Note: there are hundreds of secondary sources that address FISA and Foreign Intelligence collection in some form. Included here are some of the most rigorous, thoughtful, and/or useful analyses of FISA; FISC/FISCR; NSLs; EO 12,333; the history of intelligence collection; statutory and constitutional questions; and related areas, such as First and Fourth Amendment law, the communications infrastructure, and Internet technologies. If there are additional sources that you think should be included, please email me at lkdonohue@law.georgetown.edu.

A. BOOKS

JAMES A. ADAMS & DANIEL D. BLINKA, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: COMMENTARIES AND STATUTES (2003). Short legal treatise published shortly after the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act to clarify changes to FISA and Title III. It covers passenger screening; wire, oral, and electronic communications intercepts; video surveillance; PRTT; mobile tracking devices and thermal imaging; and transactional records. Contains the text of the relevant Title 18 and 50 statutes.

JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA (2009). [Law Library] Bamford, author and journalist, describes the actions of 9/11 terrorists prior to the attacks, and information he believes the NSA knew prior to the attack and the lack of cooperation between the NSA and FBI that may have led to the failure of the government to stop the plot.

ELIZABETH BAZAN, THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: OVERVIEW AND MODIFICATIONS (2008). Bazan, Legislative Attorney at CRS, examines the detailed statutory structure provided by FISA and related provisions of E.O. 12333.

LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE (2016). [Law Library] Donohue, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law, argues that statutory alterations, novel legal interpretations, the structure of the global communications network, and new and emerging technologies have radically expanded the amount and type of information obtained under foreign intelligence surveillance law. Traditionally, for national security, the Courts have allowed weaker Fourth Amendment standards than those that mark criminal law. Information collected for foreign intelligence purposes, though, is now used for criminal prosecution. Donohue raises concern about the resulting impact on privacy and convergence of national security and criminal law. *Winner of the 2016 IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law/Roy C. Palmer Civil Liberties Prize for the best book on the tension between civil liberties and national security in contemporary American society.

LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY (Cambridge University Press), 2008. [Law Library] Donohue writes that in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the political stakes are high: legislators fear being seen as lenient or indifferent and often grant the executive broader authorities without thorough debate. The judiciary's role is restricted. The dominant “security or freedom” framework ignores expanding executive power that shifts the balance between branches of government and between the government and the people. The book warns that the proliferation of biological and nuclear materials, together with willingness on the part of extremists to sacrifice themselves, will drive the UK and US to take progressively expansive measures, shifting their political structures.

TIMOTHY H. EDGAR, BEYOND SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, MASS SURVEILLANCE, AND THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE NSA (2017). [Ebook] Edgar (former Director of Privacy & Civil Liberties for the White House national security staff 2009-10; Deputy DNI for Civil Liberties 2006-9) considers the NSA's programs a profound threat to the privacy of everyone in the world. At the same time, he suggests, mass surveillance programs can be made consistent with democratic values, if we make the hard choices needed to bring transparency, accountability, privacy, and human rights protections into complex programs of intelligence collection. Edgar suggests that the rules-most of which date from the 1970s-are inadequate for this century. Reforms adopted during the Obama administration are a good first step but, in his view, do not go nearly far enough. Simultaneously, Americans’ privacy must be protected. *Winner of the 2018 IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law/Roy C. Palmer Civil Liberties Prize for the best book on the tension between civil liberties and national security in contemporary American society.

THE SNOWDEN READER (David P. Fidler ed., 2015). [Ebook] This edited volume considers Snowden's disclosures and their aftermath, raising historical, political, legal, and ethical concerns. Over forty documents are included, with introductory notes explaining their significance. The collection includes documents leaked by Snowden; responses from the NSA, the Obama administration, and Congress; statements by foreign leaders, their governments, and international organizations; FISC and other Article III judicial rulings; findings of review committees; and Snowden's own statements.

GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY (Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2016). [Ebook] This book is a comparative investigation of how democratic countries can govern their intelligence services so that they are effective but operate within legal/statutory/constitutional frameworks that are acceptable to their people in a complex and interconnected world. It considers the role of domestic institutions overseeing intelligence collection, as well as global technology companies and international courts.

JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2017). [Law Library] Granick, Surveillance and Cybersecurity Counsel at the ACLU, catalogues the history of American surveillance through to the present day, arguing that mass surveillance and democracy are fundamentally incompatible. Even as technology has advanced, laws placing restraint on their use by the government have fallen behind. The book proposes concrete steps to rein in use of surveillance powers. *Winner of the 2016 IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law/Roy C. Palmer Civil Liberties Prize for the best book on the tension between civil liberties and national security in contemporary American society.

