums, ticket sales, field maintenance, stadium construction, and transportation. The Cibao League directors stressed these employment opportunities for the region in their appeal to Balaguer for government support. Not only would the League provide “healthy diversion,” the directors argued, but it would also “ensure the sustenance of hundreds of families who for various months will have the favor of their job protected by the opportunity that you [Balaguer] give them.”

Like any industry, the

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441 Carta, Dr. Hernando de la Mota, Presidente de la Liga de Beisbol Profesional de Verano del Cibao, Inc., et al., a Su Excelencia Dr. Joaquín Balaguer, Honorable Presidente de la República, 17 de febrero de 1975, SEDEFIR 16543. My emphasis.
League provided employment to local communities while also producing objects, in this case ballplayers and ball games, for local and international consumption.

As an industry, the Cibao Summer League merited the support of the Balaguer Government, specifically the tax exonerations and access to loans provided under the Industrial Incentives Law of 1968. The Industrial Incentives Law of 1968 extended fiscal incentives to new and existing industries in an effort to promote national economic development through industrialization. Balaguer favored the import-substitution industrialization model that had brought Trujillo renown and wealth and he was willing to invest public money in these industries. Public expenditure, or foregoing taxes to support new industries, made sense because industries had indirect public payoffs—as demonstrated by the Cibao League’s promise to boost employment in the region. The emphasis on import substitution also coincided with the nationalism and drive for economic and political sovereignty, particularly in the nation’s relations with the United States. Some of the strongest criticisms of the Industrial Incentives Law of 1968 centered on the benefits it provided for foreign companies. The Cibao League countered that, and offered the Balaguer Government the chance to show a preference for local industries. The Cibao Summer League’s protections for Dominican ballplayers and focus on producing ball games for national fans complied with these objectives and countered

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443 The country had enjoyed a spike of economic success during the Trujillo Era, largely through import-substitution industrialization during World War II, when the country also benefitted from high sugar prices. On Balaguer’s support for ISI, Moya Pons cited a speech by Balaguer on the opening of an industrial exhibition in December 1967 to confirm these objectives, p247.

the pernicious consequences that affiliation with US Baseball had caused for the Winter League, amateur leagues, and young ballplayers like Abreu.

The Cibao League directors knew Dominican baseball fans’ love for national baseball heroes and their demands that foreign players performed. The Cibao League expected ballplayers to produce, managers to win games, and trainers to rehabilitate injuries. The same was true of US Baseball, but the local arena for the display of the Cibao League’s products gave the players more immediate value as contributors not only to their own production but to that of a ballgame. The sports pages in Santo Domingo and in *cibaeño* newspapers promoted the League by creating a buzz around the players. They reminded fans of Cuban Zoilo Versalles’s MVP season with the World-Series Champion Minnesota Twins in 1965 and hyped local stars like Félix Santana in particular. One article and cartoon appealed to *cibaeño* fans’ familiarity with Santana when they reported his signing with La Vega’s Valley Indians (Figure 6.1).445 A representative of the Indians exclaimed to fans that he had just contracted this *jurel* (mackerel, tough-skinned person) to combat against capable opponents, playing on a reputation that Santana had earned with the Aguilas.446 The Cibao Summer League teams depended on fans’ familiarity with players like Versalles and Santana to sell tickets.

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Without the players, and Dominican players in particular, there would be no Cibao League.

As leaders of an “entity that counts among its intended developments many social facets, along with its principal economic structure,” the Cibao League directors listened to the concerns that sportswriters and others expressed over Winter League practices and set clear restrictions on the numbers of foreign players allowed on team rosters to protect Dominican players even while they expanded the talent pool to include imported players. League rules allowed each team to import up to five foreign players to promote competitive balance, but they also required that at least five Dominican players be on the field at any one time. Only Dominicans could serve as the designated hitter, a

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448 “Minicosas de un Latidesorden,” *La Información*, 3 de mayo de 1975, 3. “El campeonato de Verano de la Lliga del Cibao es ente que coteja entre sus devenires muchas facetas sociales, como tambien es total su vertebralización economica.”
position generally reserved for veterans.\textsuperscript{449} Thus, the Cibao League hired men like Versalles to promote competitive balance, compromising where the Dominican Republic League would not, because Cibao League directors were as focused on the business of baseball as well as the social aspects. The strict preference for Dominican players along with the business sense of hiring foreign players served both the social and business purposes of the League.

The respect the Cibao League directors showed toward players coincided with the economic nationalism and industrial sovereignty behind the League’s foundation and created a narrative of baseball industrialization that countered the narrative of US Baseball as an escape from poverty. The Cibao League teams had more independence in their operations than did those in the Dominican Winter League or even in the Dominican Republic Summer League. By dealing primarily with free agents, men with no US contract, and limiting the number of foreign players, the Cibao League teams avoided the dependence on US Baseball teams that plagued the Winter League.\textsuperscript{450} Cibao League team managers could fill in lineup cards without a thought about limited pitch counts or at-bats allowed for a veteran player. Fans and team leaders appreciated knowing that the best players on the team would take the field night after night. Likewise, players knew

\textsuperscript{449} Félix Acosta Núñez, Editor Deportivo, “Total 75 Players Tiene Liga Cibao; Anuncian la Fecha De Entrenamientos,” \textit{Listín Diario}, 18 de febrero de 1975, 8.

