THE MILITARY IMPERATIVE FOR THE LIBERAL ARTS

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By

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ABSTRACT

After more than a decade of war involving close and often personal interaction with people of other cultures, beliefs, and customs, the Army is once again turning its attention to the need to re-establish its competence and capacity for conventional, force-on-force combat. As seen in past historical patterns of post-conflict reorientation, the Army is trumpeting its high technology edge and its anticipation of future high technology advances. Unfortunately, as captured in public statements and regulatory guidance, the Army concurrently champions an undergraduate education in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines for its future leaders in the precommissioning phase of professional military education (PME). However, that endorsement of a STEM education stands in direct opposition to the leadership narrative that emerges through close textual reading and analysis of the many publications addressing leadership and leader preparation. This narrative clearly emphasizes outcomes that can only be met through a broad-based education best accomplished through a liberal arts education.

The national security establishment is a massive bureaucracy. Unsurprisingly, it publishes thousands of documents that serve to direct, guide, or suggest actions to the armed services in the execution of their duties. Starting with the National Security Strategy published by the White House, and following the cascading narrative thread
through the various textual levels of the establishment—Congress, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ending in this case with the U.S. Army—a distinct and ever-more specific discussion of leader expectations, knowledge, attributes, and competencies are identified. With specific attention to the Army, this textual narrative thread belies the public statements supporting STEM education.

Unsurprisingly, given the massive amount of written texts, contradictions arise. However, this particular contradiction carries implications beyond the normal. When the future officer graduates from college and is commissioned as a new second lieutenant, he or she immediately assumes responsibility for soldiers assigned to his or her platoon and for leading them across a full range of missions from direct combat to post-conflict stability operations in a foreign location surrounded by indigenous populations to defense support to civilian authorities within the United States. The human complexity of the lieutenant’s responsibilities argues for the liberal arts as the optimum precommissioning education for the future officer.

Using literature as its primary example, the thesis argues that a liberal arts education is the best means of producing the leaders that the Army itself has described in its own literature as ideal. The argument is made through first person teaching examples, a literary theory of how literature study supports the learner, examination of recent, empirical research on the role of reading fiction and need for cognitive closure, and recent work on the multi-faceted cognition of the integrative thinker. Consequently, the close alignment of these outcomes with the textually defined leadership model will support the conclusion that a liberal arts education is the more appropriate and helpful undergraduate education during the precommissioning PME.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Bringing to conclusion a project such as this can be accomplished in isolation, but such is inconceivable to me. Without the support and encouragement of family and friends, I would still be struggling to finish this undertaking. Loving thanks and gratitude first to my family: to my wife, Kendra, who sacrificed the most to allow me the time and space to indulge this personal goal, and to my children, Kathleen and Gregory, and their families, all who had a role to play to see me through to the finish. Thanks also to the 2010 DLS cohort and other friends in the program who provided much food for thought and sharp insights during our regular gatherings. The positive reinforcement of my undertaking by colleagues both uniformed and civilian from across the U.S. Army and Department of Defense served to provide welcome validation at critical junctures in this effort. Undertaking an academic challenge of this rigor after many years of absence from the classroom was made easier by the guidance and professionalism of the professors in the Liberal Studies program and on my committee with whom I had the pleasure to interact in the classroom; you reawakened a joy of learning long buried under everyday concerns. Thanks also to the Woodward Library staff at Austin Peay State University, and especially Elaine Berg, for outstanding support in answering my frequent requests for source materials necessitated by my geographic dislocation from Georgetown. Finally, warm thanks to Dewey and Helga Browder, Anne Ridder, Michael Nason, Martin and Carolyn Kleiner, and Robert Maginnis for the advice, patience, and friendship you extended to me throughout the entire endeavor.
CONTENTS

COPYRIGHT........................................................................................................ii
ABSTRACT...........................................................................................................iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................v
ILLUSTRATIONS...............................................................................................vii
ABBREVIATIONS...............................................................................................viii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................1
CHAPTER 2. HEIRARCHIES, NARRATIVES, AND ENVIRONMENTS.................19
CHAPTER 3. THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE..............................51
CHAPTER 4. THE ARMY PERSPECTIVE ON LEADERSHIP...............................108
CHAPTER 5. LEADER DEVELOPMENT.............................................................130
CHAPTER 6. THE REPETITIVE PATTERN........................................................150
CHAPTER 7. THE INTEGRATIVE LEADER.........................................................170
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................194
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures
1. Army Doctrinal Hierarchy ................................................................. 66
2. A Schematic View of the Army Profession ........................................... 75
3. Cognitive Hierarchy ........................................................................ 92
4. Army Leadership Requirements Model ................................................. 111
5. Army Values .................................................................................. 112
6. Army Leader Development Model ................................................... 134
7. Officer Learning Continuum ............................................................... 141

Tables
1. Hierarchy of defense-related national strategic direction ...................... 21
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Army Capstone Concept</td>
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<td>AOC</td>
<td>Army Operating Concept</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
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<td>ALDM</td>
<td>Army Leader Development Model</td>
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<td>ALDP</td>
<td>Army Leader Development Program</td>
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<td>ALDS</td>
<td>Army Leader Development Strategy</td>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
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<td>ASPG</td>
<td>Army Strategic Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>BOLC</td>
<td>Basic Officer Leaders Course</td>
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<td>CCJO</td>
<td>Capstone Concept for Joint Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSG</td>
<td>Defense Strategic Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JIIM</td>
<td>Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>Line of effort</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>OES</td>
<td>Officer Education System</td>
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<td>PAM</td>
<td>Pamphlet</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional military education</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>Political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Regionally aligned force</td>
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<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECARMY</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics</td>
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<td>TAP</td>
<td>The Army Plan</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

[T]hose who have the germ of leadership would develop it badly if they applied themselves solely to military subjects. Power of mind implies a versatility that one does not obtain through exclusive practice of one’s profession….The real school of leadership is therefore general culture. Through it the mind learns to act in orderly fashion to distinguish the essential from the trivial, to recognize developments and causes of interference, in short, to educate itself to a level where the whole can be appreciated without prejudice to the shades of difference within it.

---General Charles DeGaulle, The Army of the Future

As a young French Army Captain teaching at the prestigious St Cyr military academy in 1934, Charles DeGaulle, a World War I veteran, produced a vision of a future French military force capable of defending France in the event of another war similar to World War I. In retrospect, it was a prescient visualization not only of French vulnerability, but of the armored warfare, combined arms operations, and force structure which would generally be vindicated during World War II with interesting congruence between the armored forces of both the Allied and Axis powers. Yet, throughout the

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1 Charles de Gaulle, The Army of the Future (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1941), 171. This is an unattributed translation of DeGaulle’s Vers l’Armée de Métier (Toward a Professional Army) written in 1934 when he was a Captain detailed to Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale.

2 Time, “Man of the Year,” January 5, 1959, http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=3&sid=038f2d60-b791-4097-91df-0de7a34d03ae%40sessionmgr4004&hid=4201&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLHVpZCZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWNvUmY2cG9zLmZjZjEwYmY%3d#db=aph&AN=54195434 (accessed August 3, 2013). The critiques and proposals made by de Gaulle were directly opposed to the prevailing doctrines of the static defense and massed infantry formations which were supported by the French senior military leadership. De Gaulle’s name was removed from the 1936 promotion list due to this
text, there is a notable thread of insight that stands out from the largely technological and organizational treatments tied to his contemporary situation, a focus on the human dimension of the military enterprise. DeGaulle’s support of the enduring human dimension as the linchpin to military operational success as opposed to the contemporaneous technical advances of the times closely corresponds to the situation faced by the military community today.

As many commanders before and since DeGaulle have learned, and as DeGaulle emphasizes, war is inherently a human undertaking: “It is true that modern equipment [i.e., radio] makes possible, technically speaking, this concentration of scattered units. But it does not prevent man from remaining the foundation of the whole: so that technical evolution demands more military solidarity than ever.” By solidarity, he means that ineffable bond of trust that exists between the members of a unit to include the essential link between leader and follower. DeGaulle continually returns to topics such as *esprit de corps*, morale, and cohesion of units. Finally, though he touches upon the topic of leadership throughout, he devotes the entire final chapter to a discussion of it.

It is in this discussion that DeGaulle identifies the most critical aspect of leader development as indicated in the epigraph. Warning against a too narrow focus of an officer’s education and study, he concisely captures the entire educational project for

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future officers, that is, “general culture.” Such study arms the mind with a discriminating cognition that allows it “to educate itself to a level where the whole can be appreciated without prejudice to the shades of difference within it.” This ability to grasp the whole despite possible variances in the particulars provides fledgling leaders a cognitive basis on which to build the foundations for their future roles, for their engagement with the human dimension of war. From such a foundation, all future military education and training can build as an individual progresses and encounters ever more complex situations. Hence, the military establishment does have an imperative to broadly educate its future officers, and the best way to meet this imperative is through the liberal arts. Yet this approach with its attendant benefits remains controversial in the present day of digitization, high technology, and virtual war.

It is this concentration on the human dimension and commissioned officer leader development with which this thesis is concerned. More specifically, it explores the question of how best to educate our future officers to assume their duties as leaders of units and managers of violence in a future of persistent conflict routinely characterized as complex and ambiguous. While the primary warrant for any United States (U.S.) Army officer is, and will always remain, how to lead one’s unit in battle so as to achieve the mission objective, the environment of the twenty-first century presents leadership challenges far more numerous than this sole concern. Many of these challenges do not involve the application of force; they are human engagement issues which require broad understanding of the human condition, cultural apprehension, and critical thinking. At

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4 The terms “officer” and “leader” are interchangeable in that every officer is considered a leader. Context will dictate which term is used.
the same time, however, the call for technologically proficient leaders given the continuing growth of high technology capabilities in the military is re-emerging. The educational question is this: how best to reconcile these seemingly incompatible requirements?

The Army has a robust commitment to the training and education of its officer corps.\(^5\) Commissioned officer professional military education (PME) spans a military career from the precommissioning programs such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) through to the attainment of general officer rank. Interspersed along this career spectrum are specific training courses focused on task performance, skills, and competencies as career progression or specific assignments may require. As will be seen, though some attempt is made in the literature to differentiate between education and training, the two terms are often used interchangeably or even grouped together inappropriately. The implications of this language use will bear directly on the proposal for the liberal arts.

This thesis will pay special attention to the precommissioning phase of the PME continuum which encompasses the undergraduate education and institutional training of officer candidates in preparation for their commissioning as second lieutenants upon graduation from their educational institution.\(^6\) The argument proposes a liberal arts


\(^6\) There are four sources of accessing lieutenants: The U.S. Military Academy (USMA), ROTC, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and direct commissioning. The first two programs include conferral of a baccalaureate degree. OCS, however, has no specific educational outcome. However, each OCS candidate is required to already possess a baccalaureate degree upon selection. In this thesis, the focus is on those candidates enrolled in ROTC or USMA.
education as the most beneficial course of study for an officer candidate. As will be argued, there is a dissonance between the Army narrative on leadership and leader expectations versus its public support for baccalaureate degrees in the STEM—science, technology, engineering, mathematics—disciplines. A close reading and explication of the Army narrative, especially regarding leader development and the challenges future leaders will face, will expose both the explicit and implicit factors favoring a liberal arts education. Following this, an examination of the liberal arts and the benefits to be gained from the study of the liberal arts, to include specific examination of selected disciplines, will indicate how such an education best prepares officer candidates for their future responsibilities and challenges.

**The Challenge**

To recruit, educate, and train future officers is not a simple task. Officer development is closely tied to a larger framework from which is distilled those desirable attributes and competencies to which officer education and training is oriented across the entire career spectrum. Starting with the National Security Strategy published by the White House, there is a cascade of documents and directives from which future force structure, materiel acquisition, and personnel development is extracted and refined by each service to its own ends.

As more than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan concludes, the entire U.S. military establishment, and more specifically here, the Army, has defined a vision of the future operating environment to guide the subsequent development of strategies, concepts, doctrines, and capabilities which will direct the Army’s future development. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has primary responsibility for
leading the Army in this effort supported by the Headquarters staff and other subordinate elements. In its primary concept document, the *Army Capstone Concept*, TRADOC captures a general characterization of the operating environment. Some descriptors of that future environment include “complex,” “ambiguous,” “uncertain,” and “volatile.” However, and most compelling for a future leader, it also includes acknowledgement of the human dimension. “Complexity as an element of the operational environment is not new. However, the lens through which complexity is viewed changes over time. *Fog, friction, chance, and uncertainty are all the result of human interaction. Taken together, these interactions produce the complexity in any given environment.*”

Trying to identify the future threat toward which to orient the future force is not an easy task.

An additional internal issue of fiscal uncertainty due to an inevitable post-conflict downsizing and the effects of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (i.e., the sequester) also complicates the Army’s ability to plan. Consequently, senior leadership is challenged to discern best choices for future forces so that they are capable of providing the necessary land forces and capabilities if called upon by the national command authorities.

There are a number of frameworks used by the Army to guide thinking on capabilities, systems, doctrine, etc. The most common guiding Army framework focused on developing integrated change recommendations has seven elements: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). “DOTMLPF is a problem-solving construct for assessing current capabilities and managing change. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of

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adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. Change deliberately executed across DOTMLPF elements enables the Army to improve its capabilities to provide dominant landpower to the joint force.”

However, the Army faces a dichotomy with which it must struggle in making informed choices about the composition and capabilities of the future force. On the one hand, after almost ten years of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, certain conventional warfighting skills such as “fires in support of maneuver forces,” have atrophied. Executing combined arms maneuver within the joint force context is a significant challenge in terms of coordination and synchronization and requires intensive training to achieve full mastery. The concerns about conventional warfighting capabilities come from those who claim certain countries around the world, such as North Korea or China, have the capability to engage the United States in conventional warfare and, consequently, we must be ready for that peer eventuality. Aspects of conventional warfare include hierarchal command chains, coherent unit formations maneuvering against a similar adversary, force ratios, logistics mass, and battlefield geometry. Most of these concepts imply a linear, mechanistic approach to warfare. In this type of scenario, the senior officers can exercise tighter control over subordinate units than in COIN.

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9 Sean MacFarland, Michael Shields, and Jeffrey Snow, White Paper: The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s ability to provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders (2007), http://www.npr.org/documents/2008/may/artillerywhitepaper.pdf (accessed February 19, 2013). This example pertains to the field artillery branch specifically, though Air Defense Artillery and Armor branches face similar problems. This was personal correspondence to the Chief of Staff of the Army from these three senior field commanders.
On the other hand, the Army today is the world’s premier COIN force after more than a decade of hard lessons and fruitful learning. The challenge: COIN focuses on small units acting in an independent, decentralized manner, working with other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and local populations. The leaders of these small units are often lieutenants or non-commissioned officers such as platoon sergeants. Within the local population, these small units work with national institutions, politicians, engineers, business people, religious leaders, and the general population. Working through interpreters also challenges them. In executing a COIN operational plan, senior leaders must delegate to these junior leaders full responsibility for tactical COIN missions. Senior leaders must trust lieutenants and non-commissioned officers to make decisions with possible strategic consequences. As opposed to the coherence of the conventional force formation, forces configured for COIN are marked by fragmentation.

Yet this is not about making a discrete choice either way; both capabilities are necessary. The question then becomes how best to balance the different requirements demanded by both alternatives? In assessing the requirements, there are multiple considerations. Personnel recruitment and retention; budgetary authority; research and development; equipment development and maintenance: these and other factors all bear on the range of possibilities. To the extent possible, Army planners strive to coordinate requirements across all of these domains while maximizing the return on its budget appropriations. This is an intensive analytic endeavor, and many different strands of effort lead to the mission-ready soldiers and unit formations needed to respond to an eventuality. It is not within the scope of this thesis to explore each of these strands.
Rather, a single strand bearing directly on the future force is its focus: the precommissioning education of our officer candidates to prepare them to assume their duties as leaders of these soldiers and military formations.

The future leaders of this emerging force are now or soon will be in college for their precommissioning education through the military academies or ROTC. The Army is responsible for the preparation of these young men and women who are already anticipating this future environment. Yet the Army is actively encouraging them to undertake STEM degrees. Anticipating a future culture marked by continuing digitization and technological advances, the implication is that leaders of the future must be STEM graduates in order to be effective officers. This belief flies in the face of the leadership narrative to be traced in coming chapters. As asserted herein, and as captured in the many leadership narratives, a return to the liberal arts at the undergraduate level is what will best prepare officer candidates for the leadership challenges they will face upon entry onto active duty in the future.

Thrust into direct leadership roles upon reporting to their first units, these young officers immediately encounter the human dimension of leadership on multiple levels. First, their unit personnel are a varied mix of backgrounds such as socio-economic, ethnic, gender, and religious. The young officer is expected not just to know the soldier but to have some feel, some understanding, of the soldier: his or her situation, needs, aspirations, strengths, weaknesses, etc. There is a cultural aspect here when discerning such knowledge across various socioeconomic, gender, and ethnic lines.

Additionally, the young officers may find themselves executing security missions in which they operate independent of their normal Army formations, not only as part of a
multinational force with its mix of cultures and beliefs, but also interacting with local populations of foreign countries. Again, interpersonal skills, cultural understanding, and religious and social sensitivities will be needed. Critical and creative thinking will be required. They will be challenged on all fronts—physical, mental, moral—in this volatile world.

Yet in all circumstances, the largest challenge to the young officer is present in the very nature of the calling: the commitment of young men and women to actions which could result in death. Only those who have been in such a position can truly know the personal toll of such decisionmaking. The Army works hard to arm the young officer with the tools to deal with this situation. Such efforts include a vigorous Army Values campaign and the propagation of other creeds and codes designed to support right conduct.⁰

It is the contention here that a liberal arts education best meets the interests of both the officer candidate and the Army. Thoughtful engagement with ideas of the great philosophers or attentive reflection on diverse characters and situations of the great writers inevitably demand that judgments be made and thus contribute to the formation of a character able to deal with the demands of the position. Such an education enhances the future officer’s apprehension of the Army Values and other creeds and norms governing his or her conduct. Additionally, such work provides a stable foundation to the new officer for continued personal growth and professional development as his or her career progresses.

⁰ DA, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, The Army Profession (Washington, DC, June 14, 2013), B-1—B-8. A complete list of such texts can be found in Appendix B, “Oaths, Creeds, and Norms of Conduct.”
Leadership

The subject of military leadership has enjoyed widespread attention from writers over the centuries stretching from Homer’s *Iliad* and Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* to the explosion of such personal memoirs and journalistic treatments flowing from the decade-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as British Army Captain Patrick Hennessey’s *Killing Time and Fighting Wars* to journalist Tom Ricks’ *Fiasco* and *The Gamble*. The general topic of leadership spans many disciplines and genres: literature (e.g., biography, memoir, fiction, drama, poetry), history, philosophy, management, psychology, organizational effectiveness, the new sciences, political science, etc. These many facets of the topic attest to the continued fascination with the inherent power attending any leadership position, much less the power to order young men and women into life-threatening situations.

In the military context, the study of leadership flows from the entry of new officers into the profession of arms to the upper reaches of the general officer ranks providing strategic leadership to the force. More pertinently here, the newly minted lieutenant shoulders tremendous professional and personal responsibility for the training and well-being of subordinates and for solving complex challenges encountered in the process of exercising the command authority granted them upon their commission. Most powerfully, they are socially chartered to wield deadly force if necessary.

There is no dearth of materials suggesting how to be an effective leader. Diverse volumes by such civilian leadership experts as Warren Bennis, Peter Senge, Margaret Wheatley, Peter Drucker, James MacGregor Burns, and Tom Peters, to name but a few, offer various formulae for achieving success as a leader. These works identify critical
leadership characteristics or offer procedural methods by which to lead an organization successfully.

The military community is aware of this body of work. However, the military itself has been engaged in its own research on leadership and leader development given its unique position as a purveyor of force when so directed by the national command authorities. The Army has created its own professional body of knowledge on the topic reaching back across the centuries. In addition to foundational publications dealing directly with the subject of leadership in the military context, the Army promotes a set of Army Values to be inculcated in all service members, but leaders are especially prompted to learn, reflect on, and embrace them as markers for their behavior. Other venues for the evolution of leader development theory are the multiple, respected military journals such as *Military Review, Parameters*, and *Joint Force Quarterly*. Such journals routinely feature essays addressing the unique topic of military leadership for dissemination of and debate on the most current research and proposals on the topic.

In most cases, the authors of these military journal articles identify an asserted unique perspective on how to better execute leadership responsibilities and duties. Additionally, recommendations are often made in regards to how to enact the new perspective. Rarely does an author identify exactly how to educate the prospective leader nor does the author clearly identify where in the PME spectrum such education should occur. Nonetheless, as will be seen, broad official command guidance does exist in which the various stages of PME are specified and the focus of each stage is explicated.11

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In sum, over the course of a career, a military leader is routinely bombarded with materials designed to make her or him a better leader. Much of this on-going education is a self-developmental effort, marked with select in-residence educational and training opportunities throughout one’s career. Yet the potential of a liberal arts education as the optimal foundational basis for future service as a military officer is lost in the popular perception of a “high tech” future requiring an officer to be more managers of technology than leaders of a human enterprise.

The Army’s Narrative

As stated earlier, the Army has a substantive and detailed leader development program which spans the entire length of an officer’s career from pre-commissioning to general officer. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that it consists simply of a compilation of materials from the overwhelming number of leadership texts flooding the bookshelves. Just as with any other aspect of preparing for its preeminent mission of unified land operations, the Army has invested valuable resources developing its own unique body of knowledge and producing a program which results in an officer ready to assume the duties of the rank to which he or she ascends. This program, though, is just one of numerous textual efforts which compose the master Army narrative. This specific sub-narrative on leadership and leader development, however, is not developed tabula rasa, but rather is constructed based on other narrative texts which originate at the national command level as well as from the Army’s historical experience.

The U.S. national security enterprise originates with the President in his role as

Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. In keeping with the long-held democratic principle of civilian control of the military, the first level of policy, doctrine, and guidance documents affecting the military originates at the political level. At the apex of a massive textual undertaking is the National Security Strategy from which all other military documents flow. Immediately below the NSS in precedence is the National Defense Strategy that originates from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) followed by the National Military Strategy which is produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Interspersed at these three levels are various other policy and guidance documents which bear directly on the military services. However, these documents, while seeming far removed from the leader development and educational concerns of officer candidates, actually provide the basis for subsequent mission analysis and DOTMLPF recommendations by the military services. Consequently, a cascade of increasingly detailed documentation is produced as one traces the specific development of topics unique to each military service’s roles and missions.

The Army’s analyses of these higher level documents and the composing of its service narrative are performed by headquarters’ staff elements as well as discrete organizational elements across the force. The primary organization within the Army responsible for its narrative is TRADOC. As the Commanding General states it, “Victory starts here – by recruiting, training and educating the Army that fights today while leading the human and structural transitions which build an Army that understands,”

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12 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Defense (Washington, DC: January 3, 2012). In 2011, the President ordered a strategic review which was published in January 2012. This new strategic guidance document serves to lend currency to the three strategies between publication of new strategies.
adapts to and dominates future conflicts.” In executing its mission, TRADOC develops the Army narrative as conveyed in the many concepts and doctrine texts which drive the transitions noted above. Recall, however, the Army publishes its work only after analyzing the many policy, strategy, and joint doctrine and concepts which flow down from above and in so doing, ensures the Army narrative is nested appropriately with the higher level guidance and directives. Ultimately, this collection of documents results in the comprehensive Army narrative.

The topic of leadership is one of these many sub-narratives contributing to the larger Army narrative. As will be seen, the basic Army doctrine on leadership and leader development can be directly traced through the hierarchy of documents. Close textual analysis of these documents yield characteristics of the environment which a new officer will encounter, the missions that an officer may be expected to perform, and the values, attributes, and competencies desired in an officer. This material reflects the need for the broad-based education best achieved through the liberal arts.

**Officer Precommissioning Education**

The analysis of the Army narrative and selected sub-narratives, especially leader development, and the examination of the PME system and its desired outcomes at each level will identify the contradictions in the leader development program as it applies to the precommissioning education of officer candidates. Conversely, that same analysis

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14 DA, TRADOC, “Comprehensive Doctrine Guide,” http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/misc/doctrine/CDG/pub_type.html (accessed January 16, 2015). As of January 16, 2015, the most basic collection of Army doctrinal publications numbered 285. This does not include other texts such as concepts, regulations, pamphlets, etc.
will provide support for the worth of a liberal arts education to the future officer.

The practical worth of liberal arts education is under increasing attack in today’s society. The escalating cost of tuition in the face of a weakened economy, the emergence of new scientific disciplines, and the constant drumbeat of information technology clamoring for graduates with technical skills have seemingly pushed the liberal arts aside for those majors favoring the STEM disciplines. Ironically, in the face of an increasingly advanced technological Army, the Army’s own narrative identification of a future leader speaks to the value of a liberal arts education. Yet, STEM majors continue to be advocated.

The argument for the liberal arts will first address the definitional issue of what are the liberal arts. In many discussions across various commentators, it seems that liberal arts is often synonymous to the humanities. It is not. In broad terms, liberal arts here will subsume the humanities while adding the social sciences and the natural sciences. As will be seen, this difference in terms is critical in addressing the critique that STEM education is needed for the high tech future. The classic liberal arts education graduates students who are scientifically and numerically literate, and prepared for the technical training to be undertaken in the respective branch schools. A pure humanities curriculum may not do so.

Having established a common understanding of the composition of the liberal arts, the thesis will continue with an examination of multiple viewpoints on the benefits of the liberal arts that will be correlated with the extracted criteria from the Army leader narrative identified earlier. For example, when discussing the value of literature, most supporters posit qualitative benefits and outcomes such as moral improvement that are
difficult to measure. However, a recent approach focuses on the development of mental capacities fostered through the study of literature, specifically fiction, as a more realistic expectation of such study. Allied with this approach is research which suggests that reading fiction also helps mitigate a need for quick cognitive closure in decisionmaking. Originating out of the Desautels Centre for Integrative Thinking at the University of Toronto, the research method is quantitative and statistically valid.

**The Leader as Integrative Thinker**

Finally, the theme of integrative thinking will be carried through to pull together the desired leadership criteria for the future officer and the values of a liberal arts education. Drawing on the work of John Henry Newman, Frederick Aquino has synthesized a theory of “an integrative habit of mind,” a theory which is redolent of DeGaulle’s view of power of mind for a leader. Aquino describes such thinking as entailing “a stable disposition and a capacity to grasp how various pieces of data and areas of inquiry fit together in light of one another, thereby acquiring a more comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand. It also entails deciphering how this kind of understanding applies to a given situation.”¹⁵ This broad description of a cognitive process is in total consonance with the Army’s vision of the minds of its leaders.

In summary, the identification of the Army’s criteria for their future officers as identified in the knowledge, skills, attributes, and competencies extracted from the Army narrative and placed in the context of the future operational environment envisioned by

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senior Army leadership will strongly correlate to the outcomes of a liberal arts education. At the undergraduate, precommissioning stage of a future officer’s education, a liberal arts education will not only arm the future officer with the intellectual capacity to engage many of the imponderables of military service, but also provide a sufficient grounding in science and mathematics to successfully navigate the first years of their training and service. They will, in other words, have started the daunting task of nourishing the “germ of leadership” and building the versatile cognitive process which de Gaulle deemed so critical in 1934 and which continues to be critical today.
CHAPTER 2

HIERARCHIES, NARRATIVES, AND ENVIRONMENTS

The Army’s mission is to build forces capable of Unified Land Operations, able to operate effectively with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners across the range of military operations to provide capable and ready forces to combatant commanders in support of the National Security and National Defense Strategies, while sustaining and maintaining the quality of the All-volunteer Force.

--- Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development¹

The national security establishment within the U.S. is large and diverse. Stretching from the President down to the lowliest soldier, the military facet of this establishment is marked in part by civil-military relations, differing organizational cultures, and large bureaucracies. Consequently, a considerable number of texts in distinct genres such as strategies, concepts, doctrines, instructions, or directives are promulgated for the sake of command, control, and coherence. There are three discernable levels of authority with which this chapter is concerned: the national command level of the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level most often embodied in the CJCS; and the individual armed forces. ²

¹ DA, AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, 1.

² U.S. Code, Title 10, § 101 (a)(4 & 5)(1956, as amended), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/101 (accessed March 15, 2013). There are seven uniformed services across the Executive Branch: U.S. Army; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Navy; U.S. Air Force; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Corps. The first five services as a group are designated the “armed forces.”
The armed forces publish materials specific to their individual services. Many of these texts serve as narratives for both external and internal audiences to establish bases for the pursuit of varied outcomes such as share of development and acquisition budget dollars, assertion of service dominance (which is hoped to lead to budget authority), or identification of common service culture to build fealty among the ranks and provide a common vision and doctrinal language for operations. Additionally, the JCS structure imposes an overarching level of “joint” narrative which is intended to serve as unifying direction for joint force operations in which two or more services are involved. Finally, national command-level security strategies originating with the National Security Strategy published by the White House and buttressed by the SECDEF’s National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy from the CJCS serve as the capstone guidance documents from which all others flow.

Other important guidance documents exist, such as the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review submitted by the SECDEF, a periodic report in which the Department of Defense (DOD) addresses strategic choices and future priorities to guide

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4 There are two other major sources of direction for the Armed Forces. The statutory vehicle is U.S. Code Title 10 (1956, as further amended). The other is DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Washington, DC, December 21, 2010). These two documents specify very generic functions for which the departments are responsible, e.g., recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, and administering. For Department of the Army specifically, see U.S. Code, Title 10, § 3013(b)(1956, as amended).
resource investments. Additional guidance documents may be issued as deemed necessary. Most recently, one such document was published in January 2012. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* serves to update the previously published national security and defense strategies in light of the ending of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the nation’s fiscal environment (Table 1).

Table 1. Hierarchy of defense-related national strategic direction (as of February 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Proponent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security Strategy (NSS)</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Strategic Guidance(^a)</td>
<td>POTUS &amp; Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Strategy (NDS)</td>
<td>SECDEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)</td>
<td>SECDEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Military Strategy (NMS)</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Direction to the Joint Force(^b)</td>
<td>CJCS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^a\)This document is unique in that both POTUS and SECDEF signed it. It serves to update, but not replace, the NDS as well as the defense portions of the NSS.

\(^b\)This document is unique in that it serves to convey the priorities of a newly appointed CJCS while not superseding the NMS published by his predecessor.

