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Tocqueville Forum Events

Alumni Homecoming Week Lecture
Bad Religion with Ross Douthat and Matthew Carnes, S.J.
September 27, 2012 –7:00 pm
Ross Douthat, New York Times columnist
Matthew Carnes, S.J., Assistant Professor of Government,
Georgetown University

Forum Lecture
American Grace Revisited
October 3, 2012—6:00 pm
David Campbell, John Cardinal O’Hara, C.S.C. Associate
Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame
Clyde Wilcox, Professor of Government,
Georgetown University

Forum Lecture
Our Divided Political Heart and the Election of 2012
October 22, 2012—4:30 pm
E.J. Dionne, University Professor, Georgetown University

Forum Lecture
Democracy in America 180 Years after Tocqueville
October 25, 2012—7:30 pm
Michael Barone, Resident Fellow,
American Enterprise Institute

Forum Lecture
Tocqueville’s Moment…and Ours
November 15, 2012—4:30 pm
Wilfred McClay, SunTrust Bank Chair of Excellence in
Humanities, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Forum Special Event
“The Final Gladness” A Last Lecture at Georgetown
December 7, 2012—5:00 pm
Rev. James V. Schall, S.J., Professor of Government,
Georgetown University
editor-in-chief
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steven waldorf (the forum)
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jordan rudinsky (the clock tower)

graduate editor
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utraque unum

georgetown university’s seal is based directly on the great seal of the united states of america. instead of an olive branch and arrows in the american eagle’s right and left talons, georgetown’s eagle is clutching a globe and calipers in its right talon and a cross in its left talon. the american seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, e pluribus unum, or “out of many, one,” in reference to the many different people and states creating a union. the georgetown seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, utraque unum.

as the official motto of georgetown university, utraque unum is often translated as “both one” or “both and one” and is taken from paul’s epistle to the ephesians. this motto is found in a latin translation of ephesians 2:14: ipse est enim pax nostra qui fecit utraque unum. the king james version of the bible says, “for he [christ] is our peace, who hath made both one.” utraque unum is the latin phrase to describe paul’s concept of unity between jews and gentiles; that through jesus christ both are one.

in view of the georgetown seal, the motto represents pursuing knowledge of the earthly (the world and calipers) and the spiritual (the cross). faith and reason should not be exclusive. in unity faith and reason enhance the pursuit of knowledge.
Acknowledgements

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As always, we welcome your thoughts and comments regarding this journal. If you are or once were a Georgetown University student, professor, or staff member we would welcome the opportunity to review your work for publication in *Utraque Unum*. Please e-mail the editors at Utraque.Unum@gmail.com for these inquiries.
Cultivating Knowledge of America and the West
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On Transcending the Moment

Joshua Mitchell

The reader of the current edition of Utraque Unum will immediately notice the usual number of far-ranging and provocative essays on matters of abiding concern to students here at Georgetown, to members of the larger national community of which Georgetown is a part, and to persons around the world attempting to comprehend not only the dizzying pace of modern life but also where surcease may be found. A perusal of the table of contents will reveal, in addition, a number of articles that pay homage to a living legacy at Georgetown, Fr. James Schall, an honorable and devout man of the Roman Catholic Church, who will be retiring from Georgetown at the end of this semester.

When asked what Fr. Schall will do now, he replies: “I am moving to a place where old warriors go to find peace.” Fr. Schall has indeed been a gentle but persistent warrior, who has tirelessly sought to understand and expost the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church and the deeper mysteries of faith to several generations of students here at Georgetown.

When Fr. Schall arrived during the second term of the Eisenhower Administration, over five decades ago, Georgetown University had not yet undergone the vast transformation we see still unfolding before our eyes today. Today, Georgetown is a modern university, which keeps up with the times. Fr. Schall has not been oblivious to these changes, nor has he failed to make the small adjustments needed to accommodate them. While the rest of us wrestle with the blur of changing events, however, Fr. Schall has always taken the longer view. Some scholars seek to contribute to knowledge, and Fr. Schall has certainly done that. But if you press him further, he will likely say that far more important is that he has participated in the witness of the Church to the world. As a participant, he takes his place among the generations who receive and hand on what the bustle of the world cannot easily disturb. That is why Fr. Schall is always of good cheer. The latest intellectual fashions captivate or ruffle only those who live in the moment. Fr. Schall is not a man of the moment.

Two decades ago, when I arrived at Georgetown, I would ask Fr. Schall what he thought of St. Augustine on this or that point of contention. He would smile at me, and gently say, “Well, the Church says…” His own opinion did not concern him, nor did mine, really. What matters the fleeting opinion of one man? His companions were the Fathers of the Church, were Plato and Augustine and Cicero, and were all those who, within the community of faith, reverentially sought to understand both themselves and that wondrous gift of philosophy that antedated the Church.

Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America that in the democratic age, man’s attention will always turn to the moment. He will “forget his ancestors” and “flee the paternal hearth.” Tocqueville worried, moreover, about the fate of the classics. He understood that a new, middle-class, democracy would most require practical education, as befits a commercial nation. He also knew, however, that such an education would not be enough; in some small corner of the nation, it would be necessary for colleges and universities to transmit the inherited understandings of civilization. For over five decades, Fr. Schall has done just that. The Georgetown he loved took it upon itself to be that light that shined forth from that small corner.

Joshua Mitchell is a professor in the Georgetown University Department of Government and director of the Tocqueville Forum on the Roots of American Democracy.
The Totality of Society:
From Justice to Friendship

James V. Schall, S.J.

The principal intention of human law is to create friendship between man and man.¹

—Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*

Comradeship and serious joy are not interludes in our travels, but . . . rather our travels are interludes in comradeship and joy, which through God shall endure for ever.

—G. K. Chesterton, *Charles Dickens*

I.

Human society has become for the modern world a complex reality, far too intricate for the mind of any one man to know thoroughly. Rarely do we understand it in its totality and unity. The basic structure of society can be grasped. Man can reflect on his experience and know the means and ends of his life in the city. Many ways enable us to discover the basic totality. The clearest way is to analyze the various aspects of law as it was set down and understood by St. Thomas Aquinas. We might also begin with justice, or the common good, or friendship, but these problems are one; the starting point alone is different. The striking thing about St. Thomas is that, within the context of the problem as he saw it, he implicitly, if not actually, uses the political definitions and distinctions between state and society and their functions that have become familiar to us.

In treating of law, Aquinas’s ideas and terms serve as our basic approach.

We accept Aquinas’s definition that law is “an ordination of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated” (I-II, 91, 4). We wish to inquire about law as it exists in a society, what it commands, what ideas, what effects it has. Human law deals only with external, human acts (I-II, 98, 1). These external acts must be ordered in such a way that the temporal peace and tranquility of society be maintained. This purpose is accomplished by regulating and prohibiting anything that could disturb the conditions of concord in society.

St. Thomas calls this peaceful order the end of human law (I-II, 98, 1).

When dealing with the essence of law, Aquinas maintains that the end of law is the “com-
mon good” (I-II, 96, 4). The principle according to which external acts are regulated is the objective order of just relations without which a society cannot exist. Consequently, when speaking of the end of the law as the common good, he means the common good as a final cause by which particular external acts can achieve their end. “Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end” (I-II, 90, 2, ad 2). St. Thomas identifies this common good in other places as the intention of the legislator. He means that it is the end or purpose for which the legislator acts (I-II, 100, 1; In Eth. #1666). However, the end of law in the sense of temporal tranquility refers to the effect actually achieved by the order of just relations in an existing society.

The first and minimal requirement of society, then, is the de facto order of men such that their actions with respect to one another are at least just. Law will command the acts of those virtues which have either directly or indirectly an effect on the external order. Those acts which have a relation to another in the external order are the acts of justice (I-II, 58, 2, 5). The precepts of law, therefore, will embody the external acts of virtue (I-II, 107, 1, ad 2). Virtues other than justice are embodied in law only insofar as their acts have an effect externally so that they can be considered as relating to justice (II -II, 58, 8, ad 3). If any given society establishes and keeps established this minimal order, it will have the basic requirement for a healthy society.

The organization or institution directly concerned with this order is the state, or in Aquinas’ terminology, the prince. The state, therefore, is that section of a society that has the external order of just actions and relations as its direct end. “For a prince is ordained to this purpose that he keeps justice, and, as a consequence, equality” (#1009).

The state, however, will be more or less perfect; it can progress or regress in its duty, for there is a whole range and hierarchy of just actions. “The intention of law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest” (II -II, 122, 1, ad 1). All problems of the external order may fall within the competency of the state in some sense at least, but it may well be that in any given body of men few of the factors that really constitute the good life will be realized.

This total order of just relations in society is called the common good of the multitude, and it will be the end for which all civil laws are primarily intended (#1030). Laws get their meaning and proportion from this end. This is not to deny that states in fact seek different ends. Thus, they establish different laws according to the way different peoples set up different goals or understanding of the common good, which, in practice, they define as virtue, wealth, world domination, or pleasure. However, as a matter of fact, the only legitimate understanding of the common good is the one that aims ultimately at virtue.

II. Human law deals with the precepts of the virtue of justice. But how is law related to justice in reality? A man becomes just by performing just acts. That is, he decides what he is to do, then, he wills to act according to this specified or understood reason. This means that a man must see the objective justum (what is right) in any of his acts. Now these objective justa (right relationships) are in part determined by nature, that is, by reason itself, and in part by positive ordination of society. These right relations that man recognizes to be existing and operative are facts. He knows that he did not make these relations solely by himself. He must, therefore, take them into consideration in his every action so that the action will be proportioned to its end. By seeing and acting according to these just relations, he will be able to become a just and good man.

Law is just the other side of this same reality. It looks to what man should do, not from the
side of the individual person himself but from the side of the legislator who established these *justa* (right relations) and *debita* (things due) for the common good, which man in his turn discovers to be factors in his every action. What a man can discover from reason therefore, namely, that there are natural limits and guideposts for his actions in reason, he, ultimately, comes to see as commands of a lawgiver, either human as in the case of civil law or divine as in the case of natural or revealed law. In other words, a man can see from reason *that* there are ways for a human being to act. He can discover in large measure just what these ways are. He may not know why this is so, but he cannot escape the fact that it is so.

However, when man progresses and discovers that these limits were not just accidental or arbitrary (assuming for the moment just human laws) and further, when he has come to see that they are commands of a lawgiver who in the case of natural law not only made the law but also the man himself; then he sees fully that the moral law is not simply a restriction or impediment. It is a definite order to man’s end, a road by which he travels and not a pit into which he has fallen. Consequently, law commands an act be done which, from his point of view, man sees is in accord with his nature to perform. This formal cause of the human act is the dictate of reason which at the same time is the law as received in the subject and the *ratio juris* (reason of or in the law) that man sees must be maintained in the act. The *ratio juris* and the law, then, are the same thing, except that the law as such refers to the lawgiver (II -II, 57, 1, ad 2).

The order of strict just relations, therefore, will include the multiplicity of just human actions required for the exterior of society and the basic laws by which these acts are enforced and ordered (I-II, 100, 2). The principle or end according to which these acts can be denominated just and good will, then, be the objective common good of the multitude. The effect of this order will be concord, the external peace (I-II, 98, 1). And concord is the result of the effective establishment of special justice, i.e., commutative and distributive, among men (I-II, 180, 2, ad 2). This is why the principle of revolution is found precisely here, in the failure to establish justice, for men do not long endure their unequal lot.

We might ask at this point about the actual content of the order of *justa*, what exactly does it embrace? The general terms that St. Thomas and Aristotle use for this order are *justum politicum* or *simpliciter justum* (#1004). These terms are used to designate the order of justice in a perfect and self-sufficient community, a community looking to the fullness of human life. Such a community, however, can only be found among free and equal men so that the primary function of justice and law must always be the establishment and protection of equality and freedom. That is, the end and purpose of the justice that the law effects. Law is the dictate of reason by which the problems of what is just and what is right are settled, as it were, outside the contingent and turbulent exchange of ordinary human intercourse; it is the attempt to apply pure reason, reason abstract from passion concerning human affairs.

*Justum politicum*, however, is a complex notion. It is a complex genus referring to all the just actions in the community, no matter how these acts obtain their *ratio* of justice. Now these actions are subject to various divisions according to the various ways this same reality taken as a whole can be considered. Thus we can consider the range of actions according to how the rightness in each action is determined. Some will be proportional, some arithmetical, some will find their rightness measured in other ways, as in the instances of the potential parts of justice. The first two of these, the *justa distributiva* and *justa commutativa*, pertain to society as such (#1005). But we can also consider these self-same actions according to their cause or origin. Then some will be just because they are naturally reasonable (*justa naturalia*); others will be just only because the particular community established them as such (*justa legalia*, #1018). The legal *justa* (right relations) are always determinations of the natu-
ral precepts. Therefore, some \textit{justa} can be \textit{distributiva et naturalia}, others \textit{distributiva et legalia}, etc., but always \textit{justa legalia} must be in accord with the natural \textit{justa}.

III. In the \textit{Summa theologiae}, St. Thomas makes a division of the Old Law with proves valuable in this regard. He divides the Old Law into moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts according to the type of \textit{justa} they contain. The moral precepts are the reasonable principles and their strictly reasonable conclusions, both of which necessarily flow from the nature of man (I-II, 100, 1). These \textit{moralia} in turn can be divided according to the difficulty with which they are known. Some are known by most men (the Ten Commandments), some are known only by the wise (no divorce), and some only to God. These precepts embrace man’s relations both with God and with other men. Those that deal with man’s relations to God are very general and must be determined by society to give unity and coherence to the acts of worship. Such positive determinations are called \textit{ceremonial}. These sorts of \textit{justa}, then, will be positive in cause, either by society in the natural order or by God Himself in the case of revelation. The determinations that deal with man’s relations with one another are called \textit{judicalia} (I-II, 101, 1).

Four types of relationships of men to one another are possible: (1) prince to people, (2) citizens to one another, (3) people as a whole to another people, and (4) the domestic relationships (I-II, 104, 4). The \textit{justa} that deal with these relationships, insofar as they are determinations of natural principles or conclusions from them, are positive in character; that is, someone decides their content.

If the sole meaning of the order is that there be only just relationships, however, it would produce a barren and rigid society. The order of \textit{justa} is, as it were, the foundation or basis of something far richer and more significant. When a legislator commands, he primarily and initially commands an external act of justice. The order of just relations refers to the external order and unity of objectively right relationships that exist because of the efficient actions of men. This suffices to maintain and define the objective and minimal order of justice. But the legislator—either of the natural or the positive law—has in mind not simply this act of a virtue. He intends that virtue itself, the habit, be implanted in the citizen. This does not mean that every lawmaker must recognize this truth and have it in his mind when making a law. Aquinas is speaking about the nature of law as such, what it must do from its very nature and what the legislator must do as a simple consequence of making the law. That about which the law is given is an act of virtue, which is at the same time the rule of society. The act of observing a law is capable of inducing a habit in the man.

The end to which the precept of the law is directed is not simply that the citizen performs the act of virtue, but that he acquires the virtue (I-II, 100, 9, ad 2). Under the strict precept of the law will be the virtuous acts that a man does, whether he does them willingly or not. The principle intent of the legal structure of society is that a man does these acts virtuously, that is, because he sees their worth and not because they are commanded by coercion (I-II, 96, 3, ad 2). In this sense, the realm of virtue is very definitely a matter for society.

Thus, the existence of habitual moral virtue in the citizens is itself a common good, the common good of the many (Contra Gentiles [CG] III, 80). This common good of the many is something that each one personally possesses, but its operation and effect is shared by many (I-II, 100, 8). The effect and end of the whole order of just relations is to make men good. St. Thomas puts it this way: “He who seeks the common good of the many as a direct consequence must also seek his own good” (II -II, 47, 10, ad 2). For it is in and through the order of external just relationships that men can become good, but their goodness is their own perfection. They cannot become good by being not good.

Activities occur within society, moreover,
that do not fall under equality and debt due in justice. These activities have a correct measure, but it is a relative one, or at least one that cannot be legislated accurately. For instance, we cannot actually give back to God, or to our native land, or to our parents, all that is due to them. We must do something, but the return is never equal. Most of these relationships, in addition to the natural obligation, have further determinations of the divine or positive law according to which certain definite acts must be placed. They do in this sense fall within the pale of the legal and just structure of society, but the acts as such never fully repay the obligation really due (II -II, 80, 1).

Some human activities cannot fall strictly under justice for another reason. The thing due is only due from a certain “goodness of virtue,” or better, from the exigencies of virtuous intercourse. Here we must see that some things are absolutely necessary for human life on the part of the individual, such as the virtue of truth in man’s words and actions. The thing due in this case is not something that can be measured or determined by a specific law, except perhaps in the case of civil contracts. Yet society cannot exist without this honesty. Liberality and affability, while not absolutely necessary, nevertheless are the perfections of human communication without which society could not last. Still, what is due must be left to the individual determination (II -II, 80, 1).

IV. We still have not penetrated to the depth of Aquinas’s social position if we content ourselves with making the good man, or better, if we permit the man, through his actions, to make himself good. If men are good, they have reached their natural perfection in the sense that their lives are well ordered, naturally speaking, should death come. But in societal philosophy, we look to the true perfection that society itself effects. Something exists beyond virtue, and that is friendship. The principal intention of the law, as opposed to the intention of the lawmaker, is friendship. This is, ultimately, the most beautiful and most powerful gift that God has granted to men. When we pass beyond human society, we find that Aquinas conceives of charity as nothing more than friendship with God (II -II, 80). Nothing is nobler or more humbling than this (I-II, 99, 1, ad 2). As Christians and as human beings, we cannot find a more truly profound and gratifying truth than this fact that our whole social and personal lives are ordained to friendship. Even from our own limited experience, it is clear that friendship is the perfection of human living; and, as we believe, of divine living as well.

Human law, in the mind of St. Thomas, has as its ultimate intention the friendship of men one to another. “The principal intention of human law is to create friendship between man and man” (I-II, 99, 2). The relationship between the establishment of the order of just relations, the common good of the multitude, and the existence of human friendship is a causal one. Friendship presupposes justice even though it passes beyond it in its own sphere. The purpose of justice is primarily to establish equality, either proportional or arithmetical, among the members of society. When this equality is established the function of justice ends, but that of friendship begins (#1632). Both justice and friendship deal with the same reality, that is, human communication. Where there is justice, there is the possibility of friendship. “Justice and friendship are about the same things. But justice consists in communication. For every sort of justice is to another (ad alterum) . . . . Therefore, friendship consists in communication” (#1658). This must mean that the perfection of human social communication is not justice but friendship.

This conclusion shows that the philosophy of friendship and love is at the root of society. It is the goal of any real human life in the city (the Aristotelian city). Aquinas with Aristotle distinguishes the kinds of friendship according to two principles of logical division: (1) “according to the kind of communication the friendship is based upon,” and (2) “according to the end of friendship, that is, utility, pleasure, or virtue” (II
Friendship based upon virtue is the highest of these, but we should not fail to understand the importance of friendships of business relationships or of pleasure.

Suppose, for example, a clerk in the store sees the customer coming and greets him with a smile and shows a real interest in the man about to make the purchase. The two have a pleasant exchange over the purchase or about any of a million other things. The customer then leaves and the two never see each other again. Yet, that exchange was a fine thing. It made something otherwise distasteful a pleasant and human thing. Society as a whole benefited, as did both men, because there was a real friendship, based on utility surely, but still a friendship that lessened the tensions among men. Also such friendly communication can form the starting point for a more perfect type of friendship and a more real union among the members of society. In a higher order, Christian charity gives depth and meaning to such friendships. This is not to deny, of course, that men are naturally friendly with one another in some sense, but it is difficult that this be more than passing, given human nature as it is since the Fall.

Philosophically, utilitarian friendship is called by St. Thomas “affabilitas” or friendliness. It is a potential part of the virtue of justice, having an object distinct from the other forms of justice, namely, the external requirements of human order and communication. “And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order and this virtue is called friendliness” (II-II, 114, 1). There is a very definite distinction, of course, between friendliness and the friendship following on virtue. This friendliness is not the friendship of virtue that stands at the very summit of societal life, but it has a very vital part to play in our daily lives.

The perfection of all human communications is friendship based on virtue. This perhaps sounds a bit unusual, but the truth of the matter is clear. A man who, theoretically, is perfectly good is an unhappy man without the friendship that follows on virtue. For as we know, man’s true happiness is not simply in the possession of a good number of habits but in virtuous activity and indeed in continuous and pleasing activity. “But to be happy consists in continuous life and operation. For he would not be virtuous who would not delight in the operation of virtue” (#1894). And the peculiar and distinguishing thing about friendship is that it consists in the communication of virtue; that is, of all the highest powers of man: “Friendship . . . consists in the communication of virtue” (#1894). Thus the scriptural phrase that it is not good for men to live alone is not solely pertinent to the man-wife relationship. In its own way, it is the nature of every human relationship including the divine one (#1891).

From the communication of virtuous activity is established and secured a society of friends (#1899). The communication of true friendship is principally the one wherein man lives most fully, since he operates according to the highest faculty, reason (#1902). Thus in one sense, to exist (esse) for man in this life is to understand “intelligere” (I, 18, 2, ad 1). Friendship implies the fact that we come closest to the being and life of a friend precisely when we communicate thought and ideas; for being is what we naturally love. “This, however, is natural; namely, that each one should love his own being” (#1846). If the being of a friend is good; that is, if he is a good man, the highest manifestation of his being, his thoughts and his loves, will be most delightful to us (#1909). Aquinas adds, “If his own being is of its very nature a thing to be chosen by a happy man, insofar as it is naturally good and delightful, since, then, the being and life of a friend are in one’s affections the next best thing to one’s own life, it follows that a friend is also a thing to be chosen by a virtuous and happy man” (#1911).
We do need our friends for our very highest endeavors.

The principal act of friendship is what St. Thomas calls “convivere,” which consists in the communication of human ideas and ideals. Hence, it is the primary human stimulus to contemplation as well as the basic source of the new and vital thinking required for the continuance and development of a people. Such exchange happens by “living together according to the communication of words and the consideration of the mind.”

For in this manner men are said properly to live together, namely, according to the life which is proper to man, and not simply according as they eat together; as happens in the case of animals” (#1910). The joy and comradeship of friends are, then, found in their intercommunication with one another. There is a profound truth in the old observation: “The supreme and ultimate product of civilization . . . is two or three persons talking together in a room.”

Society is absolutely dependent for its vitality and existence on its ability to bring about adequate friendships among its people.

Jacques Maritain, following a suggestion of Gerard Phelan, said that friendship is society’s “life-giving form.” Friendship cannot be commanded. Yet it remains that it is the perfection and beauty of society. St. Thomas beautifully remarks about law: “All precepts of law, especially those ordered to the neighbor, seem to be ordained to this end, that men love one another” (I-II, 105, 2, ad 1).

The love of friendship is the love required by society because it alone of its very nature makes a society, a real relation between persons.

Friendship adds two things to amor: one is a certain society of the one loving and the one loved in love, namely, in order that they might have mutual love for one another and that they might know of their mutual love; the second is that they work from choice and not from passion. . . . Friendship is the most perfect of those things which pertains to love, for it includes all the foregoing (loves, that is, desire of presence, dilectio, benevolence, beneficium, concord, amatio). Wherefore in this category we must place charity which is a certain friendship of man to God through which man loves God and God man; and thus there is effected a certain association of man to God. (III Sentences, 27, 2, 1, ad 1).

Friendship extends to the persons involved so that the terms of the relations are real persons and not accidents. This shows that the nature of the real communication must be a mutual sharing of love and life among rational creatures. The ultimate and most perfect meaning of society, then, will be the acts of men who are friends with one another (III Sentences, 28, 1).

Even in material things, friendship is necessary that society be perfected.

We have already noted how business friendships are most valuable. Friendships cause the material welfare of society to be better achieved. They provide for the immediate relief of citizens in distress so that the humiliation and degradation that may come from public and therefore impersonal relief is avoided by the love and aid of friends. Thus, the need and existence of so much public aid in our society is an indication of a lack of real friendship. Aquinas reveals his recognition of these problems when he remarked that the intention of one of the Old Testament Laws was “to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another’s assistance,” and he then adds “because this is a very great incentive to friendship” (I-II, 105, 2, ad 4).

Society should have laws that command men to aid one another in their necessities both in order that friendships may arise from such natural aid and in order that society will not have to burden itself with an excessive amount of works that in this life would be much better provided for by human beings in their own small circle of life.

Aquinas makes a distinction between what he calls political friendship and the true friendship of virtue. The problem concerns the number
of friends a man can have and the basis of com-
munication on which the friendship is founded.
Obviously, men are not friends in the strict sense
with everyone in a society. Sheer human limita-
tion prevents this, for they neither know all of
them, nor know them well enough to be true
friends. Citizens of a given state can be said to
be friends nonetheless. Insofar as all the citizens
of a state agree about the form of their govern-
ment and the nature of the society and culture in
which they dwell, they can be called friends. The
best examples of this are when two men totally
unknown to one another sit down together on a
train, both completely diverse in occupation, re-
ligion, or place of residence. Yet, both find them-
selves staunch democrats, and as a result, they
find it easy to be friends. The same thing hap-
pens when two men of the same nation chance
to meet on a foreign soil; they become as long-
lost brothers. Such agreement throughout soci-
ety St. Thomas calls concord (#1836). Concord or
friendship is something without which no soci-
ety can long exist.

All political friendship is a part of the poten-
tial part of justice previously called friendliness
or affability. It is the part, namely, that is con-
cerned with the particularly political relation-
ships. Friendliness includes all relationships.
Concord, when not used as a simple substitute
for political friendship, is a term generally attrib-
uted to the whole of society or people, designat-
ing the effect of political friendship among the
people. It also refers to the existence of friendli-
 ness in general. The term “peace” adds the addi-
tional note of personal internal peace and order
to external peace or concord.

VI.

St. Thomas, in his understand-
ing of the law, shows his deep
and penetrating grasp of the
societal problem by revealing the necessary dis-
tinctions that modern theories have often come
to find in society. He shows, following Aristotle,
that society, the life of the city, is the area that de-
pends on human friendship. The state, the area
of authority and justice in the city, aims at the
external order of human actions. Law is the font
out of which these orders are both kept distinct
and ordered to one another.

In conclusion, Aquinas relates the Gospel of
Christ to societal systems.

Natural justice and friendship, even of the
highest sort, are not sufficient to the race of men
as they exist under the present dispensation.
Any intelligent understanding of ourselves and
of our fellows tells us that something needs to be
added to human beings to overcome the insuf-
ficiency of the motivation and the lack of univer-
sal love we find at the root of societal friction.
Here, however, there is no intention of treating
the Christian dispensation from the aspect of
eternal salvation and ultimate friendship with
God. Rather we treat it from its effect on society,
although it would be vain to try to divorce to-
tally the two considerations.

The three major failings of natural society ap-
pear to be (1) the inability to make men good, (2)
the inability to extend effective love and friend-
ship to all men, and (3) the inability to order
rightly men’s interior intentions as well as his
exterior dispositions. All societal evils can ul-
timately be placed under one or more of these
points. Now the Christian law does not cease at
the external act, but it passes beyond to order
correctly man’s interior acts and ideas, placing
order at the very root of the matter (I-II, 91, 4).
Also since man is a social animal needing other
men, the relationship is most adequately at-
tained by a mutual and sincere love that binds
all men to one another (III CG, 117).

The divine law (revelation) is meant as a help
to the natural law, which latter also demands
that men love one another (I-II, 100, 1).

The divine law is offered to man in aid of
the natural law. Now it is natural to all men
to love one another: a proof of which is that
a man, by a kind of natural instinct, comes
to the assistance of anyone even unknown
that is in need, for instance by warning him,
should he have taken the wrong road, by
helping him to rise, should he have fallen,
and so forth: as though every man were intimate and friendly with his fellow-man (VIII Ethic, 1, 3, 1155a). Therefore, mutual love is prescribed to man by the divine law. (III CG, 117)

We must also notice that the contemplation of divine things presupposes peace and tranquility which are destroyed by a lack of love (III CG, 117). The highest effect of order on earth is true peace out of which springs true contemplation of God (I-II, 29, 1–4). It can be truly said, therefore, that a society of Christian men will come the closest to a perfect civil body on earth, since among them the sources of friction and hatred are most completely recognized and controlled, while the sources of human and divine love are most effectively encouraged and in operation.

Friendship and its perfection in the communication of thoughts and ideals, of dreams and hopes, can sometimes confuse and deceive us. We live our lives as if these friendships were mere incidents or side issues to the main problems of human existence. Yet, the reality is quite otherwise. We live our lives for our friendships. They are the goals, not the means.

Sometimes I think that the only modern man who really saw this truth as St. Thomas did was G. K. Chesterton. In this, as in so many things, he reflects conclusions that Aquinas propounded in a more philosophical, though certainly not more interesting, way.

Indeed, Chesterton’s book on Charles Dickens is perhaps the best societal analysis ever written. It may be permitted to use the concluding lines of this masterpiece for our own summation of the perfection of friendship in human life:

The hour of absinthe is over. We shall not be much further troubled with the little artists who found Dickens too sane for their sorrows and too clean for their delights. But we have a long way to travel before we get back to what Dickens meant: and the passage is along a rambling English road, a twisting road such as Mr. Pickwick traveled. But this at least is part of what he meant: that comradeship and serious joy are not interludes in our travel; but that rather our travels are interludes in comradeship and joy, which through God shall endure for ever. The inn does not point to the road; the road points to the inn. And all roads point at last to an ultimate inn, where we shall meet Dickens and all his characters: and when we drink again it shall be from the great flagons at the tavern at the end of the world.

And again we see that Christianity has not been wrong in proclaiming that the friendships of men are the very means to the friendship with our God—“He who loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law.”

So too, when Christ Our Lord wished to show to his Apostles his deep love for them, he could only say to them, “No longer do I call you servants... But I have called you friends, because all things I have heard from My Father I have made known to you” (John 15:15; I-II, 65, 5). And here we have it! God shares his ideas and ideals with men. This is indeed the highest and most perfect act.

*This essay was part of a master’s thesis in philosophy at Gonzaga University in 1955. It was originally published in The Thomist in 1957.*
Two of the most beautiful treatises from the ancient world are on the same subject: friendship. One is by Aristotle in Books VIII and IX of his *Ethics*, the other by Cicero. It should not go unnoticed that Thomas Aquinas commented not only on the whole of the *Ethics*, including the treatise on friendship, but that his discussions of charity as a theological virtue are also extensions of the analysis of friendship found in the classical writers, especially Cicero and Aristotle.

Friendship is something everyone ought to think about, Cicero wisely affirmed. Yet, like all things ethical, like laughter itself, one cannot really think adequately about this topic unless one has experience of it. Aristotle insisted that because true friendship was rare, we must begin with the imperfect sorts of friendship, those of the young, of the old, and of the imperfect, so that gradually we might make precise what true friendship is. Moreover, it is always possible to learn something of a virtue from the vice opposite to it. Vice perhaps cannot know virtue, but virtue can know vice. Vice itself, or the corruptions of the various sorts of relations that human beings might have with one another, hints at the glory of the real virtue. Likewise, as Aristotle again insisted, we do not know anything fully in the area of human action and passion unless we know both the best and the worst with the range of their movements.

Perhaps on mere statistical grounds, we could suspect that Aristotle’s commitment of two books of the *Ethics* to friendship while only one to justice, is intellectually provocative. We would hesitate to suggest that friendship is exactly twice as important as justice on such a basis. But we can certainly conclude that friendship is a critical good of human life, without which the highest questions never arise in their fullness; nor will happiness as such be achieved without it. Aristotle almost laconically remarked that “friendship seems to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice.... When men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well...” (1155a11-24). What constitutes the clear superiority of friendship to justice in Aristotle without denying the necessity of justice? Why is friendship “needed?” Why is justice not enough?

Students in universities on first encountering Aristotle in his methodical, careful manner of proceeding by definition, experience, example, argument, never expect to find in him anything like the treatise on friendship. They are usually at an age when this topic is flourishing in, or perhaps confusing their lives. Exactly as Aristotle described it, they change friends frequently; they seek pleasure; they reject utilitarian friendships even while they know the old who need them. Thus, there is a disarming warmth in Aristotle. We expect this perhaps in Plato, but we are surprised by it in Aristotle. But this should not dismay us. In this treatise, Aristotle is deadly serious. He is engaged in the culmination of his ethical reflections where he is constantly running up against questions that cannot, apparently, be resolved within this system, even though they appear to arise legitimately within his argument (1156a22-b6, 58a6-9).

To his credit, Aristotle never failed to state what the problems are which arise from the experience of friendship. He was a practical man.
And the discussion of friendship fell within the realm of his considerations of the practical sciences, even though the question of what it is that friends do together seems to reach directly into the contemplative regions. Thus, Book X of the *Ethics* seems to be the fitting book to follow the treatise on friendship. In Book X, we find that there are two kinds of happiness, political and contemplative; that we ought to have both; that both are necessary in themselves; while political friendship, by being what it is, is still preparatory to contemplative happiness.

It is to be noticed that the treatise on friendship comes after Aristotle has discussed the whole range of the moral virtues, of happiness, of the voluntary, and of the mean. Likewise, he had discussed the nature of the theoretic and practical sciences in Book VI with a needed discussion of how it is we can do evil to be found in Book VII. In other words, by the time we reach Books VII and IX, we have apparently decided already what it is for a human being to be virtuous. We are surprised that anything could be missing or might need to be added, while we are aware that the magnanimous and munificent man, who really is virtuous, actually does not have everything, though what he lacks evidently cannot be simply acquired wholly by his own efforts or fortune, as in the case of the other virtues.

