Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning
Theoretical medicine and bioethics 2010 Aug ; 31(4): 285-301
We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one's organism. We then criticize animalism--the view that each of us is identical to a human organism--by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
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