While the analytic focus of these national-level documents most often centers on both the stated and implied budgetary impacts on, for example, force structure, on-going operations, and acquisition programs, the narratives embedded in these same documents trickle down to then direct or influence the strategies, concepts, force structures, and doctrines used by the Joint Staff and each service to fulfill both stated and implied missions extracted from these higher level documents. That trickle-down influence extends to the education and training of each individual service member. More particularly, given the expectations and responsibilities invested in officers by virtue of their commission, their preparation to assume leadership roles is a topic of specific

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\(^5\) The common usage shorthand for *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* is “Defense Strategic Guidance.” This shorthand will be used throughout this thesis except those few instances where use of the full title is appropriate.
interest as the services respond to their identified mission requirements. The Army’s leader development vision, for example, derives not solely from the combat experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also from other probable missions such as security cooperation activities, building partner capacity, or post-conflict stability operations with which it will be tasked. While competence in combat leadership is a timeless non-negotiable in all documents, other aspects of a leader development program emerge over time under the influence of the cascade of the various national command-level and joint narratives as well as, for instance, lessons drawn from current operations and leadership studies joined with projections of future operating environments and threats.

The national-command level guidance documents, in addition to postulating the future security environment and identifying technical and functional requirements, also establish a consistent thread of expected leadership competencies necessary to successfully engage and execute other missions and actions outside of direct combat. The thread of these other leader requirements weaves through the subordinate, successive layers of guidance and direction as one moves toward a service’s specific implementation of its leadership development program. Prior to examining the Army-specific materials, examination of the national-command level and Joint documents is necessary so as to identify the origins and development of requirements leading to Army-specific treatment.

**The National Security Strategy**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is at the apex of this framework of texts. It is the “mother narrative” of all other national security-related narratives to follow in its wake. Issued by the White House and signed by the President, the NSS outlines in broad terms the national security goals toward which the Administration is oriented and
identifies those actions which underpin the Administration’s approach to achieving such goals. It is the story of how the administration, using all the instruments of national power\(^6\), intends to achieve the vision it holds for the country’s national security. Of course, the environment within which the NSS is to be pursued is a critical analytical element embedded in this strategy and provides the frame in which future actions may be expected to take place. As will be seen, the means by which to meet the multiple identified challenges set the initial conditions on which the military services base all subsequent, subordinate strategies.

Asserting that there is “no shortage of challenges” to our national security in these complex times, the NSS characterizes the fluid environment as “a shifting security landscape,”\(^7\) identifying numerous threats to include proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pandemics, violent extremism and terrorism, criminal networks, and the consequences of failing states as just some of the considerations contributing to the complexity of the current environment.\(^8\) For these and all other threats, the NSS goes on to discuss how such threats can be addressed. Unilateral military action, of course, will be used when the national interest demands it.\(^9\) Yet, while one may think that the NSS is specifically focused on the nation, the President declares in his opening remarks that the


\(^8\) Ibid., 2.

\(^9\) Ibid., 8.
United States “will always uphold our commitments to allies and partners.”

The NSS further asserts that the U.S. embraces “our responsibilities for underwriting international security because it serves our interests, upholds our commitment to allies and partners, and addresses threats that are truly global.”

This commitment to other nations in the broader world view is subsequently expanded through the identification of various actions to be undertaken in conjunction with allies and partners. A notable implication flowing from this assertion is that the uniformed leaders charged with carrying out this expansive charge will themselves need to have the broader world views the NSS envisions as well as understand and tolerate other cultures and mores to successfully accomplish missions in such environments.

As the NSS delves into the interests of the nation, it lists six ways through which the U.S. plans to exercise the international leadership role it assumes. The role of capable partners spans all sectors of the national security arena, but implications for the military pervade the NSS. There are multiple references to the importance of, for example, working with allies and partners, reinforcing and modernizing alliances, building capacity of partners, training and equipping other forces, achieving interoperability, and enhancing collective action through training and exercises. These are some of the initial indications of the requirement for the U.S. military to engage with other nations’ institutions and forces. Obviously, not all “capable partner” engagements

10 Ibid., Presidential memorandum in front matter.

11 Ibid., 7.

12 Ibid., 2-5. The six ways are lead: with purpose; with strength; with capable partners; by example; with all instruments of U.S. power; and with a long term perspective.

13 Ibid., 7-10, 25.
need be purely military; other arenas can include business, education, diplomatic, or some combination of such engagements. But even here, when, for example, such an engagement topic may be global health, the deployment and contribution of a capable, trained military with sufficient capacity during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa illustrates the military’s role across multiple sectors working with a range of actors.  

Though the years of war at the start of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century may leave an observer to be more focused on the deterrence of conflict and the concept of military engagement with allied and partner nations, in addressing Homeland Security, the NSS introduces a “Whole of Community” approach by which to face adversity and build resilience. The military is a member here as this approach includes “individuals, local communities, the private and non-profit sectors, faith-based organizations, and all levels of government.” While seemingly far removed from the work of preparing military officers, this whole of community approach is yet another demand placed on the military. Not only will the military leader be required to interact with other nations’ populations, cultures, and militaries, but he or she will interact also with multiple and unique U.S. organizations, implicitly dealing with distinctly different organizational cultures, their methods of operations, and their weaknesses. A young platoon leader will be expected to work with all other such actors if his or her unit is committed to such missions.

The presidential prescriptions promulgated through the NSS, then, serve as a basis for the further mission analysis and associated requirements at each subsequent level of the Defense structure, with each level achieving ever-more specificity as to the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 13-14.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 8.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
fulfillment of their various missions.\textsuperscript{16} However, the emphasis on engagement and cooperation with other nations as well as within the U.S. interagency structure will trickle down to the Army’s identification of the knowledge, skills, and abilities required of its soldiers and leaders. As will be seen, such performance expectations far exceed the basic warfighting competencies instilled during officer precommissioning preparation and speak, rather, to one’s grasp of human nature best instilled through a broad, liberal education.

\textit{The National Defense Strategy}

The SECDEF is responsible for the \textit{National Defense Strategy} (NDS). As stated in the Foreword by the SECDEF, the NDS “outlines how [DOD] will contribute to achieving the NSS objectives.”\textsuperscript{17} In particular, the “need to strengthen new alliances and build new partnerships [and] work with others to defuse regional conflicts, to include conflict intervention” are key objectives.\textsuperscript{18} A current example of this is the Asia Pivot first announced in the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance in which the U.S. is expanding (Japan), revitalizing (Philippines), or establishing (Vietnam) alliances and building new partnerships. In keeping with the narrative form of these many texts, a discussion of the strategic environment from the DOD perspective is offered initially.

\textsuperscript{16} Just as this thesis was coming to closure on February 6, 2015, the White House issued a new NSS. This thesis reflects that new NSS, the discussion of NSS 2010 having been replaced. Interestingly, as a general assertion, the new NSS has no substantive provisions that require a reassessment of the overall analysis. However, one may expect a new string of subordinate strategies to be released over the coming months as the current strategies are revised to reflect the new NSS.

\textsuperscript{17} U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), \textit{National Defense Strategy} (Washington, DC: June 2008), Foreword.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 2.
Unlike the NSS, the NDS’ environmental analysis emphasizes military aspects of the complex challenges. In the near term, threats to international and regional stability, violent extremism, rise of peer or near-peer competitors, and actions of rogue states demand attention. But looking out, the future security environment may present even more uncertainty through the interaction of multiple trends. “[P]hysical pressures – population, resource, energy, climatic, and environmental – could combine with rapid social, cultural, technological, and geopolitical change to create greater uncertainty.” The ability to respond to this uncertain environment will depend on working effectively alongside “interdepartmental, non-governmental and international partners.” Once again, the need to interact with other organizational cultures outside of the military is highlighted. Here, however, is the first mention of working with non-governmental partners.

As the NDS continues, it identifies five objectives for DOD: Defend the Homeland; Win the Long War; Promote Security; Deter Conflict; and Win our Nation’s Wars. In keeping with the NSS, there is a consistent thread weaving through these objectives that focuses on the desire to act in concert with partners whenever possible. Winning the fight against violent extremism “requires partnership with old allies and new partners” and “[w]orking with and through local actors whenever possible” at all levels.

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 4.
21 Ibid., 5.
22 Ibid., 6.
from small teams up through full unit formations. Promoting security involves “building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners,” especially helping to “build the internal capacities of countries at risk.” The specifics of this engagement provide substance to the services as they discern their respective requirements.

The NDS lists many specific missions which the U.S. military could be called on to perform. However, in terms of partner engagement, the guidance presents numerous discrete requirements: “We will support, train, advise and equip partner security forces….We will assist other countries in improving their capabilities through security cooperation….“ These are specified missions which involve not only transferring warfighting skills, but also call for strong interpersonal skills, historical and cultural understanding, and when possible, foreign language capability. Also, turning to U.S.-specific requirements such as Homeland Defense, the whole of government approach is emphasized. But given the homeland defense role DOD fills, the players are not just the national departments and agencies, but also state and local governments. From this guidance, the Army starts to discern its possible future missions and consequently what

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23 Ibid., 8.

24 Ibid., 9.

25 Ibid., 17-18. Security cooperation is defined as, “Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. See U.S. DoD Directive 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, October 24, 2008, 11.

26 NDS, 17.
the future leader will face and the expectations for success thereto. The Army’s analysis will lead, in turn, to its own service-specific narratives across multiple areas of endeavor.

**Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense**

Also known in shorthand as the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), this guidance document with its five defense priorities for the 21st century seems to supersede the NDS. However, it is unusual in that both the President as Commander-in-Chief and SECDEF signed the document. A better perspective is that it updates the Defense-related portion of the NSS. It provides new mission direction in the form of ten specific priority missions for the Armed Services as well as overviewing resource information given the current situation of the conclusion of the Afghanistan combat mission and the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region in light of China’s military modernization, the increasing regional tensions over sovereignty issues, and North Korea’s continuing belligerence and nuclear ambitions. It also reflects an attempt to account for the deleterious effects of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (i.e., sequestration). The document is widely perceived as giving precedence to the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Army due to its emphasis on the Asia-Pacific pivot and explicit denial of any future operations requiring large land forces. Yet, beyond the existential service issues of budget authority and force structure, the narrative thread of increased engagement across the globe is ever-present. The President declares that the U.S. is “deepening partnerships to ensure regional security…and joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity.”

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throughout the document, and in so doing, it also offers further specific direction to the armed forces.

The currency of this document is reflected in the assessment of the strategic environment which has emerged over the past decade and how projections of trends into the future decade are perceived. The complex challenges and opportunities mentioned in all other documents are becoming “increasingly complex…to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied.”28 Ending the war in Afghanistan, the diminishing threat from Al Qa’ida, the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East to include the Maghreb, and the poor economic condition of the U.S. dictates a re-orientation of geographic focus as well as steps to reduce defense spending. Implicitly, this reduction includes reduction in force structure. Consequently, as the document goes on to stress, alliances and partnership building will be critical; the services can expect more interaction with other countries’ militaries in complex settings such as that found on the Korean peninsula when U.S. forces join in bilateral military exercises with the South Korean military while North Korea fires missiles and issues bellicose statements aimed at disrupting the continued U.S.-South Korean exercises.

Once again, engagement with standing alliance countries, the growth of new partner relationships, and building partnership capacity remain central in the absence of conflict and the maintenance of regional security and stability. The U.S. “will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations.” Such outcomes will be achieved by “relying on exercises, rotational presence,

28 Ibid., 1.
and advisory capabilities.” 29 By means of such on-the-ground relations, U.S. forces will provide a stabilizing presence. In addition, the capability for limited stability and counterinsurgency operations will be retained as will the ability to react to humanitarian, disaster relief, and mass atrocity situations. 30 Junior leaders will be at the forefront of such missions.

The guidance also continues the emphasis placed on the whole of government approach wherein the military, if even present, is not the only governmental entity addressing a particular challenge. Once again, specific guidance on expected missions and the ways in which they will be accomplished is provided the services for their mission analysis and subsequent force development decisions. 31

**Quadrennial Defense Review 2014**

The *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (QDR) is a Congressionally-mandated report in which SECDEF reports to Congress every four years on a number of topics relating to the status of national defense looking out twenty years. By law, topics include national defense strategy; force structure; force modernization plans; infrastructure; budget plan; and other defense programs and policies as necessary. 32 The QDR is a much

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29 Ibid., 3.

30 Ibid., 5-6.

31 Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, *In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance*, Congressional Research Service Report R42146, (Washington, DC, January 12, 2012). In one of the more pertinent assessments of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the Congressional Research Service specifically questioned various facets of the document, to include engagement with international partners. The guidance itself is not an issue here. The intent here is twofold: 1) to trace the development and transmission of a particular mission set through the many levels of narrative which comprise guidance to the services, and 2) to emphasize a specific mission set, i.e., engagement, as a basis for officer cadet education.

more detailed defense review than previously examined documents and is a key text in the development of the services’ own strategies, concepts, and force planning constructs. The 2014 QDR significantly departs from the wartime focus of its 2010 predecessor as final withdrawal from Iraq happened in 2011 and U.S. combat involvement in Afghanistan concludes in 2014. The focus now is to “adapt, reshape, and rebalance our military” so that it may be prepared for both future threats and unforeseen opportunities, all of which is especially challenging in the current period of fiscal austerity.\textsuperscript{33} Notably, this QDR explicitly declares itself as being in consonance with the 2012 DSG by embodying that document’s defense priorities. In maintaining such continuity, the QDR organizes the five priorities of the Defense Strategic Guidance into a broader framework of three strategic pillars: protect the homeland; build security globally; and project power and win decisively.\textsuperscript{34} As will be seen, these pillars reinforce the partnership narrative identified in earlier documents.

Despite its focus on the post-Afghanistan era, the QDR remains generally consistent with the 2010 QDR, as well as with other national guidance documents, when surveying the future security environment and its threats. Acknowledging that the future remains “uncertain and complicated,” the identified trends clearly establish that the array of threats will be extensive.\textsuperscript{35} The trend analysis is cross-cutting with both regional and global foci, all of which will “interact dynamically” across the threat spectrum. On one

\textsuperscript{33} DOD, \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review 2014} (Washington, DC, March 4, 2014), Secretary’s letter in front matter.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., v

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 3. Remainder of this paragraph summarizes and quotes from pages 3-8.
level, the trends speak to the continued pace of technological innovation and resulting capability development and proliferation. Cyber (to include information technologies such as social media), biotechnology, nuclear, and robotics are examples of these challenges. On another level, social, demographic, and environmental concerns bearing on the security picture point to more human-driven concerns. Competition for resources as populations expand and effects of climate change are felt; transnational crime; continued terrorism; religious differences: such threats all add to a future uncertainty made worse “by a rapid rate of change and a complexity born of the multiple ways in which they intersect and influence one another.”

Given the continued fiscal vagueness surrounding the future defense budget due to the Budget Control Act of 2011 (also referred to as sequestration), DOD recognized that such future budget constraints will work to limit the reach and influence of the existing force. Reductions of force structure, support for new warfighting concepts, and select equipment modernization or divestment are identified as future directions for defense in such a fiscally constrained environment. Consequently, the importance of cooperating with allies and partners is emphasized as one means of dealing with such a retrenchment. While such emphasis is captured specifically in the strategic pillar of building security globally, working with allies and partners permeates the other two pillars. The three pillars provide a useful framework for identifying the extent of contact outside of the U.S. Army a new officer might expect to experience.

The first pillar, Protect the Homeland, is anchored in the warfighting capability of the Joint Force’s ability to deter an attack and, if necessary, defeat any attack made on the homeland. This pillar, however, involves more than homeland combat readiness. The
effort to deter a threat or defeat an impending adversary is a worldwide one.

Accordingly, DOD intends to “collaborate with interagency and international partners to tackle root drivers of conflict, including building capacity with allied and partner militaries” to include special focus on terrorist plots.\textsuperscript{36} Other cooperative efforts here include support to activities such as the Weapons of Mass Destruction Nonproliferation Agreement Implementation. Under this pillar, the various capacities of the Armed Forces can also be called upon to assist U.S. civil authorities in the aftermath of an incident or a natural disaster. Such assistance when rendered in support of a different primary lead agency other than DOD is called Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). This has important implications for the preparation of officers as such missions can involve a plethora of actors and agencies: federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments as well as private and nonprofit organizations.\textsuperscript{37} One’s ability—or not—to navigate the cultural and organizational differences will influence successful fulfillment of this mission.

The third pillar, Project Power and Win Decisively, speaks unambiguously to the requirement that the U.S. military remains preeminent in any future conflict. In doing so, however, our forces will not necessarily have only our own resources on which to call, but can expect the assistance of allies and partners in prosecuting any conflict. Given the “posture of global engagement” posited in the QDR, U.S. forces will work with others in areas such as counterterrorism, capability and interoperability development, and conflict

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 16.

deterrence through forward presence and security cooperation. Projecting power also requires the support and cooperation of allies and partners as the need for access to bases and facilities as well as posturing of U.S. forces abroad are key elements of global engagement. Access and presence of U.S. forces around the world also underpins non-combatant operations and the conduct of humanitarian disaster relief missions. In sum, this pillar maintains a commitment to the U.S. ability for direct action when necessary. However, it also identifies the ability of U.S. forces to work with other nations’ civilian institutions and militaries as a necessary element in meeting all challenges presented a global power. Once again, there remains a notable reliance on our military personnel to work with other nationalities and cultures in this pillar, something that derives from the next pillar.

The final and most pertinent pillar is the second: Build Security Globally. This pillar is the central element of the partnership narrative and its accompanying recognition of increased interaction between U.S. forces and those forces of allied and partner nations. The litany of expected actions to be performed by U.S. forces with allies and partners around the world emphasizes this element: modernize defense relationships and capabilities; update combined capacity; enhance partners’ capacity; enhance capacity and interoperability for coalition operations; conduct military-to-military activities such as bi- and multilateral exercises and training activities; and working with partners to “foster stability and prosperity.” DOD has identified numerous initiatives to support this pillar to include a renewed emphasis on linguistic, regional, and cultural ability across the

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39 Ibid., 16-19.
military as well as strengthening internal capacities for training regional and international
security organizations. As asserted in the QDR, “we will continue to operate in close
concert with allies and partners to establish norms and confront common threats, because
no country alone can address the globalized challenges we collectively face.”40 As the
QDR analysis continues, this emphasis on working in environments with partners and in
contact with foreign populations continues to be identified as a major thrust of future
expectations and speaks to the need for competency at all levels.

Having laid out the framework by which to respond to the uncertain future
environment it envisions, the QDR turns to the issue of rebalancing the joint force. After
twelve years of counterinsurgency warfare, and during a time of fiscal austerity, the joint
force faces significant challenges in executing the renewed imperative of full spectrum
warfare as well as maintaining a credible force structure in both size and capability so as
to support the three priority pillars of the QDR. In terms of the partnership narrative
implicit in the second pillar of building security globally, the expectation is that
maintenance of the U.S. global posture and presence will continue to “support stability,
security, and prosperity” across the globe so as to “protect U.S. national security interests
more effectively.” The emphasis on working with current allies and partners while
building new partnerships elsewhere resounds in this section. Additionally, the partners
are not just the military forces of our allies and partners. The QDR anticipates partners to
also be U.S. interagency colleagues, yet more organizational cultures with which a
service member will have to interact.41

40 Ibid., 16.
41 Ibid., 32-38.
Leaving aside the U.S. interagency partners, the essential element here remains the U.S. service member’s ability to enter a foreign culture and effectively interact with the societies and militaries they encounter while conveying those values and principles which underpin a professional army in a democratic society. U.S. service members are not only military trainers, they are also role models. This expectation speaks directly to a mentality that is comfortable working with others different from oneself. To apprehend someone’s concerns, perceptions, and attitudes requires cognitive agility, imagination, and some awareness of human nature. It also speaks to a necessary self-awareness on the part of the service member as to one’s own knowledge and prejudices. Understanding the possible impacts of one’s own communications in word and action requires a keen facility with language joined with an understanding of the situation. Collaborating with others through communications and actions which convey an engagement of value to the other party calls for personal attributes and competencies which the service member should possess. Such descriptors, then, provide a starting point for the services as they grapple with the most appropriate education and training necessary for their personnel.

As a final illustration of the cascading nature of these nested guidance documents, the QDR contains actual guidance on the major elements of U.S. force structure.\textsuperscript{42} Though the preceding documents address force structure in very general terms, the QDR details the expected force structure with which to accomplish the many goals and missions subordinate to the three pillars. As an example, the QDR directs the Army to have 18 divisions and 22 combat aviation brigades. Knowing this organizational

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 39-41.
structure requirement, the Army can project the number of personnel needed to man the organizations and the skills those personnel must possess. This knowledge, of course, transfers directly to the Army’s projection of education and training needs. Such guidance is another means by which a service builds its education and training requirements as it looks to the future.

*The National Military Strategy*

Proceeding down the hierarchy of national command-level documents, the CJCS is responsible for the *National Military Strategy* (NMS). Representing another step in the continuous derivative process of guidance and direction, the NMS is designed to complement the NSS, the NDS, and QDR with its ever more specificity in its analysis and guidance. Certain portions of the narrative are familiar. Acknowledging a future of rapid change and uncertainty, the NMS identifies a number of trends such as demographic change and WMD that bear on the strategic environment. But it attributes “consequential influence” to state and non-state actors who continue to seek or obtain power or other means of influence. The NMS describes “this changing distribution of power” as leading to a tension-filled “‘multi-nodal’ world characterized more by shifting, interest-driven coalitions…than by rigid security competition between opposing blocs.”43 The understanding of a threat which may have dominated military thought prior to Iraq and Afghanistan has now transmuted to a more complex and more fluid state. This shift in the nature of the strategic environment intimates the education and training requirements which the future force will need.

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Another consistent narrative thread returns to the relationships with allies and partners as an important element in the U.S. security strategy. In his introductory memorandum, the CJCS identifies this as one of his three broad themes. Noting the ever-evolving security environment, the CJCS calls for “deepen[ing] security relationships with our allies and creat[ing] opportunities for partnerships with new and diverse groups of actors.”

A substantive part of the NMS expands on the issue of strengthening alliances and building new partnerships around the globe. The NMS is quite specific as to the security approaches to be undertaken in specified geographical regions of the world. But as a general statement of the need for such engagements, the NMS asserts that U.S. interests “are deeply entwined with the security and stability of the broader international system—a system of alliances, partnerships, and multi-national institutions.”

In underpinning this international system, the Joint Force will pursue numerous initiatives with partners and allies such as security cooperation activities to increase collective security skills, enable international interoperability, and expand exchanges and exercises. Once again, short of direct combat, the future officer can expect to execute missions in support of or with foreign partners and allies. A significant educational outcome of this declaration is that those engaged in such activities will need a wide spectrum of interpersonal skills marked with an appreciation for historical, political, and cultural differences. The NMS specifically recognizes this facet of officer development.

44 Ibid., CJCS memo in front matter.
46 Ibid., 15.
As the first document produced by the uniformed services, the NMS addresses the future force and begins to sketch the requirements for future leader development. That future leader will be one who “can truly out-think and out-innovate adversaries while gaining trust, understanding, and cooperation from our partners in an ever-more complex and dynamic environment….We will develop leaders who are capable of operating in interagency and multinational environments and providing liaison to other U.S. agencies, allies, and partners.”\(^{47}\) It is clear that the future leader will be challenged with far more than combat and training for same. The additional task of knowing the interagency is also emphasized and represents a learning challenge as well. As will be examined in a later chapter, these expectations for leader performance establish education and training requirements that exceed the basic training of small unit combat tasks.

On October 1, 2011, a new CJCS was appointed. He endorsed the 2011 NMS produced by his predecessor. But in February of 2012, he published a supplemental document entitled, *Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*. While it does not specifically supersede the 2011 NMS, it reinforces select NMS points while adding elements of emphasis that the new CJCS believes important. In other words, *Strategic Direction* represents the new CJCS’s personal roadmap for his tenure. Notably, in order to deter or defeat aggression, the CJCS makes two specific assertions. When response to a threat is needed, the Joint Force “will lead and enable others to lead…by coordinating military power with the diplomacy and development efforts of our government and those

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 16-17.
As this discussion progresses, a key effort will be to “expand the envelope of interagency and international cooperation” as well as “Promote multilateral security approaches and architectures to deter, and if necessary, defeat aggression.” The emphasis on working with allies and partners remains a high priority.

In examining these essential national command-level strategy documents, then, it becomes clear that the intent of working with allies and partners, while always an element of U.S. national security policy, is taking on more emphasis. A critical reason for this emphasis is that the global threat environment continues to evolve in a diverse and complex manner, an evolution that cannot be faced by U.S. capacities alone. Involving both state and non-state actors, ranging from traditional military threats to transnational criminal networks and WMD proliferation to violent extremism, such threats may not be able to be countered if an affected state’s capabilities and capacities are lacking. The optimum solution to any emerging threat is for the affected state to take effective action to address the threat before it becomes a regional security problem requiring outside intervention. In order to support such an outcome, engagement with allies and partners, especially the military and security institutions, through various vehicles such as topical education, equipment training programs, and field training exercises, is conducted—most often, by members of the armed forces.

As one moves from these national strategic guidance texts to more military-focused texts, other kinds of documents are produced which serve to further refine the

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48 DOD, Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force (Washington, DC, February 6, 2012), 4.

49 Ibid., 5.
current manner of fulfilling the missions outlined by the national direction, as well as looking to the future and the challenges which the armed forces may expect to face in that projection of the operating environment, the threat, and the required capabilities to meet that threat. Two specific types, or genres, are critical to further analysis of the desired leadership traits and competencies now and in the future.

One genre of text is doctrine. In broad terms, doctrine may be considered the way in which the military operates today. Another genre encompasses the concepts which give the future shape and help with capability need identification. The body of doctrine, both joint and service-specific, is immense. For example, at this writing, at the level of the JCS alone, there are 83 joint doctrine publications, all substantive in their detail and direction. Concepts, however, with their more speculative nature about the future environment and threat, address specific challenges which senior leadership discerns may need new or improved capabilities to successfully meet or overcome. By comparison, there are 27 joint concepts. Both of these bodies of texts contain implications for the education and training of the officer candidate.

The following chapter will turn specifically to the Army and its body of texts. But at the Joint Chiefs level, there is one particular doctrine publication and one joint concept which bear on the continuous narrative thread concerning the preparation of officer candidates for leadership.

*Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*

Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (JP 1) represents the capstone publication in the joint doctrine hierarchy and consequently of all military doctrine, the doctrine from which all other doctrine flows. The CJCS takes a
particular interest in this publication and his introductory memorandum contains
important elements for the services since JP 1 presents “fundamental principles and
overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.” It
contains guidance for the accomplishment of missions with which the armed forces may
be tasked by the national command authorities and consequently is broad-ranging
depending on subordinate doctrine publications to address topics in a much more specific
manner. However, the CJCS makes an additional assertion which bears directly on the
joint force and the individual services. In keeping with the whole-of-government
approach to meeting challenges seen in previous guidance documents, CJCS also asserts
that “it is vital that we not only develop our military capabilities, but also strengthen the
capacity of other government departments and agencies.”

The reason for this is offered in the preface to the publication:

The nature of the challenges to the US and its interests demand that the Armed
Forces operate as a closely integrated joint team with interagency and
multinational partners across the range of military operations. Using a whole-of-
government approach is essential to advancing our interests to strengthen security
relationships and capacity by, with, and through military forces of partner nations,
US and foreign government agencies, state and local government agencies, and
intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations. To succeed, we must refine
and proportionally integrate the military with all of the tools of American power
and work with our partner nations to do the same.

Here, the full span of possible partners with whom the Armed Forces may operate, both
domestic and foreign, are clearly identified. While a newly commissioned Army officer
may not actually work with all of these possible partners, he or she will certainly

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51 Ibid., i.
encounter a subset of them. Encountering cultural differences on both national and organizational levels and working effectively to accomplish missions, then, will be something new officers can expect.

Throughout JP 1, this broad range of partners is further examined through the lens of particular activities. One particular activity to be expected is that of security cooperation, and given the post-Iraq and Afghanistan war period, security cooperation will take on added importance. This activity is wide-ranging and contributes importantly to our security.

Security cooperation encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (HN). Establishing, maintaining, and enhancing security cooperation among our partner nations is important to strengthen the global security framework of the US and its partners….Contributing to security cooperation activities is a large part of what the US military does and will continue to do.\(^5^2\)

Once again, the young officer leading a training mission to a foreign country will be expected to have effective interpersonal relationships with those being trained, as well as dealing with the cultural differences of that particular society and military institution.

JP 1 also identifies other activities which the officer will be expected to successfully execute if and when given such a mission. Two additional examples of such activities are stability operations and relief and reconstruction operations. In stability operations, “the immediate goal…often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal may be to

\(^{5^2}\) Ibid., I-11.
develop the following: indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.” While lower echelons commanded by captains and led by lieutenants and non-commissioned officers may expect some help from higher military headquarters, this litany of expectations also points to the human aspect of a major mission area, wherein senior leaders would also benefit from a liberal arts foundation. Stability operations is a military mission and the military leads it.

The relief and reconstruction activity area is similar in that such activities are focused on restoring “essential civil services in the wake of combat, a breakdown of civil order, or a natural disaster.” The critical difference here is that the military force supports the Department of State, the lead U.S. agency for such activities. Consequently, inter-organizational dynamics will be part of the young leader’s challenge.  

JP 1 also identifies other human-centric considerations. For example, JP 1 addresses the burden placed on the military force situated among a foreign population in terms of the informational instrument of power. Having identified the specter of potential strategic effects resulting from every DOD, and hence U.S. Government, action, word, or image, the publication goes on to stress the need for synchronization of all communication efforts across all instruments of national power. But fundamental in

53 Ibid., I-16
54 Ibid., I-17.
terms of the “strategic corporal”\textsuperscript{55} effect “is the premise that key audience beliefs, perceptions, and behavior are crucial to the success of any strategy, plan, and operation. … Leaders, planners, and operators at all levels need to understand the desired effects and anticipate potential undesired effects of our actions and words, identify key audiences, and when appropriate, actively address their perspectives.” \textsuperscript{56} Implicit in the declaration that “operators at all levels” must understand this complex mixture of culture and perceptions is the need for a broad-based cognition comfortable with difference and complexity when dealing with life or death situations which arise during operations in such environments.

