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The Georgetown Public Policy Review
3520 Prospect Street, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20007

Phone: (202) 687-8477
Fax: (202) 687-5544
E-mail: gpprevw@georgetown.edu

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Urban Institute

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Preface

The Politics of Information

Volume 10, Number 1

It is tempting for this policy journal, celebrating its tenth year of publication with a feature on Information, to declare that "Information is the Lifeblood of Democracy." This Milton-esque quip seems to celebrate the great purveyors of information that we emulate. What's more, the idea has gained credence in speeches at the UN Council on Human Rights and been echoed across countless weblogs. But it is the very proliferation of this sentiment that leads us to pause. If information is in fact the lifeblood of democracy, then the democracy that jogs around Washington D.C. may well be suffering from hypertension. From here at the heart of politics, we see ever greater quantities of information surging out to the public. The flow is so great that it has overwhelmed major veins of media and spilled into alternative outlets. Our intention with this tenth edition of the Georgetown Public Policy Review is to examine this flow and assess how all this extra information is settling in the American system.

The Pew survey report on media usage that opens this issue reveals changing media preferences among today's citizens. It shows that as information flows have increased, people have turned to alternative media. Dr. Douglas Reed's article looks closer at local media and examines newspaper editorial pages in order to gauge how political opinions of No Child Left Behind legislation have formed over time. Akira Tsuchiya explores the digital divide in eGovernment and relates new findings about the variables of age, race, income, and education in their relation to the scope and frequency of internet usage. Dr. Alison Dagnes and Stephanie Jirard provide a framework for understanding the African American vote in the last presidential election and note the beginning of a shift in message in American race politics with a movement towards issue-orientation.

Our interview with Washington Post ombudsman Michael Getler explores how the traditional media has endeavored to manage the wealth of information it disseminates. Renowned secrecy expert Steven
Aftergood opines on the consequences of failing to share information. Paul Rosenzweig of the Heritage Foundation shares his views on the Patriot Act and discusses the need to tear down 'walls' that block information transfer between government agencies.

A shining example of effective information sharing, “The 9-11 Commission Report,” is reviewed by Dr. Joe Ferrara. Dr. Barbara Schone also reviews "The Mediating Effect of Public Opinion on Public Policy: Exploring the Realm of Health Care."

With this tenth edition we are proud to unveil a new section: "Innovators in Public Management," which this year features Captain William Taylor of the United States Army and his analysis of force structures for a new global paradigm.

We hope you enjoy this edition of the Georgetown Public Policy Review, and we thank you for picking it out of today's information deluge.

Ryan Tuggle
Editor, Georgetown Public Policy Review
Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political News Universe

A SURVEY REPORT OF THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS

The 2004 presidential campaign is continuing the long-term shift in how the public gets its election news. Television news remains dominant, but there has been further erosion in the audience for broadcast TV news. The Internet, a relatively minor source for campaign news in 2000, is now on par with such traditional outlets as public television broadcasts, Sunday morning news programs and the weekly news magazines. And young people, by far the hardest to reach segment of the political news audience, are abandoning mainstream sources of election news and increasingly citing alternative outlets, including comedy shows such as The Daily Show and Saturday Night Live, as their source for election news.

Today’s fractionalized media environment has taken the heaviest toll on local news, network TV news and newspapers.


Results for the survey are based on telephone interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates among a nationwide sample of 1,506 adults, 18 years of age or older, during the period December 19, 2003 - January 4, 2004. Based on the total sample, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on either Form 1 (N=733) or Form 2 (N=773), the sampling error is plus or minus 4 percentage points. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

THE GEORGETOWN PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW, 10:1 (FALL 2004).
Where Americans Learn About
The Candidates and Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regularly learn something from ...</th>
<th>2000 %</th>
<th>2004 %</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<td>Morning TV shows</td>
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<td>National Public Radio</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunday political TV</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public TV shows</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web sites of news orgs</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News magazines</td>
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<td>News pages of ISPs*</td>
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<td>Late night TV shows</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-SPAN</td>
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<td>Comedy TV shows</td>
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<td>+2</td>
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<td>Religious radio</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online news magazines</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Internet service providers such as AOL and Yahoo.

Four years ago, nearly half of Americans (48%) said they regularly learned something about the presidential campaign from local TV news, more than any other news category. Local TV still leads, but now 42% say they routinely learn about the campaign from local television news. Declines among nightly network news and newspapers the other leading outlets in 2000 have been even more pronounced (10 points network news, nine points newspapers).
The Pew Research Center's new survey on campaign news and political communication, conducted among 1,506 adults Dec. 19-Jan. 4, shows that cable news networks like CNN and Fox News have achieved only modest gains since 2000 as a regular source for campaign news (38% now, 34% in 2000). But as a consequence of the slippage among other major news sources, cable now trails only local TV news as a regular source for campaign information. In several key demographic categories young people, college graduates and wealthy Americans cable is the leading source for election news.

In that regard, the relative gains for the Internet are especially notable. While 13% of Americans regularly learn something about the election from the Internet, up from 9% at this point in the 2000 campaign, another 20% say they sometimes get campaign news from the Internet (up from 15%).

The survey shows that young people, in particular, are turning away from traditional media sources for information about the campaign. Just 23% of Americans age 18-29 say they regularly learn something about the election from the nightly network news, down from 39% in 2000. There also have been somewhat smaller declines in the number of young people who learn about the campaign from local TV news (down 13%) and newspapers (down 9%).

Cable news networks are the most frequently cited source of campaign news for young people, but the Internet and comedy programs also are important conduits of election news for Americans under 30. One-in-five young people say they regularly get campaign news from the Internet, and about as many (21%) say the same about comedy shows such as Saturday Night Live and The Daily Show. For Americans under 30, these comedy shows are now mentioned almost as frequently as newspapers and evening network news programs as regular sources for election news.

But people who regularly learn about the election from entertainment programs whether young or not are poorly informed about campaign developments. In general, Americans show little awareness of campaign events and key aspects of the candidates' backgrounds: About three-in-ten (31%) can correctly identify Wesley Clark as the Democratic candidate who had served as an Army general and 26% know Richard Gephardt is the candidate who had served as House majority leader. People who say
they regularly learn about the campaign from entertainment programs are among the least likely to correctly answer these questions. In contrast, those who learn about the campaign on the Internet are considerably more knowledgeable than the average, even when their higher level of education is taken into account.

TV Still Dominates

While cable news and the Internet have become more important in informing Americans about the election, television as a whole remains the public's main source of campaign news. When individual TV outlets are tested, 22% say they get most of their news from CNN, 20% cite Fox, and somewhat fewer cite local news or one of the network news broadcasts.

By this measure, newspapers, radio and Internet are viewed as secondary sources of campaign news. At this stage, the Internet remains a secondary source even among Internet users. About three-quarters of Americans who use the Internet (76%) say television is their first or second main source for news about the campaign (37% cite newspapers, 20% the Internet). Still, the number of Americans overall who mention the Internet as a main source as first or second mentions has nearly doubled since 2000 (from 7% to 13%).

Bias Concerns Grow Among Democrats

The survey also finds that the nation's deep political divisions are reflected in public views of campaign coverage. Overall, about as many Americans now say news organizations are biased in favor of one of the two parties as say there is no bias in election coverage (39% vs. 38%). This marks a major change from previous surveys taken since 1987. In 1987, 62% thought election coverage was free of partisan bias. That percentage has steadily declined to 53% in 1996, 48% in 2000, and 38% today.

Compared with 2000 a much larger number of Democrats believe that coverage of the campaign is tilted in favor of the Republicans (29% now, 19% in 2000). But Republicans continue to see more bias in campaign coverage than do Democrats. More than four-in-ten Republicans (42%) see news coverage of the campaign as biased in favor of Democrats; that compares with 37% in 2000.
Among independents there also has been a significant decline in the percentage who say election news is free of bias (43% now, 51% then), though independents remain divided over whether the coverage favors Democrats or Republicans.

The survey finds that two-thirds of Americans (67%) prefer to get news from sources that have no particular political point of view, while a quarter favors news that reflects their political leanings. Independents stand out for their strong preference of news that contains no particular viewpoint (74% vs. 67% of Republicans and 60% of Democrats).

With the race for the Democratic nomination about to enter a critical phase, the campaign has yet to break out in terms of public interest. But attention is not notably lower than at a comparable point in the last presidential contest. Nearly half of Americans (46%) are following news about the nomination contest very (14%) or fairly (32%) closely; in January 2000, slightly more (53%) said they were following the campaign, but at that point there were nomination contests in both parties.

The survey also finds:

Political endorsements, whether made by politicians, celebrities or advocacy organizations continue to have little impact on most Americans. Moreover, among the small number swayed by such endorsements, the effect is mostly mixed. On balance, endorsements by California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and former Vice President Al Gore would have a somewhat negative impact, although most people say they would not be affected either way. An endorsement by a person's priest or minister is a net positive, but 80% say such an endorsement would not matter (up from 70% in 2000). Newspaper endorsements are also less influential than four years ago, and dissuade as many Americans as they persuade.

Internet users rely on the web sites of major media outlets for campaign news, rather than Internet-based news operations. Among Americans who use the Internet, 40% say they regularly or sometimes learn about the campaign from the news pages of web portals like AOL and Yahoo.com, and 38% say the same about web sites of major news organizations like CNN and The New York Times. Just 11% regularly or sometimes learn about the campaign
from online news magazines and opinion sites such as Slate.com.

Since 2000, there has been sharp decline in the percentage of Republicans who say they regularly learn about the campaign from daily newspapers, as well as local and nightly network TV news. And with the rise of Fox News the political profile of the campaign news audience has become more partisan. Fully twice as many Republicans as Democrats say they get most of their election news from Fox News (29% vs. 14%). Significantly more Democrats than Republicans get most of their election news from one of the three major networks (40% vs. 24%).

CAMPAIGN INTEREST AND FAMILIARITY

Most Americans are not familiar with the ins-and-outs of the campaign. Just a third say they have heard a lot about Al Gore's endorsement of Howard Dean; another 36% have heard something about it. Even fewer (16%) have heard a lot about Dean's widely reported comment about wanting to win the votes of "guys with Confederate flags in their pickup trucks." In fact, 59% say they have heard nothing about the controversy.

Public awareness of facts about the candidates' backgrounds also is relatively low. Overall, 31% correctly identified Clark as the candidate who served as an Army general. At about this stage in the 2000 Democratic race, approximately the same percentage (30%) knew that Bill Bradley was a former senator. An overwhelming percentage of Clark supporters (91%) knew that the candidate was a former Army general.

Fewer Americans (26%) were able to identify Richard Gephardt as the former House majority leader. Even Gephardt supporters were not widely aware of this fact; just 36% knew that their candidate had been majority leader.

Older Americans are more knowledgeable about these facts than are younger people, and more men than women correctly answered these questions. Interestingly, nearly as many conservative Republicans as liberal Democrats have heard a lot about Gore's endorsement of Dean (42%, 45% respectively). But liberal Democrats were far more likely to know about Clark's background than any other ideological group.
Where They Learn and How Much They Know

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Correct Answers*</th>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Regularly learn something from ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Internet</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>(218)</td>
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<td>Major news web sites</td>
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<td>(183)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>(229)</td>
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<tr>
<td>News magazines</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>(160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News pages of ISPs</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday political TV</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>(202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk radio</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily newspaper</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>(502)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public TV news shows</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable political talk</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>(586)</td>
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<td>C-SPAN</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>(541)</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>(306)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morning TV shows</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>(134)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comedy shows on TV</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>(112)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late night TV shows</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>(121)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*# of correct answers to two questions asking respondents to name the candidates who were an Army general and former House majority leader.

Online Americans Knowledgeable

Where people turn for campaign information makes a big difference in what they know about the campaign. People who use the Internet, those who listen to National Public Radio, and readers of news magazines are the most knowledgeable about the campaign.
About six-in-ten of those who report regularly learning something about the campaign from these sources were able to correctly answer at least one of the two candidate identification questions, and a third or more can answer both. Daily newspaper readers, those who listen to talk radio, and those who watch public television or the Sunday morning political talk shows are nearly as knowledgeable.

By comparison, people who say they regularly learn from late night television, morning TV shows, local television, and comedy TV shows are the least informed. Among these groups, two-thirds or more were unable to answer either of the knowledge questions. Falling in between are viewers of cable news and talk shows, C-SPAN, TV news magazines, and network TV news.

THE INTERNET AND CAMPAIGN NEWS

While 13% say they are getting most of their campaign news from the Internet, this is the highest figure ever recorded, and matches the 11% found among voters at the conclusion of the presidential campaign in November 2000. In November 2002, as the end of the midterm election campaign, just 7% of the public cited the Internet as a major source. And at a comparable point in the nominating process in 2000, only 6% cited the Internet.

These gains come not only because more people are going online now than in previous campaigns. Even among those going online, the percentage saying they are getting most of their campaign news there has nearly doubled (from 11% to 20%) since November 2002.

About one-in-five young people age 18-29 (21%) say they are getting their campaign news from the Internet, putting it within 10 points of newspapers (30%) among this group. There continues to be a gender gap in Internet use for campaign news, with more men (16%) than women (10%) citing it as a key source.

More people also say they are going online for the explicit purpose of getting news or information about the 2004 elections. Overall, 14% of all Americans 22% of those who go online turn to the Internet with the goal of informing themselves about the election. These figures are comparable to the numbers from the end of
the election campaign in 2002. Levels of online news seeking are still below those seen in November 2000, but that was at the end of a presidential campaign.

**LEARNING ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN ONLINE**

Overall, the number of people who say they regularly or sometimes learn something about the campaign from the Internet has increased nine percentage points since January 2000, from 24% to 33% today.

In addition, people report learning about the campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learning from the Internet</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
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<td>39</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*% who regularly or sometimes learn something about the candidates from the Internet.
from a variety of specific Internet sources. Nearly three-in-ten (28%) say they regularly or sometimes learn from the web sites of major news organizations, and 27% say they learn from the news pages of the Internet service providers, such as Yahoo and AOL. Fewer than one-in-ten (8%) learn from online news magazines and opinion sites, such as Slate.com.

Relying on the Internet as a source of campaign information is strongly correlated with knowledge about the candidates and the campaign. This is more the case than for other types of media, even accounting for the fact that Internet users generally are better educated and more interested politically. And among young people under 30, use of the Internet to learn about the campaign has a greater impact on knowledge than does level of education.

COMING ACROSS NEWS ONLINE

The key to learning from the Internet is active use. More people say they "come across" campaign news online (24%) than say they go online specifically for the purpose of learning about the campaign (14%); another 24% go online but say they do not encounter campaign news. This raises the question of whether inadvertent exposure to news while surfing can also help people learn about the campaign.

People who go online for the explicit purpose of obtaining election news are relatively well-informed about the campaign. On average, these people show familiarity with two of four campaign events or stories. That is more than twice the score of those who do not go online.

But those who say they simply come across campaign information when going online for other purposes are only slightly more knowledgeable than those who do not come across such news or even those who do not go online.

INTERNET AS A CAMPAIGN TOOL

For many Americans, the Internet is also becoming an important means of communicating about the campaign and participating in it. About one-in-five (18%) use the web for political activity of one sort or another (among those going online, 30% engage in some form of political activity). The most popular uses for the Internet are to get candidate issue information (11% of the
public) and to send or receive emails about the campaign or candidates (11%). Smaller numbers seek information about local groups and activities, visit candidate or organization web sites, or engage in discussions, chats, or blogs.

People under age 30 are more active in using the Internet for campaign purposes, despite being generally less interested and engaged in politics. About a quarter (24%) say they have taken part in at least one of six online activities, and 17% have engaged in two or more.

DEAN AND THE INTERNET

Howard Dean's campaign has effectively employed the Internet as a campaign tool, raising record amounts of money and sponsoring numerous local meetings of supporters. But the survey finds that Dean's supporters are not vastly different from supporters of other Democratic candidates in terms of their online campaign activity.

Supporters of candidates other than Dean are just as likely as Dean backers to be Internet users. And both groups are about equally likely to say they are regularly learning about the campaign from the Internet. But Dean supporters are somewhat more likely to say they go online seeking news about the election (by a margin of 26% to 19%).

Comparable numbers of supporters of Dean and the other Democratic candidates say they have sent or received emails about the campaign (17% for Dean, 18% for the others), sought information about local campaign activities, engaged in online chats or blogs, or visited candidate web sites. More Dean supporters have visited the web sites of groups or organizations that promote candidates or positions.

YOUNG PEOPLE LEAVING TRADITIONAL SOURCES

The increasing role of the Internet and comedy programming as a source of news for younger Americans comes as they continue to turn away from more traditional campaign news sources.

Four years ago, young people were far more likely to regularly learn about the campaign from network evening news (39%) than from the Internet (13%) or comedy programs (9%). Today, all
### Young People and Campaign News

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regularly learn something from ...</th>
<th>---Age 18-29---</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable news</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local news</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV news magazines</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network news</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily newspaper</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comedy TV shows</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morning TV shows</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable political talk</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk radio</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late night TV shows</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-SPAN</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Public Radio</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday political TV</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News magazines</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public TV shows</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious radio</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three sources rate about equally in importance, as the percent citing network news as a regular source of campaign information has fallen from 39% to 23%. The Internet and comedy shows have become more widely used as information sources (about one-in-five cite each as a regular source of campaign news).

Overall, TV remains the main source of news for all generations, including younger Americans. While network and local news have fallen in importance among younger Americans, cable news has held its own, with 37% of 18-29 year-olds saying they regularly learn about the campaign from cable outlets. TV news magazines like 60 Minutes and 20/20 also have grown in importance among younger Americans. Today 26% of younger people cite TV news magazines as a regular source of political news, up from 18% in 2000.
While these changes in the campaign news environment are the most striking among younger Americans, many of the same patterns are apparent among older generations as well. The decline in the percent saying they regularly learn about the campaign from newspapers has been just as pronounced among those over 30 as among those in their teens and twenties. Since 2000, fewer people over 30 say they learn about the campaign from network news, though here the drop-off has been greater among younger people.

Moreover, an increasing percentage of Americans in their 30s and 40s also are turning to the Internet for campaign information. 16% regularly learn about candidates and the campaign from the Internet today, up from 10% in 2000. But the Internet remains a relatively minor campaign news source for people age 50 and older. Just 7% regularly learn about the campaign from the Internet today, compared with 6% four years ago.

**Comedy Shows Matter**

Comedy programs are increasingly becoming regular sources of news for younger Americans, and are beginning to rival mainstream news outlets within this generation. Today, 21% of people under age 30 say they regularly learn about the campaign and the candidates from comedy shows like *Saturday Night Live* and *The Daily Show*, twice as many as said this four years ago (9%). (Note: In January 2000, the show *Politically Incorrect* was listed with *Saturday Night Live*, rather than *The Daily Show.*) And this is particularly true for younger men, 27% of whom regularly learn about the campaign from comedy shows, compared with 14% of young women.

Overall, one out of every two young people (50%) say they at least sometimes learn about the campaign from comedy shows, nearly twice the rate among people age 30-49 (27%) and four times the rate among people age 50 and older (12%).

Young people also are much more likely than older generations to learn about the campaign from late-night talk shows like Jay Leno and David Letterman, though there has been no increase from four years ago on this measure. Taken together, 61% say they regularly or sometimes learn about the campaign from comedy
For many young people, the content of the jokes, sketches and appearances on these programs is not just a repeat of old information. Respondents who said they regularly or sometimes learned about the campaign from these programs were asked if they ever learn things that they had not heard before, and nearly half said they had learned something new. Put another way, 27% of all respondents under age 30 say they learn things about the candidates and campaigns from late night and comedy programming that they did not know previously.

**AGE GAP IN KNOWLEDGE, INTEREST**

Younger Americans pay far less attention to the political campaign, have heard far less about major campaign events, and know little about the candidates themselves. Overall, more than six-in-ten of those under age 30 (64%) say they are not even somewhat interested in news about the Democratic primary campaigns while most people age 30 and over express some or a great deal of interest in the race. And roughly four-in-ten younger Americans have not heard about some publicized campaign events, such as Dean's "pickup trucks" comment or Gore's endorsement of Dean. Fewer than half as many people over age 30 display a similar lack of awareness of campaign events.

When it comes to knowing specifics about the candidates, the age disparity is even greater. Of two factual questions (which candidate served as an Army general and which served as majority leader in the House) just 15% of younger Americans could get either question correct (a mere 6% knew both). By comparison, 37% of people age 30-49, and half of people age 50 and older, could answer at least one of these questions.

This lack of interest and knowledge is related to younger peoples' use of media sources. Far fewer say they learn from traditional news sources, such as network evening news, PBS, Sunday morning talk shows, newspapers or weekly news magazines. These sources are strongly related to knowledge and familiarity with the campaign.

And while many young people say they learn about the campaign from comedy and late night shows, the extent to which they actually gain much information is unclear. Holding constant a
person's education, interest, and use of other media sources, there is no evidence that people who say they learn about the campaigns from late night and comedy shows know any more about the candidates, and are at best only slightly more aware of major campaign events, than those who do not watch these programs.

While late night and comedy shows may not impart much campaign information, the other growing resource for campaign information among younger people, the Internet proves to be one of the most powerful tools available. Even when the fact that Internet users tend to be more educated and engaged is taken into account, young people who say they regularly learn about candidates and the campaign online are much better informed about the campaign than those who do not go online for such news.

**Interviews, Speeches and Debates**

In general, appearances and speeches by the Democratic presidential candidates have resonated with the public more than the eight candidate debates that were held last year.

Just 20% of the public, and only a slightly greater percentage of likely Democratic primary voters (23%), saw any of the candidate debates. Far more people say they have seen the Democratic candidates interviewed on news or entertainment programs (46%) or have seen or heard part of a speech by the candidates on TV (42%).

Most of those who have seen one or more of the candidates interviewed on TV could not recall the specific program on which they appeared. Those who were able to do so mentioned a wide range of programs, including late night comedy and talk shows (10%), cable talk news shows such as Hardball (6%), network evening news programs (5%) and Sunday morning interview programs (5%). Overall, 23% of those who have seen a candidate interview or appearance cited a broadcast network program as the source, while 20% cited a cable network or program.

Interestingly, candidate speeches and appearances were not significantly more visible to Democrats than they were to Republicans, though there is some evidence that opposition to President Bush has encouraged some Democrats to pay more attention to the campaign.

Democrats who disapprove of the president's job performance were far more likely to have seen or heard the candidates in various venues.
### What the Engaged are Doing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular campaign news sources and activities</th>
<th>Very high campaign engagement %</th>
<th>Somewhat engaged %</th>
<th>Less engaged %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local TV news</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable news</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network news</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV news magazines</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morning TV news</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk radio</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable talk shows</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Internet</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday morning talk</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Websites of news orgs</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBS news shows</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Websites of ISPs</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly news magazines</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late night TV</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online magazines</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comedy TV shows</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-SPAN</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious radio</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw any debates</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seen interviews</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seen speeches</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign contributions</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted officials</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined organizations</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended campaign event</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been called on phone</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sought online news</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent/received e-mails</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online campaign activities</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion/chat/blogs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look up cand. positions</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look up local activities</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit cand. websites</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit group websites</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Number of cases** (138) (407) (961)

**Percent of Population** 7% 23% 70%

Very high engagement = follows campaign closely, enjoys following, and is familiar with all campaign events and facts. Somewhat engaged = familiar with some campaign events and facts.
CAMPAIGN NEWS ENTHUSIASTS

While the majority of Americans are at most marginally engaged in the Democratic primary process, a small number keep close tabs on campaign news and events. These people have been following the campaign closely, enjoy keeping up with election politics, and are familiar with all of the election events and facts asked about on the survey. Overall, they represent roughly 7% of the population.

Campaign news enthusiasts are roughly three times more likely than those less engaged in the election to cite cable talk shows, Sunday morning talk shows, NPR, PBS news shows, and weekly news magazines as regular sources of information. Fully half of this core group (53%) saw at least some of the candidate debates held in 2003, compared with only 20% of Americans overall. And more than eight-in-ten have seen candidate interviews, appearances, and speeches on TV.

The Internet also stands out as a particularly important source for campaign news enthusiasts. Nearly half (46%) say they have sought out campaign news online, compared with 26% of people who are somewhat engaged in election news, and just 7% of people who are less interested. They are far more likely to go online for a wide range of campaign and candidate information, and to participate in online activities such as sharing e-mails, participating in discussion groups, and looking for information on local campaign activities. The political activity of this core group is not limited to the Internet, as these same people are the most likely to have made campaign contributions, joined political organizations, and contacted elected officials in the past 12 months.

MORE SEE BIASED CAMPAIGN COVERAGE

While there has been no growth in general perceptions of media bias, the public is expressing more concern about partisan bias in coverage of the presidential race. Currently, just 38% say there is no bias in the way news organizations have been covering the presidential race, down from 48% four years ago. Majorities saw no bias in press coverage of the early stages of the 1988 and 1996 presidential campaigns.

The growing sense of biased campaign coverage crosses party lines, but is most notable among Democrats. Four years ago,
most Democrats (53%) said there was no bias in news coverage of the campaign; today just 40% of Democrats take this position, and those who do see bias overwhelmingly see it as favoring the other party.

Republicans, too, are less apt to see campaign coverage as balanced today (33% say there is no bias, down from 41% four years ago).

Americans at either end of the ideological spectrum are the most likely to see campaign coverage as biased, but in precisely the opposite ways: by 47% to 8% conservative Republicans say the press leans toward the Democrats, not the Republicans, in its campaign coverage. By 36% to 11% liberal Democrats say coverage tilts to the Republicans.

In terms of media audiences, only people who get most of their campaign news from Fox News or from radio see a distinct bias in news coverage of the election, while Americans who get most of their news from CNN, network news, local TV, newspapers and the Internet are split evenly over whether press bias tilts to the Republicans or Democrats. People who get most of their news from network or local news programming are the least likely to see any bias in campaign coverage.

**Overall Bias Perceptions Stable**

A solid majority of Americans say they see a great deal (30%) or a fair amount (35%) of political bias in news coverage generally. In contrast with the growing perception of biased campaign coverage, this measure has not changed markedly since January 2000 when 67% saw at least a fair amount of political bias.

Conservative Republicans are significantly more likely to perceive the press as biased in its news coverage than are moderate and liberal Republicans, Democrats, and independents. This ideological difference is mirrored in the disparate opinions among audiences of different news sources.

People who get most of their news from the Fox News are much more likely to say the press shows a great deal of bias than are viewers of CNN, Network news, and local TV news. People who cite radio or the Internet as their main source of campaign
### How Much Media Bias?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Great deal</th>
<th>Fair amount</th>
<th>Not much/not at all</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2=100</td>
<td>(1506)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conserv. Repub.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3=100</td>
<td>(282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mod./lib. Repub.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>*=100</td>
<td>(168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3=100</td>
<td>(463)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons./mod. Dem.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1=100</td>
<td>(324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Dem.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2=100</td>
<td>(147)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Main source of election news is...*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Great deal</th>
<th>Fair amount</th>
<th>Not much/not at all</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3=100</td>
<td>(231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox News</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2=100</td>
<td>(296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1=100</td>
<td>(199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2=100</td>
<td>(609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3=100</td>
<td>(342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local TV</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4=100</td>
<td>(250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network TV</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2=100</td>
<td>(469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2=100</td>
<td>(276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1=100</td>
<td>(596)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4=100</td>
<td>(278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4=100</td>
<td>(278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College grad</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2=100</td>
<td>(571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1=100</td>
<td>(344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. or less</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3=100</td>
<td>(588)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

News are also more likely to see widespread bias in the media.

Interestingly, younger generations express somewhat less concern about press bias than their elders. Barely one-in-five Americans under age 30 say they see a great deal of media bias in general news coverage, compared with roughly a third of those age 30 and over. More well-educated Americans also perceive the press to be more biased than those who never attended college.
MOST PREFER NEWS WITHOUT "POINT OF VIEW"

Two-thirds of Americans (67%) say they prefer to get their news from sources that do not have a particular point of view, while a quarter (25%) say they prefer news from sources that share their political point of view.

There is no significant partisan disagreement on this issue: majorities of Democrats and Republicans share a preference for news sources that do not have a particular point of view and an even greater percentage of independents holds this opinion. Moreover, there are only modest differences among news audiences, although people who rely on the Internet are even more likely than those who use other sources to favor news without a particular point of view.

But there is a significant gap along racial lines. African Americans are more than twice as likely as whites (47% to 21%) to express a preference for "getting news from sources that share your political point of view."

ENDORSEMENTS A MINOR FACTOR

Most Americans say candidate endorsements by major political figures, celebrities, well-known institutions and even their clergy would not have an impact positive or negative on their voting decisions.

Among 14 individuals and institutions tested, former President Bill Clinton had the biggest impact, but people were evenly divided whether Clinton's endorsement would make them more or less likely to support a presidential candidate (19% each).

Among other political figures, Gore and Schwarzenegger's endorsements are seen somewhat negatively, while Sen. John McCain's is viewed, on balance, positively. But most people say they would not be affected one way or the other.

That is also generally the case for organizations like the Christian Coalition and the AFL-CIO. But among various demographic groups, endorsements from some of these groups does have an impact: 37% of white evangelical Protestants say they would be more likely to vote for a presidential candidate endorsed
by the Christian Coalition, while about as many seculars (36%) say they would be less likely to back a candidate backed by that organization.