ANTHONY GREGORY, AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE: INTELLIGENCE, PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2016). [Law Library] Gregory suggests that the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures offers no panacea for combatting assaults on privacy—whether by the NSA, the FBI, local police, or more mundane administrative agencies. Given the growth of technology, together with the ambiguities and practical problems of enforcing the Fourth Amendment, advocates for privacy protections need to work on multiple policy fronts.

DAVID KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (2d ed. August 2016 Update). [Westlaw] [Law Library – 2012 ed.] In this 2-volume treatise Kris (former AAG of DOJ NSD 2009-11) and Wilson present the law governing, and related to, national security investigations. The authors explore the full background of NSIs, both from a pre-9/11 and post-9/11 perspective. The book incorporates text of FISA, its subsequent amendments, and some related guidelines.

CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: THE RELENTLESS RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND SECRECY (rev. ed. 2017). Savage, Pulitzer-prize winning journalist at the New York Times, focuses on Stellarwind and NSA surveillance 1978-2009 as part of his examination of the changing nature of war. Chapter 8 turns to the problem of leaks leading up to Snowden. The following chapter addresses the secret interpretations of the USA PATRIOT Act. Chapter eleven focuses on institutionalized surveillance (2009-2017), focusing on misinformation provided by the intelligence community to Congress, the USA FREEDOM Act, programmatic collection, backdoor searches, and battles yet to come.

BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD (2015). Schneier, a cryptographer and computer security specialist, looks at the growth of big data from a commercial and governance perspective, arguing that political liberty and justice, commercial fairness and equality, business competitiveness, privacy, and security are all at stake. Schneier offers a series of principles to guide the future evolution of data generation, collection, and analysis.

B. BOOK CHAPTERS AND ARTICLES

Matthew A. Anzaldi & Jonathan W. Gannon, In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Judicial Recognition of Certain Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1599 (2010). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Authors evaluate the 2007 PAA, its legislative history, and its implementation. They review the FISCR’s decision to uphold the PAA, creating a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.

Axel Arnbak & Sharon Goldberg, Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution: Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic Abroad, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Authors discuss legal and technical loopholes that intelligence agencies of the U.S. government could use to circumvent 4th Amendment and statutory safeguards for Americans by collecting their network traffic abroad. Their central hypothesis is that there are several loopholes (e.g., interception in the Intradomain, in the Interdomain, and on foreign soil, and deliberate BGP and DNS manipulations to divert U.S. traffic abroad) that can be exploited for largely unrestrained surveillance.

Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541 (2008). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Avery explores the constitutional issues involved in warrantless wiretapping under the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). He concludes that the President did not have inherent authority or authority under the AUMF to engage in surveillance without a warrant. Further, even with Congressional amendments to FISA in place, warrantless electronic surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment.

Marcus M. Baldwin, Note, Dirty Digits: The Collection of Post-Cut-Through Dialed Digits Under the Pen/Trap Statutes, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. (2009). [Westlaw] Baldwin analyzes the interplay between two criminal PRTT provisions [18 USC § 3121 and § 3123(7)], which have given rise to conflicting interpretations, concluding that PRTT should not be viewed as authorizing PCTDDs containing content in light of 4th Amendment doctrine and the canon of constitutional avoidance.

William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209 (2007). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Banks, founding Director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism and Professor of Law Emeritus at Syracuse University College of Law, suggests that the 1978 compromise that led to enactment of FISA is crumbling under the weight of changes in technology, slapdash amendments, and the TSP’s circumvention of the statute. He continues by suggesting that forms are needed to control programmatic surveillance and to lessen the chance of over-collection and lack of oversight.

William C. Banks, Is the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 Good Policy? Is It Constitutional?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5007 (2011). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Banks examines stresses on the original FISA architecture, TSP, efforts to fold TSP into FISA, the 2007 PAA, and construction of the 2008 FAA. Highlighting the significance of the changes made in the FAA to traditional FISA, Banks raises questions about potential further concerns related to § 702.

William C. Banks, Next Generation Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law: Renewing 702, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 671 (2017). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Banks explains how and why the 2008 FAA and its authorization of bulk collection of content in § 702 came about, predicts the main issues that will be considered in its renewal, and recommends reforms to ensure that bulk content collection does not undermine fundamental freedoms. It argues that renewal and reform of the FAA only temporarily delays the need to confront the foundational and structural flaw in FISA and foreign intelligence surveillance law in general: that technological developments make it virtually impossible, in real time, to verify the location or nationality of a surveillance target.