\textsuperscript{450} Although the Cibao Summer League operated without an official agreement with US Baseball, the directors made clear that they did not want to compete with the US organization for players. They allowed players to sign contracts with US teams without penalization. A handful of US rookies played in the Cibao Summer League during the early part of the season to prepare for their departure to US Rookie Leagues. However, the directors offered the opportunity only in rare circumstances. The Dominican Republic Summer League was less strict, and as Epy Guerrero remembered, nearly failed in its inaugural year when a majority of the young players left to join their US Rookie teams. Interview with the author, March 12, 2012.
that they would not be benched because an executive in a faraway city wanted a US
rookie to practice his switch hitting. The Cibao Summer League ensured Dominican
ownership of the national pastime and its business operations.

The national ownership of baseball that it offered and the claims that the League
was an industry put unique obligations on the Cibao League in the eyes of the Dominican
people. The narrative of US Baseball as an escape from poverty obligated US team
owners to benefit only individual ballplayers and only to the point that those ballplayers
boosted their teams. US teams were giving Dominican ballplayers the chance to become
millionaires, as Ralph Avila had noted, but as businesses they took the social objectives
only so far. They excused the difficulties faced by men like Abreu as consequences of
doing business. As a Dominican industry receiving benefits from the government, those
involved with the Cibao Summer League had to consider the League’s impact in the
community. Along with players, the League relied on local fans to support the spectacle
with their attendance. To earn this support, directors backed claims of the League’s
social benefits with action. In addition to promoting the opportunities offered to players
and workers, the Cibao League teams donated to charity. The League and the Atlantic
Pirates responded to calls in Puerto Plata for material support of a Youth Inter-
Neighborhood Tournament by donating 10% of the proceeds from a double-header.451
Such commitment to their communities earned Cibao League teams followers and
demonstrated the local pay offs for the financial incentives that the government offered to
the League.

451 Leoncio Silverio Camacho, Puerto Plata, “Siguen Justa de Beisbol Pese Problemas Utiles,” 23
de mayo de 1975, La Información, 7.
The Cibao Summer League legitimated Balaguer’s narrative of industrialization for the Dominican people by demonstrating that industries were good for the country. The *La Información* column detailed the material benefits that industry provided the region in terms of employment while sportswriters reported on the exciting games, majestic new stadiums, and the resurgence of talented national players. By emphasizing the Cibao League’s restrictions on foreign players and opportunities for Dominican professionals, sportswriters promoted this version of baseball industrialization as a way for Dominicans to attain the economic security and social well-being that they had expected a democratic government to bring. The Cibao League offered an alternative means of development focused on protecting Dominicans from the inequities in the relationship with US Baseball. The Cibao League made development palpable and beneficial for Dominicans, and especially for *cibaeños*, who imagined their region as the heart of the Dominican baseball industry.

**Regionalism and the Government’s Role in Baseball Development**

Beyond the national baseball sovereignty it offered, the Cibao Summer League bolstered regional pride and asserted the ascent of the Cibao region as a baseball and industrial power. Known as the “second city” of the country, Santiago and the Cibao region surrounding it had long been the underdogs in national consciousness and, despite the refined, cosmopolitan identities of those in the region’s cities, thought of a backwater. The effects of the Industrial Incentives Law of 1968 laid truth to this second-place status as industries continued to be concentrated around Santo Domingo rather than spreading industrialization to the interior. *Cibaeño* businessmen called attention to these
consequences and asked publicly that the Balaguer Government amend the Law. But having their calls ignored, cibaeños accepted the status quo and adapted Balaguer’s preferred import-substitution model to their preference for local materials. In imagining baseball as an import-substitution industry, cibaeño businessmen would demonstrate the region’s commercial capacity to support a professional baseball league—and by extension other businesses—and joined ballplayers and sportswriters in asserting the region’s ascent to the pinnacle of national baseball. With these efforts and their combined social and economic objectives, the Cibao League directors modeled the kind of relationship that Dominicans expected industries to have with the government and demonstrated the social benefits that the Balaguer Government claimed the industries supported by the Incentives Law would bring.

The enthusiasm that fans and businessmen exhibited for the deporte rey as a symbol of regional potential coincided with the rise of the Aguilas Cibaeñas to the top of the Dominican Winter League and an intensifying rivalry with the Licey Tigers. The Aguilas split championships with Licey throughout the 1970s, taking the finals from the Tigers for three of their five victories while also dropping two championship series to them. President ad vitam of the Aguilas, José Vega, who organized at least two of those Aguilas championship teams, recalled with pride that the 1970s “was the decade in which the great rivalry of Dominican baseball which has existed ever since, was between Aguilas and Licey and not between the traditional two clubs in Santo Domingo.”