Men are divided over the effect of an endorsement by the National Rifle Association: 21% say they would be more likely to vote for an NRA-endorsed candidate, 18% less likely. But on balance, women view an NRA endorsement negatively (18% less likely vs. 9% more likely). Majorities of men and women say an endorsement by the National Rifle Association would not affect their vote.
Two-thirds of Americans (67%) say they prefer to get their news from sources that share their political views, though a growing number say they will seek more information from news organizations that hold opposing views. This is even greater percentage of independents holds this opinion. Moreover, there are only modest differences among news audiences, although people who write on the internet are even more likely than those who use e-mail services to favor news without a particular point of view.

But there is a significant gap along racial lines. African Americans are more than twice as likely as whites (47% to 21%) to express a preference for getting news from sources that share your political point of view.

ELECTIONS

Most Americans say candidate endorsements by major political figures carry weight, well-known institutions, and even their clergy would have a “positive or negative” impact on their voting decisions.

Among 14 institutions and institutions tested, focus President Bill Clinton had the highest impact, but people were evenly divided whether Clinton endorsement would make them more or less likely to support a presidential candidate (39% each).

Among other policies such as the Gore and Sen. Feinstein's endorsement are seen as positive, while Sen. John McCain is viewed, on balance, negatively. But most people say they would not be affected by whom to vote.

But in general, people are less likely to perceive endorsements like the Christian Coalition and the NPD-GO, but among various demographic groups, such endorsements are likely to have some of these groups does not a greater 7% of the respondents. Protestants say they are more likely to vote for a religiously endorsed candidate.
Endorsing Change: Editorial Views of No Child Left Behind

DOUGLAS S. REED
Associate Professor of Government
Georgetown University

No Child Left Behind has been justly regarded as a landmark piece of federal education legislation. The passage of NCLB meant that, for the first time, federal aid to schools is conditioned upon the creation of a standards-based testing regime that imposes increasingly harsh sanctions on local schools if school children do not meet state-established (and federally approved) performance levels. NCLB is clearly intended to change the way schools and school districts do business; a perception of coercion that has rankled many long-standing supporters of a greater federal role in public education.

In fact, many opponents of NCLB had hoped that a Bush defeat in the election of 2004 would make reform of NCLB more likely - or easier. But after the votes were tallied, it became clear that, as Education Week wrote in its post-election coverage, President Bush's "signature initiative for schools is here to stay."

What is remarkable about NCLB is that it emerged from a Republican administration that was not - prior to 9/11 - terribly enamored with coercive federal regulations. Yet NCLB is perhaps the most onerous federal oversight imposed on U.S. schools since the federal courts authorized busing as part of the school desegre-
Despite the traditional public preference for local autonomy in public education, Americans have also made clear their desire for improved public education. The question for the political viability of NCLB is whether the demand for improvement in public education will outweigh the American public's longstanding preference for local control of schools. This article examines one source of public views about education and education reform - local newspaper editorials - in an effort to examine the nature of support for and opposition to NCLB among local opinion leaders. It is by no means an exhaustive tallying of newspaper support of NCLB, but it does suggest that during the summer of 2003 (when the first NCLB-required report cards were announced), local support for the education reform was quite strong, but the analysis shows that federalism concerns were frequently cited among those newspapers that opposed NCLB.

Local conditions and forms of educational organization vary substantially, as do levels of local taxpayer support for education, both in taxation rates and the local share of public education spending. Similarly, there are varying degrees of a localist ethos or tradition among the states, as well as varying degrees of state-level institutional capacity and central policy-making functions. In addition, school districts are often wildly different beasts. With over 15,000 school districts in the nation, ranging from New York City and Los Angeles' multi-million student enrollments to mid-size suburban districts to low-enrollment rural districts with far-flung schools, NCLB intersects with state and local concerns in multiple and varied ways. Different districts will feel different points of federal coercion according to local conditions. With that variation in mind, I decided to sample the local dimensions of the informed public opinion on No Child Left Behind by systematically examining the responses of local newspaper editorial writers to NCLB's second year of implementation.

As the Bush Administration enthusiastically touted in the Spring of 2003, all state-level NCLB accountability plans were largely in place by late May 2003. These plans established the standards to which schools were to be held accountable and the instruments used to assess students. Similarly, the first year of AYP progress reports were issued in all states over the summer of 2003, identifying the schools that had not met state-level goals. These
two events generated significant attention in the national, state and local presses. Through a Lexis-Nexis search of all mentions of "No Child Left Behind" in the Editorial or Opinion sections of the All News Group File between the dates of June 15, 2003 and September 15, 2003, I was able to identify 145 editorials on public education that mentioned or treated No Child Left Behind substantively. I did not evaluate articles by syndicated columnists, letters to the editor, by-lined columns or opinion articles authored by education officials, teachers or parents. I did not include editorial mentions that merely cited No Child Left Behind, without a substantive engagement with the issues raised by NCLB. I excluded from my purview trade or occupational-based publications. Instead I evaluated only unsigned editorials that represent the published opinions of general readership newspapers with primarily geographic circulations. The 145 editorials represent positions taken by 77 newspapers in 38 states. The number of editorials within each paper that substantially mention NCLB ranged from one to nine. I coded each editorial on a five point scale for its stance toward NCLB. In addition, as I read these editorials, I categorized each editorial's enumeration of the positive and negative characteristics of NCLB. Eventually, I identified 21 categories of negative traits (complaints) and 15 categories of positive traits (compliments). I coded each editorial for up to five complaints and five compliments. These "likes" and the "dislikes" were coded independently of the overall sentiment expressed toward NCLB.

So, how do the nation's newspaper editorial writers feel about No Child Left Behind? In general, there is a broad degree of support for the federal initiative. In Figure 1, we see the number of editorials coded along the five point scale depicted in a bar chart. The two favorable positions clearly dominate the local editorial perspective on No Child Left Behind. Together, both "pro-NCLB, with reservations" and "pro-NCLB, without reservations" total over 60% of all the editorials (90 out of 145). On the five point scale, the median response is 3.0 ("Pro-with reservations"). The average response leans toward favorable at 2.5. Overall, then, newspaper editorial writers across the nation seemed to have taken a generally positive stance toward No Child Left Behind in the summer of 2003, as the first real implementation wave crested. While a plurality of newspaper editorials clearly expresses some reservation about the legislation, they are nonetheless willing to endorse it.
This suggests that an increased federal role in public education is, at a minimum, not disfavored by newspaper editors, and there is strong reason to believe they favor the new federal presence, despite their reservations.

When we turn, however, to the particular aspects of NCLB that editorial writers found commendable or objectionable, we see something of a different picture. Table 1 reports the frequency of particular compliments extended to NCLB by editorial writers, both pro-NCLB and anti-NCLB, while Table 2 highlights the complaints or unfavorable aspects of NCLB, as viewed by editorial writers. Let's explore the compliments first.

By far, the most commonly cited virtue of No Child Left Behind was the notion that the law promotes accountability. Over 39 percent of all editorials expressed support for the idea that schools were now accountable, most visibly through testing. Not far behind was the compliment that NCLB ensured or promoted standards-based reforms. Clearly, the legislation's adoption or promotion of both standards and accountability are the primary strengths of NCLB, in the eyes of newspaper editorial writers. Significantly, editorial writers lauded the bill for its promotion of racial fairness and its attention to the test-score gap, through test score disaggregation, with 18.6 percent of all editorials praising that aspect of NCLB. Finally, the value of choice in education came out rather clearly in these editorials, with 16.6 percent of all editorials citing choice (or its near cousin--school vouchers) as either a desirable feature of the legislature or as a soon-to-follow consequence of the legislation. Accountability, standards, fairness, and choice ring through these editorials as the most praiseworthy aspects of this legislation.

Surprisingly, these virtues were expressed in similarly strong fashion by both supporters and detractors of NCLB, with the noteworthy exception of the notion that accountability and student testing are unvarnished goods. While nearly 49 percent of all editorials in favor of NCLB mentioned accountability as a virtue, only 25 percent of those opposed to the law did so, the largest gap among all possible compliments. Much smaller gaps (single digits) existed on the frequency with which editorial writers mentioned standards or basic fairness and equity. Double digit gaps did exist, however, on the frequency with which editorial writers cited the intrinsic value of school choice (a gap of 12.8 percentage points).
### Table 1. Compliments enumerated in local newspaper editorials, by support or opposition to No Child Left Behind, June 15-Sept. 15, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editorial Compliment, in order of overall prevalence (compliments w/ &gt; 20 pct points difference shaded)</th>
<th>Overall Pct (N=145)</th>
<th>Pro-NCLB % (N=90)</th>
<th>Anti-NCLB % (N=36)</th>
<th>% Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountability/testing is good</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>-23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards are good</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaggregation promotes racial fairness/addresses test score gap</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice is good/will lead to vouchers</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB promotes basic fairness and equity in education</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB helps shake up education establishment</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal role is good</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB ensures data reporting of violent school conditions</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools are improving/meeting AYP goals</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/state officials doing a good job of NCLB implementation</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB ensures qualified teachers</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public recognition of a achievement/local blue ribbon school</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB provides supplemental services</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB is a spur to innovate</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricular specifics (single-sex classes, P.E., phonics)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and NCLB's capacity to shake up the educational establishment, with 11.1 percent of pro-NCLB editorials citing that as laudable, while none of those opposed to the bill found that to be worthy of mention.

Overall, then, these editorials show us that accountability, standards, choice and racial fairness comprise the most frequently cited favorable aspects of No Child Left Behind. Clearly, the standards-based reform movements, and its policy cousin, the accountability movement, have found a receptive audience among the nation's editorial page writers. NCLB is seen as promoting these reforms and these policy innovations are largely regarded as favorable developments in educational policy.

So what do the editorial writers dislike about No Child Left Behind? Those categories of discontent are listed in Table 2. The most frequent complaint was that NCLB was too rigid or complex, with nearly 19 percent of all editorials citing this issue. Editorials cited with equal frequency problems with student test administration, conditions or reporting and complaints that federal funding for NCLB was too low, with both complaints found in 15 percent of all editorials. Editorial writers also complained in over 12 percent of the editorials that the state AYP goals produced school performance reports that conflicted with other state standards. Another 11 percent of editorials lamented that state and local officials did not appear to be up to the task of implementing NCLB and nearly 10 percent complained that NCLB is an unfunded mandate on the states. It is also worth noting that a little over 8 percent of the editorials mentioned the complaint that the federal government had overstepped its bounds when Congress enacted NCLB and identified state and local governments as the best administrators of public education.

When we break these complaints down, however, between those expressed by supporters of NCLB and those who oppose the legislation, we see some striking cleavages emerge between supporters and detractors, cleavages not apparent in the favorable aspects of NCLB. The largest gulls are highlighted in gray on Table 1 and they show that tensions over the federal role in public education appear to undergird the divide between editorial writers who supported NCLB and those who opposed it. The largest gulf can be found in the federalism objection. While over a quarter of all editorials that opposed NCLB cited federalism as a reason to dis-
Table 2. Complaints enumerated in local newspaper editorials, by support or opposition to No Child Left Behind, June 15-Sept. 15, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editorial Complaint, in order of overall prevalence (complaints w/ &gt; 20 pct points difference shaded)</th>
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<th>Anti-NCLB % (N=36)</th>
<th>% Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NCLB too rigid or complex</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>+20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems with test administration, conditions or reporting</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal funding is too low</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB AYP standards conflict with state standards</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>+20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/state officials not up to the task of</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB is an unfunded mandate</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>+11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism objection (role of government)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>+23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB doesn't offer enough school choice</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not fair to include LEP and Special Ed. children in AYP</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>+11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfair/uneven standards across states</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>+9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data reporting of school conditions fudged</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many schools falling; AYP unrealistically high</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>+7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State not spending enough on education</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School choice has problems</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>+7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaggregation is bad</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>+7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local teacher requirements/test results for teachers</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many schools passing/AYP too low</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curricular specifics (single-sex classes, P.E., phonics)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local property or state taxes will go up</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB ignores rural concerns</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tough standards can be counter-productive</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
like the law, only 1 pro-NCLB editorial (1.1 percent) even mentioned federalism as grounds for objection to NCLB. Those who support NCLB simply did not see federalism as a legitimate basis for complaint, while those who are opposed to NCLB cited it fairly frequently. A similarly wide gulf exists between supporters and detractors on whether NCLB is too rigid or complex. Over 36 percent of those opposed to NCLB thought the issue merited mention, while only 15.6 percent of those in favor found the criticism significant enough to mention. Another federalism-related issue, the existence of conflicts between state education standards or report cards and the AYP progress reports, also showed a wide gulf, with nearly 28 percent of opponents mentioning the conflict, while supporters cited it only about 8 percent of the time. The fourth largest gulf can be found on the "unfunded mandate" score, with over 19 percent of detractors enumerating that complaint, and only roughly 8 percent of supporters finding it worthy of mention.

No Child Left Behind, and its effects on local schools, clearly drew the attention of local editorial writers in the summer of 2003. These reactions, overall, were quite positive; a strong majority of editorials clearly supported NCLB. They found its emphasis on accountability, standards-based reforms, addressing the test-score gap between minority and white students and its promotion of school choice as its greatest strengths. In contrast, those who opposed the federal initiative more frequently cited federalism concerns, as well as NCLB's inherent complexity and policy rigidity, as reasons for opposing the legislation.

As NCLB implementation advances, the federal coercions against local schools and school district become increasingly onerous, ranging from staffing changes (including principal and teacher reassignments) to, ultimately, the closure of schools that consistently fail to make adequate yearly progress. Whether local opinion leaders will continue to endorse both the idea and the substance of NCLB in the face of these changes is uncertain. The ongoing reform and policy changes engendered by NCLB will, in the long run, be a test of whether localism is still a strong normative value in public education. In the short-run, it appears that the NCLB's cultivation of the values of accountability and racial fairness trump concerns about an over-intrusive federal role.
ENDNOTES

1. I included such national newspapers as the Washington Post, New York Times and Los Angeles Times because they, too, have local readers concerned with local school board politics, even if their editorials are also aimed at a national policy elite.

2. The following is the list of newspapers, in alphabetical order:

- Arizona Republic
- Ashville Citizen-Times (NC)
- Atlanta Journal and Constitution
- Augusta Chronicle (GA)
- Baltimore Sun
- Birmingham News
- Boston Globe
- Boston Herald
- Burlington Free Press
- Chapel Hill Herald
- Charleston Daily Mail (WV)
- Charleston Gazette (WV)
- Chicago Daily Herald
- Chicago Tribune
- Cincinnati Enquirer
- Columbus Dispatch
- Connecticut Post (Bridgeport, CT)
- Daily Journal (Vineland, NJ)
- Daily News (Los Angeles)
- Daily News (New York)
- Daily News Leader (Staunton, WV)
- Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City)
- Dallas Morning News
- Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City, UT)
- Detroit News
- El Paso Times
- Florida Today
- Fort Collins Coloradan
- Great Falls Tribune
- Green Bay Press-Gazette
- Greenville News (NC)
- Hartford Courant
- Hattiesburg American (MS)
- Herald-Sun (Durham, NC)
- Intelligencer Journal (Lancaster, PA)
- Journal News (Westchester County, NY)
- Jupiter Courier (Jupiter, FL)
- Los Angeles Times
- Morning Call (Allentown, PA)
- New York Sun
- New York Times
- News and Observer (Raleigh, NC)
- News and Record (Greensboro, NC)
- Oregonian (Portland, OR)
- Orlando Sentinel
- Palladium-Item (Richmond, IN)
- Palm Beach Post
- Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
- Plain Dealer (Cleveland, OH)
- Press Journal (Vero Beach, FL)
- Reno Gazette-Journal
- Richmond Times Dispatch (VA)
- Roanoke Times & World News
- Rochester Democrat and Chronicle
- Rocky Mountain News (Denver, CO)
- San Diego Union-Tribune
- Santa Fe New Mexican
- Seattle Post-Intelligencer
- Seattle Times
- St. Louis Post-Dispatch
- St. Petersburg Times
- Star-Gazette (Elmira, NY)
- Star-News (Wilmington, NC)
- State Journal Register (Springfield, IL)
- Statesman Journal (Salem, OR)
- Stuart News/Port Lucie (FL)
- News
- The Capital (Annapolis, MD)
- The Leaf-Chronicle (Clarkesville, TN)
- The Olympian (Olympia, WA)
- The Times (Gainesville, GA)
- The Times (Shreveport, LA)
- Times Herald (Port Huron, MI)
- Union Leader (Manchester, NH)
- Ventura County
DOUGLAS REED

(CA) Star; Washington Post; Winston-Salem Journal; Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, WI); Wyoming Tribune-Eagle (Cheyenne, WY).

3. The coding on "NCLB sentiment" was as follows: 0=Anti-NCLB, without reservation; 1=Anti-NCLB, with some reservation; 2=Neutral on NCLB; 3=Pro-NCLB with some reservation; 4=Pro-NCLB without reservation.
Toward Effective eGovernment Implementation: Examining Characteristics of U.S. Internet Users

AKIRA TSUCHIYA
Senior Researcher, Keio Research Institute at Shonan Fujisawa, Keio University, Japan

This study seeks to explore the relationship between types of internet usage, for example, net shop, online education, net game, and government information, and the socio-demographics of American internet users in order to improve eGovernment implementation. While early theorists emphasized the digital divide and the resulting challenges for eGovernment implementation, empirical studies do not provide a specific relationship between online government information and particular characteristics of its users. This study applies a logistic regression model to the 2001 Current Population Survey Internet and Computer User Supplement to examine the characteristics of online users. The findings reinforce previously discovered indications of the digital divide correlated with age, race, income level, education level and metropolitan status. Additionally, the findings suggest that out of all types of internet usage, eGovernment usage has the widest divide among different education levels. One implication of this study is that governments should pay extra attention to characteristics of different purposes of internet use, especially by less educated citizens, when designing eGovernment schemes.

INTRODUCTION

Spearheaded by the emergence of the internet, countries all over the world now enjoy advances in information technology.
known as the IT movement. From the private sector to the public sector, many try to implement newly emerging technology in their organizational structure. In the private sector, it is central to new innovations in knowledge management (Andersen, 1999; Nonaka, 1995). In the public sector, it has become one of the central elements of managerial reform and it figures prominently in future governance. It has opened up many possibilities for improving internal managerial efficiency and the quality of public service delivered to citizens. In the public sector, this movement is called eGovernment, eDemocracy or eGovernance. Especially within the executive branch, it is called eGovernment (Fountain, 2001; Watson and Mundy, 2001). eGovernment has contributed to dramatic changes in politics (Nye, 1999; Norris, 1999), government institutions (Fountain, 2001), performance management (Brown, 1999), and reengineering (Anderson, 1999) over the past decade.

In the United States, from the local to the federal level, governments use internet technology to enrich citizens' lives by maintaining websites. The internet portal sites ease administrative tasks such as distributing government documents and collecting taxes. These are useful tools for optimizing interaction between citizens and government. However, does government information on the internet, which usually requires expensive technologies reach equally to all citizens? Does a digital divide exist between different groups of people? Are the characteristics of people who use government information on the internet different from the characteristics of people who use the internet for other purposes? To assess government internet technology allocations, this study compares individual characteristics of users and types of internet use.

The study seeks to explore the relationship between types of internet usage and the socio-demographics of American internet users to improve eGovernment implementation. First, the study reviews previous research related to eGovernment and the digital divide, with emphasis on the definition of eGovernment, previous arguments regarding the digital divide, the characteristics of internet users in general, and the usability of online technologies. While early researchers emphasized the digital divide and the resulting challenges for eGovernment, empirical studies have failed to examine the characteristics of people who use eGovernment. This paper applies a logistic regression model to the Current Population Survey Internet and Computer User Supplement from September 2001. In addition, policy implications based on these findings are offered.
Toward Effective eGovernment Implementation

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

eGovernment is a concept introduced into the field of public administration from the business sector in the late 1990's, though the term is not clearly defined and understood among scholars and practitioners of public policy and administration. Like many managerial concepts and practices such as Total Quality Management (TQM), strategic management and knowledge management, the idea of eGovernment was followed by private-sector adoption of so-called eBusiness and eCommerce (Moon, 2002). Although the concept is not clear, several studies try to define this term in one way or another. The United Nations and the American Society for Public Administration, for example, formulated a comprehensive definition of eGovernment:

*eGovernment includes the use of all information and communication technologies, from fax machines to wireless palm pilots, to facilitate the daily administration of government. However, like eCommerce, the popular interpretation of eGovernment is one that defines it exclusively as an internet driven activity ... to which it may be added that improves citizen access to government information, services and expertise to ensure citizen participation in, and satisfaction with the government process... it is a permanent commitment by government to improving the relationship between the private citizen and the public sector through enhances, cost-effective and efficient delivery of services, information and knowledge. It is the practical realization of the best that government has to offer (UN and ASPA, 2001).*

The web technologies in public management can be broadly divided into two categories: internal and external. Internally, the web and other technologies work as effective and efficient managerial tools which accumulate, store, organize, and manage information. Externally, web technologies also facilitate government interaction and linkage with citizens and businesses. Government websites can serve as both a communication tool and a public relations tool. Information and data can be easily shared with external entities (Moon, 2002). Therefore, many government agencies have begun to utilize web technologies such as eFile by IRS and SEVIS...
by US Immigration and Custom Enforcement. In addition, some web technologies such as interactive bulletin boards enable the government to promote public participation in the policy-making processes by posting public notices and exchanging messages and ideas with the public (Coleman and Gotze, 2002; Tsuchiya, 2001). This paper focuses on external uses, especially for improving the government-citizen relationships.

It is the citizens who stand to benefit the most from government technology, thus, the digital divide, which delineates the differences between the "haves" and "have nots" regarding access to the internet, has become a major concern. In 2001, approximately 56.5 percent of households had computers (DOC, 2002). The percentage of households with internet access has grown from 26.2 percent in 1998 to 50.5 percent in 2001 (DOC, 2002; DOC, 1999). The growth occurred not only in the higher income brackets, but across income and racial lines (DOC, 2002). These findings have led the current administration to declare that the digital divide has been closed and to reduce the federal spending for the digital divide (Konrad, 2002; Stanton, 2004). However, other findings still emphasize the severity of the digital divide. Some suggest socioeconomic and demographic differences in use of internet and computer are critical because the ability to use technology has become increasingly vital to economic success (NTIA, 1999; Onoe and Zavondny, 2002).

Generally, the advantage of access to new technology is more likely to be given to people who are young, male, better educated, rich, urban, and non-minority than those in the general population, leading to a digital divide among several different groups (Rogers, 1995; Norris, 2001). One study shows that education and age are the major predictors of internet use, although age becomes far less important in the context of the working-age population (Robinson, Kestnbaum and Neustadtl, 2002). The study also indicates that there are important differences associated with income and occupation, but the role of income is less central than the role of education in using this new technology. Another study indicates that racial differences in education, income and occupation contribute substantially to the Black/White and Hispanic/White gaps in home computer and internet use rates. Racial differences in income are an especially important factor, explaining 25.1 to 31.0 percent of the Black/White gap in home computer rates (Fairlie,
In addition, a consistent gap between home internet use in metropolitan areas and in non-metropolitan areas is another concern. However, one paper argues that differences in household attributes, particularly education and income, account for 63% of the current metropolitan-non-metropolitan digital divide, raising significant doubts that policies that focus solely on infrastructure and technology access will mitigate the current digital divide (Mills and Whitacre, 2003). In terms of the gender gap, women were significantly less likely than men to use the internet at all in the mid-1990s, but the gap in access disappeared by 2000. However, women continue to be less frequent and less intense users of the internet (Ono and Zavondny, 2002).

Types of internet connectivity are another concern for the digital divide. Computer ownership, home internet connectivity, and broadband connection are the significant predictors of the divide. Workplace computer use is also an important factor (e.g. Forman, 2003). Although, broadband adoption has been slower than anticipated in the United States, one study indicates that the digital divide is the widest for computer ownership and the narrowest for broadband access (Stanton, 2004). Because the definition of "divide" varies, misspecification of the dependant variable may affect the conclusion.

These previous studies show the importance of the current debate on the digital divide regarding socio-economic and socio-demographic differences in the use of internet technologies, and indicate some significant facts for information technology use in general. However, prior studies do not indicate a specific relationship between online government information and particular characteristics of its users. The digital divide in the use of online government information broadly defined as eGovernment is potentially the most serious one, because the "have-nots," who are usually the target of governmental assistance, will not have access to the services once the government replaces regular schemes with online schemes.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Conceptual Framework

Based on the previous literature, this study examines how governments should design eGovernmental services from the
user's point of view. The conceptual framework in Figure 1 demonstrates how the important factors found in prior research relate to an individual's governmental information use on the internet. An individual's demographics have a significant impact on the use of government information on the internet. Also, socioeconomic status and factors such as broadband capability, home PC ownership, and workplace PC use are associated with internet accessibility. Thus, the conceptual framework is divided into three categories.

Data Description

This study uses the 2001 Current Population Survey Internet and Computer Use Supplement (CPS Supplement), which contains 158,865 observations of cross-sectional data. The CPS Supplement is collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Census and contains representation from the entire geographic United States using counties or groups of counties as the sample units. The CPS Supplement is a supplement to the monthly CPS data collection and was conducted in 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2001. However, the contents differ slightly from year to year. Since some important variables are only found in the September 2001 data, this study only uses the 2001 September Supplement. The September Supplement contained questions about the household in general and about the individual household members who use the internet and/or a computer. Respondents were at least 15 years old, knowledgeable about the internet or computers, and gave proxy responses, if necessary, for other members of the household. Interviews were conducted during the period of September 16-22, 2001. Interviewers were provided with a two-hour home study for completing the basic CPS labor force exercises, supplement exercises, and a practice interview concerning the supplement.

The non-response rate for the September 2001 Basic CPS is about 6.5 percent. The non-response rate for the internet and computer use supplement is an additional 7.9%, for a total supplement non-response rate of 13.9%. Non-response could have an effect on estimates, such as the unemployment rate, which is measured in tenths of a percentage point. Thus, missing data for the non-respondents might limit this study. Since the CPS is one of the
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Internet Use / eGovernment Use

Socioeconomic Status

- Computer Status
- Computer Usage
- Educational Background

Income

PC Use at Work

PC Ownership

Demographics

- Gender
- Race
- Age

Broadband

PC Ownership
nation's most reliable data sources, and methods for reducing non-response are also well researched in detail, this is the best survey to research on this issue (See U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). Additionally, the 2001 September Supplement includes weights to adjust the biases. These weights incorporate adjustments for differential probabilities of selection, for non-response, and for post-stratification. Non-responses in telephone interview surveys produce some known biases in statistical estimates because participation tends to vary for different subgroups of the population, and these subgroups are likely to vary also on questions of substantive interest. In order to compensate for these known biases, the sample data are weighted. The Bureau of Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics have developed the collection methodology and weighting schemes over time and have closely analyzed these methodologies to ensure accuracy.

Analysis Plan

The data analysis for this study employs multivariate logistic regression models with binary dependent variables. Models 1-4 examine an individual's preference for internet use in general as follows:

Model 1 (Internet Use - Demographic Status)

\[ \text{netuse} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{female} + \beta_2 \text{teenplus} + \beta_3 \text{young2339} + \beta_4 \text{retire60} + \beta_5 \text{black} + \beta_6 \text{hisp} + \beta_7 \text{others} + \beta_8 \text{metro} + \mu \]

Model 2 (Internet Use- Demographic & Socioeconomic Status)

\[ \text{netuse} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{female} + \beta_2 \text{teenplus} + \beta_3 \text{young2339} + \beta_4 \text{retire60} + \beta_5 \text{black} + \beta_6 \text{hisp} + \beta_7 \text{others} + \beta_8 \text{metro} + \beta_9 \text{educ1st} + \beta_{10} \text{educ2nd} + \beta_{11} \text{educ4th} + \beta_{12} \text{educ5th} + \beta_{13} \text{lessinc} + \mu \]

Model 3 (Internet Use - Demographic & Computer Status)

\[ \text{netuse} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{female} + \beta_2 \text{teenplus} + \beta_3 \text{young2339} + \beta_4 \text{retire60} + \beta_5 \text{black} + \beta_6 \text{hisp} + \beta_7 \text{others} + \beta_8 \text{metro} + \beta_9 \text{phome} + \beta_{10} \text{broad} + \beta_{11} \text{compusew} + \mu \]

Model 4 (Internet Use - Demographic, Socioeconomic &
These models examine an individual's preference for internet use in general. The dependent variable, netuse, is a binary variable which measures whether the respondent used the internet in the previous year. The independent variables are respondents' gender (female), respondents' age dummies (teenplus, young2339, and retire60), race (black, hisp, and others), metropolitan region (metro), education level dummies (educ1st, educ2nd, educ4th, and educ5th), household-total income dummy with income under 50,000 (lessinc), home PC ownership (pchome), broadband access at home (broad), computer use at work (compusew). Most of the variables are self explanatory; teenplus (age between 15-22), young2339 (age between 23-39), retire60 (age 60 or older), educ1st (less than high school), educ2nd (high school diploma), educ4th (4 year college degree), and educ5th (graduate degree).