Perhaps we can make this understanding clearer if we realize that the difference between friendship, and justice is that justice, strictly speaking, does not concern itself with the uniqueness of the person with whom one enters into just dealings. Justice is concerned with the abstract relationship (1158b29-33). And this concern is what constitutes its danger, as Plato understood so well. Anything human added on to justice is to be encouraged, but this addition is not the essence of justice. Justice, in this sense, is depersonalizing. The very people who are only just to one another are not, therefore, friends.

In a sense, the relationship of justice prescinds from the reality of friendship itself. Friendship, on the other hand, deals only with those for whom justice, while not being denied, is not the primary concern in the relationship. Justice does not take into account the very uniqueness of the persons involved in the exchanges of friendship. Justice is for those who are not friends. Strictly speaking, enemies ought to be just to one another, something exemplified, say, in the life of Robert E. Lee. At a minimum, there is justice between friends. But this is not its essence or especially its perfection.

In these reflections, I propose to look at Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, not from the point of view of politics, where he saw it rightly as the crucial bond holding any real polity together, but from the aspect of its theoretic incompleteness. This approach will seem paradoxical. After all, if Aristotle did not complete his own treatise, who did? On the other hand, within Aristotle’s discussion, he himself brought up a number of problems which he apparently recognized as valid, but which he felt have no manageable answers or procedures to cope with their resolution.

Aristotle justified including friendship in the *Ethics* by suggesting that the virtues need to be put into effect in our very lives (1166a23-b3). Not only do we need to be courageous or prudent or just or generous or temperate or liberal, but we need to be so in the presence of others. Definitions of virtues are not themselves virtue, a lesson Aristotle learned by disagreeing with a famous position of Plato. Yet, if we look upon friends as mere tools or occasions to put into effect our own virtues, this view becomes, even in theory, somewhat self-serving. This attitude would hardly be a virtue or considered so. Friendship, moreover, has the peculiar quality of being exceedingly limited (1158a10-17). And this limitation is one of the most perplexing aspects of Aristotle’s discussion on this topic. The whole world is full of potential friends we will never have, a fact which makes us wonder why it is that we have the friends we do have.

Aristotle did not doubt that we can have many friends, but only if the communication or exchange for this sort of friendship is pleasure or
utility. Ironically, to have too many friends in the highest sense is a sign of no friends. Friendship is maddeningly restricted in theory. Friendship is exalted in proportion to its restriction, something G. K. Chesterton meant when he remarked that there is more difference between two and three than between three and three million. Why is this? First of all, true friendship needs a kind of stability of character in the friend and in ourselves. Aristotle did not think that this sort of stable character normally arose before what we would today call middle age. Life up to this time is preparation for friendship, not friendship itself, since we ourselves are so changeable as are our potential friends (1156b24-32). In other words, some successful effort to acquire the virtues is necessary for friendship.

Aristotle, of course, recognized the notion of honor among thieves. And he was quite familiar with Plato’s realization that even to do injustice, there needed to be a kind of bond of perverted justice or friendship among the robbers (1159b8-10). If they too were divided among themselves, as Scripture said also, they could not stand. Likewise, also from Plato, Aristotle understood that friends should know what things are against virtue and truth. The identification or exchange of untruth, that it be seen as “untruth,” is after all one of the great acts of friendship. Truth and its pursuit is indeed a bond of friendship, yet truth, as such, is universal. At first sight, it would look like the discovery and holding of the same truths would be more alienating than unifying. Yet, Aristotle’s doctrine of knowledge maintained that the intellect of each individual is intended to know all things and also actually to know them.

The bond of knowledge between men, then, is a spiritual thing. One of the extraordinary insights into the Aristotelian theory of knowledge is his realization that the acquisition of knowledge does not, by itself, change the world. Knowledge of itself only changes the knower. Everyone gains. This understanding means that friends can indeed gain knowledge or truth which is not, by its very nature, threatening to another. The communication of the highest things in which friendship, primarily, consists is the search for and exchange of truths that reach the nature of what is. These truths will also include how we ought to live our lives. Friendship seeks permanence. That is, it recognizes that the pursuit of reality, of what is, will never cease.

The Greeks did not believe that it would end even in death because the soul was itself a spiritual power. If it is asked, then, what it is that the human soul or human being does forever, the answer is that it seeks to know the whole of truth in itself, of each part, of the whole, but in a way that the truth it knows can be spoken, exchanged with another human being, capable of both receiving and giving (1156a6-12).

What were the more specific problems Aristotle had with friendship? Perhaps one that seems more contemporary was the question of whether husbands and wives could, in the highest sense, be friends. The long discussion from Book I of the Politics about the nature of authority in the family – namely, that for the most part, the husband is the natural ruler – must be seen in the light of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship between spouses. Aristotle had held that the husband rules the wife with what he called a constitutional rule. This is a technical term which means that, unlike the case with those within the family who could not rule themselves for their own good, so that they needed an adult or normal reason to guide them, the wife could rule herself. Consequently, the natural analogate for constitutional rule in the polity was, in the family, the rule of husband and wife, and, in the individual, the rule of reason over the passions.

The family differs from the polity, however, because in it there are only two member capable of ruling themselves. In cases of conflict, one must decide if the family’s good or end as an abiding unit is to be achieved. For Aristotle, this was a perfectly obvious and logical problem which, as such, had nothing to do with the intelligence or capacity of either member. Indeed, if there was a problem with capacity, the one more capable should rule, in Aristotle’s view.

True, one could propose a kind of rotation in
which one would rule on Tuesdays and the other on Thursdays but Aristotle thought it sufficient to suggest that the two-membered "polity" of a family ought to rule itself by reason in practical things dealing with the good of this same family. For various reasons, it was most normal in experience that the husband exercise this rule, which was a rule of reason; that is, the decisions were reached by reasoned exchange. But in conflict someone had to decide. There was no avoiding this reality.

The rule of the husband, however, was precisely a “constitutional” rule, that is, a rule in which the ruled contributed its reason to the decision:

The association of husband and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his worth, and in these matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her. If the man rules in everything the relation passes over into oligarchy; for in doing so he is not acting in accordance with their respective worth, and not ruling in virtue of his superiority. Sometimes, however, women rule, because they are heiresses; so their rule is not in virtue of excellence but due to wealth and power... (1160b33-39).

This agreement of excellencies is, for Aristotle, the only solid spiritual reason for two to stay together on divisive issues.

However, Aristotle’s more profound discussion of marriage is in the treatise on friendship. We must understand that Aristotle did not think every marriage was a relationship that always involved the highest friendship, but he recognized that this could happen. Indeed, in one sense, since friends are to remain together throughout their lives, marriage seems, in Aristotle’ thinking, to provide the most permanent form of friendship, with a common sharing of life.

If the partners in the marriage were virtuous and intelligent, then they could indeed be friends in the highest sense, for

Human beings lie together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided, and those of man and woman are different; so they help each other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock. It is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of friendship. But this friendship may be based also on virtue if the parties are good; for each has his own virtue and they will delight in the fact (1162a20-20).

Aristotle does not deny that there is a difference between man and woman, but acknowledges it and argues rather that the differing gifts are intended for a common good. What is to be noted is that a marriage can also be between virtuous couples, which he acknowledges as delightful, but like any other relation, he presupposes the content of virtue and truth to be in each of the partners.

Marriage, then, is one sort of union, capable of the highest form of friendship, but in some fundamental respect quite unique because its mode of normal communication deals with the practical life of the family and its demands. The diversity of man and woman is good in itself and not to be jeopardized. No friendship of virtue except marriage will really have certain sorts of good in common, and the good that is truly existent in such a relationship will be the subject of exchanges in friendship.

Perhaps it is well to recognize that for Aristotle, friendship in the highest sense is rare. Indeed, as has been mentioned, this rarity presents something of a theoretical problem. Aristotle observed that we are fortunate if we have two or three friends in our lifetime. He recognized that chance and the rarity of true virtue and knowledge make the odds for this quite high. Still, the main reason for this rarity, and this is a fundamental point for Aristotle, is that we simply do not have time for many friendships. Friendship requires a lifetime. The variety of opinion
and virtue and character will be such that the exchanges of friendship will be restricted. The bearing of one’s soul to just everybody was not the mark of the friend but rather the mark of the tyrant in his desire to protect himself from friends. The desire for many friends then can indeed be a sign of having no friends or of no knowing what is entailed in friendship.

On the other hand, the exclusiveness and intensity of friendship with one or two throughout a lifetime, precisely in order to have friendship at all, leaves open the wonder, at least about our relation to all other human beings who exist either in our lives, in our time, or in the whole history of the world. Surely, there is something sadly ironical about the fact that we are limited here, yet we recognize that without this very limit, we would have no friends at all. This very fact, which Aristotle does not discuss directly, does, nevertheless, on his own principles, foster the question as to whether or not ultimate friendship with everyone who is good can be effected. If not, the universe is incomplete in principle, whereas Aristotle constantly states that nature never made anything in vain.

This question leads to the question of friendship with God (1159a3-5). Aristotle held that we could not be friends with someone who is too exalted over us. Aristotle’s denial of a friendship with God is rooted in a kind of pious understanding of the nature of the First Mover, whom Aristotle likewise recognized to move by love and desire. However, Aristotle was uneasy here as it seems that if friendship is in fact the highest perfection of the rational creature, then it makes the First Mover something less exalted if it cannot have this perfection. Aristotle simply left the question unresolved, thinking the problem insoluble.

Finally, Aristotle desired to know if we would want our friends to be gods or kings or extremely virtuous (1158b33-36). He was extremely cautious here. The problem had to do with who it was we wanted to be loved or to be happy. If we had a friend whom we loved, we did not want our friend to become someone else (1166a20). Nor would we want ourselves to become someone else. Yet, if we were not virtuous, we would want to become better. We would likewise want our friend to become better. In either case, we would want at the same time to remain ourselves and to become good (1156b7-24; 58a33-37). The realism of Aristotle is very perceptive here, for this is the ultimate defense of finite being, that it is alright to be what it is. Men need not be gods, but they need to be better than they are.

But how is it possible for men to remain what they are, that is, men, not God? Moreover, what is to be done with our efforts to become good in the highest sense? Aristotle himself left these questions open. Indeed, he seems to suspect a metaphysical rebellion against what is to be possible in the human heart because of this sense of incompleteness (982b29). He merely insisted, however, that we would not want to be someone else even if that meant full happiness. Nor would we want that for our friends. Further, we would want to remain precisely what we are, that is, human beings. Aristotle did hint at the immortality of the soul in this context, but he realized that somehow this did not meet the demands of full friendship of the whole human being, which for Aristotle necessarily included body and soul.

The Aristotelian treatise on friendship, in conclusion, is full of questions that arose out of his ethical reflections. These questions are based on the real nature of man and do not arise simply from Aristotle’s imagination. They have metaphysical implications of the deepest sort grounded in what is. The reading of this treatise, then, will ever remain unsettling because, when read with care, Aristotle brings us to confront certain things we might like to be true, even if, like him, we cannot see how they might be true. Aristotle, in other words, remains the teacher of the profoundest sort, one who raises questions that must be considered without trying to answer them in a false or ideological manner.

No one can finish reading Aristotle’s treatise on friendship without a deep sense of consolation about where it is that the highest things
among us are found, in our communication and living with other friends. However, we are also left with a curious perplexity of having discovered questions bravely, profoundly asked, questions that naturally arise in our pursuit of virtue and happiness, in our exchanges with friends, but which seem unfinished, somehow, by one of the greatest philosophers to have lived among us, possessed of a wife whom he loved and friends with whom he conversed.

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Chesterton and the Delight of Truth

James V. Schall, S.J.

This essay might be about the “splendor” of truth rather than about its “delight,” but John Paul II famously claimed the “splendor” for himself – Veritatis Splendor. Chesterton simply rejoices in truth, but not just for the sake of his own rejoicing, but because there is something to rejoice about. “I had heard that I was in the wrong place, and my soul sang for joy” – this is Chesterton’s startling reaction to his discovery that man is not made only for this earth but through it for eternal life. The “splendor” of truth, I suppose, stresses its own luminousness, its own shining, its reality, while “delight” indicates our proper reaction to what is, that it is at all, to what sheds its light before us when we realize at last that we need light, that there is light.

I. The Wonder of Existence

But doesn’t everyone see this luminous truth? Why was Chesterton any different? To be sure, no one lacks the power to see truth. The power is given with what we are. But many, evidently very many, having the power to see it, choose – the word is important – not to accept it. Chesterton is different because he saw, accepted, and affirmed it. His enthusiasm for reality, for what is, is our grace. If our lives are disordered, however, it is likely that we do not experience any delight in truth because we actively prevent ourselves from seeing the splendor that is there. We can seek, like the young Augustine, all those beautiful things, without letting ourselves aver to why they might be beautiful in the first place. We want things before we appreciate what they are in their fullness – the exact opposite of the right order of things.

We oftentimes suspect where truth might lead us, so we cleverly refuse to go there without ever honestly spelling out to ourselves what we are doing. We choose to deceive ourselves. We build an apparently plausible “counter-truth” to justify how we choose to live. We quietly put aside in our hearts any comparison between what we do and what we ought to do. The good, the true, and the beautiful, however, are inter-related in ways that can hide their inner-connections from those who do not want to see what is there. “The test of all happiness is gratitude; and I felt grateful, though I hardly knew to whom” is Chesterton’s way of expressing his realization of the truth that the good is really good even though he did not himself create it, perhaps primarily because he did not create it. He is grateful that he did not hide from the truth that he saw. He wants to know, in fact, who “caused” it since he knows he didn’t, yet it is there.

Chesterton wrote Orthodoxy in 1908. He was a young man at the time, already into his journalism career. He had an uncanny, almost supernatural, knack for discerning in their incipient principles what events would come about later in the twentieth century, even to its end, because he simply “saw” things, saw the truth in them and, more importantly, affirmed it. His What’s Wrong with the World (1910) spells out the cause of almost every societal aberration about which we read in our papers each day. Chesterton indeed was one of those remarkable people who learned about truth not from itself but from the common and fashionable errors he saw all about him. They left him perplexed because he could see that they were not true, in spite of their popularity.
Chesterton delighted in things because he was acutely conscious of the fact that they need not exist at all—“every man in the street is a great might-not-have-been,” as he put it. Every might-not-have-been in the streets, including ourselves, is filled with a divinely guaranteed dignity. We are all like the penny, he said in his Charles Dickens, because we have the image of the king stamped on us, the divine King. Yet every actual existence is so overwhelmingly unexpected that everyone who exists at all seems like the result of some huge, improbable choice.

When he realized that the world need not exist (the doctrine of Creation) and that God did not need to create it (the doctrine of the Trinity), Chesterton knew that he was free of all the depressing philosophies of necessity that implied that he had no other purpose of existing but necessity itself, that reality was merely an unraveling of what had to be. If the world was the result of choice, however, so much the more so was he. Yet, if a man did not need to exist, what was the “golden key,” as Chesterton called it, that could account for the wondrous fact that he did exist without his having anything to do with it? At a minimum, every person, who might not have been at all, is at least vaguely aware that his own particular existence rose out of nothingness through no input of his own.

II. Ideas Make the Difference

Heretics, Chesterton’s first major book in 1905 (and remains a penetrating read) explains just why he was not a follower of various modern intellectual movements, most of which are still around in some form or another at the turn of the twenty-first century. Basically, he did not follow them because he understood them; he understood their disorder. He knew that the purpose of a mind was to know reality, to come to a conclusion about claims to be right or true. “I am a rationalist,” he explained in Orthodoxy. “I like to have some intellectual justification for my intuitions. If I am treating man as a fallen being it is an intellectual convenience to me to believe that he fell, and I find, for some odd psychological reason, that I can deal better with a man’s exercise of free will if I believe that he has got it.” Chesterton always had the deadly capacity to see our implicit contradictions.

To meet the mind of Chesterton is to meet a mind that will not let our intellectual errors remain hidden from ourselves, however much we might prefer not to have them boldly spelled out. The most wide-spread contemporary intellectual error is no doubt something known as cultural relativism. Chesterton is always amusing when he points out the error of some such theory that asks us to maintain its contradictions as if they did not exist. “An imbecile habit has risen in modern controversy of saying that such and such a creed can be held in one age but cannot be held in another. Some dogma was credible in the twelfth century, but is not credible in the twentieth. You might as well say that a certain philosophy can be believed on Mondays, but cannot be believed on Tuesdays.” About the principle at issue, little further needs to be said in any age, in any place.

Chesterton insists on putting blame where it belongs. Many, like Marx, have blamed God for man’s problems and claim that they could do better for man by leaving God completely out of the picture. Chesterton was not so sure. “The secularists have not wrecked divine things, but the secularists have wrecked secular things.” A human error about the nature or reality of the divinity does not lead to a change in or threat to the divinity, but it does, like Marxism eventually did, ironically wreak havoc among human lives and institutions. We may not be able directly to test the divinity, but we can test what men do because of their misunderstanding of the divinity, or whatever they have chosen to take its place. Our culture is wont to teach us that ideas make little difference. Chesterton thinks that any difference there is comes from our ideas. The real issue is whether ideas are true or not.

The provocativeness of Heretics, its charming reduction of well-known philosophic and religious positions to humorous absurdity, annoyed someone so much that he challenged Chest-
ton to write a book explaining, not what he was against, but what he was for. This challenge energized him even more than his enterprise of pointing out the errors of his friends and critics in Heretics. Chesterton, incidentally, was, even in issues of great and passionate controversy, an amazing sort of man who never lost a friend because he pointed out the impossibility of his ideas. This is a rare gift and speaks much of the greatness of Chesterton.

Thus, when confronted, Chesterton took up the writing of Orthodoxy, in which he set forth what he did hold. He discovered that what he did come to maintain, which he thought so original, was in fact what all Christians profess in the Creed, many of whom, I might add, unlike Chesterton, profess the Creed without seeing its wonder, its standing at the foundation of all healthy and human things. Orthodoxy is itself one of the best and most profound commentaries on the great Christian Creed. Chesterton explains in his own way what it affirms and why what it affirms is directed to the freedom and dignity of man because it is first directed to the revelation of who God is.

Because Chesterton later wrote his own Autobiography, itself a marvelous book, Orthodoxy is not an autobiography, though it is completely autobiographical. Though he was not a Catholic when he wrote it, it is nevertheless completely Catholic. Though it is written in a completely unscholarly and familiar style, it is thoroughly scholarly and formal in its argumentation. When everyone else found “orthodoxy” to be a bad word, Chesterton found it to be the exact description of what keeps us sane. “When ever we feel there is something odd in Christian theology, we shall generally find that there is something odd in the truth.”

III. “The Great March of Mental Destruction”

To begin to understand Chesterton, it is worth recalling the last sentences of Heretics, as they reveal his soul perhaps as well as anything he ever wrote – not denying that Chesterton’s great soul clearly shone through everything he did write, even his shortest essay. But fully to comprehend what Chesterton concluded at the end of Heretics, we have to be familiar with one of the great scenes in the New Testament, with the passage that, perhaps more than any other in our literature, has consoled ordinary folks who, while bearing constant witness to the difficulties of belief and its living, nevertheless still believe.

The scene is of the Apostle Thomas, the famous “Doubting Thomas,” who will not believe reports of the Risen Lord until he sees the wounds of Christ’s body and hands. When the Lord appears to Thomas and fulfills his demand to see and to touch, evidential things, Christ says to him, with His own paradox, which Chesterton surely noticed, “Blessed are they, Thomas, who have not seen but who have believed.” We cannot be unaware that this latter group includes the vast majority of mankind who continue to believe.

“The great march of mental destruction will go on. Everything will be denied,” Chesterton concludes his analysis of modern thought in an almost prophetic voice.

Everything will become a creed. It is a rational position to deny the stones in the street; it will be a religious dogma to assert them. It is a rational thesis that we are all in a dream; it will be mystical sanity to say that we are all awake. Fires will be kindled to testify that two and two make four.... We shall be left defending, not only the incredible virtues and sanities of human life, but something more incredible still, this huge impossible universe which stares us in the face. We shall fight for visible prodigies as if they were invisible. We shall look on the impossible grass and the skies with a strange courage. We shall be of those who have seen and yet have believed.

Unlike Thomas before the Lord, who now believes because he has seen, Chesterton is talking to those modern philosophers who see the ordinary things before their very eyes and still do not believe in their existence, in their existence that reaches to the order of what is. Chesterton intimated, in fact, that in our era, we need the
faith to believe in what is evident to our senses, to our reason. The subsequent history of modern philosophy does not in the least prove that Chesterton was wrong in his supposition.

The end of *Heretics*, thus, reveals Chesterton’s profound insight that the ultimate result of the rejection of the evidence for belief in modernity would end up with a doubt about the existence of the world itself. Logically, in order to “prove” that God does not exist, we have to maintain at some point that the world and its order – the very point at which we started – do not exist. Somehow in some albeit unexpected wisdom, to maintain the existence of natural things as they are involves the belief in supernatural ones. Chesterton makes this observation not as a matter of doctrine, which it isn’t, but as a matter of historical fact, of what happens in the minds of those who consistently reject belief and its evidence and then try to explain consistently what they are doing.

It would most often be the scientists, the philosophers, and the academics who would come to doubt their senses and any concrete extra-sensory object they might reveal to us as existing. This observation was one reason that Chesterton was a democrat and loved ordinary folks – “the common man” as he called him. They were, as he knew them, less susceptible to an intellectual “proof” that the world did not exist since they saw quite clearly that it did, no matter what the specialists might tell them. Chesterton’s philosophy, as he put it, allowed him to accept or reject miracles on the basis of evidence. But a determinist philosopher is not free to accept or reject any mere evidence, because his philosophy has already precluded any possibility of miracles or evidence for them. His philosophy, in other words, has caused him to doubt his senses.

**IV. The Logic and Excitement of Orthodoxy**

The title of *Orthodoxy* means literally right opinion. First of all, it implies that there can be a wrong opinion and that the difference between the two makes considerable difference in how we live. It means further that how we live is directly affected by how we think. Almost a hundred years after Chesterton, we live in an age that doubts everything about itself – that the mind can know the truth, even that it ought to know the truth, that it ought to know anything. We advocate a kind of relativism or multiculturalism that, far from simply pointing to the myriad differences in the reality of time and space, maintains that nothing is certain, that there are no standards, particularly no human standards. Therefore, because there are no standards, no truth, we are said to be “free.” In this system, it is not the truth that makes us free. We make ourselves free by denying any criterion outside of ourselves. Everything is permitted because not only is nothing known, but nothing can be known. We choose our choices so that we are enslaved by what we want.

Second, orthodoxy implies that it is possible to establish what right opinion is by examining all opinion, especially wrong opinion. Chesterton’s favorite book list seems to have been the famous *Index of Forbidden Books*. It was from errors in the most popular and most scientific positions that he found the raw material of truth. “All I had hitherto heard of Christian theology had alienated me from it. I was a pagan at the age of twelve, and a complete agnostic by the age of sixteen.... I never read a line of Christian apologetics.” Nietzsche was a favorite author if only because he put what was wrong so well. Literally, as he tells us, Chesterton learned truth from the weirdness of the constant error he read.

On the basis of the impossibility of what theories the great modern philosophers used to explain reality, Chesterton set out to found his own “heresy,” as he delighted in calling it. He himself, however, as he conceived it, was the ultimate “heretic”! And when he found the truth, he discovered to his astonishment that it was invented some eighteen hundred years before his time and was called “orthodoxy.” He was glad that he did not have to invent the “heresy of orthodoxy” himself but could simply recognize it as already
having been invented – a fact that made him even more curious. Invented by whom?

Chesterton was constantly amused by the fact that the most true and delightful teaching was the one to which most opposition was found. It was quite contrary to what was actually taught in the modern schools. Yet, “there never was anything so perilous or so exciting as orthodoxy,” he reflects. It was “perilous” because it affirmed that our choices were infinitely serious and potentially dangerous; it was “exciting” because it showed us that our choices could lead either to damnation or to what was infinitely worthwhile. Chesterton defended the possibility of excitement by defending the doctrine of free will and the fact that it could choose rightly or wrongly, but freely, not necessarily. We may not want to have this choice, which logically means that we may not want to be what we are. But the fact is that denying our freedom leads not to excitement and drama, but to dullness and indifference. Chesterton preferred the world of freedom and excitement with its dangers and its glory.

Chesterton as a young man never heard of Christian truth, but he knew that what was proposed, especially against the faith, on examination could not be true. He could understand contradictions and therefore errors. Chesterton was converted intellectually by the heretics, not by the orthodox. He could not at first understand the odd nature of the opposition to the classic faith, but what he did notice made him wonder, finally, if it might be true because it could not be all the contradictory things said against it. “Men who begin to fight the Church for the sake of freedom and humanity end by flinging away freedom and humanity if only they may fight the Church.”

This was, I say, not something he expected as a matter of theory, but something he observed as a matter of fact. He reflected that something against which every sort of accusation is made, even if it be contradicted by another accusation, might be very odd indeed, but it might also be the normal. For to the abnormal, it is only the normal that looks most grotesque. Somehow most modern philosophy seemed to picture an utterly abnormal world that bore little relation to what was true.

V. The Meaning of Sin’s Existence

One of the chapters in Orthodoxy is called the suicide of thought. Roughly, this means that no one can think if he maintains that his organ of thinking cannot know anything or that his organ of will cannot decide anything about what is known. Moreover, no one allows his organ of deciding to decide anything if there are, on the basis of what he knows to be true, certain things that will be forbidden to him. If it should so happen that some things are right and true, we may just not want to know about them if we suspect that they might interfere with what we have already chosen to do. When we act on this failure to know what we should know, we sin, to use the classic word that indicates both the seriousness of our thoughts and the choices that follow from them. Not surprisingly, then, when asked, the reason Chesterton himself gave for his final conversion to the faith was that he wanted to get rid of his sins. He knew that the structure of reality was such that they were possible, and he knew himself well enough to know that he, no one else, committed them.

Chesterton liked to talk about sin, no doubt because it was so serious and so common. Indeed, in his Father Brown stories, he liked to write about it. He thought we should be sinning all the time, not by actually murdering or stealing or committing adultery, of course, but by writing about such aberrations. Though he loved the sinner, he did not have any sympathy for those who refused to understand the reality or depths of sin. He often suggested, furthermore, that those who know most about sin are not the sinners themselves but the pure of heart, those who have decided not to commit it. The knowledge of sin and its attraction is not itself a sin but a necessary element in our understanding ourselves. But the existence of sin and its terrorliness was part of the risk of the universe that contained the finite free creature. If God wanted to
create a finite person who could love Him freely, He had to accept, as in all love, the possibility of being rejected.

Chesterton was acutely aware that what made the universe particularly interesting was not the existence of sin in it, with its pre-condition of free will, but the possibility and condition of its forgiveness. In determinist theory, “the cosmos went on forever, but not in its wildest constellation could there be anything really interesting; anything, for instance, such as forgiveness or free will.” Free will meant that we could sin and were responsible for it. It also meant that we could be grateful for existence itself. Forgiveness meant that even if we sinned, what we sinned against could forgive us, that sin was personal both on our parts and on the part of what we sinned against. “Such ... was the joy of man; ... happiness depended on not doing something which you could at any moment do, but which, very often, it was not obvious why you should not do it.” All romance depended on not doing what ought not to be done. Sometimes on crucial things, we simply had to obey. “Thou shalt not ....”

Chesterton, moreover, thought that the doctrine of original sin grounded democracy and was the only reason we could give for not absolutely trusting a ruling elite. “The unpopular parts of Christianity (like original sin) turn out when examined to be the very props of the people.” Original sin explained why we needed to bind even our rulers by law, morality, and sanction. They too were sinners and lived in the worst possible occasion for sin – the life of power, publicity, and comfort. “In the best Utopia, I must be prepared for the fall of any man, in any position, at any moment....” But no matter in what sort of society or situation in which man lived, sin is always caused by will, not by something external to us. No arrangement of society or state, contrary to Rousseau and his tradition, would ever eliminate the possibility of sin and wrong doing from among us, especially from the elite. “For she (the Church) has maintained from the beginning that the danger was not in man’s environment, but in man.” This awareness of the possibility of sin in anyone, even rulers, is one fundamental element of any charter of liberty, of any understanding of responsibility.

What is surprising at first sight is the amount of attention that Chesterton gives in Orthodoxy to questions of sin, original sin, and free will. These three are, no doubt, essential doctrines of the faith and its philosophic support. If there is such a thing as sin, the deliberate choice of a thought or action against God and man, there must first be a free will to choose such thought or action. Moreover, it is clear that from time immemorial, man has had difficulty in living virtuously, even when he wanted to and chose to do so. Indeed, this difficulty in living virtuously will seem to justify theories which maintain that sin is the normal condition of mankind, so we should not worry about it but expect it, even excuse it, make it “normal” because it is so frequent. Chesterton’s response to this position is again amusing: “Men may have had concubines as long as they have had horses – still they were not part of him if they were sinful.” The frequency of any sin does not somehow indicate its rightness but its wrongness.

VI. **All That Is Is Created in Joy**

The greatest thing about Orthodoxy, however, is its enthusiasm for and delight in what is.

The structure of Orthodoxy is cast in the form of the adventure of a man who set out around the world to discover some strange land. Finally, his ship reaches this distant land; only there he discovers that it is England, his original home. The analogy, of course, is to Chesterton’s own spiritual adventure in discovering orthodoxy to be the home he was looking for all along only he did not recognize it right before his very eyes. One of the mysteries of his life, Chesterton tells us, was why he could be “homesick at home.” This homesickness-at-home is a most striking image, for Chesterton loved home and thought it the noblest word in the language. Yet, he understood that even when we have everything, even when we do not sin, we feel that there is
something missing to us. We seek our true home even at home.

In his musings about what it is we want, what sort of freedom is the greatest, even at home, Chesterton argued that it is the freedom to bind ourselves. “I would never conceive or tolerate any Utopia which did not leave to me the liberty for which I chiefly care, the liberty to bind myself.” This freedom of binding oneself was for Chesterton the key to the highest wisdom about the most basic things of life. “I could never mix in the common murmur of that rising generation against monogamy, because no restrictions on sex seemed so odd and unexpected as sex itself... Keeping to one woman is a small price for so much as seeing one woman. To complain that I could only be married once was like complaining that I could only be born once.” Chesterton was capable of elevating this principle to the more universal idea that our individual uniquenesses, in being bound by love, lie at the heart of all true relationships. “I want to love my neighbor not because he is I, but precisely because he is not I. I want to adore the world, not as one likes a looking-glass, because it is one’s self, but as one loves a woman, because she is entirely different.”

And because God too is entirely different and stands at the heart of all binding promises, of all freedom, it is possible to love Him because we know we are first chosen, that being ourselves is not enough. Our ideas of God decide our ideas of the world. “By insisting especially on the transcendence of God we get wonder, curiosity, moral and political adventure, righteous indignation, Christendom. Insisting that God is inside man, man is always inside himself. By insisting that God transcends man, man has transcended himself.” In transcending himself, in what he might expect of himself, man does not cease to be himself. We do not become “gods.” We love God and this is our joy. Eternal life comes precisely to us, as we are.

Chesterton ends Orthodoxy by suggesting that the only thing that the Incarnate God did not show us while He was on earth was his “mirth,” his joy. He did not show us this mirth because we could not bear it now, not because this was not of the essence of His being. “The mass of men have been forced to be gay about the little things, but sad about the big ones. Nevertheless (I offer my last dogma defiantly) it is not native to man to be so. Man is more himself, man is more manlike, when joy is the fundamental thing in him, and grief the superficial. ... Joy ... is the gigantic secret of the Christian.”

This at last is the secret of Chesterton and of his Orthodoxy. All that is is created in joy because this is what God is. Life is our seeking to find wherein joy is our home. And we can finally only have a home if we bind freely ourselves. Only this philosophy, this “heresy” of “orthodoxy” – which Chesterton discovered and in discovering leaves its gift of sanity to us – “has again and again said the thing that does not seem to be true, but is true.” Ultimately, this truth, in its splendor, is the delight of orthodoxy.

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On Education and Salvation

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The university is a peculiarly mediaeval institution in point of origin. Athens, Alexandria, Rhodes, and other centres of the ancient civilisation possessed places of higher education which attracted young men from distant lands. But they had little in common with universities as we know them. . . . The division of teachers and of students into faculties, the ordered system of curricula and of corresponding degrees, the government of the university society, are all forms of development which took shape in mediaeval times. The very name “university,” i.e., universitas or guild, is a reminder of the fact, since guilds were a characteristic feature of mediaeval society. The technical name for a university was *studium generale*, within which the universitas, or guild, whether of teachers or of scholars, built up the university life.7

—J. W. Adamson, 1921
young man’s choice and lost not merely for him alone. The rich young man was not being offered something utterly indifferent or unimportant for himself or others. No doubt, down the ages, his graphic choice resulting in his going away “sad” inspired other rich young men to leave their riches and follow Christ. The Christian world, at its highest, seems somehow suffused with invitations and not merely commands, yet with invitations that make an enormous difference whether they are accepted or not. The world is filled with something more than duty and justice.

II.

John Paul II is fond of citing the similar passage about this rich young man found in the Gospel of Matthew (19:16-21; Veritatis Splendor, Ch. 1 and 2). In Matthew, the young man wants to know what “good” he must do to be saved. He wants to know something concrete he can do, some “good.” And this “good” is not any sort of good but rather the good he must do to attain eternal life. Some good things he can clearly abuse. He wants to know how what is good is to be related to his end. Christ reminds him that only God is good, yet what is good is found in all things because of their origin in God. The commandments are designed precisely to protect these goods found in what is not God. They are designed to protect us from misusing things that are in fact good.

