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dc.creatorLe Coz, Pierreen
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-09T00:40:32Zen
dc.date.available2016-01-09T00:40:32Zen
dc.date.created2010-09en
dc.date.issued2010-09en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationJournal international de bioéthique = International journal of bioethics 2010 Sep; 21(3): 17-27, 86en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10822/1021349en
dc.description.abstractDignity is a distinctive trait that our culture has chosen to attach to the individual. Dignity is an unconditional value and the prerogative of man. It goes without saying for us today that whatever his worldly status, his age, his sex, the colour of his skin, his state of health, etc., a man possesses dignity. However, from the point of view of history, nothing seems less spontaneous than to attribute to all men equal dignity. The idea of an ontological dignity, a dignity rooted in the depths of the human being, is the fruit of a long, laborious history which bears the mark of Judeo-Christian culture, of the philosophy of the age of Enlightenment, and of the international legal clauses that followed the atrocities committed during the Second World War. Yet the semantic inflation of the concept, henceforth omnipresent in texts of law, society debates or ethical recommendations, threatens to make it sink into insignificance. Instead of enriching the argument, it becomes a pretext for not having to argue. A concept with an imprecise content, dignity has become through time a sort of magic word which, in the name of ethics, makes it possible to defend any position and the contrary. Thus the dignity argument makes it possible to justify the depenalising of euthanasia (it would be an attempt on the dignity of a being if he was refused the right to put an end to a life which is nothing but suffering) and its condemning (it would be an insult to a man's dignity if the only answer to his appeal for moral support was the administration of a lethal substance). Confused with the exercising of freedom or the quality of life, dignity has a regrettable tendency to cease to define an unconditional value; it has become a malleable, fluctuating property, sometimes even considered as related to living conditions or the state of physical and mental breakdown.en
dc.formatArticleen
dc.languagefren
dc.sourceeweb:334511en
dc.subjectCultureen
dc.subjectEthicsen
dc.subjectEuthanasiaen
dc.subjectFreedomen
dc.subjectHealthen
dc.subjectLawen
dc.subjectLifeen
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
dc.subjectPropertyen
dc.subjectQuality of Lifeen
dc.subjectSkinen
dc.subjectSufferingen
dc.subjectWaren
dc.subject.classificationPhilosophical Ethicsen
dc.subject.classificationValue / Quality of Lifeen
dc.titleDignité et liberté: vers une contradiction insoluble?en
dc.title.alternativeDignity and freedom: towards an insoluble contradiction?en
dc.title.alternativeenen
dc.provenanceCitation prepared by the Library and Information Services group of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University for the ETHXWeb database.en
dc.provenanceCitation migrated from OpenText LiveLink Discovery Server database named EWEB hosted by the Bioethics Research Library to the DSpace collection EthxWeb hosted by DigitalGeorgetown.en


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