The Relevance of Rawls' Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2002; 23(1): 45-53
An ethical conflict arises when we must perform research in the interest of future patients, but that this may occasionally injure the interests of today's patients. In the case of cognitively impaired persons, the question arises whether it is compatible with humane healthcare not only to treat, but also to use these patients for research purposes. Some bioethicists and theologians have formulated a general duty of solidarity, also pertaining to cognitively impaired persons, as a justification for research on these persons. If one examines this thesis from the theory of justice according to John Rawls, it is revealed that such a duty of solidarity cannot necessarily be extrapolated from Rawls' conception of justice. This is at least true of Rawls' difference principle, because according to the difference principle only those measures are justifiable which serve the interest of the respective least well off. Those measures which would engender additional injury for the least well off could not be balanced by any utility according to Rawls. However, John Rawls' difference principle is subordinate to the first principle, which is that each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with the same liberty for others. These "primary goods" are determined by the freedom and integrity of the person. This integrity of decisionally impaired persons would be in danger if one would abstain from research and thus forego the increase in knowledge related to their disease. Thus one could conclude, at least from Rawls' first principle, that society must take on a duty to guarantee the degrees of freedom for cognitively impaired persons and thus also support the efforts for their healing.
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Maio, Giovanni [Germany] (2000)
Bell, Derek R. (2003)In his paper, "The Relevance of Rawls' Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients" (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002): 45-53), Giovanni Maio has developed a thought-provoking argument for ...
Maio, Giovanni (2003)In my recent article, I addressed the question of whether a potential categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired patients from non-therapeutic medical research would be in accordance with the Principle of Justice as ...