Clearly, a great part of life consists both in knowing and doing what is good, in avoiding what is evil, and in recognizing the profound difference between the two. What is good is not intended to be something vague, practically indistinguishable in the real order from what is evil. If we do not “know” what is good, we surely cannot effect it, except accidentally. Knowing and doing are not necessarily the same in understanding. Both are necessary in the accomplishment of anything good. That is, truth is what guides our actions. When Christ tells the young man to keep the commandments, He is reaffirming the definition of what is good and what not. He is implicitly denying Nietzsche’s famous claim of something “beyond good and evil.” In fact, what is said to be beyond good and evil must itself be examined in terms of “what good must I do to be saved?”

At the end of his re-presentation of the rich young man, surely, as he intimates, one of the most interesting and contemporary characters in the New Testament, John Paul II repeats and adds to those basic questions that anyone seriously concerned about the meaning of his own life must ask himself. John Paul takes this rich young man as a figure or symbol of what ought to go on in the heart of each of us. Never to have asked ourselves such questions is never to have fully realized our humanity and its purpose. Knowing “thyself” or examining oneself about one’s place in reality, one’s place as a human being and one’s place as this human being, constitutes the activity in our consciousness that defines what we are to ourselves.

First, the Holy Father recalls the basic questions, found in Vatican II’s Nostra Aetate, that profoundly disturb yet also guide any attentive human heart: “What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of our life? What is good and what is sin? What origin and purpose do sufferings have? What is the way to attaining true happiness? What are death, judgment, and retribution after death? Last, what is that final, unutterable mystery which embraces our lives and from which we take our origin and toward which we tend?” (Nostra Aetate I; Veritatis Splendor, 30). Sometimes, often perhaps, we do not ask ourselves these questions because we do not want to know the answers for fear that they would require something of us that we are not prepared to do.

Such questions are not asked, moreover, as if no answers to them can be given. They do not constitute an exercise in cultural relativism. Surely, to be educated includes some basic consideration and answer to each of these fundamental questions, a consideration and answer that does not a priori exclude the revelational considerations and answers. There is, after all, something rather shallow in wanting merely to
ask the questions with no recognition of answers given to them.

To these initial questions, John Paul II, ever perceptive, adds a couple of his own: “What is freedom and what is its relationship to the truth contained in God’s law? What is the role of conscience in man’s moral development? How do we determine, in accordance with the truth about the good, the specific rights and duties of the human person?” Notice that the Pope meets head-on the theoretic principle—freedom—that justifies most of the moral and intellectual aberrations of our culture. All of these questions, the Pope thinks, are implicitly found in the rich young man’s question, “Teacher, what good must I do to have eternal life?” These questions arise simply out of the fact that we are and find ourselves existing with no adequate explanation provided by our own being apart from our reflecting on our reality.

III.

The philosopher Eric Voegelin, in a conference to students in Canada in 1965, told them of every person’s search for the ground of his or her own being. This search involves two questions: (1) “Why is there something; why not nothing?” and (2) “Why is that something as it is and not different?”8 These are, as Voegelin remarks, simply the questions of existence and essence, the basic philosophical questions. If we put the Pope’s questions together with Voegelin’s, questions that essentially come from Aristotle, Aquinas, and Leibniz, we have a program of metaphysics, ethics, and theology that serves to spell out the essential questions that any education must consider. Any formal education that does not include them as central to its purpose is simply not a “freeing,” that is, liberal education.

But it is not “education” that must consider them, as if these questions somehow existed outside our own insight into ourselves. Rather they arise within all individuals in each of their efforts to know themselves, who and what they are, from the vivid awareness that no one caused them to be or to be what they are. An education lacking formal and serious reflection on such questions and the answers given to them is already judged as inadequate, if not useless, before the highest things. In our era, the prevailing philosophy of absolute freedom does not wish to find any other answer than that no definite answers exist to these questions, at least none that are dependent on anything other than human freedom’s construction of itself.

It may well be that the “education” we need is not found, or easily found, in the institutions we have inherited or founded for the purpose of education. We have to be prepared for this possibility. If we look at these questions and the answers given to them in metaphysics and revelation, we can readily realize that few if any students in existing institutions leave them ever having raised such questions or having considered the pertinence of the answers given to them in Christian metaphysics and revelation.

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that we run into young men or women with these questions churning in their souls, the rich young men and women of our era. Or perhaps we should wonder why we do not run into many with such questioning souls? Suppose someone is not as evidently good as the rich man of the Gospel. That is, suppose that we run into those who have not been keeping the commandments from their youth, who are, already at an early age, corrupted by ill deeds and faulty understandings through not observing the Law or through practicing, as they are urged, the disordered ethos that exists in the culture. That fact alone of living a life contrary to the commandments already obscures or corrupts that person’s vision so that the fundamental questions are carefully avoided. What follows, in such a situation, about the basic questions?

By my very juxtaposition of the question of education and eternal life or salvation, I imply that a basic relation exists between what we can know about these questions and how we live. Education cannot be successful as a human enterprise if the questions addressed to the meaning of life are not carefully posed and
formulated. Moreover, it is not the posing of the questions that seems most important, but their answers. Almost any viable philosophic or religious system will be aware of such questions and have some sort of response to them. It follows from this situation that the quality or truth of the response makes some difference about whether we are living or doing what is necessary to complete our lives. It is important to live well. But we need to know the relation of living well and the truth about ourselves, about the world, about God. Education should be, even when it is not, some guide to knowing this truth.

IV. One of the things that strikes a casual traveler in this country is how prosperous, at almost every level, the educational plants, private and public, are. Catholic institutions are no exception to this rule. They all seem to have at their disposal relatively vast amounts of capital in the form of buildings, land, and equipment. There is a large and sophisticated staff. We are quite aware, no doubt, that the educational system seems to be failing at almost every level in spite of these impressive physical resources. We are aware that striking increases in monies or plant or equipment in the recent past have not made matters better but, by most accounts, worse.

We are also cognizant of the fact that some of the most successfully educated students came not from the richest or best schools in reputation, but from those of poorer or relatively modest resources, though even these have quite adequate plants. The discipline within a school or the truth that is taught or the purpose for which one learns somehow makes an enormous difference in learning. Intangibles, such as these, are usually more important than physical plant or organized administration. It is by no means evident that the profound questions about life are best posed and best answered in the most prestigious and famous schools. Indeed, prestige institutions seem often to present the most systematic impediments to these endeavors. But unfortunately they are not asked anywhere, including, too often, in the religious-oriented schools where we might expect them to be fully considered.

Catholics in particular are aware that a good percentage of the universities that call themselves Catholic are found in the United States, a country in which the vast majority of Catholic university students, however, are not in Catholic-founded universities. Often these Catholic plants likewise have remarkable facilities in terms of endowment, buildings, land, libraries, organization, and apparently qualified programs and faculty. A young professor told me this summer that all that is now needed is the will to make them what they were founded to be. Measured by standard criteria, these institutions or their departments seek to be, claim to be, excellent or very good or at least adequate by standards that come from outside themselves, from accrediting associations or other forms of legitimization and legality. There is no adequate body of accreditation that backs any kind of diversity that would include attention to the sort of learning that is most necessary.

Most of these universities are very fussy about any question of their “Catholicity.” They reserve to themselves and their faculties or administration the exclusive definition of what is Catholic. Whether any graduates could give any coherent description of basic Christian doctrine and its corresponding practice and rite is rarely tested. Generally, two or three academic courses in philosophy and theology, plus availability of sacraments and retreats, are the extent of the Catholic teaching or practice that most students receive. The courses offered are often very eclectic. A coherent grounding in what is found in the General Catechism of the Catholic Church is practically unheard of.

Generally, what students learn in universities has been looked upon from the point of view of administration and faculty, from the viewpoint of autonomy and freedom. It has rarely been considered from the point of view of bishops’ responsibilities or of the rights of the students. From this angle, it would not matter whether students in question were found in secular or
religious universities. The right to be taught the truth is not something that ceases for students in any sort of educational institution, secular or religious. No bishop who has his own house in order, it seems to me, can look comfortably at the fact that students in universities in his area of jurisdiction do not possess a knowledge of their faith, of its intellectual dimensions presented not after the manner of someone alienated from it or hostile to it, but of someone who understands and loves it.

V. In a remarkable visit with a number of Bishops from the American Midwest, John Paul II again addressed the question of what universities are and how they relate to the culture and to truth. The very first thing that Catholic education has to do, and its most basic contribution to the American culture, is “to restore to that culture the conviction that human beings can grasp the truth of things, and in grasping that truth can know their duties to God, to themselves and their neighbor” (3). The very phrase “the truth of things” or “the truth of all things,” it is to be recalled, is the title of a wonderful book by Josef Pieper. Probably no book gets us closer to the meaning of what the Holy Father had in mind, except perhaps his own Veritatis Splendor, when he called the bishops’ attention to the need for our culture to restore the conviction “that human beings can grasp the truth of things.”

A Catholic school or university is a place where students learn what makes them distinct as well as what is the meaning of the general culture that surrounds them. The Pope understands that both knowledge and example are necessary. Again referring to the existential situation of the young people of our time, to the questions of the rich young man, John Paul II positively affirms that “the Gospel message is the definitive response to the deepest longings of the human heart. Young Catholics have a right to have the full content of that message in order to come to know Christ, the only one who has overcome death and opened the way to salvation” (5). The emphasis is not on freedom to teach what one wants, but on the students and their need to have the full content of the basic message presented accurately and profoundly to them.

“Catholic universities should be expected to uphold the objectivity and coherence of knowledge” (6). To uphold these principles, of course, requires a metaphysic and philosophy that allows this objectivity and coherence of knowledge to be presented. Not all do, and these too should be examined and known in their limitations. There is nothing wrong in being what we are, “The Catholic identity of a university should be evident in its curriculum, in its faculty, in student activities and in the quality of its community life” (6). To the objection that this Catholic component to the university teaching is an “infringement on the university’s nature,” the Pope simply says that the illumination of the revelational order does not stand against “the truth of the created order.” It is precisely the truth of the created order that gives the answers of revelation their greatest impact and sense. That the Catholic university “includes the university’s relationship to the local Church and its Bishop” goes without saying. The university was founded by and for the local or national Church, not solely for the university itself. The truth of the faith includes its being founded on a living authority, not simply on university faculties and their complete autonomy.

“It is sometimes said,” the Pope remarks, showing that he has read the literature, “that a university that acknowledges a responsibility to any community or authority outside the relevant academic professional associations has lost both its independence and its integrity. But this is to detach freedom from its object, which is truth.” The Pope here suggests that universities or their professional associations that only rely on themselves become in fact closed societies. The reason that they detach freedom from its “object, which is truth,” is that truth is the object of intellect, not freedom, which is possible not because of itself but because of truth.

“Theology is done in and for the Church” (7), es-
especially in universities. Authority, as it is carefully defined in the Church, is not extrinsic to this science but fundamental to it. To claim independence of this relationship is, in effect, to claim that theological truth depends solely on what theologians in their academic isolation think just because they think it.

VI.
In a perceptive essay entitled, “The Kingdom of God and History,” the English historian, Christopher Dawson, wrote:

In spite of the differences and contradictions between die progressive idealism of liberalism and the catastrophic materialism of communism, all of them agree in their insistence on the immanence and autonomy of human civilization and on the secular community as the ultimate social reality. Alike to the liberal and to the communist the Catholic tradition stands condemned as “reactionary” not merely for the accidental reason that it has been associated with the political and social order of the past, but because it sets the divine values of divine faith and charity and eternal life above the human values—political liberty, social order, economic prosperity, scientific truth—and orientates human life and history towards a supernatural and super-historical end. And since the modern society is everywhere tending towards ideological uniformity which will leave no room for the private worlds of the old bourgeois culture, the contradiction between secularism and Catholicism is likely to express itself in open conflict and persecution.¹¹

In retrospect, this is a sobering passage. It anticipates what has in fact taken place, the rise of a fundamental conflict between standard Catholicism and the secular culture. This conflict grows more and more intolerant of Catholic practices. Many of the basic secular beliefs and practices, now often legislated into law, are increasingly forced on Catholic institutions or individuals in any way opposing them. Indeed, even within Catholicism, there are those who ally themselves more with the secular culture than with the historic implications of a transcendent faith.

Dawson’s perception is that the ultimate social reality is now increasingly conceived to be, not eternal life, but the culture itself in its own autonomy. The fact that there are principles and realities above the social order, principles that limit and place in order the social order itself, is increasingly conceived to be “fanatic” or “outlandish.” The social pressures that are leveled against orthodox religion are almost invariably derivative from this immanentist view of the ultimate reality. It is not simply a question of Catholicism being considered, in any liberal view, to be a purely voluntary society with no claims for anything other than private spiritual things that have no public effect. The very claims of the secular society, its ideology, as it were, exclude from expression any claim of Christian revelation to present and direct itself to the truth of things, including political things. Catholicism actually requires, in the name of right living, the keeping of the commandments both in the name of eternal life and in the name of what social reality in this life ought to be.

VII.
At the Eleventh General Congregation of the Synod of Asian bishops, William Cardinal Baum, made the following remarks:

Witness of life . . . rests upon a shared understanding of divine Revelation. Reference to the Holy Trinity, to the Father, to the Son and to the Holy Spirit inevitably evokes questions from our hearers. What do we mean by “God the Father?” Who is “Jesus Christ?” Who or what is the “Holy Spirit?” We Bishops have the duty to respond. More recently some . . . Bishops have begun to speak not so much of inculturation but of the need to build a new Christian culture, a sign of contradiction to today’s culture of
death. . . There is a diminished sense of sin, sometimes a complete loss of this sense. As Bishops we must make a faithful but realistic acknowledgement of the mystery of evil, present in the world and in the human heart. Essential in the lives of the faithful is personal repentance for sin. Our great hopes for renewal, for the reform of evil social structures, for a new evangelization, depend on personal conversion and repentance.  

Here, in conclusion, Baum returns to basic questions that we are asked and must ask, must answer. These imply the revelational responses. Baum is correct in perceiving that the recent theological emphasis on “inculturation,” that is, in making Christianity’s teachings and requirements as close to ideas and practices that a people is already familiar with, if there is truth in them, has perhaps reached a dead end. It is the culture itself that contains ideas and practices that cannot be reconciled. This is the meaning of the “culture of death,” as it is called.

The ultimate social reality is not some sort of good life on this earth, nor is it a social reality that claims its own self-sufficiency. Baum is correct in contrasting the corporate or societal systems with precisely “personal conversion and repentance.” That is, we live in a culture not inhabited by rich young men who have observed the commandments from their youth. The first invitation to our contemporaries cannot be “follow Me,” but repent. We know that this following and repentance imply a personal reality. As the Holy Father has often remarked, all social disorder or, if it must be called that, “sin,” is rooted in personal sin. It cannot be otherwise. Hence, the basic questions, “What is sin?”; “What is evil?” are not somehow indifferent to academic life or its analysis of the orders and disorders of any society, including our own. The basic questions and answers to them constitute the sort of destiny that we expect, both in eternal life and in this world.

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THE FORUM

On the Death of Plato
Some Philosophical Thoughts on the Thracian Maidens

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“But there is another sort of old age too: the tranquil and serene evening of a life spent in peaceful, blameless, enlightened pursuits. Such, we are told, were the last years of Plato, who died in his eighty-first year while still actively engaged in writing.”

—Cicero, On Old Age

In Volume III of his Order and History, Eric Voegelin reflected on the central importance of both Plato and Aristotle. His treatise on Plato is an extraordinary analysis of Plato's life and abiding philosophic importance. When I ask a class to read this volume on Plato, I insist that they do not read the last short paragraph of this book until they have read the rest of the book. I do not want them to miss the astonishment that I myself experienced on first reading it. Too often, of course, such is human nature, this admonition not to read a designated passage has the effect of tempting most readers to read first what is not to be read until last. This reaction is not necessarily a bad idea in reading any book, except perhaps a detective story or Voegelin’s book on Plato.

The last paragraph of Voegelin’s treatise is a poignant account of the death of Plato. The charm of this passage matches the spell that Plato himself sought to cast in his writings. Plato invoked this very literary charm to incite us to pass to the higher things or at least to render us benevolent to them. Indeed, it was his answer to Homer. He realized that if his own style were not as intriguing as that of Homer, his philosophy would not be read by anyone except the philosophers. And it was precisely those who were not philosophers who most threatened the life of the philosopher.

In violation of everything I have intimated in the previous paragraphs, however, I am going to begin this consideration by citing precisely this last paragraph of Eric Voegelin on the death of Plato. I can think of no justification for this procedure except that it is the only way I know to reflect with some care upon a certain extraordinary line of thought that Voegelin’s ending can kindle in us about the ultimate meaning of Plato. In considering the death of Plato, moreover, we are naturally and rightly prepared to compare it with the death of Socrates as Plato himself recounted that famous death in his own dialogues, in the Euthyphro, The Apology, the Crito, and the Phaedo.

We wonder which of the two deaths was the more profound, granting that the death of Socrates was infinitely more memorable and graphic. Plato perhaps had no Plato to account for his own death, though Cicero recalled its serenity. Could this missing philosophical account of the death of Plato be what Voegelin, in the sparsest fashion, belatedly tried to supply? The life of Plato subsequent to the execution of Socrates, no doubt, is consumed by the question that the death of Socrates had left Plato as a young man to resolve; namely, whether there is a city in which the philosopher will not
be killed? Evidently, Plato in the end found, or perhaps even founded, such a city. He was not killed. In the city he founded, we still read about Socrates.

Plato’s own famous pupil, Aristotle, to be sure, had once remarked, after an anti-Macedonian movement in Athens, that he himself had fled Athens, lest it be “guilty of the same crime twice”. But Socrates himself did not choose flight or banishment to another city to avoid the same crime once. Surely, we do not want to suggest that Aristotle lacked bravery. Did Aristotle mean rather that there was nothing philosophically to be gained in making the same point twice? Aristotle knew the lesson of the end of The Republic, that if we do not choose our daemon rightly the first time, we shall not likely choose it rightly a second or third time. Was philosophy already safe then because of what Plato had established to replace Athens, that is, his philosophical Academy in which the memory of Socrates would remain alive? When Aristotle subsequently found himself in Asia Minor or in Pella, was he actually in the same city that he had left, the one within Athens that Plato had bequeathed beyond his own death? Does the antagonism of politics and philosophy remain in all existing cities? Do philosophy and politics both point beyond themselves?

II. No doubt, we sense a distinct ominousness in the later dialogues of Plato, especially in the Gorgias, a dialogue full of foreboding, of war and strife, as its first lines intimate. The philosopher attempts to deal with the shrewd politician who has the power to kill him. When the politician chooses not to participate in the philosopher’s sole protection for his life, namely, in the continuation of honest discourse about what “true politics” really are, we know the philosopher is dead (521). His only safety is found if the politician will examine the issues with him. Already in The Republic, the philosopher who returned to the Cave and told his experiences to his former companions was in danger of his life (517). The prisoners did not want to hear that their life was not the real one.

Does Plato’s serene death mean rather that philosophy has been rendered harmless, that Plato died still writing in peace because philosophy no longer threatened the order of existing regimes? Do the politicians now control philosophers by threat of death? Plato himself, in his dealings in Sicily, came close to death a couple of times in his efforts to educate the tyrant. We have no reason to assume that Plato was a coward. He did not dispute Socrates’ courage and strength. Plato’s death seems to portend something else, however, something on a par with the noble death of Socrates. Thus we would be surprised if the death of Plato, in some other way, did not also match the death of Socrates in philosophic profundity. How are we to think about these things?

The following passage about Plato’s final day in 347 B.C. is the conclusion to Eric Voegelin’s Plato: “Plato died at the age of eighty-one. On the evening of his death he had a Thracian girl play the flute to him. The girl could not find the beat of the nomos. With a movement of his finger, Plato indicated to her the Measure.” What is to be noted about this riveting passage? First of all, we observe that Plato died in his own bed. He was some eleven years older than Socrates at the latter’s death. Plato did not drink hemlock by order of the laws of the democracy. To be sure, he did die in the evening, like Socrates. Athens could have let Socrates die of old age, but it chose instead to execute him at seventy. Athens, however, did let Plato die of old age. Old age was the first topic of discussion in The Republic. Socrates said that he liked to talk to old men as they had been down a path we all will follow. Plato went further along this path than Socrates.

Socrates’ last day in jail, we recall, was announced by Xanthippe, who told Socrates that this day would be a sad one for him as it would be the last time in which he could converse with his friends. All of Socrates’ days, he hoped, were spent examining life, to see if it was worth living. He had spoken with those who were said to be
wise because he wondered about the Oracle who said that he was the wisest man in Greece. No one else proved to be wise except in his limited specialty. Socrates’ days were spend in talking to his friends, something he enjoyed doing.

Socrates’ last day is best described as his second trial. His first trial before the jury at Athens left certain things unsettled. The friends of Socrates were quite unhappy with it all. Socrates’ life could not end without completing his conversations with the potential philosophers examining him about what he was doing. Socrates’ conversation did end on his last day. He finished what he had to say. The potential philosophers had only tears, not refutations. Socrates took the hemlock calmly.

For an older friend like Crito, the death of Socrates initially represented a defeat, a slurring of Crito’s public reputation. For everyone in the city knew that a rich man, as Crito was, could easily afford to bribe Socrates out of jail. But Socrates debated with Crito about why Socrates should remain in jail and suffer, though the execution could not be called a punishment since nothing can hurt a good man. Clearly such an extraordinary decision of Socrates to obey the laws needed explication.

But this jail and the sentence were not merited punishments for Socrates as he had done nothing wrong, though he had upset the order of the existing city. He did not know whether death was evil in the first place so he could not act as if it were the worst evil, to be prevented at all costs. He did know, however, that doing wrong was not open to him. These public arguments at the trial, of course, did not satisfy the young potential philosophers gathered around Socrates on his last day. In this last conversation, Socrates spoke of subjects not easily addressed in public, yet topics that had to be faced in a complete life.

Some of these friends like Apollodorus, who was to recount The Symposium from Aristodemus, were already weeping. They showed thereby that they had not learned Socrates’ lesson, that philosophy was a preparation for death. When death is present, the philosopher is present. Was Plato ultimately the one follower of Socrates who understood this? If anything the young listeners were very annoyed with Socrates, so that they subjected him to a second, more critical, trial, the trial before the potential philosophers about why he could face death so calmly. His apology at the public trial had not satisfied them, nor had it convinced a majority of the jury.

Socrates, by objective standards, may indeed have performed brilliantly at the public trial in handling the accusations of corrupting the youth. Many of these youths, sons of the leading citizens of Athens, were sitting before him on this last day in jail. Many of these same youth had annoyed their fathers, Socrates’ accusers, by going home and playfully imitating Socrates. This semi-jesting imitation was why the fathers thought Socrates was undermining the city. This bothersomeness is what brought Socrates, from his hiddenness in his private life, to their public attention. Socrates indeed may have convinced some jurors and potential philosophers at the trial that he did believe in the gods, even if not quite believing in the gods of the city. No doubt, in the minds of these young men, among whom, though he was ill on this last day, was the young Plato, Socrates was not guilty as charged in the public trial. But there seemed to be another sort of guilt, even more grave, of which he could be accused. Was the absence of Plato at the death of Socrates related to his own very different death, the death of Plato? Do all real philosophers die in the same way, whether with hemlock or with the sounds of the flute?

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From the minute they heard of Socrates’ discourse with Crito about how he was bound to Athenian law, the friends knew he was certainly going to die. He had already explained in his Apology that he did not want to drift in exile from one city to another and have the same thing happen over and over in any well-ordered city. Nor would he cease to philosophize. But as often as he had told them that philosophy was a preparation for death, something further was needed
before they would be satisfied. Of course, the last day of discourse concerned the long and intricate discussion about the immortality of the soul. Socrates’ calm before death had intelligible roots that the potential philosophers had not previously understood. The power of the state to kill Socrates always remained. But if it did execute him, it was not a defeat of philosophy. In fact, when the state kills the philosopher, it may strengthen philosophy. The only philosophy that is weakened is that whose teachers yield to the state seeking its own will.

Rather, Socrates’ execution was the judgment on the state itself. No state was to have legitimate power before philosophy if it conceived itself, on its own standards, to be an alternative to philosophy. The philosopher who is willing to accept death cannot be threatened by the politician who, as we see in the *Gorgias*, loses his power over the philosopher who is unaffected by the politician’s most dire threats. Callicles, Meletos, Lycon, and Anytos do preserve the democracy they love. In so doing they demonstrate the danger of democracy, a danger that Socrates evidently considered to be the most subtle danger a philosopher could encounter.

Philosophy, in Callicles’ view, is set aside in the politician’s youth as something interesting, but not for use as an adult. Philosophy asks questions that the actual state, because of its own disorder, cannot bear. It is better to silence Socrates than to change the regime. The sons of the politicians and craftsmen are expected to follow their fathers, not Socrates. Socrates had called the youth to another life, not to the traditional ones. This was his danger. But the real struggle was not with the fathers but with the sons, with their choosing which life to follow. Socrates seldom talked to those who had already decided, who had already definitively revealed their souls as upholders of the polis, of the ways of life of wealth, pleasure, or power. Socrates could only talk with those who could still change their souls.

When students read *The Apology*, I ask them to indicate in the text just where they are in fact themselves present. At first, one catches in their eyes a look of amusement or polite skepticism. What sort of a question is it? How could Plato have included each of them in his Dialogue? Yet, each is there, almost by name, certainly by spiritual reaction. On some reflection, suddenly a student will understand. To be sure, they all might have been there as members of the jury. Some of these very students, no doubt, will sit in similar trials some day and analogously vote to kill Socrates, even though most in their schools would sympathize with Socrates when they read him. Others will be there as one of the three accusers of Socrates, or as the potential philosophers whom Socrates was accused of having corrupted. It is not a bad idea, of course, to place oneself within the dialogues of Plato, to find one’s own personality somehow shining through the characters he so memorably describes.

But the immediate answer to the question is that each of us is present when, on reading the trial account, we too accuse this same jury, now alive before us in Plato’s account. Plato the philosopher, because he wrote of the Trial of Socrates, makes us all participants, whether we like it or not. Socrates, with some amusement, had proposed that his punishment be free room and board at the town hall. He had done nothing but keep the citizens alert to the need to examine themselves daily, itself a good service to any city. He was the gadfly. He kept the citizens from being dull. Socrates then turned to the jurors to single out those who had voted for his condemnation and death. With sudden seriousness in contrast to his previously playful mood, he spoke to them with gravity. He told them that from now on, whenever the story of this trial is told, these jurors will be condemned in the minds of any reasonable man as those who killed the philosopher.

The students clearly recognize in reading the trial, that they too had agonized over those two hundred and eighty-one jurors who voted to kill Socrates, that they too, as Socrates said, would join down the ages those vast legions who have
again and again condemned that now immortal and deplorable Athenian jury and, through it, the politics that killed Socrates in a legal trial. Most of today’s students, on reading this result, want to go out and change the world, not themselves. They want to become lawyers and doctors. They do not remember what Plato said in Book Three of The Republic, that a society filled with students of law and medicine is already a sick society. Many students continue to think that more law and more medicine will cure what can only be cured by a reform of their own souls. Again by contrast, we recall that Plato died calmly, at first sight undramatically, in his bed.

IV. On reading of the death of Plato, however, do we, down the ages, also become present at his death? Of course we do. Again we see Plato, in his eighties, a man who has mostly finished The Laws in which Socrates as such does not appear. Plato was given enough life to complete his projects, to consider all sides of the death of Socrates. He graphically delineated the souls of each of the major and even the minor characters we find in the sundry dialogues -- Theages, Meletos, Cebes, Thrasymachus, Pausanias, Alcibiades, Polemarchus, Cleitophon, Laches, Gorgias, Ion, and many others. Each had his part. Plato understood the complexity of character, of life.

And who is at Plato’s death? He does not have a room full of followers seeking to copy down the final revisions of The Laws. No conversation seems left to complete. Aristotle is not there. Nor is Dionysios. His older brothers Glaucon and Adeimanthus are not there. No Xanthippe is there. No three sons. No potential philosophers. Who is there is a young flute-player, a Thracian girl. She is not there in any erotic capacity. Plato evidently wants her to play the flute, that special instrument about which he so carefully discoursed in The Republic (399). That is to say, the philosopher dies to the sound of music. The music is not a therapy, but a pleasure. Aristotle had remarked that the gentleman should know music but should not be able to play a musical instrument too well. He knew that to play music well required a lifetime of study and practice, a lifetime that would prevent the gentleman from knowing the higher things, however much music might be related to them, as it intrinsically was.

Plato, of course, does not call in an accomplished flautist, as, presumably, he might have. He calls in the maiden who cannot find the measure. He can still teach her the measure. He moves his finger indicating the beat and rhythm. We are not told whether she picks it up correctly, but we assume she does. We assume that Plato died having heard the right measure, that he died listening to the flute as it should be played. His death would not have been complete had he not heard the correct measure. Thus Plato hears the flute with the proper measure.

Who is this flute-player? We note she was a Thracian. We can remember in The Symposium, when the banquet was about to begin, that a flute-girl entered the room ready to play. The diners at Agathon’s house discuss drinking, as the three old men also do in the early books of The Laws. The guests at Agathon’s table had all been drinking heavily the evening before. So they decide not to drink, or at least not to drink in competition or in excess. If someone might want some wine, that was quite all right, but if he did not, that was all right also. The banquet was convivial, pleasant. Even Socrates had dressed up for the occasion -- “fresh from his bath and sandalled” (174). But when this conversation, or rather when the speeches began in earnest, the wine was moderate and the flute-girl left, only to return at the end when Alcibiades unexpectedly roars into the room.

The flute-girls at Plato’s death and at Agathon’s banquet are mindful of the Thracian maidens. The Thracian maidens are those very normal and delightful young women who tell us better than any one else what most people think of philosophy, think of what Socrates does with his days. Aristotle, it will be recalled, remarked that the philosopher Thales proved the usefulness of philosophy by gaining a monopoly on
the oil and wine presses so that when the bumper season arrived, having himself studied all the signs of nature, all the unlearned growers had to pay him handsomely to use his presses. But as he did not want the money, being a philosopher, he was just illustrating that the philosopher was poor because he chose to be, because his time was better spent in other things. The philosopher knew something about music and about business, but he was not a musician or a businessman.

However, when two famous philosophers were walking down the road one day learnedly discussing the stars and other exalted things, one of them fell into a hole that he unfortunately did not see because of his absorption in philosophy. Seeing this, to them, absurd incident, the Thracian maidens began to giggle and laugh at the philosopher. Most of the human race, subsequently, would side with the Thracian maidens. One might suggest from this famous tale, that the Thracian maidens ultimately also needed to be attracted to philosophy. Is it too much to suggest that, in Voegelin’s account, this Thracian flute-girl at the death bed of Plato, fumbling with the measure, hints at a possible resolution?

But Plato’s death has a further implication. The flute-girl did, evidently, when taught, catch the measure. She was not unteachable. Philosophy seeks the eminently teachable. Plato himself knew the measure. That is to say, Plato died, to borrow Josef Pieper’s felicitous phrase, “in tune with the world.” Plato did not make the measure. He discovered it. He knew it. Protagoras in a famous phrase had affirmed that “man is the measure of all things.” In his Laws, Plato had argued rather that we are the puppets of God, that our works and days, even our highest human sciences, even politics, are not serious, at least not in comparison with God. “God is the measure of all things” (716). We are to spend our days “singing, dancing, and sacrificing” because this is the only response we can make to the good that is (803).

Thus, when Plato dies, he dies according to a measure that he knew but did not constitute. The Thracian girl picked up a beat that she imperfectly blew into her double-reed flute, but she did not quite know how it worked. Plato taught her the measure. Those who did not know the measure could learn it from the philosopher. The redemption of the flute-girls and the Thracian maidens for philosophy finds its source here, in the measure that Plato in dying did not himself constitute but which he knew and knew could be learned by the flute-girl. The last person who sees Plato alive is the Thracian maiden, as she plays according to the measure he taught her. Her flute is the last thing he listens to. Plato died with philosophy reconciled to the Thracian maidens and the flute girls. The Thracian maiden who played for him did not laugh at him, the philosopher dying. She did not think it mockingly amusing that this dying philosopher should call for her so that he might listen to the flute as he left this world. The philosopher is not laughed at. He is attended to, having learned the measure.

Socrates, as he left this world, himself on his last day, had wondered about music. Before his conversation on immortality in the Phaedo, Socrates confesses that perhaps he had misunderstood the Oracle. Perhaps the Oracle meant that he should actually compose music or poetry, cultivate the arts. So he did set some passages in Aesop’s fables to verse and some hymns to the festival gods. And Cicero also recalled that in his old age, “Socrates learnt to play that favourite instrument of the ancients, the lyre.” Plato realized in The Republic that the only way to counteract Homer would be to write a poetry and a music that out-charmed Homer. Plato’s music, as we learn each time we read him, was beguiling. Even Callicles was trained in his earlier days by reading with amusement the philosophers, so that there seems to be some missing link between the philosopher and the politician. What had gone wrong in the life of the master politician Callicles? He found the image of Socrates in mature age, still conversing with potential phi-
philosophers quietly in corners, to be ridiculous and a waste of time. He had lost the charm. Socrates was unintelligible to him, though he sensed him still to be dangerous and thus would not answer his questions. Callicles, the statesman, was unwilling to test his own reasoning. He lacked music. He was unaware of the relation of music and philosophy.