Additional models will examine an individual's preference for internet use for particular purposes as follows:

**Model 5**

\[ X = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{female} + \beta_2 \text{teenplus} + \beta_3 \text{young2339} + \beta_4 \text{retire60} + \beta_5 \text{black} + \beta_6 \text{hisp} + \beta_7 \text{others} + \beta_8 \text{metro} + \beta_9 \text{educ1st} + \beta_{10} \text{educ2nd} + \beta_{11} \text{educ4th} + \beta_{12} \text{educ5th} + \beta_{13} \text{lessinc} + \beta_{14} \text{pchome} + \beta_{15} \text{broad} + \beta_{16} \text{compusew} + \mu \]

Where \( X \) is \( \text{govinfo}, \text{geninfo}, \text{pdictinfo}, \text{netshop}, \text{netgame}, \text{nethw}, \text{netedu}, \text{jobsearch}, \text{health}, \text{and otherpurposes} \)

The dependent variables, \( \text{govinfo}, \text{geninfo}, \text{pdictinfo}, \text{netshop}, \text{netgame}, \text{nethw}, \text{netedu}, \text{jobsearch}, \text{health}, \text{and otherpurposes} \) are binary variables that measure whether the respondent used the internet for particular purposes in the previous year. \( \text{govinfo} \) is whether the respondent used the internet for government information, used a proxy variable for people's internet usage for eGovernment site;
geninfo is whether the respondent used the internet for news, weather, sports; pdctinfo is whether the respondent used the internet for product information; netshop is whether the respondent used the internet for internet shopping; netgame is whether the respondent used the internet for internet gaming; nethui is whether the respondent used the internet for school assignments; netedu is whether the respondent used the internet for online schooling; jobsearch is whether the respondent used the internet for job searching; health is whether the respondent used the internet for health information; and otherpurposes is whether the respondent used the internet for other purposes. The same independent variables used in Model 4 are used in Model 5.

This study then compares the coefficient estimates of each independent variable in the results of Model 5 for each dependent variable. By comparing the coefficient estimates, the study shows how the correlation of different characteristics with internet use varies by the different purposes of net usage.

The specified models might violate one of the multicollinearity assumptions of the best linear unbiased estimator, because the model includes variables about income, race, and education, which are frequently highly correlated with one another. If perfect multicollinearity does not exist, the study will keep these variables as part of the model.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 displays the variable, variable name, description, valid number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for all dependent and independent variables in this study. It shows that all of the variables in this study are dummy variables, therefore necessitating the use of the logistic regression model. The key item of interest is the difference in the number of observations for each variable. The dependent variable nethui have the smallest valid number of observations of 24,229, while some of the independent demographic age variables such as teenplus, young2339, and retire60 have 158,865 observations. This difference between the number of observations for the different variables means that variables lacking data will have to be dropped from the data set to ensure that enough information is available for a statistically significant analysis. However, the fact that even the small-
The baseline of these dummy variables is White male aged 40-59 who lives in a rural area whose education level is 2 years of college or a relevant degree, and whose income is above $50,000 with no computer, no broadband, and no PC use at work. The less-inc is set on the household-total family income in the past 12 years is less than $50,000 as it is the benchmark for households with a computer.

**FINDINGS**

There are two parts to the analysis. The first part analyzes general characteristics of all internet users in the United States (Model 1-4). The second part analyzes the characteristics of internet users with different purposes of net usage (Model 5).

**Models 1 - 4**

Table 2 presents the results of logistic regression models of internet use in the U.S. as a function of socio-demographic difference. Model 1 has eight demographic independent variables including sex, age groups, racial groups and metropolitan status. Model 2 adds the four variables of socioeconomic status related to education and household income level to Model 1. Model 3 adds the variables of computer status including home computer ownership, broadband connection, and computer use at work to Model 1. Model 4 adds both socioeconomic status and computer status variables. A comparison of Model 1 and 2 shows how much the effects of metropolitan status are mediated by income and education level. A comparison of Model 1 and Model 3 shows how much internet use differences are influenced by connectivity to a computer, such as home computer ownership, broadband connection, and computer use at work. Model 4 shows how much the gap in internet use is affected by the combined effects of demographic, socioeconomic, and computer status.

By using the results of Model 4 as a baseline, this study then examined specific internet use (Table 3). Model 5 uses dependent variables including internet use for government information (a proxy for eGovernment), general information such as news, weath-
ers, and sports, product information, net shopping, internet game, school assignment, job search, health care, and other purposes.

The odds ratios in Table 1 and 2 are not interpreted directly. The odds ratios indicate a negative or positive relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable with the baseline category by the magnitude of coefficient where 1.0 is the neutral point. Thus, an odds ratio coefficient that is 1.0 indicates an equal chance of the event occurring across the categories of the independent and dependent variables. An odds ratio coefficient that is greater than 1.0 shows a greater likelihood for the event to occur for that category, and a coefficient below 1.0 shows a less likely chance of the event occurring in that category.

Model 1 indicates that if one does not control for other factors, all the demographic variables appear to be related significantly to internet usability. People who live in a metropolitan area are 72% more likely to use the internet than people in other areas. Internet use is significantly higher for Whites than for Blacks or Hispanics. The odds ratio indicates that Blacks are 70% less likely to use the internet (1 - 0.30), and Hispanics are 81% less likely to use the internet (1 - 0.19) than Whites.

Model 2 controls for socioeconomic status, reducing the differences in internet use by metropolitan status significantly. People who live in a metropolitan area are only 27% more likely to use the internet than those who live in a rural area, while the difference for Model 1 is 72%. A similar trend is observed for Blacks and Hispanics, but not as significant as metropolitan status.

Model 3 controls for computer status and reduces the demographic gap in internet use. In this case, Blacks are 35% less likely to use the internet than Whites (1 - 0.65) and Hispanics are 64% less likely to use the internet than Whites (1 - 0.36). Also, people who live in a metropolitan area are 24% more likely to use the internet than those who live in a rural area. As predicted in the analysis plan, computer status, such as computer ownership, broadband, and computer use at work have a strong association with people's internet use. This is intuitive as you cannot use the internet without computers.

Model 4 simultaneously controls for all the socio-demographic factors: sex, age, race, metropolitan status, education, income, computer ownership, broadband connection, and computer use at work. It mitigates the effect of metropolitan status as well as race differences in internet use.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Valid N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Use</td>
<td>return</td>
<td>Internet use this year - y/n</td>
<td>137683</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government info</td>
<td>goinfo</td>
<td>Internet use this year, information about gov't - y/n</td>
<td>64473</td>
<td>0.301</td>
<td>0.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General info</td>
<td>geninfo</td>
<td>Internet use this year, news/weather/sports - y/n</td>
<td>77347</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product info</td>
<td>prodinfo</td>
<td>Internet use this year, product information - y/n</td>
<td>77347</td>
<td>0.661</td>
<td>0.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Shopping</td>
<td>neshop</td>
<td>Internet use this year, internet shopping - y/n</td>
<td>77347</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Game</td>
<td>netgame</td>
<td>Internet use this year, internet game - y/n</td>
<td>77347</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Assignment</td>
<td>schoolassignment</td>
<td>Internet use this year, school assignment - y/n</td>
<td>24229</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online School</td>
<td>onlineschool</td>
<td>Internet use this year, online school - y/n</td>
<td>77347</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Search</td>
<td>jobsearch</td>
<td>Internet use this year, job search - y/n</td>
<td>64473</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>health</td>
<td>Internet use this year, health information - y/n</td>
<td>64473</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Purposes</td>
<td>otherpurpose</td>
<td>Internet use this year, other purposes - y/n</td>
<td>77347</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Female= 1 Male=0</td>
<td>158865</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teen plus</td>
<td>teenplus</td>
<td>Age between 15-22</td>
<td>158865</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young 23-39</td>
<td>young2339</td>
<td>Age between 23-39</td>
<td>158865</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retire 60+</td>
<td>retire60</td>
<td>Age 60 or older</td>
<td>158865</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>black</td>
<td>Black African American (non-hispanic origin)</td>
<td>158865</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>hispanic</td>
<td>Hispanics origin</td>
<td>143300</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other minorities</td>
<td>others</td>
<td>Other minorities (non-hispanic origin)</td>
<td>158865</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan area</td>
<td>metro</td>
<td>Metropolitan status - Metropolitan=1 Rural=0</td>
<td>112202</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>educ1st</td>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>112202</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>educ2nd</td>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>112202</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 year college degree</td>
<td>educ4th</td>
<td>4 year college</td>
<td>112202</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>educ5th</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>158865</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Income</td>
<td>lessinc</td>
<td>Household income under 50,000</td>
<td>88375</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadband connection</td>
<td>pchome</td>
<td>Computer own at home - Y=1 N=0</td>
<td>158865</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer own at home</td>
<td>broad</td>
<td>Broadband connection at home - Y=1 N=0</td>
<td>70617</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model 5

Model 5 (Table 3) presents the results of logistic regression models of socio-demographic difference in internet use on different purposes. All analyses in Model 5 (Table 3) use the same independent variables as Model 4 (Table 2), which is the basic model for the socio-demographic difference in specific internet use. Also, the sample sizes of all different regressions are the same, 41651 except for School Assignment of 5102 (this variable can be one when a sample is currently in school). Therefore, Model 5 in Table 3, logistic regression models with different dependent variables can be compared horizontally. Table 3 reveals remarkable trends.

First, logistic regression models with the dependent variables Government Information, General Information, Product
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>MODEL 1</th>
<th>MODEL 2</th>
<th>MODEL 3</th>
<th>MODEL 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.0771***</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.1156***</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TeenPlus</td>
<td>0.6206***</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.3702***</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young 23-39</td>
<td>0.3745***</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.4725***</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retire 60-</td>
<td>-1.6938***</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-1.4913***</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-1.1942***</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.9613***</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-1.0582***</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-1.1412***</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Minorities</td>
<td>-0.3591***</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-0.4371***</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>0.5398***</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.2408***</td>
<td>1.27</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic Status</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-1.5202***</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.5702***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1766***</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.6642***</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Computer Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Own at Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadband Connection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Use at Work</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.2169</td>
<td>0.8578</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.1358</td>
<td>0.2445</td>
<td>0.4372</td>
<td>0.4556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Toward Effective eGovernment Implementation

Information, Net Shopping, Online School, Health, and Other Purposes have the same trend with educational attainment: The higher the education level the person has, the more the person uses the internet for each of these different purposes. Particularly, holding a graduate degree matters much on Government Information (69% more likely to use government information than 2 year college or relevant degree holders) and Net Shopping (65% more likely to use government information). On the other hand, Net Game is the only case the direction is opposite: the higher the education level the person has, the less the person uses the internet for net gaming. In the cases of Job Search and School Assignment, the trend peaks at the education level of 4 year college degree.

Second, by looking at Black variables horizontally, the table illustrates that Blacks are less likely to use the internet for General Information, Product Information, and Net Shopping than Whites, whereas Blacks are more likely to use the internet for Government Information, Net Game, Online School, and Job Search than Whites. Third, people in metropolitan areas are more likely to use the internet for Government Information (10%), Net Shopping (12%), Job Search (39%), and Health (6%) than people in rural areas. On the other hand, people in metropolitan areas are less likely to use the internet for General Information and Net Game. Fourth, people in lower income households are more likely to use the internet for Government Information (10%), Net Game (18%), Online School (12%) and Job Search (58%). Fifth, women are more likely to use the internet for School Assignment (40%) and Health (68%) than men. In contrast, women are less likely to use the internet for General Information (45%), Net Shopping (6%), Net Game (23%), and Job Search (6%) than men. Sixth, by looking at Teenplus variables horizontally, the data indicates that people less than 22 years old are more likely to use the internet for Net Game, School Assignment, Online School, Job Search whereas they are less likely to use the internet for Government Information, Product Information, Net Shopping, and Health.

CONCLUSIONS

Policy Implications

This study tries to explore the relationship between types of internet usage and the socio-demographics of American internet
users in order to improve eGovernment implementation. First analysis (Model 1-4) suggests that the relationship between internet use such as age, race, and metropolitan status are mitigated by controlling computer status and socioeconomic status such as education and income level, but not entirely. This result reinforces the findings of the previous literature; age, race, income level, education level and metropolitan status are the major predictors of digital divide.

The second analysis (Model 5) roughly explains our daily life statistically. For example, people who play net game are more likely to have broadband as they need such a connection for games; teenagers do school assignments much more as they are more likely to be in school; and younger people are much more likely to search for jobs than people over 60 years old as not so many elderly need jobs. The results of the second study indicate that Blacks and lower income people are more likely to use government information overall, but less educated people and rural people are not. This finding implies that ethnic and economic status do not provide as significant difference as education level when an eGovernment scheme is implemented as an alternative scheme to provide information to the public. Thus, educational and geographic status are central concerns for the eGovernmental implementation, because both are major concerns for the current digital divide discussion. In particular, education level matters considerably. As pointed out, the previous finding that social capital may be more important than economic capital using the internet (Robinson, Kestnbaum and Neustadtl, 2002) is most stoutly applied to government use among all the purposes of internet use.

These results can be the result of educational environments, because internet literacy has not been previously taught very often below the college level, though now many primary and secondary educational institutions have started to implement such education. Additionally, at the college level, students are more likely to be exposed to internet venues, because schools provide email addresses to their students and encourage using the internet for course materials and other information. In other words, people who have only a high school diploma or less and received their education in earlier time periods have a very limited exposure to the internet and to computers in general.

Given this situation, governments should pay extra attention to characteristics of different purposes of internet use, espe-
Table 3: (Model 5) Socio-demographic Differences in Specific Internet Use: U.S. Adults, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teen plus</td>
<td>0.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Young 23-39</td>
<td>1.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retire 60+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metropolitan area</td>
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<table>
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<th>Socioeconomic Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
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<tr>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>0.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 year college degree</td>
<td>1.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less income</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Computer Status</th>
<th>Odds Ratios</th>
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<tr>
<td>Computer own at home</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadband connection</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer at work</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Log Pseudo-Likelihood Ratio  | -25136.9     | -23895.9   | -20714.1    | -26933.6    | -29538.8    | -2027.9    | -7564.8     | -18050.2    | -25786.4    | -7434.1     |
| Pseudo R2                    | 0.0474       | 0.0529     | 0.0597      | 0.0671      | 0.0437      | 0.0837     | 0.0310      | 0.0491      | 0.0558      | 0.014       |
| N                            | 41651        | 41651      | 41651       | 41651       | 41651       | 41651      | 41651       | 41651       | 41651       | 41651       |


*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
cially those of less educated citizens, when providing services by the internet. Governments should also take these factors into consideration when designing eGovernment websites.

Limitations and Further Research

There are some limitations to this research. First, because of the data limitations, this study only analyzed a 2001 survey. However, a time trend is crucial for this analysis as internet technology grows rapidly. One-time data are inadequate as the situation could be completely different in a few years. Thus, continued analyses over time are demanded. Second, the variable Government Information captures all aspects of governmental information. This does not specify the types of services on eGovernment websites. Thus, people might be using only one website while other governmental websites are not used. More detailed variables on types of government information used on the internet should be added into the survey. Third, the analysis cannot overstate the digital divide as dependent variables also involve preference. The study does not answer the question whether this is a problem of usability/access or simply a problem of preference. Perhaps under-represented people prefer to use government information manually, and once all government information becomes available only online, those people may switch their behavior. However, there is also a possibility that online government information is difficult to use/access for particular people, or even does not have such content for them. Therefore, more detailed research on people's behavior is needed for further research.

Additionally, detailed computer/internet location variables can be added to the model, in order to assess some current policies that allocate computer/internet to public spaces to mitigate the digital divide. Employment variables such as the types of jobs/industry people belong to can also be added to assess the divide on different employment statuses, because computer use at work seems to matter significantly.

Concluding Comments

This study examines internet use for governmental service and reinforces the previous finding that education level is critical to the digital divide discussion. Furthermore, the study finds that of all
purposes of internet usage, government information has the widest diversity among different levels of education. eGovernment has the potential to reduce the cost of government administration and increase public access to government information. However, it is crucial for government to continue monitoring the demographics of information gaps among different groups of people. In this regard, this research provides a better understanding of eGovernment and the characteristics of U.S. internet users and opens a new field for further research.

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Toward Effective eGovernment Implementation


About the Author

Akira Tsuchiya is a Senior Researcher at Keio Research Institute at Shonan Fujisawa, Keio University, Japan. Tsuchiya has fulfilled various roles and responsibilities including Legislative Assistant to a Councillor of the National Diet of Japan where he established Think Net, an Internet public discussion forum for current national policy issues. He also served as Executive Assistant to the Executive Director of the Network for Policy Analysis (Policy Net) where he held the first nationwide research and education conference for public policy schools in Japan. Tsuchiya was a core member of a research consortium at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, where he investigated effectiveness of policy-making through knowledge management and on-line plat-
forms and established Policy Platform, an online deliberative council. Tsuchiya currently writes articles, serves on panels, and lectures on information technology policy, eGovernment, and the educational aspect of policy schools. He graduated from Keio University where he received B.A. in Policy Management and M.A. in Media and Governance, and now studies at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Tsuchiya has also researched at Georgetown Public Policy Institute as a Fulbright Scholar, examining the U.S. eGovernment initiatives and digital divide, and Trinity College, Oxford University, analyzing national eGovernment initiatives in Japan, U.S., U.K., and EU.
Gagging on the Donkey: The Republican Party and Black Voters

DR. ALISON DAGNES
AND
PROF. STEPHANIE JIRARD
Shippensburg University

In the 2004 presidential election, Republicans targeted black voters but not use issues of civil rights in their efforts. Instead, they focused on religious African Americans and tried to appeal to their conservative sense of morality. Thus, the modern GOP tried to re-cast the issue of race in American politics in religious terms. This article examines the Bush administration's targeting of African American voters in 2004, exploring how using issue-oriented politics may affect party allegiances and the Bush campaign's attempt to redefine race in American politics.

A full ninety percent of African-American voters voted for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election, and more than 80 percent voted for Clinton and Dukakis in the 80's and 90's. African-American reasons for voting Democrat have much to do with the histories and agendas of both major political parties and with the Democratic Party traditionally making greater efforts in the areas of Civil Rights and domestic policy than the GOP. In response to statistics like those above, Republican Party operatives have begun targeting black voters in 2004, making the assertion that Democratic challenger John Kerry has done a poor job reaching out to black voters and that the Democratic Party takes their vote for...
granted. They also contend that more young black voters are declaring themselves Independent. Further, Republicans are heartened by the fact that African-Americans, although tending to vote Democratic, are a socially conservative group. Thus, under the leadership of a pious George W. Bush, the Republican Party is reaching out to religious black voters - those who might embrace Bush's born-again Christian values and moral stands on such issues as abortion, gay marriage, and school prayer.

Final voting statistics are unavailable at this writing, but major media outlets and polls speculate that President Bush may have gained ground among black voters since the 2000 presidential election through carefully constructed attempts to paint the Democratic Party as out of touch and the GOP as a viable alternative. The number of religious black voters who indicated they would be willing to vote Republican is, perhaps, modest; however, two factors make the GOP strategy important. First, if Republicans are successful in their efforts to show that Democrats take the black vote for granted, black voters who feel ignored may opt to stay home on Election Day, pulling support away from the Democrats for whom they are likely to vote. If the GOP is able to take the next step and convince religious African-American voters to support them, any impact could be significant. Even a small number of likely Democratic voters moving Republican can matter in a close presidential election where the total vote is split almost evenly between the two major parties.

This article examines the Bush administration's targeting of African American voters in 2004, exploring the use of issue-oriented politics to affect party allegiances and the Bush campaign's attempt to redefine race in American politics. We begin with a historical retrospective of African American voting patterns and then address the reasons some think black voters may move Republican, either in the 2004 election or beyond.

AFRICAN AMERICAN VOTING IN THE LATE-NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

"We didn't come all this way for no two seats!"
Fannie Lou Hamer, Atlantic City, 1964

The movement of African-Americans from the party of Lincoln to the Democratic Party was a slow one. Lincoln's signing
of the Emancipation Proclamation would solidify black allegiance to anything Republican until the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 70 years later. Yet even as Blacks looked upon the Republican Party as the great emancipator, it became quickly apparent with the death of Lincoln and the implementation of the Republican Reconstruction agenda that race mattered more than a shared political vision, and the black vote became something to be manipulated, co-opted or prevented.

**Reconstruction**

The strain of three million black freedmen on America's economic, social and political resources was immense, particularly as America was embroiled in its bloodiest war, fought largely on the question of the integration of its black people (Trefoussse 1955). Shortly after the Civil War ended and President Lincoln was assassinated in the spring of 1865, former slaves migrated to southern towns and cities to exercise their new mobility and to be closer to occupying federal troops, other similarly-situated blacks, and work opportunities. The black population doubled in the southern cities of Richmond, Norfolk, Wilmington, Charlotte and Raleigh; tripled in Portsmouth, Knoxville and Nashville; and grew fivefold in Atlanta and Little Rock (Hahn 2003, 119). Blacks also began to assemble politically within the established frameworks of the Republican Party - the Union Leagues and Equal Rights Leagues established to promote black suffrage - and had established their own freedmen's conventions "to impress upon the white men . . . that we are part and parcel of the American Republic" (Hahn 2003, 120).

An example of successful Republican Party Reconstruction activities was the enfranchisement of the African-American male in Washington, D.C., immediately after the Civil War. The D.C. Republicans embodied the hopes, the energy and the promise of blacks' first social and political freedom (Harrison 2002). By advocating social justice and political opportunity, District blacks were overwhelmingly Republican and revealed in often boisterous meetings that intertwined religion and politics. Republican meetings often took place in black churches. "More than any other institution, church organizations bound African-Americans together and formed a network of solidarity and communication upon which
the nascent party could build" (Harrison 2002, 83). Black ministers, hailing from all geographic areas, from varied background, and representing different religions were elected to legislative seats during Reconstruction (Foner 1988, 93).

Post-Reconstruction Disenfranchisement

When Reconstruction ended in the mid-1870s, Democrats actively engaged in a variety of measures to both limit Republican power and to severely restrict black voting including racial gerrymandering and ballot rigging (Perman 2001, 11). Democrats felt that Reconstruction was nothing more than federal interference with state rights, an opportunity for wholesale political fraud and an attempt "to impose Negro domination on the superior white race" (Foner 88, 93). The emotional underpinning of the Democrat movement to virtually eliminate black suffrage was racism, plain and simple. According to the white Representative from Georgia, Allen Chandler, the Negro had been given the ballot "when he was utterly and totally unprepared for it. He regards it as a bauble, a plaything, an article of merchandise. He regards Election Day as a public holiday. He goes to the polls as he goes to the circus or to a public execution - as a frolic" (Perman 2001, 11).

After Reconstruction, the southern Democrats enacted many seemingly race-neutral measures aimed at denying only blacks access to the ballot, and the Republican Party, in response to this systematic black disenfranchisement, did not act. The assault on black voting rights, according to author J. Morgan Kousser, metastasized in four stages. The first was "the Klan stage," exemplified by the killing of 200 blacks in St. Landry Parish in Louisiana by the "Knights of the White Camellia" between the election for Governor in April and the election for President in November in 1868 (Kousser 1999, 23). Second came the "dilution stage," or the legal codification of diluting the black vote. Next came the "disenfranchisement stage," which ensured white Democratic dominance on the political landscape of the future. Finally, the "lily-white stage" guaranteed permanent impotence of the black community in collecting and exercising political clout (ibid.). Constitutional conventions were convened everywhere in the South and the legislative imperative of the gatherings was clear. Mississippi's Solomon
S. Calhoun proclaimed at his state's 1890 convention, "Let us tell the truth if it bursts the bottom of the Universe. We came here to exclude the negro. Nothing short of this will answer" (Perman 2001, 70). The result of the Democratic black disenfranchisement efforts was a political legacy that left blacks perpetual beggars at the table of political power in the South.

The Shift to the Democratic Party

In the early 1890s, farmers struggling against the growing American industrial economy spawned the third-party Populist movement. Blacks were attracted to the Populist movement because they shared the same economic problems as poor white farmers. Also, the Republican Party failed to protect blacks from the post-Reconstruction Democrat decimation and dilution of black political power and the virulent and aggressive tactics Democrats employed to subjugate blacks. The Populist Party's outreach to black voters was not based, necessarily, on a commitment to a winning bi-racial commission but rather on the economic realities that often bind poor peoples' interests together. "Gratitude," said the leader of the Populist Party Tom Watson, "may fail; so may sympathy and friendship and generosity and patriotism; but in the long run, self-interest always controls. Let it once appear plainly that it is to the [economic interest] of a colored man to vote with the white man, and he will do it" (Winsboro & Musoke 2003, 1365).

Although the Populist Party held emotional appeal for black voters excluded from the Democratic Party and left adrift by the Republican Party's inability and unwillingness to secure and protect their rights African-Americans began in 1932 to shift their party allegiance from the Republicans to the Democrats (Weiss, 1983). Republican President Herbert Hoover had done nothing to ameliorate the disproportionate economic impact the Depression had on black communities. Blacks, even though they may have only comprised a fraction of a city's overall population, suffered unemployment rates up to four times their percentage in a city's population. The National Urban League reported that by 1931 the dislodging of blacks from their jobs "to reduce unemployment among whites" (emphasis in original) had become "an accepted policy." With the large number of unemployed whites growing throughout the Depression, the chances of blacks being hired or
rehired into former jobs were slim. As the League's industrial relations director, T. Arnold Hill claimed, "At no time in the history of the Negro since slavery has his economic and social outlook seemed so discouraging" (Weiss 1983, 15).

By 1932, although some blacks voiced concerns over voting Democratic in a time of economic trouble, others welcomed the opportunity to reject the Republicans and show their resentment at the voting booth. "If blacks would begin to vote 'on issues rather than worn-out traditions,' the historian Carter G. Woodson advised, they could make the ballot a tool for advancing the interests of the race" (Weiss 1983, 28). Blacks did end up voting for Democrat Franklin Roosevelt for President, breaking for the first time their tradition of voting Republican and starting a trend that would last the rest of the decade. They did so, however, out of economic necessity rather than an intention to make a permanent shift in party allegiance. The Democratic Party was an unattractive choice for African-Americans. To be a Democrat meant belonging to a party that was the repository of white-Southern racists, the party that spawned white-supremacy legislation, the party that tolerated white-perpetrated violence, odious attributes blacks steadfastly rejected. But in return for economic benefits received as a result of Roosevelt's New Deal, blacks were firmly behind President Roosevelt and the Democratic Party by the presidential election of 1936, despite Roosevelt's lackluster record in advancing civil rights. When in 1934 a particularly brutal lynching and mutilation occurred in Marianna, Florida, a reporter asked the President if he planned to support anti-lynching laws. Roosevelt responded that he needed time "to check up and see what I did last year. I have forgotten" (Weiss 1983, 109).

If the black vote for either party was unpredictable in the presidential election of 1932, by 1936 blacks had become a tremendously important factor in national elections, and "the parties from [then] on [were] expected to vie in offers for [black] support" (Weiss 1983, 180). The issue of race relations became paramount as racial demographers showed large numbers of blacks migrating to major northern cities. As they moved north, blacks also became more politicized and civically active. The popular political scientist explanation for the black shift from Republican to Democrat during the New Deal is that previously apolitical blacks, once animated and energized to become involved in shaping their econom-
The Republican Party and Black Voters

ic futures, chose a party identification with Roosevelt. (Weiss 1983). Weiss explains just how energized the black electorate was:

[T]he number of people who went to the polls in black districts in Cleveland increased by 14 percent between 1932 and 1940. In Chicago, the increase was almost 26 percent; in Detroit over 30 percent. In Harlem, it reached a staggering 78 percent. At a time when the size of the potential electorate in these areas remained relatively stable, so significant a change in the size of the actual electorate carried an unmistakable message: national politics had assumed a new, more immediate relevance for black Americans (228-229).

The conclusion to be drawn is that the shift from the Republican to the Democratic Party had as much to do with the story of black politicization as it did with the immediate attraction of what the Democrats could deliver to African Americans in the late 1930s and early 1940s via the New Deal. Black voters were now mostly voting Democratic and this had much to do with the ideological and demographic makeup of the GOP during the mid to late twentieth century.

As the issue of civil rights for African Americans emerged after World War II, Republicans strongly opposed the general direction in which the country was moving, finding themselves at odds with domestic policy developments of the New Deal and with the way Democrats handled foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War (Patterson 254). The GOP focused intently on anti-communism but, despite the Brown v. Board of Education decision handed down in 1954, avoided efforts to address or advance civil rights for African Americans. Most Republicans took their cue from President Eisenhower. According to James Patterson, "Conservative by temperament, [Eisenhower] was deeply pessimistic about the possibility of significant changes in race relations and dead-set against suing the federal government to force the South to mend its ways" (Patterson 393). While Southern Democrats opposed civil rights efforts, Northern Democrats were far more supportive than Republicans from all other regions around the nation. This left the Democratic Party as the most viable option for black voters.
The Civil Rights Movement began in the late 1950s and extended into the 1960s, affecting internal Democratic Party politics. In 1964, on the eve of President Johnson's acceptance of his party's nomination for a second term, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), an integrated coalition of seasoned activists for voter registration in the Magnolia State, was at the convention door demanding to replace their state's all-white delegation. The pressure was on the Party to solve the MFDP "problem," as well as a number of other issues that arose. First, Democrats had to keep all of the Southern delegates from bolting from the convention and handing the Republicans a victory. Next, they had to sustain the momentum of racial inclusiveness embodied in Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech given a year before in August 1963. Finally, Democrats had to appease liberal Northern Democrats so that the convention would not disintegrate into a street brawl. In order to do this, President Johnson dispatched Hubert Humphrey, a tried and true friend to black Americans as the mayor of Minneapolis, to be the Democratic lightning rod for a bold and ambitious civil rights plank at the 1948 Democratic Convention. His involvement, however, left no one happy. After four days of mediation, the Party offered the MFDP seats for two delegates, whom they had no say in choosing, and a promise that, in the future, no segregated delegation would sit at the Convention. On the lips of Fannie Lou's declaration that the two seats were not what they "came all that way for," the MFDP and the official all-white Mississippi delegation stalked out of the convention.