William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633 (2010). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Banks evaluates the implementation of the 2008 FAA, arguing that FISA has become so complex that the law further occludes informed policy choices suggesting that the basic architecture of FISA should be recast.

Patricia L. Bellia, The 'Lone Wolf' Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 425 (2005). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Bellia, Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame Law School, begins with Moussaoui case/introduction of the lone wolf provision in 2004 IRTPA, using it as a way to get at the constitutional questions that mark the piecemeal evolution of FISA and arguing that Congress must develop new approaches and policies for ensuring congressional and public accountability.

Emily Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections and Government Surveillance, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 771 (2016). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Berman, Assistant Professor of Law at University of Houston Law Center, notes that FISC’s role has changed over time and highlights the court’s use of minimization to protect constitutional values despite third party doctrine.

Scott A. Boykin, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Separation of Powers, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 33 (2016). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Boykin, Associate Professor of Political Science at Georgia Gwinnett College, considers FISA a narrative of largely unsuccessful efforts to monitor and limit executive branch agencies’ intelligence-gathering activities. He argues that FISC/FISCR have little control over the executive branch’s surveillance and intelligence-gathering programs and provide a minimal check on executive power. He concludes with separation of powers concerns and ways in which FISA has contributed to a decades-long trend of increasing concentration of power in the executive branch.

Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (2013). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Butler, Senior Counsel at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), considers proposals to increase transparency and oversight of FI surveillance. Butler considers the Court's standing analysis in Clapper and argues that the current proposals do not do enough to reform the current FISA system. He proposes additional transparency and oversight procedures, including additional public reporting on the scope of FISA surveillance, mandatory public disclosure of FISC decisions, and adversarial briefing at FISC.

Nicole B. Cásarez, The Synergy of Privacy and Speech, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 813 (2016). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Cásarez, an attorney and Professor of Communications at the University of St. Thomas, argues that First and Fourth Amendment analyses should be jointly considered in determining the constitutionality of FISA and 12333 surveillance, pointing out how the latter, together with DOD Directive 5240.1-R, provides a legal loophole. The article critiques the USA FREEDOM Act for failing to resolve the metadata debate, leaving intact the government’s theory that contact chaining lays outside constitutional constraints.

Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Cate, Professor of Law at Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law, highlights the volume and variety of personal information which the government has access to through regulatory and administrative programs and private industry. He argues there is an absence of meaningful limits on data mining, leading to compromises in individual privacy and national security and underscoring the need for Congressional action.

Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Minimization Cannot Be Relied Upon to Protect the Rights of Americans Under a Warrantless Surveillance Program (Sept. 17, 2007), https://perma.cc/8T5L-WNYZ. CDT argues (contra the Executive branch) that relying on minimization will not address the deficiencies in the PAA: (a) even if it meant that the gov’t would discard all USP communications intercepted (which it doesn’t), it fails to address the privacy violation of the initial collection; (b) the minimization rules allow for the retention, analysis, and dissemination of the communications of individuals inside the U.S. incidentally collected.

Jennifer Daskal, The Un-territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Daskal, Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law, considers how territorial assumption in Fourth Amendment doctrine proves inapposite in a digital age. Although not directly on FISA, the article highlights challenges going forward for FI collection.

Laura K. Donohue, Functional Equivalence and Residual Rights Post-Carpenter: Framing a Test Consistent with Precedent and Original Meaning, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2019). Donohue, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law, analyzes the Court’s holding and the associated dissents in Carpenter. The Article draws attention to the myriad questions raised by the CSLI / third party exception, advocating in its place a property-based approach that extends the rule of functional equivalence that characterizes home and border searches to digital papers. It suggests a “but for” analysis to ascertain ownership, turning to bailment, as Justice Gorsuch did in his dissent, to lay out a way to think about third party records moving forward.

Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Donohue argues that the § 215 bulk telephony metadata program runs contrary to FISA’s purpose and violates the statutory language by (a) failing to satisfy the requirement that records sought be “relevant to an authorized investigation”; (b) violating the requirement that information otherwise be obtainable via subpoena duces tecum; and (c) bypassing the statutory framing for pen registers and trap and trace devices. The article suggests that under Katz, Smith and Miller are inapplicable to the digital age. The article rejects the government’s “automation exception” argument, calling for an end to the telephony metadata program, the use of new technologies, and use of adversarial counsel in the FISA process to heighten protections for U.S. persons.

Laura K. Donohue, The Dawn of Social Intelligence (SOCINT), 63 DRAKE L. REV. 1061 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Donohue argues that the collection of SOCINT, which can be combined with other information and queried to produce knowledge, and which is vulnerable to manipulation, presents a new form of intel. The article posits three characteristics: non-traditional; employed to engage in social order analytics; and useful to neutralize actors or effect large-scale social, political, and economic change. The article argues that that SOCINT requires a stronger statutory framing, removing it from the sole domain of Executive Order 12333 or an ancillary to FISA §702.