But both the Thracian maidens and Callicles needed to be redeemed by true music and true politics. That is to say, we could not have a city composed only of philosophers, only of shepherds, only of craftsmen, only of politicians, only of flute-girls. Harmony required more. Specialization meant that not everyone could be expert in everything else, that is was all right if everyone did not do everything. The philosopher was a specialist in the whole. It was all right that Plato, the philosopher, did not himself play the flute well, but not all right that he did not know anything about it, did not delight in listening to it. Philosophers enjoy music in part because they know it, in part because they know that life is more than philosophy. All things had their harmony in the philosopher who was to know the parts, even the measure of the laws of music. Plato did not ask for a flute so that he could himself play. As he lay dying, he did not act, he listened, until he heard what was not in tune with the measure. Music and nomos were reconciled. The Thracian maiden played. Plato listened. Plato does not die in silence.

At the end of Symposium, “the sound of the flute is heard” (212). Alcibiades, unlike Callicles, has felt the charm of philosophy all his disordered life, even though he had to shut his ears against it. Astonishingly, he compares Socrates precisely to a flute-player.

And are you not a flute-player? That you are, and a performer far more wonderful than Marsyas. He indeed with instruments used to charm the souls of men by the powers of his breath, and the players of his music do so still: for the melodies of Olympus’ are derived from Marsyas who taught them, and these, whether they are played by a great master or by a miserable flute-girl, have a power which no others have; they alone possess the soul and reveal the wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries, because they are divine. But you produce the same effect with your words only, and do not require the flute; this is the difference between you and him (215).

The melodies of Olympus have a measure. Whether they are played by Marsyas or a miserable flute-girl, they have power. They possess the soul and reveal the “wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries.” Those who have need of gods and mysteries were those who were not the philosophers. The philosopher had no need of being a musician, but he loved music. He had no need of the mysteries and the gods, but he loved them. What was missing in the cosmos was someone to praise what is for what it was, for its own sake.

VI. The words of Socrates, Alcibiades tells us, are like music. They have a divine origin. Chaerephon, we recall, had gone to the Oracle at Delphi. His brother Chaerocrates was at the trial and could testify to it. Alcibiades, whose life Socrates had saved at the Battle of Delium, was the most talented and handsome of all the young men of Athens. Socrates loved him in his potential virtue but not in his corruption. Alcibiades stands at the threshold of ruining the city because he rejects philosophy. He goes on to betray Athens, Sparta, and Persia. He admits that Pericles speaks well, but when Alcibiades heard Socrates, he explained, “I felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading.” Alcibiades realized that if he did not “shut his ears” against the words of Socrates, “and fly as from the voice of a siren, my fate would be like that of others -- he would transfix me, and I should grow old sitting at his feet” (216). Alcibiades does not grow old sitting at Socrates’ feet. Plutarch gives two accounts of Alcibiades’ death (404 B.C.). He is
murdered by darts either because he debauched a maiden or because he betrayed Lacaedaimon and Persia.

Xanthippe, his wife, is not present when Socrates drinks the hemlock, though she has been there in the morning. The potential philosophers and the good jailer are there. Socrates remembers to offer a sacrifice to the God of Healing, for he is being healed in his death. Socrates entrusts this sacrificial mission to his old friend Crito, who could not get him out of jail with his money because Socrates had forbade him. We realize already at the banquet of Agathon (415 BC), however, that Socrates, in undergoing a more severe test than that of death, will not be corrupted by Alcibiades. He will not do wrong for the sake either of Callicles’ demos or Alcibiades’ own ambitions, or beauty or love, or pleasure, or popularity.

Why must Alcibiades at the banquet close his ears to the siren voice of Socrates? “For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the he concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him”. Alcibiades knows perfectly well why he acts as he does. In this explanation he is more revealing than Callicles, though both of them do the same thing in refusing to listen to Socrates. “For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. And therefore I run away and fly from him...” (216). Alcibiades takes the only escape possible. He refuses to listen and he immediately seeks to corrupt Socrates so that Socrates will not be superior to him in virtue.

When Alcibiades fails, he admits to the others that “I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self-restraint and manliness”. Alcibiades wonders about this virtue, but to no avail. Aristotle had said that wonder was the beginning of philosophy. Socrates, in fact, not Alcibiades, was the only one “with any real powers of enjoyment” (219). Alcibiades is thus the model of the opposite of the philosopher-king, more so than Callicles who is not a philosopher. Alcibiades not merely refuses to listen to argument. He also takes positive steps not to know. He does everything in his power not to acknowledge that he is wrong, even though he does know it. He tries to corrupt the only source of virtue he admires so that he will have no model testifying to his corruption.

The worst tyrant, as we recall from Book One of The Republic, was the one who did evil or whatever else he wanted. But this same tyrant not merely wanted to do evil or what he wanted, he also wanted to be praised by everyone for what he did. This praise is crucial, for it implies that even evil needs rational approbation. Otherwise, as Socrates shows us in The Gorgias, the tyrant is utterly alone and in the worst possible position. The ring of Gyges, the original invisible man who could do what he wanted if only he were not seen, corrupted also the people in defiling the shepherd who found the ring and corruptly became a king. In the Gorgias, the worst tyrant is the one who thinks that to do evil is better than to suffer it. He is the one who refuses punishment for his evil rather than freely to accept it and therefore acknowledge a good he did not make.

At the end of Alcibiades I, Alcibiades seems to have decided to follow Socrates; he has shown that he could follow the highest arguments of virtue posed by the philosopher. “I shall begin at this moment to take trouble over justice” Alcibiades explains. To this happy thought, Socrates responds, “And I would wish you to continue doing so. Yet, I stand in dread, not because I do not have trust in your nature, but rather because, seeing the strength of the city, I fear that it will overcome both me and you” (135). In a sense, we have here the preview of the young Augustine, the two loves and the two cities. Socrates lived a private life because he expected he would have been killed long ago if he did not. However ready for death he was, he did not seek it, but suffered it if it came along. The Symposium revealed
that Alcibiades, not Socrates, was the one seeking the beloved. What ultimately attracted Alcibiades, in spite of himself, was philosophy, the love of wisdom and truth. Socrates, for his part, realized that Alcibiades could also corrupt him, the philosopher, as well as himself. How? Because of another love, the love that Alcibiades confessed that he was attracted to whenever he left Socrates’ presence. Politics, when it did not feel the charm of philosophy, remained the most serious opponent to philosophy.

If Socrates is the real flute-player, as Alcibiades said, is it not of some interest that Plato dies alone, in old age, of a natural death, with the sole consolation of a flute player, a Thracian maiden who does not know the measure? “God is the measure of all things” (716). Plato knew the nosos. His death was in tune with everything that was in the cosmos, the measure. Plutarch said that, as a young man, Alcibiades “obeyed all his masters fairly well, but refused to learn upon the flute, as a sordid thing....” If we recall the Thracian maiden who played the flute for Plato when he showed her the measure, on the evening of the day on which he died, isn’t that refusal of Alcibiades an extraordinary thing? In the Crito, Crito himself remarked that Socrates could also have been exiled to Thessaly, another wild place like Thrace. Crito’s friends there would give Socrates complete protection and there they would make much of the philosopher. But of course, Socrates realized that in a Thrace or a Thessaly, the philosopher would be merely an oddity, a show-piece. He would have had no one with whom to speak. Socrates tells Crito that their long years of “serious discussion” have taught them both that “to do wrong is in every sense bad and dishonourable for the person who does it” (49).

In his last words in The Apology, Socrates spoke of death, of going to the Isles of the Blessed, where he would meet the gods and the heroes, where he would even meet Homer; the old quarrel between poetry and philosophy could be resolved. Even Socrates wanted to continue his conversation beyond death to find out who really is wise. When Plato dies, however, he does not, like Socrates, seem to anticipate this further conversation. What he seems to anticipate rather is the music, that is, the praise. We should spend our lives “singing, dancing, and sacrificing” (803). Plato does not, like Socrates, seek among the gods and heroes to find him who is “really wise” and him who “only thinks that he is” (42). Plato understood the Alcibiades who refused to learn the flute. Plato did not refuse to listen to Socrates, the master flute-player.

Plato taught the Thracian maiden the nomos, the measure. Plato knew the flute. He taught her this measure the evening he died. The Thracian maiden did not laugh at him. He heard her play the flute. He knew the measure, that he was not the measure himself. “God is the measure of all things” (716). The Thracian maiden learned the measure. Philosophy, poetry, and politics are reconciled. In the Academy of Plato, we can still catch strains of the measure, even in any existing city, but only if we worry, like Socrates, about the demos, about the love that has no order.

In Book Ten of The Republic, after mentioning the “old quarrel between philosophy and poetry”, Socrates admits that

“if poetry directed to pleasure and imitation have any argument to give showing that they should be in a city with good laws, we should be delighted to receive them back from exile, since we are aware that we ourselves are charmed by them. But it isn’t holy to betray what seems to be the truth. Aren’t you, too, my friend (Glaucon), charmed by it, especially when you contemplate it through the medium of Homer?”

“Very much so.”

“Isn’t it just for it to come back in this way -- when it has made an apology in lyrics or some other meter?” (607).

Eric Voegelin was charmed by the death of Plato. Philosophy, Voegelin thought, had fled to the Academy -- Plato’s Academy not ours -- wherein poetry and the pleasure of music are received back no longer tainted by the polis using
them for its own purposes. The apology in lyrics and in meter, in measure, are present in the music of the Thracian maiden playing the flute with the nomos that the dying Plato gave her. Plato died in full tune with the world and with its Measure.

VIII. A friend of mine happened to be in the Stanford Chapel at the Memorial Service of Eric Voegelin. My friend did not know who Voegelin was at the time, but he made a tape of this moving service. At this world-famous university only about forty people attended the service for Voegelin. Philosophy has fled even the academy. Voegelin seems to have chosen the music, Schubert, and the readings, from Ezekiel, from the First Letter of John, and from the Gospel of John. In his lovely eulogy of Voegelin, Ellis Sandoz remarked that the last time he saw Voegelin, a couple of months before he died, he had just ordered a new edition of Shakespeare’s works, as the one he had been using was worn out. Voegelin tried to read the complete works of Shakespeare every year. The day before he died (January 18, 1985), Voegelin spent his time correcting some page proofs of his essay, “Quod Deus Dicitur”, a proposition, he remarked, whose “specific form” comes from Thomas Aquinas.

The very last word Voegelin ever wrote was “Plato.” On the day of Voegelin’s death, a Psalm was read as he passed into unconsciousness. The Psalm was the Twenty-fifth. “Oh, keep my soul, O Lord, and deliver me: let me not be ashamed, for I put my trust in Thee.” Voegelin died peacefully while this Psalm was being read. As his wife was too weak and anxious, the Psalm was read to Voegelin by his American Indian housekeeper whose name was, with splendid paradox, Hiawatha.

All true philosophers, when they die, die the same death. All true philosophers when they die, die in the same city.

This essay was first published in The American Scholar in 1996.
The day after Easter, I was rereading Benedict XVI’s new and brilliant encyclical, Spe Salvi. I have three different copies of this remarkable document, one printed from the Vatican on-line system, one from L’Osservatore Romano, English, and a bound version published by Pauline Books. I was reading this latter publication when, as often happens, I ran across a sentence that did not strike me the earlier times I had read this encyclical.

This is the sentence: “Heaven is always more than we could merit, just as being loved is never something ‘merited,’ but always a gift” (#35).

What struck me here was the analogy between heaven-merit and love-merit. Behind this issue stands the whole controversy in the Reformation about whether we could by ourselves “merit” salvation by our “works.” The orthodox doctrine, of course, is that we cannot “merit” salvation as such. If we could, we would already be gods in no need of it.

But if heaven is “more” than we could merit, it does not follow that it may not be offered to us but not first as a result of merit. This is the ultimate surprise of what it is to be a human being, that both heaven and love are offered to us as a gift, probably because they are the same thing. Nor does it mean that we cannot “merit” salvation as such. If we could, we would already be gods in no need of it.

The other side of the analogy has to do with love, which is the basis of redemption as we know it in the first place. We must be careful to catch the nuances here. If we are “loved,”—not love, but are loved—it is always a “gift,” not just in heaven. Being loved is not a response to our good looks, such as they be, to our brains, brawn, income, clout or virtues. These may be the occasions for our being noticed by someone. Such qualities are not what it is ultimately that is loved. That is to say, if someone really loves us, it is not principally because of something we do to make us worthy, even if we should strive to be worthy. Love essentially makes us worthy by first penetrating to the core of what we are.

It is said that if we are not first loved, something we have first received, we will never be able to love someone else. The familial and personal status of every human being is bound up with this principle. That is, if we think that the object of love is our worthiness caused by something we do, we will never really be loved for what we are. This is why both heaven and love have to be free, and for the same reason. They are both first gifts.

The concept of a “gift” is one of the most profound ideas of our existence. It goes against practically everything in our culture that constructs the world on the basis of “rights,” on what is first “due” to us from someone else. If we spend our lives defining and demanding our “rights,” chances are we will never be much loved, even though there may still be those who love us none the less. We will think that we can demand love. We can accuse those of fault who do not choose to love us. I cannot think of a sadder assumption than this.

A gift is not essentially the “what is given,” the flowers, the box of candy. First, it is rather a human effort to concretize, make incarnate, something that is spiritual and invisible, yet real and
bodily. If we like our gifts because they are expensive, we probably do not know what the love of the giver is, nor what heaven is for that matter.

This view, however, does not mean that expensive gifts are essentially alienations. Quite the contrary, gifts also have that quality of being sacrificial. The sentimental stories of the little boy who works all summer to give his mother a twenty dollar gift, instead of buying something for himself, also are symbolic of the nature of a real gift. There is no reason that a very wealthy man may not give expensive gifts because he in fact loves someone. But everyone who loves can and indeed should at times give gifts. This is itself a sign that, among us, love is already incarnate, already has taken flesh.

“Heaven is always more than we could merit, just as being loved is never something ‘merited,’ but always a gift.”

The foundations of the world are not based in justice. There is something more than justice, without denying that justice has its place. There can be, and usually are, those who love us in spite of the fact that we do our best to be unloveable. But once we know that we are loved, it is not a virtue not to do all we can for those we ourselves love. The first-being-loved is itself a powerful force for knowledge and action.

Love is always a “gift,” and as such it is unmerited. The whole of the physical and human cosmos is based on this truth. We ourselves exist first as gifts. The first metaphysical question that we need to ask ourselves is whether we are the sole origin of what is gift-worthy in us. If we think we are, we will never understand the universe that is.

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The Dream of the Enterprise State

An Examination of Renaissance Political Philosophy through the Major Works of Niccolo Machiavelli and Sir Thomas More

Stephen Taft

Since the Renaissance is regarded as the dawn of the modern era, it is fitting that two enormously influential modern political concepts emerged from it. These are the reaffirmation of the republican style of government and the concept of the “enterprise state”, that is to say, a state that has the structure and moral imperative to aim for an idealistic temporal society. Sir Thomas More was an English statesman and Niccolo Machiavelli a Florentine diplomat of the early sixteenth century. They were respectively two of the leading political thinkers of the Northern and Italian Renaissances. Proponents of republican government in an age of kings, More and Machiavelli not only envisioned the “enterprise state”, but many of the ends towards which modern political ideologies would direct such a state. They agreed on the need for a republican government to supersede the shortcomings, not only of monarchy, but of ordinary human society as well. They differed as to where they thought such an enterprise state should aspire. In this regard, Sir Thomas More’s Utopia foreshadows the modern political left and contains some elements of Socialist and Communist thought. In contrast, Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince and his Discourses on Livy contain more “rightist” seeds of Nationalism, Imperialism, and even Fascism. Together, Machiavelli and More stand like rival colossi at the gateway of modern political philosophy, unaware of the totalitarian destinies towards which their ideals would one day tread.

That More favored republican government is obvious even in the first few pages of Utopia long before he had begun to spell out the structure of the Utopian government. More strongly criticized the monarchical regimes of his era, saying that “most princes apply themselves more to the affairs of war than to the useful arts of peace” and that “they are generally more set on acquiring new kingdoms, right or wrong, than on governing well those they possess.” Against this, More argued that the duty of a monarch, and presumably that of any ruler, was to “take more care of his people’s happiness than his own” and preside over a peaceful and prosperous state. Yet More made it clear that he regarded the monarchical system as fundamentally flawed, and that enlightened counselors such as himself were more or less incapable of reforming it from within. As he remarked, “there is no room for philosophy in the Courts of Princes, where great affairs are carried on by authority.” In Book II, More outlined his republican solution in the form of the fictional ideal state, Utopia, which...
possesses a number of extraordinarily forward-looking republican institutions, most of which would not be tested by Western Civilization until the founding of the United States more than two centuries after More had written.23 Utopia is what the American founders would have termed a "large republic", being a confederation of fifty-four republican city-states bound together by a federal legislature of three "senators" from each city. Each Utopian city state possesses a republican government complete with a legislature and an executive. The legislature is bicameral, with more local 'syphogrants' and more superior 'transibors' (who rotate to assist the executive). The semi-executive function of the upper house resembles some practices of the pre-revolutionary American colonies. The executive "prince", who has a life-term, is also chosen by an American Colonial procedure, through a combination of the people and the legislature. In these few short pages, More clearly anticipated the innovations and controversies of the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers that would occur more than two hundred and fifty years later.24

In contrast to More, Machiavelli’s republicanism comes as a surprise to many readers, especially those who have only encountered The Prince and not the Discourses, but it is no less true to say that he was a republican thinker than it is to identify his English contemporary as one. The former work, his famed instruction manual for autocratic rule, would seem to belie the claim that he ascribed to republican thought. Yet the Discourses, which, unlike The Prince, was not written for a public audience, doubtless more accurately reflects the true character of his thought.25 In the work, Machiavelli clearly asserts that republics are superior to the rule of a single man for their longevity, stability, and conduciveness to classical virtue and to geographic expansion. One passage in particular confirms him as a republican thinker; in it, Machiavelli notes that, throughout history, the states that operated as pure monarchies, oligarchies, or democracies (the three classical government types) were often susceptible to a cycle of revolution and authoritarian rule that deprived the polity of any lasting social stability. Machiavelli presented his solution to this dilemma by arguing, "thus, those who were prudent in establishing laws recognized this fact and avoiding each of the forms in themselves, chose one that combined them all, judging such a government to be steadier and more stable..."26 Machiavelli presented two ancient republics, Sparta and Rome, as examples of states which successfully combined the government types into peaceful and lawful regimes, while he criticized the Athenian democracy because it "did not mix democracy with the power of the principality and with that of the aristocrats."27 Machiavelli demonstrated, with this concept of a "mixed" government, that his ideal was not the autocratic monarchy of The Prince, but in fact something far more nuanced and radical. Not only did it look back to Antiquity with a critical eye, but it unknowingly looked forward into the future. The concept of combining the best elements of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy is central to republican political theory, as the American Founders and other Enlightenment thinkers would later understand, and hence Machiavelli was just as much ahead of his time as was More.28

For both More and Machiavelli a republic was more than a mere regime in which citizens autonomously live their lives, striving for whatever ends please them. Their respective republican governments are in fact engaged in an idealistic enterprise, endeavoring to forcefully reshape society and individuals. In these philosophical differences, we encounter More and Machiavelli’s most revolutionary and radical sentiments—sentiments which, in contrast to their innocuous republican similarities, bear the seeds of the totalitarian ideologies of left and right.

More’s ideal republic is what we would today term a “leftist” enterprise state, for its telos, or purpose, is to achieve complete human economic and political equality by removing the temptations of material and political gain. Its all-powerful state benevolently regulates its
citizens’ lives to maintain this egalitarian environment, rotating them efficiently between urban and rural communes whose land, facilities, and surplus goods are the property of the state and not of individuals. Political office brings no social distinction, and people pursue different careers and trades only insofar as the state deems them useful to the community. In return, the state keeps treatable disease, violent death, crime, warfare, competition, and other typical forms of adversity to a minimal level. Although citizens rotate as members of a “family”, the State reserves the right to transfer individuals between families in order to equalize population and to provide them with training in their chosen trades. In this sense, the defining unit of society is the individual and the defining relationship of society is between the individual and the State, which more or less owns his life, as well as the fruits of his labor. The guiding principles of Utopian society are egalitarianism, a cura personalis approach to philosophy and earthly pleasure, and an un-dogmatically Deist consensus about religion and the afterlife. At root, More and his ideal republic are egalitarianism, a cura personalis approach to philosophy and earthly pleasure, and an un-dogmatically Deist consensus about religion and the afterlife. At root, More and his ideal republic evoke an idealized conception of human nature, as evidenced by the lack of dissent and corruption in Utopian society that prevails even without the oversight of modern surveillance techniques and bureaucracy. For More, the human character is apparently eminently perfectible if the state will only provide him with a conducive environment for flourishing. Yet they are also different; whereas More saw such an environment as liberating man’s natural goodness Machiavelli saw it as restraining his natural wickedness.  

So what, then, were the qualities of Machiavelli’s republic? First and foremost, it needed to engage in imperialism and expansion. He derived this principle by comparing the “exclusive model” of Sparta and Venice with the “expansionary model” of Rome. The former two republics, he argued, thrived for many centuries in security and social harmony by limiting their expansion, remaining ethnically exclusive and hierarchical, and by virtue of their remote locations. However, Machiavelli claimed that even if the need for expansion did not undermine a republic of the exclusive model, “…it is impossible for a republic to succeed in remaining tranquil and to enjoy its liberty within its own narrow confines, for if the republic does not harm others she will be harmed herself; and as a result of being harmed the desire and the necessity for expansion will arise.” Instead, a republic
at its founding should not only be equipped for expansion, but also be situated in a fertile location, in which it comes into conflict and competition with other powers. The mild climate and threat of rival principalities, he further reckoned, would compel the state to instill military discipline in its citizens by force of law, which is a good thing in itself. That the choice for Machiavelli’s republic lay between excluding foreign nationalities on the one hand and conquering them by force on the other lends strong credence to the claim that it is Fascist in character.

Indeed, the notion that martial values and war are in themselves good for the health of a polity is a hallmark of Fascism, as is the notion that nationalities are in a perpetual struggle that can only be resolved if the superior races subjugate the rest, or at least keep themselves “pure”. Different forms of Fascism have emphasized certain of these outcomes to varying degrees. One could argue that Machiavelli saw his republic as having a choice between a Nazi “expansionary” Fascism and a more “defensive”, Franco-style Fascism. In either case, the survivalist and martial undertones come across strongly in Machiavelli’s arguments.

With respect to the internal governance of the republic, the Florentine political philosopher argued that his republic needed to promote social cohesion and national harmony using those traditions and religions which foster civic loyalty and martial virtues. Once again his argument was premised on historical analysis, in this case an examination of the state religion of the Roman Republic. Machiavelli enthusiastically commended the nationalist pagan religion which King Numa Pompilius had handed down to the Roman kingdom and republic. To him, its significance lay in the fact that it helped the Romans have a strong national spirit and cohesion in their national undertakings. With his subsequent description, Machiavelli revealed that he cynically regarded religion as essentially nothing more than a useful tool of the state to promote social cohesion and loyalty, for “the observance of religious teaching is the reason for the greatness of republics, in like manner the disdain of the practice is the cause of their ruin: for where the fear of God is lacking a kingdom must either come to ruin or be sustained by the fear of a prince who makes up for the lack of religion.”

This attitude strongly evokes the prevalent policy of Fascist regimes in the twentieth century of using nationalist and traditionalist elements of the Christian churches to shore up their authority, while at the same time disdaining their transcendent and universalist tendencies. Regarding the more universalist Christianity of his era, Machiavelli argued that it “established as the supreme good humility, abjection, and contempt for human affairs, while ancient religion defined it as grandeur of spirit, strength of body, and all the other things likely to make men most vigorous.” This language, eerily reminiscent of Nietzsche and certain proto-Fascist thinkers, indicates the sort of martial qualities that Machiavelli believed the culture of a state should instill in its citizens.

The three major philosophical works of Thomas More and Niccolo Machiavelli, Utopia, The Prince, and the Discourses, embody ideals, principles, and convictions that foreshadow the course of Western political history well into the twentieth century. Both, anticipating the Enlightenment, agreed in their identification of a republic as the best regime, but they differed as to the means by which these governments were to achieve their respective conceptions of human flourishing. Though starting from contrasting convictions about human nature, they agreed that mankind needs direction from the state, whether for liberation of its goodness or coercion of its sinfulness. With these revolutionary outlooks, they foreshadowed the enterprise states and totalitarian movements of the twentieth century and this fact is a testament to the prescient power of their intellects and the Renaissance societies which nurtured them.

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Saint Augustine has been claimed by thinkers in nearly every school of thought. Professor Todd Breyfogle has pointed out that various commentators have identified the Bishop of Hippo with anything from authoritarianism to a politics of limits; that some call him the root of modern liberal politics while others say he supports the classical ideal of the polis. One could blame him as the cause of the complacency that lets the problems of this earthly life go unaddressed, while another could at the same time argue that he gives men the only true motivation for service to others. Augustine’s output is so vast that it is not surprising that such a wide array of conclusions should be drawn from them. Perhaps the cause of such a lack of consensus is not the inaccuracy of these evaluations, or even the inadequacy of our paradigm of political thought, but in our attempt to treat Augustine as we do other political theorists. Augustine did not intend that City of God should be a systematized theory of political engagement. As Villanova political theorist Thomas Smith has noted, Augustine’s goal is not theoretical but practical. His stated purpose is “to enhance the glory of the City of God, which will shine the more brightly when set in contrast with cities of other allegiance,” not to set forth the design of a regime that will achieve the most flourishing. Despite this, however, the former may not preclude the latter. In fact the primary disposition of Christians who think about politics ought to be one of reverence for the City of God, God’s divine kingdom yet to come, for true Christian politics places its telos not in this world, but in the consummation of the City of God in the next world.

Such an approach to politics would go far in correcting the problems regarding the understanding of the role of politics held by many of today’s right-wing Evangelical Christians. The way in which the Religious Right approaches political engagement in our era is marked by an earnestly-felt need to Christianize America through politics, a conflation of Christian flourishing with earthly flourishing, and a false no-
tion of divine approval rooted in a skewed view of America’s heritage. Were the Religious Right to ever grapple with Augustine’s insights in *City of God*, particularly with his most foundational one, the profound disparity between the City of God and the earthly city, it would face two sobering propositions: first, that the City of God has never eclipsed and can never eclipse the earthly city, whether by politics or other means, and second, that therefore the greater political community of America should not be the place to evaluate the success of God’s mission in this world.

Likely no Christians would flatly say that they think heaven can be achieved on earth, but it is often the underlying assumption of the Religious Right. They reason that if God is Lord of all, his rule must therefore exercise itself through political rule. Influential Evangelical Francis Schaeffer writes of the Moral Majority, an evangelical activist group from the 1980’s, that they “have carried the fact that law is king, law is above the lawmakers, and God is above the law into this area of life where it always should have been.” Like Schaeffer, many Evangelicals firmly believe that we have a moral obligation to extend “the Lordship of Christ,” to use Schaefer’s words, through law over all of society, and that a top-down Christian influence over society glorifies God. Such influence usually does not affect religious practice, but rather social issues. The assumption is that a more moral society glorifies God more than an immoral one, regardless of the state of each individual soul in the society, and should therefore be the aim of every Christian.

This idea that the two groups, Christians and non-Christians, are in a fight with each other for control over one law springs from the conflation of divine favor and earthly flourishing. Through reading Old Testament prophets, who attribute Israel’s suffering to Israel’s betrayal of God, many conservative Evangelicals conclude that these prophetic voices are addressed equally to a morally declining America. The more pious society, it is held, the greater it will flourish and the more prosperous it will be. Fundamentalist Baptist pastor Dennis Terry introduced presidential hopeful Rick Santorum expressing this very conviction: “I believe that Christians in America is [sic] the key to the jobless rate continuing to go down… If we put God back in America, in Washington, D.C…. then we can have revival in America, and the Holy Spirit will show up, and great things will happen for this country.” The Lord’s judgment and rewarding of His people Israel, as seen in the Old Testament, is thus applied by such Christians directly to life in the twenty-first century.

Perhaps the common root of both of these traits is the belief in a certain religious version of American Exceptionalism: that America, because of her prosperity and freedom, is a divinely appointed Christian Nation. American Christians note the religious character of the early American documents and literature, as well as the triumph over religious persecution that preceded independence, as nothing less than divine endorsements, so to speak. As they see it, America was commissioned by God two centuries ago and has been slowly drifting away from its roots ever since.

The modern phenomena of the American Religious Right can be cast in Augustinian terms: American Christians conflate the City of God—that portion of the human race which lives according to God’s will—with the earthly city—the portion which instead lives by human standards. On account of this fundamental error, they glorify this “immanentized” City of God much more than the true one, the consummation of which will be at Christ’s second coming and no sooner. This glorification of the earthly city yields restlessness in the hearts of American Christians when the earthly city is anywhere short of perfect. Alexis de Tocqueville discerned the root of this restlessness over 150 years ago, writing:

[The American’s] setbacks teach him that no one has discovered absolute good; his successes inspire him to seek it without slackening. Thus, searching always, falling,
picking himself up again, often disappointed, he is ever striving toward that immense grandeur glimpsed indistinctly at the end of the long track humanity must follow.\textsuperscript{43}

...It is odd to watch with what feverish ardor the Americans pursue prosperity and how they are ever tormented by the shadowy suspicion that they may not have chosen the shortest route to get it. The American cleaves to the things of this world as if assured that they will never die, and yet are in such a rush to snatch any that come within their reach, as if expecting to stop living before they have relished them. They clutch everything but hold nothing fast, and so lose grip as they hurry after some new delight. Death steps in in the end and stops him before he has grown tired of this futile pursuit of that complete felicity which always escapes him.\textsuperscript{44}

What Tocqueville saw in America was the unexpected negative effect of the seemingly limitless possibilities in the New World. To Tocqueville, an aristocrat from Europe, this egalitarian meritocracy we take for granted today was in sharp contrast to the traditionally defined social structure of his homeland: in eighteenth-century France a man’s life was virtually determined by his class and family, and his prospects for something different were very slight. Yet in America virtually all such constraints had been wiped away, and each man held his destiny in his own hands, or so he thought. But what seems possible and what is possible are not always the same, and thus the American’s hopes always exceeded his experience, yet were always still projected onto the things of this world. This is not an exclusively American or even modern phenomenon. Tocqueville noted that “it is a spectacle as old as the world; all that is new is to see a whole people performing in it.”\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, Augustine himself lived out this very “spectacle”, and it decisively influenced his thought.

Augustine’s reflections on the Christian’s place in earthly society bear invaluable application to us respecting the three traits explained above. Like his intellectual forefather Plato, Augustine wisely saw that justice in society begins with justice in each individual soul, and therefore, to add the Christian element, so long as sin remains in the soul, society remains imperfect: “For if a soul does not serve God it cannot with any kind of justice command the body, nor can man’s reason control the vicious elements in the soul. And if there is no justice in such a man, there can be no sort of doubt that there is no justice in a gathering which consists of such men.”\textsuperscript{46} Therefore there is an irreconcilable divide between the two intermixed collectives of people, the City of God, made up of souls “justified” by God, and the earthly city.\textsuperscript{47} The top-down approach of such Christians as Schaeffer that seeks to establish the “Lordship of Christ” over all of society too easily tries to overcome this divide. Augustine tempers such grandiose ambition with a healthy dose of realism. He argues that Christian laws do not necessarily make a nation Christian. This realization ought to limit our expectations from the political realm. Human perfectibility, in society just as much as in the individual, is not possible in this life. Therefore, the Christian must accept that, so long as the two divorced cities are intermingled, his dwelling place will have faults; it will be tragic.

This is certainly not to say that the Christian is justified to act wrongfully. Augustinian realism is far from Machiavellian realism. Machiavelli and Augustine saw the same sad truth about mankind: he is sinful. He cannot be expected to act virtuously, and therefore the state cannot legislate as though he will. Machiavelli concludes from this that standards are meaningless, that virtue is a bane and not a boon. What matters is securing and maintaining power, by whatever means necessary. Augustine does not go so far. By his logic, he could not, for evil only exists because good pre-exists; evil is the lack of a good where a good ought to be. Therefore the standard of the good must remain or what
has been identified as sin can no longer be so. For Augustine sin is a tragic constant in this life that nevertheless must be countered by justice to achieve the “peace of Babylon” which the two opposing cities may share, at least for a time. Thus Augustinian realism is a balanced combination of classical political philosophy and later realism, upholding the ideal of the former while acknowledging the sad truth of the latter.

Augustine’s profound realization of the presence of sin in the world leads him to conclude that Christians cannot be exempt from its ill effects any more than the heathen are. This does away with the notion that earthly prosperity is directly related to the level of Christian political influence on the nation. Such thinking arises from ignorance of the extent to which sin has affected all humanity, even the regenerate believer. Augustine was able to astutely perceive that, “Good and bad are chastised together, not because both alike live evil lives, but because both alike, though not in the same degree, love this temporal life.” Moreover, if it were true that man’s earthly prosperity were determined by his righteousness, man’s beatitude would be a thing of this life. It is not. Augustine writes, “But [God] has willed that these temporal goods and temporal evils should befall good and bad alike, so that the good things should not be too eagerly coveted, when it is seen that the wicked also enjoy them, and that the evils should not be discreditably shunned, when it is apparent that the good are often afflicted with them.” So why is it, then, that some people and some eras see prosperity? Augustine’s answer is the same for both scenarios: so that Christians may not create idols of prosperity and security.

This fact should not discourage but rather be a cause for joy to the Christian. In truth, the flourishing of the City of God on pilgrimage does not depend on the flourishing of the earthly city. On the contrary, there is no change of circumstance that can hinder the flourishing of the City of God, for it is not in the circumstances themselves that prosperity lies but in the soul’s handling of them. As Augustine himself remarked, “The fire which makes gold shine makes chaff smoke.”

