Structural Restrictions to Gerrymandering: An Examination of the Effect of the Number of Districts on Partisan Redistricting

Abstract

Gerrymandering, which is the practice of drawing representative districts to enable an unfair electoral advantage for one particular group, has afflicted the American political system for centuries. However, certain states that have been apportioned only one congressional district, cannot engage in gerrymandering because there are no lines to draw. Thus the structural requirement prevents gerrymandering from occurring at the congressional level in these states. Based on this observation, it might seem that reducing the number of districts might simultaneously decrease the potency of gerrymandering. This paper examines the relationship between the number of districts and gerrymandering along with the effect that the change in districts over time has on partisan redistricting. The results produce here suggests that more populous states with many districts are more susceptible to gerrymandering than their less populous counterparts. However, there does not appear to be any significant relationship between the change in the number of districts over time and the level of gerrymandering.