After President Kennedy narrowly defeated Richard Nixon in the presidential election of 1960, Kennedy delayed sending civil rights legislation to Congress, wary of potential southern backlash and eyeing his prospects for reelection in 1964 (Schofield, Miller, Martin 2002). After Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon Johnson defeated a Southern filibuster on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and, for the first time since Reconstruction, the South's veto was forestalled. The Act, which guaranteed integration in all places of public accommodation and outlawed discrimination based on race in both public and private employment, was a legislative success, but the accomplishment had another impact within the Democratic
The Republican Party and Black Voters

At this point, many Southern conservative Democrats defected to the GOP. The Republican Party during this time had nominated Barry Goldwater for president—a man who ran on a platform embracing racial segregation and who stated in his 1964 Republican Party acceptance speech: "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice." Nixon's run for office in 1968 had embedded in it the so-called "Southern Strategy" that played, in part, on the racial fears of white voters. The result for black voters was that they had to pin all of their hopes to the Democratic Party if they were to have any chance of advancing their social and political agenda. As the Democrats increasingly emerged as the pro-choice champions of blacks, gays, Jews, feminists, the loyally Democratic southern states defected from the party, having a sense that "Democrats had embraced the social excesses of the later 1960s" (Zeitz 2004,69). When President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 into law, the exodus of white conservative Southerners from the Democratic Party was virtually assured.

The 1980's and Beyond

It is ironic that even after the sweeping civil rights reforms enacted by the Democrats in the 1960s, black voters eventually began to feel that their votes, energy, and presence in the Democratic Party were under-appreciated. In 1984 and again in 1988, the black Reverend Jesse Jackson capitalized on black feelings of discontent within the Democratic Party by mounting his own, ultimately unsuccessful, presidential bids. In a 1992 paper entitled "The Impact of Jesse Jackson's Presidential Bids on Blacks' Relationship with the Democratic Party," Katherine Tate wrote that Jesse Jackson's failed presidential candidacy actually solidified and strengthened black identification with the Democratic Party. "Between 1984 and 1988, the percentage of [blacks who strongly identified as Democrats] increased from roughly 44 percent to approximately 60 percent" (Tate 1992,191). Jackson's candidacy linked black political aspirations more firmly to the Democratic Party.

The 1980s and 1990s, then, were decades that served to solidify the place of African-Americans within the Democratic Party, and Republicans did very little to change that. In fact, then-Vice President George H.W. Bush, running against Massachusetts
Governor Michael Dukakis in 1988, mounted an ad campaign to make Dukakis look weak on crime. The "Willie Horton ads," which attempted to link Dukakis to a black inmate who used his weekend prison furlough to assault and rape a woman, proved ultimately successful but virulently racist in nature, enraging the black political community and moving African-Americans further away from the GOP. Bush's racial blunders continued through the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation hearings and well into the next campaign, when he proclaimed his love of all of his grandchildren, "even the brown ones." By the time Clinton was elected in 1992, African-American voters welcomed a man to the White House who could speak the language of race well and with authority. Blacks continued to vote Democrat in huge proportions throughout the nineties, although African-American voter turnout lagged.

Now, in the early part of the 21st century, Republicans are asserting that African-Americans find themselves operating in patterns set by politicians without either their consent or their control. We continue with an examination of how the modern Republican Party is trying to win back the votes of African-Americans.

THE BUSH CAMPAIGN AND THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN VOTE

Republican strategists coordinating the President's re-election campaign point to two important issues concerning the black vote in modern American politics. First, they argue that Democrats take the African-American vote for granted and, as a result, John Kerry has done little to court black voters. Also, they point to the morally conservative nature of the black community in the hope that a similarly conservative president will attract more voters. These two ideas have led the GOP to set an optimistic goal for gaining black votes in 2004. According to Republican Party Chairman Ed Gillespie, who is working to attract black voters: "It is not in my interest that 90 percent of the African-American electorate vote Democratic" (Rennie 17).

Taking the Black Vote for Granted

In 1960, baseball legend Jackie Robinson campaigned for Richard Nixon instead of John Kennedy, in part because Kennedy
never looked Robinson in the eye during a personal meeting, and in part because Robinson felt the Democratic Party assumed the black vote. Although Robinson came to regret his support for Nixon, his point was well taken. For the past 50 years, the Democratic Party has been able to presume African-Americans will vote their way simply because there seemed to be no other option: the Republican Party was on the wrong side of most civil rights battles from 1950 through the turn of the century.

However, this perceived complacency on the part of the Democrats is taking its toll. The threat of black voters not voting at all, combined with GOP leaders who are working hard to chip away at the stronghold the Democrats have on African-Americans, threatens this important segment of the Democratic Party base. This threat has many Democratic and African-American leaders concerned, and they are appealing to the Kerry campaign to work harder to entice black voters. According to the Rev. Joseph Lowery, former president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference: "What [Democrats] usually do is wait until the last minute and try to stir up interest in the black community, which would be a serious mistake...I sense a great frustration in the black community with this president, and they want to express their frustration at the ballot box. But I don't see Democrats taking advantage of that" (Fears A04).

The appeal seemed to be falling on deaf ears for most of the campaign, and it was rare to see Kerry engaged with African Americans. While a Democratic candidate would naturally address issues that most concern African-American voters, Kerry has been reticent to make any major, specific stand in this area. Covering the Democratic Party Convention for Black Entertainment Television, "Cousin Jeff" Johnson stated: "I have not heard yet from Kerry enough on how he intends to address issues that matter to people of color and poor people." Other reporters at the Democratic Convention in Boston this summer canvassed Roxbury and other predominantly black areas in the city to show that African American voters there were not wildly supportive of the nomination at the Fleet Center only a few miles away. A recurring theme was Kerry's lack of attention to policies that affect black voters (Kurtz, Media Notes). Indeed, the major press attention Kerry has received concerning the black vote has not been focused on policy initiatives at all, but rather on missteps by the campaign or blun-
ders from his opposition. Two examples illustrate this point. In March of this year, Kerry gave an interview on the American Urban Radio Network where he stated: "President Clinton was known as the first black president. I wouldn't be upset if I could earn the right to be the second." Civil rights leaders protested. Paula Diane Harris, founder of the Andrew Young Center for Social Change stated, "John Kerry is not a black man. He is a privileged white man who has no idea what it is in this country to be a poor white man in this country, let alone a black man" ("Civil Rights Leader Wants Apology"). Kerry's campaign maintained the candidate was trying to be humorous, but the damage caused by this misstep was done. Additionally, in July, Kerry spoke to the annual conference of the NAACP and promised to unite the nation. However, the largest headlines were not his remarks to the group, but rather President Bush's absence from the meeting. It was the first time a sitting president did not attend the convention since the 1930s, and President Bush's absence overshadowed the positives of Kerry's remarks.

To compound this problem, Kerry has not engaged a significant number of African Americans in his election efforts, which may contribute to a serious perception problem as well. University of Maryland Political Scientist Ron Walters stated, "You pick up the paper... and you see a picture where [Kerry's] surrounded by all whites.... It raises questions about the lack of blacks and Hispanics in his inner circle" (Fears A04). Felicia Davis, executive director of the Benjamin E. Mays Educational Resource Center in Atlanta supports this: "Mr. Kerry shouldn't have any problem at all finding qualified, tremendous black people, and yet there were none around his campaign." (Fears A04). All of this lends disingenuousness to Kerry's campaign, which breeds the possibility of the GOP taking hold of the black vote.

Moral Conservatism

Turning the tide of black voters away from the Democratic Party would be virtually impossible were it not for specific issues that are terribly important in this election year, specifically concerning morality. While conservative African-American voters have maintained their affinity with the Democratic Party despite past ideological differences, the hot-button issues of gay marriage,
The Republican Party and Black Voters

abortion, and school prayer threaten to become wedge issues among black voters. This is due to the fact that African Americans are, as a group, more socially conservative than liberal. According to Georgia State University Political scientist Allison Calhoun-Brown: "The whole moral-cultural agenda of the Democrats doesn't sit well with black voters, who tend to be rather traditional" (White 1A). This gives the Republicans an issue-specific advantage in a year when moral issues matter considerably.

One African-American clergy member from Boston, Rev. Eugene Rivers, stated, "With the homosexual-marriage debate, the black community formally abandons the Democratic Party plantation" (Convey 008). Ohio pastor Rev. Marvin McMickle, an African American and one-time Democratic congressional candidate, supported this assertion: "I'm paying attention to the folks who are paying attention to me... It's going to be much more of a two-party environment as long as the Republican Party gives us some issues we can consider in good conscience" (Briggs Bl). Indeed, there is the sense that this may be the start of a new trend in black politics for many religious African-Americans. Says the Rev. C. Jay Matthews of Mount Sinai Baptist Church in Ohio: "We can't be bound to any party" (Briggs B1).

Republican leaders point to a growing conservative movement within much of the black population in America as reason to try to woo African-American voters away from the Democratic Party. Black voters, while morally conservative, still pledge allegiance to the Democrats because of the party's liberal stand on such issues as the economy, job creation, and affirmative action. Historically, black Americans have been seen as liberal, but changes liberalism and its meaning may be shifting that stereotype. Classical liberalism, rooted in the Latin term for "freedom," meant independence from both governmental and religious authority, but since the nineteenth century when classical liberalism applied, the definition of the word has evolved to mean something quite different. During the first half of the twentieth century and Franklin Roosevelt's administration, New Deal liberalism was the term for government assistance intended to help deliver people from poverty and oppression. Liberalism, at this point, became the buzzword for the expansion of the federal government to meet the needs of the American people. As the country grew during the twentieth century and citizens became dependent upon government provid-
ed services, the federal government expanded its scope and size to accommodate the needs of the people.

Hence, as the Civil Rights movement began in the 1960s, it made perfect sense that African Americans felt more liberal than conservative, since liberalism was the ideology that professed to care about their needs. However, at this time liberalism began to shift once again in its definition and scope. Progressive liberalism, which focused more broadly on civil rights and liberties for underrepresented Americans, supplanted New Deal liberalism, which had focused specifically on poverty assistance, unemployment, and infrastructure growth. This progressive liberalism expanded during what were known as the "rights revolutions" to address social issues, most notably abortion rights, rights for homosexuals, affirmative action, and passage of the ERA. Thus, the current incarnation of "liberal" has come to include unblushing stands on divisive issues.

It is, then, easy to see how black voters who are both economically liberal and socially conservative might be tempted by the conservative morality of the GOP. The Democratic Party has long been known to be the home of progressive liberalism, and for this reason the term "liberal" has dogged the Democrats for the past three decades. It helped to defeat Democratic presidential nominee Michael Dukakis in 1988, Clinton deftly avoided it in 1992 and 1996, and now John Kerry is working hard to dance around the accusations by the Bush administration that he is an out-of-touch left-winger. This may not matter to the segments of the electorate that divided into ideological camps early on. However, for those who are undecided or for whom specific issues are deciding factors, the "liberal" tag and emphasis on moral issues may be enough to sway voters to the right. These specific moral issues mostly concern abortion and gay marriage, and religion in this presidential election adds to their importance.

Forty percent of the votes President Bush received in the 2000 election were from white evangelicals, and as a result the President and his top advisors paid close attention to the wishes of the devout. This is not for purely political reasons, as clearly President Bush is a deeply religious person. The president named Jesus as his favorite political philosopher in the 2000 campaign, speaks freely of his own religious devotion, and has accordingly expanded the office of Faith Based Initiatives within the executive
branch. President Bush invokes religion in policy speeches on the war on terrorism, gay marriage, and steroid use by professional athletes to great applause, welcomed by a predominantly Christian nation that admires a man of faith. The connection between the President and the religious electorate is clearly honest and true. However, as an extension of the obvious simpatico between Bush and the religious right, there are electoral concerns to be accounted for, and the President's re-election campaign is paying specific attention to religious voters, black and white. The Bush-Cheney campaign has worked to build a grassroots network based in the religious community, which has opened the door to criticism by groups on the left. A June e-mail from the Bush re-election headquarters in Pennsylvania stated the campaign was trying to "identify 1600 'friendly congregations' in Pennsylvania where voters friendly to President Bush might gather on a regular basis," and e-mail recipients were asked to "serve as a coordinator in your place of worship" (Eisenberg A8). While religious organizations are prohibited from direct campaign involvement, they are allowed to register voters and places of worship have traditionally been campaign stops for candidates from both parties. The Bush campaign defended the effort by stating, "People of faith have as much right to participate in the political process as any other community" (Eisenberg A8).

The White House and the Bush campaign have specific assistants working on the relationship between religious voters and the President's re-election efforts. In the White House, under advisor Karl Rove, is Timothy Goeglein, the official White House liaison to Christian groups. The Bush campaign has reached out to black churches, and since African-Americans have faithfully blended political discourse with religious worship through church attendance, the Republicans may hit a receptive target audience within the religious black community. These votes may add up to a GOP victory in the tight 2004 election or set the stage for increased African-American voting for Republicans in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

In late July, 2004, President Bush spoke to a meeting of the National Urban League in Detroit and asked, "I know plenty of politicians assume they have your vote. But did they earn it and do
they deserve it? Is it a good thing for the African-American community to be represented mainly by one political party? ... How is it possible to gain political leverage if the party is never forced to compete?" These questions clearly resonated with many in the audience who agreed that the Democrats had fallen short of meeting black voters' expectations. The lack of strong enthusiasm for Kerry by African-American voters in the polls shows that the President's remarks may be especially prescient during this campaign season.

However, does this mean that black voters will migrate to the GOP? Perhaps, some may, wooed by the conservative stand on social issues that the Republicans offer in this heated and divided period in American politics. If this is the case, the Republicans will win support from a traditionally Democratic group and may be able to recast the issue of race in terms of religion. Yet many black voters, feeling neglected by the party they have disproportionately supported throughout the years, may opt instead of turning their support elsewhere to simply stay at home and support no one. If this is the case, Republicans will gain support only by virtue of the Democrats losing support, and in this case they will serve to weaken political participation on a national level.

The late black Republican politician Charlie Gaines once stated: "Blacks are gagging on the donkey but not yet ready to swallow the elephant" (Stevenson A10). In tight races between the two party animals, African-American voters are crucial to electoral success. In an American political system that is just and truly representative, African-American voters are also important to systemic fairness. And until all politicians reach out to all communities throughout the country with equal attention, African-American voters might decide that any effort is wasted on politicians who do not care enough to pay real attention to them.

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Transformation of Army Capabilities: A Congressional Perspective

CAPTAIN WILLIAM C. TAYLOR JR.
U.S. Army

Abstract: The United States’ dominant role in international relations has translated into the need for a large commitment of military capabilities. In addition, the nature of warfare has changed, requiring forces with decentralized command structures and expeditionary capabilities. The present Army force is inadequately structured to meet current and future needs. A wide range of issues and considerations influence the selection of a force structure policy, from specific technical and military issues to legislative concerns. Particularly, the politics of legislation realm cannot be ignored. Congressional support is essential in order to provide the legislation necessary to authorize and fund change. This analysis will focus on issues as they relate to Congressional concerns and politics. It is recommended that the Army must change its cultural aversion to Congressional liaison activities and incorporate three key beliefs. First, proactive Congressional "lobbying" efforts are not only acceptable but necessary. Second, the Army must view liaison opportunities as an opportunity rather than a burden. Third, Army senior leaders must increase their visibility on Capitol Hill. Finally, the Army must incorporate political and Congressional considerations into its message when communicating with Congress.

INTRODUCTION

In 1990 Charles Krauthammer stated, "the immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar, it is Unipolar. The center of
world power is an unchallenged United States, attended by its western allies."\(^1\) As the world becomes hegemonic, the United States has taken the dominant role in almost every key international security situation. This dominant role has translated into the need for a large commitment of military capabilities. As a result the United States Army is committed around the globe at a level unprecedented in recent history. In 2003, 24 of the 33 active duty Brigade Combat Teams were deployed or committed outside the continental United States. The Army has troops deployed in over 120 countries including Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, Korea, the Balkans, Egypt, the Philippines, and Honduras.\(^2\) Almost all of these missions involve long term commitments, which will ensure that the deployment levels of 2003 will continue well into the near future.

To sustain these long term commitments, rotation of forces in these operational theaters will be required. Sustained force rotations require a force structure that is at least three times as large as the force structure required to conduct operations. This requirement is based on the assumption that you will have one group of forces conducting operations, one group of forces recovering from operations, and a third group preparing to deploy and conduct operations. A smaller force structure requires repeated deployment of the same active duty units and also may require extensive use of National Guard and Reserve forces to augment operations. The repeated use of active duty units is possible in the short term but is not sustainable for an extended period of time. Similarly, the National Guard and Reserve can be used to meet short term needs but not to meet long term requirements. The repeated use of forces for an extended period of time will result in serious personnel and maintenance problems leading to the reduced effectiveness of Army forces.

The United States Army must also be prepared to meet contingency requirements. The current instability of the international security situation clearly creates the need for a contingency planning construct. This instability includes not only locations where United States military forces are currently committed, but also potential situations such as Korea, Iran, and Haiti where additional military forces may be needed. In the 2002 Defense Planning Guidance, the Department of Defense committed to the 4-2-1 contingency planning construct. The 4-2-1 construct requires the
Army to be prepared to deter forward in four contingency areas, rapidly transition and defeat an adversary in two overlapping conflicts, and be prepared to exploit defeat through occupation or regime change in one of those conflicts. Based on the current international security situation and the Department of Defense contingency planning construct, the Army must maintain uncommitted forces prepared to respond to the world's emerging problems.

**THE PROBLEM**

The current active duty force structure is not sufficient to meet operational and contingency planning needs. Current Department of Defense operational commitments require 8 divisions or 25 brigade combat teams. Most of the contingency planning requirements are accounted for by current operations. Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai/Honduras, and Korea account for the requirement to deter forward in 4 areas, Afghanistan accounts for the requirement to defeat an enemy in one area, and Iraq accounts for the requirement to exploit defeat and conduct regime change. Based on the 4-2-1
Table 2: Preparation and Recovery

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<th>Units Preparing</th>
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<td>Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>Sinai &amp; Honduras</td>
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<td>Other Operations</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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contingency planning construct, the only requirement remaining is the ability to defeat an enemy in a second contingency area. The Army must therefore still be prepared to defeat an enemy in one contingency area, requiring 1 division or 3 brigade combat teams. In total there is a requirement for 22 divisions or 68 Brigade combat teams. The Marine Corps is currently providing 3 divisions or 9 brigade combat teams with a division conducting operations, a division preparing for operations, and a division recovering from operations relating to either OIF or OEF. Operation Noble Eagle is conducted primarily by National Guard and Reserve forces meeting the requirements for 1 division or 3 Brigade Combat Teams. In addition, National Guard and Reserve forces can provide a division conducting operations, a division recovering from operations, and a division preparing for operations for a total of 3 divisions or 9 brigades. Employing one National Guard or Reserve division at a time will allow a given unit an acceptable period of at least five years between deployments. Accounting for the Marine Corps and National Guard and Reserve contributions, the Active Army must fulfill the remaining requirement of 15 divisions or 48 brigade combat teams. The current structure of 10 divisions or 33 brigade combat teams is insufficient and must be increased to 15 divisions or 48 brigade combat teams to fulfill operational requirements.

Due to the shortage of active duty units, the Army has relied heavily on the use of National Guard and Reserve forces and
repeated deployments of active duty forces. The percentage of National Guard and Reserve forces for OIF will increase from 21% to 37% from OIF 1 to OIF 2.9 Additionally, the predominance of the Homeland Defense requirements and all of the Balkan requirements will be fulfilled by the National Guard and Reserves.10 Repeated deployment of active duty forces is also reducing the number of units required to conduct operations. For example a brigade of the 1st ID was redeployed to Kosovo in July 2003 and redeployed to Iraq less than 7 months later in February 2004. The 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, and 82nd Airborne Division experienced similar situations between operations OEF and OIF.11 The army has also reduced force requirements by relying on recently redeployed units to fulfill contingency planning requirements.12

While these measures have allowed the Army to fulfill its operational requirements, they are not sustainable for extended periods of time and have a detrimental effect on the force. The National Guard and Reserves are intended to meet the nation's military needs in times of national emergency, not to fulfill long term mission requirements. The repeated deployment of National Guard and reserve forces puts a great strain on the soldiers and these units, and could result in serious retention and readiness issues in the future. The active force has similar concerns. High operational tempos will eventually have a detrimental affect on soldier quality of life leading to retention problems, and a detrimental effect on equipment readiness and training.

The current force structure shortages are not related to the number of soldiers that are currently in the Army but rather to the number of operational units that are available to conduct operations.11 The problem is not solved by merely increasing the number of soldiers in the Army, but also by creating a larger number of operational units that can be deployed to meet the Army's commitments. Increasing the number of operational units will allow the Army to lessen its dependence on National Guard and Reserve forces and to decrease the operational tempo for active duty forces. An increase in operational units will allow the Army to meet its long term commitments and be prepared to conduct contingency operations as necessary. The policy issue facing the Army is to determine the most effective way to increase the operational capa-
bilities to meet the 15 divisions or 48 brigades force structure required to support current and future operational requirements.

Changing the force structure of the Army requires coordination beyond the scope of just the Department of the Army. The Army is responsible for developing and implementing force structure change, but external support is essential to provide the authorization and funding required for any major change. Any force structure change will involve changes to personnel policy, changes to officer management policy, additional equipment funding, military construction (MILCON) funding to fulfill basing requirements, and changes to national security policy. These changes will require defense authorization legislation, appropriation legislation, MILCON legislation, and officer personnel management legislation. Therefore, the ability to gain Congressional support for a policy option is essential to its successful implementation. The selection of a policy solution must not only address technical and military capabilities, but must also address key congressional concerns.

**Policy Options**

In order to increase the operational capabilities of the Army to meet current and projected needs, the Army force structure must be changed. While the nature of the problem and the solution are easy to define, identifying the preferred policy solution is much more difficult. The solutions to this policy issue will increase capabilities based on an overall concept concerning the structure of military forces. Each policy solution is characterized first by a force structure concept and second by the resulting method for increasing operational capabilities. There are currently three dominant force structure concepts and therefore three options for increasing operational capabilities. The first policy option, division structure, involves maintaining the current divisional force structure and increasing operational capabilities by increasing the number of divisions. The second policy option, the Unit of Action / Unit of Employment (UA/UE) Concept, involves restructuring the current 10 division structure into independent modular units. Operational capabilities are increased by restructuring and streamlining divisional forces and increasing the number of operational units in each division. The third policy option, the regimental system,
Transformation of Army Capabilities

involves a revolutionary change to the force structure that creates a core of operational units that are supported by a system of regiments with responsibility for recruiting, training, equipping, and managing the subunits assigned to the operational units. An increase in operational capability is achieved by creating a separate set of units, responsible solely for conducting operations.

**OPTION 1: DIVISION STRUCTURE**

The Division Structure option can be seen as the status quo solution. This solution is based on the divisional force structure concept that the Army is currently using. The evolution and use of the divisional structure began during World War I and continued to evolve throughout the second half of the 20th century. Development of the divisional structure focused on the need to fight a large scale war against the Soviet Union. Command structures and personnel policies were centered around a mobilization concept where a small active duty force would integrate a large number of reserve units, national guard units, and drafted manpower to fight World War III. The result is a force structure with redundant headquarters, redundant force capabilities, and a large officer corps that could easily absorb an influx of units and personnel.

The current Army structure consists of 10 divisions assigned to 4 corps headquarters. The basic division consists of a division headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), three maneuver brigades, an aviation brigade, a division artillery, a support command, a cavalry squadron, an air defense artillery battalion, an engineer battalion or brigade, a signal battalion, a military intelligence battalion, a military police company, and a chemical company. Each division consists of approximately 16,500 soldiers, of which one third are assigned to combat or operational units, and the remainder are assigned to support units, service support units, and headquarters.

When the United States conducts operations, the Department of Defense establishes a Joint Task Force headquarters which integrates and controls Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy elements as necessary for the given mission. The Army in turn assigns corps, division, or brigade size elements as necessary for the given mission. Recent operational deployments such as
Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq have shown that Army requirements will differ from mission to mission in size and organization. However, the current Army structure is designed to meet relatively static size and organizational requirements. As a result, the Army has had to create ad hoc organizations to fulfill operational mission requirements.

The organization of units during garrison or home station periods differs from the organization of units during operational periods. When division or brigade size elements deploy to conduct tactical operations, the division creates ad hoc organizations called brigade combat teams which control the elements necessary for each mission. The current force structure does not have standing units with the capabilities necessary to conduct operations and must assign elements of various different units to a brigade headquarters to provide those capabilities.

Within this force structure concept, an increase in Army operational capability is achieved by increasing the number of operational units. The Army will maintain the current force structure and create an additional 5 divisions to meet the 15 division requirement. Assuming a 16,500 soldier division, an increase of five divisions will require an endstrength increase of approximately 85,000 soldiers.

Authorization and appropriation legislation will be required to increase endstrength and to fund the additional recruiting and personnel costs. Increased recruitment efforts, quotas, and enlistment bonus funds are required to provide the additional personnel requirements. Authorization and appropriation legislation will be required to increase and fund the acquisition of weapons systems and ancillary equipment to equip the additional units. MILCON legislation will be required to either create new bases or expand current bases to accommodate additional units. The advantage of this option is that endstrength can be increased without changing the current force structure avoiding the need to change personnel policies, change doctrinal practices, parochial interests, and upheaval to the system.

**OPTION 2: UNIT OF ACTION/UNIT OF EMPLOYMENT (UA/UE)**

The UA/UE concept transforms the current 10 division structure by changing the internal organization of each division.
The UA/UE concept is designed to address several key operational concerns. First, we should organize as we fight. In the current divisional structure, unit organization at home station differs from unit organization during operations. Second, Army units must be capable of conducting expeditionary warfare which entails deploying to unknown destinations with minimal infrastructure in a short period of time. The current force structure has only limited ability to rapidly deploy into austere operational theaters without extensive prior planning and infrastructure improvements. Finally, the current force structure represents an inefficient use of manpower and resources. The inefficiency is due to a large number of unnecessary headquarters elements, redundant force capabilities, and outdated force capabilities.

The UA/UE force concept transforms the current division structure by restructuring all of the units within each division. The current division structure will be replaced with Units of Action (UA) and Units of Employment (UE). The UA is analogous to the current brigade and the UE is analogous to the current division. The division headquarters today, in order to deploy, must pull support from various units within the division. The establishment of the UE will create a stand-alone headquarters that does not require assets from above or below to operate. The UE structure will absorb signal, intelligence, artillery, and engineer assets that are currently assigned to independent units in the Division. A UE is designed to control up to 7 UAs, which will encompass all of the units in the current division structure and some Corps level units.

Within each division the remaining forces will be organized into UAs. Three primary types of UAs will be established: combat, aviation, and sustain. The Combat UAs will be based on the brigade combat team structure. The UA will change the current brigade structure by removing one combat battalion and adding an armed reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, a support battalion, and a brigade troops battalion. The Aviation UA encompasses all of the aviation assets in the current division structure and most Corps aviation assets, with the ability to support up to five Combat UAs. The Sustain UA encompasses all of the current division level service support units and some Corps level assets, which is capable of supporting up to five Combat UAs.
The UE/UA force structure concept is based on modularity and the standardization of units. The concept takes the current division structure, consisting of over 14 different interdependent organizations, and creates 7 organizations that can deploy and operate independently. Any module, or UA, can be unplugged from its parent UE and be plugged into another UE. The result is organizations that are task organized for operations, rapidly deployed, and easily configured to meet mission requirements.

The UA/UE concept increases Army operational capability by increasing the number of UAs, which are equivalent to a brigade combat team. The UA/UE concept would transform the existing 33 brigade combat teams into Combat UAs and create an additional 15 Combat UAs, to fulfill the 48 Combat UA requirement. The personnel requirement for the 15 additional UAs can be met with the personnel currently in the 10 divisions plus an additional 31,000 personnel. The additional 31,000 personnel can be realized either with an increase in Army end strength or streamlining of Army personnel outside the division structure. This minimal personnel increase is possible because extensive personnel savings are realized by eliminating unnecessary headquarters elements and redundant units in each division.

If the Army increases endstrength to meet the personnel requirements, authorization and appropriation legislation will be required to authorize the change and fund the personnel requirements. Authorization and appropriation legislation will be required to increase and fund the acquisition of weapons systems and ancillary equipment to equip the additional units. MILCON legislation will be required to expand current bases to accommodate additional units. Officer personnel legislation will be required to change the authorized number of officers and to change officer management regulations. These force structure changes will result in the reduction or elimination of some units and changes to officer and enlisted career paths for some branches. Branch parochial interests and the Army culture will have to be changed to accept and implement the new force structure. Finally, the Army will have to revise operational doctrine and training requirements to reflect the new force structure.
OPTION 3: REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

The regimental system is a revolutionary concept that completely changes the current force structure. The concept was introduced by MAJ Donald Vandergriff in his book, Path to Victory. MAJ Vandergriff has gained an increasing amount of support for his concept and it has become a critical policy option to consider. The concept is based on the assumption that the nature of warfare has changed from the linear second and third generation warfare of the Cold War to a more asymmetrical fourth generation warfare. The current Army structure was designed to defeat the second and third generation threats of the Cold War and must be changed to address the fourth generation threats of the 21st century. The regimental concept addresses several key issues necessary to address 4th generation threats. First, current Army doctrine is based on linear and sequential attrition warfare and must be changed to address an asymmetrical battlefield, focusing on maneuver warfare and flexibility. Second, current Army structure is too centralized, has excessive levels of command, and is too cumbersome to be effective on a fluid and ever changing battlefield. The Army must change from a mobilization-based doctrinal force to an expeditionary forced entry force. Finally, the current personnel system focuses on individuals rather than the organization. The bloated officer corps, officer and NCO career paths, promotion policies, the military education system, and the individual replacement system are focused on individual interests at the cost of organizational interests. The personnel system must be fundamentally changed to provide flexible and adaptive leaders and soldiers in cohesive units necessary to create a force capable of addressing fourth generation threats.