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452 José Augusto Vega Imbert, interview with the author, April 17, 2012, Santiago.
change in rivalries shifted the center of Dominican baseball from the capital to a north-south axis and represented the ascent of Santiago and the Cibao region.

The Aguilas success came as no surprise to cibaeños, who had always anticipated their region’s surge to the top. Previously regarded as an “also-ran” next to the rivals in the capital, the Aguilas embodied the pride of an underdog destined to superstardom. Cartoonist Octavio projected this regional attitude on Cibaita, or Little Cibao, the character that represented the Aguilas in his regular sports-page cartoon featuring the Winter League mascots. In one such cartoon just before the start of the 1956–1957 season, Cibaita asserted his strength next to that of the Escogido Lion and Licey Tiger, whose victories over Puerto Rican teams from Caguas and San Juan, respectively, raised their confidence for the upcoming Winter League Tournament. (Figure 6.2) While the Lion and Tiger lifted weights and flexed their muscles in the background, the Elephant commented on their displays of power. Cibaita, flexing, countered by asserting his own strength: “Let them fall because of their overconfidence. Look here, too!” While those in the capital focused on the feats of Licey and Escogido against the Puerto Rican teams, Cibaita was ready to prove his own strength.
By 1975 cibaeños openly criticized Licey President Monchín Pichardo and liceista (supports of Licey) sportscasters’ disrespect toward the Aguilas and the Cibao region they represented. With a comment similar to Cibaita’s flexing, an editorial in the Santiago-based La Información claimed the Aguilas’ victory over Licey in the 1975 finals as “a symbolic victory of a powerful but humiliated, crushed, discriminated, attacked region.” La Información’s editor cited Pichardo’s treasonous comment during the Caribbean Series that he supported a team from another nation rather than the Aguilas as evidence of a “‘profound, capital-based hatred for everything from the Cibao.’” Defining this capital-based hatred as “Capital Regionalism,” the editor criticized broadcasters of the Series as well, noting that they reported on the Series without “‘losing the least opportunity to humiliate the country where they were born in their desire to humiliate the Cibao.’” The sports editor for the capital-based Listín Diario, Félix Acosta

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454 Domingo Saint-Hilaire, hijo, “Diario Ve en el Beisbol Regionalismo Capitaleño,” Listín Diario, 13 de febrero de 1975, 8, reprinted much of the editorial and reported it to readers in the capital.

455 Ibid.
Núñez, dismissed this idea. Citing a comment of questionable sportsmanship made by a *cibaeño* sportscaster during the previous year’s semifinals, Acosta Núñez defended Pichardo’s comments and their repetition by the broadcasters as camaraderie-driven humor, or “one or another joke among friends.”456 *Cibaeños* felt more was stake.

Businessmen in the Cibao region interpreted this “‘profound, capital-based hatred for everything from the Cibao’”457 as one of the reasons behind their inability to gain special incentives for their region’s agro-based industries. Economists trained at the Santiago-based Catholic Mother and Teacher University (*Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra*, UCMM) had publicly criticized the proposed Industrial Incentives Law in 1968 and even earned some congressional support until the industrialist lobby in Santo Domingo modified the bill.458 Santiago industrialists gained ground against the powerful Santo Domingo lobby with an amended bill in 1970, but again, the capital-based industrialists manipulated the implementation of the Law to their favor. By 1975 *cibaeños* had given up on gaining special incentives to support the industrialization of their region. Instead, they designed the Cibao Summer League to meet the requirements for receiving government aid under the existing law, and adapted Balaguer’s favored import-substitution model to meet Dominican social-economic needs. By defining the League as an industry with the dual purposes of employing Dominican ballplayers and


communities and founding a new industry in the region, Cibao League directors demonstrated how the UCMM economists and others in the Cibao region had imagined the Industrial Incentives Law should work. With this alternative, or “third-way” model, the Cibao League gained access to many of the same concessions (facilidades) granted to the Winter League each season and earned more government support than the less-business-minded Dominican Republic Summer League.

The foundation of the Cibao Summer League signaled the region’s attainment of the industrial and commercial capacity necessary to support a professional baseball league. While the Aguilas' climb to the upper echelons of the Winter League proved the region’s baseball potential, this prowess could not undermine capitaleños’ (people from the capital) views of the Cibao region as part of the cultural backwaters of the “interior.” In the Cibao Summer League, cibaeños saw the opportunity to change that reputation. The directors supported the League because of their confidence that “this region can support an event of this nature.”^459 Just as the incorporation of the Dominican Winter League and its affiliation with US Organized Baseball and the Caribbean Confederation conveyed a level of modernity and progress to the Dominican Republic as a whole, the success of the Cibao League would project the region’s potential to the rest of the country. The cities of San Francisco de Macoris, La Vega, Puerto Plata, and, later, Mao, joined Santiago as Dominican versions of “Big League cities,” or those able to support a

professional baseball team. The sell-out crowds in new stadiums across the region affirmed the sportswriters and investors’ faith in the region, and though the League lost $100,000 in its inaugural season, it was perceived a financial success in later years and even served as a model for the Dominican Republic Summer League when it revamped its operations in 1978.

