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Cover for Transformation of Payment Models in the World Bank: Does the Result-based Payments (Program-for-Results Financing) Really Reduce Corruption in Borrowing Countries?
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dc.contributor.advisorBednarzik, Robert
dc.creator
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-16T19:46:00Z
dc.date.available2019-01-16T19:46:00Z
dc.date.created2018
dc.date.issued
dc.date.submitted01/01/2018
dc.identifier.uri
dc.descriptionM.P.P.
dc.description.abstractThis study finds a surprising correlation between the engagement of Program-for-Results (PforR) Financing, a results-based financing mechanism started by the World Bank in 2012, and the corruption in a beneficiary country. Countries using the program tend to have higher corruption. It was expected that an external intervention of a results-based financing program would be associated with a lower level of corruption in the government. Regression models built on the empirical literature used the control of corruption index as the dependent variable and the dummy independent variable indicating whether the country participated in the PforR controlling for significant influences on corruption. The results of the regression indicate that the engagement of PforR is unexpectedly negatively associated with the cleanliness of governance, that is, the engagement of PforR appears to worsen the level of corruption in the government. The probable explanation for the results may be the reverse choice, which means that the World Bank is more likely to apply this mechanism to the operations in the countries with higher level of corruption. In addition, overestimates of the inputs in the program operations may also be a reason for higher corruption.
dc.formatPDF
dc.format.extent49 leaves
dc.languageen
dc.publisherGeorgetown University
dc.sourceGeorgetown University-Graduate School of Arts & Sciences
dc.sourcePublic Policy & Policy Management
dc.subjectcorruption
dc.subjectexternal intervention
dc.subjectnegatively associated
dc.subjectPforR
dc.subject.lcshPublic policy
dc.subject.lcshOceania -- History
dc.subject.otherPublic policy
dc.subject.otherHistory of Oceania
dc.titleTransformation of Payment Models in the World Bank: Does the Result-based Payments (Program-for-Results Financing) Really Reduce Corruption in Borrowing Countries?
dc.typethesis
dc.identifier.orcid0000-0003-2148-5521


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