Good fortune and bad fortune alike can serve to advance the soul of the Christian on the path to its beatitude. These reflections must cause us to change our conception of prosperity. True prosperity, the soul’s virtue, may indeed be had in greater amount by the poor slave than his rich master; for though slave, the former is free, and though free from bonds, his master may be slave to vice.

Going hand in hand with an awareness of sin’s ubiquity in society is the knowledge that no time in history is worth our longing for it. It may come as a surprise to conservative Christians that Augustine spends half his ink in the City of God dismantling the Romans’ idealized conceptions of their past, proving that it was never a true republic because true justice never existed in it. At the time Augustine began the City of God, the Roman people was shaken to its very core by the recent sack of the city by the Gauls. Rome, long thought to be immortal and eternal, began to show signs of mortality and temporality. The entire worldview of most of Augustine’s contemporaries was upended. Not even the Christians were totally immune to the shock; Christianity itself had begun in the Roman era, and many wondered whether it would be able to survive the Empire’s collapse. It was to assure men of the security and steadfastness of the faith, that Augustine wrote his magnum opus et arduum.

Christians’ lamentations of the present, he trenchantly argued, were tied to their idealization of the past, of their “immanentized” equation of the City of God with the Roman polity. The destruction of this illusion, he further contended, was good, for only with the wretched truth of the earthly city exposed could the City of God, the Christian’s blessed hope, shine in glory. The Christian is not tied to such conceptions of the past because he knows that the only truly perfect city will be joined together in the future, when time has ceased and the past, the present, and the future are one. When the earthly city has an appearance of splendor, as it has
in our recent history and as it did in Augustine’s Rome, men hold fast to it, and then anguish when that splendor fades. Though certainly many wise principles were applied in America’s founding era, to which principles we would do well to return, many Christians either forget or are oblivious to the fact that America is largely a product of Enlightenment thinking, a huge departure from much of the Christian wisdom of the past. A sober Augustinian reminder of the earthly city’s depravity would indeed go a long way in assuaging the anxieties of many contemporary Christians over poorly run politics. What else should we expect from fallen mankind, he would undoubtedly ask. But citizens of the City of God, as he would be quick to remind us, need never anguish, for the splendor of their fatherland never fades and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

In short, the approach to politics that Augustine advances is one of both realism and hope. It acknowledges the limits of what is possible in this mortal life, only to shatter any such limit to the bliss of eternal life. It is at once morbid and joyful, the outlook of pilgrims not yet home. Professor Smith employs the best analogy to illustrate this dynamic, that of a foreign traveler. He asks how an American couple ought to live in Austria, and his answer is as resident aliens:

In short, the family must live in Austria without being of it... And to make sure that their true home is not forgotten, they will seek to make the United States, absent from them in its fullness, present by retaining its language, customs, and celebrations in their home. When they celebrate American holidays with the American community they meet in Austria amid American symbols and cultural trappings, America is present to them in faith, hope, and love. If they wish to remain American citizens during their stay overseas, they must struggle to love a community that is at once absent in its fullness yet present in their expectations, desires, and ritual celebrations.

As citizens of heaven, Christians, too, are “foreign travelers” in this world. Just as American travelers in Austria always have the lingering expectation of returning home, so also Christians will have this constant expectation until death or the parousia. Thus the Christian does not approach politics with an eye toward arranging for his final beatitude but rather with the lower goal of achieving a “compromise between human wills” of Christians and non-Christians, so that he may practice his religion peacefully.

This perspective on man’s life in the world may seem morbid or relieving, depending on the reader. To understand Augustine’s simultaneously tragic and hopeful writing we must understand the man himself. Such universal claims about the proper life of Christians on earth trace back to very particular insights into his own human experience. Throughout his years Augustine sought the good life. His life was marked by several significant “conversions,” changes of the object in which he sought his Supreme Good. As a youth, he, like many young Romans, aspired to the glory of a life of politics. But in 373, at age 19, a transformative encounter with Cicero’s lost dialogue Hortensius changed his hope. Of this book Augustine writes, “It altered my outlook on life. It changed my prayers to you, O Lord, and provided me with new hopes and aspirations. All my empty dreams suddenly lost their charm and my heart began to throb with a bewildering passion for the wisdom of eternal truth.”

This “conversion” led Augustine first into Manichaeism and a literary career. Manichaeism, with its material explanation of good and evil, gave Augustine the illusion of wisdom but left him somewhat helpless to progress morally. He continued in this sect until he encountered the Platonists. Among other things, the Platonic philosophy offered Augustine something which Manichaeism had failed to provide: the possibility to attain true wisdom. Peter Brown, in his definitive biography of Augustine, writes, “The Platonists had always felt able to offer a vision of God that a man might gain for himself, by himself, through the unaided, rational ‘ascent’ of his
mind to the realm of ideas.” From Platonism it was just a small step to accept the Christian claim of the Word made flesh. As of yet, however, his repentance and embrace of the faith was still a means to the ideal of wisdom, which he still thought to be his telos in life.

It was another intellectual epiphany that caused Augustine’s career change from teaching to a life of “Christian otium” with friends in Cassiciacum, a town outside Milan, which consisted of reading, writing, and seeking to attain the wisdom of God. An inner conflict over his ability to give himself wholly over to God led Augustine to leave this leisureed life to seek baptism from the bishop Ambrose in Milan in 387. Augustine subsequently made his way to Hippo in North Africa and became a priest there in 391. He still maintained his hope of attaining wisdom, but during the next ten years he abandoned it. The cause of this change is not entirely clear to historians, but we know that at some point before the year 400 Augustine preached to his flock:

Whoever thinks that in this mortal life a man may so disperse the mists of bodily and carnal imaginings as to possess the unclouded light of changeless truth, and to cleave to it with the unswerving constancy of a spirit wholly estranged from the common ways of life – he understands neither What he seeks, nor who he is who seeks it.57

And he expressed the same sentiment in the year 397 in the Confessions, writing:

And sometimes you allow me to experience a feeling quite unlike my normal state, an inward sense of delight which, if it were to reach perfection in me, would be something not encountered in this life, though what it is I cannot tell. But my heavy burden of distress drags me down again to earth.58

Augustine had finally embraced the tragic nature of this mortal life and the limits to human fulfillment in it. This is arguably his last major intellectual “conversion”. It was not just Christian doctrine but his own experience that told him that his true citizenship was not of this world, and therefore not to any city in it. Hence that unforgettable line at the beginning of the Confessions is as political a statement as any: “Our hearts are restless until they find rest in Thee.”59

Augustine’s approach to politics follows from this very personal series of epiphanies; the paradigm of pilgrimage is not simply political but existential. Thus it can only be truly shared by those who share Augustine’s experiential awareness that we are citizens of a different city than any that could be found or founded on this earth. Augustine had reached the limits of human nature and saw that it pointed outside and above itself. Therefore, citizens of the City of God are so because of a soul change to the love of God. We should not think of the City of God as a collective of any and all who associate themselves with Christianity, because her citizens are made so, not by an assent of the intellect, but by love; each one affectionately yearns for God.

We see in the particular case of Augustine that the transformation of society begins with the transformation of the soul. Hence the primacy of the Church; the building of the City of God is done not through policy changes, but through the sanctification of souls; not through the state, but through the Church. The life of the pilgrim Christian is to be lived in the context of the Church, for the Christian pursuit of the Supreme Good is made complete by friendship, a proposition to which Augustine would have been the first to agree. And the reforming of the world is to be accomplished through the work of the church, for true justice begins in the soul’s orientation and submission to God.60 This realization also greatly lowers the Christian’s sights of what is possible in this life, for as an individual he has a limited capacity to reach others. The Christian must accept his limited capability of “saving the world”. But this humbling truth only serves to remind him of the finitude and limits of this mortal life, and therefore how much is to be hoped for in the life to come. He
sees that there is no hope of wholly saving this earthly city, and thus he all the more yearns for That City which is above all others.

With this view of life and politics, all the Christian needs from the temporal state is the freedom and protection to live out his faith in peace. He can understand Paul’s command to Timothy (one of the very few politically relevant passages in Scripture) to pray “for kings and all who are in high positions, that we may lead a peaceful and quiet life, godly and dignified in every way.”

Given its divergences with the Religious Right, an Augustinian approach to political engagement is not likely to gain acceptance among politically active Christians. Thus it is fair to ask: is an Augustinian outlook compatible with political engagement? The energy poured into the political process by candidates, campaign workers, legislative staff, lobbyists and others certainly comes from the hope that the outcome of their efforts would be a far better state, nation, or society than the current one—the hope of the perfect city. Augustine, like Plato, had something to say about the perfect city: it is in heaven. Perhaps more important is the implication: it is not on earth. Such a conviction, if any politically engaged person developed it, would likely take the wind out of her sails. But this effect does not follow necessarily. Perhaps politically active Christians can adopt this mindset and aim not so much at “establishing the lordship of Christ” over the city of man, but at the much lower goal of maintaining the peace of Babylon. They could labor at this task all the more effectively because they would understand that they are not yet home. And to all those around them, to those who do not share Augustine’s conviction regarding the limits to happiness in this mortal life, they would be a cause for confusion. Were they to pick up City of God or Confessions they would find a similar cause for confusion: the fact that at the same time as he laments the wretchedness of life, Augustine waxes beautifully about love more than any other subject. He was a man at once pessimistic and “rooted and grounded in love.” But to others, to Christians throughout the ages, his words ring true and give wisdom for political life in light of the world’s finitude and wretchedness on the one hand, and its goodness, truth, and beauty on the other. This dichotomy explains how, in the words of G.K. Chesterton, one can “feel homesick at home,” for in fact the Christian is not yet home.

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The Farmer and the Motorcycle Mechanic

Jonathan Askonas

...I don’t like machines, which are neither mortal nor immortal, though I am constrained to use them. (Thus the age perfects its clench.) Some day they will be gone, and that will be a glad and a holy day. I mean the dire machines that run by burning the world’s body and its breath. When I see an airplane fuming through the once-pure sky or a vehicle of the outer space with its little inner space imitating a star at night, I say, ‘Get out of there!’ as I would speak to a fox or a thief in the henhouse.

–Wendell Berry, “Some Further Words”

While vintage motorcycles are certainly not first on the list of machines with which agrarian philosopher Wendell Berry wishes to do away, there is nonetheless an uneasy tension between his views and those of ethicist Matthew Crawford’s on technology. While Berry consistently prefers hand tools to power tools and implies that internal combustion engines are a necessary evil, Crawford limits his critiques of technology to those individual and societal technologies that undermine craft or trade work. While Berry is a well-known contrarian, it is curious to find this disparity between two authors whose writings on the dignity, purpose, and pleasure of work are otherwise so similar. This essay seeks to identify the roots of Berry and Crawford’s disagreement through the hermeneutic of Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics. Crawford and Berry, following MacIntyre, both identify virtues intrinsic to labor. Crawford explicitly invokes MacIntyre in the acknowledgements for Shop Class as Soul Craft, and MacIntyre’s After Virtue is itself clearly echoed in Crawford’s writing. Whether Berry has read MacIntyre is unclear, but their respective works certainly coalesce around notions of virtue, the nature of public and private, and the reexamination of particularity as a foundation for ethics. This analysis reveals that Crawford and Berry essentially agree about the relationship between work and virtue and the individual, communal, and societal levels in which virtue is enacted. However, Berry adds an additional scale that alters his relationship to technology: the Great Economy, encompassing not only human environments but the entire Kingdom of God.

Crawford’s work Shop Class as Soulcraft provides both a theoretical framework and practical examples of the relationship of work to virtue.
For Crawford, the practice of judgment is the distinguishing characteristic of virtuous work. This perspective, alongside the concept of internal goods, seems to articulate well the distinction that MacIntyre makes throughout *After Virtue* between human practices and more menial activities. Crawford echoes MacIntyre when he writes: “Every trade is different. Each offers its own intrinsic satisfactions, characteristic frustrations, and cognitive challenges; sometimes these challenges are rich enough to be totally absorbing.” For Crawford, the individual learns ethical as well as intellectual virtues as he adopts his practices to the objective reality he encounters, gaining skill and judgment in the process. This knowledge is inherently contextual, acquired by specific kinds of work, but the product of the labor is held to the objective standards of the practice (internal goods), against which the practitioner is measured. Virtue, the excellence that enables the practitioner to advance in these internal goods, thus emerges out of the characteristics and necessities of the practice. Hence, the goods of motorcycle maintenance are the repair of bikes and the ensuring of their long-term functioning (what might be called “motorcycle flourishing”). Entailed in the attainment of these goods is a set of virtues such as attentiveness, intuition particular to motorcycles, and practical wisdom as well as skills like being able to remove an engine without destroying the bolts holding it in place. This same hermeneutic of virtue holds true for most trade or craft work but not, it must be stressed, for most work subject to the division of labor, for in such activity skills, practices, and goods are separated from one another. As it relates to the question of technology, it is immediately clear that the divergence of Berry and Crawford does not emerge in their analysis of individual virtues. While both philosophers denigrate technologies that divide labor (thus destroying the link between virtue and work), they also presume the goodness of tools useful to undivided practices (e.g. motorcycles are intrinsic to the practice of motorcycle maintenance - their goodness is assumed in the activity). If there is a disagreement between them, it must arise elsewhere.

The goods of a practice do not end at the individual. As Crawford writes, one of the joys of motorcycle maintenance (and of all practices in general) is the community of mechanics that arises from mutual striving towards shared ends. Crawford refers to this as a “community of work” that overlaps with a “community of consumption,” by which he means that the pleasure found in the internal goods of the practice overwhelms, in part, the distinction between work and leisure so that the workman is also a partaker in the leisurely side of his practice. Thus, Crawford writes of his time in the “community of speed” at Donsco Speed Shop (his local parts store) and of cruising with the men and women whose bikes he had fixed. This group of people together form an informal institution of virtue that sustains and maintains a practice, its standards, and its goods, thus ensuring the survival of the practice (in this case, good motorcycle maintenance) in the long-term. Without this community, collective knowledge and experience would be lost, standards would loosen, and other goods would eventually creep in. However, just as at the individual level, a community of motorcycle enthusiasts revolves around and presumes the goodness of motorcycles and thus its internal goods implicitly sanction the technology. Nothing in Berry’s philosophy of community condemns the role of technology in community; thus it is necessary to further broaden the scope of our study to find his fundamental contention.

As Crawford points out in his conclusion, communities of particular virtue also foster the virtues necessary for bodies politic. Individuals growing in practical wisdom are better citizens, and moreover, trade and craft practices force individuals both to gain concrete skills and to experience failure in objective terms, leading them to better understand both reality and human limits. Further, it is within the political community that the individual encounters the tension between internal and external goods. Crawford, for example, writes of his great difficulty.
in drafting fair bills for his clients, balancing his love for the work with the banal necessity of feeding himself. Every citizen must likewise balance the internal goods of his practice with the internal goods of citizenship and the generic external goods of money, power, and status. Taken as a whole, practices of virtue thus strengthen and harmonize the political community.

Wendell Berry’s writings more or less concur with the above analysis of virtue in Crawford’s writing on motorcycles. Similar conceptions of virtue, practice and particularity inform Berry’s writings concerning farming. His controversial writing on tobacco farming, for example, defends primarily the internal goods of farming tobacco against those who malign tobacco’s broader societal effects. But to Crawford’s three layers of virtue Berry adds a critical fourth. For Berry, all human activity pales in comparison to what he refers to at times as the “Total Economy”, the “Great Economy” and the “Kingdom of Heaven”. This Great Economy is the whole activity of the earth and its creatures; it transcends and subsumes all human activity. The foundations of human participation in the Great Economy are humility, limitation, and affection, for it is greater than us and we are created within it. Critical for understanding the goods of the Great Economy is the recognition that humans cannot make things or know the deepest patterns and principles of the Great Economy. Berry argues that humans can and ought to form minor economies of human practice and flourishing, but that these owe their foundation to the Great Economy, whence they draw all value and all substance. Thus, the foremost human virtue in the Great Economy is the affection whereby we cultivate “such love for a place and its life that [we] want to preserve it and remain in it.”

If such are the virtues internal to the Great Economy, then we can begin to understand Berry’s arguments regarding machines, particularly those driven by fossil fuels. In his view, we ought not to operate machines that fail to preserve the Great Economy by separating us from labor with the earth and placing us in an instrumental relationship to nature. We cannot listen to, feel, or care for the earth while we are distanced by a clumsy tractor or car. From his writings on the Great Economy, it is likely that Berry would question the motorcycle (and other such machines) in something like the following manner: does this machine abide by the rhythm and tempo of the Great Economy? Does it generate or degenerate the value of the earth? Does it live within limits, human and natural? And, most importantly, does it help you practice resurrection?

This last criterion, of embodying and imaging everyday the vitality of the world, points to the fundamentally religious and, indeed, eschatological character of Berry’s argument. Machines “neither mortal nor immortal” obscure from us the cycle of life and death going on beneath us and around us. Machines to Berry are vicious to the extent that they hide our ties to the earth from us and hamper our virtuous affection for the world. And yet Berry, the practical farmer, understands that those of us who live in the present age are constrained to use technology and thereby damage the earth. While the Great Economy warns us of our limits and simultaneously our coldness to them, there is yet grace to heal the earth. Practicing resurrection is more than caring for and healing the earth: it is also a virtue of hope. As we are called towards a greater age, an age in which we will know and love the world in a way occult to us now, the practice of resurrection is the connecting thread between man’s present telos and his everlasting purpose.

In the quiet of a natural world, we can again hear the Kingdom of God, echoed here in Berry’s poetry: “Heaven enough for me would be this world as I know it, but redeemed of our abuse of it and one another. It would be the Heaven of knowing again.”

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Of particular interest to Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is the idea of the “calling.” Indeed, the very title of the book might be explained as follows: a man’s calling imposes upon him certain obligations (leading to what Weber calls the “Protestant Ethic”), which over time and inadvertently fuel the “Spirit of Capitalism.” Stated somewhat differently, the idea of the calling, which began as a purely religious phenomenon, in time became an “iron cage”—a secularized one, no less—for the whole of capitalist society. My purpose in this paper is to explain, in Weber’s estimation, how such a transformation occurred. As Weber demonstrates, the norms attached to the calling, when carried to their logical conclusion, lead to deeply ironic consequences.

Weber finds the origins of the calling to be primarily religious in nature: “Now it is unmistakable that even in the German word Beruf, and perhaps still more clearly in the English calling, a religious conception, that of a task set by God, is at least suggested. The more emphasis is put upon the word in a concrete case, the more evident is the [religious] connotation.” What is more, the idea of the calling is a distinct product of the Reformation, meaning it is distinctly Protestant in nature. Weber does acknowledge that there may have been a different version of the calling within the Catholic Church before the Reformation, but that it was invoked in a very specific sense, namely, in priestly vocations. That is, only monks, priests, anyone of the organized clergy were called by God to their position in life. However, with the advent of the Reformation, Weber says, there is a universalization of the calling: “[E]very legitimate calling has exactly the same worth in the sight of God.” Weber also makes it clear that, at least for Luther, living acceptably to God does not mean excelling in “monastic asceticism” like the days of old, but rather through the “fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world.” The calling is universal in more ways than one: not only is it available to everyone, it may be fulfilled in a variety of ways.

Though Luther “mightily increased” the religious sanction of worldly labor, Weber asserts that Luther is not responsible for modern, capitalist society. In fact, in as far as Luther professed an economic teaching at all, by Weber’s standards he would belong to a group of premodern “traditionalists.” Economic “traditionalism,” as Weber understands it, is a specific kind of worldview, one that posits that “[a] man does not ‘by nature’ wish to earn more and more money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose.” Organized around this ethos, the traditionalist society as depicted by Weber enjoys a leisured, albeit austere, lifestyle, and although the class structure is more or less ossified, there is little resentment among the laborers and indeed even among commercial competitors. This sort of economic traditionalism—which we might trace back to Aristotle—obtained for hundreds, even thousands of years, making it “the most impor-
tant opponent with which the spirit of capitalism, in the sense of a definite standard of life claiming ethical sanction, has had to struggle.”

Above all, economic traditionalism was informed by Christianity in such a way that the economic and religious areas of life had become inseparable—i.e., not two separate “spheres” but one.

Luther, for his part, admonished his followers to “wait...for the coming of the Lord” and to “remain in the station and in the worldly occupation in which the call of the Lord had found [them], and labour as before.” In other words, “everyone should abide by his living and let the godless run after gain.” These words certainly do not coincide with the capitalist dogmas of upward mobility and accumulation of wealth. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that “programmes of ethical reform never were at the centre of interest for any of the religious reformers [like Luther and Calvin]....They were not the founders of societies for ethical culture nor the proponents of humanitarian projects for social reform or cultural ideals. The salvation of the soul and that alone was the centre of their life and work.” Luther and others put forward certain theological claims, from which other ancillary implications—moral, economic, etc.—could be derived. In calling Luther a “traditionalist,” then, Weber is claiming that Luther’s conception of the calling is traditionalist in nature, not that Luther is laying down some sort of positive economic argument.

Weber goes on to derive one very important implication from Luther’s admonition. Since each man’s vocation, and its attendant obligations, are a manifestation of the Divine Will, “[t]he pursuit of material gain beyond personal needs must thus appear as a symptom of lack of grace, and since it can apparently only be attained at the expense of others, directly reprehensible.”

One might say that Luther’s argument is highly Platonic: justice obtains when each man stays in his place and does not overreach. Commercialism, unbridled accumulation—for Luther, both can be subsumed under the larger category of mammonism. The Spirit of Capitalism “… evidently cannot be derived directly from the attitude of Luther and his Church to worldly activity.” Indeed, in the Weberian scheme of things Luther comes across as decidedly anti-capitalistic. Despite his traditionalist sensibilities, though, Luther laid the groundwork from which later figures would depart. Foremost among these men was John Calvin.

At this juncture it at least bears noting the biographical differences between Martin Luther and John Calvin. Luther’s father, Hans, had pre-arranged for his son a career in the law, an essentially secular way of life concerned solely with the quotidian needs of the present world. Yet despite his father’s encouragement, Luther’s law career ended almost as soon as it began. After two memorable experiences—the first a serious accident with a sword, the second a brush with a powerful thunderstorm—Luther decided to enter an Augustinian monastery, and thus never became fully ensconced in the secular world.

The story was different for John Calvin. Born of a “respectable middle class background,” Calvin’s father originally raised his son for an ecclesiastical career. Calvin’s university training in theology and philosophy, it was supposed, would lead him to life as a priest, until, in the late 1520s, his father had an abrupt change of heart. In Calvin’s words:

My father had intended me for theology from my early childhood. But when he reflected that the career of the law proved everywhere very lucrative for its practitioners, the prospect suddenly made him change his mind. And so it happened that I was called away from the study of philosophy and set to learning law.

And so, at least for a time, John Calvin immersed himself in the secular world of the law that Luther renounced. As a consequence, Luther and Calvin approached the idea of the calling from distinct and highly personal vantage points. Their differing theologies, it might be said, reflect in part their differing life experiences.
For Weber, Calvin does indeed take a new and precipitous “step” in his interpretation of the calling. Before discussing Calvin’s contribution to the calling, however, Weber makes an important note regarding his methodology: he will present all religious ideas in the “artificial simplicity of ideal types, as they could at best but seldom be found in history.” The simplicity afforded by ideal types gives Weber’s work considerable explanatory power, and it is to his explanation of John Calvin that we now turn.

Calvin’s idea of the calling is intimately bound up with the concept of predestination and a certain kind of rationalism. In the first place the doctrine of predestination foments a feeling of “unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual”; by the “quite incomprehensible decrees” of a distant deity the fate of every individual has been fixed from eternity. When added to the systematic stripping of all religious pomp and circumstance, as well as various mediating forces—sacraments, the Church proper, etc.—, one finds “the roots of [a] disillusioned and pessimistically inclined individualism.” Stated otherwise, Calvinism breeds a specific psychological type, one centered around the question: “Am I one of the elect?” This psychology transforms the nature and purpose of the calling.

In taking Luther’s idea of “justification by faith” to its radical conclusion, Calvin brings about an acute awareness of the fact that “however useless good works might be as a means of attaining salvation...they are indispensable as a sign of election.” To shirk one’s calling is to concede damnation. Instead, “intense worldly activity is recommended as the most suitable means [of achieving self-confidence]. It and it alone disperses religious doubts and gives the certainty of grace.” Not only does intense activity slake the Calvinist’s deep thirst for certainty, according to Weber it is also demanded by God: “Not leisure and enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase the glory of God, according to the definite manifestations of His will. Waste of time is thus [for the Calvinist] the first and in principle the deadliest of sins.” Indeed, God’s exhortation is even more specific: “What God demands is not labour in itself, but rational labour in a calling.”

We must now explore the consequences of Calvin’s rationalized calling. According to Weber, the enemy of rational asceticism was the “spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment” of life. Liturgically speaking, Calvinism ushered in a “rational suppression of the mystical, in fact the whole emotional side of religion.” The most salient byproduct of Calvin’s rationalism, though, is described by Richard Baxter:

If God shows you a way in which you may lawfully get more than in another way (without wrong to your soul or to any other), if you refuse this, and choose the less gainful way, you cross one of the ends of your calling, and you refuse to be God’s steward, and to accept His gifts and use them for Him when He requireth it: you may labour to be rich for God, though not for the flesh and sin.

This is an extremely telling passage, one that beautifully illustrates the main difference between Luther and Calvin: whereas Luther asked people to make the best of things (that is, to accept and work hard in their given station in life), Calvin asked people to make the most of things (to improve their station in the world as much as possible). In the eyes of Calvin, Luther’s advice amounts to a reprehensible—maybe even sinful—condoning of mediocrity and irrationalism. Weber thus explains that “Lutheranism...lacked a psychological sanction of systematic conduct to compel the methodical rationalization of life.” Under the Calvinist worldview, wealth is not some zero-sum game where one person’s gain is another’s loss, and consequently there is such a thing as wealth justly acquired. Rightly understood, Christians should accrue wealth for the greater glory of God: “wealth is thus bad ethically in so far as it is a temptation to idleness.
Calvinism in its purest form therefore rested on dual pillars:

[It] acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of possessions... [and] restricted consumption, especially of luxuries. On the other hand, it had the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods from the inhibitions of traditionalist ethics. It broke the bonds of the impulse of acquisition in that it not only legalized it, but (in the sense discussed) looked upon it as directly willed by God.  

The good Puritan was to be at once religiously ascetic and rationally acquisitive. For Calvin these two ideals did not stand in tension with one another because, in Weberian parlance, Calvin subordinated the economic sphere to the religious sphere.

The problem arises when the Kingdom of God becomes not the end, but the means; that is, when “Divine Providence” is deployed as a fig leaf over naked, secular self-interest. For the first time in Christian history, the businessman could do good by doing well. Over the passage of time, “where the fulfilment [sic] of the calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all.” What had once animated the calling—a profound and ascetic commitment to God—becomes a quaint relic of the past. John Wesley puts the irony as follows:

I fear, wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion. Therefore I do not see how it is possible, in the nature of things, for any revival of true religion to continue long. For religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches.

The Puritans set out to remake the world, with ironic success. Through his rationalization of the calling, Calvin set in motion strong—perhaps inexorable—forces that were profoundly unintended. Tellingly, Weber places Calvin’s thought at the “cradle” of modern economics. Modernity for Weber is largely characterized by the fragmentation of life into separate and autonomous “spheres.” Instead of organizing life under one comprehensive Weltanschauung (as in pre-modern times), modern man must reckon with distinct, competing spheres. In the context of the present discussion, whereas once the economic sphere was subordinated to the religious sphere, the logic of Calvin’s calling in fact reversed these two.

We thus arrive at the final version of the calling, whose “...essential elements...are the same as what we have just shown to be the content of the Puritan worldly asceticism, only without the religious basis.” In this end stage the calling has become hyper-universal—apparently demanded of every person, regardless of religion—and hyper-rational—in thorough opposition to any sort of magic or religion. Hence the two most famous lines of the Protestant Ethic: “In Baxter’s view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the ‘saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment’. But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.”

This jarring and somewhat cryptic conclusion cannot be adequately treated within the confines of the present essay. Suffice it to say that, for Weber, there is no easy way out of our modern economic predicament. Reenchantment of the calling seems impossible and, even if it were possible, it would prove futile. Capitalism no longer needs its religious roots to sustain itself; it instead depends on something far more reliable: rational, calculating self-interest. By weaving the smaller narratives of Luther and Calvin into a larger “grand narrative,” Weber demonstrates how the universalism of Luther’s calling and the rationalism of Calvin’s were combined and radicalized into the secular calling of Franklin’s day.
All of this holds out disastrous consequences for culture as a whole:

“Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.”

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Evaluating human life through the assumptions of modern laissez-faire economic theory has created many systemic problems throughout America. The destruction of communities, exploitation of the environment, and concentration of wealth and power are just a few of the consequences of this worldview. The most dangerous consequence, supported by this economic theory, is that there is not a universally recognizable way to live a good life—merely a series of preferences that govern one’s actions.

In order to detach ourselves from our self-image as purely economic creatures, we must first accept that there is such a thing as the good life, a singular way to live that is in accordance with human nature. After that, we must recognize that modern economics’ definition of free individuals as autonomous, rational, utility-maximizers is flawed.

In accordance with economic thought, many currently see freedom as the absence of nearly all limits on desires or even behavior, and promote this type of freedom as a universal human good. I wish to endorse Wendell Berry’s definition of freedom for a moral society—freedom “located not in the impulse of selfhood but in deliberately maintained connections.” Only through adopting this conception of freedom can we create an economy that promotes healthy local communities based on meaningful work and strong human relationships—the kind of economy that leads to human flourishing.

Along with Berry, Barry Lynn and Matthew Crawford also explore areas of dysfunction in the modern economy. Lynn’s writings on effective but targeted regulations provide us with a framework in which this governance can be effective in promoting the good life. Crawford’s book Shop Class As Soul Craft shows how meaningful work can give us deep satisfaction and ground us in substantial human relationships. Rather than outlining specific policy measures, in this paper I will explore how the works of Berry, Lynn, and Crawford support a conception of individual freedom which does not define humans radically individuated utility-maximizers.

I. The Decline of Community

In his book What Matters? Wendell Berry argues that the conflation of freedom with the absence of limits on human behavior is responsible for many of the social and economic problems we face today. The very foundation of our present economy is the “doctrine of general human limitlessness,” meaning that “all are entitled to pursue without limit whatever they conceive as desirable.” This limitlessness applies on every level of the economy, from individuals to corporations. In both areas, it destroys the safeguards which would prevent self-interest from corrupting our economy and our morality.

On the individual level, “we have tried to define ‘freedom’ as an escape from all restraint,” allowing us to justify the harms we inflict on the environment and others in the single-minded pursuit of our goals. This definition of freedom is deeply ingrained in the American psyche, and it profoundly re-shapes our self-image. We have “assumed godly limitlessness,” believing that we can transcend nearly any natural limits on our capabilities. Our efforts to push the bound-
aries of the human body are evidence of this. An individual who needs minimal food and sleep is held in high esteem, because he is more efficient and can complete more work than the average man. We constantly seek to expand the envelope of what is considered the peak of human capability.

Acting to expand the limits on human life leads to many advancements, but also to deleterious social consequences. We lose sight of the fact that “as humans, we must do certain things and we must not do certain things.” Our existence is driven solely by the cold logic of the market and the understanding that “the word ‘free’ has come to mean unlimited economic power for some, with the necessary consequence of economic powerlessness for others.”

This zero-sum way of looking at the world has caused interpersonal relationships, and consequently local communities, to break down. By always looking at the world using a cost-benefit analysis, we forgo acts of kindness and altruism which demonstrate our common humanity and help us build lasting friendships. The conception of freedom as the absence of all restrictions means that the exercise of one’s freedom often comes at another’s expense.

Most importantly, although we think we are autonomous and unencumbered by rules, we have only an impoverished view of freedom. We are simply locked in a constant struggle against our fellow citizens to see who can use their “freedom” to enrich themselves the most. This is the curse of the idea of freedom without limits. It can only be lifted by embracing a different definition of freedom, one that focuses not on “the selfish context of the individual life,” but rather on the “deliberately maintained connections” which make life meaningful.

The distorted conception of freedom applies to corporations as well as individuals. As Berry states, “the ‘right’ of a corporation to exercise its economic power without restraint is construed by the partisans of the ‘free market’ as a form of freedom, a political liberty.” However, this ‘right’ only ensures that those with the most money are able to set the rules for all other businesses, and consumers have no choice but to fall in line. The end result is that “everything small, local, private, personal, natural, good, and beautiful must be sacrificed in the interest of the ‘free market’ and the great corporations.”

The fact that exercising freedom in the free market is the exercise of unchecked influence hurts consumers. A proper definition of freedom would recognize that limits on our behavior and desires are not handicaps, “but rather are inducements to formal elaboration and elegance, to fullness of relationship and meaning.” These limits would be determined by our responsibilities to our home, and our obligation to preserve one’s home for future generations. Examining the structure of the American marketplace makes it clear that businesses and consumers both sorely need a redefinition of freedom which is further in line with Berry’s ideal.

II. Monopolies and Distorted Markets

Barry Lynn’s book Cornered goes further into detail about the specific pathologies which are present in the United States’ economic system due to a distorted view of what constitutes freedom. The conception of freedom without limits has created a series of monopolies in various industries, with a few titans controlling the supply of household goods. In this way, Lynn argues, companies have used the extensive leeway that the people gave them to establish a money-making machine, maintained at the expense of the consumer.