Vandergriff's regimental system scraps the current command structure and replaces it with three Corp Groups. The Corp Group becomes the primary ground component organization and operational headquarters. Additionally, each Corp Group will be responsible for recruiting, training, and managing its personnel. The establishment of the Corp groups will result in the elimination of army commands, corps commands, division commands and many training commands. It will also result in the reduction of the Army staff, Human Resources Command, Training and Doctrine
command, and Recruiting Command as many centralized personnel, training, and recruiting responsibilities are decentralized to the Corps Groups.

Each Corp Group will consist of approximately 85,000 soldiers organized into 7 brigade combat teams and additional support elements. The 7 brigade combat teams will be a mix of heavy, light, aviation, and reconnaissance brigades, each of which can operate as an individual entity. Additionally the individual battalion task forces within each brigade can also be easily organized to operate independently. The result is an organization that is easily packaged to respond to the full spectrum of warfare from small regional threats requiring a battalion task force to larger contingency threats requiring a task force of several brigades. The Corps Groups has the ability to tailor force capability and size to a specific mission, and to conduct several mission simultaneously. Finally, all three Corp Groups and all of their components will be available for immediate action.

The core of this system is the establishment of a regimental system within each Corps Group that provides the maneuver battalions and additional company sized elements necessary to fill the Brigade Combat Teams in the Corp Groups. In each Corp Group, a regiment will represent each combined arms specialty: infantry, armor, artillery, engineer, logistics, air defense, and aviation. The Regiment will be responsible for recruiting, forming, and training battalions or companies to serve in the brigade combat teams and standing them down once they have served in a brigade combat team. A battalion or company will go through a four-year life cycle. They will spend the first year in the regiment forming and training, the second and third years in the brigade combat teams in an operational status, and the fourth year back in the Regiment standing down. In comparison to the current structure, the number of brigades will decrease while the number of battalions will increase to meet rotational demands. The brigade combat teams will be responsible solely for maintaining readiness and conducting operations, while the regiments will be responsible for training, recruiting, and career management.

The regimental system easily provides the necessary force capability to meet Army requirements. Current operations and contingency planning requires 28 brigade combat teams conducting operations or prepared to conduct operations. Assuming one
division from the Marines and one division from the reserve and National Guard, the Army would need to provide the remaining requirement of 22 brigade combat teams. The 24 brigade combat teams in the Corp Groups easily fulfill the requirement. The remaining 40 brigade requirement of unit preparing to deploy and units recovering from operations is contained in the regiments supporting each Corp group. The Corp Group requires 84,000 soldiers to man the seven brigades, supporting units, and the regiments, for a total of about 250,000 soldiers for the entire force. Additional elements and higher headquarters would easily fit within the remaining personnel of the current 482,000 personnel end-strength. In fact, the flattening of the organization and the elimination of unnecessary commands may allow a decrease in end strength from the current level.

Authorization and appropriation legislation will be required to increase and fund the acquisition of weapons systems and ancillary equipment to equip the additional units. MILCON legislation will be required to expand current bases to accommodate additional units. Officer personnel legislation will be required to change the authorized number of officers and to change officer management regulations. The primary disadvantage of the regimental system is the drastic changes required. The force structure changes will result in the reduction or even elimination of some units and drastic changes to officer and enlisted career paths for some branches. Branch parochial interests and the Army culture will prove to be a major roadblock will have to be changed to accept and implement the new force structure. Finally, the Army will have to revise operational doctrine and training requirements to reflect the new force structure.

EVALUATION CRITERIA

A wide range of issues and considerations influence the selection of a force structure policy. The issues and considerations range from specific technical and military issues to legislative concerns. While technical and military capabilities need to be kept in the forefront of consideration, the political reality of the legislative realm cannot be ignored. Congressional support is essential in order to produce the legislation necessary to authorize and fund change. This analysis will focus on issues and consideration as
they relate to Congressional concerns and politics. Evaluation criteria were chosen and defined to determine the relative Congressional support for the three policy options. While some of the criteria will address and measure specific military capabilities, these measurements will be related to their likely effect on Congressional support.

**Cost**

Budget concerns are currently, and will continue to be, a major political and legislative issue for Congress. The national debt is currently $7.1 trillion, with a budget deficit of $375 billion in 2003 and a projected deficit of $477 billion in 2004. Defense authorization spending was $455 billion in 2003, accounting for over 50% of discretionary spending. In addition, supplemental defense spending similar to the $87 billion in 2003 is anticipated for the next several years as operations continue in the war on terror. "The reality is that while the American public wants a strong military and accepts current defense budgets, it is not clamoring for a big expensive buildup." Thus the Department of Defense and Congress must support a force structure that meets the current and future operational needs but is also affordable, requiring the lowest increase in defense spending. All three options will require increased defense spending; however, the lower the increase required, the greater the Congressional support.

The factors affecting cost are extensive and an exact cost estimate would require extensive calculations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed cost analysis, however cost trends can be determined by examining selected factors. This analysis will measure selected factors and identify relative cost trends between the three options. The cost associated with force structure change is based on two factors, the cost of implementing the change and the operating costs once the change has been made. Implementation costs will be a one time upfront cost. While there will be differences in the cost between the three options it will not greatly affect the long term costs of the options. The true cost difference between the three options will be reflected in the yearly operating costs of each option. Additionally, the factors that will be used to analyze the yearly operating costs will
reflect a similar relationship between the implementation costs of the three options. Implementation costs are based on the number of units that must be equipped and the number of additional personnel that must be recruited, which will be reflected in the analysis of the operating costs.

Operating costs will be analyzed based on two factors, personnel costs and unit maintenance and training cost. Personnel costs will be based on the number of personnel required by each option at the Corps level and below. The Army estimates personnel costs at $1.2 Billion per 10,000 personnel, including salaries, medical care, housing, education, and other miscellaneous costs. Comparison of the personnel costs will be based on the estimated personnel costs of each option. The number of combat and support battalions required by each option at the Corps level and below will determine maintenance and training costs. Comparison of the operating costs will be based on the number of units required in each option.

FORCE CAPABILITY

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, national defense has become a key political issue, particularly the ability to execute the war on terrorism throughout the world. Much of the debate in the 2004 presidential election has focused on the military and defense experience of the candidates and the ability of the candidates to effectively execute the war on terrorism. National defense will continue to be a key issue not only in future presidential elections but in current and future congressional elections as well. Members of Congress will want to be seen as strong on defense and will support national defense policies that expand our ability to defend the United States and execute the war on terrorism.

William S. Lind defined four generations of modern war, which are widely accepted by the defense community. Lindh's definitions identify four different types of conflict and the capabilities necessary to combat them. First generation warfare is defined as close quarter, linear, and orderly battles as seen in Napoleonic warfare. Second generation warfare maintained the linearity and order of first generation warfare but incorporated the use of mass firepower, mainly indirect fire, and the concept of attrition warfare. Second generation warfare focuses on processes and methods. The
Civil War and World War I are examples of second generation warfare. Third generation warfare changes the focus from internal mechanisms to the external influences of the situation and enemy forces. Third generation warfare, or maneuver warfare, is non-linear and seeks to use firepower and maneuver to surprise and control the enemy by attacking from multiple angles and locations. Third generation Warfare is exemplified in the German Army's blitzkrieg tactics of World War II. Fourth generation warfare maintains the nonlinear aspects of third generation warfare, but removes the limits of the battlefield, tactics, and the players. Fourth generation warfare is asymmetric warfare where there are no front lines, and no clear enemies. The enemy includes both state and non-state actors, and the tactics include the full gamut from traditionally military battles, to guerilla warfare, to terrorism. Recent actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have encountered enemy forces utilizing fourth generation tactics. Future operations in the war on terrorism will continue to encounter fourth generation tactics. The Army must be able to address fourth generation threats to effectively execute the war on terrorism.

The analysis of force capability will be determined by the ability of each option to address fourth generation threats. A qualitative assessment of the ability to address fourth generation warfare will be based on two key characteristics, command structure and expeditionary capability. To counter asymmetric attacks and make asymmetric attacks less attractive to potential adversaries, deployed forces must have operational flexibility. Operational flexibility requires leaders at all levels to make on the spot decisions to address a quickly changing environment and to capitalize on opportunities as they present themselves. Operational flexibility increases with the decentralization of the command structure. Expeditionary capabilities are essential to effectively address fourth generation warfare. Expeditionary capabilities include the ability to conduct forced entry operations and the subsequent logistical sustainment in extremely austere environments. The war on terrorism will continue to be fought in third world countries with limited infrastructure with hostile forces controlling the points of entry. The evaluation of these two characteristics provides an effective metric ability to address fourth generation warfare.
The implementation timeframe for force structure changes will be a key Congressional concern. The extremely high operational tempo required to fulfill current operational requirements will begin to have detrimental effects on Army forces and their ability to execute the war on terrorism. An increase in force capability must be achieved within a short period of time to avoid potential problems. It is also clear that Iraq and Afghanistan will not be the only theaters in the war on terrorism, which will require action in additional operational theaters. Intelligence gathered from the current counter-insurgency operations in Fallujah suggest that Iran and Syria are playing a key support role. At some point in the future, the United States must deal with Iran and Syria, potentially triggering offensive military operations. In addition, throughout the 9/11 commission hearings, testimony from almost every witness has warned that terrorist organizations are continuing to plan attacks against the United States, and that another attack or attempted attack is imminent.

The questioning in the 9/11 commission report has focused on the failures of the government to act properly and in a timely manner. In a desire to avoid similar criticism, members of Congress will prefer an option that can be enacted in a timely manner. Members of Congress realize that force structure must be increased prior to the next phase of the war on terror and also prior to a breakdown of Army units due to the overwhelming demands of current deployments. The sooner an option can increase the force structure capability of the Army, the greater the Congressional and Executive support.

Evaluation of timeliness will be based on the time required to enact each option. The analysis of the time required will be based on qualitative time estimates from experts familiar with each of the options. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine specific timelines and estimates for implementation. However, it is possible to determine general timeframes for each option based on the actions required to enact each option. Based on general implementation timeframes, the level of Congressional support for each option will determined in reference to the other options.
Efficiency is an idea that dominates contemporary American discourse about public policy. Efficiency in simple terms is getting the most output for the least input. In terms of government programs, efficiency is the effective and proper use of tax dollars to provide a service. Congress has oversight responsibility for government agencies and is therefore seen as the steward of government agencies and America's tax dollars. Oversight activities continually focus on pork barrel spending, and ineffective government bureaucracy. James Q. Wilson stated, "No politician ever lost votes by denouncing the bureaucracy." Members of Congress will be inclined to support policies that make efficient use of government resources and can be used as a positive example in political campaigns. On the other hand, politicians will be less inclined to support a less efficient option or support a current policy that is less efficient than a proposed change. In short, the more efficient a policy option, the greater Congressional support.

"Trying to measure efficiency is like trying to pull oneself out of quicksand without a rope." Efficiency can be measured by the comparison of a variety of inputs with a variety of outputs. Once again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed efficiency analysis of the three options, but efficiency trends can be determined by examining a few selected factors. The ultimate output for any military organization is combat capability. Efficiency analysis will focus on the overall efficiency of the Army and the efficiency of the organizational structure. Overall efficiency will be based on the number of units required to achieve a minimum level of combat capability. Organizational efficiency will be based on the ratio of combat units executing combat operations to support units enabling combat operations. Analysis of overall efficiency and organizational efficiency will also be indicative of cost and personnel efficiency.

Implementation Feasibility

The history of public policy implementation is wrought with examples of good policy ideas that could not be successfully implemented. Examples of policies intended to reduce recidivism in prisons, improve the health of the poor, and increase the cogni-
transformation of anony capabilities of students in our schools have proven unsuccessful. Roadblocks to successful implementation include limited resources, unattainable objectives, and organizational opposition to change. Policy decision makers will avoid supporting a policy that cannot be successfully implemented. A decision maker might agree with a policy concept and its goals but will not support that policy option if implementation is difficult or unlikely. In many cases, decision makers will support an attainable policy with lesser goals. As an example, most conservative Republican politicians support extensive privatization of Medicare, but voted to support Bush's Medicare prescription drug plan, which included a much weaker privatization plan. This support was due mainly to the realization that full privatization is not feasible or attainable. In addition, support of failed government policies is continually used against politicians by their opponents in elections. In the 1992 presidential election, conservative opponents used Bill Clinton's education policies in relation to the low ranking of the Arkansas educational system as an indictment of his ideas and abilities as a leader.

"On at least four occasions during the forty years following the end of World War II the United States Army made major changes in its war fighting doctrine. However, little change at the level of doctrine and organization has resulted from these attempts. The primary roadblock to real change in each of these cases was internal opposition to change. Organizational need for the continuation of existing roles and responsibilities, minimization of conflict between the branches, and the desire of leaders to avoid having to make tough choices among the branches mitigated actual change to Army doctrine and organization in light of initiatives that called for revolutionary change. Future attempts to change Army doctrine and Force structure will face similar roadblocks. The more a policy option calls for drastic changes to current branch roles and responsibilities, the more roadblocks to implementation it will encounter.

Option feasibility will be based on an analysis of required changes to current policies and the level of organizational opposition to those changes. It is extremely difficult to quantify option feasibility, but it is possible to develop qualitative assessments of the three options in relation to each other. This analysis will not
determine whether a specific option can or cannot be successfully implemented but rather which options are more likely to succeed based on organizational opposition to change. Analysis will rank the three options in terms of the amount of change required and the impact on current branch structure and interests, correlating directly to the relative feasibility of each option.

**Criteria Weighting**

Congressional support for a given policy is difficult to quantify with regard to the individual criteria. Similarly it is difficult to provide specific weights to each criterion. The analysis will provide a qualitative assessment of the relative congressional support for each option with regard to specific evaluation criteria. Overall analysis will be based on a rank ordering of the importance of the criteria. A qualitative comparison of the options, based on the ranking of the evaluation criteria, will provide a relative assessment of the Congressional support for each option.

The most influential evaluation criteria is force capability. The ability to effectively execute the war on terrorism and respond to a rapidly changing national security environment is, and will continue to be, a key Congressional issue. The Army is currently conducting operations against fourth generation threats in two theaters, Iraq and Afghanistan. Future operations in potential theaters such as Iran and Syria will encounter similar fourth generation threats. The conduct of these operations has been a key issue of the 2004 Presidential election. The 9/11 hearings have highlighted the importance of looking ahead and being prepared to deal with the terrorist threats of today and tomorrow. The political aftermath of the hearings will ensure that members of Congress will position themselves with policies that will support the countries ability to execute the war on terrorism.

Implementation feasibility ranks second in influence on Congressional support. Feasibility is closely tied to force capability. For similar reasons, the ability to successfully implement force structure change will be a key issue. Politicians will not want to be caught supporting a policy option that is not successfully implemented and leaves the Army unable to effectively execute the war on terrorism. A force structure policy is useless if it cannot be successfully implemented.
Cost ranks third in influence on Congressional support. Conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has proven costly, requiring an $87 billion supplemental appropriation. The country has a national debt of about $7 trillion, with projected budget deficits for the near future. Fiscal responsibility has been a perennial issue in Congressional elections and will continue to be in the future. Given policies that can address the fourth generation threat and that can be successfully implemented, Congress will support the least expensive option.

Implementation timeframe ranks fourth in influence on Congressional support. Force structure is a prescient issue given ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the likelihood of future operations in additional theaters. Force structure increases must be implemented as soon as possible to relieve the current operational pressures and to be prepared to address future threats. However, Congressional political concerns are focused more on short term implications for the next election than on long term implications for national security. Once a policy has been supported and enacted by congress, the timeliness of implementation is easily put on the shoulders of the Army. In terms of national security timeliness is a key issue; however from a political perspective timeliness is less important.

The least influential criteria is efficiency. Congress is the steward of the government and the country's tax dollars, and will always support efficiency. However, the blame for inefficiency is easily placed on the shoulders of the executing agency. In the interest of good stewardship, efficiency will be an issue, but less important from a political perspective.

**ANALYSIS**

The analysis of the three options will examine each criterion individually then provide an overall analysis and recommendation based on fully combined consideration of the criteria. While each option has different force capabilities and characteristics, each option provides the requisite force capability to meet operational and contingency requirements. The corps element is common amongst all three options and provides an effective point of comparison. Consideration of each evaluation criteria will consider force structure at the corps level and below and will not address
higher echelon force structure. The unit of measure for force structure will be the battalion. The battalion structure is similar between all three options and provides an effective unit of comparison.

**COST ANALYSIS**

The personnel costs show that Option 1 (Division Structure) is the most costly, Option 2 (VA / UE Structure) ranks second, and Option 3 (Regimental Structure) is the least costly. Option 1 has significantly greater personnel requirements and costs than the other options, which have similar personnel requirements. The differences in personnel requirements are closely tied to the force structure concepts. The UA/UE structure and the regimental structure realize significant personnel savings due to a streamlining of units and elimination of redundant headquarters and support elements. In order to create additional maneuver units, Option 1 must create not only maneuver units but a large number of divisional support units and headquarters. The UA/UE structure and the regimental structure incorporate many of the support requirements into the maneuver elements allowing the creation of additional maneuver elements without large increases in corresponding support elements. In addition, the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure require significantly fewer headquarters elements.

The unit requirements show a similar trend with Option 1 (Division Structure) requiring the most units, Option 2 (UA / UE Structure) ranked second, and Option 3 (Regimental Structure) requiring the least units. The three options have significant differences in unit requirements, approximately 100 units. The UA/UE force structure requires fewer units than the divisional structure due to the streamlining of forces and elimination of redundant force capabilities and headquarters elements. The difference in unit requirements between the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure is due to the unit rotational cycle of the regimental structure. The regimental structure only maintains half of the units in an operational status while the UA/UE structure maintains all of its units in operational status. By maintaining only half of its units in an operational status the regimental structure is required to provide fewer support elements, resulting in significant unit savings.
Table 3: Personnel Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Yearly Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Option 1 (Division Structure)</td>
<td>363,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 2 (UA / UE Structure)</td>
<td>285,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 3 (Regimental Structure)</td>
<td>252,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Unit Maintenance and Training Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total BNs</th>
<th>Combat BNs</th>
<th>Support BNs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Option 1 (Division Structure)</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 2 (UA / UE Structure)</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 3 (Regimental Structure)</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis shows significant cost differences between the three options. The clear differences in cost will ensure differing levels of Congressional support for each option with regard to cost. The divisional structure has the highest cost, with significantly greater personnel and unit requirements than the UA/UE structure. The UA/UE structure is ranked second, with similar personnel requirements but significantly greater unit requirements than the regimental structure. The regimental structure clearly has the lowest cost. The significant level of difference between the options ensures that cost will serve as a significant factor in the Congressional support.

FORCE CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

Option 1 (Division Structure) was designed to address second and third generation threats from the Soviet Union and is not suited to address the fourth generation threats of the global war on terrorism. The current force structure maintains a redundant and bloated command structure that was designed to expand to control a large mobilization force and to provide command billets for general officers and combat service and combat service support officers. The force structure also organizes units by specific functions, not by combined arms war fighting capabilities. As a result, when units task organize to conduct operations, control and decision making authority is shared by several different headquarters elements. The effect is a centralization of decision making to higher command levels that control and direct the subordinate
The current Army structure has limited expeditionary capability. The deployment of Task Force Hawk to Albania during the Kosovo Air War provides an excellent example. The port facilities, roads, and airfields in Albania were quite austere with limited ability to support the deployment of forces. In addition, the forces necessary to conduct operations had to be task organized on an ad-hoc basis from several different units throughout Europe. As a result, the deployment of a relatively small Task Force of 5,100 personnel took almost a month. Operation Desert Storm provides another example of the limited expeditionary capability of the current force structure. The deployment of forces and preparations for offensive operations in Desert Storm required extensive infrastructure improvements in the theater of operations and almost six months to move the equipment, personnel, and supplies to support operations. The limited expeditionary capability is due to the heavy nature of Army forces and the organization structure. "The Army has forces that can be deployed quickly and forces that employ overwhelming combat power, but it doesn't have units that can do both." Under the current structure the Army must create ad hoc organizations to provide the force capabilities necessary for operations and must move a large amount of equipment to support these ad hoc organizations. The time required to integrate units to conduct operations and the requirement to move a large amount of heavy equipment and supplies results in a force with limited expeditionary capability.

Option 2 (UA/UE Structure) provides a streamlined and modular force structure that is capable of addressing fourth generation threats as well as the traditional second and third generation threats. The UA/UE force structure reduces the number of headquarters elements and streamlines the command structure. The current division structure, consisting of at least 14 independent headquarters elements, is reduced to no more than 7 per UE. In addition, units are task organized, not by specific function, but rather as independent combined arms organizations. Each headquarters has independent responsibility for its components and its mission with no overlapping command responsibilities. As a result, subordinate elements have the ability to exercise decentralized decision making without the need for direction from higher
headquarters.

The UA/UE structure is designed to provide expeditionary capabilities. The units of action and the units of employment are organized as combined arms elements capable of deploying and conducting operations independently. Each unit contains all of the force capabilities necessary to conduct operations requiring no integration of external capabilities or the creation of ad-hoc organization to conduct operations. Furthermore, these units require fewer personnel and less equipment and supplies than the task organized ad-hoc organizations of the divisional structure. Units task organized on an ad-hoc basis result in redundant command and support elements. The UA/UE structure combines forces in a much more efficient organization, under a single command element and support structure. As a result, UA/UE elements are able to rapidly prepare for deployments and operations and require fewer movement resources.

Option 3 (Regimental Structure) also provides a streamlined and modular structure capable of addressing fourth generation threats as well as second and third generation threats. The regimental structure streamlines the command structure even more than the UE/UE structure, maintaining only 9 independent operational headquarters elements below the corps level. As with the UA/UE structure, the hierarchical command structure of the current system is replaced with a flattened command structure that distributes command authority horizontally. The regimental structure also organizes units as independent combined arms organizations, not by specific function. The structure is designed to eliminate overlapping responsibilities and to rely on subordinate units to take initiative and exercise decentralized decision making authority. The flattened command structure fosters trust and understanding among leaders, encourages initiative, and generates cohesion.

The regimental structure is also designed to provide expeditionary capabilities. As with the UA/UE structure, units are organized with combined arms capabilities and require no integration of external assets or units to deploy and conduct operations. The regimental structure maintains a set of units prepared to deploy and conduct operations rapidly. The regimental structure provides light infantry brigades to rapidly deploy and conduct forced entry operations, followed in 3 days or less by heavy
maneuver brigades to generate greater combat power and exploit the forced entry.\textsuperscript{69} As with the UA/UE structure, the regimental structure streamlines command and support structures, and organizes units into lighter organizations that can be rapidly deployed with fewer movement resources into austere environments.

The UA/UE structure and the regimental structure have similar capabilities to address fourth generation warfare, while the division structure clearly has only limited ability to address fourth generation warfare. Force capability will clearly provide greater congressional support for the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure as compared to the division structure. However, force capability provides little difference between the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure, resulting in minimal differences in Congressional support between the options.

**IMPLEMENTATION TIMEFRAME ANALYSIS**

Option 2 (DAIUE Structure) can be implemented in the shortest period of time. The transition to the DAIUE force structure can be accomplished within four years.

The transition to the UA/UE structure can be accomplished without reducing the number of units available to conduct operations. The transitions are conducted after units have returned from operations in Iraq or Afghanistan and are completed during the normal recovery and train-up period following a deployment. In addition, force capability will increase each year as units complete the transition to the new force structure. The transition can also be conducted with the current endstrength, avoiding the requirement for additional recruitment efforts. The transition is conducted in a short period of time, with minimal impact on current operations and capabilities, and provides additional capabilities as the process moves along.

Option 1 (Division Structure) will take at least twice as long to implement, requiring approximately 7-8 years. The most time-consuming aspect of creating five additional divisions is the recruitment effort required to man the additional divisions. In FY03, the Army recruited 73,800 soldiers to maintain the current endstrength.\textsuperscript{71} Assuming that the Army could increase recruiting efforts by 20% a year, it would take at least 6 years to recruit the
Table 5: UA/UE Structure and Timeframe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 04</th>
<th>FY 05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Infantry Division</td>
<td>10th Mountain Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Air Assault Div</td>
<td>4th Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Brigades Available</td>
<td>39 Brigades Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 06</th>
<th>FY 07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>2nd Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>1st Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82nd Airborne Division</td>
<td>1st Armored Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Brigades Available</td>
<td>48 Brigades Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Department of the Army, G-3 estimates

85,000 soldiers necessary to man the additional divisions. Furthermore, time will be required to promote and develop the additional senior NCOs that will be necessary to man the new divisions. The additional divisions would have to be created one at a time, as additional personnel are made available through recruiting efforts and development of additional NCOs. In the best case scenario, the Army would need at least 1.5 years to create each division, requiring at least 7.5 years to create five additional divisions. The creation of the five divisions would have no impact on the current force structure or capabilities and would provide additional capabilities as each division is completed.

Option 3 (Regimental Structure) has the longest implementation period. The architect of the regimental system, MAJ Vandergriff, estimates that the necessary doctrinal and organizational changes will take 10 years. The transition to a regimental system would require a complete change in the current organizational structure, doctrine, and personnel policies. The transition would also require extensive realignment of the current basing structure and the creation of new bases. Each of the three corps groups would be assigned to a specific geographical location within the United States which will support recruitment efforts, training areas, and deployment resources. The realignment of forces
into these geographical areas would require extensive movement of forces, the closure of some existing bases, and the creation of new bases to support the regional alignments. The organizational, doctrinal, and basing changes are extensive and will require a long period of time to implement. In addition, the changes cannot be made incrementally and will drastically impact current operations and capabilities.

The analysis shows significant differences in the implementation timeframe for the three options. The clear differences in implementation timeframes will ensure differing levels of Congressional support for each option. The UA/UE structure requires the shortest implementation period of 4 years, the division structure is ranked second at 7-8 years, and the regimental structure requires the longest implementation period of 10 years. More important than the ranking of the options is the significant level of difference between the options. As a result, implementation timeframe will serve as a significant factor in Congressional support.

The total unit requirements show that Option 3 (Regimental Structure) requires the least number of units, Option 2 (UA/UE Structure) ranked second, and Option 1 (Division Structure) is third, requiring the greatest number of units. The total unit requirements show a distinct difference of about 100 units between each option. As discussed in the cost analysis, the differences in unit requirements are due to the streamlining of units and the elimination of redundant headquarters and support elements relative to the other options.

The combat to support unit ratios show that the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure have similar ratios with the divisional structure significantly lower. The division structure clearly has the worst ratio of combat units to support units, and exhibits the least efficient use of resources. The UA/UE structure and the regimental structure have almost identical ratios exhibiting equally efficient use of resources. The regimental structure requires fewer units by utilizing a unit rotation system that maintains a smaller number of units in an operational status but exhibits a similar organizational efficiency to the UA/UE structure. As a result, the regimental structure shows a greater overall efficiency but has a similar organizational efficiency to the UA/UE structure.

The division structure is clearly the least efficient of the three options and will receive the lowest level of Congressional
Table 6: Efficiency Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Structure</th>
<th>Total BNs</th>
<th>Combat BNs</th>
<th>Support BNs</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UA/UE Structure</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimental Structure</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>372</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure is less clear. The overall efficiency difference clearly favors the regimental structure; however, the similar organizational efficiency mitigates the advantage. In light of other factors such as feasibility or total combat power, efficiency will have minimal impact on congressional and executive support between the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure.

IMPLEMENTATION FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS

The division structure requires no change to current force structure and doctrine, and is the most feasible option. Force capability is increased by maintaining the current force structure and expanding the force by five divisions. Current individual and branch interests would be maintained and in many instances expanded. The creation of additional divisions would result in the enhancement of current career paths with additional officer and NCO billets, and increased funding which could be used to further branch interests. Internal opposition to the force capability increase will be minimal to non-existent, making implementation simple and feasible.

Option 3 requires drastic changes to the current force structure and is the least feasible option. The transition to the regimental structure will require changes to organizational structure, doctrine, training, personnel policies, and individual career paths. The transition will result in a drastic downsizing of the officer corps and the elimination of many command billets and positions, especially in the combat support and service support branches. The regimental structure will eliminate most of the combat support and service support brigade and battalion command positions,
drastically changing career paths and opportunities for both officers and NCOs in those branches. General officer billets will also be drastically reduced with the elimination of much of the vertical command structure and the decentralization of personnel, training, and recruiting management from the Department of the Army to the corps groups. Individual interests will serve as a key point of opposition to the transition to a regimental structure.

The transition to the regimental structure will also drastically reduce the number of units within and the roles of some branches, especially the combat support and service support branches. Most of the combat support and service support command structures will be eliminated, with these capabilities becoming subordinate elements of combat commands and the combat branches. The current structure consists of 423 combat support and service support battalions at the corps level and below, which is reduced to 258 battalions in the regimental structure. As the command structures, units, and autonomy of these units are reduced, the strength and influence of the associated branches will also be reduced. Branch parochialism will serve as a key point of opposition to the transition to a regimental structure.