The Balaguer Government’s support for the League, both in offering the concessions granted to the Winter League and in constructing stadiums not offered to the Dominican Republic Summer League confirmed the Cibao region’s position as the center of a national baseball industry. The Cibao League directors earned concessions that the government generally granted to the Dominican Winter League by appealing to the Balaguer Administration on the basis of the League’s industrial merits. They secured tax exonerations and breaks on electricity similar to those that the Winter League had received for decades. Yet instead of being paid from the budget dedicated to sport in the nation, the Industrial Incentives Law funded the breaks. Thus, the Cibao League earned

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the same government support for its commercial enterprise that the Dominican Winter League enjoyed but attained that support from funds dedicated to economic rather than sporting development.

The relative success of the Cibao Summer League compared to the Dominican Republic Summer League’s fits and starts in the first few seasons attested to the positive effects of the Cibao League’s claim of industrial objectives. The business sense behind Cibao League operations, particularly around the hiring of foreign players and the use of veterans, earned the League more legitimacy in its appeals to the Government for financial assistance and allowed the Government more flexibility in granting its concessions. Along with receiving the use of stadiums and tax exonerations, the Cibao League earned discounts on electricity that the Government originally denied the Dominican Republic Summer League. This concession gave the Cibao League a huge advantage over its parallel in the capital. Electricity represented a substantial cost for all professional leagues, with estimates nearing $20,000 for the 1961 winter season, well before the OPEC crisis. Balaguer had continued to supplement electricity for the Winter League through subsidies, and the Cibao League took advantage of this by negotiating discounts on its electricity costs.

The annotation of “OK” next to a request for subsidies in the Cibao League letter suggested that the administration gave the Cibao League a break on electricity. However, the correspondence around the question of similar subsidies in the case of the Dominican Republic Summer League revealed some political maneuvering by Balaguer to avoid both exonerating the electricity costs and saying “no.” The administrator of the electric company told the League directors that he lacked the authority to grant the exonerations, explaining that only the President of the Republic could order them. Meanwhile, Balaguer claimed that the electric company’s autonomy prevented his intervention. Beginning with the official inquiry from the President’s office to the state electricity corporation on 30 April, these exchanges all took place after the initiation of the Dominican Republic Summer League season on 19 April, suggesting some foot dragging by Balaguer’s office. See Carta, Liga de Beisbol Profesional de Verano del Cibao, Inc., a Su Excelencia Dr. Joaquín Balaguer, Honorable Presidente de la República, 17 de febrero de 1975; Oficio Núm 15298, Secretario Administrativo de la Presidencia al Administrador General de la Corporación Dominicana de Electricidad, 30 de abril de 1975; Oficio Núm 17882, Secretario Administrativo de la Presidencia al SEDEFIR, 21 de mayo de 1975; Oficio Núm 1955, Administrador General de la Corporación Dominicana de Electricidad al Sr Secretario Administrativo de la Presidencia, 12 de mayo de 1975, SEDEFIR 16543.
League since 1966, charging only $75 per game, less than half the cost of lighting a stadium for one night.\textsuperscript{462} Without this support for electricity, the Dominican Republic Summer League was forced to play day games, which further eroded its revenue from ticket sales. The Cibao League, in contrast, earned the support necessary to continue to play night games by portraying itself as a rising industry with the objectives of providing employment for the entire \textit{cibaeño} community. Later in 1975, a sportswriter borrowed the Cibao League’s argument about indirect employment benefits to support the Winter League after the Balaguer Government nearly forced the teams to play three day games a week during the 1975–1976 season because of the oil shortage.\textsuperscript{463}

The Government’s support for the industrialism behind the Cibao Summer League also translated into better stadiums for the Cibao region. These benefits came in part from the Secretary of Sports program to build installations throughout the country discussed in the previous chapter. But the million-dollar stadiums built in La Vega and

\textsuperscript{462} The Dominican Winter League requested the rate of $75/game through at least the 1974–1975 season based on a precedent set by Trujillo. A more thorough study of electricity costs would be necessary to demonstrate the true value of this discount over time, but in 1963 the Director of Sports complained to President Bosch that lighting the Estadio Cibao cost $300 per night, or $225 more than the professional teams were required to play. On the precedent from the Trujillo Era, see SEDEFIR 16583. For the continuation, see Carta, 28 de agosto de 1961, Liga Dominicana de Baseball Profesional, Incorporada, Dr. Alvarez Sánchez, Secretario, a Virgilio Díaz Grullón, Subsecretario de la Presidencia, SEDEFIR 16567. For other notes on the costs of electricity, see, Remite No. 2870, 4 de julio de 1963, Director General de Deportes al Ministerio de la Presidencia, SEDEFIR 16577. On the \textit{doce años}, see, Carta, 10 de septiembre de 1974, Dr. A. Alvarez Sánchez, Secretario, Liga Dominicana de Baseball Profesional, Incorporada, al Dr. Joaquín Balaguer, Presidente de la República, SEDEFIR 16543.