For “under the banners of ‘free’ market and ‘free’ trade and ‘freedom’ from ‘government regulation’ these self-appointed lords seized monopolies . . . and transformed them into private taxation systems.” These monopolies are a direct result of the idea that freedom is the absence of limits, applied to the economic system.

While companies need a good deal of freedom in order to compete and innovate, unchecked freedom will result in monopolies and
uncompetitive practices which harm the consumer. Take, for example, the near disappearance of local microbreweries in the United States. Lynn states that at the start of World War II, there were 750 different companies that brewed beer in the United States. After an incredible wave of consolidation, “the United States was basically reduced to reliance on a world-bestriding beer duopoly, run not out of Milwaukee or St. Louis but out of Leuven, Belgium, and Johannesburg.”

Taking the best economic option available to them, smaller companies sold out to the larger ones, who continued to grow in the pursuit of higher profits and market share. As a result, communities based around a local brewery were decimated. The link between producer and consumer was severed, as people no longer knew where their beer was coming from or what costs were incurred in its production. Instead, the consumer now has a choice between a dizzying array of products, all marketed to a different niche but all still made by the same industrial conglomerate. This is exactly the outcome that one would expect given a system which believes that freedom is a company exercising its influence to the maximum degree, with minimal attempts by the government to regulate its actions.

Some may argue that this kind of activity is what one wants in a free-market system, since consumers benefit from low prices and a seeming plethora of choices. However, Lynn would argue that both of those benefits are mirages. What really exists is “a hierarchy of power in which a few immense trading companies—in control of and to some degree in cahoots with a few dominant supply conglomerates—govern almost all the industrial activities on which we depend.” We are merely “choosing” from a slate of options that has already been predetermined for us, different products which have all been precisely calibrated to achieve maximum profit for the corporation. Our expansive definition of freedom, and fixation on price as consumers, has caused this situation.

In order to address this problem, Lynn states that we must use regulation to break up into smaller concerns the institutions that monopolists “use to magnify their power.” In addition to breaking up these conglomerates, one must create political institutions that are small enough “to gather and process and transmit useful information to one another and through society itself.” The mission of these political institutions must be in accordance with the proper definition of freedom: to promote responsible, sustainable growth within the limits imposed by our human nature. Only then can we hope to maintain a system that does not become choked by its own excesses.

III. Promoting Fulfilling Work

Matthew Crawford’s book Shop Class as Soul Craft details the nature of work and how it can give us fulfillment or deaden our souls. The fact that the current economic system is based on the idea of freedom without limits also has important consequences for the nature of work. A system with this conception of freedom promotes monopolization and the treatment of individuals as means to an end. Both blue and white collar jobs are being “radically simplified,” in the name of increased efficiency and better management practices. This “separation of thinking from doing” represents a threat to work’s status as something which allows an individual to feel fulfilled or to gain a sense of self-actualization.

It may seem that a system based on the idea of freedom as the absence of most restrictions on wants or behavior, such as our own system, would be best for the individual worker. They would be ostensibly allowed to shape the course of their own life, conduct their own work, and gain as much as they could from the system for themselves. However, in such an arrangement, the workforce becomes dominated by a series of large conglomerates. Consequently, although the worker is “free,” he does not really have much power. He is essentially subservient to the corporation which gave him his process-based job. In this way, freedom without limitations...
leads to the exploitation and degradation of workers.

Dominated by large corporations, individuals are led to believe that they have a nearly limitless choice of potential jobs, but in reality they are being pushed into choosing between a narrow set of options. Gratifying work in the trades is de-emphasized because it is not efficient enough and it does not fit neatly enough into the regimented economic framework. In contrast, an understanding of freedom as living within the restrictions of human nature would promote high-quality work and support a sustainable, community-based marketplace.

An economy based on a sense of freedom that values human connections would promote a healthier job market. It would emphasize the kind of work that provides a deeper sense of fulfillment, rather than one simply being an anonymous cog in a machine. The type of work that is valuable is “being good at something specific, which happens through the accumulation of experience.” One is most easily able to gain this sort of experience in a community in which one knows the buyers and sellers of one’s products. This way, an individual has an incentive to improve at his craft because he can see the tangible results of his work in his interactions with others. Therefore, in order to have the “humane economy” that Crawford desires, we must change the neo-liberal mindset that disdains so-called inefficiencies or intangibles, recognizing that they have a genuine role in promoting fulfilling work.

IV. A Reevaluation

While Berry, Lynn, and Crawford approach the problems of the modern economy from different angles, they all recognize the importance of making conscious, value-driven choices on how we structure our economic system. Their critiques highlight the significance of individual human agency and our responsibility to create a prosperous yet sustainable economy — one that can fulfill the potential of future generations, not leave them to clean up our mess. Reforming the American economy to fit this mold would better provide for the flourishing of all people and give individuals the opportunity to live successful and fulfilling lives. In order to do this, we must recognize that humans are not just rational utility-maximizers. We are remarkable creatures with the capacity to love, give altruistically, and act as stewards for future generations — all qualities that modern economics cannot quantify.

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University education in the West — particularly at a place like Georgetown University, which was founded as a religious institution in the late eighteenth century — lives amongst divisive and schismatic tensions. In the wake of post-enlightenment developments, the academy is defined by a pregnant conflict between old and new. As President John J. DeGioia of Georgetown University stated in his 2001 inaugural speech, modern institutions face an identity crisis due to this conflict:

The question before us – now and always – is how we live our mission and identity. I believe that framing this question is one of the deepest and most important exercises we could ever undertake. Because when we frame this question we are really asking ourselves, what is the nature of this tradition of learning, faith and freedom that we willingly are knowingly placing ourselves within? 141

Answering this difficult question about traditional forces and their modern challengers, institutions like Georgetown must make decisions about what to teach and how to teach students. These challenging ideas emerge directly from Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, who posit revolutionary theories through new modes of inquiry. Considering Smith and Kant’s shared presuppositions about knowledge and its practical implications, the two posit a new way of thinking about the world. Using the university as a touchstone to see the impact and divergence of their different ideas, it is clear that Kant and Smith have posed a series of difficult and imposing arguments for modern institutions; their thought forms the foundation of the modern research university.

At the highest level of inquiry, Kant and Smith premise their arguments on a revolutionary theory of epistemology. In lieu of knowledge of providence or heavenly wisdom, both authors accept a materialist view of knowing that is founded upon the use of human reason in conjunction with externally verifiable data as perceived by the senses. Kant does not hide his rejection of divine providence and clearly bases his project upon a clear and limited definition of knowledge that exists within the possibility of experience:

The use of the word ‘nature’ is more fitting to the limits of human reason and more modest than the expression indicating a providence unknown to us. This is especially true when we are dealing with questions of theory and not religion, as at present, for human reason in questions of the relation of effects to their causes must remain within the limits of possible experience. On the other hand, the use of the word ‘providence’ here intimates the possession of wings like those of Icarus, conducting us toward the secret of its unfathomable purpose. 142

While he does not outright reject providence, Kant is wary to think that man has the capacity to understand the divine; his fanciful illusion to Greek mythology implies a fatal hubris that can lead only to tragedy.
Likewise, Smith’s inquiry into the causes of national wealth is based upon experiential or empirical knowledge. Smith’s lone metaphysical claim rests in his statement that wealth “…is not originally the effect of any human wisdom,” but it emerges from “…a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity in human nature to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.”

In the same spirit as Kant, there is no desire in Smith’s writings to enter into a high-minded discussion of human nature or metaphysics for “no further account can be given” than what one observes; Smith’s foundation upon the observation of commercial man is grounded in a pragmatic desire to account for phenomena empirically.

This philosophical shift undergirds Smith’s general theory on the motion of society, which is his market theory of prices. As a result of this shift, Smith describes the means by which society operates—the aggregation of observable demand and the scarcity of physical goods rather than divine wisdom or providence.

Kant and Smith’s conceptions of knowledge possess corresponding conceptions of material and moral progress. The Kantian political project desires to leverage reason and man’s rational capacities to understand nature in order to govern man individually and in aggregate. Kant’s ultimate desire is to “know the mechanisms of nature in order to use it on men, organizing the conflict of the hostile intentions present in a people in such a way that they … submit to coercive law” and bring peace to temporal order.

Likewise, Smith bases his understanding of society on observable exchanges, which are driven by man’s desires. Individuals demand certain goods, whether material or non-material and they compete for the means to attain these ends; the effect is a natural improvement of material well-being for all, through the “liberal reward of labour,” which is “the natural symptom of increasing national wealth.” These two ends and their emphasis on empirical truth have major implications for, not simply society, but the way the university itself is organized.

For Kant and Smith, knowledge is something that has profound utility, though their uses of knowledge differ. In the institutions of his time, Smith noted that “the proper subject of experiment and observation, a subject in which a careful attention is capable of making so many useful discoveries, was almost entirely neglected” in exchange for “the subject in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can consequently produce nothing but subtleties and sophisms, was greatly cultivated.” The pre-modern university was dominated by ontology and metaphysics and neglected the useful application of physics and the laws of nature. In Kant and Smith’s views, knowledge of the world has the greatest potential for material and moral improvement; these shared sentiments alongside their empirical epistemologies directly contradicted traditional academia. To bring about improvements, Kant and Smith recommend different changes to academic culture.

In the world of Adam Smith, the university was the primary tool for material innovation and the application of useful knowledge; it could only produce improvement by subjecting itself to market forces and individual demand. As Smith argued, overcoming the feudal system of endowed chairs and independently wealthy institutions, which prevented any responsiveness to consumer demands, will enable the improvement in useful knowledge and produce material benefits and gains. Smith also sees professors as factors of production and individual laborers, who work and compete amongst one another. His market theory for universities entails the fact that “…rivalship and emulation render excellency, even in the mean professions, an object of ambition, and frequently occasion the very greatest exertions” whereas “great objects … alone and unsupported by necessity of application, have seldom been sufficient to occasion any considerable exertion.” The necessary applicability of new and useful knowledge will produce, as stated earlier, the “liberal reward of...
labour,” which yields material wealth and improvement.\textsuperscript{151}

For Kant, the university is the social institution that enables the moral improvement of man through research; this end is achieved through freedom of thought and the popular assent of the reading public. Kant bases the intended moral improvement of men by scholars upon public reason, which is “the use which a person makes of [reason] as a scholar before the reading public.”\textsuperscript{152} The nature of reason, which when used “in a creature is a faculty of widening the rules and purposes of the use of all its powers far beyond natural instincts,” requires an institution to maintain and further reason to the logical end.\textsuperscript{153} This implies that a university must teach, research, test and collect mankind’s achievements, for “reason itself does not work instinctively, but requires trial, practice, and instruction in order gradually to progress from one level of insight to another... in order finally to bring the seeds of enlightenment to that degree of development in our race which is completely suitable to Nature’s purpose.”\textsuperscript{154} At a practical level, the university thus plays a procedural role in creating, teaching and maintaining knowledge as well as improving man’s morality.

The university can, however, only promote these two forms of progress through freedom and popular assent. In Kant’s model, the scholar may not be limited by temporal authority or old ways of knowing and must be subjected to the opinion of other scholars and the public at large. Reason, due to its nature, must remain pure and uninhibited by institutional restraints in order to reach its conclusion, particularly by faith. Kant communicates this idea by forwarding institutional flexibility. When critiquing religious institutions, Kant argues that a “newly introduced [religious] order might last until insight into the nature of these things had become so general and widely approved that through uniting their voices... they could bring a proposal to the throne to take those congregations under protection which had united into a changed religious organization according to their better ideas, without, however hindering others who wish to remain in the order.”\textsuperscript{155} This sort of moral improvement catalyzed by reason is premised on popular legitimacy of the reasoned argument, which parallels Smith’s materialist demands, and the free use of Reason to elicit more intelligible truth for the purpose of moral improvement.

The seeds of the modern research university were sown within the thought of both Kant and Smith. While they each saw the university contribute to their general theory of the world in different ways, mainly material and moral improvement, they both firmly set their beliefs in empiricism. Using both competitive market mechanisms and the free use of one’s reason before a listening public, Kant and Smith desired to orient the university to human demands. While not outright rejecting providence and divine knowledge, Kant and Smith subjected them to the same forces as all other forms of knowledge.

Georgetown University has proceeded largely, though not entirely, in the spirit of Kant and Smith. It has sought to produce useful knowledge and moral improvement while dealing with its religious heritage. As Father Timothy Healy, S.J. argued when he came to the presidency in the late 1980’s, Georgetown needed “to add the doctoral research facilities that will make us what the nation’s capital much needs, a great University” in which to educate and populate the “federal Escorial.”\textsuperscript{156} One only has to look out the windows to see this, as glistening science and business edifices compete mightily for our gaze with a gothic chapel and neoclassical halls.

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Jewish Salvation within the Catholic Church

Brendan Eng

The question of who gains salvation is one that is disputed within the Christian faith.

Lumen Gentium, the Vatican II dogmatic constitution of the Church, lists the groups of people who may still receive salvation despite their decision not to believe in the Gospel. In that list, section 16 of Chapter 12 states “that people to whom the covenants and promises were made, and from whom Christ was born in the flesh.” This refers to the Jews because they are the people with whom God made the Old Covenant and according to Christian tradition, are the people that Christ, a Jew, was born into in order to fulfill the covenant. This paper seeks to explain why the Catholic Church believes that Jews can obtain salvation and how this doctrine emerged from Vatican II.

The belief that Jews can obtain salvation is disputed by many other denominations of Christianity who believe that salvation is only for Christians who consciously believe that Jesus Christ is God’s son, the Messiah. The Gospel of John says, “For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life” (John 3:16). Later in the same Gospel, Jesus himself says, “I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me” (John 14:16). Many Christians disagree with the Catholic Church on this issue because they take these verses literally and believe that in order to reach the eternal life that John speaks of, or to reach the Father through Jesus, one must explicitly believe that Jesus is the Christ.

In order to understand why the Catholic Church believes this, it is necessary to learn about the history of Judaism and Christianity before one can understand the Church’s subsequent reasoning on why Jews can attain salvation. These points will be considered from a Catholic perspective.

First of all, one must define salvation, as there are many different definitions and opinions of what it is. Michael Himes says in The Mystery of Faith that “Salvation is the story of God’s entry into the world in order to reaffirm the first judgment, which is that God has looked at us and seen that we are good.” He continues to elaborate on this idea when he says that “salvation is...God’s coming to live in the universe with us so that we finally recognize how good the universe is.” With this definition, he focuses on two ways to accept salvation: “to affirm the goodness of who we are” and to accept the goodness of everybody else because “there is no salvation without entry into community.” This emphasis on community means that we must love one another to reach salvation. As a result, Himes says that this “salvation reconciles us with one another and so restores us to communion with God.” So in this case, salvation is union with God and others.

When Jesus spoke of salvation, he often described it as a meal, where people sit down with one another in communion. Jesus said to his apostles, “you are those who have stood by me in my trials...so that you may eat and drink at my table” (Luke 22:28-30). In this example, one can see how the shared meal is the ultimate goal, not necessarily for the meal itself but for the unity that it represents among the apostles and
between them and Jesus, who is God. This meal would thereby also fall under Himes’ definition of salvation, being union between God (Jesus) and others (the fellow apostles).

The root of salvation for both Jews and Christians dates back to God’s covenant with Abraham and his descendents, the Jews. This covenant bonded God with the Jews and is what made them God’s people, setting them apart from the Gentiles. More importantly, this meant that they had the opportunity to obtain salvation. However, because of sin, which separates man from God, God promised to send a Messiah to redeem mankind. This promise with the Jews was fulfilled when God sent his son down to Earth to die for the sins of humanity. Moreover, as advocated by the Apostle Paul and believed by Christians, this covenant with the Jews was then opened up to all of mankind through Christ’s death, therefore offering the possibility of salvation for all.

Paul writes about this in Ephesians when he says, “He [Jesus] has abolished the law with its commandments and ordinances that he might create in himself one new humanity in place of the two, thus making peace, and might reconcile both groups to God in one body” (Eph. 2:14-16). So through Jesus, and as acknowledged by Paul, gentiles may now receive salvation because they can be reconciled with God.

However, the reconciling of gentiles must not be confused with the idea of Supersessionism. This is the idea that because Jews rejected Jesus, they are forever condemned and in their place, God has now continued his covenant with Christians. The Catholic Church disagrees with this and reaffirms the reconciling of the Jews when it says “The Church believes that Christ who is our peace has through his cross reconciled Jews and Gentiles and made them one in himself” (Nostra Aetate 4). This makes it clear that because of Jesus, everybody has been reconciled, including the Jews who do not believe Christ is their Messiah.

In fact, Lumen Gentium says that the Jews are “a people in virtue of their election beloved for the sake of the fathers, for God never regrets his gifts or his call” (LG 16). This means that the Jews are still the chosen people of God. More recently, when visiting Mainz in 1980, Pope John Paul II reaffirmed this idea in saying that the covenant between the Jews and God has not been revoked, thereby saying that the Jews are still in the same covenant that Abraham made with God.

With this brief history of salvation in the Christian tradition and introduction to the Catholic view of the Jews’ special relationship with God, one may now look at the important events leading up to Vatican II that influenced the council’s need to address Judeo-Christian relations. There were two important issues, the first being the long lasting tension between Jews and Christians as to who was to blame for the killing of Jesus. The Gospel of Matthew is one example of where this argument comes from, offering an account of how the Jews rejected Jesus. Upon choosing to crucify Jesus, the Jews say, “his blood be on us and on our children!” (Matt. 27:25). This verse not only describes the Jews’ rejection of Jesus but their acceptance of responsibility for his death on their hands. The Gospel of Luke also offers a similar account, further intensifying the tension between Jews and Christians.

John O’Malley notes in What Happened at Vatican II that the Catholic Church certainly had strained relationships with other Christian churches, but these issues were “not nearly so rough as the relationship to the Jews.” One of the goals of the Vatican II Council was to help fix hostilities that had been created with the Jews.

Nostra Aetate, the Catholic Church’s “Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions,” was a means for the Catholic Church to ease tensions, and in this document, they do acknowledge that “as holy scripture testifies, Jerusalem did not recognize God’s moment when it came (see Lk 19:42). Jews for the most part did not accept the Gospel; on the contrary, many opposed its spread (see Rom 11:28)” (NA 4). However, in saying this, the Council’s goal was not to promote the blaming of Jews for Jesus’ death, nor to condemn their
decision to not accept him as their savior. The document continues, saying that “even though the Jewish authorities and those who followed their lead pressed for the death of Christ (see Jn 19:6), neither all Jews indiscriminately at that time, nor Jews today, can be charged with the crimes committed during his passion” (NA 4).

This puts to rest the argument that Jews should be blamed for the killing of Jesus in two ways. It acknowledges that even during Jesus’ time, there were only a select few of the Jews that actually sought to kill Jesus, meaning that the Jews as a whole should not have been to blame, even during Jesus’ time. Furthermore, it makes even less sense that the Jews of today should be to blame for Jesus’ death.

The second issue that motivated Vatican II to acknowledge the treatment of the Jews was the Holocaust. This marked a very significant point in human history that demonstrated the lack of respect for human dignity. Human dignity is the fact that everybody was created “in the image of God,” and that upon seeing everything that was created, God said that “they were very good” (Gen. 1:31). The Church was concerned that this lack of recognition of the human dignity of the Jews may have been partially triggered by the Christian attitude toward Jews for the killing of Jesus. Regardless of whether this was the case, the Holocaust was a clear sign that the Church had to speak out about the dignity of the Jews and the way that they should be treated.

In addition to the two issues mentioned above, the Catholic Church also had to consider the political and religious implications that could result from Vatican II. This included not only the consideration of how Christians around the world might react to the Church’s position regarding the value of Jews in the eyes of God, but more importantly, the political implications that would result in the Arab world. One of these concerns was the potential backlash if their addressing of the Jews was interpreted as support for the state of Israel. Yet the Church reaffirmed that though Vatican II could be interpreted in political ways, the intention for the Church was simply to proclaim the truth of Jesus Christ and the love that he represents.

Nostra Aetate went through many changes before it gained the approval of the Vatican II Council. The idea of this document began with Cardinal Bea, a member of the Council who strongly advocated for the Church’s address of Judeo-Christian relations. In September of 1964, Bea presented his proposal for a decree to the Vatican II Council. Just as Bea thought he was expected to do, he went through with his intention to draft a document that solely addressed the human dignity and treatment of the Jews. However, at this point in the Vatican II Council, it had already been agreed upon that by looking at the sign of the times, world religions other than Judaism also had to be addressed such as Islam, the other Abrahamic tradition.

The Pope reassigned a new group to draft a decree. The word “Jews” was removed from the title of the document in order to make it clear that it was now addressing all of the world’s religions and text was added to also include Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. After much work, the group was able to write what we now know as Nostra Aetate. So, though Bea’s initial intention is no longer present in the document, Nostra Aetate still uses some of his original ideas regarding Jews, which can be found in Section 4 of the document. Nonetheless, Bea was not stripped of his duties altogether. One of the reasons his first document had been changed was because Chapter Two of Lumen Gentium had already included much writing about the Jews. The Pope reassigned Bea to insert his thoughts into this chapter, already and appropriately titled “The People of God.” Bea agreed, and composed what we now read as the portion of Lumen Gentium that addresses Jews.

Characteristic of the other decrees of Vatican II, Nostra Aetate and Lumen Gentium brought developments in the way people lived their Christian lives, particularly marking the beginning of the Church’s new approach toward the viewing and treatment of the Jews. The Church no longer sees Jews as people that must be converted.
(though still advised) but as the people who “remain very dear to God” (Nostra Aetate). In relation to the Jews, it must be noted that these documents focus mainly on individual Jews and their identity as Jewish people rather than Judaism itself. This is important because though the Church acknowledges the value of each individual and the existence of certain truths within their religions, it must make it clear that Christianity is still the best path to God.

Yet although Christianity may be the best path, the Catholic Church does clearly say that Jews may also obtain salvation. As mentioned earlier, Lumen Gentium notes that “the plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the Creator” (LG 16). Among these people, the text includes “that people to whom the covenants and promises were made” (LG 16). Karl Rahner’s idea of “anonymous Christians” and the declaration Dominus Iesus help to explain why Jews are included among the people who may obtain salvation. Rahner says that one’s belief in Jesus “can be present in an implicit form whereby a person undertakes and lives the duty of each day in the quiet sincerity of patience, in devotion to his material duties and the demands made upon him by the person under his care” (Rahner 394). Additionally, Rahner also says that anybody who does not consciously and explicitly believe in God but “testifies to him by the radical acceptance of his being, is a believer.” This means that by loving one’s neighbor in a selfless way as Jesus did, a Jew acts as a witness to Christ and his teaching. Furthermore, Rahner says that because Christ is present in an “anonymous Christian,” he must also be present in their non-Christian religion.

In this way, Jews actually obtain salvation by unconsciously accepting Christ as their savior and therefore becoming “anonymous Christians.” This maintains the belief that salvation is still only attainable through Jesus Christ, the ultimate sacrament of God. McCoy reaffirms this fact when he says, “the Church acknowledges the presence of God and his grace and providence throughout his creation. But the source of that grace is always Christ, the Incarnate Word of God” (McCoy 63). So in the Gospel of John, where it says that “for God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life,” (John 3:16) and later, when Jesus says “I am the way, and the truth, and the life, no one comes to the Father except through me” (John 14:16), Jews are included because they go through Jesus and get to the Father by being “anonymous Christians.”

Along these lines, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI signed Dominus Iesus in 2000, a more recent declaration by the Catholic Church regarding the importance of Jesus and the Church in the salvation of the Jews. The document says that though the Church has “sincere respect” for other world religions, this does not mean that people should have religious relativism, where one believes that “one religion is as good as another.” Instead, one needs to have “the Church, [in order to] have the fullness of the means of salvation” (Dominus Iesus 22). This reiterates the fact that the Catholic Church is always the best way to God.

Of course, the Church still remains a Mystery because God is a Mystery and the relationship that Jesus has with the Church is also a Mystery. Dominus Iesus acknowledges this when it says, that the “means of Christ in the Spirit...has a mysterious relationship with the Church” (DI 22). Because the Church and God are Mysteries, it must also be made clear that this means that salvation for the Jews also remains a mystery. “The Second Vatican Council limited itself to the statement that God bestows it [salvific grace] ‘in ways known to himself’” (DI 22).

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Memorials to American presidents reflect as much of the politics and culture of the era in which they are built as they do of the men they are built to honor. George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt are currently honored with significant edifices in Washington, DC, with Dwight D. Eisenhower soon to join them. Each of these presidents underwent a period of historical evaluation before earning a place of stone and marble in the nation’s capital. Choosing to honor them required responsiveness to the political climate of the era in which the memorials were erected. Architectural trends also influenced the form of presidential memorials, trying to make them timeless while capturing the age that created them. Many different actors involved themselves in the process of memorializing presidents—family, friends, and associates of the honored president, politicians, bureaucrats, architects, critics, and the general public. The battles over how to memorialize a president ensured that considerations of the present were often equal, if not superior, to the events of the past.

To show how contemporary concerns affect official commemorations of American presidents, this paper will examine in detail the planning, execution, and dedication of the Lincoln Memorial, which was profoundly shaped by the ideology and political needs of the early-twentieth century Republican Party.

The completion of the Lincoln Memorial represented not merely the enshrinement of a man but the victory of a political agenda that prized national unity and centralized government. Early proposals to honor Lincoln focused on his accomplishments as the Great Emancipator. As the Civil War and Reconstruction faded into the past, the slain president’s memory came to represent the unity of the whole nation. To incorporate this interpretation of Lincoln into national memory, national Republican leaders took an active role in shepherding the memorial towards completion. By the time the memorial was built and dedicated, it evoked the beliefs of the early-twentieth century United States, and particularly those of the Republican Party, as much as it did the memory of the sixteenth president.

Soon after Lincoln’s death in 1865, proposals emerged to officially memorialize the assassinated leader. In 1867, the Republican-controlled Congress passed legislation creating the Lincoln Monument Association. While the association was privately funded, the anticipated design of the memorial it commissioned deeply reflected the political ideas of congressional Republicans. The designs of sculptor Clark Mills included statues of Union generals, Lincoln’s political allies, and abolitionists. Lincoln himself would sit atop the monument, portrayed in the act of signing the Emancipation Proclamation. Due in part to the monument’s grandiosity and fundraising difficulties, it was never erected. Furthermore,
the message of racial equality promoted in its design faded from the national agenda with the end of Reconstruction and the continued reintegration of the former Confederacy into the Union. By that time, Mills’ design was as impractical politically as it was materially.\(^\text{174}\)

Plans for a Lincoln memorial languished in the ensuing decades. The sixteenth president himself became more universally admired throughout American society, instead of remaining limited as a sectional, partisan symbol. Even in the South, where some sought to turn the page on the Civil War and make their land a dynamic, integrated part of the Union, ardor cooled against Lincoln.\(^\text{175}\) However, it took the return of strong Republican leadership to promote anew a national monument to Lincoln. During the presidential administration of William McKinley, the United States enjoyed a period of economic prosperity and military victory in the 1898 Spanish-American War. These successes boosted the reputation of the Republican Party, which Lincoln had once led, while encouraging a spirit of national unity, which Lincoln had come to represent. Also contributing to the rise in Lincoln’s reputation, McKinley’s successor Theodore Roosevelt deeply admired the sixteenth president.\(^\text{176}\) A \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune} editorial, penned in 1902 and commenting on a proposed monument, displayed its perception of Lincoln’s merit:

Lincoln is now recognized in both sections of the union as so great a man, so lofty in his purpose, so humane in his execution, and so devoted to his country, that certainly if any American is deserving of an enduring memorial, after Washington, it is Lincoln. . . They recognize him as one of the greatest of Americans, and history will preserve his fame as such through all time. As one of the “plain people,” as a statesman of the highest purpose, as a man of infinite tenderness, patience, forbearance, and kindness, as the great Emancipator, he is now admired by the whole country.\(^\text{177}\)

Notably, while the proposed Mills monument literally put emancipation as Lincoln’s top achievement, this editorial lists Lincoln’s identity as “great Emancipator” as last. Instead, in this era of great national feeling, Lincoln’s fame stemmed from his representation of the American character and status as a symbol of union for the whole country.

As Lincoln’s memory was appropriated as a symbol for the politics of the early twentieth century, the time seemed right to make another push for an official memorial in the nation’s capital. A plan to substantially improve Washington, DC, incorporated a memorial to Lincoln into its vision. Named after the senator who formulated it, the McMillan Plan placed the memorial by the Potomac, along a line originating at the Capitol building and passing through the Washington Monument.\(^\text{178}\) It would take the form of a portico containing a statue and inscriptions of Lincoln’s speeches. The McMillan Plan enjoyed the support of the Roosevelt administration. To finally construct a Lincoln memorial, an existing proposal offered by Senator Shelby Cullom was brought into alignment with the McMillan Plan and enacted in June 1902.

Cullom’s legislation formed a Lincoln memorial commission, consisting of Secretary of War William Howard Taft, Secretary of State John Hay, Senators George Peabody Wetmore (R-R.I.) and George Graham Vest (D-Mo.), and Representatives James McCleary (R-Minn.) and James Richardson (D-Tenn.). These chosen figures emphasized the importance of honoring Lincoln as a nationalist and Republican. Cabinet officers Taft and Hay were national figures closely associated with the Roosevelt administration. Additionally, Hay enjoyed a close personal association with Lincoln, having served as his private secretary in the White House, coauthored a ten-volume biography, and edited his collected works. Wetmore and McCleary, also Republicans, led the congressional library committees. Vest and Richardson, as Democrats hailing from ex-Confederate states, were essentially outsiders.\(^\text{179}\) Their presence promoted the idea...
of the united country coming together to honor Lincoln, but their minority status ensured that Southerners and Democrats would have little actual input in creating the memorial. The Republicans in charge of the national government would institutionalize Lincoln’s memory using their preferred narrative.

Despite the committee’s centralized nature and ideological homogeneity, constructing a Lincoln memorial under the auspices of the McMillan Plan came up against several obstacles. One of the most stubborn was Joseph G. Cannon, chair of the House Appropriations Committee and later Speaker. Although a Republican of national stature, like most of the memorial commissioners, Cannon objected to the site of the memorial as a “God damned swamp.” Personal politics also intruded in the planning. Cannon resented that the McMillan Plan had bypassed the House, and the representative was considerably more conservative than President Roosevelt. Cannon, joined by Democrats Vest and Richardson and his political ally, Mc Cleary, continuously worked to interrupt the proceedings of the commission. Eventually McCleary was sent to Europe to study similar memorials, and the commission never met after April 1904.180

Other suggestions of ways to memorialize Lincoln also complicated the work of the memorial commission. Not all were conceived as traditional statues or located within the nation’s capital. One plan proposed a bridge across the Potomac, from Washington to Virginia. The New York Globe opined, “Such a structure would not only have great dignity, but it would express the thought forever to be associated with the name of Lincoln – the abiding reunion between what was once Secessia and the section which made such sacrifices that the nation might live.”181 In a similar vein, McCleary proposed a highway between Washington and Gettysburg, a site with great meaning to the Civil War and Lincoln in particular.182 Yet another plan placed a peristyle with a frieze containing Lincoln quotations near Union Station.

As the centennial of Lincoln’s birth approached with little progress on a memorial, debate grew about the most fitting way to honor the sixteenth president. A January 3, 1909 article in the New York Times surveyed the opinions of several “citizens of well-known public spirit” about the proposed locations. Robert C. Ogden liked the Union Station peristyle for its location “nearer the centre of national life.” Henry Holt disliked all of them: the McMillan Plan’s memorial near the Potomac would be too remote a location; the road to Gettysburg simply lacked the character of a true memorial; the Union Station peristyle, which actually surrounded a sculpture of Christopher Columbus, contained nothing particularly distinct about Abraham Lincoln. Finally, R.M. Shurtleff wrote favorably of the road to Gettysburg: “In our memory Lincoln is associated with both the White House and Gettysburg. It would be a useful as well as a beautiful thing in itself, and would be seen and talked about more than either of the other plans.”183

The opinions of the New York Times’ correspondents captured much of the debate surrounding the proposals. Questions of location centered on whether the locations should speak more to the nation or to Lincoln. While a road from Washington to Gettysburg connected two important places from Lincoln’s time, a memorial to Lincoln right in the capital would serve to highlight the president’s importance to the United States. Questions of form also provoked debate. Many roads already took their names after people and events of the Civil War, and a road could be useful, but perhaps its very utility would render it commonplace instead of a special forum for reflection and remembrance. Furthermore, a memorial needed to speak distinctly about Lincoln, which made some leery of the Lincoln Plaza near Union Station containing a statue to Columbus. Designing and constructing a Lincoln memorial first required a determination of Lincoln’s true importance, and then the best venue for honoring him.

In December 1910, Shelby Cullom once more proposed a bill that created a Lincoln Memorial Commission. The successful legislation returned
Taft, by then the president, to the commission as chair. It also named Cullom, Cannon, Wetmore, Representative Samuel McCall (R.-Mass.), House Minority Leader Champ Clark (D-Mo.), and Senator Hernando Money (D-Miss.), a former Confederate soldier. Once again, the commission was dominated by national Republican leaders. This commission reviewed the existing plans for a monument while also evaluating new possible sites. Cannon remained deeply hostile to the Potomac site and favored the Union Station proposal. As a further impediment, Clark praised the idea of a Washington-Gettysburg road. Taft asked for the input of a separate group, the Commission of Fine Arts, which backed the Potomac site and recommended architect Henry Bacon as the designer. Cannon convinced the House to ask for designs from another architect, John Russell Pope, for memorials located at Soldiers’ Home and Meridian Hill. Ultimately, Potomac Park was chosen as the site on February 3, 1912. Bacon and Pope then refined their proposals specifically for this site. Bacon’s design earned the votes of a majority of commissioners on April 16, 1912.