The UA/UE structure splits the ground between these two options. Transition to the UA/UE will require changes to the current organization structure, doctrine, training, personnel policies, and individual career paths. However, the change is less drastic than the regimental structure and will have a lesser impact on individual and branch interests. The UA/UE transition will reduce the number of combat support and service support battalions from 423 (under the current structure) to 332. This will impact individual and branch interests, but to a much lesser extent than the regimental structure. In addition, the UA/UE structure focuses most of the changes at the division level and maintains much of the current corps structure. The maintenance of most of the current corps structure provides autonomous command positions and roles for the combat support and service support branches, mitigating some branch opposition to change. The transition to the UA/UE structure can also be conducted incrementally spreading out the "pain" of the transition. In contrast, the transition to the regimental structure requires a "painful," all-at-once transition.

In terms of feasibility, congressional and executive support will clearly be the highest for the division structure. The UA/UE
structure and the regimental structure will both require changes to the current system and will meet with internal opposition to change. However, regimental calls for more drastic change and will result in much greater internal opposition to change. Congressional support will be much higher for the UA/UE structure in comparison to the regimental structure. Implementation feasibility will serve as a key factor in Congressional support between the three options.

The analysis clearly shows that the division structure generates the lowest level of Congressional support. The division structure ranks last in force capability, cost, and efficiency. The current division structure is a bloated, inefficient, and costly throwback of the Cold War with limited ability to address modern day fourth generation threats. Implementation feasibility is the only criteria that the division structure scores well on. However, the ease of implementation is only due to the fact that it maintains a force structure that ranks last in three other criteria. Congressional support for the current division structure should be minimal when compared to the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure.

The distinction between the UA/UE structure and the regimental structure is less apparent. Both options are designed to address fourth generation threats providing expeditionary capabilities and decentralized command structures. The distinction between force capabilities is minimal and is not a deciding factor. The regimental structure is the least costly and has the most efficient use of resources. However, the UA/UE structure has much better prospects for successful implementation and can be completed in a relatively short period of time. The cost and efficiency gains of the regimental structure will not outweigh the implementation risks and required time. In comparison to the current structure, the UA/UE structure realizes significant cost and efficiency gains. Given the option of supporting a risky and time intensive policy that achieves extensive cost and efficiency gains and a less risky and quickly implemented policy that achieves lower but still significant cost and efficiency gains, Congressional support will tend to move to the middle. The division structure and the regimental structure set the right and left limits of the force structure issue, representing the best and worst of almost every evaluation criteria. The UA/UE structure provides a highly acceptable compromise that cures most of the ills of the current structure without
Table 7: Overall Analysis

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<th>Option 1</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Force Capability</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Cost</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
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the risks and difficulty of implementation of the regimental structure. The UA/UE structure provides members of Congress with a policy that addresses key concerns in some manner without the risk of supporting a revolutionary and risky policy.

**GAINING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT**

"Few developments in the national security affairs arena have been so significant in the past few decades as the increasing assertion by Congress of a strong and continuing role, indeed a full partnership, in the national security policy process."75 Congress is allocated the power to declare war, raise and support armies and the navy, make rules for the government and regulation of the forces, call the militia, and make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out these functions.76 Any change to Army force structure will require a wide range of Congressional actions to include defense authorization legislation, defense appropriation legislation, MILCON legislation, and personnel management legislation.77 Understanding and leveraging the interests and concerns of Congress, as a key player in the process, is essential to changing Army force structure.

**CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS**

While Congress is quite influential, their concerns and interests with regard to national security policy differ greatly from the other members of the national security community. Department of Defense and Executive concerns and interests focus on issues of strategy and national priorities.78 The Congressional focus is somewhat different:
Members have been concerned with subjects that impinge directly on their reelection and on their influence within their respective houses of Congress. In general, those members of Congress not on a major defense committee do not consider questions of military policy in terms of their implications for strategic objectives or goals. Instead, they have been focused on constituency related issues such as spending that aids their districts, National Guard Armories, or the minutiae of line items which have popular appeal.79

Congress wants a marriage of good policy and good politics. Congressional concerns focus not only on the specifics of a policy solution but, more importantly, on the political considerations that could complicate or ease the adoption of a policy recommendation.80 Understanding the concerns and interests of Congress is essential for gaining support, authorization, and funding for many defense related activities.

Changing Army force structure addresses a wide range of concerns and issues from specific military concerns to more general Congressional concerns. Congressional concerns will focus on specifics of the military solution in the context of politics and the government as a whole. Cost will be a key concern in the context of current budget restraints and deficits. Force capability and the implementation timeframe will be key concerns in the context of the ongoing war on terrorism and a public desire for a defense establishment that can effectively wage the war. Efficiency will be a key concern in the context of a desire to be, or at least appear to be, good stewards of government activities and American tax dollars. Feasibility will be a key concern in the context of the political impact of supporting effective or ineffective government activities. All of these concerns will be considered in the context of political realities and reelection concerns.

THE KEY CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION: COMMITTEES

Congressional government has been described as committee government due to a system with fixed committees and fixed jurisdictions.81 The fixed jurisdictions give the committees strong influence over the policy content in their assigned area.82 While every Congressmen will ultimately vote on every legislation, the
committees play the dominant role in the development and ultimate success of defense legislation. Congress authorizes and funds defense activities through a two-step process of authorization legislation and appropriation legislation, controlled by the Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committees. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for the authorization legislation that establishes the approved programs and activities of Department of Defense Organizations, MILCON legislation that addresses basing requirements, and Personnel Management legislation that addresses personnel policies. The Senate and House Appropriations Committees are responsible for setting the funding levels for the authorization legislation, MILCON legislation, and personnel management legislation passed by Congress.

The split responsibility between authorization and appropriation is a key concern for the Army. Most of Congress accepts the need for force structure change, but is viewing that need in the context of large budget deficits. The Army is concerned that an authorized force structure change, such as an increase in end-strength, will be authorized but the funding required to support the increase in end strength will not be appropriated. Policy requests must address the dual requirements of the authorization legislation needed to support forces structure change, and the appropriation legislation needed to fund and execute the change.

**ARMY WEAKNESS: LIAISON ACTIVITIES**

The reality in any government agency, including the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army, is that authority and funding for activities is dependent on Congressional support. Government agencies must in effect "lobby" or conduct liaison activities with Congress to support its desired policies and agendas. However, the Army has shown an aversion to "lobbying" efforts. U.S. Code Title 18 Section 1813, the Anti-lobbying act, states:

No part of the money appropriated by any enactment by Congress shall, in the absence of express authorization by Congress, be used directly or indirectly to pay any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone,
letter, printed or written matter or other device, intended to influence in any manner a Member of Congress but this shall not prevent officers or employees of the United States or of its departments or agencies from communicating to Members of Congress on the request of any Member of Congress, through the proper official channels, requests for legislation or appropriations which they deem necessary for the efficient conduct of public business.

On the surface it would appear that the anti-lobbying act restricts almost all proactive communication between Congress and government agencies. However, this is not the case: Collectively the GAO, the Department of Justice and its Office of Legal Council, the Comptroller General, and the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General have interpreted the Anti-Lobbying Act and related provision to prohibit the use appropriated funds to encourage, pressure, or suggest that private citizens, citizens groups, corporations, associations, or other organizations contact or solicit Congress on a legislative matter. However, the Anti-Lobbying Act does not prohibit direct contacts between Department of the Army and other services' officials and the Congress. Thus, Armed Forces officials in Washington may provide information to Members of Congress or solicit Congressional support for legislation supported by the administration.

The future of Army Transformation rests directly on the Army's ability to effectively "lobby" Congress and articulate a clear message to its Congressional stakeholders that the path to transformation will not make key congressional constituents "have-nots". The Army's relations with Congress have been disjointed and ineffective in articulating transformational needs. The ineffectiveness of the Army is due to two key problems. First the Army has a negative culture concerning Congressional liaison activities. The Army sees Congress more as a hindrance than a help. Having to deal with Congress is seen as a burden or threat rather than an opportunity to engage decision makers and sell the Army agenda. "The Army approach is wary of Washington conflict, and it fears being drawn into the uncertain legislative forum of competing interests and prefers to stay above the fray, resting upon the principled correctness of its positions. In addition, Army gener-
al officers are the least represented and the least engaged on Capitol Hill.\textsuperscript{91} The Army places minimal importance or effort on Congressional liaison activities, and in many cases avoids liaison activities all together. At the same time, the other services have developed cultural norms which both encourage and support liaison activities. As a result, "the Army message and priorities increasingly get lost in the shuffle of the other services' more astute and positive embrace of the Hill."\textsuperscript{92}

The second problem is that when the Army does conduct liaison activities, it is ineffective in communicating its message and priorities. The problem is largely cultural, resulting in both an unwillingness and inability to "sell" policies to Congress:

One facet of the Army's cultural proclivity to look inward and value internal over external performance is many Army officers' belief that directing increased agency resources toward communicating their message more effectively with external audiences is unnecessary. This results from a naïve trust or arrogance that the Army message is or should be understood by Congress and other external audiences.\textsuperscript{93}

The Army also tends to focus the communications it does have with Congress on internal concerns and priorities and does not address Congressional political concerns as well. Congressional decision making is based on a marriage of good policy and good politics. Policy recommendations based solely on planning and intellectual analysis will identify a possible solution to a given problem that can not necessarily stand the tests of legislative approval and executive implementation.\textsuperscript{94} Policy recommendations that focus on a policy solution without addressing political considerations are unsatisfactory in supporting the collective choices that members of Congress must make.\textsuperscript{95}

"SELLING" TRANSFORMATION TO CONGRESS

The analysis at the beginning of this paper clearly shows that the current Army force structure is inadequate and must be changed to address current and future mission requirements and threats. This paper has also shown that transformation to the UA/UE structure is the most effective option and most likely to stand the test of legislative approval. The Army must develop an
effective plan to convince Congress to support, authorize, and fund the transition. The Army must first change its cultural aversion to Congressional liaison activities and embrace liaison activities as an opportunity to engage Congress and support the Army agenda. Second, the Army must incorporate political considerations into its message when communicating with Congress.

CULTURAL CHANGE

The Army culture must be changed to accept three key beliefs. First, proactive Congressional "lobbying" efforts are not only acceptable but also necessary. Historical precedence and legal interpretations of U.S. code have clearly shown that proactive "lobbying" efforts in support of an agency agenda are legitimate. Furthermore, the success of the other services in supporting their agendas in Congress, in light of many Army failures, highlights the necessity of proactive efforts. Second, the Army must view liaison opportunities as an opportunity rather than a burden. The Army has clearly shown a tendency to view liaison activities as a hindrance, to be avoided as much as possible. The Army must accept the reality of the Congressional role in the defense policy decision making process. Liaison activities must be seen as an integral part of the policy process to be leveraged and used at every opportunity. Finally, Army senior leaders must increase their visibility on Capitol Hill and engagement with Members of Congress and their staffs. "In the eyes of Congress, Army general officers are least visible and engaged on Capitol Hill." The Army senior leadership must be our standard bearers on the Hill. They need to be seen more, and they need to interact more frequently with members and their staffs.

FRAMING THE ARMY TRANSFORMATION MESSAGE

The Army cannot continue to frame policy recommendations to Congress in a strictly military context, but must be framed in a political context as well. Contrary to popular belief in the Army, the two are not mutually exclusive. The five criteria chosen to analyze the policy options in this paper provide an excellent example. The criteria examine specific military requirements, but
frame the importance and impact of those requirements in a political context. In addition, the three policy options examined in this paper represent the entire range of policy options available, from no change to revolutionary change. The recommended policy option is basically a compromise between the two extremes. In framing Congressional messages the Army can use a comparison of the strengths and weakness of the extremes to support the effectiveness of the UA/UE structure.

**Recommended Messages**

The Army must develop a series of messages, geared towards Congressional concerns, to support the transition to the UA/UE structure. The Army should develop an overall message to support the transition, but it must also develop individual messages addressing the criteria identified in this paper. Each member of Congress has individual concerns and interests. The Army must be prepared to tailor the message and focus on specific criteria depending on the audience.

**Force Capability Message**

The UA/UE Structure provides the force capabilities necessary to address fourth generation threats and to effectively wage the war on terrorism. The current force structure clearly lacks the expeditionary capability and the decentralized command structure necessary to address the emerging tactics and capabilities of current and future threats. A mere increase of the current force structure will provide the units necessary to fight the war on terrorism, but not the capabilities needed. The Army must highlight the importance that the public places on the war on terrorism and the ability to address those threats. Furthermore, the Army must show how UA/UE structure addresses those concerns, while the division structure does not. Members of Congress will want to appear strong on defense and support effective defense policies. In addition, if members of Congress still want to increase the size of the Army, it is more effective to increase the size of the army under the UA/UE structure than the division structure. By relating the military requirements to the political implications of public opinion, the Army can deliver a message that addresses both military and Congressional political concerns.
IMPLEMENTATION FEASIBILITY MESSAGE

The UA/UE structure is the most feasible option that also provides the necessary force capabilities. While increasing the current force structure is the easiest and most feasible option to implement, it does not provide the force capabilities needed to fight the War on terrorism. Furthermore, other options that provide the necessary force capabilities, such as the regimental structure, require revolutionary change and are difficult to implement. The Army must represent the UA/UE structure as a viable solution that has the lowest level of risk as compared to other possible solutions. Members of Congress will want to avoid supporting solutions that have a low likelihood of successful implementation and the political liability associated with such a failure. The political attractiveness of the UA/UE structure is increased by addressing the lower risk in terms of achieving the needed force capabilities.

COST MESSAGE

The UA/UE Structure is the least costly and feasible policy solution. The required increases in the current structure will require higher implementation and operating costs than UA/UE structure. While other options might have lower operating costs, the risk that must be assumed with those options far outweighs the cost savings, especially given that the UA/UE structure still realizes cost savings over the current structure. Given the current budget deficits and competing demands for government resources, cost is a key concern for members of Congress. Highlighting the UA/UE structures cost savings, compared to the current structure, increases attractiveness to Congress.

IMPLEMENTATION TIMEFRAME MESSAGE

The UA/UE structure can be implemented quickly, relieving stress on the force in the shortest time possible. The UA/UE structure can be operational within four years; the other options require 7 to 10 years. The current stress on the force structure could be [maybe more certain here since this is the conclusion] detrimental to the war on terrorism. In addition, the public has shown clear signs of concern and opposition to the operational
tempo that we are demanding of our troops. Selecting a policy option that can be implemented quickly not only addresses military concerns but political concerns as well. Politicians can show that they are strong and effective on defense by supporting a policy that can be implemented quickly.

**EFFICIENCY MESSAGE**

The UA/UE structure increases the efficiency of Army forces. The current structure requires a large number of support elements and headquarters to conduct operations and is very inefficient in putting combat power on the ground. The UA/UE structure streamlines the military, creating a much more efficient organization. Again, while other options are more efficient, the risk inherent in those options is far outweighed by efficiency gains, especially given that the UA/UE structure realizes efficiency gains over the current system. Stewardship of government and American tax dollars is a concern for members of Congress, both for practical and political reasons.

**CONCLUSION**

The current Army force is inadequately structured to meet the current and future needs of the Army. The Army does not have enough combat units or the force capabilities necessary to maintain current operations or address potential future operations. The United States' ability to continue to wage the war on terrorism will be in jeopardy without increasing the force structure and changing force capabilities. In addition, the change must be made quickly to avoid collapse of the current system.

Any force structure change will involve changes to personnel policy, changes to officer management policy, additional equipment funding, and military construction (MILCON) funding to fulfill basing requirements. These changes will require defense authorization legislation, appropriation legislation, MILCON legislation, and officer personnel management legislation. Clearly, the ability to gain congressional support for a policy option is essential to its successful implementation. A viable policy solution must not only address technical and military capabilities, but must also address key Congressional concerns.
The UA/UE force structure provides a policy solution that accomplishes both goals. The UA/UE force structure provides a solution that increases the number of units available to conduct operations and provides the expeditionary capabilities and decentralized command structure necessary to effectively fight the war on terrorism. In addition, the UA/UE force structure can be implemented rapidly, making it the best option to relieve the stress on the current force. From a congressional perspective, the UA/UE structure is the most attractive option. The UA/UE structure offers increased force capability and efficiency, while still offering cost savings compared with the current structure. The UA/UE structure also provides a solution that will yield quick results and has a high probability of success. Supporting the UA/UE structure has the lowest risk and provides members of Congress with a solution that can enhance their standing on national defense.

In order to "sell" the UA/UE structure to Congress, the Army must change its culture aversion to Congressional liaison activities and the framing of messages to Congress. The Army culture must be changed to accept three key beliefs. First, proactive Congressional "lobbying" efforts are not only acceptable but also necessary. Second, the Army must view liaison opportunities as an opportunity rather than a burden. Third, Army senior leaders must increase their visibility on Capitol Hill and engagement with members of Congress and their staffs. Finally, the Army must incorporate political considerations into its message when communicating with Congress.

FUTURE RESEARCH

The purpose of this paper was to expand the discourse on Army transformation to include political and Congressional considerations. The majority of the discussion and literary work on transformation has focused on the specifics of military concerns. While this is an essential part of the process, the reality of our political system requires an examination of the political aspects of transformation. The scope of this paper has just brushed the surface of the political and Congressional aspects of transformation. This paper identified and highlighted key issues for future research to develop and explore in greater depth. My first recommendation for future research would be an in-depth analysis of Congressional
concerns and issues regarding defense policy in light of events on 9/11 and the ongoing war on terrorism. The political landscape has been drastically affected by the events of 9/11 and the ongoing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper identified the fact that political and Congressional concerns are a factor. An in-depth analysis will provide the Army with the information that it needs to effectively frame its messages to Congress.

The second recommendation would be an in-depth analysis of current legislative liaison activities and the cultural aversion to liaison activities. This paper provides a limited analysis of the problems with current liaison activities and the cultural aversion to liaison activities. The Army must develop an in-depth understanding of the problems with the current system and reasons why the Army has been ineffective in conducting liaison activities. An in-depth analysis would provide the Army with the details needed to reform liaison activities and organization and change cultural norms.

The final recommendation is to develop detailed messages to support a transition to the UAIUE structure. Once again this paper provided possible themes that could be used and not complete messages. Based on the analysis provided by the first two recommendations, the Army would have the information resources needed to craft specific messages and information plans to "sell" transformation to Congress. The message must be clear, concise, and easily understood. The Army must also be prepared to provide the analysis and details needed to support these messages. Finally, the messages must be framed to highlight and address Congressional concerns.

ENDNOTES


5. Requirements for units preparing to conduct operations and units recovering from operations is based on the current operational requirements of the United States Army. Korea and Homeland defense are not rotational assignments and therefore do not require additional forces preparing and recovering. The mission in Korea is continuously executed by the 2nd ID. Homeland Defense Missions require minimal preparation and recovery time and therefore have minimal impact on units available for operations.

6. Historical analysis of recent operations has shown that a minimum of 1 division is required to defeat an adversary in a contingency area as shown by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

7. LTG Schwartz briefing.
9. LTG Schwartz briefing.
10. Ibid.

11. Based on personnel experience as a member of this brigade and on conversations with numerous colleagues who have related similar experiences.

12. Currently all units that redeploy from a given area of operations have 6 months to complete reintegration training and be prepared to deploy to fulfill contingency requirements or identified operational requirements.

13. Operational units are defined as a unit that is capable of conducting combined arms actions in High Intensity Conflict or Stability and Support Operations. For the purpose of this paper operational units are defined as Brigade Combat Teams.

14. BG Guy Swan, Director Army Office of Congressional Legislative Liaison, Personnel Interview conducted 30


18. The current Army Divisions are: 1st Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division. 6 of the divisions are heavy divisions which are either Armor or Mechanized Infantry Heavy. The remaining 4 divisions are light infantry divisions, of which one is an airborne unit (Parachute), and one is an air assault unit (helicopters). The four corps headquarters are I Corps (2nd ID, 25th ID), III Corps (1st CAV, 4th ID), V Corps (1st AD, 1st ID), XVIII Airborne Corps (82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne, 10th Mountain, 3rd ID).

19. The U.S. Army Website, <http://www.army.mil/organization/divisions.htm> (10 April 2004). The divisional components listed are an estimate based on an analysis of the organizational charts from the websites of the current Army divisions. Each division has a slightly different organizational structure. The components listed are represented an average of the 10 different structure examined.


22. Ibid.

23. Recent Operations in Iraq highlighted this problem. The bulk of the operational forces involved in this operation were
supported by a large preexisting infrastructure in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Attempts to open a second front from Turkey required an extensive effort by the military to upgrade facilities and resources such as ports, and railways. Military forces spent several months and an extensive amount of resources to prepare Turkey to support operations.


25. BG Fastabend.


28. Ibid., slide 9.

29. Ibid., slide 22.

30. Ibid., slide 11.

31. Ibid., slide 8

32. Ibid., slide 13

33. Ibid., slide 19.

34. Vandergriff, pages 161-163.

35. Ibid., page 161.

36. Ibid., page 196.

37. Ibid., pages 263-266.

38. Ibid., pages 203-225. This section of the book outlines the entire regimental system structure. This note covers all of the descriptions of the organization of the regimental structure in this section.

39. Ibid., page 212.

40. Department of the Army, Building Army Capabilities, slide 29.


42. Ibid.

43. Richard L. Kugler, "The Defense Budget: Meeting Growing

44. Ibid., page 135
45. GEN Schoomaker.
49. Ibid, page 99
50. Fox Cable News Channel, 11 April 2004. News reported capture of Syrian and Iranian fighters, and 11 April 2004 seizure of bomb making factory in Fallujah which included suicide letters to relatives in Iran and Syria, and signature of professional terrorists.
51. John Batchelor, "John Batchelor Radio Show", 12 April 2004. ABC analyst John Batchelor argued that Iran and Syria are enemies in the war on terror and must be dealt with.
55. Stone, page 65.

57. Wilson, page 218

58. Ibid., page 219

59. Ibid., page 223


61. Vandergriff, page 206-207


63. Ibid., page 72

64. Ibid., pages 68-73.


67. The current division structure maintains at least 14 independent headquarters elements as shown in Annex A. The UA/UE structure combines all of the divisional assets into three types of organizations; maneuver, aviation, and sustain Units of Action. Each UE can control up to five maneuver UAs. one aviation UA, and one sustain UA for a maximum of 7 headquarters elements per UE.

68. Vandergriff, page 210

69. Ibid., page 210


72. Vandergriff, page 194

73. Ibid., page 212

74. Ibid., page 192


77. BG Swan.


79. Ibid., page 126-127.


82. Ibid., page 255.


84. Ibid.

85. BG Swan.

86. Scroggs, page 5-6


88. Ibid., page 3

89. Scroggs, page 60.

90. Ibid., page 60.

91. Ibid., page 64.

92. Ibid., page 63.

93. Ibid., page 123.


95. Wildavsky, page 124.

96. Scroggs, Throughout this book the author highlights examples
of the Army losing out to the interests of the other services. Examples from the book include the APA example in the preface and the M1A1 example in chapter 5.

97. Scroggs, page 64.

William C. Taylor Jr. is currently a Captain in the United States Army. He is assigned as an Action Officer in the Joint Staff Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development. In this position he deals with Joint Professional Military Education policy, Joint Doctrine policy, and NATO Doctrine policy. CPT Taylor is also assigned to the 2005 BRAC Commission examining potential Professional Development Education closures and realignment.

CPT Taylor has served in many positions in the United States Army to include Armor Platoon Leader, Scout Platoon Leader, Brigade Plans Officer, and Armor Company Commander. He has served in assignments both within the United States and overseas including Germany, Czech Republic, and two deployments to Kosovo.

CPT Taylor received his MA in Policy Management from Georgetown University and BS in Electrical Engineering from the United States Military Academy.
Transparency in the Media

INTERVIEW WITH MICHAEL GETLER
Washington Post Ombudsman

Your role as ombudsman requires that you try to keep the media open and honest. Could you comment on the role of honesty and openness in government and how it influences openness and honesty in the media?

There's a direct relationship, obviously. I think we all, as citizens, support openness and honesty in government. That's what we hope for. It's very hard to find any administration that has not been shown to be secretive and at times not completely honest. You'll find that to be the case in any modern American presidency. But there are degrees to it, and to the extent that an administration is what I describe as excessively secretive or been shown to be dishonest, that obviously hurts our democracy and it hurts the public. It also restricts the ability of the press, at times, to provide coverage of what's really happening.

But it also is a challenge, when it's obvious that an administration is not being forthright and is attempting to keep secrets beyond the normal realm of functioning. I think it serves as almost a trigger of aggressiveness to reporters in news organizations - good ones, anyway - to find out what's really happening.

I think that over the long-term, the truth usually comes out. Sometimes it comes out before elections, sometimes after. But it eventually comes out. And I think too many politicians are gambling that it won't come out in time to hurt them. I don't mean just politicians, but also administration officials. And the role of the press, newspapers in particular, is to get at that truth. It rarely
comes out in one shot. But it comes out in layers, piece by piece by piece, and eventually you have something approaching a verifiable truth. Sometimes it's quick and sometimes it can take years. But I think that ultimately it does surface. The press is one of the few ways to make it surface. Congress is another, and the courts are another. The press is clearly one of the checks and balances.

I think that over the long term, the truth usually comes out.

In your role as ombudsman, you must reflect on both the viewpoints of the editors and the reporters, as well as the wants and needs of the readers. What do you see as being most important: being fair and balanced, respecting the wishes of important politicians, including the president, or giving the readers what they want?

It's giving the readers not necessarily what they want, but what is necessary. It sounds corny to say this, but what's necessary in a democracy is being an informed citizen. A lot of times news organizations tell people things that they'd rather not hear. But nevertheless it's important that these matters are surfaced. I think Watergate is an example. I was a reporter here at the time, and there were a lot of people who didn't want to know. They felt the press was being unfair and was picking on the president. But that doesn't mean you stop reporting. You, of course, continue pursuing the story wherever it leads.

I try to approach this job as a reader. I don't see myself as a reader advocate, in the sense that I don't always agree with the criticisms that the readers make of the newspaper. But I do try to approach it as one of them. This job works as an independent contractor. It's structured in a way that, to the great credit of the Washington Post, there is absolutely no benefit to being nice to them.

So this is a contracted job. It has a certain ending to it. It is a two-year contract that can be extended by mutual agreement. Mine was extended for another two years. But then it's over. You can't take any job associated with the Post from this position. So, the way I view it is that the Post is one of the most important newspapers in the country, and it needs to be very good, it needs to be challenged. And the ombudsman is one of the ways of challenging the newspaper.
Even though I know a lot of people here, I don't worry about my relationships with them at all. The only thing I care about is that the newspaper remains strong and vital and that it be challenged. It should not be allowed to slip. It needs to be challenged intelligently and frequently. It doesn't mean the challengers are correct. But the newspaper needs to know how its reporting and analysis are being received by readers and what kind of substantive complaints they have - complaints that go to what I call the journalistic mission of the newspaper. Sometimes I give my opinion on those challenges as well. In general, I find, the Post has a very good and sharp readership, very alert. They raise good questions and they make good points. Not all of them all the time, but enough to help keep the paper sharp, accurate.

To follow up on that: You say that it is critical for the Post to hear about different discrepancies might come up. How do you find that the newsroom reacts to some of the readers' complaints?

First, I think it is important to give the Post credit for this institution. They were the first major newspaper in the United States to have an ombudsman, although the Louisville Courier Journal in Kentucky was the first paper in 1967. The Post was the really big paper to follow this road three years later in 1970. So they've had an ombudsman here for almost 35 years. I'm the 12th ombudsman. They actually had 13. One person did it twice.

And also to their great credit, they-the management--do not interfere in this role at all. This is a completely independent job. I don't report to anybody. Nobody sees my material before it goes in the paper or before I write these weekly internal memos to the staff. And they are used to it. They absorb it. There will be individuals - editors or reporters - who will disagree with me, certainly, and they let me know it. But the process goes on. When there's a disagreement I try to come back to it in print in some fashion, either in the Sunday column or the internal memos.

I should explain here that I do three major things in this job. One is that I deal with readers. I get probably 1000 emails a week plus telephone calls and regular mail. I can't possibly answer all of that, so I answer some of it by phone or email, and then I write a Sunday column that appears on the editorial page on Sundays. And sometimes that column deals with the issues that readers have
called about, so I figure that they see the issue and my sense of it in
that column.

In addition, I also do, every Friday, an internal memo for
the staff. And that is basically a critique of the previous week's
newspapers. What I put in that memo are all the other issues that I
think are substantive journalistic issues that readers have raised
during the week with me, but that are not part of the column. So I
use the memo to make sure that all of the substantive observations,
critiques and compliments of readers get to the staff. The idea is to
insure that between the column and the internal memo, the staff
sees all of the critiquing of the newspaper that goes on from readers.

And there is a fourth element, which is that all the phone
calls to me that are recorded on the public line are transcribed and
also put into the internal electronic system so that the staff can also
see what callers are saying. Between all of that, the newspaper,
through me, or through whoever is the ombudsman, supports
pretty substantive rapport and exchange with readers - way
beyond what would be possible simply by reading the Letters to
the Editor column.

And that's a very good thing. So I have a lot of respect for
the Post's support. It's expensive to have an ombudsman - you have
to pay that person instead of an extra reporter or editor. It takes up
an office, and it causes them grief at times. But I think on the whole
that readers like it - it improves the credibility of a newspaper and
improves the sense that readers have that the newspaper is willing
to listen to them in a variety of ways and in that sense, I think, it's
actually good business to have ombudsman. I think more newspa-
pers should have them. I was glad to see the New York Times now
has one. The Baltimore Sun now has one. There are about probably
35 to 40 of them in the United States in the major news organiza-
tions and some not so major.

Going back to what we talked about earlier, do you think that the govern-
ment or politicians ever try to fool the media? How is that reflected in the
information that actually makes it into the public domain, or makes it into
the newspaper?

