Three Articles on Proportional Representation in American Cities (with an Introduction)

Abstract

This dissertation gives the first quantitative account of the adoption and repeal of proportional representation via the single transferable vote (PR-STV, STV, or PR) in American cities. Who enacted it and why? Who repealed it and why? Did legislative discipline vary with known STV electoral strategies?

I find that three groups colluded to enact PR: minority parties, incumbent-party factions that could not win primaries, and, less often, third parties. When the largest of these groups began losing on legislation, it colluded with the largest party to repeal PR. It did so to absorb the smaller parties' voters.

Further, legislative discipline flagged when parties endorsed more than one popular candidate. I give circumstantial evidence that low party discipline resulted from a party's accumulation of popular incumbents.

I draw on two new sets of data. One comprises election and referendum returns in three similar cities that chose different electoral rules. The second comprises 5,127 roll-call votes, 126 unique legislators, 1,011 rounds of STV vote-counting, 1,001 candidates, and their party affiliations over 25 elections. The data come from three very different cities representing US experience with PR: Cincinnati (1929-57); New York City (1937-47); and Worcester, Mass. (1949-61).