\textsuperscript{463} Alvaro Arvelo hijo, “Temas Deportivos: Beisbol Profesional,” \textit{El Caribe}, 23 de octubre de 1975, 26, argued for the support for the Dominican Winter League on the basis that “\textit{El beisbol profesional sigue siendo el deporte favorito de las grandes masas dominicanas}” and the requirement that they play day games would destroy the professional game. Along with making the argument that other national activities cost more electricity, Arvelo argued on the basis of the thousands of jobs created by professional baseball. He noted that “\textit{El beisbol, en cambio, proporciona empleo a miles de personas, incluyendo peloteros, managers, entrenadores, masajistas, médicos, obreros, empleados, funcionarios ejecutivos, periodistas, técnicos de diversas ramas, cocheres, árbitros, anotadores, etcétera, etcétera.”
San Francisco de Macorís in 1975 as well as renovation of Puerto Plata’s stadium in 1976 and the construction in Mao for the 1978 season went a step beyond. By 1978, the Cibao region boasted more, and better, stadiums than the capital, which had only the Estadio Quisqueya and the Olympic Center constructed for the 1974 Central American and Caribbean Games. Sportswriters and directors of both the Cibao and Dominican Republic Summer Leagues recognized the impact of the stadiums and other demonstrations of government support and blamed the Dominican Republic League’s struggles on the fact that it “has not had the official backing that its counterpart, the Cibao League, has counted on.” More than simple installations that made sports accessible to thousands of aspiring athletes, the Balaguer Government saw new stadiums as infrastructure for a budding industry. In contrast to the Dominican Republic League, the Cibao League fulfilled expectations for a plan of baseball industrialization and received the corresponding benefits.

The dual sporting and industrial purposes of the Cibao Summer League opened League directors to bend to the new relationship that the new Secretary of Sport, Justo Castellanos Díaz, was defining for the government and professional baseball. They were willing to negotiate incentives creatively, in ways that the Winter League had not yet been forced to create. Castellanos took his new role seriously and responded to criticisms against government support for professional baseball, such as those by Vega and Valdez described earlier, by initiating policies such as one in 1975 against granting

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464 Enrique Mota, “Toquecitos,” El Caribe, 22 de abril de 1978, 32. “Además, la Liga de Verano de la República Dominicana, a nuestro juicio, no ha contado con el respaldo oficial que ha tenido su similar el Cibao.”
administration of public goods, like baseball stadiums, to private enterprises, like professional baseball teams.\textsuperscript{465} As the Cibao League prepared for its inauguration, Castellanos and the directors negotiated partial administration of the stadiums rather than the full use and control usually granted to the Winter League. Thus, the Secretary of Sport fulfilled his duty to protect amateur sport while also supporting the development of a new baseball industry in the nation. His willingness to grant even partial administration certainly stemmed from his support for sport as a whole. He recognized the Cibao League’s sporting objectives and the benefits of extending access to the deporte rey to the thousands of Dominicans who could now see professional baseball for the first time. The days of public favors granted to professional teams during private meetings in the President’s offices were over. The Cibao Summer league would succeed on its business acumen and popular appeal.

The Cibao Summer League received government support because it embraced its commercial role and envisioned baseball as a national industry independent from US Organized Baseball. The Cibao League directors acted to protect Dominican ballplayers in a way that affirmed the benefits that development would bring the nation. Although Julián Javier overlooked the League’s commercialism when he explained that “It was to

\textsuperscript{465} Oficio NUM 2146, 22 de septiembre de 1975, Justo Castellanos Díaz al Secretario Administrativo de la Presidencia Quezada, Re: "Solicitud de concesión de facilidades que anualmente otorga el gobierno a la Liga Dominicana de Béisbol [sic] Profesional," SEDEFIR 16543. The secretary explained his stance: “This Secretary of State is not inclined to grant all types of tax exonerations and economic facilities, or of any other type, on behalf of the Dominican State to professional sport, because this is an activity of imminently commercial character.” "Esta Secretaría de Estado no se inclina al otorgamiento de todo tipo de exoneración impositiva y facilidades económicas, o de cualquier otro género, de parte del Estado Dominicano al deporte profesional, por ser ésta una actividad de eminente carácter comercial.” Castellanos cited Oficio No. 548, 27 de mayo de 1975. Although he offers no further context for this missive, it is possible it followed requests for support by one or both of the summer leagues, both of which were experiencing financial issues at the time.
help a few retired players. We never received the benefits; the players received the benefits,\footnote{Julián Javier, interview with the author, April 17, 2012, San Francisco de Macorís.} his response likely mirrored how Dominican sports fans perceived the Cibao League. It benefitted players and fueled their own pride in the national pastime by creating a worthy, Dominican-led spectacle on Dominican baseball fields. Along with providing employment for ballplayers and cibaeños, the new baseball leagues gave Dominicans who lived hours from the homes of Winter League teams the opportunity to watch professional ball on new or renovated home fields. In the end, the government backed the Cibao Summer League because it opened the access to sport and employment that Dominican citizens expected a democratic government to provide. And it survived on its business merits rather than government support. The Cibao Summer League demonstrated that, at least in baseball, the Dominican Government functioned as Dominicans believed a democracy should.