Laura K. Donohue, FISA Reform, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOCIETY (ISJLP) 599 (2014). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Donohue offers a taxonomy for FISA reform based on how technology has impacted the information available and its transmission and storage. It suggests five primary types of data: personal, transactional, relational, locational, and content. Set against the five categories are six methods of access, transmission, and storage: audio/visual observation, communications networks, papers, hard drives and independent electronic devices, remote servers and cloud technologies, and social media. Using the distinctions, the article divides FI collection between front-end collection and back-end analysis and use, noting that each category contains a counterpoise structured to ensure the appropriate exercise of authorities. For the front-end, this means balancing the manner of collection with requirements for approval. For the back-end, this means offsetting implementation with transparency and oversight. The typology provides a structure for comprehensive reform.

Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Donohue discusses the evolution of § 702 and argues that the NSA has sidestepped the statutory restrictions related to targeting via the “to, from, or about” nomenclature, created a presumption of non-U.S. person status, and failed to adopt minimum standards that would require the agency to ascertain whether a target is within domestic bounds. The paper considers the purpose of analysis, the scope of the minimization procedures, and the use of U.S. person information to query the data and recombinant information. Donohue argues that both areas, as well as the NSA’s retention and dissemination of data practices, raise Fourth Amendment concerns.

Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 155 (2010). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Dycus, Professor of Law at Vermont Law School, argues that the future of the United States may depend on our ability to use cyber weapons wisely. He outlines the Congressional intel oversight structure, urges collaboration amongst the various intelligence agencies, and suggests the need for Congress to establish its role in the development of policies for war on a digital battlefield.

Mieke Eoyang, Beyond Privacy and Security: The Role of the Telecommunications Industry in Electronic Surveillance, 9 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 259 (2017). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Eoyang, Vice President for Third Way’s National Security Program, frames issues related to the 2008 FAA and electronic surveillance programs authorized by § 702, which were set to expire in December 2017. It focuses on telecoms, ISPs, and electronic communications service providers, as well as surveillance authorities used to target overseas persons for FI purposes. It does not cover electronic surveillance in domestic law enforcement or data handling by private entities for commercial purposes.

Bart Forsyth, Banning Bulk: Passage of the USA Freedom Act and Ending Bulk Collection, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Forsyth, Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner’s Chief of Staff at the time of the Snowden leaks, discusses the standard of production for tangible things under § 501 of FISA, criticizing the government’s overbroad interpretation. The article argues against the FISC/FISCR applying the doctrine of ratification in the context of national security legislation, stating that because the judicial and administrative interpretations are classified/not public, it is not reasonable to assume that members of Congress are aware of statutory interpretation prior to passing legislation. It discusses legislative responses to the leaks and passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, evaluating how the USA FREEDOM Act ends bulk collection.

Susan Freiwald, Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide: Competing Visions of the NSA’s 215 Program, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 309 (2014). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Friewald, Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law, focuses on how differently proponents of the § 215 bulk collection program (considering it vital/legal) and opponents (considering it unauthorized/unconstitutional, yielding minimum benefits and subject to significant abuses and insufficient oversight) conceive it. She focuses on differing views of what constitutes abuse (with proponents viewing it narrowly and opponents understanding it as not following procedures, mission creep, and possessing data without authorization), raising questions about the absence of further insight because of the classified nature of related data. The article concludes that the lack of a common understanding of costs and benefits, the legal framing, and what constitutes abuse will continue to exacerbate differences.

William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism: The Intelligence/Law Enforcement Dilemma – A History, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1099 (2007). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Funk, Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus at Lewis and Clark Law School, argues that the original purpose of FISA was to gather foreign intelligence, not to obtain evidence for criminal trials. Subsequent misinterpretations by DOJ and FISC led to the creation of the wall, which was contrary to the original intent of the statute. Attempts to clarify this requirement under the USA PATRIOT Act were unnecessary and gave rise to other constitutional issues.

Jonathan Gannon, From Executive Order to Judicial Approval: Tracing the History of Surveillance of U.S. Persons Abroad in Light of Recent Terrorism, 6. J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 59 (2012). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Gannon, previously DOJ NSD and now Assistant Vice President and Senior Legal Counsel at AT&T, notes that counterterrorism investigations involving the activities of USPs abroad are on the rise. He examines the history of surveillance, the power vested in the Attorney General in EO 12333 to authorize overseas surveillance (at issue in U.S. v. Bin Laden), and §§ 703 and 704 of the 2008 FAA.