Oh, sure they try to fool us. I think that happens a great
deal. I'm sure if you looked at it the other way they'd probably say
it's just reinterpreted in different ways. But I think there have been
many times when there are certainly efforts to fool and to mislabel things.

The national security label, for example, has always been easy to try and hide behind. We've found many instances in which the issues do not really involve national security -- but they involve political embarrassment or policy differences or things of that nature. National security gets invoked very easily and it's rare, very rare, when national security is truly involved, or threatened to be compromised, as opposed to simply facts that politicians or the administration would prefer that the public not have.

The role of the Congress is very important in these kinds of matters because they have tools that reporters don't have, such as security clearances, the ability to subpoena witnesses, to hold hearings, open and closed, have people testify under oath and all kinds of other things. So when there are challenges to official goings-on, congressional actions are very important to helping uncover things. Although the Post, for example, played a crucial role in Watergate, it was the congressional follow-up that lead to its resolution. Without that, nothing would have happened.

The absence of any meaningful Congressional role, which I think you saw in the run-up to the war in Iraq, feeds into the lack of information to the press. So when the Congress does not do a very aggressive job in challenging the reasons we're going to war in Iraq in a public way, that I think becomes a factor in the press' ability to follow up on some of the statements and allegations. The press, of course, will always press ahead on its own, and historically they've been fairly good at it. But if the Congress is not playing its role in an active way, its checks-and-balances role, it makes it more difficult.

In a recent column you asked, "How do we make important judgments about things like the validity of war in Iraq, the situation on the ground there?" How can the press help the public make such judgments?

Well, they're trying to do as best they can in Iraq. The ground situation, which as you know is extremely difficult now, and it's very, very dangerous. It's very hard for reporters, in the last several months, to get around and go into places without being kidnapped or shot. So they have to rely on Iraqi staff to do it and
trust the people that they've hired there to try to get them some of the things. Reporters are still getting around, but nearly as much as we'd like. So the on-the-ground is just very hard to do.

And I think as citizens we are lucky to have so many different news outlets. For example, you have reporters from scores of news organizations that are over there. You have a lot of television reporters. You have now Arab networks that also supply information, which may be more controversial in this country. But nevertheless they're there -- especially their cameramen. They see a lot and those images are also seen by American reporters. So you have a lot of pieces of the mosaic that can provide I think a fairly accurate presentation of what's happening on the ground even though any particular news organization is pretty restricted.

In Iraq, it turned out to be much harder to find out here what was the validity of the information the administration's war rationale was based upon. There have been a lot of critiques now saying that the press failed its job, didn't do a very good job, and there's certainly validity to that. But it's not a simple thing.

It was a very complicated problem in the sense that there was a history of what Saddam had certainly done and tried to do in the past. The intelligence is highly classified always, so it's very hard for reporters who have no clearances to get to, obviously. And secondly, for people who work on the intelligence, for them to talk about it is actually a crime. So they just don't go out and start talking about top-secret material even if they think it's wrong. And, as I said, the Congress was not much help in challenging anything, so it was a very hard story to get at.

Despite that, I think that there were a number of stories, pre-war, that did raise serious questions and serious doubts about the information, particularly the nuclear threat. Also, as a complicating factor, it really wasn't until December 2002 or January, 2003, that even Hans Blix, the UN person in charge of the inspection, began to surface his doubts publicly, and that was already pretty close to the start of the war.

My own view, which I've written in several columns, is that too many of the good stories that the Post did and that were challenging were placed not on the front page but inside the paper. In hindsight, the Times and the Post both have acknowledged that they didn't do a good enough job before the war. But the Times coverage was much more problematic because it actually fed the
administration's case that Saddam was developing weapons of mass destruction, especially the nuclear ones. But I also have written about something that, in my view, was another very serious flaw in pre-war coverage, especially by the Post. This involves the failure to put serious public challenges to the war, not just to the intelligence but also to the concept of the war, on the front page. Sometimes these stories weren't even covered. I've been very critical of the Post along those lines, even more so perhaps than the weapons question, which was very hard to get at.

There were early commentaries, for example, by people such as General Scowcroft, the first President Bush's national security advisor, that were really very serious critiques and challenges to the policy that got very little attention in this newspaper. There were commentaries by some other Republicans raising doubts. There were early hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee which were important but which, amazingly, got little or no coverage. There were early speeches and comprehensive critiques by Senator Kennedy and Senator Byrd that got little or no coverage. Even the anti-war demonstrations, when they first began to take place, were played inside the paper. Even that huge demonstration in Washington was put on the Metro page. So it isn't just the weapons story. It was a lot of rhetorical challenges to the idea, for example, of "why couldn't we just continue to contain Saddam Hussein," which was discussed in the Foreign Relations Committee. The military dangers, and cautioning about an invasion, were discussed by several three-and four-star retired generals in front of the Armed Services Committee. A lot of this was pulled together in speeches by Kennedy and Byrd. But this was not really put in front of the public in a prominent way, at least by this newspaper.

In my analysis, a couple of other things happened. First, after 9/11, there was virtually no opposition to striking back at the Taliban and Afghanistan. A vast majority of the people supported it. And then after Bin Laden got away from the Tora Bora attack, which was in December of 2001, the administration switched and stopped talking about Bin Laden and started talking about Saddam Hussein and Iraq. And my own analysis is that the press was slow to sense how important that shift was. And secondly, they were slow to sense that the public opposition to a war in Iraq was much more significant than almost no opposition to a war in
Afghanistan. So whatever challenge the press was to make, I thought in a way lagged behind the sense of the public that something different and big was happening. I feel it was an obligation of the press to present both sides of this case in a prominent way when you’re talking about war. And when you know the president or any administration can really grab the front page any time it wants by making a speech or by making some policy announcement that’s important, we have to cover it seriously. But I don’t think the challengers were fairly presented beforehand. I think the administration was much better at making its case that there was somehow a linkage between 9/11 and Saddam Hussein, than the press was in shooting it down.

In the last several months there’s been a lot of focus on how the press was late in telling us that, or at least warning us that, Saddam may not have weapons of mass destruction. But actually the breakdown, I thought, was much broader, because it was a failure to present the case against the war as well: not just questioning the weapons of mass destruction, but questioning the need for the war, the potential for resistance and unrest and civil war afterwards, and the costs.

There’s another element. That is the bureaucracy, which I mentioned earlier in the sense that people were dealing with classified information, and it’s very dangerous business to be disclosing it in an unauthorized fashion. On the other hand, we now know that there were people, experts in the U.S. Air Force, who disagreed with the administration’s statements that Iraq had these unmanned drone aircraft that were designed to carry biological weapons and then spray them. We know that there were Air Force experts who disagreed with that, who believed the drones were for reconnaissance purposes, not for spraying biological weapons.

We know that there were experts in the Department of Energy who disagreed that these aluminum tubes were for nuclear centrifuges, as opposed to conventional rockets. We know that there were people in the State Department who also disagreed that Saddam had reconstituted the nuclear program, as Vice President Cheney had claimed. We know now that there was a huge report
by the State Department, with other experts, warning about the post-war problems that one would find in Iraq. That was disregarded. So the question then is, where were the whistle-blowers? It would have been nice if somebody resigned from the government and said, "Look, there's more to this story. There's another side to this story." But nobody did. Nobody really spoke up.

That's where Congress again came in. If Congress had held hearings and called some of these people where they had to testify under oath, or something, it might have helped. It at least would have put the naggings in the public domain or given the press a lead to use and people to go to. So I think all these things came together and led to a war that I think is fair to say, now, turned out to have been presented in false terms to the American public. And that is really serious. That's a serious situation. To me, it's not a political situation, it's a journalistic situation. Whatever administration undertakes such actions, the press has a role to play, in leading into this in a timely fashion.

*Do you think the media sees itself as dependent on those within government to frame the opposition?*

Actually, I do. There are certainly reporters and editors who understand this. Clearly there are reporters and editors who should have enough experience to be skeptical, and to think this through and understand that there is probably another side to things. But it is hard for the news side of newspapers to just raise this on their own. You can do it on the op-ed page or on the editorial page, but you don't have the power of authoritative news stories unless you have sources who know things and are willing to talk. And they're going to be anonymous for the most part, and that weakens the story even though the information may be right. Frequently it is Congress, or individual senators or congressmen, who frame and who raise the doubts and that provides a way to surface them.

It's very hard for reporters. You can write a news analysis story, and say 'here are a whole bunch of questions,' and people do that and do it well. But it's important also to have on-the-record political or expert voices to do that. Ideally it's important to have it done in a bipartisan way so it doesn't become a totally political issue. That's why the unraveling of Watergate was so interesting,
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It was really bipartisan. There's been quite good, but late, bipartisan questioning on Iraq by Senators Lugar and Biden and Hagel and Levin and others who have challenged this in one way or another from both sides, and I think that's healthy and important.

This is not to say that the administration was right or wrong to invade Iraq. I think history will tell and it will take more time to tell how significant that will have been from the standpoint of U.S. security. But clearly as a citizen, as a journalist, to now understand and know that almost all of the major rationales for going to war were not there, is extremely troubling.

I think in a situation like this, experience is vital to news organizations. You need people in charge of this coverage, this kind of coverage, who have been through some of these situations before. You need an understanding of politics, military affairs, international affairs, economic and budgetary affairs. They all come together when a country is talking about going to war, and you need to be able to pull all this together to develop at least a sense of what's happening and, therefore, what kind of questioning or reporting needs to be done in addition to that which is being put out by an administration. If you have an administration that is extremely secretive and puts a huge value on loyalty within the administration - in other words not talking, not saying anything that's not party line - it's quite a challenge. So you need experienced reporters who have good sources that they trust. You need new reporters to do things that nobody has thought of before. You also need to go to alternative places. For example, the United Nations turned out to be more accurate, particularly on the nuclear question, than the administration was about Saddam's capabilities in that area. Yet, because it's the UN, it's not as normal for American reporters to go to as it is to go to their administration sources or their other American sources. So a lot of times you need to develop alternative sources of information, and sometimes that's overseas. There were people in other countries that were saying interesting things as well about what was going on.

With all the information out there, and disinformation, can we rely on the media to make sense of all the information that's out there, all the complicated information that may be out there, potentially sensitive information, or should it just be given to the public as is?
No. I mean you can give it to the public as is and that would be fine, but people aren't going to read 500-page reports and GAO reports and UN reports and everything else. So an important function of the press is to distill this blizzard of information out there.

What people, I think, expect news organizations to do is to sort out for them what the really important stuff is and boil it down into understandable reporting - with context, you need to have context - and that needs to be done in a fair and balanced way. You need to have some sense of why this information is important and how it fits into the overall policy and picture; and that's what good newspapers are supposed to do, and television as well. I think you need the press to do that, and you need a press that's unafraid, not intimidated, and examining these issues in an independent, non-partisan, intelligent way, and a fearless way.

Other than the specific questions that we've had do feel like there's anything that we haven't covered, or anything that we've discussed that you'd like to expound upon, or address?

I think what we've been through in the past few years is a really profound episode in modern American history. My personal feeling is that we have entered into an extremely important war in Iraq, and I would separate that completely from the war on terrorism. This war on terrorism is a war that is a completely unique and new kind of war, and unfortunately I think we'll probably be involved in it for a long time. The war in Iraq, though, was a war of choice and a preemptive war, and the implications of that war are not at all clear - and it could have a huge impact on this country. So how we go into it and what it will mean for the future of this country are, in my view, enormous questions. There needs to be a relentless pursuit of finding out exactly what the basis was for the invasion. All the valuable work that the post-war 9/11 and Senate Select Intelligence commissions and committees have done have stopped short of answering the whole question of how intelligence was used and whether it was manipulated. It's just vitally important for the country to know. I would hope that the press stays on the case.
How many secrets does the government create every year and how are these secrets classified?

According to the latest statistics there were fourteen million new national security secrets created in fiscal year 2003. Those are statistics compiled by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), which is the government organization that has oversight responsibility over the classification system. Now I say those are national security secrets because those are specifically secrets that are generated under the President's Executive Order 12958 - the Classified National Security Information Executive Order. This was under former President Clinton, and it was amended by President Bush in 2003. There are many other kinds of secrets that the government keeps that are not national security secrets - about personal privacy, census information, a large and growing relatively new category of information called 'sensitive but unclassified', which is not formally classified as a national security secret but is nevertheless withheld from the public.

Can you give me an example of sensitive but unclassified information?

That's a very good question because it highlights the fact that there is no fixed definition of the category. It can include things that are already protected by statute, such as the Privacy Act. Documents containing an individual's social security number may be marked as sensitive but unclassified. It could include things that
are deemed to pose a possible security threat - like blueprints of government buildings - and a number of other things that are deemed plausibly sensitive. The policy problem posed by this category is that it has no statutory definition so it is liable to be abused to justify the withholding of anything that a particular individual deems sensitive or simply does not want to disclose.

Fourteen million new national security secrets were created in 2003.

With regard to the information that you were talking about, what do citizens gain by having more access to that type of information? To be more specific, does the government take into account the potential impact that secrecy may have on the public? If the general public is not trained in policy or finance, what good does it do to actually share these forms of information?

These are very good questions that really boil down to the question of why do we prefer open government and self-government over rule by bureaucrats? It may be that in some circumstances, rule by bureaucrats would be more efficient, less expensive and less time-consuming. But as a society we aspire to democratic self-governance - we want the government to do its business in the open. Now everybody recognizes that there are limits to that, including national security limits. We don't want to advertise, more than they are already known, the recipes for building weapons of mass destruction. We don't want to disclose in advance plans for military operations that are to be conducted tomorrow. These are all things that need to be kept confidential in order for their functions to be accomplished. But those are exceptions. The rule is that self-governance means open government. Now of course no ordinary citizen is going to be an expert simultaneously in all areas of public policy. If I'm a specialist in education, I'm probably not going to be conversant in social security. However, I would still have an interest in having such information be publicly available so that my proxies in the news media and in nongovernmental organizations, who do indeed specialize in these areas, can render independent judgments and can participate on my behalf in policy formulation.

So would it be safe to say that you believe the information should be out there regardless of what the government might think the public has the ability to do with it?
I would put it slightly differently. I think the information should not be disclosed if there is a plausible national security or other statutory justification to withhold it. But just because some government official believes that certain information is boring or of no interest to the public is not a sufficient reason to withhold it.

Following up on self-governance, what kind of oversight can citizens actually provide in terms of getting this information? For example, in getting the intelligence budget declassified, were the end goals financial oversight or to have citizens have some input in this planning process?

There's a whole spectrum of tools that people have available at their disposal to become informed and active citizens. They range from such mundane things as reading the newspaper everyday to filing a Freedom of Information (FOI) request. Congress specifically passed a statute to enable individual citizens to access government records that are of interest to them and a growing number are taking advantage of that tool. Last year for the first time the number of FOI requests with government agencies passed the three million mark. Many of those were actually filed by businesses looking for information about their competitors. They weren't all democratic idealists. What about the intelligence budget question? I think I have multiple motivations. One is that government agencies should not be withholding information unless they have a legitimate reason to do so. And I don't believe there is a legitimate reason for withholding the Intelligence Budget. At least not the budget total, and certainly not the budget total from fifty years ago. Nevertheless that information is still withheld. The other motivation is to sort of test the system. How far can a private citizen go in challenging entrenched secrecy? My experience has been mixed. I got the Intelligence Budget disclosed twice. On other occasions I have failed. On still other occasions, the verdict is still out.

Can you tell me what justification you've been given for why you did succeed with the intelligence budget in some instances but not others?

I honestly don't find the explanations persuasive. The budget total was disclosed under pressure of litigation in 1997 and 1998 by the then Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet. The amount was 26.6 billion dollars in 1997 and 26.7 billion
dollars in 1998 for all U.S. government intelligence agencies and activities. The DCI said that he had made a judgment that national security would not be damaged by that disclosure. Come 1999, however, we sued again and we lost. The DCI argued that somehow the 1999 figure was qualitatively different, which I understood to mean that it was significantly larger than the 1997 and 1998 numbers, and the increase in the size of the budget would both pose a national security problem and would also lead itself to disclosure of how the intelligence budget was concealed within the open budget and thereby compromise an intelligence method. I did not find that explanation persuasive.

Interestingly, the 9/11 Commission, which reported earlier this year on its investigation of the events leading up to September 11th and the lessons to be learned from it, said there is too much secrecy in the U.S. intelligence community. They identified one step that should be taken to combat such secrecy - the Intelligence Budget total should no longer be kept secret. That's on page 416 of the 9/11 Commission Report, which I've memorized by now. They singled this out as the place to begin combating excessive and unnecessary secrecy.

You've spoken about the information gathering network Echelon before, noting that it is considered highly controversial. Would you mind explaining Echelon and its general purpose? Also, have your opinions about Echelon changed, or do you feel it is still as controversial?

You don't hear a lot about Echelon today compared to a few years ago and I think it's a case where news media coverage and popular culture got a bit far ahead of the known facts. To begin with, the U.S. government does not acknowledge a program called Echelon. In the opinion of most experts, I dare say, many of the press reports about what Echelon is and does are exaggerated to the point of impossibility. So I would not frame the question in terms of Echelon so much. What is true about Echelon? What is true is that the United States government collects electronic communications of various forms. It's one of the primary functions of the National Security Agency. What is also true is that U.S. intelligence shares information with its allies around the world. Now, between those two facts, you have about ninety-percent of the
Echelon story. What you don't have is allegations that every conversation and every fax and email that anybody might send to anybody else anywhere in the world are being hoovered up by this electronic vacuum cleaner called Echelon where they are being analyzed by these secret agents in Washington. It is simply not happening, and it's not possible that it would happen and there's no need for it to happen. So I would set Echelon aside.

The other part of the question is, has my perception of security policy changed since September 11th. The answer is yes. I think for everyone 9/11 has given us a concrete understanding of what damage to national security could mean. For many of us prior to 9/11 the notion of national security was probably something of an abstraction. Damage to national security was a formula that was uttered to justify denying release of information and it just was not to be taken too seriously. Post 9/11 everyone understands that there are people out there in the world who are committed to perpetrating spectacular acts of mass murder and that we are all potentially vulnerable to them and finally that that means that certain kinds of information and other vulnerabilities need to properly protected. That simply is not a controversial proposition in the same way as it might have been in the past.

Now that is not the end of the story because what we find is that government agencies have overreacted and they use September 11th as a pretext for withholding all kinds of information that has little or no connection with a terrorist threat from Al Qaeda or anywhere else. And that is a temptation that needs to be challenged. An example, five years ago I used to go to the Government Printing Office (GPO) book store on North Capitol Street and purchase the Pentagon phone book, the Department of Defense Telephone Directory, because it gave me all kinds of useful phone numbers - who is where, what's the number for the Missile Defense Office. Post 9/11 the DOD Telephone directory is for official use only. You cannot get it at the GPO book store. And that to me is a remarkable development. The notion of a secret phone book is something you might associate with the former USSR or with Communist China. It is not something I would ever
have imagined in the US. It is an arbitrary and unnecessary wall that has been erected between the American public and its government. Now it may well be that most Americans have no interest in calling the Pentagon (laughs). I am sure they don't. But they should be able to if they want. The net result is a change in the complexion of American government. We are no longer as open or as democratic a society as we were and that's a pity.

Touching on the post 9/11 atmosphere - right after 9/11 Congress passed the Patriot Act and from the news media accounts we can understand that that has allowed the government and the law enforcement agencies to a sort of back door access to a lot of information - bank records, library and internet browsing activities - so what I'd like to know is how you viewed this. Do you think that this is potentially protecting our country from some unethical people who wish to harm us or is this a general invasion of our privacy?

I think the debate over the Patriot Act has been unfortunate in some respects because it has strayed from the text of the law in many cases. My impression is that eighty percent of the law is innocuous, fifteen percent of it is positively beneficial, and only five percent of it is problematic and needs to be reviewed. I think there is a rule of thumb that whenever increased authority is granted to a government agency it should be matched by increased oversight and I don't believe that has been the case with the Patriot Act. I think that this administration has in many cases resisted oversight and sometimes for no good reason - out of spite it seems like. Let's not have op-eds about the Patriot Act, let's have hearings. Let's find out exactly what's been done - the successes, the failures and the works in progress. But that seemingly sensible option has been resisted by the administration. As a result the battles are being fought in court, often by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and with some success. That is a great credit to the ACLU. But it is not the optimum way to conduct public policy.

In a recent testimony before Congress you cited the 9/11 Commission's identification of over-classification as an impediment to information sharing. Has our government reached a balance between honest disclosure and protecting our homeland?
I don't think so on either point. When the 9/11 Commission talks about information sharing, they are talking about inter or intra governmental information sharing, not public disclosure. Increased information between agencies often means raising barriers between the government and the public. For example, if an agency brings in a local sheriff in some Midwestern state into the information sharing loop on homeland security, chances are that Sheriff is going to have to sign a non-disclosure agreement. There is a kind of dark side to what is called information sharing - that it involves new barriers for public access to information.

On the other hand, there have been some tragic absurdities in the lack of information sharing. The CIA and the NSA had relevant information pertaining to the 9/11 hijackers that they declined to share with FBI agents in the field because they considered it too highly classified. This is obscene. Since 9/11, even before the Commission Report, the agencies themselves recognized that they had a problem in this regard and they have made a good deal of headway in correcting it. They are not finished with the needed changes yet, partly for policy reasons, partly for technology reasons. Many of these agencies have database management systems that are incompatible with one another. Even if they want to share, they cannot make it happen. These problems are being remedied.

Further, the process of classification is extremely expensive. It is not just stamping a document 'classified' - the process of doing so triggers a whole apparatus of security measures, from security clearances to physical security to computer security. This cost the government 6.5 billion dollars in 2003 alone. There is a financial incentive to limit classification. It could be accomplished if agencies took their own in-house top to bottom review of what is being classified.

Congress could do much more. It could oversee the classification system. It could look at trends in classification. Is secrecy growing? The answer is yes. What are the costs? Secrecy has been described as a cement overcoat - it impedes the movement of information even to those who are authorized to have it.

Congress could legislate standards, not only for classified information but for unclassified information as well. In the Homeland Security Act, for example, Congress told the new department to generate procedures for protecting sensitive homeland security information, but it didn't say what "sensitive" means.
I consider it an act of legislative malpractice. Inevitably, the agency is going to implement the most expansive interpretation there is. And that is why we get the mess we already have. Congress could be more scrupulous about defining what should and should not be secret.

One day we are going to wake up and not recognize our own government.

Would you like to add anything?

I hope I communicated that this should not be a subject that is only of interest to specialists or conspiracy theorists. This is a subject that defines the character of our political system. Do we want to have an open government? Or would we rather rely on rule by professional bureaucrats. If as a society we do not stand up and insist on openness we are going to inexorably slide towards government by anonymous bureaucracy. One day we are going to wake up and not recognize our own government.
What degree of secrecy is necessary in regard to national security measures and other government information, and do you think the government has struck the right balance between letting citizens and other agencies get the right documents versus protecting what needs to be for national security interests?

I think we're talking about two things here: The inter-branch, inter-agency secrecy prior to 9-11 prevented the sharing of information, and the secrecy between the government and the citizens. With respect to the first of those, I think we are doing a lot better now. To be sure, there are imperfections. A friend told me that when they first opened up the terrorism threat information center, the CIA guy would lock his door when he was inside so that nobody could talk to him. But we're changing that.

We've changed some of the legal barriers to information sharing. The Senate has passed legislation that, if it becomes law, will help fix some of the technological barriers. The cultural barriers are a little harder to fix. It mostly takes a whole new generation of people. Somebody said, "the FBI is from Mars, the CIA is from Venus." And, it's pretty true. Their tasks are different; their approach to data is different. It is captured most in the way they...
view sources of information. In the FBI they are considered informants: They are bad guys and you would never want to be their friends. In the CIA they are considered assets. They're good guys, and you will expend your life protecting them. That's just a simple example that catches a much broader difference.

But we are doing much better in breaking down those barriers to the exchange of information. There will always be institutional reasons why agencies erect those barriers. It controls the flow of information; it also gives people the ability to oversee work and to critique it. But that's not a function of the secrecy regime, that's a function of bureaucracy and it holds true in the Department of Agriculture, too, where you won't get the crop data if it doesn't sound good.

The other aspect, though, where I think we are doing less well is the transparency that is necessary for the oversight of the operations of government by the citizens. It's a fundamental challenge that is not perfectly answerable. Complete transparency of the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) type will defeat the national security methodologies. Like if we expose to the public that we can tap Osama's satellite phones, as we did during the trial of 1993. In 1994, he stopped using satellite phones. On the other hand, that cannot be an excuse for complete and utter secrecy and the absence of oversight because the foundational aspects of American legal culture and political culture are checks and balance.

What we need to do, and what we haven't done a really good job at yet, is what I call "calibrated transparency," or "graduated transparency": The existence of mechanisms that are alternates to complete public disclosure through FOIA and on the front page of the New York Times. Those should include a reinvigorated congressional oversight process. Congressional oversight has become somewhat lax, and, at least as far as homeland security is concerned, is diffused among a half dozen committees. That's one of the fundamental re-organization recommendations from the 9-11 Commission. If we had an ideal world and we were talking policy and not politics - that would be one thing.

Another thing we need to think about is ways of constructing neutral third-party adjudication - third-party arbiters and peo-
ple who can serve as the public's proxies. It doesn't have to be judges, although they are obviously good models. It's probably a good thing that the new national intelligence director will have a strong Inspector General. He's got a lot of powers; he'll be one of the strongest Inspector Generals we have. If we get a bad Inspector General, it's useless, but at least we're trying to build the right structures.

There are instances of limited disclosures to a subset of trusted proxies that are acceptable, whether it's a judge, a federal committee advisor, an Inspector General, or an ombudsman. We haven't really begun building that sort of system out yet and frankly what that system will look like will depend on what the question is -- like looking over Secure Flight versus how we deal with surveillance of Americans versus how we deal with new information technologies versus the government's prosecution of terrorists. We haven't begun doing that yet.

Regarding the wall between law enforcement and intelligence gathering agencies: what were the concerns about that wall being there, and is the reason for that wall or concerns about it any less important now?

It's not less important at all. It arose out of some of the old abuses of the 1950s and the 1960s and our fears from those. The wall is almost a direct product of the Church and Pike Commissions, and the CIA seemed to be meddling in domestic affairs and the FBI seemed to be using its authorities to harass Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others.

Every rule comes with both costs and benefits. The obvious side of the coin is that the costs have become prohibitively high when the consequences of the failure to share information are not that some Russian spy will learn some secret but that some nuclear bomb will go off in New York. About which, I commend to your attention Graham Allison's book "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe." His prediction is that there is a 50/50 chance in the next ten years that a nuclear device will be exploded in the United States. If he's right, or if he's anywhere close to right, then that's the cost side of it.

But I think that there's another side of it, which is that notwithstanding the fact that we haven't constructed all the right mechanisms for oversight, I think it's a systematic matter - the risk of really substantial and fundamental abuse is less now than it was in the 1950s.
First, the courts are far more engaged in overseeing accepted behavior. Consider the courts' earlier response to government authority -- they were just not in the same business of restricting it as they are now. Now we have evidence that even in the midst of a war, our courts are going to willingly step in and manage when they think there are excesses of executive authority. Contrast that with the response to Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus where, two years after the war, they called it unconstitutional. It's a much more engaged judiciary, both on the specific sets of issues and institutionally; they are far more willing to second guess executive authority now than they were in 1960.

Congress is a similar case. The Congress of the 1960s wasn't exactly a creature of the Executive, but it was a fairly supine institution. Now though I've just critiqued the lack of a concerted system of oversight, we have a partisan Congress where there is a market for scandal, a market for oversight.

Congress is more engaged, the courts are more engaged, and the press is more engaged, post-Watergate. The 1940s press concealed Roosevelt's disability and the 1960s concealed JFK's dalliances and, as we know from the 1998 press, due to the coverage of Clinton's indiscretions, that's just not on the table anymore. So we have a very effective press mechanism.

If, for example, the powers that we give the government were to be used to obtain Hillary Clinton's library reading list, I have no doubt that would be on the front page of the Washington Post within 48 hours. Senator Clinton would have to figure out how to make sure the leak happened, without it coming back to her. But, it's just an impossibility to believe that large scale systematic abuses, like the mass detention of Japanese Americans in the 1940s during World War II, would not go widely reported.

Then, there's the rise of public interest litigation. Back in the 1950s, there was basically the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) and the NAACP (National Association for Advancement of Colored People), and that was it. Today there are thousands of them, all anxious. I disagree with almost everything they say, but I am very glad that the ACLU is there. Because they're there, the government can be more aggressive, and I can be more comfortable that the government is more aggressive and pushes the envelope right to the edge. And I don't want the government to be chilled in its efforts to stop terrorism. I want them to do every human thing that's lawful, and nothing more.
And then there's the public. The fact that the Georgetown Public Policy Review is having an edition dedicated to this topic of secrecy and information is indicative of the interest that people are paying. It's not "Ozzie and Harriet" land anymore. Besides that, there's a lot more information available to you. The Internet society makes you and everybody out there educated in ways that are just great. This is kind of the argument in David Brin's book, "The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom?" that the growth of information technology can be turned around on government to make it more transparent to us. And that's true, at least to some degree.

Generally address what the Patriot Act is and what people are complaining about, why it's necessary, and why it's suitable.

That kind of gets back to the fundamental question of abuse, and people are confusing the potential for abuse with actuality.