JP 1 goes on to address many structural and instrumental issues concerning the joint force such as establishing, manning, commanding, and administering a joint command or outlining the process for joint force development. But this publication also includes a discussion of The Profession of Arms, a doctrinal capture of a topic important to the CJCS and more fully developed in his earlier White Paper, “America’s Military –

\textsuperscript{55} Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal,” \textit{Leatherneck} 82, no.1 (Jan 1999): 14-17. In 1999, the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps authored an article on “The strategic corporal.” The article anticipated the potential strategic influence, once publicized through the pervasive media presence, on U.S. national goals and outcomes in a foreign operation resulting from the actions of an imaginary corporal executing a mission leading his squad in a complex, ambiguous environment. “In order to succeed under such demanding conditions they [future young leaders of all ranks] will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned and independent [author emphasis] decisions under extreme stress -- decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion. [His decisions] will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of this article suggests -- the \textit{Strategic Corporal}.”

\textsuperscript{56} CJCS, JP 1, I-13
A Profession of Arms.” By being included in the capstone joint doctrine publication, however, the Profession of Arms assumes a position integral to the overall development of the joint force. This discussion centers on character and competence as key attributes of the professional, and includes a discussion of the values of joint service as well as the concept of teamwork with its essential features of trust and confidence. A more specific examination of the values inherent to a military career will be undertaken in a later chapter when examining the Army values. But in this short appendix, two telling assertions are made which continue to highlight the human domain in the military.

Keeping in mind the preeminent mission of the military is to successfully defend the nation from aggression, leaders nonetheless must be “moral individuals both of action and of intellect.” These leaders are charged to study the art and science of war, military history, and the theory and philosophy of war. The reason: “Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war include their fellow citizens.” Though seemingly cold-blooded in its unambiguous declaration of the soldiers to be led as resources, this single sentence drives home clearly to all leaders and those aspiring to lead the human-centered nature of military leadership. This hard reality establishes that the human domain of war involves not just enemy combatants, allied and coalition partners, and the noncombatants present in the operational area, but also one’s own unit for whom a leader takes full responsibility, a grave responsibility bearing on the education and preparation of future leaders.

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58 CJCS, JP 1, B-1.
As discussed earlier, military concepts are a genre of future-oriented texts which serve, in turn, to guide force development. The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (CCJO) looks to the anticipated strategic and operating environment of 2020, advances a new joint operational concept, and lists features suggestive of the future force. But one clear conclusion it reaches is that “the conduct of military operations remains a fundamentally human enterprise.”

The narrative thread centered on the human domain continues throughout the CCJO; partnering with other nations and agencies is a key element of the new operational concept, globally integrated operations. Declaring that the new operational concept places a premium on partnering, it proposes that “Joint Forces must be able to integrate effectively with U.S. governmental agencies, partner militaries, and indigenous and regional stakeholders. This integration must be scalable, ranging from the ability of an individual unit to enroll the expertise of a nongovernmental partner to multi-nation coalition operations.”

As can be understood from this description, the range of partners is large, presenting the young officer with many challenges beyond the combat leadership skills they will possess.

As noted above in the JP 1 discussion, succeeding in the information-rich environment of tomorrow will be critical to mission success in foreign settings. This aspect enters the CCJO within the context of operational discrimination. The application of force will need to be managed ever more precisely given “the increased transparency

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60 Ibid., 6.
of the future security environment,” itself saturated with digital devices. Though primarily applied to the issue of wanton destruction through indiscriminate application of fires such as field artillery, the CCJO also notes that the element of discrimination is applicable to maneuver and information operations. There are echoes of the strategic corporal when the CCJO asserts, “In the saturated information environment of tomorrow, even minor lapses in conduct or the application of fires could seriously damage the reputation of the United States. This reality places a premium on joint operations informed by values and professionalism.”\textsuperscript{61} The conduct noted here is, of course, the conduct not just of units maneuvering in an operation but also the conduct of each individual soldier. Molding and managing the conduct of individuals under the stress of combat takes not just an authoritarian fiat but an intensely human engagement with the soldiers one leads. The newly commissioned officer will be challenged by the diversity he or she will encounter in that first leadership assignment. In this, then, the CCJO continues the narrative thread of the importance of human interaction while making it more militarily specific in its detail.

As seen originating in the trail of national strategic guidance documents, the narrative thread of the importance of the human domain gains focus and detail as the various texts move toward ever-more military-specific treatment. The human domain here covers all conceivable groups and a plethora of organizational cultures a future leader could encounter: military and civilian, combatants, noncombatants, governmental and nongovernmental workers, and, most importantly for the leader, the very people he or she will lead. It is a heterogeneous spectrum which challenges the most experienced of

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 7-8.
leaders. The officer candidate needs the best possible preparation for this challenge, and a liberal arts education provides the optimum means by which to provide that preparation.

As previously discussed, these documents also serve as the originating point for the necessary analysis by the individual services in regards to their roles and missions, which in turn drive many aspects of a service’s existence. The epigraph to this chapter is one example of how a service takes all of these guidance documents and synthesizes them into a single mission statement from which that service’s unique education, training, doctrine, force development, etc. will further devolve. In this case, the Army, the largest service of the armed forces, has clearly identified the primary elements of the various senior guidance documents and constructed a seemingly simple mission statement. Its terseness, however, cloaks a depth of complexity in preparing and fielding a force and its members for such a mission.

As has been emphasized throughout the analysis of the national command-level guidance, one element of the Army’s derived mission statement clearly reflects the need for leaders to operate in and engage with organizational and social cultures other than just the Army culture. The Army leader of such endeavors will require a breadth of vision, tolerance, understanding, and imagination in interacting with others from outside his or her frame of reference. In the following chapter, the focus will narrow to follow the Army’s conceptual and doctrinal development of this human domain requirement and the consequent development of its approach to leadership and its development.
CHAPTER 3

THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Leaders in the 21st century must be: competent in their proficiencies; broad enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict; able to operate in joint, interagency, and multinational environments and leverage political and diplomatic efforts in achieving their objectives; at home in other cultures and able to use this awareness and understanding to support operations in innovative ways; courageous enough to see and exploit opportunities in the challenges and complexities of future operating environments; and grounded in national values and a Warrior Ethos.

--- General George W. Casey, Jr.  
Chief of Staff of the Army, 2007-2011

As previously discussed, the U.S. defense establishment has a clear, hierarchical structure originating in the President as Commander-in-Chief, and cascading down through SECDEF and CJCS to the individual Military Departments. It is through this chain that guidance flows to each of the armed forces by means of various strategies, regulations, and directives. The individual military departments take these documents as the starting point for the subsequent integrated development of policies, plans, and programs which allow the departments to fulfill the intent and meet the delineated requirements of these directives. In the Army, charged with providing the strategic landpower piece of the joint force, such integrated development begins with The Army Plan (TAP). However, though seemingly singular in its noun, landpower is a multifaceted construct encompassing much more than simply tactical warfighting

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capabilities. Prior to the continuing tracing of the human dimension thread in Army guidance and doctrinal publications, an understanding of this faceted construct is necessary.

A Landpower Context

After twelve years of war with accompanying growth in personnel, equipment, and budgets, the U.S. military now faces a post-conflict era of fiscal austerity during which reductions will happen across these three categories. In the case of the Army, which is responsible for providing the strategic landpower element of the joint force, this reduction poses significant challenges as the Army struggles to justify retaining desired levels of end strength, equipment modernization and recapitalization, and budgetary sufficiency. Its means for mounting its argument is reflected in its attempt to capture exactly where and how landpower contributes to national security beyond its preeminent mission to fight and win the nation’s wars. This argument also contributes to the narrative thread of the complex nature of leadership in today’s Army. The Army contributes to the national security through multiple other means and methods outside of kinetic warfare which are all captured under a landpower construct.

Recalling the DSG of January 2012 and as further amplified in QDR 2014 from the previous chapter, the Army faced a directed downsizing in its force structure. In an attempt to present the full range of contributions which landpower makes to the national defense, the leaders of the Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces chartered a Strategic Landpower Task Force to more fully explore and delineate those contributions. Dismissing the limited view proposing high technology capabilities such as standoff weapons as the primary means to deter or win future conflicts, these leaders
assert that “armed conflict is a clash of interests between or among organized groups, each attempting to impose their will on the opposition. In essence, it is fundamentally a human endeavor….”

This focus on the human domain was subsequently expanded in the accompanying White Paper from the task force, “Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills.”

Highlighting the fact that U.S. national interests are protected and advanced through a “comprehensive engagement with nations, institutions, and peoples around the world” through the tools of American power such as defense, diplomacy, and development, this White Paper makes clear that all such action takes place in “the international arena aimed at influencing human activity and the environments in which that activity occurs.” The authors go on to argue, however, that past military experience reveals the lack of consideration of the “physical, cultural, and social environments” in the planning and understanding of those actions and that actions were more successful when they flowed from “an understanding of the human and societal dynamics” of the places to which forces have deployed.

The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) noted a year before this task force was formed that the Army “will be increasingly focused on preventing conflict and shaping the broader security environment” by a growing emphasis on broadening relationships

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2 DA, Memorandum, Subject: Strategic Landpower Task Force (Washington, DC: May 6, 2013). This memorandum served as the chartering guidance and was signed by Chief of Staff of the Army, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Commander, Special Operations Command.

with partner nations. The White Paper also identified selected areas of undertaking in which land operations play a significant role “influencing the ‘human domain’ short of war, such as peacekeeping, comprehensive military engagement [such as in the multitude of security cooperation activities], security force assistance, building partner capacity, and stability operations.” It also identifies humanitarian aid and providing support to civil authorities as additional missions. As the White Paper concludes, “Operations in the ‘human domain’ provide a unique capability to preclude and deter conflict through shaping operations that leverage partners and populations to enhance local and regional stability.” Such activities will be undertaken by any size element, ranging from a small detachment of one or a few personnel on an exchange or training mission to major combat formations participating in training exercises. In such scenarios, leaders at all levels will be challenged to apply many other skills aside from pure combat leadership.

The previous examination of strategic landpower involves three different commands. Within the Army specifically, however, the application of landpower in all its variety is captured in the Army construct of unified land operations. This construct recognizes “the need to conduct a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authorities simultaneously.” In strategic terms, it also pertains to the need to ensure Army efforts are fully meshed with interagency and multinational partners. While offensive and defensive operations are essentially understood, stability operations introduce that litany of other responsibilities a leader can

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expect to undertake. Such operations encompass “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”

Though only four discrete mission areas are identified, each area consists of numerous subordinate tasks for which leaders are also responsible and which fall outside the normal understanding of military operations. In addition to the life-and-death decisions leaders face regularly when deployed, “[i]n today’s conflicts, responsibilities are even greater and more complex: playing the roles of warrior, diplomat, mayor, economist, city engineer, and tribal liaison—all often at the same time.”

The assignment of young platoon leaders (lieutenants) as “mayors” of towns and villages, responsible for, among other things, political and social conflict mediation, infrastructure restoration, and public safety, marked a significant increase in the type of knowledge and skills demanded of the most effective leaders. Dealing with such complexity requires the young leaders to have a robust cognition capable of accommodating effectively these disparate, ambiguous charges.

Thus, one can now apprehend the tremendous variety of missions and tasks for which a leader must prepare. The Army, as the premier land force in the world, must prepare itself, and its leaders and soldiers, for a kaleidoscopic variety of missions.

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The Army Plan

Just as the NSS provides the guidance from which all subordinate strategies are derived, so does TAP serve as the primary basis for all subsequent Army planning. Filtered through the Title 10 lens, the TAP ensures that Army meets its varied responsibilities through alignment with the many legal and national strategy and guidance documents to which the Army must respond. A coherent collection of four discrete planning documents, TAP serves to provide common direction to the department as it grapples with increasingly specific functions such as manning the force, training and educating the force, equipping and sustaining the force, and employing the force. Concurrently, TAP guides and directs efforts across the Army to transform its institutional processes so as to position the Army to respond to the uncertain security environment in which it will operate. Given the classified nature of much of the information within these documents, Sections II – IV are beyond the purview of this discussion. However, Section I, Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), is an unclassified document promulgated jointly by the SECARMY and the CSA in which their “vision, direction, objectives, and institutional strategy” are made clear. Consequently, the ASPG provides the starting point of the winding trail of narratives which will arrive at a detailed description of the desirable traits and competencies of the Army leader who will lead units in accomplishment of assigned missions.


9 Ibid., 1-4.
Army Strategic Planning Guidance

As intimated in its title, the ASPG sets the course by which the Army responds to the priorities laid out in the national guidance documents as it looks to the Army of 2020 and beyond. This prioritization is to “ensure that [the Army] is an agile, responsive, tailorable force capable of responding to any mission, anywhere, anytime.” Further discussion lends initial refinement to such a broad and seemingly all-encompassing purpose statement and starts to provide a working definition for the subsequent analyses leading to doctrine, concepts, and strategies. For example, in reviewing the Army Vision statement, the reader will notice the continued emphasis on being “an indispensable partner” working in a “Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational [JIIM] environment” while identifying the Army’s triune role in the Joint Force as “Prevent, Shape, and Win.”

While all three roles require the young officer to be able to operate with other communities, agencies, and militaries, one role in particular—Shape—speaks to a need for interpersonal, interorganizational, and cross-cultural competence. Given its strategic focus, the ASPG also sets the terms for the further work of subordinate institutional elements through its characterization of the future operational environment and its identification of four imperatives, fulfillment of which will allow the Army to evolve so as to meet the requirements derived from the national guidance documents.

Anticipating an uncertain environment where there is no singular threat but rather a “complex and interconnected global operational environment populated by a multitude

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11 Specific explication of these roles is found in subsequent publications which are examined in the following pages.
of opportunists [posing] a wide range of possible threats under chaotic conditions with local events now having global consequences,” the assessment also sees opportunity for working with friends, partners, and allies. The human dimension continues to permeate the environmental analysis as it concludes that “lasting strategic events can only be achieved by effectively influencing people. Success depends as much on understanding the social and political fabric of the situation as it does on the ability to physically dominate it.” This understanding is not just for senior officers to achieve, but also applies to the lieutenants and sergeants leading small units scattered across the operational environment. This is emphasized in the view of the future Army which anticipates that regionally aligned forces, from squad to joint task force level, will have to accomplish missions “in challenging human terrain.”

In response to such a future, the ASPG articulates four short but implication-laden imperatives, together which provide the essential basis for the Army’s organizational adaptation as it moves into the post-Iraq/Afghanistan period. Three of the four imperatives hold implications for the continuing narrative of the human element of military service.

The first imperative specifies a land force that is modernized and tailored in capabilities so that such a force can conduct a range of military operations in support of the combatant commander. As stated previously, the first and nonnegotiable requirement is to be able to fight and win as a member of the joint force in unified action. Once that competency is attained, the focus switches to the acquisition of regional and cultural expertise to include language capability in accord with the unit’s regional affiliation. The ASPG declares this approach “requires emphasis on the human dimension’s cognitive,

\[12\] DA, ASPG, 3-5.
physical, and social components” in readying the force.\textsuperscript{13} The leaders of these units are expected to be intellectually agile enough to understand these components and their integrative nature once placed in such a foreign milieu. Once again, the young lieutenant will be confronted with cognitive requirements far in excess of maneuvering his or her platoon. The second imperative speaks directly to this expectation.

The leaders of these units are expected to be intellectually agile enough to understand these components and their integrative nature once placed in such a foreign milieu. Once again, the young lieutenant will be confronted with cognitive requirements far in excess of maneuvering his or her platoon. The second imperative speaks directly to this expectation.

The broad nature of the second imperative’s language hints at the scope of the expectations for young officers: “develop leaders to meet the expectations of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.” Having just learned the Army’s view on the future operating environment of complexity and uncertainty, the future leaders need to “be comfortable making decisions with imperfect information in any situation including highly complex and dangerous environments” and prepare for a “need to operate independently in more dynamic environments.”\textsuperscript{14} Also, fostering the development of critical thinking skills is an important element here. The Army recognizes that single-facet thinking and experience is detrimental in addressing the importance of broadening opportunities for leaders.

Leaders need perspectives not limited to purely Army endeavors. Enhanced broadening experiences will build critical thinking skills and the ability to develop innovative solutions applicable to difficult situations. The Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment demands broader mindsets best developed through a variety of experiences.\textsuperscript{15}

This passage resonates with significance when addressing the education of the officer candidate.

Further examination of the implications of this language will follow in later

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 8-9.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 13.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
discussion. Initially, however, it is important to note this assertion here. Experience will certainly provide differing perspectives. Yet, the development of critical thinking skills begins with the engagement of multiple disciplines in a liberal arts education for the officer candidate. A multi-perspective outlook begins with the exposure to other cultures and worldviews inherent in the liberal arts. Cognitive patterns such as subject recognition, debate, evaluation, and resolution are established after substantive encounters in world history, literature, ethics, or psychology. This educational pattern should be sought in precommissioning education. The young officer will learn the tradecraft of infantry, aviation, or any of the other branch specialties starting with the officer basic course. But as previously identified, leaders at all levels must prepare to work independently in ambiguous and complex situations with less than perfect information. The Army cannot wait until the officer is a senior captain or major headed to the Command and General Staff College to instill critical thinking skills.

The ASPG contains two other imperatives. In broad terms, the third imperative addresses structural issues related to gaining efficiencies across the Department in its administration of the Army and reengineering its instrumentalities to support future requirements. However, the fourth imperative—Enhance the All-volunteer Army—sets forth another critical objective directly related to leadership preparation.

This objective admonishes the Army to embrace and leverage the diversity to be found in its soldiers and civilians. Indeed, “a diverse force provides a competitive advantage in fighting and winning the Nation’s wars and enhances [the Army’s] capacity to operate globally with a culturally adept force.” There is also recognition that working across a diverse force requires the maintenance of trust and respect in environments
“inclusive of Soldiers, Civilians, and Families from diverse backgrounds” (17). While unsurprising in regards to soldiers and civilians a leader directs, the inclusion of the family here adds to the expectations of leaders when they assume command of a unit. Leading effectively and successfully now requires, from the first day they take responsibility, a level of interpersonal skills, cultural and socioeconomic awareness, and ethnic sensitivity that is best obtained through a liberal arts education. This objective reflects a continuing concern within the Army senior leadership to prepare leaders across the force and all ranks for the diversity they will face, a concern identified more pointedly in another text promulgated by SECARMY, CSA, and the Sergeant Major of the Army.

Published in 2010, the “Army Diversity Roadmap” is essentially an action plan addressing both the growing diversity within the Army itself as well as the diversity the Army will encounter when deployed to foreign locations. The purpose of the roadmap, however, is largely internally focused. Its purpose is “to foster an environment of inclusiveness, collaboration, and creativity, while serving to recruit, develop and provide leadership and mentoring support” to the Army’s personnel of “different backgrounds, cultures, ideas and beliefs.” Notwithstanding the internal focus of the roadmap, there is an associated benefit. Recognizing that cultural understanding must start within the Army’s own formations, such ability will create within the soldiers “a proclivity” for understanding other foreign cultures within which the soldiers may find themselves operating.

This state of affairs carries through six strategic outcomes, only one of which suggests the foreign cultural engagement. The roadmap for achieving these

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outcomes offers five goals as the basis for the diversity program within the Army, with similarly only one goal explicitly focused on preparing for foreign area operations. The goal of implementing diversity training and education so as to develop socio-cultural competencies is underpinned by a need for Army leadership to be “versatile in managing many cultures, experiences and other backgrounds” under the challenging conditions “of persistent conflict and dynamic, uncertain operational environments.” Once again, guidance from the senior leadership focuses on a leader’s ability to be effective in the face of significant cultural, ethnic, religious, and gender diversity.

In keeping with the focus on the uniformed leader, there are other guidance documents which are issued solely by the CSA and target, to a large degree, the uniformed force and the Department of the Army Civilians who support them. These additional documents essentially supplement the ASPG and can have different names. Currently, the CSA has published Marching Orders, Waypoint updates, and even personal emails to the force addressing specific topics. One, “CSA Strategic Priorities,” which was presented in a briefing format of Powerpoint slides, clearly reflects the focus on the uniformed force. There are five priorities, one specifically about leader development: Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World.

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17 DA, Diversity Roadmap, 9.

18 General Raymond Odierno is CSA as of this writing.

19 U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army, “CSA Strategic Priorities” (Washington, DC: October 16, 2013), http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/316390.pdf (accessed October 16, 2013), slide 3. All extracts in this and the following paragraph are from this slide. The five priorities on slide 2 are: Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World; A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army; A Ready and Modern Army; Soldiers Committed to Our Army Profession; and, The Premier All Volunteer Army.
Though slightly different in tone from the ASPG leader development imperative examined above, the essential outcomes are similar. As always in the Army profession, the primary emphasis is on the continued fostering of combat expertise: battlefield skill, fighting spirit, tactical competence, and technical proficiency. But there is that thread of education, also. The need to “grow the intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary security environment” so as to “better lead Army, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational task forces and teams” will be accomplished through evolving the Army school system to provide “the right education and training to the right individuals at the right time.” Additionally, the cultivation of “strategic perspective and leadership” is sought among senior ranks. Once again, developing cognition for complex and ambiguous situations is a critical piece of leader development.

This was highlighted by the CSA in a speech to the Association of the U.S. Army. Addressing leader development, he asserted the need to develop officers—specifically captains and lieutenant colonels—and their personal capabilities rapidly given the challenges they face today. He went on to say that “we have to develop them in many more diverse ways to give them an understanding of the socioeconomic, culture, and religious environments around the world….We have to have leaders who can do critical thinking under pressure.” While the selection of the specific two ranks might be an indication of command levels—captains command companies, lieutenant colonels battalions—the narratives all point to every level of officer and leader needing this diverse development. Such development best starts with a liberal arts education.

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The ASPG and other senior leader guidance, then, identifies in the broadest terms the desired goals for the Army in light of the national strategic guidance documents and frames subsequent requirements and capabilities analysis by all subordinate Army elements. As further analysis of this in-house strategic-level guidance progresses throughout the institution, there occurs a proliferation of documents across multiple functional areas and processes which serve to lend specificity to the Army’s efforts to meet its essential mission of providing strategic landpower to the joint force and the nation. Just as with the national strategic guidance hierarchy, each area has its own narrative, though each narrative will be nested progressively underneath the preceding, governing narrative. Areas such as human capital management, budgeting, science & technology, and equipment modernization will have their own distinct policies, plans, and strategies promulgated in order to provide their “slice of the pie,” contributing to the efficacy of the total Army force and its necessary capabilities. Among this welter of written material, the topical thread of leadership and leader development in the context of the human element emerges in accordance with the Army strategic guidance just examined. Selected texts from each category will be considered so as to continue tracing the narrative thread of the human element and the performance and knowledge expectations for leaders of all ranks, but especially for the newly commissioned officers facing their first unit leadership assignment.

Cascading down from the ASPG and other senior leader guidance, the treatment of leadership and leader development becomes progressively more detailed. Regulations, doctrine, concepts, additional senior leader guidance, and supporting implementation strategies serve both to delineate in detail how the Army now goes about producing the
officers it needs to lead its soldiers as well as how it conceptually anticipates via futures analysis its needs into the future. The two primary narratives concerning leader development emerge from the doctrine and concepts categories. There are important differences between these two types of documents.

Doctrine provides fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, requiring judgment in application. Doctrine describes the current (and near-term) force, current and programmed force capabilities, and the current (and near-term) force’s ability to apply those capabilities to accomplish missions in support of national security objectives.21

Doctrine, then, is a narrative describing the here and now. It is a descriptor of how the Army organizes, equips, and executes missions in the present timeframe. Most importantly, all leader training and education is based on doctrine.

Concepts, on the other hand, attempt to identify challenges yet to come and are focused on a period of 6-18 years in the future.

Concepts illustrate how future joint and Army forces may operate, describe the capabilities required to carry out the range of military operations against adversaries in the expected [operational environment], and explain how a commander, using military art and science, might employ these capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives. They describe a problem or series of problems to be solved, the components of the solution, and the interaction of those components in solving the problem.22

In other words, concepts are stories about a future situation or state of affairs that the military instrument must be prepared to address. Most commonly, components of a solution will derive from an analysis using a force development framework which looks at issues such as doctrine, organization, or training and education.


22 Ibid., 5.
That these two narratives have a temporal sequence in terms of their outlooks has direct implications for leadership and leader development. Current training and education of leaders is based on doctrine. The doctrine specifies what is desirable in a leader and hence provides the basis for instruction, counseling, evaluation, and mentoring. Concepts, on the other hand, provide the grist for future considerations of doctrine. In theorizing about a future state or condition, a concept implicitly presents the challenge of what doctrine, if any, needs to be revised or if new doctrine must be developed. Once this determination is made and approved, it will be incorporated into the appropriate doctrinal narrative, and current training and education will be revised as necessary even as new concepts are developed or existing concepts revised to reflect anticipated changes in the operational environment. As with the national and joint level documents, the Army’s doctrine has its own internal hierarchy of discrete texts moving from the general to the specific (Figure 1).

**Army Doctrinal Hierarchy**

**Army Doctrine Publication (ADP):** 15 texts. An ADP contains “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” ([JP 1-02](#))

**Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP):** 15 texts. Each ADP is supported by an ADRP which provides a detailed explanation of doctrinal principles which provide the foundational understanding so everyone in the Army can interpret them in the same way.

**Field Manual (FM):** 50 texts. An FM lays out tactics and procedures.

- *Tactics:* “The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.” ([JP 1-02](#))
- *Procedures:* “Standard, detailed steps that describe how to perform specific tasks.” ([JP 1-02](#))

**Army Techniques Publication (ATP):** no limit on number. An ATP contains techniques which are “non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks.” ([JP 1-02](#))

Figure 1: Army Doctrinal Hierarchy. Compiled from “Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing,” Combined Arms Command, Ft Leavenworth, KS, September 17, 2012.
In tracing the thread of leader development through these various narratives, doctrine, given its currency and immediacy, will be the first body of texts to be analyzed. Here, ADP 1 and ADP 3-0 and as necessary, their associated ADRPs, will be examined as they are considered the capstone doctrine manuals. Additionally, ADP 6-0 dealing with mission command will be examined given its importance to leaders of the force. (Analysis of ADP 6-22 and ADP 7-0, both specifically treating the topic of leadership and leader development, will be undertaken in the following chapter.) Then, turning to concepts, leadership and leader development implications of those texts will be examined. This conceptual analysis is pertinent as the officer candidates entering college this fall will be the future lieutenants and captains dealing with those possible futures. Consequently, anticipation of future challenges as evidenced in these narratives will direct the future education and training of these young professionals.

**Army Doctrine Publication 1: The Army**

Just as JP 1 provides the capstone direction for the U.S. joint military forces operating in unified action, so Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1: *The Army* is considered the capstone doctrine for the Army. In his Foreword, the CSA explains that,

> [ADP 1] frames how we, as the Soldiers and Civilians of the United States Army, think about the strategic environment, develop and refine doctrine, and chart a course into the future. It is my [CSA] vision of how the world has changed and how we as an Army will adapt to those changes, ensuring that we remain the world’s dominant land force and a crucial contributor to the joint team.”

He continues on to highlight specific themes with which the Army must be concerned: identifying the three strategic roles of the Army; emphasizing the importance of the

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professionalization of the force and the inculcation of the Army values as key to this
effort; stating unambiguously that the Army’s primary mission remains warfighting; and
addressing the impact of technological advances. The CSA also asserts, however, the
importance of the human dimension spanning all of these themes:

At the same time, a decade of war has reinforced timeless lessons about the
centrality of human beings in all aspects of military operations. We must build on
these insights to change how we think about, plan for, and conduct all of our
operations. Although some will argue that technology will simplify future
military operations, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that warfare remains a
fundamentally human endeavor. Direct engagement with people has always been,
and remains, a core strength of the United States Army.24

As capstone guidance, such emphasis on the centrality of the human being in the Army’s
mission will percolate down through the development of further doctrine and gain in
definition as increasing levels of specificity are reached. Additionally, those humans who
are central in military operations are not just American soldiers; enemy combatants and
civilian populations are also included in that human presence. Finally, in carrying
through a theme also established in the national-level guidance documents, other players
on the field in addition to U.S. joint forces include interagency personnel from other U.S.
Government agencies, intergovernmental partners from other governments, and partner
countries’ military forces. Consequently, such a narrative indicates that the future officer
must not be competent just in his or her trained tasks, but also be capable of interacting
effectively across diverse human communities and organizational cultures.

This narrative thread of the centrality of the human, at times explicit and at other
times implicit, is woven throughout ADP 1. In one instance echoing the ASPG, as

24 Ibid.
reasons for service by members of a volunteer force are explored, the ADP states that “Their reasons for serving vary as much as their ethnicity, gender, and beliefs vary. Their diversity becomes our strength…” Socioeconomic background might also be added to the reasons for a service member volunteering. Consequently, when one takes into account all of these facets of the force, the young officer reporting for duty will assume responsibility for leadership of as heterogeneous a group as any in America.

The recognition of the central place of humanity in all its diversity continues as the unique position of the Army operating in the land domain is further explained: “The land domain is the most complex of the domains, because it addresses humanity—its cultures, ethnicities, religions, and politics.” The presence of humans in large numbers is “the distinguishing characteristic” of the land domain, and among these populations are where the soldiers will operate, “face-to-face with people, in the midst of environmental, societal, religious, and political tumult,” cooperating, shaping, influencing, assisting, and/or coercing as necessary. Other players on the field in addition to those mentioned may include interagency personnel from other U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental partners from other governments, nongovernmental organizations, and partner nations’ military forces. The importance of this human interaction is later crystalized with the awareness that “tactical victories achieved by our firepower only lead to strategic failure and world condemnation” if the

25 Ibid., vi.


27 ADP 1, 1-1.
needs of noncombatants before, during, and after battle are not addressed. The Army’s three strategic roles all occur within this challenging, human-centric environment.

Among all other responsibilities a young officer faces, the ability to lead his or her soldiers in the warfight and win is paramount. No other outcome is acceptable. Of the three roles (Win, Prevent, Shape), Win is the most critical. However, in the absence of conflict, the other two roles indicate actions that are undertaken on a daily basis around the world to try and deter conflict. The Prevent role is one of deterrence. The Army, in maintaining its credibility as the preeminent land force present throughout the world and often working with JIIM partners, can serve to prevent conflict from breaking out. Such actions as the stationing of forces overseas in host countries or the regular participation in bi- and multinational exercises in different regions contribute to deterrence. The third role, Shape, demands additional knowledge and skills allied to a cultural understanding capacity over and above conventional warfighting abilities.