**Conclusion**

The Cibao Summer League and Dominican Republic Summer League grew from a new understanding of what baseball could mean for Dominicans and for the Dominican Republic. Always at the heart of national pride and identity, baseball became a tool for individual prosperity and national economic security by 1975. Young men lined the fields for a chance to sign a contract with a US team and start a career in their favorite sport. Others invested to build their own businesses while helping these youth reach their dreams. Since the Trujillo Era, the Dominican government had been one of the greatest supporters of the national pastime. With the Cibao Summer League, the reasons for that
government aid shifted. No longer just *pan y circo* to distract the population from human rights abuses and limitations on their freedoms, baseball as an industry offered Dominicans a means to attain the economic security and the access to a good life for all that they had expected a democratic government to bring. Baseball became a path of government action to benefit the people materially, and an avenue for the people to forge careers that they could achieve despite slow progress in public education and other services.

Baseball made industrialization more palpable to Dominicans who had seen government concessions for industrialists damage the national social system and undermine national sovereignty. By operating as Dominicans imagined a capitalist democracy should—with market forces rather than personal favors from the government determining the success of private enterprises—the Cibao Summer League gave Dominicans hope in the Balaguer Government’s promise to bring economic security through development. The Balaguer Government’s construction of new stadiums in the Cibao region served as examples of largesse for national businesses to counter criticisms against the no-strings incentives the Government offered to foreign businesses. Through sport, Balaguer, like Trujillo before him, demonstrated that he cared about Dominicans.

The most important consequences of the Cibao Summer League and its desire to establish a baseball industry in the region derived from its dual social and economic purposes. In arguing for incentives on the basis of the jobs they provided for the communities in San Francisco de Macorís, La Vega, Puerto Plata, Mao, and Santiago, the Cibao League directors showed their faith in Balaguer’s rhetoric for development. They
disagreed with how the incentives were applied in the 1968 law, but they ultimately backed the rationale that development through government investment would push the nation closer to its goal of modernity—or economic security and political and civil liberties for all. The Cibao Summer League offered an example of development that Dominicans felt good supporting. The pursuit of profit with an eye on the social effects of its operations created a model for doing business that contrasted with the negative effects of the US Baseball industry in the Dominican Republic. Most importantly, the Cibao League asserted Dominican control over the baseball industry. Dominicans ran the teams, organized tournaments, decided on the rules, filled in lineup cards, played, consumed the baseball game from the stands, sold concessions, drove buses to the ballpark, and washed the uniforms. Baseball was not only the national pastime but part of the national patrimony.

The Cibao Summer League operated for ten summer baseball seasons, helping Dominican ballplayers rehabilitate or initiate their careers, continue working after their release from US teams, and apply their skills as managers or administrators. In the inaugural season of the Cibao League, two players earned another opportunity in US Baseball by signing minor-league contracts while Félix Santana earned a coaching job with the Winter League Estrellas Orientales. In 1978, Jesús Rojas Alou boosted the Cibao League’s reputation when he returned to the Big Leagues for two seasons with the Houston Astros after playing with the Northwest Linesmen from Mao. Tony Fernández refined his skills in the Cibao League in the early 1980s on his way to building a Big
League career that included five All-Star Game appearances and four Gold Gloves.\footnote{Fernández was named an American League All Star in 1986, 1987, and 1988, playing shortstop behind Cal Ripken, who started. In 1992, Fernández played for the National League All Stars behind Ozzie Smith, while returning to the AL roster for the 1999 game at the age of 37, again playing behind Ripken, but this time at third base. Fernández won Gold Gloves as an American League shortstop in 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989.} As time passed, young prospects like Fernández replaced veterans like Jesús Alou on Cibao League teams and in 1984 the League moved to the capital and merged with the Dominican Republic League. Later, the new league affiliated with US Baseball and became the Dominican Summer League (DSL) that currently organizes tournaments for the Major League Baseball-affiliated academies in the Dominican Republic.