I'm waiting for the first misuse of the Section 215 power to get Hillary Clinton's book records. I'm just waiting for someone to show me anything that's even close to that. I'm waiting for some FBI agent to use the "sneak and peek" power to sneak into your house and plant drugs so that he can arrest you -- as if the existence of the authorization to do that is what makes it possible for him. I mean, if he wanted to plant drugs, he'd break into your house irrespective of whether we had the law or not. I take great comfort in the fact that the inspector general, who reports every six months, is still counting the number of civil rights and civil liberties violations since 9-11 that are attributable to the Patriot Act powers as zero. I take great comfort in the fact that the ACLU can't find an abuse yet. They are making [don't know - how about this] several challenges to some of the provisions, none of which have been very successful yet. But I'm still waiting for them to show me someone who has had his butt kicked because of the Patriot Act.

But it hasn't happened yet. And why do I think that is? Because fundamentally, the Patriot Act continues with more or less traditional law enforcement measures and retains the more or less

We have a partisan Congress where there is a market for scandal, a market for oversight.
successful law enforcement paradigms for oversight. This is one of
the areas where we actually don't have too much of a transparency
problem. The "sneak and peak," for example, the delayed notifica-
tion, you have to go to a federal judge and show probable cause.
That's the standard we've been using for the issuance of warrants
to enter someone's house since 1789. We've been doing this for a
long time and there hasn't been a rampant outbreak of abuse in the
last 50 years, and I don't think the codification of it in the statute in
2001 is going to all of a sudden produce abuse where it had not
been there before. That one is a perfect map to the pre-existing
legal authority.

Where do these misunderstandings come from?

Some of them are misunderstandings, but a lot of it is poli-
tics. The ACLU's membership has tripled. Their coffers are much
higher. If I were them, I would be making this argument, too. But
it doesn't mean that it's right. Their most recent ad is a farrago of
well-calibrated efforts to generate hysteria, and they're good at it.
When they say, "someone can enter your house and they'll never
tell you," that's wrong. Delayed notification is not permanently
delayed notification. You will always know, under Section 213.

If you take that extreme and you ignore the benefits of
delayed notification, like more utility and being able to conduct
investigative techniques without them being thwarted. The John
Gotti microphone example I'm sure you understand - if the govern-
ment had to notify Gotti when it put a microphone in his eating
club, what would be the point?. When you explain the substance
of it and why, it's pretty sensible.

Have we realized the benefits of the Patriot Act?

For the Patriot Act generally, I think it's very clear that
we've seen benefits. Many of the prosecutions that have been
brought have been the result of at least two of the provisions, the
information sharing that allows FISA (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act) information to come along to the FBI and vice
versa and the expanded definition of material support that recog-
nize for the first time the different nature of what is happening
- that material support is not just for guns and butter but for com-
puters and things like that.
A really good example, not widely reported, is the unsealed prosecution of Muhhamed Junneh Babar who was arrested in New York in April of 2004. He'd been here for about 6 months, and his arrest was not disclosed until three or four weeks ago (September). He pled guilty to setting up a Jihad training camp here in the United States and purchasing materials for making bombs. He pleaded guilty to sending back military equipment to Al Qaeda army operatives. He was operating in New York City. The information sharing provisions were used for tracking him, and gathering the electronic evidence of his crimes and terrorist activities. And he was charged and pleaded guilty under the materials support provisions. I would say, interestingly, to all those who think libraries should be safe havens, that after he was convicted and asked, "We had a tap on your home computer. Why didn't we ever see any messages? How did you communicate with people?" he said, "I was using the email system at the New York Public Library." And that's the case. If you really want to make the New York Public Library a safe haven for Muhammad Barbar to talk to Osama bin Laden, then let's go ahead and do that, but I submit that that's not really a wise policy.

And, the likelihood that John Ashcroft will be seeking the Greenpeace reading records is sufficiently small. Imagine what has to happen in order for Ashcroft to misuse this authority successfully. First off, you have to really believe that John Ashcroft is "Darth Vader." Because you have to begin by thinking that he's going to purposefully falsely swear that the reading records of Hillary Clinton or Greenpeace are related to a foreign terrorist investigation. So he [Ashcroft] personally, Robert Mueller the Director of the FBI, or the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division has to actually perjure himself in a very conscious way, because only one of the three of them can sign one of these things. Then, of course, they have to have the complicity of an FBI agent, because the FBI agent applying for the Section 215 order has to swear out the warrant that demonstrates the facts about why these records are relevant. And those warrants are usually about like an inch-thick summary of what's happened. So some agent has to swear out a full form that would assert that Greenpeace is connected to Al Qaeda in some way. Of course, if it's a true warrant, I don't see any need for Greenpeace to be protected.

So the agent has to willfully be false about it or such an idiot that he's a dupe. Then, a federal judge who gets this application has
to be a total idiot and not look up and say, "now tell me a little bit again why you think Al Qaeda is connected to Greenpeace or Hillary Clinton." He has to be a complete wimp who doesn't do anything. The library that gets this application has to choose not to challenge it. The existence of this bad warrant has to be concealed from the Inspector General for the Department of Justice, which reviews Patriot Act activities. So we also of course have to conceal it from the House Intelligence and Judiciary committees, and the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees who receive twice-yearly reports on all Section 215 activity. And, of course we have to assume that nobody in the library picks up the phone and calls the Washington Post.

Now if John Ashcroft can achieve that, then Al Qaeda's got no hope at all because he's Superman. It just isn't happening. It isn't likely to happen. Is it possible? Yes. But the moon could be made of green Swiss cheese, too.

The assertion of completely unreviewable authority is never a good idea.

You did express a bit of concern regarding the Attorney General’s power, in terms of keeping the lawyer/client discussion private. Have you had any reason to feel that issue has been allayed at all, or is it still a concern?

We are talking here about the assertion by the Attorney General that for terrorists who are incarcerated, he could unilaterally decide to listen in on their conversations with their lawyer. I was concerned because of the lack of any judicial review of that decision. That concern's been allayed at a practical level, because the number of times it's been used is something like six. And so, simply in terms of practical effect, it's not nuclear war in any form. On a theoretical level, the reason I'm still concerned is that there's not any oversight. And that's always where the mistake is likely to lie. I have for example, some a similar reaction to the opinion on the national security letters that came out a little while ago. I think the reaction overblown because it obviously wasn't the Patriot Act; it was this 1986 law that was incorporated into the Patriot Act and was struck down. The government was in there saying that there should be review, and the judge should have construed the statute as the department said and made review part of the law. Instead,
he said, "it's not in the law, so I'm striking it down." If I really thought it wasn't in the law, or if the government was saying that it wasn't in the law, I'd have had a lot more concern. The same is true of the initial efforts of defending the detention of Yasser Hamdi (one of the enemy combatants) as a completely unreviewable decision - bad idea. They eventually settled on some review, and that's a good thing. I think that we've settled more or less in a way that sets us back. The assertion of completely unreviewable authority is never a good idea.

To what extent do you think a new system for preventative detention is feasible? Is anyone making steps to go in that direction?

The answer to the second question is no. There are a limited number of cases that don't fit in our current system. The Moussaoui case involving the so-called "20th hijacker" (United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004)) may be one of them. The criminal justice system is the only answer we have to terrorism that is a legally constrained and judicially manageable system. There has to be an alternative. I try to set out some principles in a recent paper. But I'm by no means wed to any particular kind of structure. We can't watch them forever, so we need a methodology.

This is something that Congress should do. It could be imposed by executive fiat, but it would be much better I think for Congress to engage itself so that we could think of what the architecture would look like. Great Britain has such a system that has grown out of their Northern Ireland problems that they've now applied to Islamic terrorists as well. But that doesn't make it an unfree country. One of the unique things that they do, that I don't think we could mimic, is there's an independent oversight by an individual whose job is to review every case and he's a member of the Liberal Democrat party, not in power. This is somebody whose mission is to look at every detention with a very careful eye. We can think of ways to do this in an American context that would effectuate the similar proxy oversights that work.
The assertion of completely unreviewable authority is.

The power to issue such orders is exercised by a certain intelligence committee. These committees are empowered to make such recommendations to the President as they see fit, and these recommendations are often carried out without any oversight or accountability. This system allows for a high level of discretion and secrecy, which can be problematic in terms of transparency and accountability.

However, it is not only the intelligence committees that have such powers. The legislative branch also has the ability to enact laws and make recommendations to the President, but these processes are subject to review and oversight. The judicial branch also has the power to interpret laws and regulations, which can serve as an important check on executive power.

In conclusion, the system of executive power in the United States is complex and multifaceted, with various branches of government playing a role. While there are mechanisms in place to check and balance power, there are also opportunities for abuse, particularly in the area of national security. It is important for citizens to be aware of these issues and to hold their elected officials accountable for their actions.
"That September Day...
A Review of the 9/11 Commission Report

In the wake of some of America's most wrenching public tragedies, the nation's political leaders have often turned to independent commissions to help the country sort through what really happened, separate fact from assumption, and develop recommendations to prevent similar problems from ever occurring again. This is a long tradition in American politics. Such commissions have studied everything from presidential assassinations (the 1964 Warren Commission) to space shuttle crashes (the 1986 Rogers Commission and the 2003 Columbia Accident Investigation Board) to airline disasters and aviation safety (the 1997 Gore Commission on Aviation Security).

How can we judge such efforts? Certainly, one standard is their impact on politics and policy. Did the commission's work really affect the political debate? Did commission recommendations find their way into law and policy? If yes, then we might say that the effort was successful. By this standard, it is safe to say that many government commissions have fallen far short of success. Indeed, subsequent commissions investigating a related problem have sometimes found themselves essentially repeating the never-implemented recommendations of earlier reports. The authors of the final report of the 2003 Columbia Accident Investigation Board, for example, more than once saw fit to refer to earlier recommendations of the Rogers Commission, which 17 years earlier had...
reached similar conclusions about NASA's organizational culture and its deleterious effects on shuttle safety.

Another standard weight used to evaluate government commissions is the degree of seriousness and commitment they bring to their work. Looking back upon a completed report, we could ask, did the commission appear to take its mission seriously? How competent was its staff? Did commissioners fight political opponents or did they roll over in the face of criticism? On this score, as well, the report card yields mixed results. While it is probably fair to say that many, if not most commissions have made an earnest attempt to fulfill their mandate, certainly not all of them have been willing to fight prolonged political opposition or to complete the heavy lifting necessary to ensure that at least some recommendations see the light of day. For example, commission after commission has been chartered to study and "reform" Social Security, yet how many have succeeded? How many are even remembered?

A final standard we could use to evaluate a government commission is its sheer communicative power. Is the commission's diagnosis and description of the problem clear and compelling, even to the non-specialist? Have its findings broken through the rarefied universe of policy wonks and political professionals and actually pierced the consciousness of the general public?

What sets the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (hereafter, the "9/11 Commission") apart from many of its predecessors is that it has been largely successful against all three of these standards. First, there is no question that the 9/11 report has affected the political debate. Well before the final report was even completed, the informational hearings held by the commission generated massive publicity and media attention. The appearances of national security advisor Condoleezza Rice and former counter-terrorism official Richard Clarke, for example, were front-page news. The report's recommendations, particularly those focusing on how to restructure the national intelligence community, have gained widespread public attention. Immediately after the final report was issued, Congress took up the recommendations and, as this is written, continues to debate the proposed implementation of legislation. And, of course, both major candidates in the 2004 presidential election took great pains
to endorse the commission's findings. The differences between George Bush and John Kerry mostly came down to implementation details.

Second, the 9/11 commissioners and their staff were tenacious in pursuing their mandate, and, as the final report notes in its Preface, the mandate was "sweeping." Essentially, the commission was directed by law to investigate all "facts and circumstances" relating to the terrorist attacks, guidance that took the commission far and wide - from the effectiveness of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to the role of Congressional oversight. All told, the commission interviewed over 1,200 individuals in ten countries and examined more than two and a half million pages of documentation. In addition, it held 19 days of hearings at which 160 witnesses gave public testimony.

The chapters describing the looming plot are case studies in painstaking detail. Chapter 7, which is entitled "The Attack Looms," focuses on the movements of the hijackers as they begin to arrive in the United States in January 2000 and includes nearly 200 footnotes to support its 40 pages of narrative. Some of the detail is incredibly minute - we learn, for example, that Hani Hanjour "visited [a] gas station in La Mesa," where he was introduced by his traveling companion, Nawaf al Hamzi, as a "longtime friend from Saudi Arabia." The report also informs us that earlier, after the departure of another of the attack operatives, Hamzi "grew lonely and worried that he would have trouble managing by himself."

Beyond the sheer volume of work, one must also note the commission's willingness to stand up to serious political opposition. More than once, the Bush administration resisted the commission's work. Among other things, the administration squabbled with the commission about fully funding its efforts; initially opposed its request for an extension of time; and tried to prevent Condoleezza Rice from testifying in an open public hearing. In many cases, the sheer perseverance of key commissioners broke down administration resistance. Rice did indeed finally testify (as did President Bush and Vice President Cheney). A time extension was in fact granted, and so on. Most of the time the commission was able to get what it wanted (although there were important exceptions, of course; most damaging was probably then-CIA Director George Tenet's refusal to let the commission directly interview detainees).
Furthermore, Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, as commission chair and vice-chair, adopted the sober and serious approach the job demanded. Even as some of commissioners gave into partisan grandstanding during public hearings, Kean and Hamilton remained above the fray - as did the staff. Drawn from government, the private sector, and academia, the staff members were on the whole extremely competent and well-versed in the subject matter they were examining. Staff Director Philip Zelikow, for instance, came to the commission not only as a professor at the University of Virginia but also as a veteran of the Navy, the State Department, and the National Security Council.

Finally, the report is highly readable, even literary at times in its eloquent and heartbreaking descriptions of the hijackings and their terrible aftermath. Being readable and eloquent is a standard that most texts rarely achieve, let alone reports issued by government commissions and drafted by committee. In recognition of this high quality, the report has achieved the rare distinction of being a nominee for the annual National Book Award, one of the most prestigious literary awards in the United States. To my knowledge, this is basically unprecedented; according to press accounts, the only other government report to have ever been nominated for a major literary award was by a New York state commission on the 1971 Attica prison riots. And the 9/11 report has not only received critical acclaim, it has been a bestseller. There are over one million copies in print of the authorized edition published by W.W. Norton (As this is written, there are now reports that both ABC and NBC are planning miniseries based on the commission's final report.)

The first chapter is an excellent - and chilling - example of the report's literary quality. Entitled "We Have Some Planes" (an allusion to a radio transmission sent by one of the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 11 shortly after they had taken control of the plane), the chapter contrasts the peaceful and cloudless dawn of that September day with the horror and death soon to follow: "For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey. Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine." Throughout the chapter, the hijackings themselves and the reactions of the crew and passengers are recounted in a steady and austere prose, a wise decision
because there is no need for verbal ornamentation - what is being described has a unique and terrible power all its own. Consider this passage detailing Lee Hanson's final cell phone conversation with his son Peter, a passenger aboard United Airlines Flight 175:

It's getting bad, Dad ... a stewardess was stabbed. They seem to have knives and Mace ... they said they have a bomb ... it's getting very bad on the plane ... passengers are throwing up and getting sick ... the plane is making jerky movements ... I don't think the pilot is flying the plane ... I think we are going down ... don't worry, Dad ... if it happens, it'll be very fast .... my God, my God.

After this conversation, which ended abruptly, Lee Hanson turned on his television and watched the plane his son was on smash into the World Trade Center. Everyone aboard died instantly.

One might argue that the commission sets such a high standard in its first ten chapters - the section of the report that describes the hijackings and all that led to them - that it is inevitable that the reader will feel let down by the final three chapters, which provide analysis and recommendations. There is something dispiriting about reading through 300 pages describing the meticulous planning and stunning execution of the worst terrorist attack in American history only to discover in the final chapters that yet another government reorganization is the best the commission can do when it comes to offering recommendations for preventing a future 9/11. Indeed, some have argued that perhaps the report would have been even more powerful had it eschewed policy advice altogether. As Richard Posner argued in his New York Times review, "combining an investigation of the attacks with proposals for preventing future attacks is the same mistake as combining intelligence with policy." In other words, because the commission focused on the structural inadequacies of the intelligence community, it inevitably came to blame this very structure for failing to detect and prevent the attacks.

Perhaps investigative commissions should focus their energies on documenting the problem and let policymakers propose the solutions. Perhaps the real value and power of investigative commissions is their potential to pull back the curtain of official secrecy and give us all a look inside. This is certainly one of the
The 9/11 Commission's greatest achievements, if not the single most important. On September 11th, as many Americans sat transfixed in front of their televisions watching the horror unfold, we asked ourselves: How did this happen? How could this happen? Who did this? How is the government responding? The 9/11 Commission answers these questions in full and often excruciating detail. The portrait it paints is very disturbing.

First, there is the utter chaos and confusion at all levels of government during the morning of the attacks. A manager in the FAA's New York center, for example, tells other FAA personnel during an 8:48 a.m. teleconference that "we're watching the airplane [American Airlines Flight 11]...they've told us that there are people in the cockpit that have control of the aircraft and that's all the information they have right now." Of course, American 11 had already crashed into the World Trade Center by this point. Earlier, the report shows that the FAA was unaware for several minutes that the second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, had even been hijacked. The reason? The same air traffic controller was assigned to both American 11 and United 175, and was concentrating on finding American 11 and thus did not pay attention to United 175.

The confusion, of course, was not confined to the FAA. The president himself and his closest advisors were befuddled during the first phase of the attacks, in part because they knew nothing about the hijackings that were culminating in the devastating crashes. The 9/11 commission, for example, found "no evidence" that the hijacking of American 11 had been reported to anyone in Washington outside the FAA before the plane crashed at 8:46 a.m. Most federal agencies learned about the first crash the way most of us did - by watching the television news. Even Jane Garvey, the administrator of the FAA, did not know that American 11 had been hijacked until she learned of it from a television report.

At the White House, Vice President Cheney had just sat down for a meeting when an assistant told him about the first plane crash. Someone turned on the television as Cheney sat wondering "how the hell could a plane hit the World Trade Center." But that meeting, and others scheduled in the White House and throughout official Washington, continued as planned, even as the participants watched TV to get updates. It was only after the second plane hit the World Trade Center that the senior leadership of the U.S. government even realized the country was under attack.
The president, as we all now know, was seated in a Florida classroom when, at 9:05 a.m., Chief of Staff Andrew Card whispered to him: "A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack." President Bush remained in the classroom for five or so additional minutes while children continued to read to him, but then left to consult with advisors in a nearby holding room. What is striking from this section of the report is that no real decisions were made by the president and his on-site team in Florida. The focus, as the report says, "was on the President's statement to the nation." (In politics, it seems, the focus is always on the "message," even at moments of total crisis.) The only decision made during this time "was to return to Washington," but of course even that did not happen immediately.

Even after the president and other senior officials fully realized what was happening, they were still impeded by communications problems. President Bush testified to the commission that he was frustrated with poor communications that morning -- and not all of the official communication that morning was ever documented. A distressing example of such documentary gaps is Vice President Cheney's order to shoot down hijacked commercial aircraft that refused requests to divert and land. Cheney claims that he talked by phone with the president about combat air patrols (CAPS) over U.S. airspace and about the authorization for CAPS pilots to shoot down hostile aircraft. According to the chronology of events that morning and the testimony of numerous witnesses, this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15 a.m. But there is no documented evidence that the phone call took place. And people in the room with Dick Cheney, including his wife Lynne and his chief of staff Scooter Libby, do not remember the vice president and the president having a phone conversation during these crucial minutes. (Equally distressing to learn is that the vice president was acting on information from the Secret Service and the FAA about an incoming plane approaching Washington airspace - in fact, it was United 93, the fourth and last hijacked plane - but by the time the vice president began communicating shoot-down orders directly to air defense pilots, United 93 had already crashed in Pennsylvania.) Moreover, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was never consulted about the shoot-down order, despite his critical position in the military chain of command. (Perhaps this did not matter; according to the report,
after learning of the second strike in New York, Rumsfeld simply returned to the intelligence meeting that was underway in his office.)

As the commission report concludes, the U.S. was essentially improvising a homeland defense strategy on the morning of September 11th, 2001. The defense of American airspace that morning "was not conducted in accord with pre-existing training and protocols...it was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction." Because of this, our air defenders had scarcely nine minutes of early warning about the first aircraft and no advance notice on any of the remaining three planes.

The second area of government operations upon which the 9/11 report shines its light is intelligence and law enforcement. George Tenet famously told the commission that the "system was blinking red" during the summer of 2001. Officials in the U.S. and across the world were alerted to the fact that intelligence indicated evidence of a significant and potentially devastating terrorist threat. But as we know now, no one "connected the dots." George Tenet, for example, received a briefing in late August 2001 about terrorist suspect Zacarias Moussaoui entitled "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly," but there is no evidence that the FBI, which had earlier arrested Moussaoui because of a visa overstay, was told of this briefing. Indeed, there is not even evidence to show that either the FBI's acting director or counter-terrorism director was ever briefed on the Moussaoui case prior to 9/11. As the commission concludes, "No connection was made between Moussaoui's presence in the United States and the threat reporting during the summer of 2001."

At lower levels of the intelligence and law enforcement hierarchy, there are tantalizing glimpses of hard-working agents who seemed to have grasped what might be afoot. In one conversation, again about Moussaoui, an FBI headquarters agent complains to the local FBI manager in Minneapolis that his local agents are couching their reporting "in a manner intended to get people 'spun up.' The supervisor responded that was precisely his intent. He said he was 'trying to keep someone from taking a plane and crashing into the World Trade Center.' The headquarters agent replied that this was not going to happen and that they did not know if Moussaoui was a terrorist."
The 9/11 report concludes that in large part the failure of the intelligence community to detect and prevent the terrorist assault was a "failure of imagination." Not only did the U.S. government not imagine the full fury that al Qaeda might unleash, it could not even decide whether al Qaeda should be considered a "first-order threat." Was terrorism just a nuisance that "killed a score of Americans every 18-24 months," or was al Qaeda the "point of the spear of radical Islam?" Before the 9/11 attacks, that question was never answered because "no one forced the argument into the open by calling for a national [intelligence] estimate or a broader discussion of the threat...the issue was never joined as a collective debate by the U.S. government, including the Congress, before 9/11."

Now, of course, that debate is joined. The Bush administration launched major military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The recent Bush v. Kerry presidential contest featured ongoing discussion about how best to deal with terrorism. Congress has passed anti-terror legislation, such as the USA Patriot Act, and created new government agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security, and now debates the intelligence reform recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Whether all of these policies make sense is the subject for another article, but one must conclude that the Commission has done the country a real service - the final report does indeed fulfill the commission's mandate to examine all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 9/11 attacks. Readers of the final report will confront some very uncomfortable facts about how the U.S. government failed to imagine the worst-case scenario and then, when it happened, stumbled around clumsily, unsure of what to do, unsure even of itself. But we are better off for knowing this. The 9/11 commission has done America a lasting favor by showing that it is possible to make the country stronger and more secure - not by ignoring our weaknesses and our failures, but by facing them.

DR. JOSEPH FERRARA
Georgetown Public Policy Institute
The supervisor responsible for the decision, however, insisted he had not been informed of the Morocanou incident and made no advance notice on any of the remaining three planes. The incident, he claimed, was a technical error. A flight by the Swiss International Airlines, he said, had been delayed due to mechanical problems with the aircraft. The problem was resolved, he added, and the flight was scheduled to depart within the hour. He apologized for the inconvenience and assured passengers that they would be informed of any further delays.

Despite the incident, the supervisor maintained that the incident was isolated and not indicative of any broader issues. He assured passengers that all flights would depart on time and that their safety was the primary concern. He thanked everyone for their patience and apologized for any inconvenience caused by the unexpected delays.
Public Opinion and Policy:
A Review of *The Mediating Effect of Public Opinion on Public Policy: Exploring the Realm of Health Care*

The path of United States health care policy over the past fifteen years points to the amazing complexity involved in changing the health care system. At a time when health care costs were rising at alarming rates and concerns about the uninsured population were growing, broad changes were proposed in the Clinton Health Security Act. The subsequent failure of this policy is likely to remain an important marker from Clinton's first term as president. Subsequent changes in health care policy have been more incremental, including expansions in insurance coverage for children through SCHIP (State Children's Health Insurance Program), state-level market reforms of the small group and individual insurance markets, and most recently, expansions in Medicare to provide prescription drug coverage to seniors. Why did health care policy over the past fifteen years take the path that it did? What are the factors that lead a policy to be successful? When is society likely to get substantial reforms rather than incremental reforms? All of these questions are addressed at some level in Richard Chard's compelling book, *The Mediating Effect of Public Opinion on Public Policy: Exploring the Realm of Health Care."

Chard, a political scientist, contends that understanding the path of public policy requires a broader understanding of the role

of public opinion in informing policy. In this book, Chard takes a systematic approach to make the case for the important role that public opinion plays in the health policy arena. He first argues that policy changes are path dependent - that it is not possible to analyze public policy outside the broader context of how policy has evolved over time. Chard then recognizes that policy changes can either be incremental in nature (e.g., SCHIP was adopted as an expansion to Medicaid and its expansions) or more fundamental in nature (e.g., the adoption of Medicare). Given the dynamic nature of policy change, he asserts that the factors that allow fundamental policy change occur only under very special circumstances. In making his argument, he makes extensive use of the history of health care policy and provides an excellent overview of how health policy has evolved over the last fifty years.

The main premise of Chard's work is that public opinion plays an important role in the formulation and adoption of policy. One of the strengths of Chard's work is his reliance on sophisticated econometric techniques to ascertain the role of public opinion. Initially, he focuses on the role of public opinion using time series analysis to show that public opinion does affect federal health care spending (as a percentage of total health care spending). He then recognizes the need to establish paths by which public opinion can affect health care policy and concentrates on the role of public opinion in shaping the actions of the president. Using a sample selection econometric framework and time series data on presidents, he estimates two equations: 1) the likelihood of the president making a health policy proposal; and 2) conditional upon proposing legislation, the likelihood that a presidential health care policy initiative is successful. The main explanatory variable of interest in the model is the health policy attitude of the public but there are important controls for the political climate (including the political attitudes of the president and the House and Senate). In these models, Chard finds strong evidence that public attitudes affect the likelihood that the president will propose legislation and that presidential popularity and the political climate affect the president's success with his policy initiatives. He uses his empirical results to then scrutinize the experience of President Johnson with respect to Medicaid and Medicare and contrasts the situation with President Clinton's experience with the Health Security Act. Chard argues
that the climate was right for the fundamental changes during the Johnson presidency and that the political climate that faced Clinton (i.e., a much more conservative climate) significantly lowered the likelihood that Clinton would be successful with the Health Security Act.

The second half of Chard's book focuses more specifically on the Health Security Act. He argues that the complexities of the Health Security Act and the public's ability to process the features of the proposal played an important role in shaping public opinion. Voters who were more knowledgeable about the Health Security Act had stronger reactions to the Act (with knowledgeable Clinton voters having an increased likelihood of supporting the Act and Bush voters having a decreased likelihood of supporting the Act). The fact that the Health Security Act was complex for the average citizen to understand also meant that there were opportunities for opponents of the Act to use information to try to sway support away from the proposal.

The remaining two main chapters of the book specifically deal with the issue of whether the "Harry and Louise" advertisement campaigns (sponsored by the Health Insurance Association of America) that were opposed to the Health Security Act were successful in changing public opinion of the Health Security Act specifically and of voting intentions in the 1996 Presidential election. Additional evidence was gathered using an experimental design to see whether exposure to a health care plan proposal affected preferences for Bill Bradley as a presidential candidate (who had been more vocal at the time about making health care a significant part of his campaign agenda) and Al Gore as a presidential candidate (who had not, at the time, pushed the health policy agenda). Overall, Chard found that exposure to the "Harry and Louise" ads were successful in shaping public opinion away from support of the Health Policy Act, especially for those individuals who were not especially knowledgeable about health care policy. Moreover, intentions to vote for Clinton were negatively associated with exposure to the "Harry and Louise" ads and the experiment indicated that prospective voters who were exposed to a health policy proposal account did not alter ratings of Gore but exposure to the health care policy proposal by conservative voters lowered support for Bradley (but raised support for Bradley among more liberal voters).
This book is accessible to a wide audience and is very readable. Chard chooses his arguments carefully and presents them in a forthcoming manner. My main concerns with the analysis are twofold: First and most important, aside from discussing the role of the media, Chard provides little discussion of how public opinion is formed. In fact, the analyses in the book assume that public opinion is taken as given. The evolution of public opinion is itself of general interest and probably evolves in a complicated manner that reflects not only the influence of the President and other politicians but also influence by other players who are affected by health care policy. For example, there is little or no mention of the role of providers and insurers in steering public policy and public opinion in certain directions. Understanding the motives of these different participants in the process and how they act to influence the political process (and public opinion) seems like an important aspect for understanding health care policy. Second, while the book is generally very well written, there are redundancies across the chapters that reflect the fact that they are not as well integrated with each other as they should be. The main advantage of that approach is that many of the chapters are relatively self contained; the disadvantage is that much of the introductory sections in the chapters are quite similar to one another.

Overall, this book represents a systematic and careful analysis of the role of public opinion and its effect on health care policy. Chard successfully weaves his arguments together in a reasonably sophisticated way by using data and econometric tools to evaluate his main hypotheses. The organization of the book is highly readable and should be accessible to readers with a variety of backgrounds since most of the details of the empirical work are contained in a technical appendix, which is also readable. This book will provide an interesting overview for those individuals who are interested in the evolution of health care policy and want to learn more about the role of public opinion. It will appeal to both political scientists who are interested in the role of the public in shaping policy, as well as readers who want to gain an understanding of the political context for policy formulation.

Dr. Barbara Schone
Georgetown University
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