Shape arguably is the role most concerned with cultural understanding and interpersonal relationships in those cultures. Engagement with partners; military-to-military contacts building mutual understanding; helping partners build the capacity to defend themselves; training security forces of other nations; training of foreign military personnel at Army schools and training programs: these are some of the ways by which the Army is executing the Shape role everyday around the world. The surprisingly expansive entirety of contacts and actions with partners is called security cooperation. For example, there are forty-eight programs through which the Army makes contact with

28 Ibid., 1-7.

29 Ibid., 1-5—1-6
other partner nations’ military institutions. In FY2011, over 4000 discrete shaping events happened; in FY 2012, that number increased by almost 300.\textsuperscript{30} This is an important role for the Army and demands cross-cultural competence on the part of the soldiers and their leaders who travel to train and exercise with the partner nations’ forces.

The need, post-Afghanistan, for a continued cultural awareness and knowledge mindset is being implemented through a concept called Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). CSA has stated that “Before the most recent set of conflicts, it was generally believed that cultural awareness was only required in select Army units, such as Special Forces or Civil Affairs. Recent history has made clear that we need expanded levels of cultural and regional awareness in all Army units.” Seen as another means to build and strengthen partnerships around the world, RAF is expected “to improve partner capacity, sustain strong relationships, and to assist our Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational partners in building a stronger global security environment.”\textsuperscript{31} Though there remains some confusion as to the exact purpose for and means by which RAF will be implemented, such initiatives reflect broader performance and knowledge expectations of a new officer.\textsuperscript{32}

In addition to these specific human-centered concerns in ADP 1, it also introduces formally within the doctrinal materials the Army-as-profession. The Army had begun an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Rosa Brooks, “Portrait of the Army as a Work in Progress,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2014), 42-51. Offers a particularly incisive examination of the RAF concept.
\end{itemize}
intensive effort reviewing its status as a profession at the turn of the 21st century.\textsuperscript{33} But during the decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, when the focus was squarely on generating forces for deployment, the study of the Army as a profession progressed unevenly. Journal articles, monographs, symposia, establishment of centers focused on the professional military ethic and then the Army profession and ethic: these and other vehicles attested to continued efforts by individuals within the Army to institutionalize this professional focus. But as the Army drew down its forces in Iraq and anticipation of the end of combat in Afghanistan grew, the institutional Army once again turned full attention to the issue of Army-as-profession. After establishing a Center for the Army Profession and Ethic in July 2010, an Army-wide campaign was launched in December 2010 to assess the state of the Army profession. As the Commanding General of TRADOC identified in the opening paragraphs of a preliminary White Paper initiating the study effort, the decade of war had shown the dedication, determination, and adaptability of junior leaders over numerous deployments. Yet he goes on to add that “we have also struggled in some areas to maintain the highest standards of the Profession of Arms. As we have at other times in our history, we assess that it is time to refresh and

\textsuperscript{33} This initial work is documented in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., \textit{The Future of the Army Profession}. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, Project Directors. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002). However, the reality, demands, and stress of combat on soldiers in the war on terrorism and fissures such as loss of view of the Army as a profession by those soldiers exposed by research subsequent to the initial effort led to publication of a second round of new research and refinement of selected previous work in a revised and expanded second edition (2005). This second edition is the essential foundation for the formalized Army-as-profession campaign of 2011 and consequent development and promulgation of an Army Profession framework in both doctrinal publications as well as an on-going, comprehensive education and training program. See Gordon B. Davis and Jeffrey D. Peterson, “America’s Army—Our Profession,” \textit{Military Review} 93, no. 1 (January-February 2013): 43-48.
renew our understanding of our profession.” The introduction of this subject in ADP 1 signals the formal adoption of the Army Profession campaign outcomes. A more complete treatment of the topic follows below as the supporting Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, is devoted entirely to the issue.

In summary, then, ADP 1 introduces those foundational elements on which the entire principle of service to country as a soldier in the Army is based and from which all subsequent doctrinal materials is developed. Warfighting competence is clearly the top priority. However, ADP 1 also recognizes and begins to expand on the human dimension of being both a soldier and a leader. This human focus will continue to become ever more detailed as the continuous narrative process of doctrinal specification continues to unfold.

*Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1: The Army Profession*

Recalling that an ADRP is designed to amplify fundamental principles laid out in the associated ADP, ADRP 1 devotes itself to the singular topic of the Army profession, just one of the specified topics in ADP 1. However, ADRP 1 does ultimately reinforce its parent publication through the mechanism of the extensive study of Army-as-profession and subsequent development of an explicit Army-as-profession framework. Though this text was published in 2013 as part of the Army’s retrenchment following a decade of war, much preparatory work was accomplished in the first decade of the twenty-first century as previously discussed. ADRP 1 begins the important work of transitioning the human dimension narrative thread from the general principles identified in the previous

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publications to the more specific treatment to follow in subsequent texts which will be used across the Army in producing its future leaders and maturing its present ones.

To this point, starting with the national-level documents, the human dimension narrative thread has focused in broad terms on what the current and future leaders may expect, to include: persistent conflict, complexity, ambiguity, partnering with allies and coalition members, and effective, values-based leadership of forces. Together, the ASPG and ADP 1 translate this broad guidance and direction into Army-specific roles, missions, standards, needs, and developmental goals. ADRP 1 places such expectations squarely within a professional framework which serves the evolving doctrinal narrative concerning leader development. ADRP 1, however, is not just about leadership, but rather applies to the entire force from private to general. And while warfighting competence remains, as always, preeminent, the majority of topical treatment focuses on human aspects of service as a professional.

ADRP 1 fulfills a number of important functions in asserting the Army as a profession and “fostering continued commitment to the Army Profession and its Ethic.” Among others, it provides definition and description of the Army Profession as well as the Army Ethic. It also discusses the Army Profession’s essential characteristics, the criteria for membership and certification in the profession, and “lays the groundwork for developing the moral identity of the Army Profession and its professionals.” Finally, it is the preeminent text from which trainers and educators will extract curricula on the Army Profession, the Army Ethic and character development of Army professionals.\(^{35}\)

\(^{35}\) DA, ADRP 1, The Army Profession (Washington, DC: June 14, 2013), 1-1 and iii.
is a graphic representation of the profession and provides clear pointers to the human
dimension of leading soldiers.

The Army Profession
A unique vocation of experts certified in the design, generation, support, and ethical application of
landpower, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and
interests of the American people.

Army Professional: A member of the Army Profession who meets the Army’s certification criteria of
competence, character, and commitment.

Five Essential Characteristics:
1. Trust: Bedrock of the profession
2. Military Expertise: The ethical application of landpower
3. Honorable Service: A noble calling to service and sacrifice
4. Esprit de Corps: A winning spirit
5. Stewardship of the Profession: The long term responsibility

The Army Ethic
The evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs, deeply embedded within the core of the Army culture and
practiced by all members of the Army Profession to motivate and guide the appropriate conduct of
individual members bound together in common moral purpose.

Values: Loyalty • Duty • Respect • Selfless Service • Honor • Integrity • Personal Courage

Ethical Foundation: Legal and Moral

Figure 2: A Schematic View of The Army Profession. Modification of Introductory Figure 1of ADRP 1, v.

In reviewing the components of the Army Profession, its characteristics, its ethic,
and its foundation, it becomes clear that a newly commissioned leader carries
responsibilities and faces expectations beyond his or her mere technical ability to
accomplish a mission. Keep the individual in mind: a newly minted lieutenant given
total responsibility for some number of soldiers and for their welfare, including families.
For that newly minted lieutenant, the basis for maneuvering a platoon in a successful
offensive action or directing a convoy of humanitarian aid to its destination and its
successful distribution is broader and deeper than mere technical mastery of a task.
Responsibility for the “ethical application of landpower” itself alludes to many leadership facets of human interaction. Consequently, of the five characteristics of the Army Profession, trust is rightly declared to be its bedrock and operates on several levels: between soldiers; between soldiers and leaders; between soldiers, their families, and the Army; and between the Army and the American people.

The success of any military formation is based on the trust which builds between its members. The Army identifies three criteria each individual must exhibit to secure this element of trust amongst the group: competence, character, and commitment. Competence is that demonstrated ability to perform one’s duties successfully and accomplish missions with discipline and to standard.36 For a newly commissioned officer charged with the leadership, health, and welfare of soldiers, those duties far exceed mere technical competence. For example, a new leader also grapples with a complexity emerging from the human relationships between leader and led.

The criterion of character also bears heavily on a new leader. Defined as one’s “dedication and adherence to the Army Values and the profession’s ethic as consistently and faithfully demonstrated in decisions and actions,”37 character challenges the new leader in his or her internalization of this value set and ability to act on it in a fair and unbiased manner toward soldiers who come from diverse, even drastically different, backgrounds. This speaks directly to the leader’s self-awareness and empathy, aspects of leadership which will be addressed further in discussion of ADP/ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership.

36 ADRP 1, 2-1.
37 Ibid.
Finally, as the third criterion, commitment speaks to one’s resolve to honorable service and performance of duties with discipline and to standard, and to strive, in the face of adversity or other challenges, to successfully and ethically accomplish any mission. Honorable service and ethical accomplishment of missions once again challenges a new leader’s development of and understanding of self.

Thus, as captured in the three criteria, in building trust, the new lieutenant must demonstrate and enact a range of both technical and interpersonal knowledge and skills. In executing his or her duty as leader, the new officer will need to possess a self-awareness that permits him or her to effectively and ethically lead soldiers. These same criteria, however, also must be enacted across the other levels of trust, most specifically that of leader to soldier, the Army (as embodied in its leaders at all levels) to the families of soldiers, and ultimately to the nation. The new leader is challenged on many levels far exceeding one’s technical competence to act, for example, as flight lead for an air assault.

ADRP 1 continues to define ever more specifically within the overarching characteristic of trust many elements of professionalism within the military context which clearly drive at the continuing narrative thread of the human dimension, especially in terms of leader preparation and expectations of performance. One example speaks to the element of trust in regards to the nation. As a profession, the Army “discriminately use[s] lethal force in conditions of moral complexity common to unified land operations.” Consequently, the Army professional must exhibit and enact a strong professional ethic—an ethic with both legal and moral foundations—and have the character to abide by that

\[38 \text{Ibid.}\]
When faced with a mission for which the legal foundations for action do not provide a clear way forward, decisions must be based on the moral aspects of the Army ethic in compliance with the Army values. Continuing to speak to the need for individual development and self-awareness, the doctrine makes clear that in situations involving hybrid threats, the leader is “challenged to apply moral understandings of the ends, ways, and means of war and their relevance under the Army Ethic…The Army Ethic requires us to move beyond resorting to deadly force whenever we can….” Given today’s pervasive, media-saturated world, less than honorable actions of soldiers and their leaders can lead to diminished trust in the institution by the American citizenry. Consequently, leaders are expected to have developed a capacity for moral understanding that can guide them in the ambiguous, complex situations they may be expected to face.

Another guidance tool which the Army professional has is the bundle of Army values (see Figure 5). In their specifics, they will be examined further in the ADRP 6-22 discussion to come. But in explicating the Army Profession, they are viewed as those “principles, standards, and qualities considered essential for successful Army leaders and all Army professionals.” Seen as fundamental in helping soldiers make correct situational decisions and develop their character, the Army values are seen as replacing the set of values that existed prior to taking the oath of service. The Army leader,

\[39\] Ibid., 2-3.

\[40\] Ibid., 2-4.

\[41\] DA, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: May 16, 2012), 4. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.

\[42\] ADRP 1, 2-5.
consequently, is charged with “developing these values into the character of Army professionals” and “teach[ing] these values by creating a common understanding of the Army Values and expected standards, and by modeling [them] in their leadership.” As a final comment on the characteristic of trust, the singular value of respect underpins the trust between soldiers and their leaders. A leader who has some understanding of the heterogeneous nature of an Army formation today will most likely have greater success in extending respect and dignity to all, consequently building those bonds of trust that mark all effective units.

Of the four remaining characteristics of the Army Profession, the issue of expert knowledge is addressed under that characteristic of military expertise. As doctrinally propagated, the Army has four distinct fields of expert knowledge, only one of which—the military-technical field—speaks to the more quantitative aspects of knowledge, i.e., aspects of knowledge that are trained through various programs of instruction. The other three fields, however, deal with knowledge more appropriately related to the human dimension. These fields are: the moral-ethical field; the political-cultural field; and the leader/human development field. One can point to studies in these various fields to make data-driven arguments and where appropriate, such information should be part of the learning process. But in thinking of these fields of expert knowledge in the case of a newly commissioned officer leading a platoon of soldiers on a mission, interacting with civilians of another culture, or perhaps maneuvering the squads in an engagement with enemy forces, the latter three fields speak to knowledge that is enhanced by a broader

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43 Ibid., 2-7.
understanding of human nature and cultures. As the discussion of the application of military expertise within the professional context makes clear, “the art of the Army professional is to exercise discretionary judgments that often carry with them moral implications or consequences….Army professionals must have high moral character to make the proper discretionary judgments.” 44 The senior leader is not able to be at all places at all times. Consequently, senior leaders will leave it to the junior officers to make the right decision, to do the right thing.

This aspect of the leader’s totality of self beyond the technical training received also permeates the final three characteristics of the profession: honorable service; esprit de corps; and stewardship. The development of “moral consciousness and sensitivity” is necessary for one to act honorably as “honor integrates all Army values.” These values are more than mere rhetoric, but rather, “integrated through a sound understanding of the professional’s honor, these values form the moral identity that motivates Army professionals.” 45 Not only is the individual leader to pursue character development through “continual study, reflection, experience, and feedback,” but leaders are also responsible for “encouraging, supporting, and assessing the efforts of their subordinates” in this developmental pursuit. 46 Again, the leadership challenge facing any new officer exceeds the skills learned at technical, functional training received at various programs of instruction.

44 Ibid., 3-2.
46 Ibid., 4-3.
In another scenario discussed under honorable service, the issue of ethical—or lawful—orders arises. Geneva and Hague Conventions; civilian authority; military command; oath of office; these are some of the many influences bearing on a leader or soldier in the event of a questionable order. Seeking clarification is the immediate and most obvious action if there is doubt or confusion. But if an immediate decision on an action is needed, the leader is admonished to “make the best judgment possible based on the Army values, personal experience, critical thinking, previous study, and reflection….Spending time to reflect on the Army values, studying, and honing personal leadership competencies will help.” These aspects of self-awareness weigh heavily on an individual and are not easily imbued through training courses. The subjective nature of such individual development speaks to a liberal approach to one’s preparation.

The final two characteristics—esprit de corps and stewardship—are deeply anchored in the bedrock characteristic of trust, the singular internal organizing principle of the profession. A unit composed of competent and selfless soldiers trusting each other and their leader will be a coherent and successful organization possessing esprit de corps. Serving as stewards of the profession is a direct outgrowth of the trust the American public places in the Army to do the right thing by maintaining the efficacy of these five characteristics. Consequently, the doctrine asserts that upon taking their oath, Army professionals do not enter a “physical workspace [but rather] a moral workspace,” stewarding the sacred trust of always being ready to fight and win to protect the nation.48

47 Ibid., 4-4.
48 Ibid., 6-2.
To be clear in concluding the human dimension thread of the Army Profession: none of these characteristics or their associated aspects operate independently of each other. Ultimately, the totality of these fields as embodied in each soldier and leader is brought to bear in the ethical application of landpower. ADRP 1 provides the ethical basis governing such application; the second capstone doctrine text, ADP 3-0, provides overarching doctrine and framework for conducting land operations.

*Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations*

ADP 3-0 serves principally to provide the overarching doctrine by which Army units conduct unified land operations as the Army’s contribution to the “larger national effort characterized as unified action. Army leaders\(^{49}\) must integrate their actions and operations within this larger framework, collaborating with entities outside their direct control.”\(^{50}\) As seen in earlier publications, those outside entities include the other services of the joint team, members of the interagency, multinational partners, and NGOs. Once again, the need for interpersonal and interorganizational competence as well as the ability to deal with complexity is noted as a requirement for the leader. However, even given the main thrust in this text of planning and conducting operations, it cannot avoid addressing the role of the commander in ensuring successful outcomes, thereby implicitly identifying the expectations of skills and knowledge of the commander. This is emphasized in the personal Foreword to the ADP by the CSA in which he directs that the

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\(^{49}\) The use of two nouns—leader and commander--throughout ADP/ADRP 3-0 are synonymous for our purpose of examining officer education and training requirements within the context of the narrative threads we have been tracing.

\(^{50}\) DA, ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 3.
doctrine in ADP 3-0 “permeate…our leader professional development programs.”

In preparing for any mission, a commander seeks as complete a picture of the operational environment as possible. It can vary in complexity, being “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences” that bear on the commander’s decisions and the employment of forces. Among the many aspects to be considered, a framework of operational variables is identified. These variables are: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Even without examining each variable as a discrete entity, it is clear that a commander has levied on him or her an expectation of cognitive agility in understanding and synthesizing a broad range of variables often of a complex and ambiguous nature. This environment, of course, is constantly changing as any of the variables change.

ADP 3-0 also identifies six tenets characterizing Army operations: flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. Of these, two—integration and adaptability—hold particular significance when addressing implications for leader professional development. Integration addresses the requirement for the commander to integrate his or her operations within the larger frame of a joint, interagency, and frequently, multinational undertaking. The ability to nourish relationships and understand other viewpoints is key to the success of this tenet. Shared understanding and purpose through collaboration will mark effective integration.

Adaptability is the second tenet of importance to leader development. At each

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51 Ibid., Foreword.
52 Ibid., 2.
53 Ibid., 7.
step along the trail of narratives, especially as will be seen in the discussion of ADP/ADRP 6-22, possessing the self-ability to adapt or the state of adaptability on the part of organizations is emphasized. ADP 3-0 begins to move the discussion beyond generalities into the realm of land operations and the need for adaptive commanders.

Recognizing that it is impossible to have set answers to problems before their manifestation, ADP 3-0 admonishes Army leaders to adapt to each situation. Not only should formations and their employment be subject to adaptation, but the leader’s thinking must adapt, also, which “requires an adaptable mind.” The leader must also understand the environment in which the operation is taking place. Earlier, the PMESII-PT operational variables were identified as one way to understand the environment. But given the complexity of today’s situations, “interactive learning” is necessary in that leaders must “intentionally and repeatedly interact with the operational environment so as to test and refine multiple hypotheses.” This is accomplished by Army leaders who expand their understanding “through broad education, training, personal study, and collaboration with interagency partners.” The emphasis on the cognitive capability of the leader is notable. Once again, an Army leader’s preparation indicates a cognitive agility and capacity across a broad range of topics marked by ambiguity and complexity.

ADP 3-0’s supporting text, ADRP 3-0, greatly expands on the basics in ADP 3-0. The following discussion will cull out only those points most pertinent to the continuing effort to identify the range of expectations of Army leaders which speak to the human dimension of leadership.

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54 ASPG, 7, 13; ADP 1, 4-3—4-4, 4-7.

55 ADP 3-0, 8.
As one begins to read ADRP 3-0, the reader is immediately challenged in the Preface that “military operations are foremost a human undertaking,” an explicit assertion missing in the parent text. This thought resonates throughout the expanded discussion in the ADRP as it continues to enlarge on the spare discussion of ADP 3-0.

An important amplification of the ADP is on the issue of the operational environment. ADP 3-0 offers a basic definition of the operational environment as a composite of three broad factors (see discussion above). In ADRP 3-0, the view of an operational environment adds specificity that speaks to the cognitive challenges a leader faces in coming to grips with the environment in which the leader’s operation will happen. The ADRP text presents an environment that “is not just isolated conditions of interacting variables” but also “involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that impact on conditions and operations” in that leader’s area of operations. Further, the description of the environment adds an undefined category of subvariables to the mix for consideration, while also identifying “the relationships and interactions” between both the variables and subvariables, all of which drives an operational environment that is constantly evolving.

One factor adding complexity (with no easy solution) is the increased difficulty of distinguishing between an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend. Invoking all of these variable elements, the text declares the consequence that land operations are

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57 ADRP 3-0, 1-1—1-2.
“exceedingly difficult to understand and visualize.” Recalling that doctrine is applicable across all levels of operations, this expanded view of the challenges a leader faces in mission planning and execution further delineates how a leader must cognitively be comfortable with complexity and ambiguity.

Another topic on which discussion is expanded is that of adaptability by both leaders and consequently their units. Two ways of approaching the topic are presented in ADRP 3-0. The first way is through the Army core competency of mission command. “Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Further, mission command “provides commanders and staff with a philosophy for operating in an uncertain environment as opposed to trying to create certainty and impose order and control over a situation.” When successful, mission command will foster adaptability, a “quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit through critical thinking, their comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, their willingness to accept prudent risk, and their ability to rapidly adjust while continuously assessing the situation.” Once again, leader success is identified with critical thinking and the ability to deal with ambiguity and uncertainty.

Also, adaptability is examined through the lens of it being a tenet of unified land operations. While reiterating the quality of adaptability from the previous discussion on mission command, the text turns to a more specific examination of adaptability on the part of well-led units. Able to adapt to changing circumstances, an effective unit’s

58 Ibid., 1-7.
59 Ibid., 2-10--2-11.
adaptability is “essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative based on relevant understanding of the specific situation.” In such units, what is evidenced is the ability to “anticipate transitions, accept risks to create opportunities, and influence all partners.” The progression of thought from critical thinking and comfort in complexity to these three abilities is clear. For example, in the case of anticipating transitions, the facts surrounding a given situation can be ambiguous or even non-existent, but an ability to understand, or “read,” the situation and available information enables a leader to prepare his or her unit, allowing the soldiers to successfully posture for the transition from one situation to another. The Army recognizes the importance of imbuing this quality in soldiers and leaders, but approaches the topic from a developmental perspective in its doctrine on leadership in ADP/ADRP 6-22, the topic of the following chapter.

Given the inherent generalities that arise in ADPs given their briefness (ADPs are designed to adhere to a 15 page maximum), it is of little surprise that the ADRP consequently provides more details on specific sub-topics that could not be included in the ADP. Among this group of subjects, two bear specifically on leader development and preparation.

A discussion of close combat—direct, face-to-face fighting—is introduced after a passing reference in ADP 3-0. The centrality of the human dimension is carried through here when soldiers are acknowledged as the preeminent means of success, notwithstanding the importance of technology. Success in the complex, ambiguous

60 Ibid., 2-13—2-14.
operational environment “requires Soldiers whose character and competence represent the foundation of a values-based, trained, and ready Army,” and it will require adaptive leaders to succeed. Among the qualities of these leaders is included the need to remain “culturally astute” and be “grounded in the Army Values.” Recalling the discussion of leaders’ responsibilities from ADRP 1, the Army values are essential to disciplined and effective forces. Leaders will be responsible for nurturing adherence to these values in their subordinates. Additionally, cultural awareness arises even here for the leader. As previously noted, given the encompassing responsibilities with which a leader is charged vis-à-vis the soldiers under his or her command, cultural understanding of one’s own soldiers is as important as understanding the culture(s) encountered in an operational environment.

Another topic introduced in ADRP 3-0 is that of the law of war. An “affirmative duty,” every soldier is bound to follow these laws in executing missions as such compliance is “not situationally dependent, contingent on the nature of the conflict, contingent on the nature of the enemy, nor otherwise optional.” It is the important responsibility of a commander to ensure that soldiers do so and that they receive “regular and rigorous training” on these obligations. As the law of war has evolved over time, two categories of purposes emerged for its need: humanitarian and functional. Maintaining our focus on the human dimension of soldiers and leaders, a notable functional purpose of compliance with the law of war is that of “maintaining and

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61 Ibid., 1-8.
preserving the humanity of the Soldiers involved in a conflict.”

All leaders are challenged here not just to prepare their soldiers for the event but also to oversee their recovery from it, tending to much more than their physical wounds and needs.

To now, the focus of the doctrinal examination has been on those qualities, requirements, or challenges faced by or expected of leaders. Within the military vocation, the ultimate test of leadership is that of command. In the majority of cases, only commissioned officers, those who by virtue of their commission are also leaders, can be a commander. And as with every other significant process in the Army, there is doctrine underlying its enactment. However, there is also a legal basis for command. Being selected and designated as a commander of a unit is based in regulations; in the case of the Army, that is Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy. This regulation “prescribes the policy and responsibility of command, which includes well-being of the force, military and personal discipline and conduct, The Army Equal Opportunity Program, Prevention of Sexual Harassment, and the Army Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program.”

As can be seen, the regulation addresses many topics which are more administratively oriented but no less important to successful command tenure. However, it is in the accomplishment of missions, the effectiveness of chains of command, and the responsibilities and expectations of the commander which is addressed through the doctrine of mission command.

**Army Doctrinal (and Doctrinal Reference) Publication 6-0: Mission Command**

Given the close resemblance in the treatment of mission command in these two

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63 Ibid.

64 DA, AR 600-20, Army Command Policy (Washington, DC, November 6, 2014), i.
publications, and given the desired focus on the attributes of the individual commander, the identification of specific desired traits and abilities of a commander across both texts will be combined in this discussion. Recalling the primary focus on the preparation of officer candidates for their duties as officers and leaders, most officers, as lieutenants, first become platoon leaders and then, when they are promoted to captain, company commanders. The mission command discussion involves senior leaders with staffs, but the attributes identified for commanders and the essential processes by which command is exercised applies across the range of military ranks and leadership positions, even by junior officers. Leadership doctrine is taken up in ADP/ADRP 6-22 and the concept of leadership and the construct of successful leadership will be taken up specifically in the next chapter. However, given the close relationship between leadership and command, the discussion of mission command necessarily introduces material that will be expanded upon in discussion to come.

In reading both the ADP and ADRP 6-0, certain qualities and attributes necessary for the successful enactment of mission command on the part of the individual leader are specified. These traits, however, are first placed in a context wherein the human dimension of conflict is once again acknowledged. The mission command approach cannot be rigid “because military operations as a whole defy orderly, efficient, and precise control. [They] are complex, human endeavors characterized by the continuous, mutual give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants” which includes operations amongst civilian groups who add an element of complexity.65 Enemies are

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thinking, uncooperative, and adaptive themselves, contributing to a commander’s uncertainty about how they will act and react or how events will unfold. Stress, mistakes, chance, or friction as related to friendly forces also contribute to uncertainty. Mission command is a human endeavor, and this essential fact points to a number of human behaviors by commanders successfully exercising it. These behaviors manifest themselves throughout the exercise of mission command.

Building trust throughout an organizational structure as well as with other partners is critical to mission command. Overcoming barriers such as culture or differing capabilities and attaining unity of effort among all forces and partners requires interpersonal skills with which to build effective relationships, shared understanding, and the resultant trust. Collaboration and dialogue are key to this outcome of shared understanding. Dialogue places unique demands on a leader, especially when collaborating with a governmental, multinational, or non-governmental organization partner, in terms of language, cultural tolerance, and mediation skills. As understood in Army doctrinal materials, dialogue “is a way to collaborate by involving the candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants that encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement…sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand situations and make decisions.” This expectation of leaders speaks to an aspect of individual temperament and preparedness that develops over the course of a

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67 Ibid., 2-2.
person’s life. Pre-commissioning education is a critical element of this development for the young lieutenant and captain.

The notion of understanding applies not just to interpersonal relations, but also to the transformation of raw data into understanding (Figure 3).

![Cognitive Hierarchy: Raw Data to Understanding](image)

**Figure 3: Cognitive Hierarchy: Raw Data to Understanding.** From ADRP 6-0, Figure 2-1, 2-7.

In the end, understanding is “knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment applied to it to comprehend the situation’s inner relationships.” Leaders exercise judgment through their experience, expertise, and intuition.⁶⁹ This process is not completed individually. At senior levels of command—battalion and above—a commander has a staff to help work through this cognitive process. However, platoon leaders and company commanders also apply this process in executing their missions without the benefit of a staff. In working through their mission challenges, dialogue helps at these echelons by the exchange of viewpoints with members of one’s unit, such as a company commander may expect with the First Sergeant and platoon leaders with their platoon sergeants.

In the discussion of understanding, the ADRP, with its expanded treatment of the generalized topics the ADP offers, introduces and differentiates between two kinds of thinking: critical and creative. These two modes of thinking are also covered in other

⁶⁹ ADRP 6-0, 2-7.
Army texts, most notably as a key tool for successful decisionmaking in the operations process.\textsuperscript{70} Mission command and the operations process are closely related as the commander oversees the operations process through his or her exercise of mission command. The discussion of the two modes of thinking in the mission command ADRP is sufficient to stand for the instances in other publications.

Critical and creative thinking are key elements in facilitating understanding and supporting decisionmaking related to an operation. Both the commander of a unit and the staff supporting the commander should be comfortable in these modes of thinking. Unsurprisingly, critical thinking “examines a problem in depth from multiple points of view…determining whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true based on a given inference or argument.” The critical thinker him- or herself is characterized as “purposeful and reflective” applying judgment “about what to believe or what to do in response to known facts, observations, experience, oral or written information sources, or arguments.”\textsuperscript{71} The quality of reflection as an attribute of the thinker carries a connotation of self-awareness as knowledge of oneself is integral to such thinking. Yet the ability to be reflective is an essential element of a leader’s composition. This aspect will be explored more in the specific leadership discussion in the next chapter.

Creative thinking, on the other hand, “involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas….lead[ing] to new insights, novel approaches, fresh perspectives, and new ways of understanding and conceiving


\textsuperscript{71} ADRP 6-0, 2-7—2-8.
things.” Creative thinking is called for when facing unfamiliar problems or old problems requiring new solutions. 72

As can be expected across a corpus of texts as large and diverse as Army doctrine, the desirable attributes, competencies, and capacities of leaders will inevitably be discussed repeatedly, continuing and adding to the narrative theme of leadership and leader development. The expectations and requirements placed on leaders have already been made clear without invoking any of the specific leadership doctrinal publications. The strategic guidance and capstone doctrine just examined are a small number of the texts which serve as the basis for leader development education and training programs. In the following chapter, the premier doctrine on leadership and leader development, ADP/ADRP 6-22 and 7-0, will be analyzed. However, there is another body of texts that require examination for their influence on the future of leader development. The Army’s conceptual thinking about the future resides in this family of concepts. By way of differentiating the two bodies of texts, “doctrine guides today’s force and influences near term change; concepts stand years [6-18] in the future and pull today’s force forward to anticipate operations in the future OE.” 73 In examining select concept texts, tracing of the continuous narrative thread regarding future leadership and leader development will be identified.