Scott J. Glick, FISA’s Significant Purpose Requirement and the Government’s Ability to Protect National Security, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 87 (2010). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Glick, Senior Counsel at DOJ NSD’s Office of Law and Policy 2011-17, examines the FISCR’s decision to let stand certain restrictions on the government’s use of FISA. He argues that the court reached an erroneous conclusion in regard to the scope of the government’s power. Article legislative history of FISA’s purpose requirement, both before and after In re Sealed Court, proposing removing restrictions imposed by FISCR.

Elizabeth Goitein, Another Bite out of Katz: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance and the “Incidental Overhear” Doctrine, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2018). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Goitein, Co-Director of the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program, observes that after DOJ began notifying criminal defendants in 2013 (from the post-Clapper debacle) that evidence used in their trials derived from FISA, regular Article III courts began considering incidental acquisition. Looking at the arguments presented in U.S. v. Mohamud (9th Cir. 2016), U.S. v. Hasbajrami (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2018); and U.S. v. Muhtorov (D.Colo. 2015), she argues that under Katz, the § 702 acquisition of USP communications fails to meet the reasonableness requirement.

Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145 (2004). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Howell, who in 2001 was serving as General Counsel of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary for Committee Chair Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), outlines the compromises made during passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, noting that due to the expediency of the process, there was little chance to build public understanding of, or confidence in, the statute—heightening the need for continued public discussion of the legal implications of the law.

Margaret Hu, Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2018). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Hu, Associate Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University School of Law, argues that bulk biometric metadata collection likely falls outside the protections embedded in the USA FREEDOM Act.

Orin S. Kerr, The Modest Role of the Warrant Clause in National Security Investigations, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1669 (2010). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Kerr, now Professor of Law at USC Gould School of Law, grapples with the modest role played by the Warrant Clause in national security cases, attributing judicial reluctance to enforce it to the lack of legislative guidance, diplomatic implications, difficulty harmonizing disparate legal regimes, and uncertainty.

David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 209 (2013). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Kris, AAG of NSD while the § 215 bulk telephony program was in place, analyzes five related legal issues that arose post-Snowden: NSA dependence on the theory as to the “relevance” to an FBI terrorism “investigation”; direction from FISC to produce metadata to the NSA, not to the FBI; the timing of the production required from the provider (daily and ongoing); restrictions on the use and dissemination of the data (including the RAS query standard); and whether and to what extent the legal arguments in support of bulk telephony metadata collection could apply to other kinds of business records.

David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, (Brookings Inst., Geo. U. L. Ctr. & Hoover Inst. Counterterrorism and Am. Statutory L. Working Paper, 2008), https://perma.cc/C25A-HKAL. Kris discusses the justification for and meaning behind the PAA, the Responsible Surveillance that is Overseen, Reviewed and Effective (RESTORE) Act, and the FAA. The paper argues for a new approach to communications that takes account of new technologies and increased globalization. Note: paper also appears in a slightly updated version in Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform, Benjamin Wittes, ed., Brookings Press (2009).

David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 487 (2006). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Kris provides a history of the rise and fall of the wall. He argues that security and liberty can be better protected with the wall down than with the wall up as foreclosure of the use of civilian courts may elicit the use of less desirable remedies.

David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and Beyond, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 377 (2016). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Kris makes predictions about political and technological trends that will have the biggest impact on surveillance. This includes increasing pressure on FISA's "technical assistance" provisions, a growing but unmet need for international agreements to resolve cross border data requests, the increasing indeterminacy of location on the internet and the increasing availability of open source and social media, which creates significant problems and opportunities for U.S. intelligence and counter-intelligence.

Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 (2003). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Lerner, Professor of Law at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, observes problem with Rowley Memo (critiquing FBI HQ decision not to pursue Mousaoui) was disparate views of probable cause, arguing against an absolute rule in favor of a PC balancing test. The Article explores the history of PC.

Peter Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs” in Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act: The Virtues and Deficits of Post-Snowden Dialogue on U.S. Surveillance Policy, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1283 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Margulies, Professor of Law Roger Williams University School of Law, states that the “foreign affairs” prong of “foreign intelligence information” under § 702 deals largely with matters ancillary to diplomacy, arguing for recognition of this interest. He notes the impact of PPD 28 and argues for the inclusion of amici at the FISC.

Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2014). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Margulies argues that the fiduciary concept of relevance was a reasonable interpretation of § 215 in light of the history of government secrecy and that a “dynamic conception” of surveillance authorities would better integrate secrecy, deliberation, and strategic advantage.