On December 4, 1912, outgoing President William Howard Taft sent to Congress the Lincoln Memorial Commission’s final report for approval. After detailing the process of considering alternatives to the Potomac Park site, the report stated, “It is impossible to overestimate the importance of giving to a monument of the size and significance of the Lincoln memorial complete and undisputed domination over a large area, together with a certain dignified isolation from competing structures, or even from minor features unrelated to it.” Instead of a commonplace structure such as a road or a bridge, a memorial needed to stand on its own, impressing upon its observers not its usefulness but grandness, and concentrating their minds on the meaning the memorial contains. This conception of a memorial’s proper form was emphasized in the report’s discussion of why it chose Potomac Park over Union Station:

“... more people would see it there than elsewhere. It is true that more transient visitors would pass it; but it is also true that an object which we must make some effort to see impresses itself on us with much more force than does one which is seen casually or incidentally. Not how many people see a monument, but how great is the impression made by it, is the real test.”

The general qualities found desirable in a memorial, such as its imposingness, were joined in the Potomac Park site by a meaning specific to the United States. By placing the Lincoln Memorial there, the commission aligned the structure with the Capitol and the Washington Monument. The report quoted the Commission of Fine Arts, “The Lincoln Memorial would have its dignity enhanced by being so placed; and the termination of the axis by an object worthy of rank with the Washington Monument and the Capitol would be of the utmost value to the great composition.” The commission treated the Potomac Park location as deeply symbolic, combining the story of the government (the Capitol), its founder (Washington), and its savior (Lincoln). Proponents of the plan linked it with the original vision of Washington’s designer, Pierre Charles L’Enfant, who envisioned a great mall in the heart of the city, stretching from the Capitol building through the then-planned Washington Monument to the Potomac River. What Cannon once dismissed as a swamp was now a site of almost sacred importance. To further add to the sense of divine import, the report reminded its readers of a quote in favor of Potomac Park by John Hay, by then deceased:

As I understand it, the place of honor is on the main axis of the plan. Lincoln, of all Americans next to Washington, deserves this place of honor. He was of the immortals. You must not approach too close to the immortals. His monument should stand alone, remote from the common habitations of man, apart from the business and turmoil.
of the city – isolated, distinguished, and serene. Of all the sites, this one, near the Potomac, is most suited to the purpose.\textsuperscript{189}

In using the sanction of a close associate of Lincoln’s, who characterized the Potomac Park site as a type of Olympus, the commission began the process of elevating the newly-chosen site of the Lincoln Memorial from merely one of several contenders to holy ground.

With the approval of the memorial commission, the Lincoln Memorial appeared ready for construction. Bacon’s vision for the memorial replicated a classical Greek temple, with its thirty-six columns representing the states of the Union at the time of Lincoln’s death. Within the memorial, carved inscriptions of his second inaugural address and the Gettysburg Address would remind observers of Lincoln’s words. In the very center would sit a statue of the sixteenth president, carved by Daniel Chester French. Bacon’s Classical design provoked protests from American liberals, including architects, who sought a more “American” architectural design, instead of what they considered a tired old form.\textsuperscript{190} Nevertheless, construction proceeded fitfully. In 1922, the memorial was finally ready for dedication.

The date for the dedication was May 30 – Memorial Day, still deeply associated with the Civil War. A crowd of thousands, including Union and Confederate veterans, watched Taft officially present the monument to President Warren Harding. The president used his address on the occasion to present his views of Lincoln’s legacy. Harding downplayed the abolition of slavery in favor of the preservation of the Union as Lincoln’s overriding legacy:

The supreme chapter in history is not emancipation, though that achievement would have exalted Lincoln throughout all the ages. The simple truth is that Lincoln, recognizing an established order, would have compromised with the slavery that existed, if he could have halted its extension. . . . Emancipation was a means to the great end – maintained union and nationality. Here was the great purpose, here the towering hope, here the supreme faith. He treasured the inheritance handed down by the founding fathers, the ark of the covenant wrought through their heroic sacrifices, and builded [sic] in their inspired genius. The union must be preserved. It was the central thought, the unalterable purpose, the unyielding intent, the foundation of faith.\textsuperscript{191}

While Harding’s speech paid some recognition to Lincoln’s antislavery sentiments, and Robert Russa Moton of the Tuskegee Institute praised emancipation, the message of the day was clear. Union was Lincoln’s great legacy. Its prominence marked the culmination of a shift in the remembrance of Lincoln. No longer was he the Great Emancipator portrayed in the 1867 monument plan offered by Radical Republicans. The early twentieth century, when nationalist sentiment ran strong, the Progressive movement called for a stronger central government, and progress for African-Americans was minimal, brought out the elements of Lincoln’s legacy that most spoke to it. Lincoln’s fight against slavery was set aside as unimportant to the United States of 1922. Harding was indeed accurate when he claimed, “This memorial, matchless tribute that it is, is less for Abraham Lincoln than for those of us today, and for those who follow after.”\textsuperscript{192}

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In the 5th century B.C., Herodotus of Halicarnassus was traveling throughout the eastern Mediterranean world and gathering the stories that he would set down in the *Histories*. In roughly same time period, Plato wrote: “The fact is that this invention [writing] will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it. They will not need to exercise their memories... And as for wisdom... [they will have] only a semblance of it.” The concept of memory is indeed critical, and through that lens we can evaluate Herodotus’ entire understanding of knowledge and the fear of forgetfulness, shedding light on the structure of the *Histories* and the reason of why Herodotus wrote the *Histories*.

One modern edition of Herodotus begins with a preface lamenting that “few facts are known about the life of Herodotus.” The cause for this is as much Herodotus and his contemporaries’ radically different notion of history and knowledge as our lack of information. Herodotus himself provides only one concrete fact about himself; he is “Herodotus of Halicarnassus.” It would have been inconceivable for Herodotus to fill his work with the tables, guides, references, appendices, footnotes, timelines, and maps that make up so much of modern texts. The modern comprehension of a world known through knowledge of objective, unconditional, and context-less “facts” is a 17th-century “invention,” a distinction enunciated by early Empiricists as part of their philosophy, as is our division of all knowledge into different categories by objectivity or domain: “Herodotus...lived in a time when categories of knowledge had not been rigidly separated.”

This is not to say that ancient writers did not collect what we can now call “facts,” or that they did not distinguish between true and false, but that their different organizational schema shows that they thought no “fact” was complete if it was not enveloped and embedded in a story. A pure or naked fact was useless. They placed no emphasis on facts for the sake of facts, or in contrast to fictions. Ancient annals recorded major events over time, mostly political, but did so side-by-side with accounts of miracles or monsters, which we would consider fantastically fictitious. Herodotus cannot be viewed as a fact-finder, but is more like a memorial narrator, constantly recounting stories he remembers to pass on to the memory of others, so long as they have a memorable lesson worth retelling. Norma Thompson writes, “For Herodotus the two types of evidence are not radically different; fact and fiction are presumed to coexist in human remembrance.” Herodotus focuses so much on stories and so little on anything approaching our fixation with “facts” because, as Stewart Flory suggests, he recognizes that what people choose to remember and retell often gives the greatest insight into what is really important in world events.

Part of what makes Herodotus’ *Histories* so insightful and epic a narrative is that he includes a sweeping preface where he sets out to state the purpose of his inquiries. He writes that he made his inquiries, his *Histories*, “so that human achievements may not become forgotten in time, and great and marvelous deeds – some displayed by the Greek, some by barbarians – may not be without their glory.” Some historians devote most of their analytical effort for the *Histories*...
ories on the equality given between Greeks and non-Greeks, the praise of “marvelous deeds,” and Herodotus’ analysis of the wars between Greece and Persia, though this misses a fundamental part of his preface. Multicultural interest and insight may be a component, but it does not underlie his worldview as historian. Reading the structure of these sentences carefully reveals that the dual purposes are to prevent heroic action from being “forgotten” and to give praise where praise is due.

Herodotus’ main concern is one of memory. Understanding his preface as such, we see that his real end is to relate the results of his inquiries so that they themselves are memorized and memorialized, committed to the oral historical tradition. The Greeks had no word for history—Herodotus was in fact inventing it—and the word we use for history is ultimately derived from the same one now translated into “inquiries.” Herodotus shows, however, that “inquiries” alone is not accurate, for his aim is greater than this and involves the exercise of memory against the threat of forgetfulness. Herodotus values his inquiries, but recognizes that if forgotten, they will become useless. Viewed in this way, Herodotus sounds much less like any modern historian, and much more like a panegyrist or narrator of human events, for he implies that the greatest crime against his inquiries, and perhaps history as a field in general, is not that they would be inaccurate or misunderstood, but forgotten.

Most ancient societies valued a strong memory because it was necessary for both survival and meaning. Pre-scientific and pre-industrial civilizations were intimately connected with their environments because they were directly dependent on them for survival, and developing strong memories was a necessary part of knowing the land well enough to survive. Through their myths—Prometheus being the most enlightening—it is clear that the Greeks, as much as any other ancient civilization, recognized how naturally unadapted humanity is to bare survival, and that reason and memory are the only tools that allowed early man to ultimately triumph in otherwise deadly environments and eliminate predators superior in most physical abilities, especially natural weapons. One would be tempted to add education, but even education is entirely dependent on memory. In Greek mythology, Mnemosyne, the divine personification of memory, was the mother of all nine muses, from which all art and forms of human knowledge came. The tools of civilizations, including law, science, agriculture, warfare, etc., without exception, could only be maintained across an entire society through educated memories. If a small village somehow forgot its prized agricultural techniques, defense strategies, moral codes, or inspirational figures, the result would be immediate and palpable decline. In part, elders were so highly respected because, without education and literacy, they were to their communities as libraries and universities are to us. St. Jerome wrote, “Nothing that you have seen or heard is useful, however, unless you deposit what you should see and hear in the treasury of your memory.”

Memory was also important for more transcendent reasons. Thomas Aquinas, renowned for having developed a memory so extraordinary that he could simultaneously compose multiple works in his head, was canonized in part because of the enormous moral praise given to him for his memory. St. Anthony, 3rd-4th century A.D., astonished his contemporaries by memorizing the entire Bible without ever having read a word, a claim so astounding as to be simply unbelievable today were it not for the regularity with which such feats occurred in the ancient world. Not only did memory have a value so great as to be a major determinant of one’s character, indeed Cicero had earlier included it as a large part of prudence, one of his four cardinal virtues, but its richest form came through dedication, practice, and inculcation. If memory were only a matter of natural born talent, though it could be a sign of divine grace, it would not have been a moral trait or virtue. When the ancients refer to memory they would not have focused on rote memorization, degradingly useless and strenuous by modern
standards, as very important, because they considered it common and easy. Instead, “the proof of a good memory lies in...the ability to move it about instantly, directly, and securely,” in the sense of it being so adeptly grasped that it can be constantly applied and made use of. Though none of the aforementioned was a contemporary of Herodotus, each relied on essentially the exact same Greek tradition of memory, which remained current even in the Middle Ages before the printing press made knowledge cheap.

In examining the Histories more closely, Herodotus says in the preface that the topic of his work will be the conflicts between Greece and Persia, and then begins to describe Croesus, king of the Lydians as a very long prelude to the Persians under Cyrus, which then leads to Cambyses. That Cambyses led an expedition against Egypt subsequently leads into a seventy-five-page digression into the culture of the Egyptians before he casually and uninterruptedly continues his story. Each time the Persians encounter a different civilization Herodotus takes an aside, often dozens of pages long, to discuss every facet of that civilization’s culture before returning to his original aim. In Book 3 Herodotus is in the middle of describing the way Darius collects taxes when he addresses the way the Indians gather their gold, which leads him to discuss Indian culture in general, and then specifically the way Indians gather their gold dust from giant ants, before embarking on a further tangent regarding the practices of all of the civilizations at the ends of the earth.

In written organization this is fairly bizarre, especially considering no warnings are given, but is quite understandable if one views the Histories formatted and received as a written speech or conversation, and reminds us of the way that long and significant stories and conversations are naturally structured. It also would have demanded a very attentive memory from its listeners. Indeed, Herodotus’ Histories would probably rarely have been read alone, and even then would not have been read in silence, but aloud. The ancient Greeks had no word corresponding to our verb “to read,” the closest word they had, ἀναγιγνώσκο, meant “to recollect” or “to know again”, which refers to an act of memory and, implicitly, speech. The Histories were written to be told like a story and remembered as one. Most would have known his work through oral presentations that he or others gave at festivals or in philosophical circles. That his work would pass into the oral tradition and into the collective memory of society if well received not only influenced the structure Herodotus gave to the written Histories, but must have influenced his inquiries themselves. His preface and the structure of his work both correspond with his original aim to inscribe in memory the true history of men.

In nearly unanimous consensus today’s historians look back on Herodotus as the father of a history that we have since greatly expanded upon and improved, without wondering if this is merely our own shortsighted and hubristic meddling. Herodotus had a clear view of the purpose of history. He combined the practical, or perhaps didactic, as well as the fascinating, to satisfy our intellect and curiosity. Herodotus and the ancients’ view of history as collective memorialization gave them communal strength, virtue, pride, and international understanding as well as personal wisdom, humility, and purely satisfying cultural education. Herodotus’ epistemology is narrative, homiletic, and memorial, viewing human beings as creatures of story, as opposed to modern tendencies towards Empiricism and the Enlightenment’s brand of natural reason. Most importantly, Herodotus knew that history was useless unless it was known and remembered intimately and existentially (certainly not Herodotus’ terms, but the closest we can get), a view often forgotten in the intensity, specificity, and narrowness of modern scholarship. Ryszard Kapuściński writes in Travels with Herodotus that Herodotus questioned and wrote because he feared memory’s fragility; instead, we might consider that Herodotus wrote as much because he cherished memory. If history is written but forgotten and uncherished, Herodotus knew it was not history at all.

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Iago’s Plausibility and Motivations
A History of Attempts at Shakespeare’s Enigmatic Character

Luke H. Young

Often considered the most nefarious of all Shakespearian villains, Iago poses a unique challenge for any production of *Othello*. In order to present a convincing version of Iago, a production’s interpretation must either reconcile the character’s enigmatic contradictions or explain the forces behind his paradoxical nature. On the one hand, the nature and personality of Iago’s character must be such that the confidence Othello places in him remains plausible. After all, his ability to facilitate the destruction of the other characters is contingent upon his pre-established, plausible reputation as an honest and loyal soldier. On the other hand, his motivations must sufficiently complement his nature in a way that justifies his villainous deceit. Iago’s motivations are ultimately integral to the play as a whole, as any individual interpretation of Iago inevitably dictates the interpretations and perceptions of the other characters, and Othello in particular. As phrased by Marvin Rosenberg, “to know how a noble man may be betrayed into murder, we must know the motives and manners of his betrayer.” In this case, of course, the reverse also applies. Nearly as fickle as the character himself, the performance history of Shakespeare’s enigmatic villain colorfully depicts his conflicting nature. Although all notable productions of *Othello* have addressed both interdependent sides of the problematic knave, earlier productions focused primarily on the plausibility of Iago as a character, whereas more recent interpretations have attempted to further investigate the motivations behind Iago’s malice.

Little is known of the first performances of *Othello* with respect to the interpretation of the tragedy’s characters on the Shakespearean stage. By the time that the Restoration witnessed the return of theatre in England, whatever was left of the original portrayal of Iago came under swift assault. In accordance with the trend of “Decorum,” which preferred archetypal characters, critics such as Thomas Rymer criticized productions of *Othello* (and indeed the deceased Shakespeare himself) on the grounds that the soldier Iago was a villain “...instead of [the] open-hearted, frank, plain-dealing...character confidently work by [soldiers] for some thousands of years.” With the introduction of the eighteenth century’s emphasis on morality, much of Iago’s bawdy dialogue and sexual humor was cut from the script, leaving only those sexual references necessary for comprehending the plot. At that time, notable among the portrayals of Iago was that by Colley Cibber, whose treachery was so obviously apparent as to make Othello appear an utter fool. Countering this interpretation, which actors like Thomas Ryder and George Frederick Cooke regretfully perpetuated, Charles Macklin and David Garrick attempted to make the role believable through
“gradual disclosure” of Iago’s character and by removing “absurd by-play.” Experimenting further with this interpretation during the eighteenth century, actors like John Henderson and Charles Kemble ultimately disguised Iago’s villainy to the extent of blandness.

As the development of Iago’s plausibility continued into the nineteenth century, actors Edmund Kean and Gustavus Vaughan Brooke brought a “gaiety and carelessness” to the character that has dominated many interpretations since, but which ultimately seemed to devalue Iago’s inner malice. Meanwhile, popular performances featuring the Iagos of William Macready, Charles Fechter, and Henry Irving attempted to build upon this new understanding of Iago, breaching his jovial exterior and exposing his passionate villainy to the audience through the character’s soliloquies. These efforts collectively served to preserve the character’s wickedness while also giving Iago an innocent and honest outward appearance. They thus made the character more plausible within the context of the play. However, the disparity between Iago’s “surface gaiety” and his “inner vindictiveness” ultimately exceeded the realm of plausibility.

As articulated by an issue of Macmillan’s Magazine at the time, “these contrasts want no heightening, this villainy no deepening…Iago is no unnatural monster of chaos of irreconcilable opposites; he is a man, and a natural man enough, if one looks carefully at his character.”

The most influential Victorian interpretation of Iago was envisioned and portrayed by the great American actor Edwin Booth. Rejecting the exaggerated contrast between the villainous inner-Iago and the implausibly merry outer-Iago, Booth successfully deepened Iago’s vindictiveness by replacing Kean’s “cheerful honesty” with a friendly and decidedly “unvillain-like,” exterior, which he maintained throughout the performance. In Variorium, Booth himself writes on the ubiquity of Iago’s sincerity: “To portray Iago properly you must seem to be what all the characters think, and say you are, not what the spectators know you to be; try to win even them by your sincerity.” Even when Iago was the only character on the stage, Booth felt that there was “little need to remove the mask entirely,” writing that “Shakespeare spares you that trouble.”

The greatest showcase of Booth’s interpretation was in Iago’s temptation of Othello in the third scene of Act 3. Rather than displaying sly cunning for the audience’s sake, Booth instead adopted a frank appearance and a concerned, respectful countenance when addressing Othello. Appearing as a loyal friend to Othello, Booth’s Iago avoided all by-play until the final conclusion of the conversation, upon which time he left the stage as he presented “a quick, fiendish smile of triumph and a rapid clutch of the fingers.” Even here, Booth took careful consideration to perform the gesture “unobtrusively” and away from Othello’s sight. In crafting a plausible exterior for the wicked villain, Booth’s interpretive performance augmented the credibility of Iago’s outward appearance while highlighting the deep-seated nature of his malice.

Like most portrayals before it, Booth’s interpretation of Iago was less concerned with explaining the motivations behind the vindictiveness that it highlighted. As such, the production rarely expanded beyond the confused hints within the script of the play itself. In a noteworthy exception to this rule in Act 2, Scene 1, Booth’s production showed Cassio the Lieutenant laying a full-fledged kiss on Iago’s wife, Emilia. Serving to spice up the following dialogue, this choice colored Iago’s malice against Cassio with jealousy and further explored the possibility that Cassio had actually cuckolded Iago. When it came to Othello, however, Booth’s interpretation did not seek to clarify Iago’s motivations in plotting against the general. And yet, despite his potential jealousy of Cassio, the destruction of Othello remained Iago’s primary aim. In the telling final moments of the production, Booth’s Iago donned a wicked smile as he pointed triumphantly at the corpse of the fallen general.
Iago’s Plausibility and Motivations

portrayed an Iago who was at once Othello’s dearest friend and most wicked destroyer.

Unfortunately, the greater part of the twentieth century witnessed little advancement in either the plausibility of Iago as a believable character or the underlying motives behind his actions. In a great number of productions in the first portion of the century, such as those featuring actors Basil Rathbone and Maurice Evans, Iago presented himself, in accordance with the Kean’s model, as “a gay scoundrel, raising more laughter than fear at all.” In the productions of the last century, the predominant, motiveless Iago has furthermore tended to dominate over the character of Othello, cheapening somewhat the tragic value of Othello’s fall. Of the exceptions to this pattern, the portrayal on behalf of Micheál Mac Liammóir alongside Orson Welles’ Othello was particularly notable, in that Liammóir’s grim Iago was cold and ruthless. Of such unsmiling Iagos, the Spectator commented, “Iago takes himself so seriously that we miss the flavor of cynical gusto…and the rough humour which properly belong to the part.” In yet another prominently unusual production, actor Ralph Richardson attempted to create the most “hon­est” Iago possible. The portrayal horrified its audience with Richardson’s overall agreeableness. Despite the production’s creativity, the Spectator expressed concern for the ambiguity of Iago’s motivations in a deserved critique that may as well apply to a majority of early twentieth century interpretations: “…the bulk of the evil in Iago remained an unknown quantity, a dark power only to be guessed at.”

Luckily, interpretations concerning Iago’s motivations did see some degree of progress at the time. Laurence Olivier, for one, boldly attempted to explain Iago’s most fundamental motives. After consulting Freudian Dr. Ernest Jones, Olivier concluded that Iago had been driven to madness and knavery by “a subconscious affection for the Moor, the homosexual foundation of which he did not understand.” Portraying the role against Ralph Richardson (this time taking the role of Othello), Olivier attempted to bring this interpretation to life. The defining moment of this particular production occurred in Act 3 upon Iago’s line, “I am your own forever,” at which point Olivier’s Iago kissed Richardson’s Othello on the mouth. Unfortunately, the production failed to convey its novel interpretation. The actions of Olivier’s Iago came across as “the slightly malicious pranks of a young man with a grudge” with “no motivating dimension.” But while Olivier’s production fell flat, his attempt was nevertheless significant. Other productions had occupied themselves with creating a supremely plausible Iago – one who would appear realistic and yet sufficiently capable of carrying out his deceit without diminishing the intelligence or plausibility of the other characters. Now Olivier had attempted to uncover and to portray the true motives underlying the plausible villain’s deceit.

Prominent among recent stage interpretations of Othello was the 1989 production directed by Trevor Nunn and performed at The Other Place theatre in Stratford. Later filmed as a television special, the Nunn production’s interpretation of Othello relied heavily upon its general appearance and upon precise and emotional deliverance of Shakespeare’s text. The same goes for Iago, portrayed by Ian McKellen. Unlike most prior depictions of the role, McKellen’s Iago donned an appropriate military uniform and conducted his deceit within the confines of modest military barracks. Iago presented himself as a “rigidly disciplined non-commissioned officer obsessed with order and tidiness.” Even when not delivering lines, the regimented McKellen remained vigilant of his disciplined, military posture and tediously straightened the rugs and furniture on the set (a detail television cameras failed to capture). In masking his deceit of Othello, Ian McKellen’s Iago successfully strode the line between loyal subordinate and wise, caring friend. Originally showing nothing but disciplined respect for his ranking superior Othello, Iago gradually (and most likely strategically) dropped the military formalities as he gained the trust and obedience of the emotionally vulnerable general.
While his interactions with Othello were largely moderated by military discipline, McKellen’s Iago proved vulgar and cynical amongst his wife and his fellow soldiers. This interpretive choice necessarily made Othello look marginally foolish for trusting in Iago and thus reduced the plausibility of the portrayal somewhat. The overall effect of offering a more extended glimpse of the unreserved Iago, however, seems to have been to disclose greater insight into the villain’s motives. Older than any other character, McKellen crafted an Iago who was, above all, bitter. As witnessed by an impassioned soliloquy at the end of Act 1 (the most revealing of the production), McKellen’s Iago actually believed that Othello had cuckolded him. Bitter for this realization, McKellen addressed his wife dismissively and demonstrated general scorn for women throughout the production.

Combined with an air of legitimate racism, Iago furthermore felt that he had been robbed of a deserved promotion by Othello and, by association, Cassio. Creating a precise portrayal through fitting appearance, meticulous mannerisms, and impassioned delivery, Ian McKellen built upon Shakespeare’s text to further develop the motivations behind his most perplexing villain. In so doing, he brought to life an aging, racist Iago bitter from his ranking inferiority to a moor, bitter from the perceived infidelity of his wife, and bitter for his lack of deserved promotion – certainly a step away from the smiling Iago’s of the past.

Oliver Parker directed the most recent film production of *Othello* (1995), a popularization of Shakespeare that casts Laurence Fishburne as Othello and modern Shakespearian actor Kenneth Branagh as Iago. Much like in McKellen’s portrayal, Branagh’s Iago often breaks the “fourth wall,” delivering his soliloquies into a closely zoomed camera as if having an intimate conversation with the individual moviegoer. Whereas McKellen’s passionate soliloquies served primarily to reveal Iago’s malicious motives, however, Branagh’s Iago appears less candid, concealing his truest emotions even from his audience. But while Branagh’s Iago never seems to reveal himself entirely, Parker’s production on the whole leaves Iago’s knavery thinly disguised from the other characters. Booth’s Iago hid behind a perfectly loyal, friendly exterior. McKellen’s Iago hid behind predictably rigid military discipline. Branagh’s Iago, on the other hand, comes across as *acting innocent* – an attitude which, under normal circumstances, would more often incriminate than exonerate. Once he has successfully transformed Fishburne’s overly exotic Othello into a seething mass of jealous vengeance, Iago sheds even this weak exterior, appearing roughly as open as in his soliloquies. As articulated by the Washington Post, the overall effect of Branagh’s performance is the portrayal of a “narcissistic, bratty” Iago. Branagh’s interpretation thus fails to reconcile Iago’s exterior nature with the “honest” reputation upon which his deceit is contingent. As a result, Fishburne’s Othello (who seems strangely aware of his own downfall from the onset), and the characters of Rodrigo and Cassio in particular, come across as more foolish than a tragedy ought to permit.

Although Parker’s film adaption finds itself lacking when it comes to the plausibility of Iago as a character that is both trustworthy (in reputation) and malicious, Branagh’s interpretation and communication of Iago’s motives is uniquely refreshing. In a certain regard, Parker’s *Othello* appears to be opposite from most interpretations, in that the viewer seems to gain more insight into Iago’s motivations from his interactions with the other characters than from his soliloquies. In a select few moments within the film, Iago’s expressive countenance and silent mannerisms clearly undercut his stated motivations for vengeance. When Iago gives a blood oath to Othello and promises to help him carry out his revenge in Act 3, Scene 4, the two share an intimate embrace in which Iago visibly sheds tears. In the final moments of the film, the injured Iago stares pathetically into the camera as he climbs onto the wedding bed already home to the corpses of Emilia, Desdemona, and Othello. Together, these scenes indicate that Iago may be driven to vengeance by his love of Othel-
lo and by a deep-seated jealousy of Cassio and Desdemona, two characters whom Othello gives interpersonal precedence over Iago. Despite his insistence to the contrary in Act 1, Branagh’s Iago does not 

*hate* Othello. Rather, Branagh’s Iago appears hurt as a consequence of his emotional *attachment* to Othello. Even if not overtly homosexual, Iago’s moving affection for Othello in Parker’s production constitutes a more manageable, realistic depiction of Laurence Olivier’s interpretation of the character.

The performance history of *Othello*’s Iago testifies to the paradoxical complexity of Shakespeare’s most mysterious villain. On one hand, successful interpretations strive for a believable, plausible Iago capable of deceiving a noble Othello into the tragedy that bears his name. On the other hand, bold interpretations seek (successfully or otherwise) to interpret and to shed light on Iago’s motivations for deceit. The difficulty of achieving both cannot be overstated. Several historical productions have helped to craft an increasingly plausible Iago, but have failed entirely to reveal an interpretation of the villain’s true motives. Likewise, the latest productions of Shakespeare’s tragedy, such as Oliver Parker’s popularized film adaption, successfully explore Iago’s private motives, but damage his overall plausibility within the context of the other characters. Is a reasonably motivated, plausible Iago possible? Or does the magnitude of Iago’s double knavery expel him from logical comprehension? Ultimately, this ambiguity is an essential quality of Iago’s character. If there were an answer to these questions, there would be little need for, or interest in, the interpretation of the villain.

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Charles Dickens begins his novel Bleak House, published in 1853, with vivid descriptions of the fog that pervades London, describing it as hanging “dense” and “heavy” on street corners, up the river, and in the meadows. While palpable haze literally obstructs the vision of Londoners as they go about their daily duties, so too does it figuratively cloud the judgment of the characters in the novel. Fraught with social and political commentary, Dickens uses satire as he explores the role of parenting, particularly focusing on the effects of paternal neglect. This is exemplified in his depictions of Mrs. Jellyby and Mr. Turveydrop. Superficially, the characters are very different; she is a dedicated philanthropist and he is obsessively consumed by his own Deportment. Regardless of their apparent dissimilarities, Dickens proves that both characters, blinded by their own ambitions and driven by a desire to uphold Victorian ideals, fail as parents. This parental negligence and selfishness causes their children to suffer and become disenchanted. It would naturally follow that their lack of parental guidance promotes a new generation of bad parents and perpetuates the degradation of the family structure. Measuring these characters by the metric of Aristotle’s conception of justice, this paper will argue that however, that by portraying Mrs. Jellyby’s daughter, Caddy, as a thoughtful and kind mother, Dickens allows for a redemptive—and less bleak—reading of Victorian society.

In Book V of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that justice can mean lawfulness or fairness, arguing that “The man who acts unjustly gets too much and the victim of injustice too little of what is good.” This description applies to the responsibility that parents have to their children, as they are to provide basic necessities such as shelter, food, and security, in addition to unconditional love. He refers to justice as a “mean,” arguing that the “equal is a mean between the greater and the less.” Justice will be achieved when equality is restored between both parties involved. When parents, like Mrs. Jellyby and Mr. Turveydrop, act in their own self-interest and are unable to balance personal aspirations with parental duties, they fail to act justly, which instigates their children’s suffering. This disproportion is such that all of the needs of the selfish parent are met at the expense of the children, who do not receive proper care. According to these stipulations of justice, Mrs. Jellyby and Mr. Turveydrop are clearly deficient in virtue. However, Aristotle notes that these unjust actions are not always voluntary; as such, the wrongdoer is not necessarily culpable. He characterizes involuntary acts as being “done in ignorance or if not in ignorance, outside the agent’s control, or under compulsion.” When someone does not realize they are creating a disproportion of justice, they accidentally harm others, and are not acting with malicious intent. The inequality implicit in the injustice that Aristotle articulates is exemplified in Chapter 4 of Bleak House, “Telescopic Philanthropy.” Esther enters Mrs. Jellyby’s home and is shocked at the clutter and surprised and frightened by how grimy and unhealthy her children appear. The scene is chaotic, the house is bitterly cold, and the erratic behavior of the rambunctious youngsters proves the difficulties that arise due to the
absence of motherly guidance and love. Though Mrs. Jellyby is physically at home, her mind is elsewhere, as she devotes “all of [her] energies” to philanthropic efforts to employ and educate Africans in Boorioboola-Gha. Mrs. Jellyby is blind to the plight of her own family, and Dickens repeatedly refers to her misdirected sight, including phrases like, “she was looking far away into Africa, straight through my bonnet and head,” to illustrate her skewed priorities. In her desire to educate Africans, she forgets to instruct her own daughter, Caddy, who confides in Esther that she can “do anything hardly except write…for Ma.” Mrs. Jellyby’s philanthropy solely satisfies her own romantic desires. Though Mrs. Jellyby is bankrupt and lacks both the means and the time to be a successful philanthropist (like Mr. Jarndyce), she dedicates herself to the cause for her own self-worth and gratification.

Joyce Kloc McClure argues that Mrs. Jellyby’s “brand of charity is really false love” and that Dickens “shows us that genuine love cannot coexist with injustice.” Mrs. Jellyby’s philanthropy is “telescopic” in that she has never traveled to Africa and is too consumed by the idea of her pursuit to step back and access its true value and viability. Her mission’s failure at the novel’s denouement substantiates this idea, as “the King of Borrioboola [wanted] to sell everybody.” Mrs. Jellyby’s philanthropic efforts are insincere and misguided. In accordance with Aristotle’s philosophy, self-serving in her motivations, Mrs. Jellyby creates a disproportion between her well-being and that of others, not only in her own home, but also abroad. The Jellyby children will be granted justice only when their mother’s “portion” is no longer in excess. For this to be achieved, Mrs. Jellyby would need to focus her attention on her own family as opposed to her philanthropic efforts in Africa.

Mr. Turveydrop is similar to Mrs. Jellyby in that he is also blinded by the fog of his own pursuits. While he misguidedly believes her vocation is to be an advocate for Africans, Mr. Turveydrop feels he must uphold the tenets of English Deportment. His adherence to these anachronistic values and customs is all consuming. Dickens’s satire and exaggerated language highlight Old Mr. Turveydrop’s “false complexion, false teeth, false whiskers, and a wig” in a “pinched in, and swelled out” persona. He is a caricature whose ostentatious personality is manifest in his appearance. This is evident in the novel’s illustration “A model of parental deportment” in Chapter 23, which expertly depicts him as a larger than life figure. He dedicates his days—and his life—to the cultivation of his own image, but he is, in fact, a sham of Victorian aristocracy. Trevor Blount asserts that Turveydrop “cancel[led] out his individuality and turn[ed] himself into a painted emblem, a stuffed dummy, no more alive than a Dedlock ancestor and far more grotesque.” Undoubtedly, Mr. Turveydrop has convinced himself that he is a part of the aristocracy. While his delusions nurture his own happiness, they cripple his productivity and hurt those around him.