Though hardly the bastion of baseball patrimony that the Cibao Summer League represented, the DSL today forms part of a baseball industry that accounts for over US $125 million in annual GDP and initiates the baseball careers of hundreds of young Dominicans each year. Major League Baseball’s predominance in Dominican baseball today perpetuates the narrative of baseball as an escape from poverty, symbolized most poignantly in documentaries that show young prospects eager to buy their mothers new homes.\footnote{Most recently, Guagua Productions, Ballplayer: Pelotero, Documentary Film (Stamford, CT: Makuhari Media, 2011), showed the underside of MLB operations in the Dominican Republic. Earlier films also demonstrated young men’s view of US Baseball as a way out of poverty, see Jared Goodman, Road to the Big Leagues (Boston: Element Productions, 2008); and for a fictional account, Anna Boden and Ryan Fleck, Sugar (Culver City, CA: Sony Pictures Home Entertainment, 2009).} Still, recent developments show that the dream made a reality during the Cibao League’s ten seasons remains. The foundation of a new Cibao Summer League in many of the same cities, a project by the Dominican Winter League to establish a new Summer League affiliate, and new leagues formed by independent scouts—the famous \textit{buscones}, or bird dogs, who train the adolescents who fill the Major League team academies—
represent Dominican attempts to assert control over their national pastime and the industry that surrounds it. Like the Cibao League in the 1970s and 1980s, these new attempts demonstrate baseball’s lasting importance in the Dominican narrative of progress and as a means to express, and sometimes to enact, Dominican visions of a democratic society.
On Saturday, July 28, 2012, the Epy Guerrero Complex outside of Santo Domingo teemed with excitement as boys aged about fourteen to twenty mingled with scouts of all ages in anticipation of the inauguration of a new baseball league for Dominican prospects. Epy Guerrero greeted former players, parents, and scouts he had competed against for players as he roamed the fields, happy to serve as the host for this next iteration of Dominican baseball. Scouts, players, parents, Guerrero’s family, Winter League officials, and even workers from Major League Baseball’s Santo Domingo office had gathered at Epy’s Complex to witness the inauguration of the National Prospect League (NPL) and to honor Guerrero for the work he had done in nearly a half century.

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Photo by the author, taken at the Complejo Epy Guerrero de Villa Mella, July 28, 2012.469
dedicated the development of young ballplayers in the Dominican Republic. As Guerrero spoke in the pre-game ceremony, he emphasized the importance of investing in youth to secure the future of the nation and his hope that efforts like the National Prospect League would help protect Dominican ballplayers eager to make careers in professional baseball from the business practices and dubious interests that left many prospects with no future. Other scouts, including independent scouts as well as those affiliated with Big League teams, among them one New York Yankees scout recognized with an award by the new League’s directors, cheered as Guerrero threw the pitch of honor to his son Patrick, who held a bat at home plate (Figure 7.1). On the mound, in the dugout, and in the bleachers stood men who had made their careers in baseball, ready to give the first chance to the young men standing eagerly on the baseline, hoping to follow in their footsteps.

The National Prospect League and organizations like it represent innovations by scouts, and especially independent scouts, as they respond to demands of the global market for baseball talent. They want to maintain the Dominican Republic’s competitive advantage and to ensure their own livelihood, which depends on the signing bonuses young Dominican prospects earn from Major League teams. Since Guerrero built his complex to give prospects in the 1970s and 1980s time to gain muscle and hone their skills before they went to the United States, Dominican ballplayers have fallen behind their Latin American counterparts in game-time experience. Venezuelans brought to the Major League team academies in the Dominican Republic generally enjoy more success than their Dominican teammates because they understand the game of baseball better and make better decisions on the field. Surely, most people who watched the Dominican
team play their way to the World Baseball Classic Championship in 2013 would be shocked to learn that many of the young men who represented the Dominican Republic in the tournament had played fewer games than US players of the same age. Although boys in Dominican Republic start working to become professional ballplayers as young as fourteen years old, they often do so under the guidance of an independent scout, who works alone or with a few other coaches and lacks the resources or numbers to even scrimmage. Thus, Dominican players learn to field a grounder or throw a curveball, but lack the situational knowledge gained only through games. The National Prospect League, like the Dominican Prospect League founded by Major League Baseball, was designed to give baseball hopefuls this game-time experience.

The need for institutions like the National Prospect League arose from the combination of MLB scouting practices and government austerity programs after Balaguer’s doce años. While the first generation of Dominican ballplayers developed their baseball talent in national tournaments sponsored by the Director of Sports or, later, the Secretary of Sports, more recent generations have grown up with less support from this institutional structure. On one hand, the influx of US scouts in search of young Dominican talent in the 1970s and 1980s depopulated the rosters of the amateur leagues that had not only prepared Dominicans for international competitions and professional baseball but also entertained the population. On the other, neoliberal reforms required that money from the faltering amateur leagues be invested elsewhere. Although the
Ministry of Sports still invests more money on baseball than any other sport, by the age of 14 most talented ballplayers develop in private academies, often borrowing time and resources that they are expected to pay back with a share of their signing bonuses. The onus for the development of the youngest baseball talent, then, falls on the players themselves, their families, or, often, the scouts who decide to take a chance on them and hope to receive a return on their investment in the form of a share of a signing bonus. After Dominican ballplayers sign, Major League Baseball takes responsibility for their training.

While the same is true in the United States in the sense that families often invest in their children’s training for professional sport, the shift from public to private investment in the Dominican Republic represents changing expectations. During the Trujillo Era and through at least Balaguer’s twelve years, Dominicans and their leaders saw baseball as an integral component of the education of modern Dominican citizens primed for democracy. This expectation was set in part through rhetoric that portrayed Trujillo as the region’s best populist, Benefactor of the Nation, and Maximum Protector of National Sport, but it persisted as Dominicans held governments of all political bents

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470 Subsecretaria Técnica de Deportes y Oficina Nacional de Estadística, “1er Censo Nacional de Recursos Humanos en Deportes y Entidades Deportivos” (Santo Domingo: Secretario de Estado de Deportes, Educación Física y Recreación [SEDEFIR], 2006).