Peter Margulies, Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act: A Blueprint for Enhancing Privacy Protections and Preserving Foreign Intelligence Capabilities, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 23 (2016). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Margulies urges legislative changes to enhance technological safeguards and use of public advocate as an adversarial party (in addition to amici) at FISC, simultaneously arguing against the use of warrants for querying U.S. person information collected downstream (via ISPs).

Peter Margulies, Surveillance by Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized Intelligence Collection, and Human Rights, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1045 (2016). [Westlaw] [Hein] Margulies agrees with surveillance critics that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially. Machine access to data can cause both ontological harm, stemming from individuals’ loss of spontaneity, and consequential harm, stemming from errors that machines compound in databases such as no-fly lists. Schrems went too far, though, by failing to acknowledge that human rights law provides states with a measure of deference in confronting threats such as ISIS.

Valsamis Mitsilegas, Surveillance and Digital Privacy in the Transatlantic “War on Terror”: The Case for a Global Privacy Regime, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., Spring 2016, at 1. [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Mitsilegas, Professor of European Criminal Law at Queen Mary University of London School of Law, analyzes U.S. and EU law, noting the latter’s greater privacy protections. He examines the governance structures adopted to take account of the differences as part of the evolution of transatlantic counterterrorism cooperation and argues that, in light of the increasingly globalized nature of mass surveillance, states should work toward the establishment of a global privacy regime. Article addresses TFTP, PNR, MLATs, SWIFT, and the Microsoft case.

Andrew E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1201 (2007). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Nieland discusses the evolution of NSLs, arguing that the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 failed to accomplish meaningful reform.

Paul Ohm, The Argument Against Technology-Neutral Surveillance Laws, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1685 (2010). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Ohm, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law, provides the strongest arguments in favor of technology-neutral statutes, and the underappreciated counterarguments, ultimately making a case for Congress to shift to a tech-specific approach.

Deborah Pearlstein, Before Privacy, Power: The Structural Constitution and the Challenge of Mass Surveillance, 9 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 159 (2017). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Pearlstein, Professor of Law at Cardozo Law School, argues that the structural approach undergirding broad readings of sovereign state conduct in external affairs bears little relation to the type of authority exercised under Exec Order 12,333 and that, while functional necessity is an important structural purpose, it cannot be evaluated independent of the parallel goal of preserving a free society—an interest at the heart of bulk collection. Article notes that the Court’s 1972 recognition of executive power was narrowly framed: domestic surveillance “necessary to protect the nation” from attack, in which particular individuals would be targeted for surveillance (not whether authority extends to collecting transmissions along an entire channel of communications, to include “incidental” collection of an unidentifiably large quantity of Americans’ domestic communications). The classic constitutional case for executive power here (based on text, case law, functional necessity, historical practice, and congressional acquiescence) does not support the claim that Article II authorizes E.O. 12333-type bulk collection without either front-end congressional authorization or back-end judicial review.

Daphna Renan, The FISC’s Stealth Administrative Law, in GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 121 (Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2016). [Ebook] Renan, Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, using § 702 as a case study, looks at FISC’s increasing reliance on administrative rules to provide context for 4th Amendment reasonableness and proposes that institutions like PCLOB ensure more transparent and participatory rulemaking.

Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Rubenfeld, Professor of Law at Yale Law School, argues that the 4th Amendment has been misconstrued to guarantee a right to privacy but instead establishes a right of security. This construct rejects special needs doctrine, warrantless interception of domestic and international communications, and incidental collection.

Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 244 (2007). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Ruger, Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania Law School, assesses Rehnquist’s 25 appointments to FISC and finds a conservative cohort inclined to favor the government on 4th Amendment issues—an approach consistent with the majority of judges on the inferior federal bench. FISCR reflected a more hegemonic pattern, with a more uniformly conservative bench.

Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. 112 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Schlanger, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School, argues that the intelligence legalism embedded in FISA, EO 12333, and NSA’s compliance and oversight institutions reinforces compliance with existing oversight but does not create more protections for privacy and civil liberties. The question is “Can we do x?,” consistent with law, not “Should we do x?” in light of interests and the risks posed to rights.

Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287 (2008). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Schwartz, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley School of Law, highlights gaps in the Wiretap Act, Pen Register Act, Stored Communications Act, FISA, and NSL provisions and considers NSA domestic surveillance, suggesting that the collection of telecommunications statistics is largely ritualistic, a form of privacy theater that perpetuates the myth of oversight. The article argues for provisions that will minimize the impact of surveillance on civil liberties and maximize its efficacy for law enforcement purposes.

Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and the Lessons of Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 97 CAL. L. REV. 407 (2009). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Schwartz argues that for there to be participation in a democracy, individuals must have an underlying capacity for self-determination provided by some personal privacy. Therefore, private liberty is a precondition for public liberty. As such, information must be adequately protected from government intrusion.

Richard Henry Seamon, Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449 (2008). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Seamon, Professor of Law at the University of Idaho College of Law, argues that the President has inherent authority and congressionally irreducible power to respond to true national security threats outside of FISA, but that this power does not justify the continuance of TSP beyond the weeks immediately following 9/11.

Christopher Slobogin, Cause to Believe What? The Importance of Defining a Search’s Object-Or, How the ABA would Analyze the NSA Metadata Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725 (2014). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Slobogin, a Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School, raises question about how probable cause and reasonable suspicion relate to the object of a search (e.g., that a search “might lead” versus “will produce” evidence of wrongdoing), highlighting the tangential nature of the § 215 telephony metadata program. He applies the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards) to the program.

Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 (2008). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Solove, a Professor of Law at George Washington Law School, faults the analytical construct applied to data mining for adopting a utilitarian approach that undervalues the myriad liberty interests involved, skewing the analysis in favor of greater government power.

Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264 (2004). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Solove analyzes the scope, standards, and enforcement mechanisms embedded in ECPA, the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, the Pen Register Act, and FISA, as well as more deep-rooted and systematic concerns, concluding that surveillance law is overly intricate and complex, has failed to keep pace with new technologies, and lacks sufficient judicial and legislative oversight.

Geoffrey R. Stone, The NSA’s Telephone Meta-data Program: Part I, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 24, 2013), https://perma.cc/GU88-UJN5.
________. The NSA’s Telephone Meta-data Program: Part II, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2013), https://perma.cc/HP4S-D9JR.
________. The NSA’s Telephone Meta-data Program: Part III, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 31, 2013), https://perma.cc/J79M-WKN2.
________. Is the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Meta-data Program Constitutional?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2014), https://perma.cc/CQ7B-XLZ5.
________. Is the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Meta-Data Program Constitutional: Part II, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2014), https://perma.cc/UMQ4-G6S9
________. The NSA’s Telephone Meta-data Program Is Unconstitutional, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/BGY8-LPKR.
Stone, Professor of Law and former Dean of the University of Chicago Law School and member of the President’s Review Board, writes a six-part blog post discussing the contours and constitutionality of the § 215 program, concluding that it is unconstitutional.

Katherine Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association’s Specificity Requirement, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y (ISJLP) 327 (2014). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Strandburg, Professor of Law NYU School of Law, emphasizes the importance of the First Amendment in assessing the legality of the collection and analysis of metadata that includes associational information. She proposes three specific requirements to pass constitutional muster (promotion of a specific compelling government interest; a sufficiently close nexus to that specific interest; and necessary in that there are no substantially less burdensome means to achieve that specific interest) and applies them to the NSA’s § 215 telephony metadata program.

Peter Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306 (2004). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Swire, Professor of Law at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, provides a thoughtful analysis of the history and theory of the U.S. system of foreign intelligence surveillance law and proposals for reform.

K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2003). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Taipale, Executive Director of the Stilwell Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy, argues that new technologies can provide security for privacy by building in rule-based processing, selective revelation, and strong credential and audit features.

K.A. Taipale, The Ear of Dionysus: Rethinking Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH 128 (2007). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Taipale considers how transit intercepts, collateral intercepts, content filtering, traffic analysis, and link or pattern analysis relate to the statutory language of FISA and proposes new language to address deficiencies in the law.

Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Vladeck, Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law, looks at the evolution of FISC from its founding through 2015, arguing that the orders for bulk or programmatic collection of foreign intelligence surveillance do not, in any meaningful way, resemble a warrant, which means that an alternative Article III justification (which has not yet been provided) must be established for them. While Congress provided for adversarial process, the fact that it had seldom been used opened the door to Constitutional challenge.

Patrick Walsh, Stepping on (or Over) the Constitution’s Line: Evaluating FISA Section 702 in a World of Changing “Reasonableness” Under the Fourth Amendment, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 741 (2015). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Walsh, Associate Professor at the Judge Advocate General’s School, reviews judicial decisions and PCLOB findings concerning § 702 that have thus far upheld the program’s constitutionality but with significant reservations and limitations and discusses relevant Fourth Amendment case law that courts have not yet considered in the context of § 702. The Article concludes that jurisprudence has laid the groundwork that a future court may use to find that FISA § 702 violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches.

Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A Practical History of the USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 37 (2005). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Woods, former chief of the FBI’s National Security Law Unit, analyzes § 215 in light of the counterintelligence needs of law enforcement to obtain transactional data. He proposes two changes to address civil liberties and counterintelligence: (a) limiting its application to transactional records that are truly relevant to authorized investigations by certain language; and (b) inserting the notice requirements from FISA’s electronic surveillance, physical search, and PRTT provisions into § 215 (i.e., requiring notice where the government intends to “enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court” information so obtained), and giving the aggrieved party a procedure to challenge its use in a criminal proceeding.

John Yoo, The Legality of the Nationality Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 901 (2014). [Westlaw] [Lexis] [Hein] Yoo, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Office of Legal Council (2001-03) and Professor of Law at UC Berkeley Law School, discusses the evolution of al Qaeda and argues that the § 215 program meets statutory and constitutional requirements.

C. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORTS

ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL30465, THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW DECISIONS (2007). [FAS] [Local] Comprehensive (103 page) report recounts the history of FISA and subsequent amendment of the statute via the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, the 2002 Homeland Security Act, the 2002 Intelligence Authorization Act, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the 2005 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, and the 2006 USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act. Report also addresses FISC’s publicly-available opinions as well as Exec. Order 12333.

ELIZABETH B. BAZAN ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., RL33424, GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PHONE CALLING ACTIVITY AND RELATED RECORDS: LEGAL AUTHORITIES (2007). [FAS] [Local] Addresses recently-released public information about NSA collection programs and progress of related litigation, as well as statutory authorities regarding access by the government, for either foreign intelligence or law enforcement purposes, to information related to telephone calling patterns or practices.

ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL34143, P.L. 110-55, THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007: MODIFICATIONS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2008). [FAS] [Local] Discusses alterations made to FISA by the PAA of 2007 and their potential impact on and parallels to existing law, as well as recent legislative developments.

VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RES. SERV., R43534, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: SELECTION OF JUDGES (2014). [FAS] [Local] Responding to increasing attention paid 2013-14, the report considers various Congressional proposals to change the manner in which judges are appointed to FISC/FISCR.

JARED P. COLE & ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RES. SERV., R43451, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW (2014). [FAS] [Local] Identifies potential legal questions related to a range of Congressional proposals introduced post-§ 215 to alter FISC/FISCR: public advocates, amicus curiae, en banc panels, voting rules, selection of FISC/FISCR judges; mandatory disclosure of court opinions.

CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., RL33320, NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL BACKGROUND (2015). [FAS] [Local] Doyle discusses early judicial reaction to the PATRIOT Act, inspector General's Reports on NSL Amendments, Post-Amendment Judicial Action, and the recommendations of the President's Review Group.

EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RES. SERV., R40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015 (2011). [FAS] [Local] Discusses extension of three FISA-related provisions: USA PATRIOT Act Section 206 (amending FISA to permit roving wiretaps); USA PATRIOT Act § 215 (tangible goods); and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6001(a) (amending FISA to permit “lone wolf” targeting).

EDWARD C. LIU & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R40980, GOVERNMENT COLLECTION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES RELATED TO THE USA PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION (2011). [FAS] [Local] Discusses controversial aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act and exploring the arguments that undergirded support for and opposition to the measures.

EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R43459, OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NSA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES (2015). [FAS] [Local] Describes § 215 bulk telephony metadata program and § 702 interception of Internet-based communications targeted at foreigners underseas that inadvertently acquires U.S. persons’ communications. Addresses constitutional challenges to both programs at FISC, as well as civil actions or criminal proceedings in non-specialized Article III courts.

EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RES. SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT (2013). [FAS] [Local] Discussing H.R. 5949 (which extended Title VII of FISA until Dec. 31, 2017), and addressing the contours of Title VII, as well as the subsequent litigation.

EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RES. SERV., R44457, SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGNERS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) (2016). [FAS] [Local] Edward Liu discusses the use and implementation of § 702. Specifically, the scope of acquisitions, certifications procedures, exigent circumstances, and constitutional challenges.

ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R43260, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE (2014). [FAS] [Local] Considers the legal nature of the office of a public advocate, Article II’s Appointments Clause, and Article III restrictions.

ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RES. SERV., R43362, REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: PROCEDURAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGES (2014). [FAS] [Local] Addresses host of bills designed to make procedural and operational changes to FISC including amicus curiae, en banc proceedings, voting rules requiring between 60 and 100% of the judges to concur.

D. ADDITIONAL SOURCES

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (Aug. 9, 2013). [WWW] [Perma] White paper explaining the government's legal basis for the NSA's FISA program enacted as part of 215 of the Patriot Act.

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