*The Army Concept Framework*

As noted earlier, a concept is essentially a future problem set that serves as the basis for proposed solutions to a military problem, that is, proposing the required

72 Ibid., 2-8.

73 DA, TRADOC PAM 71-20-3, 7.
capabilities required to successfully prosecute operations in some future operating environment against a future potential adversary. It is a thinking exercise. This work leads to a future required capability which may not necessarily be a material or technical solution, as “concepts do not assume technology is the solution, rather they assume technology enables the solution.”

Thus, a required capability could be a new organizational construct or a change in the education or training of soldiers.

The Army Concept Framework is similar to the doctrine corpus; concepts are hierarchically arranged within the framework, moving from the general to the specific. Of the twelve concepts composing the framework, the premier text is the Army Capstone Concept (ACC), followed by the Army Operating Concept (AOC), which in turn cascades down to a series of specific functional and special concepts. All twelve concepts contain some discussion of leadership and its development applicable to that specific concept. In addition to the ACC and the AOC, there are three concepts that have notable implications for the future preparation of officer candidates. They cover the topics of mission command, engagement, and the human dimension, and these three will be examined as a group.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The U.S. Army Capstone Concept

In introducing this principal concept, the Commanding General of TRADOC notes that among other influences, the “reach of human interaction” on the future operational environment will contribute to its unpredictability and complexity.

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74 Ibid., 8.
75 DA, TRADOC PAM 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept (Ft Eustis, VA, December 19, 2012), iii.
idea reverberates throughout the following narrative. One substantive example is the introduction to the discussion of the future operational environment. Complexity is acknowledged as a continuing element in military operations, though the manner by which complexity is viewed will necessarily change with time. “Fog, friction, chance, and uncertainty” produce such a condition, and are the result of human interaction. Other human impacts on the operational environment are “cultural shifts” which lead to complications in relationships between peoples and societies. Further, given an increased tempo in human interaction, “distinguishing between the types and motives of future actors becomes more complicated.”\(^76\) These human interactions will challenge future leaders, then, as they navigate the human domain in their missions.

Unsurprisingly, as the capstone concept for the future Army, one major emphasis in the ACC concerns the role of Army forces in shaping the operational environment through various mechanisms such as helping partners build their own capacities, conducting recurring training and exercises, or supporting security cooperation activities. One outcome of such engagement benefits the involved Army forces as such a mission “enables them to understand more clearly the populations among which they may operate” and will allow for a more “culturally attuned manner” on the part of Army soldiers.\(^77\) As the document’s narrative projects beyond the prevent-shape-win roles of the Army, ideas are proposed that support the future assertions in the preceding discussion of each role. The key position is that decisive land operations must account for “the human aspects of conflict and war….the human role in warfare.” Consequently,

\(^76\) Ibid., 6.

\(^77\) Ibid., 13.
in defining the operational environment, the Army “must account for the socio-economic, cognitive, and physical aspects of human activity. Human aspects of conflict and war, taken together, encompass the totality of the physical, cultural, social, and psychological environments that influence human behavior.” Given that the goal of military action is to affect behaviors of human groups toward a desired outcome, success in this human domain depends “on the application of capabilities that influence the perceptions, understandings, and actions of relevant populations and makers.”

Commissioned officers of all ranks will be responsible for not only executing missions and applying capabilities in close proximity to or in partnership with other populations, but as they progress in rank and responsibility, they will also be responsible for grappling with these aspects of human activity so as to provide the necessary capabilities to their subordinate commanders and forces. Such work will require an integrated understanding of human nature so as to adapt successfully to meet these complex and uncertain missions.

A persistent thread in not only this family of concepts but also the doctrine narratives is that of adaptability as a necessary quality in future soldiers, leaders, and units. This concern for adaptability across all echelons of the Army continues in the ACC. In addressing leader development and education, the ACC notes that increasingly lower echelons of command are empowered “with the capabilities, capacities, authorities, and responsibilities needed to think independently and act decisively, morally, and ethically.” In language reminiscent of the strategic corporal, such decentralized execution can have “strategic, operational, and tactical implications.” Consequently,

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78 Ibid., 15-16.
such employment of forces, in addition to understanding the operational environment, must also have “an understanding of the geopolitical, cultural, linguistic, technical, and tactical factors that impact operations.” Indeed, in identifying specific future capability needs, the ACC declares that the future Army will need “future leaders at all echelons who are critical and creative thinkers with highly refined problem solving skills that can process data and information into usable knowledge.” Though soldiers of enlisted ranks, especially non-commissioned officers, are understood to be included in this future need, it is the commissioned officer, their leader, to whom the unit soldiers will look for sense making and who will direct the accomplishment of missions. The scope of cognitive agility across multiple areas of expected knowledge by future leaders clearly indicates the need for a broad-based education across disciplinary areas. Technical and tactical competence will be attained through training. But the issues surrounding the human dimension are less quantifiable, demanding broader intellectual preparation.

*TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1: The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040*

This concept is the most recent of the Army’s think pieces on future armed conflict and how the Army must evolve to meet complex challenges arising over the next few decades; it is the “start point for developing the future force.” It further refines the Army-specific future requirements flowing from the ACC. The AOC identifies those

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79 Ibid., 21-22.

80 Ibid., 31-32.

81 DA, TRADOC PAM 525-3-1: The U.S. Army Operating Concept (Ft Eustis, VA, October 7, 2014), iv. Hereafter referred to as AOC.
“first order capabilities” which the Army believes must be developed if it is to be successful against future adversaries in direct combat or in performing any of the myriad missions spanning the range of military operations. This concept marks, in some ways, a significant departure from its predecessor. However, in terms of leader expectations, it varies hardly at all.

Whereas the ACC posits future challenges to the Army at the strategic level, to include acknowledgement of the constraints deriving from the country’s fiscal condition, the previous AOC emphasized the future employment of Army forces at the operational and tactical levels of war. To date, the ACC has not changed. This new AOC, on the other hand, has changed to reflect a focus on all three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. This change does hold significance for the examination of leader preparation at the precommissioning level as the past twelve years of conflict have recognized lieutenants as strategic actors. These young leaders will operate in a “complex world,” the meaning of which is “an environment that is not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing.” This is reflected in one of the assumptions underlying the concept when it states, “Changes in technology and geopolitical dynamics as well as the enduring political and human nature of war will keep

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82 DA, ADRP 3-0, 1-6. The range of military operations spans major operations and campaigns, crisis response and limited contingency operations, and military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

83 AOC, 1.

84 The inclusion of the strategic level reflects the acknowledgement of the strategic role young lieutenants fulfill as discussed in the earlier pages of this chapter, as well as the “strategic corporal” discussed in Chapter 2, footnote 53. Definition of “complex” at AOC, iii.
war in the realms of complexity and uncertainty.”

To further illustrate the Army’s narrative of the broad expectations placed on future leaders, the TRADOC Commander specifically notes in his Preface the introduction of a new “tenet of simultaneity” which emphasizes how the future Army must be prepared to “extend efforts beyond the physical battleground to other contested spaces such as public perception, political subversion, and criminality.”

The future leader is immediately confronted with the need for a cognitive agility in dealing with multiple dimensions of the human domain. This applies to the newly commissioned platoon leader as much as to his superiors. This once again hints at the vast range of expectations placed on the future lieutenant. This emphasis on the human dimension beyond the mere technological continues throughout the AOC. Writ large, however, many of the topics covered in the AOC resonate across the Army textual corpus. Consequently, the AOC will be examined only in respect to two issues bearing on the expectations of leaders and the associated role of technology.

The first issue is captured in the phrase “increased momentum of human interaction” when discussing the future operational environment. The increased momentum is a result of advances in technology and the proliferation of information. Yet this concept recognizes “the need to balance the technological focus of Army modernization with a recognition of the limits of technology and an emphasis on the human, cultural, and political continuities of armed conflict.”

The concept does not

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85 AOC, 6.
86 Ibid., iv. Emphasis in original. Tenets guide the generation and application of combat power. See AOC, 18.
87 Ibid., 6.
dismiss technology; it recognizes that technological advances will continue to bear on conflict. But it asserts that technology affects the domain of land warfare less than the other domains “due to geography, the interaction with adaptive enemies, the presence of noncombatants, and other complexities” encountered in war. Early on in the text, it can be seen that the human dimension and an ability to engage across multiple disciplines will pose significant challenges to any future leader.

Other specific statements supporting the emphasis on the human dimension and the leader recur throughout the text. In addressing how the future Army will operate, a common theme is the ability of Army forces to operate effectively among populations due to cross-cultural abilities they will possess. Another measure of Army operations is its ability to consolidate gains, a supporting role Army forces fill by “reinforcing and integrating the efforts of multiple partners” in areas such as governance, rule of law, and law enforcement. The officer candidate, however, in continued reading of the concept, would surely note its multidisciplinary expectations of the future leader. Army forces will work “to understand, influence, or compel human behaviors and perceptions. Army commanders understand cognitive, informational, social, cultural, political, and physical influences affecting human behavior and the mission. Leaders exert influence on key individuals, organizations, and institutions through cooperative and persuasive means.” One may mistakenly assign these expectations to senior leaders only. The concept itself, however, helps to dispel such a narrow assignation. Recalling again the role of young

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88 Ibid., 7.
89 Ibid., 16.
90 Ibid., 17.
officers as mayors of villages and towns, the concept itself emphasizes decentralized
operations that “require competent leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of
uncertainty,” gaining “intellectual advantages over adversaries through cross-cultural
competencies and advanced cognitive abilities,” all while maintaining their commitment
to the Army professional ethic…and preserv[ing] their moral character.” Further, in its
discussion of the tenet of adaptability, other expectations of a leader include critical
thinking and comfort with ambiguity. 91

A final role for the Army and its leaders, for the purposes of this tracking of the
human dimension, is that of shaping the security environment. In particular, the recent
Army initiative of regionally aligned forces (RAF) will place the young leader in a
position wherein he or she, as leader of an element sent to work with a foreign partner
country, will be expected to “develop relationships with and strengthen partner land forces,
share intelligence, increase cultural awareness, and conduct bilateral and multilateral
military exercises.” 92 These are important missions. They are, however, just one aspect
of the expansive expectations identified in the AOC for the successful young leader.
These many qualities and attributes certainly speak to the value of a broad, liberal
education in preparing the officer candidate for his or her future duties and
responsibilities.

The AOC also has some important assertions regarding technology. These
assertions bear particular significance in the face of the emphasis placed on STEM
educations as will be seen in Chapter 6. The explicit recognition of the limits of

91 Ibid., 18-19.
92 Ibid., 20.
technology was noted in the opening discussion above. An additional aspect of the technology discussion in the AOC occurs in Appendix C: Science and Technology.

This appendix identifies specific technological focus areas important to the future Army in order to fulfill the vision of the AOC. It is addressed to a collective consisting of the Army, DOD, national research and development communities, industry, academia, and international partners. While it acknowledges the importance of advanced technology to the current Army’s overmatch capability and the need to continue to develop technology, it moderates the technological determinism in some circles by emphasizing that “there are no ‘silver bullet’ technological solutions.” Rather, any technology’s full advantage flows from its combination with leadership and skilled soldiers through changes in organizations, doctrine, leader development, training, and personnel policies, and most importantly, understanding this integration in light of the technological advances. As the discussion concludes, it is imperative that the Army “fit machines to Soldiers rather than the other way around.”

This Appendix identifies eight “key technological focus areas.” These might be best characterized as pleas from the Army to the research and development collective to produce such advanced, future technologies. Nowhere, however, in any of this discussion is there any implication that new lieutenants need to perform such work. The newly commissioned lieutenant will receive excellent training in the use of such technologies as applied to his or her particular branch specialty, such as aviation or

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93 Ibid., 34.

94 Ibid., 34-38. They are: mobile protected precision firepower; lethality and effects; logistics optimization; Army aviation; information to decision; human performance optimization; medical sciences; autonomy-enabled systems.
logistics, similar to today’s current training on extant technologies in use. But whether current or future, any technology chosen for use by the military will have been developed and molded to allow for specific skill training that leads to an effective use of the technology by a leader directing a small unit as part of the total integration of the previously identified functional areas (above). And in an ironic twist, the AOC speculates whether advanced technologies may reduce “technological complexity” for users.\textsuperscript{95} Indeed, in looking at the technical focus area of human performance optimization, the reader learns that advances across the range of cognitive, behavioral, and learning sciences (which includes advances in virtual, constructive, and gaming training environments) “must produce young leaders with the experience, maturity, and judgment previously expected of a more senior and experienced leader.”\textsuperscript{96}

The essence of being a leader remains centered on the human dimension as will be borne out in the specific examination of the Army’s view of leadership and leader development (Chapters 4 and 5). The thesis next examines, however, an additional three specific concepts from the framework which serve to capture the essence of the leader and leader development narrative thread from across the full family of concepts.

\textit{TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-3: The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command}

\textit{TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7: The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept}

\textit{TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5: The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement}

The first common component is that of the human element involved in all missions. From the perspective of mission command, to prevail in the contest of wills to

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 37.
influence behaviors of an opponent will require an “acute understanding of human
behavior” while increasingly forcing leaders to make decisions and act in the face of
incomplete information.\textsuperscript{97} This theme is carried through the human dimension concept
with its identification of the “rising velocity of human interaction,” making it more
difficult to deal with events or their aftermath or navigate the increased flow of
information. Enhanced human performance in the future military context through
different mechanisms is the focus of the human dimension concept. Consequently, in
dealing with such problems, an improvement in cognitive abilities is desirable. The
cognitive component refers to “the mental activity pertaining to the act or processes of
perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning.”\textsuperscript{98} Finally, in discussing how the Army
will engage with others outside of the Army, the need for broad-based cognition and
critical thinking skills arises again. Once more asserting that future leaders must
understand human aspects of operations, the concept asserts that leaders “must develop
the capacity to assess diverse cultures, ethnicities, and vulnerable populations…. Under-
standing the relationships between actors and their influencers, their allegiances
and behaviors, and trends that shape their interaction” will be critical to future success.\textsuperscript{99}

There remains an emphasis on a leader’s capabilities that speak to a very broad
disciplinary exposure. In addressing the mission command challenge in the security
force assistance mission wherein Army forces embed with foreign counterparts, lower

\textsuperscript{97} DA, TRADOC PAM 525-3-3: \textit{The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission
Command} (Ft Eustis, VA, October 13, 2010): 10-11.

\textsuperscript{98} DA, TRADOC PAM 525-3-7: \textit{The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept} (Ft Eustis,
VA, May 21, 2014), 7, 12.

\textsuperscript{99} DA, TRADOC PAM 525-8-5: \textit{The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement} (Ft
echelons of command often need a broad freedom of action to adapt to the specific, local situation. Leaders will need to be able to “collaborate across language and cultural boundaries and to negotiate and mediate agreements between factions with significantly different interests, objectives, and thresholds.” Leaders, therefore, will need to be able to constructively engage this spectrum of actors in a variety of settings and situations.¹⁰⁰

Recall the earlier discussion about the three missions of the Army: Prevent, Shape, and Win. In all missions, Army forces engage with other groups. Shape, in the absence of actual conflict or war, is the predominant mission for the Army now and into the foreseeable future with the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan nearing its conclusion and Iraq having ended. The engagement concept addresses the kaleidoscopic spectrum of knowledge leaders need to be able to recognize, process, and address as necessary: cognitive, moral, physical, and socio-economic considerations of the regional operational environment; political considerations, religious beliefs, and ethnic differences that could bear on mission success; and social, cultural, historical, political, economic, population and geography of the area of operations. Taken together, “understanding the power residing in human interaction, social constructs, language, culture, behavior, and other human variables will provide the construct” so that Army forces can influence the operational environment.¹⁰¹ It is important to remember in the face of this comprehensive list of factors bearing on a leader that the leader still must maintain tactical and technical skills appropriate to his or her field.

¹⁰¹ DA, Functional Concept for Engagement, 17, 32.
Even from this small sampling of Army texts, a close reading reveals a clear, repetitive litany of skills and knowledge which leaders, both presently and into the future, will be expected to possess and be able to apply to the human domain of operations. The narrative is overwhelming in its focus on cognitive skills, interpersonal relationships, and broad disciplinary familiarization. This is not to minimize the primary and proper standard that leaders be technically and tactically proficient in employing their forces to ensure mission success. Yet, many of those technical skills are trained skills wherein the leader benefits from the system of Army training courses from the beginning of one’s career. As this survey of desired leader qualities, competencies, and knowledge reveals, however, there is present in the corpus of Army texts a strong narrative concerning personal cognitive capabilities that speaks to the value of a broad-based, multi-disciplinary education. But before taking up the topic of pre-commissioning education, the focus now turns to the inherent qualities of a leader as defined in Army doctrine and supporting texts.
CHAPTER 4

THE ARMY PERSPECTIVE ON LEADERSHIP

An Army leader is anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.

Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.

--- ADP 6-22: Army Leadership

The subject of leadership is extremely important to the Army. ADP 6-22 is one of just four doctrinal publications the CSA personally approves. In the previous chapter, two others—ADP 1, The Army and ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations—were examined; both contained significant discussions of leadership. ADP/ADRP 6-22 are, in addition to such administrative publications as Army regulations or strategies, publications that address leadership and leader development from regulatory or policy perspectives. One other doctrinal text, ADP/ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, is the fourth text the CSA approves.

The majority of Army doctrinal and conceptual texts address the demands placed on leaders in situational contexts, such as offensive operations or negotiation with

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1 DA, ADP 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: August 1, 2012), 1. The second epigraph is the Army’s formal definition of leadership.
indigenous population groups. Individual characteristics such as initiative or courage may be emphasized. Skills such as conflict mediation and resolution will be identified. Adherence to and modeling of the Army values may be discussed. But it is in the leadership-specific materials where the individual person is the subject. It is in these specific texts that one finds the material that deals with those intrinsic aspects of a leader—what qualities, what ethic, what values, what competencies—are believed necessary to be an effective leader of soldiers at any echelon or in any position, whether that of command or of institutional element leadership.

Among the various texts on leadership and leader development are the key doctrinal publications providing the essential information on leaders and leadership. ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, provides the basic principles for the Army’s approach to leadership. ADRP 6-22 of the same title further details, refines, and supplements the basic framework presented in the ADP. Also to be examined in the following chapter are other texts that bear more directly on leader development to achieve the outcomes in ADP/ADRP 6-22: ADP/ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders; pertinent regulations; and implementing pamphlets and strategies.

As this examination of leadership requirements starts, it is also useful to recall the specific subject of this analysis: the officer cadet who is in precommissioning education in preparation for commissioning. This substantive body of texts addresses leadership from the direct (i.e., first line) level through the strategic (i.e., general officer) level of

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2 Recall in ADRP 1, The Army Profession, the individual as professional is explicitly discussed. It does address individual qualities such as ethical behavior and espoused values as integral to the professional soldier. It is a given that leaders, as exemplars for those they lead, must adhere to this professional framework. While closely associated to elements of leadership, this discussion of professionalism targets a larger, more generic audience than ADP/ADRP 6-22.
leadership. The officer cadet is being prepared to assume his or her leadership responsibilities at the direct level. As cadets, they will have been exposed to this leadership literature and its requirements. They may even have gained some practical experience through the cadet unit command structure or during one of the summer training and evaluation programs available to cadets. There are also those cadets who have served as an enlisted service member and now seek a career as a commissioned officer. But the actual responsibility of leadership will fall on their shoulders with their commissioning and first assignment. As will be seen when the various attributes and competencies of the leader, and attendant expectations of performance, are examined, the pre-commissioning educational preparation of the officer cadet takes on special importance.

ADP/ADRP 6-22: Army Leadership

The epigraph presents the definitions of an Army leader and that of leadership. From these definitions one can extract a key starting point for analysis: influence. This is not a capability with which someone is simply born. Rather, based on decades of experience and research, the Army believes leadership to be a process of influence. Critically, since it is a process, leadership “can be learned, monitored and improved…. [good leadership] is a developable skill.”

Through various mechanisms such as training, education, mentorship and, perhaps most importantly, hard experience, one can learn from decisions taken and the resultant action. But such a process needs grounding in recognizable traits and competencies. The Army has developed a

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3 ADP 6-22, 1.
leadership requirements model (Figure 4) that identifies the make-up of a successful leader, that is, a leader able to influence others. This model represents the individual alone and provides a schema for evaluating the individual as leader.

![Army Leadership Requirements Model](image)

Figure 4: Army Leadership Requirements Model. From ADP 6-22, 5.

The three attributes in the model are concerned with “the values and identity of the leader (character), with how the leader is perceived by followers and others (presence), and with the mental and social faculties the leader applies in the act of leading (intellect).”

Of these three attributes, an individual’s presence is largely physically oriented with its focus on bearing and fitness. Character and intellect are of interest from the perspective of one’s educational preparation as they involve less quantifiable aspects of an individual. Army doctrine is very focused on producing leaders who “discriminately use lethal force in conditions of moral complexity.”

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4 ADRP 6-22, 1-5.

5 ADRP 1, 2-3.
attributes, the identification of which is the result of decades of study, are seen as those necessary for fulfilling one’s full potential as a leader, and character is where a leader’s ethical and moral qualities are found. The first two elements of character, the Army values and empathy, immediately speak to one’s self-awareness.

![Army Values](image)

The Army values (Figure 5) are not taken by the Army as everyone’s value set upon taking their oath of service to the country. Everyone enters the service uniquely individual in the personal values they developed in the years before entering the Army. But as the doctrine states, once having taken the oath of service to country and the Army, “one agrees to live and act by a new set of values—the Army Values. [They] consist of the principles, standards, and qualities considered essential” for success as an Army leader. This is not to say that an individual enters service with divergent values; the

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6 ADRP 6-22, 3-1.
7 Ibid.
mere act of enlistment would indicate possession of some or all of these values. However, their internalization is crucial if leaders are to model them for their soldiers. Indeed, even more so than modeling the values, Army leaders have the “important responsibility” of teaching them, “creating a common understanding of the Army values and expected standards.”

Thus, this issue of personal values shifts, and understanding enough to teach them challenges the cadet officer in terms of self-awareness and ability to reflect on the values and their meaning to him or her. Within the Army, there is a concerted effort to educate personnel on the values. By regulation, Army schools are expected to “conduct initial training…that instills common values, ethics, reasoning, and warrior ethos.” But the entire issue of modifying one’s worldview or even assisting others in such an effort by way of reflecting on the value set and what the implications are for the individual of those values requires not only a sufficient level of self-awareness, but also a cognitive process comfortable with critical thinking across a number of disciplines.

An additional foundational element for the attribute of character is empathy. This element may seemingly fly in the face of the popular conception of the soldier and leader as a dispassionate individual. Yet in being an Army leader with all of the implications of missions ordering men and women into combat, empathy becomes critical to the success of a leader. According to one source, empathy is “the imaginative projection into another person’s situation, especially for vicarious capture of its emotional and motivational

8 Ibid.

qualities...considered a precondition of ethical thinking and a major contributor to social bonding and altruism, mental state attribution, language use, and translation.” 10 The long experience of the Army confirms this.

In its guiding doctrine, enjoying a substantive treatment, empathy is discussed as benefiting the leader in his self-awareness and in her dealing with others—soldiers, Army civilians, Army families, local populations, and enemy combatants.

Army leaders show empathy when they genuinely relate to another person’s situation, motives, and feelings. Empathy does not necessarily mean sympathy for another, but identification that leads to a deeper understanding. Empathy allows the leader to anticipate what others are experiencing and to try to envision how decisions or actions affect them....The ability to see something from another person’s point of view, to identify with, and enter into another person’s feelings and emotions, enables the Army leader to better interact with others. Essentially, empathy produces better cultural understanding of people, missions, and operations and how they connect.11

The question of empathy is a very subjective exercise requiring a good level of self-awareness, of one’s own biases, from the moment of commissioning. Even before any deployment to an operational area, the new lieutenant will encounter a diverse group of people in the soldiers of his or her unit and, when applicable, their families accompanied by the inevitable vagaries that permeate human relations. The “Army Diversity Roadmap” recognizes the need to create “a proclivity for understanding others” in a variety of settings. Noting that the Army is deployed in nearly eighty countries, creating an incentive for cultural understanding, the Roadmap goes on to note that “cultural understanding begins at home. The Army’s future demographics will bring new

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11 ADRP 6-22, 3-3—3-4.
language and cultural challenges to our own ranks.”\textsuperscript{12} The tie to the Army value of respect is evident.

Noting that respecting and recognizing the dignity of all is an expected behavior given the diversity of people encountered, Army doctrine discussing the value of respect continues to charge leaders to “prevent misunderstandings arising from cultural differences….Leaders must actively seek opportunities to better understand other cultures, see other perspectives, and appreciate what others find important.”\textsuperscript{13} That lieutenant is now expected to make room for other opinions, render decisions, teach others, and issue guidance and advice taking into account this activity of “imaginative projection” of the other. A liberal arts education fosters such capacities.

As the issue of character development continues to unfold in the doctrine, the need for self-awareness continues to be raised. Attributing growth as a leader of character to continual study, reflection, experience, and feedback, the first step is to develop and maintain a leader identity, which “refers to an individual’s awareness of self as a leader.”\textsuperscript{14} Leaders who lack self-awareness face many obstacles in their growth as leaders of character.

Leaders of character also adhere to the Army values and that for which they stand in establishing an ethical climate marked by high standards of behavior. Further, a leader cannot just know the Army values; rather, ethical leaders “must be able to apply them to find moral solutions to diverse problems…consider[ing] ethics in planning, preparing,

\textsuperscript{12} "Army Diversity Roadmap," 2, 4.
\textsuperscript{13} ADRP 6-22, 3-2.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 3-5.
executing, and assessing operations” from multiple perspectives. Ultimately, however, “resolving ethical problems requires critical thinking based on the Army values. No formula will work every time.”\textsuperscript{15} Self-awareness, reflection, critical thinking, cultural learning: in the context of leadership and a newly commissioned officer, it is in his or her pre-commissioning education where exposure to multiple disciplinary subject areas must occur. These requirements also point to the last attribute in the leader requirements model, intellect.

Under the intellect attribute, Army doctrine isolates five elements that shape a leader’s conceptual abilities and effectiveness: mental agility; sound judgment; innovation; interpersonal tact; and expertise. Such abilities allow for effective problem solving and sound judgment, helping the leader “think creatively and reason analytically, critically, ethically, and with cultural sensitivity to consider unintended as well as intended consequences,” anticipating the second- and third-order effects of actions.\textsuperscript{16} Here, given the concern with the preparation of the new officer cadet to step into a leadership role upon commissioning and the role of the undergraduate education in that preparation, only select elements will be examined.

Mental agility is cognitive flexibility that supports reasoning through uncertain or changing circumstances. But in describing mental agility, the doctrine makes an interesting assertion: “Mental agility relies upon inquisitiveness and the ability to reason critically. Inquisitive leaders are eager to understand a broad range of topics and keep an

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 3-7.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 5-1.
open mind to multiple possibilities before reaching an optimal solution.” Of particular note here is that the leader is “eager” to engage a number of subjects. The delineation of leader expectations thus far supports this need of inquisitiveness and comfort in engaging people and situations across complexity and uncertainty. The second element of intellect, sound judgment, can be seen as a result of mental agility as sound judgment “requires the capacity to assess situations shrewdly and to draw rational conclusions.” Forming sound opinions, making reliable estimates, and rendering quality decisions characterize sound judgment in the face of juggling facts, questionable data, and intuitive feelings.  

A third element of intellect is interpersonal tact. To an extent, this circles back to the earlier discussion on empathy and respect. Knowing what others perceive allows for effective interaction with them. Recognizing the diversity of others and the fact that they can bring valuable perspectives to a discussion supports the team effort and signals that people are valued for their contributions. An understanding of the backgrounds and cultures of a leader’s subordinates contributes to this effort.

A fourth element of intellect, expertise, is largely focused on mastering tactical and technical service and joint knowledge. But it also calls for mastering cultural and geopolitical knowledge. Doctrine applies this knowledge across three contexts. The first is that of the unit itself and the members within it so as to best utilize their talents and abilities. The second context is knowing the culture of the country where an operation is occurring. One must deal with the population of the country whether they are partners,

\[17\] Ibid.

\[18\] Ibid., 5-1—5-2.
neutrals, or adversaries. Finally, the third context encompasses both unified action partners within the U.S. team as well as the various countries participating in a multinational operation.\textsuperscript{19} As noted numerous times, the emphasis on cultural and geopolitical knowledge permeates the doctrinal corpus. Once again, much is expected of that new lieutenant upon commissioning.

The attributes just examined clearly indicate an expectation of a confident cognition and base of knowledge in an individual comfortable with multifaceted problems and other cultures. According to the doctrine, these attributes represent what a leader should be and what a leader should know. It is in the three categories of competencies—leads, develops, and achieves (Figure 4)—that one finds what a leader is required to do.\textsuperscript{20} These three categories of competency clearly parallel the definition of leadership contained in the epigraph to this chapter: Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. When a person leads an organization, he or she is exercising influence. One achieves results through mission accomplishment. Finally, a leader develops the organization and the individuals assigned to it through monitoring, counseling, and training of performance across the organization. Despite the action-oriented emphasis in declaring that the competency categories are what a leader must be able to do, there exists within the categories specific competencies that continue to reflect the need for a broad educational preparation due to their focus on the self and on others.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 5-2--5-4. This and previous paragraph are summaries of document text.

\textsuperscript{20} ADP 6-22, 5.
The category of achieves has one competency—gets results. This, of course, speaks directly to the enduring requirement that mission accomplishment remains preeminent among all other considerations. Yet even here, the language surrounding this seeming operant competency retains a focus on cognitive abilities in the face of complex environments as well as interpersonal skills. Recognizing that a leader can accomplish little as a sole actor, the stated primary responsibility of a leader “is to help organizations operate effectively.” Planning, preparation, execution, and assessment are the four steps of the operations process through which the leader guides the organization.\textsuperscript{21} The doctrine goes on to identify specifics such as adaptability in the face of friction and uncertainty affecting original plan (i.e., cognitive agility), managing resources (money, materiel, personnel, or time), and monitoring performance at both individual and organization levels.\textsuperscript{22}

The aspect of monitoring performance, that is, assessing both one’s own as well as others’ performance in the context of mission accomplishment, is especially demanding of the leader.