Mr. Turveydrop is a parasite, living off the earnings of his “meek little dancing-mistress” who he “worked to death” and his son Prince. Instead of teaching Prince and instilling in him fatherly wisdom, Mr. Turveydrop forces him to work twelve-hour days and dedicate his life to Deportment. Like Caddy, Prince is uneducated as a result of his parent’s selfishness. Caddy says that his schooling “had been so neglected that it was not always easy to read his notes.” Rather than nurturing and educating their children, Mrs. Jellyby and Mr. Turveydrop use their children to help them attain their own selfish goals. This is exemplified when Caddy, who Mrs. Jellyby refers to as her “amanuensis,” exasperatingly tells Esther that she refuses to “be a slave all [her] life.” Both neglectful parents are so self-absorbed that they believe society would suffer if they did not serve it through their deportment and philanthropy. Ironically, the opposite proves true, as the only people they end up helping are themselves. In response to Prince and Caddy’s wedding proposal, Mr. Turveydrop responds, “I will do my duty to society, and will show myself, as usual, about town.” It is as though he
would be doing the world a disservice if he did not uphold his Deportment.

In an attempt to find redeeming characteristics in Mrs. Jellyby and Mr. Turveydrop, Aristotle’s concept of the “voluntary” and the “involuntary” can be applied. Granted, Dickens’s novel is highly satirical, but differences between Mrs. Jellyby and Mr. Turveydrop become evident in their reactions to Caddy and Prince’s desire to marry and start a family. When Caddy mentions the marriage, Mrs. Jellyby is angry, but so absorbed in her agenda, that she does not have time to care, responding, “Now, if my public duties were not a favourite child to me, if I were not occupied with large measures on a vast scale, these petty details might grieve me very much.” Mrs. Jellyby follows this condescending remark by calling Caddy a “degenerate child” and stressing that she should be more concerned with the “destinies of the human race.” Furthermore, when Caddy and Prince have a child, Mrs. Jellyby looks with “serene contempt…miles beyond [the baby], as if her attention were absorbed by a young Boorioboolan on its native shores.” Mrs. Jellyby is mean-spirited and patronizing, and her disdainful language merits the claim that she is aware of the sadness and pain she afflicts on her daughter. She cannot restrain herself – she is an extremist in that she can only take care of those farthest away.

Conversely, when Mr. Turveydrop learns about the wedding, his reaction is not overtly hateful. Rather, in keeping with his personality, it is entirely self-centered and egotistical. He says, “My wants are few and simple. My little apartment here, my few essentials for the toilet, my frugal morning meal, and my little dinner will suffice. I charge your dutiful affection with the supply of these requirements, and I charge myself with the rest.” In reality, these prove to be monumental requests that cause Caddy and Prince much duress, but Mr. Turveydrop does not seem cognizant of that. While his response is not exactly good, the consistency in his aloofness is “involuntary,” making him less culpable than Mrs. Jellyby for his behavior.

Aristotle states that when a person acts involuntarily “his action is neither just nor unjust.” He continues, arguing that an act can be “unjust but stop short of being unjust” if it is involuntary. Mr. Turveydrop’s behavior better corresponds to this logic than Mrs. Jellyby’s. He does not seem to realize that he is hurting those around him, and thus gains some absolution. Dickens illustrates this when Caddy says Prince cannot spell, noting that he “puts so many unnecessary letters into short words…but with the best intentions.” Just as the extra letters hide the meaning of the words, so too do Mr. Turveydrop’s complicated Deportment rituals distract him from being a good father. If Dickens plays with language to refer both to father and son, then the most important phrase becomes, “with the best intentions.” It shows that Mr. Turveydrop is not a malicious person at heart, but instead is misguided. An element of malice is missing in Mr. Turveydrop’s personality that shows through in Mrs. Jellyby’s behavior and mannerisms.

Despite the tragedies that are interwoven into this novel, which details the most rotten aspects of British society, including deceit, selfishness, wrath, inequality, suicide, and death, Esther’s final narrative introduces a note of lightness, helping to dispel the permeating “fog.” She describes Caddy’s life, saying that she works diligently, and cares for her sick husband as well as her child who is no longer “such a mite” but “deaf and dumb.” While Caddy does suffer from the injustice that Aristotle describes at the hands of Mrs. Jellyby, whose self-serving actions provide only herself with excess and leave little for those whom she is supposed to love and care for, she eventually prevails. Instead of falling into a vicious cycle of parental neglect and selfishness, Caddy realizes her mother’s failing and corrects it with kindness as she raises her own imperfect child. Through her role as a loving wife and caring mother, she proves that action and compassion can dispel the wickedness that neglect and selfishness can cause to the family structure.

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Haiti’s theological identity has long been erratic and mercurial, a sign of dialectic between the cultures of the colonizers and the enslaved. From this liminal identity has arisen the creolized Vodou, a hybrid religion drawing on practices of both Catholicism and Yoruba spiritual customs. The tension between religious identities has considerably impacted Haiti’s political developments, as different classes have used religious identity as a means of discrimination and segregation. Past Haitian literary figures have tried to erase this gap; in the works of Alexis, Roumaine, and the Marcelin brothers, the authors often try to ideologically legitimize Vodou in the eyes of the literate bourgeois and middle classes. Yet in this process we see a curious politics arise; theology is no longer an entity with its own purposes and teleology. Rather, it becomes a tool for political and cultural manipulation. In The Farming of Bones, Haitian-American author Edwidge Danticat attempts to capture this tension between politics and theology, and plots an intricate conflict among the cultural, political, and theological forces of Haiti’s people.

The novel’s title posits a synthesis of the political-theological concepts, referring both to the violence Haitians in the D.R. faced as cane workers during the Trujillato, and to the supernatural intersection of regeneration and death. In relation to Schmitt’s Political Theology, Danticat’s novel does not blatantly dispute the idea that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.” Rather, she seems to problematize the cultural phenomenon of assigning such political concepts dogmatic glorification, in which societies or ruling social forces fetishize such concepts and render them incontestable. By including a selection of verses from the Book of Judges, Danticat uses the novel’s epigraph to introduce the story’s spiritual nature, and also provide a Biblical parallel with which to consider the ensuing narrative:

The Gileadites captured the fords of the Jordan leading to Ephraim, and whenever a survivor of Ephraim said, ‘let me cross over,’ the men of Gilead asked him, ‘Are you an Ephraimite?’ If he replied, ‘No,’ they said, ‘All right, say “Shibboleth.”’ If he said, ‘Sibboleth,’ because he could not pronounce the word correctly, ‘they seized and killed him at the fords of the Jordan. Forty-thousand were killed at the time. Judges 12: 4-6

The degree to which the Biblical narrative mirrors aspects of the 1937 Parsley massacre is uncanny; during the Parsley massacre 20,000 Haitians were killed, many of whom tried to escape to Haiti by crossing the Massacre River. Dominicans would identify Haitians for slaughter by asking suspects to pronounce the word “perejil,” a word Creole-speaking Haitians could not easily pronounce.

The Biblical elements of the massacre are further revealed when one compares its broader historical contexts to the entire story of Judges. The Book of Judges constitutes a history of Israel’s many “judges,” and comprises tales of the Israelites’ idolatry, as well as God’s irate reprimand, which in turn sends the Israelites’ enemies to con-
test their sacred land. When compared to Haitian history, Trujillo then seems to be the god figure, acting upon his right of “exception” to purify his sacred land of infidels, while the Haitians can be seen as his impure Israelites. Danticat creates the comparison of the sacred, God-given land of Israel and the fetishized nation-state of the Dominican Republic, seemingly implying that, to the Dominicans, the nation-state was a political concept that received the divine glorification of a theological concept. Danticat continues to theologize the concept of nation state throughout the novel by establishing Biblical comparisons and blending political and theological themes through figures such as the Massacre River and the minor character Father Romaine. By centering the narrative on a political act of mass violence that is catalyzed by nationalist sentiment, Danticat develops a criticism of the modern nation-state.

The comparison to the Book of Judges is not the novel’s only Old Testament analogy; the escape of the narrator/protagonist Amabelle Desir seems to more closely resemble the story of Exodus than that of Judges. Amabelle and her band of refugees can be read as Moses’ evacuees, escaping persecution by crossing a river which becomes an ambivalent symbol of both life and death as the story progresses. Within this analogy, the Haitians can once again be read as the Israelites, enslaved and forced in to dangerous labor, while the Dominicans are the Egyptians, hence the death of Amabelle’s employers’ first born son. The comparison is significant because it once again involves a Biblical narrative in which divine land is central to the narrative’s trajectory. Yet it is also important because it casts Haiti, the land to which Amabelle flees, as the Holy Land, while the story of Judges analogy casts the Dominican Republic as the land of Israelites. Yves and his “large Adam’s apple” create an allusion to the Garden of Eden story, a Biblical narrative in which yet another plot of land is made sacred. Danticat creates these Biblical comparisons seemingly to illustrate how both Dominicans and Haitians glorified the nation state as if it were a theological concept.

The rest of the story can then be seen as a way to show the dangers of the deified nation state, in which patriotic fanaticism overrides humanistic concerns. Danticat uses the minor character Father Romaine to once again compare the glorifications of theological and national sentiments, while also showing the violent results that occur when one fetishizes the nation state more than one reveres religious concepts. When Father Romaine is first introduced, Amabelle describes him as a “Haitian priest,” immediately setting up a character who is both nationalized and theologized. Danticat continues to establish his nationalist characterization on the next page, when Amabelle contrasts Father Romaine to “a Dominican priest, Father Vargas”, and later when Father Romaine, greeting Amabelle for the first time in the novel, says, “It is Amabelle, she who is from the same village of the world as me, Cap Haitien, the city of Henry I’s great citadel.” Amabelle later remarks “Father Romaine always made much of our being from the same place, just as Sebastien did.” Indeed, Father Romaine may be the novel’s central nationalist character, to an extent that it seems his dedication to Haiti overshadows his dedication to Catholicism.

It is significant then that through Father Romaine we conversely hear strong Dominican nativist sentiments, perhaps more so than through any other character. When Amabelle finds Father Romaine after the massacre, he tells her in his altered mental state, “We, as Dominicans, must have our separate traditions and our ways of living. If not, in less than three generations we will all be Haitians… our children and grandchildren will have their blood completely tainted unless we defend ourselves now, you understand?” This brainwashing is significant, less because it reflects the malleability of nationalist sentiment, and more because it involves the nation state’s assimilation of a religious figure, asserting the authority of its own ideology while manipulating an official of a theological institution to spread said ideology. Examples of this exploitative relationship are continued throughout the novel, such as in the
baptism scene, in which “children [who] were already six or seven years old [were] being re-baptized so the Generalissimo could now become their official, albeit absent, godfather.” It is seen again in the conversation Amabelle overhears between Mercedes and a soldier: “‘You know how much I admire the Generalissimo... Even so, I say we are asking for trouble when we arrest the priests in their own churches.’ ‘You should have been there to see it,’ one of the soldiers argued. ‘They cried like new widows, those priests.’” Through this relationship between the nation state and the church, Danticat shows both how the ideology of the nation state had become more theologically authorized than an actual theological institution, as well as the violent results such a glorification of ideological concepts can have. Romaine eventually heals from nation-state’s inflicted mental damage, but only after he is “no longer with any order.” The scene in which he announces his separation with the church is also the first scene in which Father Romaine mentions neither Haiti nor the Dominican Republic. Danticat simultaneously denationalizes and de-theologizes him, implying that the nation state has so overpowered the church that it is impossible to “stop the tears... [gain] an even greater understanding of things both godly and earthly” without leaving both the church and the nation state ideology.

Whereas Danticat uses Father Romaine to show the violent results of political fetishes, she uses Amabelle’s ambivalent relationship with the river to show the nation state’s contestability in contrast to theological concepts. To understand how Danticat does this, it is first necessary to understand the nature of Amabelle’s ambivalent relationship with the river. Amabelle directly associates the river with her painful experiences, in particular the deaths of her “mother and father, Wilner, and Odette.” Yet the river is also something with which she seems to have a powerful spiritual relationship; she prays to it in the epigraph, saying “in confidence to you, Mères Dlo, Mother of the Rivers,” and refers to it on the next page, calling the location she and Sebastien have their dreamt spiritual encounters, “the cave across the river.” It is significant then that the river, both within the story and in real life, represents a border, a physical object that demarcates and consequently defines the nation state, but which is theologized throughout the story. When Amabelle enters the river at the end of the story, she regards it as a theological rather than political object, describing it as “the river... Sebastien’s cave, my father’s laughter, my mother’s eternity... where it is said the dead add their tears to the river flow.” It is also necessary to remember, however, that the river is not only a representation of theological and political concepts, but also a geographic location in which the concept of the nation state deconstructs, since within the river one is either in both states or neither, a contradiction that confirms the limitations of nation state as ideology. Amabelle’s entrance into the river can be seen as the novel’s ultimate political act, a way in which Amabelle uses a theological entity to deconstruct the nation state, thus asserting the authority of theological concepts to the authority of political concepts. With this ending Danticat reveals the continued struggle between theological and political forces and reveals the nation state’s vulnerability.

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In Shakespeare’s Politics—first published in 1964—Allan Bloom and Harry Jaffa analyze the major political and social themes of several of Shakespeare’s most famous plays, which were written in England during the late 16th century. Bloom deplores the state of university education, and criticizes the division of modern academia into seemingly autonomous disciplines such as philosophy, art, literature, and politics. According to Bloom, Shakespeare’s plays “presuppose knowledge that cuts across those partially accidental lines” and show audiences the potential of the world outside their private lives. Shakespeare’s works thus encourage spectators to live as “social and political animals” in the tradition of Aristotle. Indeed, audiences can understand themselves better by becoming emotionally invested in the plays, and consider what they themselves might or potentially be in the “real” world.

I argue that Bloom’s interdisciplinary analysis of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar is a model for the ideal liberal arts education in a university. It is unnatural for subjects to be arbitrarily divorced from one another, and it is imperative that both professors and students search for connections between a wide variety of disciplines in order to fully understand any source material. Bloom’s chapter on Julius Caesar, entitled “The Morality of the Pagan Hero,” illustrates the necessity of understanding the political environment of any Shakespearean play through the lens of multiple academic subjects.

In Julius Caesar history, philosophy, and rhetoric respectively set the background for Caesar’s rise, describe the logic of his murderers, and detail the chaotic mob-rule that ultimately destroys the conspirators and Rome’s political order. Julius Caesar is set in 44 BCE, during the Roman Republic. While Rome had originally been founded as a monarchy in 753 BCE by Romulus and Remus, various aristocratic families drove out the last king Tarquinius Superbus in 509 BCE and established a constitutional republic. Laws were made by elected senators, and two elected consuls were the heads of state to prevent the abuse of power by a single person. Dictatorships could only occur during wartime emergencies, and could usually last no longer than six months. Therefore, Caesar’s decision to cross the Rubicon River with an army and transform his consulship into a formal dictatorship was an especially egregious break with Roman republican tradition. However, since this incident occurred prior to the action in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, the audience must have a solid background of Roman history in order to appreciate Caesar’s unprecedented influence on Roman life. Only by realizing the Roman tradition of republicanism would audiences understand why ambitious Caesar would “thrice refuse the kingly crown” from Antony during the Lupercal. In this way, the “morality of the pagan hero” must be understood through the lens of historical tradition.

Shakespeare’s play also provides its audience with opportunities to become emotionally
invested in Roman history through the development of individual characters. For example, Brutus is torn between his loyalty to Rome’s history of democratic governance (Brutus’s family was involved in ousting Tarquinius) and his personal friendship with Caesar. Since Brutus is one of the play’s tragic heroes, it is absolutely essential that audiences connect with him on a personal level in order for his tragic fall to have the desired bittersweet taste. For this reason, an understanding of philosophy is also essential in analyzing *Julius Caesar*. Shakespeare intends Cassius and Brutus to personify two opposing political philosophies, Epicureanism and Stoicism, respectively. For Cassius, political issues are less important and his ill-will toward Caesar primarily stems from a fear of losing his many privileges under a new Roman empire ruled by a dictator. He is the “seducer” of Brutus, and uses dishonest methods like forged letters to convince Brutus to take part in the assassination.

In contrast, Brutus believes that politics is of the utmost importance. Brutus is rigidly idealistic, and his Stoic philosophy drives him to believe that he must place his civic duty, the public interest of the Roman people (i.e. preserving the democracy), above his personal friendship with Caesar. As a Stoic, Brutus places a high emphasis on virtue, but his desire to balance civic duty with his personal virtues leads to his downfall. For example, he ignores Cassius’s advice to also kill Antony by saying,

“Our course will seem too bloody, Caius Cassius, to cut the head off and then hack the limbs, Like wrath in death and envy afterwards. For Antony is but a limb of Caesar. Let us be sacrificers, but not butchers, Caius.”

Brutus is unwilling to kill Antony because this shrewd, politically necessary action conflicts with his own virtuous desire to keep the bloodshed as low as possible to prevent Caesar’s dictatorship. Ironically, Brutus’s insistence on moral grounds (again, at Cassius’s disapproval) that Antony have the last word at Caesar’s funeral actually yields increases bloodshed because Antony incites the plebeians to riot against Caesar’s murderers. Through these examples, Shakespeare shows that although Brutus is virtuous and “the noblest Roman of them all,” unwavering adherence to any philosophy is ultimately unsuccessful as a political method. Brutus wants to save the Republic from the disorder of Caesar as a dictator. However, by murdering Caesar and sparing Antony, Brutus fosters severe civic disorder and cements Caesar’s status as a “mortal god” whose name would forever become associated with the apex of political success. Brutus’s struggles with private virtue, philosophy, and civic duty again highlight the importance of understanding Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar* from the perspectives of both history and philosophy.

Rhetoric, while not a contemporary academic discipline, is nonetheless vital in further analyzing the theme of deception and misinterpretation in *Julius Caesar*. Cicero, the famous orator, acknowledges in Act 2, scene 3 that “men may construe things after their fashion,” and that they interpret things in whichever way they like. This idea relates to the public outrage following Caesar’s death which leads to civil disorder in Rome. During Caesar’s funeral, Shakespeare highlights the contrast between Brutus and Antony. Brutus appeals to the virtues and reason of the common people and assumes that they share his strong morality; in contrast, Antony appeals to the crowd’s emotions and sparks the plebeian revolt that causes the decline of public order. Antony, as a skilled rhetorician, is successful because he is able to manipulate others’ emotions and his use of language to this end reflects Shakespeare’s original intent in all of his works: motivating his audiences to think outside their private lives by reflecting on the emotions they feel while watching his plays. Antony’s skillful use of rhetoric allows him to gain the upper hand throughout the play, first by ingratiating himself with the conspirators after Caesar’s murder, and then turning the Roman public against them. Throughout the play,
Shakespeare highlights the negative qualities of all parties (i.e. Caesar, Brutus, Cassius, etc.) and the common people are no exception. Indeed, Shakespeare suggests that the plebeians are especially vulnerable to emotional manipulation; they are not virtuous in their group mentality because they murder innocents such as the poet Cinna, whom they mistake for the conspirator of the same name.  

Although rhetoric may have faded from the current halls of academia, it still wields considerable influence in contemporary life. It is clear that people all over the world are motivated to change the status quo (for better or for worse) by their reactions to social unrest and rhetoric. The chaotic mob rule in *Julius Caesar* bears eerie resemblance to the protests which mark the Occupy movement and the Arab Spring. The meteoric rise of President Barack Obama is also clear evidence of rhetoric’s profound influence. For these reasons, it is imperative for universities to re-establish the study of rhetoric as an academic norm. Universities are designed to teach students how to make arguments based on factual evidence, but it is all too clear that success outside of academia often involves demagoguery rather than facts. In *Julius Caesar*, Brutus makes a logical appeal to the citizens’ reason and sense of civic duty (based on Rome’s democratic tradition), but it is ultimately Antony’s demagoguery that wins their hearts (and consequently, their minds). Rhetoric cannot function as an isolated discipline; rather, students must learn to defend their positions (in any discipline) through skillful persuasion in addition to traditional forms of evidence.

Allan Bloom’s argument about the unfortunate division of universities into autonomous discipline is sadly as relevant in 2012 as it was in 1964. Shakespeare was never meant to be taught exclusively in “English literature” courses, and *Julius Caesar* is only one example of how one of Shakespeare’s plays must be analyzed through the lens of multiple university disciplines. It is impossible to completely know the play by reading the text in isolation; history provides the background for Caesar’s break with Roman tradition, philosophy sheds light on the conspirator’s justifications for the murder and their subsequent failure to maintain order, while finally, rhetoric highlights many people’s vulnerability to skillful persuasion. However, these subject areas constitute only a small number of the themes of *Julius Caesar*, and the play would also find relevance in many other disciplines including (but not limited to) psychology, sociology, and democratic theory. This interdisciplinary approach reflects our essential human nature; we should not draw arbitrary distinctions between our public and private lives because as humans, we are by nature “social and political animals” that must engage with each other in both public and private contexts. Therefore, in order for universities to cultivate the best human beings, they must revive interdisciplinary education.

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In the three years he has been here on the Hilltop, Fr. Matthew Carnes, SJ, has quickly become one of the most well-known and esteemed Jesuit professors on campus. A scholar of political science, Carnes sees his academic life very much intertwined with his religious vocation as a Jesuit.

Carnes came to Georgetown from California. His first real exposure to the Society of Jesus came during his undergraduate years at Stanford where the Newman Center, a Catholic student ministry, was directed by a Jesuit who introduced Carnes to the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. It was at this point that Carnes began to develop a prayer life and, with spiritual direction, to discern what his vocation in life would be. Sitting in the lobby of Wolfington Hall, having just returned from the local parish, where he often says Mass, Fr. Carnes tells the story of how, when the chapel at Stanford was destroyed in the 1989 earthquake, he would go into the depths of the library to find the silence needed for prayerful contemplation and meeting Christ in the Scriptures. “The place of my conversion was in a library,” he says—a fitting place for a man whose life would come to be marked by a deep interconnection between scholarship and faith.

Studying in Chile his junior year in college, Carnes was struck by the Christian-based communities he encountered in the wake of the Pinochet regime. A meeting with a group of ordinary Chileans for a class quickly turned into a religious experience for Carnes when he and his classmates were invited to a First Communion. Seeing these members of the Church in the ordinary and extraordinary moments of their lives helped him to discern his desire to be present in the lives of the poor.

Returning stateside, Carnes entered the California Province of the Society of Jesus upon graduation from Stanford. Asked why he ultimately chose the Jesuit vocation, he said three things guided his discernment: the need for God to be at the center of his life, his conviction of the importance of education, and his desire to live in close friendship and community with others.

Through this process, Fr. Carnes retained his strong academic and scholarly interests in political science, particularly in Latin American politics. He told of a trip to an impoverished village in Paraguay, where, while on the one hand there was no electricity or running water, one could nevertheless look out on the horizon and see the lights of the Itaipu Dam, the world’s largest hydro-electric dam at the time. This sparked in him a deep curiosity about how political dynamics and decisions made at the government level lead to outcomes that have profound effects on peoples’ lives. He forewent applying to graduate school to enter the Jesuits, unsure of how his desire to be a scholar would come to fruition yet sensing a certain intrinsic connection between his desire to be a force for justice and his passion for studying the politics of the just distribution of goods and resources. He recalled being reminded by a professor at Stanford that there exists a certain inherent compatibility between the academic life and religious life, a connectivity that harkens back to medieval scholasticism.

This connectivity has marked Fr. Carnes’ time at Georgetown. In the classroom, he lec-
tures on social welfare policy, the politics of labor, resource allocation and access, and the politics of poverty. He urges students to reflect on why there is such a chasm between rich and poor, between those with access to resources and those without, and how this chasm might be overcome. As a Jesuit-in-Residence in Kennedy Hall, Fr. Carnes is able to continue the conversation with many of his students outside of the classroom, helping them to delve even more deeply into the issues and to make connections between what they study in class and their own lives. At Georgetown, Fr. Carnes is also able to be present to students in a pastoral, non-academic way. By celebrating a number of Masses on campus each week, hearing confessions, and giving retreats, Fr. Carnes, bringing his youthful vigor to bear, has become a touchstone for the kind of life that represents Georgetown at her finest: the communal integration of the life of prayer and the life of study.

Fr. Carnes locates the strength of Georgetown’s intellectual life in the high caliber students and professors that populate the Hilltop. He also points to Georgetown’s academic culture, which encourages students and professors alike to delve deeply into their academic interests. However, this same variety of scholarship and academic opportunities also presents a challenge for Georgetown. Depth must be balanced with breadth, according to Carnes. He sees a dangerous temptation for each discipline to become so mired in itself and so narrowly focused that it loses sight of the intellectual contributions made by other fields of study, bringing to mind Cardinal Newman’s quip about people who know so much about so little. Fr. Carnes hopes that Georgetown will encourage more “cross-pollination” among disciplines. In his view, Georgetown encourages her students to go deep; now they must also go across.

Fr. Carnes sees the tradition of the liberal arts as one of Georgetown’s greatest strengths, setting her apart from other institutions. The liberal arts education encourages an intellectual breadth that discourages the atomization of intellectual life and promotes an understanding of the whole and of the interconnectedness of knowledge. For his own part, Fr. Carnes makes it a point to ground what he teaches—complex, data-driven analysis of political and economic policy, actors, and institutions—in the broader philosophical understanding of the human person, human flourishing, and human community. His exposure to political philosophy while studying at Fordham during his Jesuit formation perhaps explains why he begins his class in Comparative Political Systems by reading Aristotle.

Asked what has been an impactful piece of literature in his life, Fr. Carnes points to Augustine’s *Confessions*. In many ways, Carnes muses, Augustine’s unwavering search for the truth can be seen as a model for Georgetown’s students. As the Bishop of Hippo slowly came to realize the joy of finding God, the ultimate truth, he realized the harmony between himself and the God who created him. Ultimately, says Carnes, we, like Augustine, are to find God at the very core of our being, the same core that is the location of our deepest spiritual and intellectual loves.

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The Forum

1 The extensive citations from Aquinas in both Latin and English are here modified. This essay is reworked and shortened. Standard references to Aquinas will be placed in the text. The Summa theologiae is cited as (I-II, 87, 2); the Commentary on the Ethics cites the paragraph number (#1002).


6 For Aristotle, I will cite from the Basic Works, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). I will assume in this discussion a familiarity with Aristotle’s treatise on friendship in Books VIII and IX of the Ethics, which I hope might be read or reread along with these reflections.


14 Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, in Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 3-268. The Louisiana State University Press has subsequently issued Plato as a separate paperback text.

15 Ibid., 268.

16 The word for flute was aulos. It was apparently a double-reed wind instrument, more like an oboe than a modern day flute.

18 Cicero,. 233.


23 That said, the Dutch Republic of the late sixteenth century would begin to experiment with some such institutions.


25 On account of *The Prince*—Machiavelli’s famed instruction manual for autocratic rule—he is popularly regarded as having favored the autocratic rule of one man. The Discourses, however, suggests that he was in fact a republican. It is far more likely that this treatise, rather than *The Prince,* reflects Machiavelli’s true political philosophy. He originally wrote the latter treatise for Giuliano de Medici, the ruler of Florence, as an instruction manual on authoritarian statecraft, hoping this would impress the Medici and secure his release from exile. Machiavelli had been banished for supporting a short-lived reincarnation of the Florentine Republic, and hence by expressing republican sentiments to the resurgent Medici he would have been unlikely to accomplish his goal. He assembled the *Discourses,* however, from a series of marginal notes on Livy’s history of Rome. In fact, it is unlikely that he collated the work in its entirety for publication. Thus, given that it was a personal work, he would have been able to write more or less as he pleased. Its writing style reflects this freedom, for Machiavelli’s passion is far more evident in the *Discourses* than in the constricted and un-sentimental style of *The Prince.* In the *Discourses,* we therefore encounter what is likely to have been the real Machiavelli and his ideal of a republican city-state


28 *Ibid.,* 77-166, 179-181


32 *Ibid.,* 171-175, 188-193, 301, 320-322.

33 *Ibid,* 209.

34 Examples include the Nazi Party’s courting of the German Lutheran church for electoral support, seeing it as a rallying point of German nationalism and tradition. When the German Nazis held power, however, they often came to regard Christian worship with more suspicion and as a competitor to their nationalist ideology. Nazi officials often sought (unsuccessfully) to replace Church attendance with what was essentially secular worship of the regime through rallies and political rituals. For more information, see Peter Fritzsche’s *Germans into Nazis,* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
40 St. Augustine, *City of God*, 46.
46 St. Augustine, *City of God*, 883.
47 To understand Augustine on this point, one must have a solid grasp of his theology of man’s depravity and conversion. Fallen man is “turned inward” upon himself, and serves himself as lord. What happens upon conversion is God’s turning (he was monergistic) of a soul from itself to Him and to service to Him.
48 St. Augustine, *City of God*, 883.
51 I Corinthians 7:22.
52 Matthew 16:18.
54 St. Augustine, *City of God*, 877.
58 St. Augustine, *Confessions*, 249.
60 St. Augustine, *City of God*, 883.
61 I Timothy 2:2.
62 Ephesians 3:17.
63 Gilbert Keith Chesterton, *Orthodoxy* (New York: John Lane Company, 1908), 147.


Crawford, *Shop Class as Soulcraft*, 185.

MacIntyre, 194-195.


The Chamber


Weber, 98.

Ibid., 104.

Ibid., 105. Here Weber invokes the primordial sense of disillusionment, the removal of “magic” from religious life. This is not to be mistaken with the second sort of disillusionment, the rejection of religion altogether.

Ibid., 115.
94 Ibid., 112.
95 Ibid., 157.
96 Ibid., 161-162; italics supplied.
97 Ibid., 119.
98 Ibid., 123.
99 Ibid., 162.
100 Ibid., 128.
101 Ibid., 163.
102 Ibid., 171.
103 Ibid., 182.
104 Ibid., 175.
105 On the idea of “unintended consequences,” see Brad Gregory’s remarkable new book, The Unintended Reformation.
107 ie. “worldview”
108 Of course, this expression is still anachronistic and somewhat misleading. For Calvin there were never “two spheres.” Nonetheless, the point remains: man’s salvation, not his economic well-being, was the ultimate goal.
110 Ibid., 181.
112 Weber, 182.
113 Wendell Berry, What Matters? Economics For A Renewed Commonwealth (Berkely, CA: Counterpoint, 2010), 42.
114 Ibid., 45.
115 Ibid., 43.
116 Ibid., 45.
117 Ibid., 42.
118 Ibid., 47.
119 Ibid., 48.
120 Ibid., 47.
121 Ibid., 45.
122 Ibid., 182.
123 Ibid., 182.
124 Ibid., 180.
125 Ibid., 50.
126 Ibid., 45.


144 This statement implies that Smith is unconcerned about the source or cause of commercial man; he is only focused on what elements of human nature are manifested and observable in the world. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 17.

145 Smith’s discussion of the market theory of prices outlines the means that direct society. Aggregate demand and supply create a price and this price acts as a signal to direct capital and labor. This process, which implies that man is focused only acquiring material benefit and satiating desires, directly conflicts with the notion that society and man is ordered in accordance with divine wisdom; man’s basest desires motivates society. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 62-71.

146 Kant outright rejects the moral improvement of men in conjunction with providence. He instead seeks to create a political order based upon the laws of observable effects to coerce men into a peaceful political system. Kant is advocating for political reform that can only come by expanding by greater knowledge. Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 112.

147 Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 84.


149 Smith notes that public institutions, which did not have endowments, were generally more responsive to market demand. He writes that at poorer universities, “in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their subsistence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world.” This is further evidence that Smith desires to make knowledge a commodity that can be created. *Ibid.*, 295.
The direction that Kant is attacking is formulated and postulated by earlier thinkers, who placed reason under the direction of faith. Kant, *Ibid.*, 3.

The Sanctuary


*(Gaudium et Spes 12)*

O’Malley, 219.


The Archive


176 Thomas, 12-13.


178 “To Beautify Washington: Mr. Frederick Law Olmsted Outlines Commission’s Plans,” *The Sun* (Baltimore), April 20, 1902.


184 Thomas, 43.


190 Thomas, 96.


192 Harding, 6.


201 Marincola, xiv-xvii.
202 Herodotus, trans. by Sélincourt, 3.
205 Ibid., 3.
206 Ibid., 12.
208 Carruthers, 12.
210 Carruthers, 19.
211 Yates, 5.
212 James Burke, The Day the Universe Changed (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985), 112.
213 Carruthers, 30.
214 Marincola, xxii.

The Parlor
217 Ibid., 26.
218 Ibid., 47-49.
219 Ibid., 47.
220 Ibid., 48-49.
221 Ibid., 50.
222 Ibid., 121-122.
223 Ibid., 123-126.
224 Ibid., 127.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid., 121, 128-129.
227 Ibid., 128.
229 Ibid., 183.
230 Ibid.


Dickens, 987.


*Ibid.*, 378


Dickens, 226.


*Ibid*.


Aristotle, 191.

*Ibid*.


*Ibid*.


*Ibid*.


**The Clock Tower**

Georgetown University, *Ye Domesday Book*, 1949, 177.

Washington Star, “Impressions of a Necrophile,” clipping from the Georgetown University Archives.

Tom Donnelly, “The Mysterious Heart of the Matter,” clipping from the Georgetown University Archives
294 Donnelly, *Heart of the Matter*.

295 The Washington Star, “Christianity is No Special Diet, But Food for All, Waugh Asserts.” Clipping from the Georgetown University Archives.

296 Donnelly, *Heart of the Matter*.

297 Ibid.

298 Ecclesiastes 2:10-11, King James Version.

299 Donnelly, *Heart of the Matter*.

300 Ibid.

301 Ibid.


303 Sykes, 300.

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