471 After ballplayers are signed at age 16, they move to academies run by Major League Baseball teams, concentrated near Santo Domingo. Players live at the academy for ten months of the year—the academies are closed in December and March—and train and attend classes throughout. In the summer months, beginning in mid-June of each year, they play a short schedule of games. All Major League teams have an academy in the Dominican Republic, though some invest more than others in terms of facilities and services. For example, the New York Mets, San Diego Padres, and others built multi-million dollar training complexes outfitted with top-of-the-line equipment and facilities while others rent older, less spacious terrains and buildings.
accountable for Trujillo’s level of support for the national pastime. Dominicans’
responses to the shift in the global rhetoric around Cold War objectives from an emphasis
on democracy in the 1950s and 1960s to government-led development later in the 1960s
and on made Dominicans more critical of how the Government invested in baseball.
Investment in private enterprises, even professional baseball, had to benefit the nation
and local economies. Even as the Secretary of Sport turned the emphasis on public
sporting support to amateur baseball, Major League Baseball and other professional
leagues earned industrial incentives.

Major League Baseball has done its best to comply with Dominican expectations
for new industries, projecting itself as a provider of opportunities and a social do-gooder.
Teams that build and establish academies in the Dominican Republic receive tax breaks
and other incentives for their investment in the nation. In return, the academies provide
employment for hundreds of Dominicans. Housekeepers, cooks, nutritionists,
receptionists, coaches, teachers, managers, trainers, maintenance staff, and administrators
receive regular salaries almost year-round while players receive salaries during the
Dominican Summer League season to add to their sometimes-sizable signing bonuses.

The fact that less-than one-third of all players who go to the academies will even
make it to the next level of professional ball has led teams to fill obligations that citizens
often expect of governments, including that of education. The academies were founded
in part to facilitate prospect’s cultural adjustment should they go to the United States, so
they initially focused on teaching English and classes to raise awareness about
differences between the US and Dominican diet and dating relations. Increasingly,
academies and Major League Baseball’s offices in Santo Domingo have taken on the role of high-school education. In 2012 Major League Baseball hired a full-time education coordinator to facilitate efforts by teams to allow prospects to complete high school, an endeavor many sacrificed to train full time. Some academies, such as that run by the San Diego Padres, support prospects, even if they are cut, in graduating from high school. These young men leave the academy with a high school diploma if not an illustrious playing career.

Figure 7.2: Flecha

While Major League Baseball’s promises and the emphasis of government investment on baseball cause problems, the narrative of national progress through

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baseball persists, upheld by the glowing examples of legends like Felipe Alou and Juan Marichal, heroes like Pedro Martínez and Vladimir Guerrero, and rising stars like Hanley Ramírez and Fernando Rodney. With the growing role of Major League Baseball in fixing social problems that resulted in part from its influence in the country and the shift to neoliberalism, the Dominican Government has played a decreasing role in supporting Dominican youth achieve that image of progress. Much has changed. But much about the Dominican Government’s relationship to baseball has also remained the same. On November 28, 2013, Dominican President Danilo Medina spoke at a luncheon to honor the World Baseball Classic Champions. Team members received rings, much like World Series rings, bought for them by the Government. Although he had not originally planned to speak, Medina was moved to thank the players for reinvigorating Dominicans at a time when the country was “wrapped in pessimism.” He had feared social upheaval in February and March after fiscal reforms implemented by his government took effect, but the World Baseball Classic distracted Dominicans from high food costs and other tensions until the victory “filled all the country with optimism.”

Many questions remain about the Dominican Government’s ability to fulfill the population’s expectations for a democratic society even 35 years after the first democratic transition. Yet, Dominicans continue to see baseball as a sign of progress, one with which Medina could

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473 “Presidente Medina expresa orgullo y gratitud a equipo ganador de Clásico Mundial,” Presidencia de la República, Noticias, 28 de noviembre de 2013, http://presidencia.gob.do/comunicados/presidente-medina-expresa-orgullo-y-gratitud-equipo-ganador-de-clasico-mundial. As the article noted: “A seguidas manifestó que el país, en los primeros tres meses ‘estaba arropado en pesimismo,’ pero comenzó el Clásico Mundial y se convirtió en un toque de queda.” As Medina said, “‘Poco a poco el equipo fue sacando las agallas y se fue convirtiendo en una esperanza para todo el país. Y fue ganando, partido tras partido, hasta que finalmente conquistamos la corona de manera invicta y eso se convirtió en la República Dominicana en un triunfo que llenó de optimismo a todo el país.’”
not resist associating as he surrounded himself with the latest crop of Dominican baseball heroes, who leaned low to the ground and pointed to the sky in the signature *flecha* (arrow) pose that marked their on-field celebrations. They shot for the stars, raising their flag and, Medina hoped, him and their nation.
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