The ability to assess a situation accurately and reliably against desired outcomes, established values, and ethical standards is a critical tool for leaders to achieve consistent results and mission success.\textsuperscript{23} Accurate assessment requires instinct and intuition based on experience and learning. It demands a feel for the reliability and validity of information and its sources.

The language of this human-focused aspect of achieving results is easy to overlook in terms of preparing the officer candidate for his or her responsibilities once commissioned.

\textsuperscript{21} ADP 5-0, 1.

\textsuperscript{22} ADRP 6-22, 8-1—8-3.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 8-3.
as an officer and leader. But this language continues to reinforce the notion of a broad education. The role of values and ethical standards in assessment implies not just the self-knowledge which the new leader possesses in regards to these topics, but also that leader’s ability to convey and explain these topics to those assigned under him or her.

Likewise, the ability to evaluate sources of information and their credibility is a personal capability honed through the reading and research of a broad array of material. Consequently, even in fulfilling such an action-oriented competency as getting results, which can be seen as the culmination of all other preparatory actions, the continued focus on the cognitive capabilities of the leader remains.

The category of develops is certainly a precursor to achieving results and consists of four competencies. The Army views development responsibilities of a leader on three general levels: self; others; and the organization as entity. When this trio is properly addressed and enacted, other benefits flow from them such as creation of a positive command climate and stewarding of the profession. Here, given the close focus on the expectations of a new leader, two of those competencies will be closely examined while selected aspects of one other will be discussed.

The central competency in terms of our officer candidate is that of preparing self. Keeping in mind from previous analyses the complex operational environment future leaders will face, the Army places tremendous emphasis on self-development and self-study because “[b]esides becoming multiskilled, Army leaders have to balance the demands of diplomat and Soldier.”24 The officer candidate, however, through the pre-commissioning education he or she is undertaking, is just beginning on the path to

24 Ibid., 7-6. This includes the following block quotation.
knowledge and self-development as well as the ability to enact self-study. The doctrine continues on in very specific language as to the cognitive expanse expected of the leader.

[L]eaders must exploit every available opportunity to sharpen their intellectual capacity and relevant knowledge. The conceptual components affecting leader intelligence include mental agility, judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and expertise. A developed intellect helps the leader think creatively and reason analytically, critically, ethically, and with cultural sensitivity. When faced with diverse operational settings, a leader draws on intellectual capacity, critical thinking abilities, and applicable expertise. Self-development should include learning languages, customs, belief systems, motivational factors, fundamentals, and [operational details] of unified action partners and potential adversaries.”

These many capabilities and subject area knowledge expected of the leader reinforces the need for the base of knowledge and inquiry that attends a liberal arts education.

Another competency in the develops category is that of developing others. The leader is specifically charged with this: “In developmental relationships, it is the leader’s responsibility to help subordinates learn.”25 Consequently, the new officer will be expected to assess those he or she leads, help the subordinate identify areas of improvement and then, through counseling, coaching, and mentoring, work to provide the learning opportunity best suited to improving that subordinate’s skills or knowledge. It is through this process, then, that a leader moves toward the more encompassing goal of team-building and improving the organization. Such work requires a good sense of individual learning processes, interpersonal and communication skills, and subject area expertise.

The remaining competency to be examined is the creation of a positive environment. The expectations of the leader in establishing a positive climate within the

25 Ibid., 7-9.
unit or element continue to point to more human concerns. Leaders, as the “ethical standard-bearer” for their organization, should seek a “fair, inclusive, and ethical” climate in their organizations consistent with the Army values. Unambiguously, the doctrine makes clear that “[r]egardless of available expert help, the ultimate responsibility to create and maintain an ethical climate rests with the leader.”26 The leader implicitly must not only have an internalized, general understanding of values and ethics as well as a specific understanding of the Army values and ethic, but must also have the communication and teaching skills to convey such understanding to those in the organization so as to gain their adherence to and concurrence in maintaining such a climate. Once again, a leader has a responsibility which is beyond the need for tactical and technical competence.

This human focus is also evident in other actions expected of the leader in creating a positive organizational climate as are various cognitive expectations. Select examples include:

- Encourages learning about and leveraging diversity
- Prevents all forms of harassment
- Reinforces expression of contrary and minority viewpoints
- Displays appropriate reactions to new or conflicting information or opinions
- Guards against groupthink
- Expresses value of interacting with others and seeking counsel
- Stimulates innovative and critical thinking in others
- Guides subordinate leaders in thinking through problems for themselves

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26 Ibid., 7-3.
• Provides accurate evaluations and assessments

• Addresses subordinates’ and families’ needs (health, welfare, and development)²⁷

Such listings of expectations, and this example is just one of many, provide a basic checklist for the new leader. Yet, just as with the previous discussion on establishing an ethical climate, such seemingly simple, directive language masks an underlying complexity and demand on a new leader in terms of cognition, knowledge, skills, and self-awareness.

The final competence category—leads—really addresses the aspect of influence and how to gain it so that others will willingly follow one’s lead. There are five competencies in this category and all continue addressing the human dimension of leadership and are intimately connected. The first competency—leads others—devotes a significant portion of its discussion to the aspect of influence. Influence is “the essential element of leadership…. [it] refers to how people create and relay their messages, behaviors, and attitudes to affect the intentions, beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes of another person or group of people. Influence depends upon relationships where leaders build positive rapport and a relationship of mutual trust, making followers more willing to support requests.”²⁸ There is no doubt that in certain situations, a leader gains compliance with any order based on the authority granted by virtue of rank or position, but to gain the willing acquiescence of followers requires a broader view of and understanding of human relationships and associated dynamics.

²⁷ Ibid., 7-5. See Table 7-1 in which eight categories of expected performance are broken down into thirty-six specific sub-elements from which this listing is drawn.

²⁸ Ibid., 6-2.
A second competency is introduced in the discussion of influence above. That competency—builds trust—derives from the essential respect with which a leader approaches those personnel in the organization. The establishment of a positive organizational climate discussed earlier is a substantive step in building trust between leader and followers. Adding to this accumulating trust which increases one’s leadership influence is a third competency—leads by example.

Leading by example essentially means being a role model displaying character, courage—both moral and physical—and competence. Modeling desirable behaviors, especially of the Army values, is expected of all leaders. Among the different categories of expected performance\textsuperscript{29} in leading by example are a need for understanding the importance of conceptual skills and modeling them to others through such indicators as being comfortable working in open systems, identifying critical issues to use as a guide in making decisions, and relating and comparing information from different sources to identify possible cause-and-effect relationships. Another category of performance is seeking diverse ideas and points of view through, for example, the exploration of alternative explanations and approaches for accompanying tasks. These and other expectations continue to frame a leader who, while technically and tactically proficient, is also able to employ a broad intellectual foundation with which to address the challenges and ambiguities of leadership.

The fourth competency supporting the leads category is communicates. This is considerably more than “the simple transmission of information.” Effective

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 6-12. See Table 6-4. All information in this paragraph is drawn from this table containing six categories of expected performance with twenty-eight specific sub-elements.
communication “achieves a new understanding creat[ing] new or better awareness.”
Cogent communication allows shared understanding of issues and solutions when conveying critical information or direction. Most importantly, good communication “conveys thoughts, presents recommendations, bridges cultural sensitivities, and reaches consensus. Leaders cannot lead, supervise, build teams, counsel, coach, or mentor without the ability to communicate clearly.” Army doctrine declares that “communication is essential to all other leadership competencies.”

The newly commissioned officer’s communication skills will be necessary not just for issuing orders to subordinates in the chain of command based on the authority of the position held, but for developing the fifth and final leads competency of extending influence beyond the chain of command.

By addressing this final competency of extending influence, the Army acknowledges the many lessons learned over the past decade of war concerning future roles of young officers. As has been seen throughout the examination of the succession of national –level strategies and guidance, doctrine and concepts of the joint force, and the Army’s own guidance and doctrinal materials, leaders at all levels will be expected to effectively engage with others outside of the formal chain of command and organizational formation; they will not enjoy the formal authority they hold in their units. Characterized as “multiskilled leaders,” they will lead soldiers in “politically- and culturally-charged operational environments” in which they will of necessity “work closely with unified action partners, the media, local civilians, political leaders, police forces, and nongovernmental agencies…to influence the perceptions, attitudes,

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30 Ibid., 6-12 and 6-14.
sentiments, and behaviors of key actors and agencies.” Consequently, the leader will be expected to adapt to “the environment and cultural sensitivities of the given situation,” requiring “cultural knowledge to understand different social customs and belief systems and to address issues in those contexts.”

This pointed focus on a proclivity for adaptation, qualitative skills, and cultural and social knowledge also carries over into the other significant elements of extending influence in these charged environments and amongst such a diverse range of actors: negotiating, building consensus, and resolving conflicts. One might add diplomacy, arbitration, partnering, and coordination as additional skills the leader will likely need. Once again, the Army itself focuses on significant leader expectations that speak to human-centered requirements, a narrative thread that permeates its leadership guidance and doctrine.

However, the Army also examines in the ADRP what this concept of leadership might look like in practice by proposing certain topics for the leader to consider. Two of these topics have particular pertinence regarding the range of cognitive flexibility a leader must possess. First, it identifies the challenges the leader will face in the operational environment. Second, it then addresses adaptability, both what it looks like in practice and how one might become a more adaptable leader.

Challenges, both predictable and unpredictable, in an operational environment are abundant. Threats are constantly evolving requiring adaptable leaders and units. The

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31 Ibid., 6-8.
32 Ibid., 6-10.
33 The following paragraph on challenges is based on ADRP 6-22, 9-1—9-4.
media also influences leaders, and the ADRP calls upon leaders not only to work with the media, but also to understand the “effects of pervasive media and understand the long-term effects of stories and images.” Of course, the leader will encounter different cultures and sub-cultures, within both the military sphere as well as the civilian. The geopolitical situation will have diverse “religions, cultures, living conditions, education, and health” in which the leader must balance diplomacy and military power. Learning languages and studying regional cultures and histories of interest helps address the challenge of leading in these new environments. Technology, of course, poses a challenge given its pervasiveness, speed of proliferation, and means of use. One aspect of technology, the flow and volume of information, challenges a leader to ascertain what is important and necessary for decisionmaking. According to the ADRP, “the answer lies in the agile and adaptable human mind.” Other challenges include systems understanding, health of the command, and combat and operational stress. These challenges all speak to the requirement of adaptability in the leader. Not surprisingly, a discussion of adaptability follows in this chapter addressing leadership in practice. What is surprising is the implicit recognition of the need for a robust and flexible cognition on the part of the leader striving for adaptability.

The essential elements of adaptability are first identified, and then followed by specific discussion points. Recalling that the newly commissioned officer can face a spectrum of mission tasks beyond direct combat, operational adaptability is defined as “the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions.” Such ability is marked by “critical

34 The following two paragraphs on adaptability are based on ADRP 6-22, 9-4—9-6.
thinking, creative thinking, displaying comfort with ambiguity, willingness to accept prudent risk, and ability to adjust rapidly while continuously assessing the situation” as well as influencing foreign populations. When monitoring the environment, the adaptable leader can “derive the key characteristics of the situation and be aware of what it will take to perform in the changed environment” while being “particularly observant for evidence” of unexpected change. Other markers of adaptability include being comfortable entering unfamiliar environments and being an agent of change. Failure to adapt, on the other hand, is marked by leaders entering all situations in the same manner expecting past experience to carry them through.

The doctrine also provides some means by which one might become more adaptable. “Challenging previously held ideas and assumptions by seeking out novel and unfamiliar situations” is the first suggestion. Most significantly, the doctrine goes on to assert that adaptability is “encouraged by a collection of thought habits. These include open-mindedness, ability to consider multiple perspectives, not jumping to conclusions about what a situation is or what it means, willingness to take risk, and being resilient to setbacks.” Consequently, one should:

- Embrace opportunities to adapt; seek out diverse and dynamic challenges.
- Lead across cultures; seek out diverse relationships and situations.
- Seek challenges; one can be a specialist, but a leader needs a broad base of experience.

Yet, in the end, while acknowledging the importance of adaptability as a tool for the leader, leaders are still exhorted to “use their cognitive abilities…through logical problem solving processes.” One example of such a process is the Army Design methodology
which is largely focused on problem definition, especially in ambiguous, complex environments. Such a process requires “agile, versatile leaders who foster continuous organizational learning while engaged in iterative collaboration and dialogue to enhance decisionmaking.” In all ways, adaptability calls for leaders confident in their cognitive abilities and self-awareness, attributes best cultivated through a broad education.

ADP/ADRP 6-22 presents the underlying doctrine concerning successful leadership. It is, in a manner of speaking, the Army’s entry in the current deluge of texts focused on leadership requirements and effective organizations. This doctrine provides the Leadership Requirements Model just examined. But there also exists a significant body of other texts addressing the “how” of developing such leaders. Regulations and pamphlets, doctrine and strategy: the Army makes a significant investment in its leader development efforts. In the following chapter, these texts devoted to leader development will be examined as the basis for the accompanying examination of the professional military education (PME) system which underpins career–long officer education.
CHAPTER 5

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process - founded in Army values - that grows Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action.

---Army Regulation 350-1: *Army Training and Leader Development*¹

As has become evident, the identification of leader expectations is a topic of substantive treatment at all levels of the military establishment. The challenges a leader may expect to face in the future, the environments in which the leader may be expected to operate both physically and cognitively, the inclusive human domain of combatants and civilian populations alike: the narrative thread of attributes, competencies, and skills weaves through all the various publication types and their discussions of such topics. This continuous, close attention to the expectations of the military leader reflects the reality that the vast majority of military missions are executed by teams of soldiers who deserve and expect the best possible leadership the Army can produce.² Consequently, the issue of leader development is a critical element in the Army’s on-going efforts to prepare future leaders. Speaking to a graduating class of senior officers from the Army

¹ AR 350-1, 2.

² There are some select missions on which a single individual may be sent; the assignment of an officer to serve as a liaison between U.S. forces and those of a partner nation is one such example.
War College, the CSA declared, "As we begin our transition following this time of
twelve years of war, we must re-dedicate ourselves to the development of our leaders as
our best hedge against complexity and uncertainty." This re-dedication involves not just
revisions of existing training and education processes, but also development of a new
strategy and supplemental publications.

The epigraph presents the Army’s formal definition of leader development.

However, in their joint Posture of the Army 2014 statement to Congress, SECARMY and
CSA provide a more fulsome overview of leader development:

The unpredictable nature of human conflict requires leaders to not only lead in
close combat but understand the operational and strategic environment, to include
its socio-economic, cultural and religious underpinnings. Our leaders must
demonstrate the competence, proficiency and professional values necessary to
achieve operational and strategic mission success. We must continue to educate
and develop Soldiers and Civilians to grow the intellectual capacity to understand
the complex contemporary and security environment to better lead Army, Joint,
Interagency and Multinational task forces and teams….We will continue to build
leaders who exhibit the character, competence and commitment that are hallmarks
of the Army Profession.

This declaration presents a formidable litany of outcomes that the Army strives to
achieve through its developmental programs. The primary outcome—successfully
leading in close combat—remains preeminent. However, the challenges facing emerging
leaders in their development speak to a requisite broad basis of understanding across a
multifaceted spectrum of expectations. In order to develop its leaders, the Army has

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3 Raymond Odierno, U.S. Army War College Graduation Address (Carlisle, PA: June 8,

4 A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2014 to the Committees and
Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 2nd
formalized a strategy to lend coherence to the regulatory, administrative, and doctrinal treatments to which this undertaking is subjected. The following discussion will examine these texts to identify essential elements of the leader development process and finish by focusing on one aspect of the developmental continuum, professional military education.

The approval in June 2013 by the senior leadership of the Army of the first-ever “Army Leader Development Strategy” (ALDS)\(^5\) indicates the seriousness of the current time of transition in the Army from twelve years of war to an Army preparing for not only a complex, uncertain, and ambiguous future threat environment, but also significant force restructuring and budget reductions. Leader development becomes critical as the various environment and threat projections lead to small unit, decentralized operations and the devolution of previously unheard of levels of authority and responsibility to captains and lieutenants. Consequently, this strategy presents the overarching guidance and direction to the force for leader development. As in the typical format for a strategy document, the ALDS segments its guidance into the ends-ways-means schema supplemented by a set of career-spanning imperatives and three lines of effort to implement the strategy. This structure allows specifics from related texts to be framed in a manner showing their contributions to the strategy’s intent.

The ALDS immediately makes clear the institution’s self-assessment of its efforts to produce the necessary leadership for the Army. “The U.S. Army builds leaders for our nation. Developing leaders is a competitive advantage the Army possesses that cannot be replaced by technology or substituted for with advanced weaponry and platforms. If we

do not develop leaders well we cannot build quality units, design cogent campaigns, or execute effective operations in theater….Leader development is fundamental to our Army.” Given this bedrock commitment, the ALDS unsurprisingly identifies what that developmental process produces, namely, a leader who:

- Understands the strategic environment
- Thinks critically and creatively
- Visualizes solutions with imperfect or ambiguous information
- Describes and communicates crucial information to achieve shared understanding, collaborate, and build teams across the JIIM environment
- Possesses emotional intelligence; fosters trust and develops others
- Is adaptable, agile, flexible, responsive, resilient, and morally grounded
- Manages ill-structured problems on an iterative basis
- Is a leader of character, commitment, and competence at all levels commanding units, establishing policy, and managing resources while balancing risks and caring for people and their families.\(^6\)

The consonance between these expected outcomes—or ends—of the developmental system and the attributes and competencies delineated in the Army Leader Requirements Model (ALRM) (Figure 4) are unsurprising given the discussion of leadership texts in Chapter 4. The move to the ways and means of executing leader development, however, opens another portfolio of associated development texts which attend to each of these categories.

In the category of ways, the Army addresses three domains by which leaders are developed over the course of a career: institutional, operational, and self-development.

\(^6\) ALDS, 3-5, 13.
As always, these domains have discrete purposes, but ultimately serve to reinforce each other as shown in the Army Leader Development Model (ALDM) (Figure 6).

![Figure 6: Army Leader Development Model. From ALDS, 8.](image)

The mechanisms by which development takes place across these domains are training, education, and experience; these three mechanisms are called lines of effort (LOE). There is also some congruence between the domains and the LOE as depicted in the Venn diagram at the center of the ALDM. The model, as a whole, however, captures on a very broad level the entirety of the Army’s vision of the leader development effort. A brief analysis of the model will begin to clarify specific aspects of this process which will be pertinent as the discussion moves into the area of professional military education later in the chapter.
In many ways, the Greek temple image represents the individual entering into this process. The intellectual foundation of the process is the *Army Capstone Concept*. As discussed in Chapter 3, the capstone concept provides the basis for the entire family of concepts from which current leader competencies and attributes are validated or future ones derived. The three LOE are present in each set, or domain, of the diagram. In each domain, though, a different LOE is emphasized. Additionally, the rotational arrows between each domain indicate the continual integration or reinforcement of developmental outcomes across the domains. We will return to these domains and LOE in detail below.

The domains themselves and the individual learning occurring there takes place in a setting that includes one’s peers and one’s mentors or coaches. In all domains, a leader encounters others that help to stimulate learning by discussion and debate. Also, all Army leaders are charged to contribute to the development of subordinates to prepare them to assume higher levels of responsibility. Consequently, these superior-subordinate relationships are important to the learning process. Finally, as clearly stated in the capstone concept at the heart of the model, the environment to be faced is one of complexity and uncertainty. The leaders, the domains, and the entire developmental process are surrounded by an environment of change and all those within the process, as well as the instrumentalities, must constantly adapt to prepare to meet these environmental challenges. The ALDM is a comprehensive model spanning the spectrum of a leader’s career. The three domains supported by the three LOE are the heart of the model. Further definition of these elements provides an important basis of understanding when the specific examination of the education of officer cadets is undertaken in the
following discussion. However, first understanding the Army’s differentiation between education and training is necessary to assist in grasping the alignment of the domains with the LOE.

In a classic example of how language used sloppily can hinder understanding, the use of the terms training and education within the Army pose a challenge. Don Vandergriff, an acknowledged thought leader on personnel management within the Army, has written that “it is a common Army cultural error to use the word ‘training’ to substitute for education. Both mean something different in regards to cognitive development and the subsequent reinforcement of that development….When teaching someone ‘how to think,’ it is education; it is training when the aim is reinforcing established ways of doing something.”  

This narrative essentially captures the difference. However, the military does formally define these terms in a DOD instruction which cascades down throughout the armed services; in the Army, these formal definitions are included in the glossary to AR 350-1. The ALDS, however, contains a more practical and explanatory treatment of the terms.

In the ALDS, education is described as “the process of imparting knowledge and developing the competencies and attributes” that any Army leader will need in accomplishing future missions. In the context of leader development, the Army views education as contributing “to the growth of the three leader attributes of character, presence, and intellect. Education focuses on intellect and moral character of leaders to improve judgment and reasoning and hone the habits of the mind: agility, adaptability,

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empathy, intellectual curiosity, and creativity.”

Training, on the other hand, is viewed as “an organized, structured, continuous, and progressive process based on sound principles of learning designed to increase the capability of individuals, units, and organizations to perform specified tasks or skills. The objective of training is to increase the ability of leaders to perform competently in training and operational situations.”

The officer cadet receives both education and training during the undergraduate, precommissioning phase of PME. This phase largely occurs under the auspices of the institutional domain of the ALDM, though elements of the training and experience domains are certainly present. An additional confusing use of these terms will be seen below.

Of the three domains, the most pertinent to this discussion is the institutional. This is a broad categorization encompassing all elements and activities of the Army except deployable units. Most germane here, however, is that it includes the Army Institutional Training and Education System, the purpose of which is to provide Army personnel “the attributes and competencies required to operate successfully in any environment.”

The ALDS expands on this regulatory purpose by its assertion that “the institution provides the knowledge and develops the leadership attributes and competencies at the right time necessary for increased responsibility at the current and future rank or grade.” Consequently, in the precommissioning phase of PME, the cadet’s education is fulfilled through the undergraduate education the cadet is pursuing,

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8 ALDS, 11.
9 Ibid.
10 AR 350-1, 42.
11 ALDS, 11.
and the cadet’s precommissioning training occurs under the auspices of the resident ROTC detachment or the Department of Military Training at USMA. Referring to the ALDM, education is the primary LOE supporting the institutional domain.

Of the remaining two domains, self-development carries a long-term implication for the individual. This domain “includes planned and goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual’s knowledge base and self-awareness.” This effort is seen as spanning the entirety of one’s career by setting the conditions for “continuous learning and growth.” In addition to self-development activities undertaken by direction or by suggestion to enhance professional competence, personal self-development is “self-initiated learning to meet personal training, education, and experiential goals.” The primary supporting LOE here is experience, which is seen as “the continuous progression of personal and professional events” across the entire span of one’s career. Officer cadets gain experience not just through activities in which they are involved at the college or university, but also through assignment of duties and leadership responsibilities within the cadet structure. Though not a specific focus of this discussion, this particular domain also clearly benefits from a liberal arts education in both assisting in the individual’s personal journey to a reflective self-awareness as well as providing a more robust multi-disciplinary base on which to build a self-initiated learning program.

The final domain is the operational domain, that is, deployable units. Recalling the earlier admonitions that the primary responsibility of a leader is to succeed in mission accomplishment, this domain has training as its primary LOE in that individual and

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12 Ibid. Italics added.
collective tasks and skills are the focus. It is here that leaders will undergo the bulk of their development and “junior leaders achieve technical competence, mid-grade leaders further develop their ability to lead units and organizations, and senior leaders contribute to the development and implementation of national and geo-political strategy.”

The ALDS, then, provides the strategic direction to the Army for the entirety of the leader development enterprise. As previously stated, out of this entire spectrum of leader development efforts and responsibilities, this discussion is focused solely on the precommissioning phase of PME and the officer cadet preparing to assume his or her duties as a leader in the Army. Before examining the place of precommissioning education in the PME spectrum, though, examination of the various remaining texts will reveal further aspects of the leader development undertaking. These other texts contain policy, direction, and doctrine concerning leader development, all of which further illustrate the asserted need for a liberal arts education as the foundation of officer education.

Just as the ALDS sets strategic direction for the force, “policies, procedures, and responsibilities for developing, managing, and conducting Army training and leader development” is disseminated through Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development. In this publication, the specific what, who, and how are delineated. It treats not just those responsible for the development and delivery of the training or education, but also addresses who is qualified to attend such opportunities. Discussion of supporting efforts and systems and direction on the development of

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13 Ibid.

14 AR 350-1, 1.
training outcomes or educational curricula convey the outline of how this work is to be approached. It is in the discussion of the various elements of the system, however, where the first detailed description of PME is found.

The regulation contains a description of the many elements of the training and educational endeavors undertaken by the Army. Programs such as culture and language awareness and proficiency, Army modernization training, and the Training Support System are discussed. However, the core of the regulation is the treatment of the Army Institutional Training and Education System. This system spans the entire range of formal education and training opportunities for officers, enlisted, and Army civilians from initial military training to functional or specialty training to General Officer education. Within this structure and most pertinent to this discussion, there exists the Officer Education System (OES). The OES has as its goal the production of leaders able to meet the expectations or fulfill the requirements of the many leader attributes and competencies discussed in previous chapters. These include: “fully competent in technical, tactical, and leadership skills, knowledge, and experience…prepared to operate in JIIM environments; demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility; can operate in an environment of complexity, ambiguity, and rapid change; can build effective teams…and adapt to and solve problems creatively.” It is within the OES that the many components of the PME system are contained. It is in this sequence of PME opportunities in which the professional “enhances knowledge of the art and science of war.” This range of education and training is captured in Figure 7, The

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\[\text{\cite{15}}\]
The figure is illustrative of the definition of PME: “[PME] provides progressive education that prepares leaders for increased responsibilities and successful performance at the next higher level by developing the key knowledge, skills, and attributes they require to operate successfully at that level in any environment.”

Yet, when discussing the precommissioning phase of PME, it fails to fully illustrate that specific aspect of cadet officer training and education, an aspect repeatedly referred to across the Army’s texts as a phase of PME.

Figure 7: Officer Learning Continuum. From *How the Army Runs*, 15-18.

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17 Ibid.
The first primary level education experience for the newly minted second lieutenant is shown in Figure 7 as the Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC). This depiction implies a singular element along the continuum. However, BOLC is actually divided into two subsections: BOLC Phase A and BOLC Phase B. BOLC A is the precommissioning element of education and training; BOLC B is the element that the newly commissioned second lieutenant undergoes at the specific branch school such as infantry or aviation into which he or she accessed. BOLC A, consequently, is where officer cadets receive their initial military training and education. This military instruction is in addition to the regular undergraduate curriculum cadet officers undertake in pursuing their baccalaureate-level degree. In the military realm, BOLC A “provides initial military training and education to potential commissioned Army officers…which consists of foundational Army values, professional and personal attributes, and fundamental tactical/technical skills.”\(^{18}\)

As previously stated, AR 350-1 contains a significant amount of direction for the execution of the training and leader development effort as well as description of the many schools, courses, and training opportunities available in the Army system. This sole text, as important as it is to the Army-wide training and leader development enterprise, is also supported by other texts which further explicate associated methods and processes. An additional administrative publication, DA Pamphlet 350-58, *Army Leader Development Program* (ALDP), conveys detailed processes for managing and supporting the ALDP. Included here are program execution, approval, incorporation of new initiatives, and

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 68.
recommendations for prioritization of resources.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the administrative aspects of the ALDP are well covered. In the units themselves, however, leader development is guided largely by the two doctrinal texts, ADP 7-0 and ADRP 7-0, \textit{Training Units and Developing Leaders}.

As an indication of the central position these texts enjoy in the family of doctrine publications, the CSA again personally addresses the force through his Foreword to ADP 7-0. Unsurprisingly, the focus of these texts places leader development largely within the context of unit training. There is discussion of leader development within the institutional and self-development domains, but such discussion serves to present the same coherent view of the ALDM as AR 350-1 and the ALDS. There remain, however, important elements which serve to reinforce the previously identified cognitive demands placed on leaders once they report to their units as they face the training challenges as leaders of units. The focus here will be primarily on ADRP 7-0, recognizing it essentially provides an expanded discussion of the topics first presented in ADP 7-0.

Though the cognitive demands placed on newly commissioned officers is the primary purpose of this work, it is necessary to understand training within the Army so as to then understand that all soldiers and officers, regardless of background, will proceed through an orderly progression of individual and collective task training under challenging and realistic conditions “to achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and adaptability.” Indeed, they will proceed through “a system of techniques and standards that allow units and Soldiers to determine, acquire, and practice

\textsuperscript{19} DA, PAM 350-58, \textit{Army Leader Development Program} (Washington, DC, March 8, 2013), 1.
necessary skills.”

So it becomes clear, reinforced by the policy and direction of AR 350-1, that all individuals, regardless of rank, undergo a similar progression of skill training. This includes such basic individual skills as rifle marksmanship or combat first aid, or unit collective tasks such as conducting a raid or conducting an obstacle breaching. A complicated collective task such as conducting an air assault is built upon numerous, progressively trained individual and small unit skills and tasks, all trained through training centers, unit training, and functional courses. Over the course of its existence, the Army has refined the practice of skill and task training. This is why a newly commissioned officer’s educational and cognitive preparation for all the previously identified challenges is so critical. He or she will be trained in the specifics of the branch specialty chosen through BOLC, but the flexibility of thought, the broad-ranging cognition, the grasp of the human dimension which is leadership’s domain starts with that undergraduate education.

ADRP 7-0 further buttresses the need for a broad-based education when it addresses selected training needs. There are eleven training principles promulgated in the ADRP. Two of them have particular significance. One is “Train as you will fight,” which means “training under an expected operational environment for the mission.”

There are ramifications here for the leader aside from the tactical problem and technical means available. The setting for the training should enable leaders “to assess challenges and employ critical thinking to develop sound, creative solutions rapidly.”

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20 DA, ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders (Washington, DC, August 23, 2012), 1-1.

21 ADRP 7-0, 2-2.
description goes on to assert that “operations require leaders who understand the cultures in which they will operate.” It is not only the foreign culture, the setting, that one will face, but also cultures of the other services, government agencies, and militaries of other nations with whom a leader may expect to work in the current environment. Training with these other actors is necessary so as to “avoid actions and perceptions that can undermine relationships and missions.” Seeking proficiency in cultural norms and foreign language is also encouraged. In addition, familiarization with and use of the PMESII-PT operational variables is again emphasized as contributing to effective training. These variables represent cognitively much more than mere skill acquisition or task mastery. All of this has been emphasized before in previously examined texts but here clearly move the leader beyond the mere mastery of skills usually associated with the goals of training.

Recalling the earlier exhortation that all commanders are responsible for their subordinate leaders’ development, one principle of leader development is to “Train leaders to think critically and creatively.” Leaving aside the dissonance created by the use of the concept of “train” in this construct when recalling the definitional difference between training and education, this principle speaks to “leaders able to solve difficult and complex problems” and “make decisions with only partial information.” Switching from the leader to the creative and critical thinker as subject, such people:

- Are open-minded and consider alternative, sometimes non-conformist, solutions and the second- and third-order effects of those decisions.
- Collaborate with others for help in analyzing and war-gaming solutions.

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22 Ibid. All selections in this paragraph are from this page.
• Make timely, informed decisions.

• Are adept at honestly assessing their own strengths and weaknesses and determining ways to sustain strengths and overcome weaknesses.\(^{23}\)

Such desired outcomes speak more to a solution anchored in an ability to cognitively apprehend a situation and its surrounding dynamics rather than an answer adhering to a training task-condition-standard construct.

The final yet notable principle for developing leaders is “Train your leaders to know their subordinates and their families.” Aside from the expected requirement to know one’s subordinates’ strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities, leaders should also know and help their families. “Training and education ensure subordinate leaders recognize the importance of families and are adept at helping individuals solve family issues and sustain sound relationships.”\(^{24}\) Again, a leader is expected to perform in areas that rise above mere training. The Army is a diverse organization that cuts across many demographic lines: race; gender; religion; socioeconomic; and cultural. The new lieutenant, as detailed in the discussion of leader attributes, will be expected to exhibit empathy toward the soldiers and family members assigned to him or her. In fact, the newest iteration of Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, gives explicit direction for leaders across a number of non-tactical topics such as equal opportunity or prevention of sexual harassment and assault.\(^{25}\) A previously examined text, “The U.S. Army Diversity Roadmap,” also recognizes the challenge facing our future leaders when

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\(^{23}\) Ibid., 2-5. Bullets are direct quotes.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 2-5.

\(^{25}\) DA, AR 600-20. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 address these examples.
it asserts that “cultural understanding begins at home. The Army’s future demographics will bring new language and cultural challenges to our own ranks. Understanding of our own cultural, personal, and other differences…will create in us a proclivity for understanding others.”26 Once again, across multiple texts, the need for engaging and understanding the human dimension of leadership emerges clearly and emphatically.

The Army devotes other resources to leader development in addition to these directive texts. One in particular, the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), “conducts leadership and leader development research, studies, analysis, assessment and evaluation; provides the Army leadership and leader development doctrine, products and services; develops and maintains the Army Leader Development Strategy and annexes; and manages the Army Leader Development Program.”27 Included among its many products are handbooks designed to help commanders develop subordinate leaders as well as helping individual leaders assess their own strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. Additionally, various self-improvement and assessment software programs are available.28 Finally, CAL administers the Annual Survey of Army Leadership. This important survey provides the senior Army leadership a yearly review of leadership at all levels across the force by “assess[ing] and track[ing] trends (since 2005) in Army leader attitudes of leader development, the quality of leadership, and the contribution of leadership to mission accomplishment.”

26 DA, Diversity Roadmap, 4.


A final text of consequence to leader development is DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*. Its principle purpose is to provide a career guide for the professional development of the Army’s leaders, its officers. This text provides generic career roadmaps for each specialty within the officer corps from second lieutenant to colonel, contains possible assignment options or school attendance at each level of service (e.g., as a captain or a major), and serves as an important tool in the counseling or mentoring of subordinate leaders by superiors. The pamphlet directly supports ADP 7-0 when it states “leader development is a continuous and progressive process, spanning a leader’s entire career.”29 The pamphlet also poses its own substantive view of the desired outcome of this conceptual professional development roadmap. These developmental processes will produce leaders of “unimpeachable integrity, character, and competence” exhibiting the following capabilities:

- “…understand the conditions of the modern global environment, analyze them in terms of the problems they face, and re-frame them in mission command terms.”

- “…successfully interact at the human level with not only our own Soldiers, but with [JIIIM] partners; the indigenous populace and government; and with local, national, and international media.”

- “…cross-cultural communications, language, and the ability to enable economic development, governance, and conflict resolution through negotiation.”30

The Army takes seriously its charge to produce competent, confident leaders of character. After all, these leaders are those individuals charged not only with the moral application of violence on the part of the sovereign state, but also those responsible for

29 ADP 7-0, 3.

30 DA, PAM 600-3, 5. This very recent text revision interestingly eliminates “information systems literate” as one area of expected leader competency from the previous version.
the employment of young men and women into such situations—and all that implies. As this quick survey of texts focused solely on the issue of leader development indicates, extensive personnel, monetary, and intellectual resources are devoted to this endeavor. Yet as will be shown in the following chapter, the Army, despite the consistent narrative thread of expectations of its leaders, continues to diminish the value of a broad liberal arts baccalaureate education as the foundation for such leader development and career progression through levels of increasing responsibility and complexity with each promotion. One reason is the continuing confusion, on the one hand, between the difference of education and training as these terms are conceptually defined and espoused in the many texts examined and, on the other hand, the common conflation of training and education in practice and extemporaneous narrative. In the current climate, these tensions are evidenced in the emphasis on STEM baccalaureate degrees for officer cadets in ROTC and USMA. The next chapter will examine the repetitive pattern of these tensions over the past decades and begin to propose the value of a foundation in the liberal arts.
CHAPTER 6

THE REPETITIVE PATTERN

It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless. They aim at fixed values; but in war, everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military actions are intertwined with psychological forces and effects.

---Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

As the previous analysis clearly establishes, Army leadership and leader development policy, regulation, doctrine, and concepts flowing from national command guidance, lessons learned, and internal studies establish a litany of expectations of the Army’s leaders, to include those newly commissioned lieutenants reporting for their first operational assignment. This litany, however, while including technical and tactical competence, is overwhelmingly focused on the human dimension, creating the military imperative for the liberal arts at the precommissioning phase of undergraduate education. This assertion, of course, runs counter to the current cries for STEM education as the best undergraduate preparation for the officer cadets. After all, is not the military arguably the most technologically oriented organization in the world?

An outside observer draws that conclusion from night vision equipment, drones whose operators are seven thousand miles away, precision munitions, satellite

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communications antennae, and the whole range of modern military platforms carrying and employing some of the most sophisticated electronics and weaponry as well as from some of the latest, unique equipment fielded to the individual soldier engaged in close combat. While not every challenge is necessarily open to a technological solution, the real issue is that there are humans involved in these technologies: the leaders directing them, the soldiers using them, the enemy combatants against whom they are directed, and the non-combatant, neutral—or perhaps not so neutral--indigenous populations in between. Everyone present in a conflict zone can and often does affect military operations. As enunciated in a recent Army directive, “armed conflict is a clash of interests between or among organized groups, each attempting to impose their will on the opposition. In essence it is fundamentally a human endeavor….”

A related document goes on to identify a lack of consideration by leaders of the “physical, cultural, and social environments” in which operations have taken place. These declarations, of course, are focused on the external human challenges facing a deployed leader; they do not address the issue of the internal, variable dynamics the leader encounters within his or her own unit and which is clearly endorsed as an area of concern in the literature. This focus on the human dimension represents, as shown, a dominant narrative thread which exists, both explicitly and implicitly, across the range of texts concerned with leadership and leader development.

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2 DA, Memorandum, SUBJECT: Strategic Landpower Task Force (May 6, 2013). This memorandum served as the chartering guidance for the task force and was signed by Chief of Staff of the Army, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Commander, Special Operations Command.

Yet, even in the face of this leader narrative and with the hard lessons learned from decades of conflict, peacekeeping missions, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance, the recrudescent refrain of “a high tech force requires a high tech officer” is quietly animating policies on precommissioning education. A corollary to this claim is that quantitative skills supplement the high technology focus as challenges are reduced to matters such as data algorithms, budgets, and force ratios. Consequently, emphasis on undergraduate STEM degrees for cadets is becoming embedded in policy and guidance. However, before addressing this latest thematic re-appearance, it is possible to trace this pattern of constantly turning away from a liberal education to one marked by the latest fascination with technology and quantitative approaches in terms of officer PME. In critiquing this parlous pattern, one writer exclaimed, “As Americans, we place more faith in engineering skills than in our historical memory. We have more confidence in our weapons than in the breadth of perspective that informs their use.”

There are clear examples of this misplaced approach over time, selections of which follow.

Retired Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, writing in a notable collection of essays on why history is important to the military profession, relates how in the 1950s and early 1960s history was eliminated from PME. Not only atomic weapons, but many of the analytical and managerial advances of World War II, led those heading the defense establishment to eliminate history in favor of “courses on nuclear war…systems engineering, operations analysis, and management. Senior officers clearly deemed the emerging quantitative methods far more relevant…to the nuclear age.” He continues on

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152
to assert that Vietnam era leaders were deprived of an important educational element and consequently, “America paid a high price for such myopic views, and the resulting undue emphasis on the science of war to the detriment of the art of war.”

A slightly older contemporary of Van Riper, Robert McNamara, the SECDEF during the height of the Vietnam War, ultimately came to understand that analytics were not the means by which to prosecute a war.

McNamara came to the Pentagon at the request of President John F. Kennedy in 1961, who “knew I would bring to the military techniques of management from the business world.” He remained SECDEF under President Lyndon Johnson until 1968. He brought a strong economics, mathematics, and management background to the position, based on education (BS, CAL-Berkeley; MBA, Harvard) and experience (Ford Motor Company President and a statistical control officer for the U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II). In his detailed memoir of this period as SECDEF, he acknowledges a preference for quantitative analysis and measurement of “variables [such as] traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the number of captives…the enemy body count, and so on.” He also worked to instill this ethic across the defense enterprise writ large. What is notable, however, are certain of his assertions as to why the U.S. failed in Vietnam. Out of his list of eleven failures (none of which imply any shortcoming in the quantification of the war approach), three specifically stand out as indicators of a lack of understanding of the

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7 Ibid., 237-238.
human dimension of war.\(^8\)

First, he acknowledges underestimating “the power of nationalism to motivate a people…to fight and die for their beliefs and values.” Second, “misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area….” Finally, he acknowledges failure “to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people’s movements.” Included here was also a failure “to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.” These failures, of course, all speak to the efficacy of a liberal arts education. History, literature, fine arts, sociology, and other liberal arts disciplines are all areas of endeavor where such understanding, or rather, the cognitive flexibility necessary for such understanding, is first fostered. McNamara’s pernicious influence was not limited simply to the halls of the Pentagon.

This statistical approach to war had deleterious effects across the services, but most especially the Army and its leadership. Writing about the post-Vietnam Army, its many problems, and the leaders who transformed that Army in the 1980s resulting in the force that executed Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, James Kitfield identifies a critical turning point in forcing recognition that the Army had a problem with its leadership. He addresses the highly charged 1970 *Study on Military Professionalism*, a study which has over the years become a touchstone within the Army when discussing

\(^8\) Ibid., 322. All quotations in the following discussion of the three reasons come from this page.
leadership, possible pitfalls, and solutions to such pitfalls. In summarizing the findings, Kitfield writes that “the Army leadership had instituted, or allowed to be instituted, a system of statistical measures that had almost nothing to do with winning a war….numbers had become an end in themselves….To the rank and file, it seemed as if nothing was too sacred to be sacrificed on the altar of numerology.” This altar bore statistical categories such as “enemy killed, miles trekked, villages ‘pacified,’ or soldiers reenlisted and AWOL.” This finding serves to reinforce the detrimental effect of McNamara’s insistence on numbers.

But during the 1980s, a number of new and advanced combat weapons platforms such as the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter and the M1 Abrams main battle tank were introduced into a force still using World War II and Korean War vintage equipment. These new platforms with their cutting edge technical capabilities including ancillary equipment such as laser designators and night vision goggles sent a clear message of technological superiority. From this, audiences drew the conclusion that only officers with science and engineering education could succeed in leading this new, high-tech force. Unsurprisingly one such audience emerged at USMA.

In 1986, the USMA Board of Visitors recommended a return to a strictly “exact sciences” curriculum, including a final, year-long core course in weapons systems engineering even at the cost of the then-fledgling optional academic majors in humanities and public affairs (HPA). The USMA Curriculum Committee-- all Vietnam veterans--

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responded to the Board using the HPA courses as the basis of their rebuttal of the Board’s underlying assumptions about exact sciences being the optimal educational preparation of cadets for their service as officers. In the response memorandum, they relate how in Vietnam the real problems that “marred” the Army’s performance “arose from judgments of character, interactions with a foreign culture, responses to complex political, psychological, and economic pressures, knowledge of the law, application of moral reasoning, and communications to our superiors, our subordinates, ourselves.” They go on to assert that Vietnam had “disabused” them of any notion that war is an exact science. They foresaw “both finite technical problems and the ‘inexact’ kinds of problems that gave us trouble in Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{11} Of course, the next major conflict was the first Gulf War in 1991, and operations there were a far cry from Vietnam.

Recalling the speed with which the objectives of Operation DESERT STORM had been reached and the display of conventional warfare fought with the new weapons platforms and technologies to now include stealth and precision guided munitions, a call for more focus on science, math, and engineering (SME) education for officers was inevitable. In February 1996, following the oft-stated vindication of “high tech” forces in Operation DESERT STORM and the Army’s futuristic work to digitize the force, especially the battle command function, under FORCE XXI efforts\textsuperscript{12}, the Army Science Board determined that the Army officer corps was deficient in its “technology-literate

\textsuperscript{11} Curriculum Committee, U.S. Military Academy, Memorandum, SUBJECT: Reports to the 1986 Board of Visitors (March 6, 1986), 2. Copy in possession of author.

\textsuperscript{12} Force XXI was the program of the early and mid-1990s to trade off shrinking force structure post-Cold War for improved capabilities in command, control and communications, situational awareness, and enhanced lethality through exploitation of information technology.
line officers and SME-educated officers,” those very types with their technical competencies “to fully capitalize on the combat leverage provided by modern digitized weapons systems.”

The study concentrated on three specific areas in terms of officer requirements: entry-level requirements, career development and training requirements, and position requirements. Keeping the focus here on officer cadets preparing for leadership roles, that entry-level officer, the study recommended mandating that 50% of all USMA and 2/3/4 year ROTC scholarship students be SME majors and the remaining cadets have “a strong SME core” of either 8 or 15 SME courses within their course of study. Though these specific recommendations were never subsequently mandated despite senior Army leadership endorsement, this focus on high technology remained preeminent through the 1990s.

Ironically, during this timeframe and throughout the late 1990s and the early years of the 21st Century, the deployed Army was dealing with multiple peacekeeping missions, trying to overcome the challenges of operating among the people. Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo: these and other operations found soldiers dealing with populations across ethnic, cultural, social, and religious lines, not to mention language proficiency issues, for which they had little, if any, specific preparation. The advanced weaponry wielded so successfully in Iraq had little impact for a mission requiring foot patrols and close

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14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., 33.
interaction with bitterly divided and belligerent populations.

The force in general, however, continued to promote and train in conventional, combined arms maneuver warfare. The vindication of this singular lens was clearly validated in the extraordinary lightning campaign to Baghdad in 2003, showcasing the lethal combination of competent, trained forces wielding advanced weaponry, electronics, and information technologies. Yet that force and its leaders, despite the previous years of peacekeeping missions and lessons learned from them, still crashed on the social, political, religious, ethnic, and socio-economic barriers encountered in Iraq in the post-invasion phase. Shock and awe, with its attendant high technology ideology, was no match for the human dimension of war and its aftermath.  

Now, following over twelve years of war and engagement through which an increased focus on the human dimension of conflict emerged, there is evidence that this cycle of technological seduction is poised to repeat itself despite the contradictory language as previously seen in multiple texts—guidance, regulations, doctrine, concepts, strategies, etc.—that emphasize a leadership based not on a quantitative protocol but rather a challenging, broad-based, integrative cognition. There are a number of different indicators of the return to a technology focus encompassing recruitment, educational inducements for STEM, and language occurring across some of the same publications previously examined.

At some basic level, this renewed fascination with STEM is a direct outgrowth not only of the increasingly technical sophistication of the Army’s weapons and systems, but also the general call-to-arms regarding STEM education, workforce, and capabilities.

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16 Stephenson, "Revolution in Military Affairs," 45-46.
across the entire national spectrum. Within DOD itself, a substantive effort regarding
STEM education and workforce development is overseen through the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.\(^{17}\) Supporting this DOD
lead, the services all have discrete STEM programs; the Army’s Educational Outreach
Program encompasses all grade levels from kindergarten through college as well as
career development opportunities.\(^{18}\) In another instance of supporting STEM education,
the Director of the U.S. Army Marketing and Research Group, a subordinate element
under the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, told a
group of community and educational leaders from around the country that “STEM is at
the foundation of every Army career.” This is a questionable assertion for the officer
cadet given the expected leader attributes, competencies, and expectations identified
earlier. But more tellingly, he goes on to state that the Army provides “career training
and skills development in more than 150 career and technical specialties.”\(^{19}\) This is an
important point: the officer cadet will receive the necessary training to acquire skills
allowing him or her to deploy and use such equipment as duties may demand. The
content of a liberal arts education that is more applicable to the demands and expectations
of the leader is not comparable to skill training. In reviewing these programs, one may
claim that the programs target the mainly civilian workforce that supports the research

\(^{17}\) See homepage at www.acq.osd.mil/rd/organization/stem.html for complete menu to
include a STEM Education and Outreach Strategic Plan.

\(^{18}\) See program homepage at www.usaeop.com.

\(^{19}\) “U.S. Army Hosts a Strengthening America’s Youth Committee Leadership Meeting
and development enterprise in DOD and the Army. There can be no doubt, however, that future officer cadets will be influenced by such programs, especially when current leaders voice such opinions about STEM.

In another instance, the Army’s Accessions Command and Research, Development, and Engineering Command have jointly fielded a recruiting tool named the STEM Asset Vehicle, a modified tractor-trailer carrying a virtual, immersive simulation using the latest digital and simulation technologies.\(^\text{20}\) Designed to visit high school and college campuses, students will be faced with a humanitarian disaster scenario and will use these latest technologies to craft a solution. The stated goal is to encourage students to undertake civilian careers in the Army as scientists and engineers. However, at the college campuses, ROTC cadets are encouraged to participate so as to consider undertaking STEM education in their studies.\(^\text{21}\) This emphasis also reflects a recent change in the measurable value the U.S. Army Cadet Command places on STEM degrees.

In broad terms, a cadet is evaluated across twelve discrete areas of varying values on two primary levels: the academic and the leadership program which, in turn, encompasses the physical readiness and leadership development areas. The academic portion is based solely on the cadet’s cumulative GPA regardless of the cadet’s major. A cadet receives points (carried out two decimal places) for the level of achievement in


\(^{21}\) Personal conversation with ROTC instructor at local ROTC detachment during a visit by the vehicle.
each area, a result known as the Order of Merit score (OMS). The OMS is used to develop the national Order of Merit list (OML) which is the key to a cadet’s future. A cadet’s success in gaining the branch assignment sought such as infantry, armor, engineer, or aviation depends to a large degree on one’s placement on the OML. But not all scores are equal starting with the commissioning class of 2014. A STEM incentive has been added, amounting to a bonus point allocation of 0.5 or 1.0 to one’s OMS if a cadet is enrolled in certain majors.22 As the immediate past Commanding General of Cadet Command (CG, USACC) stated, “more weight will be given to cadets who choose difficult academic majors. ‘We need to increase our STEM degree graduates,’ [he] said, explaining that today’s Army needs more officers versed in [STEM].”23

The designation of acceptable STEM-related degrees that benefit from the incentive flows from the manner by which the Cadet Command groups the many academic majors. These groupings are called the “Academic Discipline Mix” (ADM) and there are five of them, of which four are of concern here. ADM 1 is the Generalist grouping; found here are disciplines such as foreign languages and literature, psychology, human resources, cognitive science, and area studies. History, liberal arts, social science, interdisciplinary studies, and political science are also found here. ADM 2 encompasses Technical Management disciplines such as accounting, business, nutrition, and law. Physical sciences and analytical disciplines such as operations research, biometry,


physics, and pre-medical/dental/veterinarian compose ADM 3. ADM 4 is engineering and covers the profusion of specific engineering disciplines such as civil, environmental, computer science, and electrical.24 The STEM degree incentive of a half point applies to ADM 3 disciplines; ADM 4 disciplines receive a full point bonus. In a competition (for branch assignments and active duty assignments) where scores are carried out to two decimal places, these bonuses for the STEM degrees are notable. They also correlate to the preferences shown in scholarship allocations across the disciplines.

According to the official procedural guidance, scholarships will be awarded across the ADMs on a “best qualified basis.” However, it continues on to direct that “specific academic discipline group percentages will be applied in the selection of scholarship recipients.” These percentages are: Engineering 35%; Physical Science/Analytical 25%; Technical Management 25%; and Generalist 15%.25 In addition, these percentages reflect a change of plus 5% in Engineering and minus 5% in Generalist from the earlier version of this guidance, reflecting again a trend towards a technical education, even in the face of the earlier, extensive identification of desirable leadership attributes and competencies.26 Such contradiction flows also from leadership statements concerning goals and outcomes of undergraduate education in the precommissioning phase of PME.

The immediate past CG, USACC instituted many significant changes collectively

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24 U.S. Army Cadet Command Regulation 145-1: Army ROTC Incentives Policy, November 6, 2012, 150-158. ADM 5 is specifically nursing and is handled discretely.


designated “Bold Transformation” to the four-year ROTC military science curriculum. The focus on STEM was one of them. But endorsements of STEM made in various fora can leave one confused on exactly which educational path is most appropriate when those endorsements are contrasted to the expansive rhetoric of leader expectations presented across the range of leadership and leader development literature. In another setting, the past CG, USACC sketched out an expansive if somewhat ambivalent view of a cadet’s education when he stated that “future leaders will need to be educated in [STEM].…They will need foreign language skills, must be culturally sensitive and possess established critical thinking and problem solving skills.”27 As part of this transformation, STEM internships for cadets will be pursued. Once again, an interesting contradiction in language arises.

Yet the Chief of the Cadet Professional Development Division at Cadet Command somewhat differently described the goal of the education cadets are encouraged to pursue. The goal, he said, is to “develop agile, critical thinkers who can make strategic decisions at a moment’s notice on the ground.” Invoking past battlefields on which linear-oriented battles were fought under tight, central control, he went on to assert that today’s battlefield, or operational environment, is asymmetrical. Such an environment means that “a young lieutenant may become engaged in any degree of conflict ranging from a direct firefight to a political engagement with a local leader. It can all happen at a moment’s notice and that means young officers have to function

quickly at a variety of levels.” This description helps to illustrate the tension inherent in cadet training and education. Basic tactical and technical skill is needed to maneuver one’s platoon, call in a fire mission, or conduct convoy operations in contested space. There can be no uncertainty when it comes to the basic leadership challenge of combat: to prevail over one’s enemy. But once the lieutenant enters the other realm of cross-cultural understanding and interpersonal relations, politics, and unified action within the JIIM environment, he or she will be operating in that complex, ambiguous, uncertain arena of human nature and foreign cultures. The flexible cognition developed in a broad-based education will best serve the lieutenant in such situations.

This focus on STEM is also surfacing in select Army texts that deal with leader development and the human dimension of operations. Recall the ALDS. In this analysis, the current version of 2013 was used. There is a notable shift in language when compared to its 2009 predecessor. In addressing the pre-commissioning phase of PME, the 2013 ALDS asserts that the proponent is “taking a hard look at pre-commissioning sources to ensure that leaders of tomorrow come into the force with the right set of skills, to include reemphasizing the need for those with backgrounds in [STEM].” The 2009 version, however, had no specific mention of STEM, emphasizing rather the need to deal with the complexity introduced by “societal, religious, tribal, and economic factors”; to be prepared, in a decentralized arena, for greater capability cascade and decisionmaking authority”; and to be comfortable working to frame ill-structured problems which will be

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28 Ibid.
29 ALDS, 8.
“ill-defined and multifaceted.” The Commanding General at the time responsible for the 2009 strategy expanded on this when he stated that these young leaders had to be “tremendously culturally astute and understand where elements of the fabric of society have been marginalized to see what it’s going to take to get them integrated so they can be effective. These are the types of leaders we have to develop.” The population groups behind “elements of the fabric of society” are numerous and diverse.

Unfortunately, once again, as the Army’s focus shifts from the difficult and messy human dimension of war characterizing the past decade of war to conventional combined arms maneuver as the Army looks into the future, the technological perspective reemerges ever more overtly.

This passage from the 2013 ALDS also continues the previously noted tension between education and training. The Army wants the “right set of skills” in its future lieutenants. However, in the Army, skills are attained through training, which does occur as part of precommissioning PME. Here, though, “skill” is conflated with an educational outcome, i.e. STEM. Certainly, a STEM education can be seen as instilling a skill given the hard technical nature of STEM. Still, as shown previously, when one speaks of STEM in relation to precommissioning PME, one is referring to a STEM degreed individual. A fair reading of the language as written can certainly be taken to mean that STEM degreed lieutenants had training during their undergraduate program rather than an education. Such a reading has implications for the new STEM lieutenant given the


previous analysis of what is expected of that individual as a leader.\textsuperscript{32}

Finally, occurring at approximately the same time as the two leader development strategies, in 2008 \textit{The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations, 2015-2024} was published. This version, similar to the 2009 leader development strategy, embraced a larger view of the educational and intellectual needs of the Army leader. The future arena of conflict remains “complex and chaotic, and human frailties and irrationality” characterize war’s nature. Contributing to the fog of war with which commanders must contend is the “climate of war” containing ambiguity, danger, physical exertion, friction and chance.” It continues, “Technology, intelligence, and operational design can reduce uncertainty. However, commanders must still make decisions based on incomplete, inaccurate, or contradictory information.”\textsuperscript{33}

This concept continues on in discussing socio-cultural awareness to further identify the leader’s need for “the capability to understand and address the ‘human terrain’ of social, cultural, historical, political, economic, and population and urban geography of the area of operations.” Consequently, the concept states, “the Army must increase training and education to improve Soldier understanding of diverse environmental conditions and improve cultural awareness programs, language skills, \textit{and invest in humanities educational programs}.”\textsuperscript{34} Recall that in 2007, when the groundwork

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\textsuperscript{32} It must be noted that the mission area of cyber operations has driven a specific need for computer science and information systems degreed lieutenants. There are incentives in the OML and branching processes for accessions of such officers into the Signal Corps, the branch of the Army responsible for cyber. The exact leadership role of those new lieutenants as opposed to their peer infantry or field artillery lieutenant is still in flux.

\textsuperscript{33} DA, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7: \textit{The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations, 2015-2024} (Ft. Monroe, VA: June 11, 2008), 2.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 19-20. Emphasis added.
\end{flushright}
for this concept was being done, the surge in Iraq began. The emphasis on and litany of leader capabilities is unsurprising given the counterinsurgency mission of that time. But this is the only place—now a superseded text-- where a specific recommendation for humanities education was ever made.

The replacement concept text for the 2008 version was issued in May 2014, just weeks before the 2014 ALDS. And in consonance with that strategy, the new concept text turns back the emphasis on those social science and humanities topics of the 2008 version. In fact, rather than being outward looking to acknowledge all parties involved in the human dimension of conflict, the 2014 concept turns inward and focuses on the Soldier and Army Civilian. Its purpose is to provide “a framework for how the future Army must select, develop, sustain, and transition [personnel].”35 Throughout the text, there is a strong thread of reliance on human performance enhancement advances across multiple areas of endeavor such as accelerated learning, physical performance enhancement, or augmented cognition. In terms of STEM education, the concept writer recognizes that “technological savvy” is a desirable attribute for future recruiting; an assumption looking into that future is that “Army learners will be masters of automation and digital technology (much from pre-Army education and experience).”36 Yet there remains a thread of outward vision when the social component is discussed.

The essence of the social component is how Soldiers “interact with and are influenced by others’ beliefs, behaviors, feelings, and interpersonal interactions.” Such

35 DA, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7: The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept (Ft. Eustis, VA: May 21, 2014), 5.
36 Ibid., 12-13.
an essence is based on a concept of social fitness consisting of individual well-being, essentially demonstrating “strong ethical, moral, and spiritual beliefs” joined to a firm internalization of both the Army ethic and the Army values.\(^{37}\) Noting the need for “adept” soldiers at understanding the PMESII-PT variables, “Army professionals must understand and address the human aspects of the area of operations….Developing an understanding and respect for the importance of culture is an essential element of 21\(^{st}\) century operations with unified action partners.” Such cultural understanding is then extrapolated to the Army profession internally “as the nature of America’s diverse population impacts the composition of the Army in gender and cultural origins.”\(^{38}\) Thus, just as its predecessor document does, this current concept does recognize the need for a broad base of integrative knowledge across multiple subject areas. The point of departure is the absence of a call for liberal education as a means to answer this desired capability. It simply identifies the need. In this, it closely parallels the two leader development strategies in the move from a more liberally based view of knowledge requirements to that of STEM, despite the overwhelming narrative previously identified concerning leadership and leader expectations.

The historical pattern of returning to a technological focus in PME is clear. What is not clear is why the outcomes of such a pattern have not been recognized, particularly in light of the Army’s recent experience and the literature’s description of the qualities the Army seeks in its leaders. A classic liberal arts undergraduate education will better arm newly commissioned lieutenants—leaders of men and women-- as they venture forth

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 15.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.
carrying now the responsibilities for the health and welfare of those in their units as well as those encountered across the human dimension of the range of conflict. In the final chapter, a classic liberal arts education will be examined. Select benefits of such an education will be correlated to the expectations of and required attributes and competencies of the new leader.
CHAPTER 7

THE INTEGRATIVE LEADER

More than ever, war is a thinking man’s game. Wars today must be fought with intellect as well as technology. Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are telling us that wars are won by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions, all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their cultures, and their motivations. While wars have become more complex, responsibility for those who fight them has increasingly slipped down the chain of command to junior personnel. Yet these young, inexperienced leaders have little time to prepare themselves to make strategic decisions.

---Major General Robert H. Scales, U.S. Army, Retired

The epigraph above serves as a concise summary of the examined dominant narrative thread regarding the expectations of young leaders during this period of persistent conflict. It serves to focus in on the key points of the current challenge in developing leaders: junior officers as strategic actors; a leader’s need to be self-reflective; an understanding of human nature in all its manifestations; and the place of technology in executing leader responsibilities. As has been seen in the preceding chapters, this same narrative emerges across the more than fifty official national security, joint, and Army publications with many other uncounted texts addressing the topic at various levels of specificity. Importantly, however, Scales identifies a critical detail little acknowledged throughout these same texts: there is little time for preparing the new

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junior leader to assume these considerable responsibilities and perform to expectations. Yet despite the textually consistent narrative on leadership and leader expectations, the Army’s approach to addressing the identified knowledge and capabilities expected of the new lieutenant is somehow seen to reside in an increased emphasis on the STEM disciplines as the undergraduate education of choice for future officers.

Unfortunately, given the various intelligence estimates that a future operational environment will be volatile, uncertain, ambiguous, and complex, will occur amongst indigenous and sometimes hostile population, and will be carried out by units as diverse in makeup as any organization in America, a STEM education will not provide the broad-based disciplinary education suited to college students who upon graduation will be immediately imbued with the state sanctioned ability to wield deadly force and given full responsibility for those soldiers he or she will lead. As a newly commissioned lieutenant stated, “You go from being a college kid and having almost no cares in the world, to being in charge of a platoon of 60 people. That’s huge. We’re entrusted with America’s greatest resource, and that’s people’s sons and daughters.”\(^2\) The implications of this trust, of course, means not just directing violence against enemies through external means (such as air support missions) while considering the non-combatants who may be in the same battlespace, but also employing his or her instrument of force, the men and women who compose the unit the lieutenant leads. As one professor of English at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point offered to a high school student contemplating attendance at USMA, “Officers in particular must be keenly aware of the sacrifices they

\(^2\) Tanner Cole, “New lieutenant: We are entrusted with people’s sons and daughters,” AUSA News (October 2014), 12.
might someday ask their soldiers to make—the price that might have to be paid. It is vitally important that a cadet’s education make him or her fully aware of all perspectives. To do otherwise would be to act dishonorably.”

To be “aware of all perspectives” requires an educational foundation that arms the future officer with the necessary cognition to transcend the technological, data-based world view underlying the STEM advocacy evident in practice.

Despite the broad endorsement here of a liberal arts education as opposed to STEM as the better educational preparation of future officers, a small number of the cadets will be immediately thrust into a disciplinary field requiring the specific professional preparation of a STEM education. But as seen previously, such cadets are most specifically identified with the quickly emerging requirements for cyber warriors. Outside of this career field, officers can expect to fulfill leadership roles within their basic branches such as aviation, armor, or military intelligence through the early years of their service.

For those individuals who choose to make the Army a career, they will have various opportunities starting at the 5-7 year mark to attend graduate school to achieve specific disciplinary education or to serve an internship with industry or a think tank to broaden their perspectives and gain experience specific to their functional specialty. Additionally, a comprehensive system of progressive PME awaits the career officer as he or she continues to gain positions of increasing responsibility with promotions. However, those advanced education and broadening opportunities lie well beyond the focus here on

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3 Elizabeth D. Samet, Soldier’s Heart: Reading Literature Through Peace and War at West Point (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 57. The correspondence is attributed to a fellow professor and military colleague in the English Department at USMA. Professor Samet is a civilian faculty member there.
undergraduate, baccalaureate education and the preparation of the cadets for assuming their initial leadership responsibilities. The traditional liberal arts curriculum, encompassing humanities, social sciences, and sciences, will not only provide the cadet with a robust cognition, but will also ensure the cadet graduates numerically and scientifically literate. This is sufficient, especially since the Army assumes “future Army learners will be masters of automation and digital technology.” If this assumption is valid, then short of having to write code, no cadet will lack the ability to be trained on the equipment with which he or she will be expected to be proficient.

Numerical and scientific literacy remains important. Recall the earlier discussion of the Army’s views of training and education in Chapter 5: “[Education is] a structured process to impart knowledge through teaching and learning to enable or enhance an individual’s ability to perform in unknown situations….This is in contrast to training, where a task or performance basis is used and specific conditions and standards are used to assess individual and unit proficiency.” The Army conducts skill training very effectively. There is perhaps no better illustration of this than the Army’s Initial Entry Rotary Wing training course, the world’s gold standard on combat helicopter pilot training.

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4 Association of American Colleges and Universities, “What is a 21st Century Liberal Education?” http://www.aacu.org/leap/what-is-a-liberal-education (accessed August 19, 2014). These three categories are the norm in liberal arts’ descriptions. However, other organizations may add a category such as the University of Northern Iowa adding “Creative Arts (Fine Art, Theater, Speech, Creative Writing)” to the liberal arts’ categorization. See Richard Sigurdson, “Why Study the Liberal Arts?” http://www.uni.edu/reineke/whystudyla.htm (accessed August 31, 2014).

5 ALDS, 13. Though this assumption has no further definition, context implies a person comfortable with technology and able to both understand and to utilize a technology’s potential.

6 AR 350-1, 229.
A 32-week undertaking, the flight student receives 179 hours of hands-on flight instruction from entry-level piloting skills to conducting various mission scenarios under different environmental conditions. But there are many more hours spent in classrooms on subjects such as aerodynamics, meteorology, helicopter performance calculations and parameters, and aeromedicine. A degree in aeronautical engineering is not necessary; the student is not designing empennage so as to reduce aerodynamic drag nor an optimum rotor airfoil camber. By the time the student completes flight school, however, he or she will have learned and internalized how to draw an advanced turbine engine and explain, for example, the axial compression stage and its role in the entire process of power generation. So it will also be with the fledgling pilot’s ability to explain the importance of Bernoulli’s Principle of fluid pressure and fluid velocity in the production of lift.

There are many other challenges facing the student in terms of the technical knowledge to be mastered. But the Army has a proven system for academically training the student on all the facets of rotary wing flight necessary to one’s successful performance as an Army rotary wing pilot. But if there is a specific problem with the engine, such as the fuel atomizer, there are highly trained maintenance personnel who can disassemble, troubleshoot, and repair any part of the engine. This ability to train military personnel on specific equipment at different levels of specificity spans the multitude of equipment the Army uses every day. The proven success of this immense training endeavor seems to contradict the assertion that the high tech Army requires high tech leaders.

In fact, in the 1980s, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Aviation Center (and head of all Army Aviation) brought into the force, among other new or improved
aircraft, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, arguably the world’s most technologically advanced weapons platform at the time of its fielding. His biography states:

...he helped define requirements for the development of helicopter systems, to include their logistic support, training programs, leadership development, tactical employment and doctrinal integration with joint and combined arms forces. He was instrumental in the requirements, development, and evaluation processes for all modern Army aviation programs to include Black Hawk, Chinook, Apache, Kiowa Warrior, and a long list of other manned and unmanned aircraft systems.  

This officer, Major General Rudolph Ostovich III, held an M.A. in International Relations and a B.A. in Liberal Arts (with a music focus). It is not unreasonable to assert that his success was due to an ability to lead people, provide motivation, and make connections across multiple, disparate undertakings, all skills deriving from his broad educational grounding.

Leadership in the military has been shown to carry notable responsibilities across a span of expectations, but most importantly in the complex human dimension. A program of such specialization as in the STEM disciplines leaves little room for courses which would serve to expand a cadet’s worldview, increase one’s critical and creative thinking, and contribute to the understanding of different perspectives in a diverse world. The singular, quantitative focus of a STEM degree program can have negative consequences. Recently, two prominent members of the science community—both leaders in their organizations—addressed the shortcomings of the strictly utilitarian viewpoint that the quantitative disciplines can produce.

Dr. Jim Solti is the Chief Scientist at the U.S. Air Force Academy’s (USAFA) Office of Research; his specialty is computational structural mechanics. In a recent

interview,\(^8\) he addressed why, after a scientific career of service, he has come to the realization that the humanities are critical to a military leader and decision-maker. As a member of the U.S. military effort in Iraq in 2004, he was responsible for a team of analysts working on strategies and plans. As he relates it, after a month of pure quantitative analysis on recommendations for future military actions, the vice-admiral receiving the briefing and possessing a background in international relations, “dismissed them very quickly.” Initially believing the “older guy” did not understand “the power” of the analysis, Solti eventually came to understand that there had been no consideration of the region’s history and culture in terms of the recommendations, something the vice admiral intuitively understood. Pure data analysis was insufficient. Terming it an epiphany for him, Solti stated his belief that “the humanities and social sciences provide the ability to take those ones and zeroes and put them in the broader context.” He now champions the humanities as part of a larger curricular move at USAFA towards cross-disciplinary projects at USAFA. The humanities provide “a way to understand complex, interdisciplinary relationships between seemingly disparate entities” that is critical to the formation of the future officers.

In another article, Solti writes that as “a scientist by nature and education, I failed to realize the importance of humanities in making scientific decisions—the political science and history inherent in every military decision.” Once taken with this realization, he started to look at mission orders with a renewed appreciation for “the sociocultural, geopolitical, and legal influences behind those decisions.” Perceiving the USAF as the

most technological service, he believes “the humanities must harmonize with STEM to produce the appropriate measured response in every action taken.” His conclusion: “It’s taken me nearly thirty years, but now I get it. The need to harmonize STEM with the humanities and social sciences isn’t an academic necessity. It’s a military imperative.” While the STEM needs of the Army are not as pronounced as in the USAF, a liberal arts education will provide the basis for that harmonization across disciplines which Solti now champions.9

In another startling analysis of an unexpected subject, Roger Forsgren, the Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership, uses Albert Speer as an example of how a technically oriented person, “in the absence of a sense of morality and a capacity for critical thought and judgment, can also make reality of nightmares.”10 There should be no implication taken here that this choice of example implies anything specific about those who undertake STEM studies today. Forsgren’s project is to encourage a more well-rounded education, especially adding in the humanities, for today’s engineering students. As he states, “the liberal arts are necessary to teach these good engineers the wisdom of history, to provide the foundations for young students to grow and mature as citizens with responsibilities beyond the immediate technical concerns of their work.” He continues on to assert that only the liberal arts “can train a young mind to think


critically and discriminately about moral questions….Most engineers are gifted in math and science; this alone is not sufficient to make them responsible or moral human beings.”

However, Forsgren isolates an interesting claim by Speer regarding his education and the resulting utilitarian view he brought to his work under the Nazis wherein he was able to shut out the human dimension of his industries and building efforts. Contemplating his joining the Nazis in late 1930 when he was an assistant professor, Speer maintains his limited intellectual preparation as an undergraduate had a role. Expressing some surprise that he did not apply the same logical reasoning framework to this decision as he did to his architectural work, Speer, calling himself an intellectual, claims his failure to fully understand the Nazis, his lack of examining various points of view, was a failure “rooted in my inadequate political schooling. As a result, I remained uncritical, unable to deal with the arguments of student friends, who were predominantly indoctrinated with the National Socialist ideology.” 11 In another context, a monk who became friends with Speer after his release from prison claimed that Speer “was a brilliant man incapable of abstract thinking.” 12 This issue of ethical action—or lack thereof—on the part of engineers and scientists even in today’s world resonates when Forsgren addresses the issue of automobile safety recalls. Once again, there is no implied parallel here between today’s STEM students and practitioners and the execrable Speer. But it is another cautionary tale about the veritable exclusion of the liberal arts from STEM education and the deleterious effects such a limited, technical cognition can have

11 Ibid., 55-56.

12 Ibid., 48.
on an individual’s apprehension of the world around him or her.

In both these cases, it is not that one style of learning is inherently better than the other, but rather that some balance must be struck in the acquisition of knowledge and the ability to engage the human condition, a highly uncertain proposition. In a paean to Dr. Jacob Bronowski on the 40th anniversary of his death, Simon Critchley focused on Bronowski’s effort to reconcile scientific activity and artistic creation as comparable creative acts of the human imagination. He came to see Werner Karl Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle as “a misnomer” as it implied that one is in a constant state of uncertainty. Rather, as Critchley puts it, Bronowski believed “knowledge was precise, but that precision is confined within a certain tolerance of uncertainty” (emphasis in the original). He believed this tolerance extended into relations between people, where encounters occurred in “the gray area of negotiation and approximation…in the business of listening and the back and forth of conversation and social interaction.” Consequently, Bronowski concluded that “human knowledge is personal and responsible, an unending adventure at the edge of uncertainty.” If one was to insist on certainty, this would lead “ineluctably to arrogance and dogma based on ignorance.” The site of this utterance is Auschwitz, where many members of his family died.

It is clear from previous analysis that the future officer will be expected to operate effectively at that “edge of uncertainty” as he or she deals with many different human encounters both external to the immediate unit he or she leads and internal to it. The

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14 Ibid.
testimony of one such new lieutenant preparing his platoon for a combat deployment clearly brings to the fore the reality of this challenge: “Leading a real platoon was far more complex than I had imagined, and it involved much more than the tactics, endurance, and analysis I had learned at West Point. It demanded the tact of a marriage counselor, the ear of a priest, and the skills of a social worker—and all this before anyone fired a shot in combat.”\textsuperscript{15} Possessing a cognition that accommodates this uncertainty, to be comfortable with the ambiguity induced by differing cultural backgrounds or languages in translation, are traits that flow from the broad education associated with the liberal arts curriculum. As Scales put it, “Training prepares a young Soldier to deal with expected situations on the battlefield. Education prepares him to deal with uncertainty.”\textsuperscript{16}

The question remains: can the liberal arts curriculum fulfill this cognitive imperative for the young officer? In opposition to the previously examined examples of the cognition resulting from a purely scientific or engineering education, the identification of educational methods and expected outcomes associated with a liberal arts education can provide a basis for evaluating the applicability of such education to the substantive catalog of leader expectations. The field most often cited as of questionable relevance to the military profession is that of literature, especially at USMA where the intellectual tradition tending towards science and engineering remains despite recent moves to incorporate more liberal subjects into the curriculum. Fortunately, one of the premier commentators on the value of grappling with the vagaries of language and literature for the cadet and future officer is also a civilian professor of English at USMA.

\textsuperscript{15} Craig M. Mullaney, \textit{The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier’s Education} (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 199.

Professor Elizabeth Samet arrived at USMA in 1997 freshly graduated from the Ph.D. English program at Yale; her undergraduate work was at Harvard. She has published, in addition to numerous journal essays and book reviews, three books firmly anchored in her encounter with West Point as well as the military at large. Her first book, while firmly rooted in the literary critical tradition of close reading of texts and relating to volunteerism and military service, does not specifically address her teaching experience at USMA. Her subsequent books, however, paint a very pointed picture of the experience of teaching literature at a military academy. While a reader may be surprised at the range of literary texts encountered in not only the mandatory literature course in the plebe (i.e., first) year, but also the various electives offered, the intent here is to isolate how Samet perceives literary study as contributing to the formation of the cadet in preparation for his or her service as an officer. Unsurprisingly, Samet’s experience with the cadets’ engagement with literary texts resonates with Bronowski’s “adventure at the edge of uncertainty.”

Samet first addresses her time at West Point in her 2007 book, Soldier’s Heart. To the casual reader unfamiliar with the military and especially West Point, Samet’s description of her experiences of the job interview, her arrival at West Point, her initiation into the arcane language and culture of the military, and her growing understanding of West Point and its educational mission is an excellent introduction. However, she quickly grasps the underlying paradox of educating cadets, namely, the tension that exists between the results of a highly regimented existence and the desire to prepare cadets for the uncertainty they will encounter as leaders. She learns early on that a cadet’s time at West Point falls into three programs: physical, military, and academic.
She recognizes that there is a “reassuring clarity and transparent relevance to the first two realms, but in the last, especially those disciplines in which results cannot be quantified, ambiguity holds dominion.” It is in this atmosphere, then, that Samet believes “cadets have their best chance to prepare themselves for uncertainty—to the extent that anyone can prepare for that.” In dealing with the plebes who struggle with this paradox, Samet learns that while the administration supports the academic mission, “education necessarily coexists…with the realms of training and indoctrination,” and the plebes struggle to reconcile this conflict.\(^{17}\) Within this environment, Samet recognizes that “the ‘uses’ of literature have always been difficult to evaluate, the metrics for cultural awareness, empathy, or knowledge of the human condition being far less precise” than those disciplines of fact, measures, and calculations.\(^{18}\)

Samet found that in dealing with the indeterminate nature of literary texts over the course of a semester, the cadets would eventually become confident in offering their own judgments as to the meaning of the texts. Samet believes the emerging ability to render judgment on such texts is key to moral courage, a desired leader attribute. As she continues, she believes that literature can bestow “a particular kind of knowing…consist[ing] in an ability to know more than one truth, to rest in uncertainty when uncertainty is required, and to change one’s mind when the evidence demands. It [is] a mature knowledge of the type…enabling us to move beyond the books from which we learn.”\(^{19}\) As she concludes in the face of the uncertainty which awaits one of her elective

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\(^{17}\) Samet, *Soldier’s Heart*, 55, 60.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 80.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 212, 239.
class of firsties (i.e., seniors) in a time of war, she relates how she was suddenly
challenged to explain why she taught at West Point. She tells the cadets that she “like[s]
to think I’m arming you with something you may need…something of value.” She
continues that she hopes they become travelers, “wayfarers who visit foreign lands” in a
unique manner “learning of the humours of those peoples and of their manners, and
knocking off our corners by rubbing our brains against other people’s.”

Samet’s view of the benefits of “travel” is uncannily supported by the view of a
West Point graduate who, during the course of his Rhodes scholarship tenure, took the
opportunity to travel widely. Rather than knocking corners off his brain, however, he
feels “stretched, both literally and figuratively.” For him, these travels, where he
encountered new peoples and cultures, “were a continual confrontation with the
unknown, each journey the mental equivalent of leaping out of a helicopter. Later, my
intuition would prove correct. Comfort in ambiguity would be as essential to leading in
combat as the ability to plan. West Point, an institution with instructions on folding
underwear, was poor preparation for chaos. Bangkok and Istanbul were perfect.”
While Samet remains ambivalent to the end, however, about whether she can ever be
certain that she is, in fact, arming the cadets with something of value, she makes a strong
and compelling argument for the value of literature in the education of cadets for
leadership.

When Samet comes to write her newest book, *No Man’s Land*, published in 2014,
she has progressed “from her own comforting narrative of the new century,” a tidy,

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20 Ibid., 247-248.

practical story of a “neat arc from peace to war” in which she could lose herself to the uncomfortable realization that there was “no satisfactory end in sight.” In an echo of Simone Weil’s essential theme in her seminal essay, “The Iliad, or the Poem of Force,” Samet starts to recognize in the returning veterans that “violence works deep transformations in even the most self-aware soldier.” On one point, the Army’s desire for a reflective leader, Samet also adjudges that the Army, “fundamentally biased toward action…, pays lip service to the value of reflection while remaining uncomfortable with such invisible, unpredictable activity.”

Samet also recognizes that the she and all others who purport to prepare the cadets face a challenge: “to imagine that any regimen can eliminate the unexpected is to embrace a dangerous fantasy. And how best to prepare soldiers for the inevitability of their own unpreparedness is a conundrum with which anyone responsible for their education must reckon.” Here, there is a return to the theme of preparation seen in her earlier work. She continues this theme as she addresses the tension between training and education in the institutional Army (and by extension the USMA):

Yet as an institution preoccupied with habits of body and spirit, its culture can seem less interested in—perhaps even ill-designed for—the project of developing habits of mind or intellect. For unlike a perfect score on a physical fitness or marksmanship test, success in this domain doesn’t have a uniformly predictable end, a discrete measure of success or victory. In fact, it might lead only to more questions and doubts or to conclusions that unsettle established narratives. Yet the early encouragement of such habits is absolutely necessary for a military that

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24 Samet, No Man’s Land, 43.
is in the process of having to reinvent itself….The sense that the study of literature can create atmospheres of productive discomfort in which such traits might be fostered animates my belief in it as a teacher…A cadet might refine analytic skills and observation through practice at close reading, and she may also thereby acquire a sophisticated sense of narrative.25

This latter point, close reading and a sense of narrative, also comes into focus when Samet speaks of how her teaching literature attacks the current generational fascination with all things internet. She is frustrated when the cadets turn to the internet and Google for information when the sought-after information is there before them. In her poetry classes, especially, she emphasizes that “the skill of interpretation—of a text or any other kind of knowledge or evidence—is more important than ever in a world glutted by information.” Her example is the oft-repeated mantra of connecting the dots. She asserts that “connecting dots is an act of interpretation and synthesis; it requires sustained attention to find significance in an indiscriminate welter of information.” Just to be sure, she makes the cadets aware of the virtue of “deep attention,” a virtue she illustrates for them with an account of Ulysses S. Grant at work as observed by a member of his staff, General Horace Porter: “[Grant’s] powers of concentration of thought were often shown by the circumstances under which he wrote. Nothing that went on around him, upon the field or in his quarters, could distract his attention or interrupt him….Nothing short of a general attack along the whole line could divert his thoughts from the subject upon which his mind was concentrated.”26

25 Ibid., 119.

Finally, in one of the more surprising discoveries as a director of student theatrical performances, Samet comes to realize there is a close connection between the elements of successful theater and successful military organizations. She comes to see that to be successful, the troupe must exhibit “faith in the mission, absolute trust, teamwork, superior listening skills, and the courage to take risks,” all positive traits for success as a leader.27 Samet’s experiences and perceptive insights into how literature supports the preparation of young cadets for the complex environments and uncertain situations in which they find themselves, then, is one notable educator’s understanding of how such education actually complies with and supports the Army’s narrative on leader development and leader expectations.

Samet’s teaching methodology of close engagement with the texts so that cadets might assess the texts’ applicability to them and their lives is supported by another unique argument about literature’s place in the education of a person. While not specifically illustrated through a military lens, John Carey also sees in the “ind distinctness” of literature an important formative role for the individual. Proceeding from the position of literature as an idea-bank, Carey argues that in the act of reading, the materials appeal to the imagination. “Literature’s power to strengthen one’s sense of selfhood and individuality…depends, to a large extent, on this capacity to cultivate and enfranchise the reader’s private, individual imagining.”28 But how does a reader create from a text already fully formed? Carey’s answer lies in what he terms literature’s indistinctness. Calling it a vital element in all literature, it is the indistinctness which empowers the

27 Ibid., 191.

reader. “The reader, that is, not only can, but must, come to some kind of accommodation with the indistinctness in order to take meaning from the text. For that, the imagination must operate.” The result is that multiple individual readings are derived from any singular text. In assisting her cadet scholars in navigating that ambiguous journey to personal self-awareness and meaning through literature, Samet’s accounts are clearly supported by Carey’s assertions. Many “texts” the cadets will encounter will be indistinct. Their skill as close readers will allow them to navigate such challenges.

Attaining a level of comfort with this indistinctness also seems to support recent research on the need for cognitive closure performed by a team of researchers led by Maja Djikic at the University of Toronto. As defined by the team, such behavior reflects a person’s need “to reach a quick conclusion in decisionmaking and an aversion to ambiguity and confusion. It encourages ‘seizing’ on an early statement or proposition in the process of acquiring knowledge, followed by rigidly ‘freezing’ on the seized item and remaining impervious to additional information.” Proceeding from earlier research on this topic, Djikic’s team pursued the effects of reading essays and short stories on an individual’s need for cognitive closure. However, the emphasis was on reading fiction, which the team “conceptualized as a cognitive and emotional simulation” engaging the characters and situations in the works read. The person reading fiction is not necessarily led to a decision due to a reduced need for urgency or permanence that negates the need for cognitive closure. Concurrently, the reader can simulate the thinking styles of all

29 Carey, 214.

characters encountered in the text. The researchers note this as a “double release—of thinking through events without concern for urgency and permanence and thinking in ways that are different than one’s own—that may produce effects of opening the mind.”

The result of their experimentation supported their principal hypothesis: “When compared to reading an essay, reading a literary short story led to a significant short-term decrease in participants’ self-reported need for cognitive closure….When one reads fictional literature, one is encouraged to simulate other minds, and is thereby released from concerns for urgency and permanence.” The experiment’s results indicated the source of this decreased need: it “occurred principally by means of a decreased need for order and a decreased discomfort with ambiguity.” It is notable that these two categories—order and ambiguity—are specifically identified in the leadership literature as areas in which the leader must be prepared to operate with less-than-perfect knowledge. Consequently, in the absence of an open mind not driven to premature cognitive closure, a leader could suffer from “sub-optimal information-processing strategies.”

In choosing literature as an example of how a liberal arts discipline benefits the emerging leader and assists him or her in preparing for the leadership challenge to be undertaken, one must also recall the full panoply of disciplines to which a liberal arts student might expect to be exposed also contributes to the opening of one’s mind to possibilities in one’s apprehension of any particular situation. Cognitive comfort in the integration of multiple perspectives also requires an ability to avoid premature cognitive

31 Ibid., 150.
32 Ibid., 153.
closure. Recent work on the model of an “integrative thinker” clearly speaks to similar conclusions as in the research undertaken by Djikic, et al. in the singular field of literary fiction.

There remains one final, summarizing aspect as to the value of a liberal arts education for the future military leader. The interdisciplinary aspect of such a curriculum encourages the cadet to become a better integrative thinker. Calling on the works of John Henry Newman, Professor Frederick Aquino of Notre Dame has formulated a theory of an “integrative habit of mind” that speaks clearly to the Army’s narrative of an effective leader. The goal is not to critically examine each thread of Newman’s individual works, but rather to focus on the synthesis of his work as constructed by Aquino so as to establish how Aquino’s theory points to a liberal arts education and its benefits for the military leader. For Aquino, an integrative habit of mind “entails a stable disposition and a capacity to grasp how various pieces of data and areas of inquiry fit together in light of one another, thereby acquiring a more comprehensive understanding of the issue at hand. It also entails deciphering how this kind of understanding applies to a given situation.” Aquino acknowledges, though, that cultivating such a habit of mind is not easy. It “requires appropriate levels of training, reflection, and the courage to engage and learn from a circle of interlocutors.” The specifics behind this cultivation include “conducting thorough inquiries, carefully scrutinizing evidence and arguments, investigating numerous fields of study, considering alternative explanations, and giving, receiving, and responding to criticism.”

Aquino goes on to discuss how such development cannot take place in isolation; his view of the process is that it is “social, communal, and dialogical.” Three key elements apply here: “(1) the capacity to draw adeptly from the informed judgment of others, (2) the aptitude to see how the relevant pieces of data cohere, and (3) the ability to discern how the resultant understanding pertains to the context and issues at hand.” An important element in the development process is that of the “connected view,” and that view is developed and fostered by the interdisciplinary nature of a liberal arts education. It is this aspect of Aquino’s work that perhaps carries the most significance for the cadet and young leader.

For Aquino, a “connected view in an educational setting entails grasping how insights from different fields fit together in light of one another and showing how this kind of understanding applies to the particular context at hand.” Aquino asserts such a view provides a bulwark against “intellectual vices such as dogmatism, fanaticism, narrow-mindedness, making rash judgments, arbitrary appeals to authority, [and] fudging the evidence.” The goal is to produce students who can “reason proficiently in different disciplines, participate in truth-conducive practices, acquire greater levels of understanding, make interdisciplinary connections, and embody a holistic way of being in the world.” Aquino goes on to identify two necessary educational outcomes of this interdisciplinary approach: “to think critically and to weave ideas from different sources

34 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 67, 70
of informed judgment into a coherent account.”

The concept of integrative thinking has wide application, emerging also within the business community. At the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, Dr. Roger Martin has been developing this theory as it evidences itself in current leaders in multidisciplinary fields such as business, non-governmental organizations, artists, and others. In his resulting publication, *The Opposable Mind*, he constructs a definition of integrative thinking based on interviews with and observation of fifty leaders in addition to other research: “the ability to face constructively the tension of opposing ideas and, instead of choosing one at the expense of the other, generate a creative resolution of the tension in the form of a new idea that contains elements of the opposing ideas but is superior to each.” More particularly, in regard to the fifty leaders he interviewed, Rodgers credited them with integrative thinking “without panicking or simply settling for one alternative or the other.”

This calmness in the face of important decisions is a trait that comes from a comfort with one’s cognition and preparation over a lifetime, a trait that starts with a broad education. Indeed, as Rogers delineates the differences between integrative thinkers and conventional thinkers, the following stand out:

- The integrative thinker (IT) takes “a broader view of what is salient to the issue” at hand and does not shy away from complexity.

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37 Ibid., 86-87.


39 Ibid., 6.
• The IT does “not flinch from considering multidirectional and nonlinear causal relationships.”

• The IT has a “distinct architecture” to their decisions, avoiding breaking the problem into discrete pieces for separate resolution but rather keeping a holistic view of the problem.

• The IT searches for “resolution of tensions rather than accept unpleasant tradeoffs.”

Just as Aquino’s individual seeking to establish an integrative habit of mind builds a connected view, so Rodgers’ subjects enact such a habit and view.

Ultimately, it is such an integrative thinker which underlies the many varied roles the cadets will be called upon to fill and the many inconceivable problems they will face and will have to resolve. As leaders of men and women, as managers of violence, as representatives of the U.S., these cadets once commissioned will be expected to model a formidable list of values, attributes, and competencies in the execution of their duties. It will take the cognitive benefits of a liberal arts education to best prepare them for the significant, complicated, and numerous challenges awaiting them.

In sum, then, a close textual reading of the selected conglomeration of documents addressing the issue of military leadership spanning the national security spectrum discloses a leadership narrative of competencies and knowledge that opposes the commonly accepted public utterances of the need for STEM as the education of future Army leaders. The expectations of leading soldiers in operating environments marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity joined to instrumental aspects encompassing areas such as empathy, interpersonal relations, cross-cultural awareness, and values-based leadership indicate a need for a broad-based education better delivered

40 Ibid., 41-44.
through the liberal arts than the Newtonian, linear assurance marking STEM education. The future leader’s encounter with the liberal arts will provide him or her the robust cognitive foundation identified not only in emerging research on cognitive closure, but also the growing attention to the aspect of integrative thinking which marks those leaders operating in conditions of complexity and uncertainty. The Army would be better served by providing its future leaders with the cognitive foundation of the liberal arts as opposed to the restrictive cognitive perceptions attendant to the STEM disciplines.
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