|dc.description.abstract||Minority shareholders in public companies represent a significant component of today’s corporate regulations. Numerous studies have illustrated how safeguarding them with decent protections could correspond to the development of the nation’s stock exchange and attract investments. Indeed, the importance of minority shareholders guided the OECD to urge the nation’s legislators to absorb these protections into their domestic laws. In addition, the Saudi government declared its long-term economic vision for the nation to be fulfilled by 2030. One important element of this vision is to polarize foreign investments. To achieve the previous intention, Saudi Arabia needs to adjust its legal infrastructure to meet its objective.
Saudi Arabia passed its newly reformed corporate law at the end of 2015. One
intention of this law’s passage was to attract foreign investment. However, this thesis argues that the new corporate law has failed to protect minority shareholders of publicly held joint stock companies and, hence, would fail to attract investments. This thesis sheds light on the importance of recognizing the ownership structure of the Saudi stock exchange when evaluating the protections the new law carries. This thesis argues that the substantial safeguards and protections the law provides have failed to protect minority shareholders. The significant deficiency, this thesis explains, in the Saudi companies law is its failure to provide practical private enforcement tools, which minority shareholders of public joint stock companies could deploy in the event of expropriation and abusiveness. This thesis proposes appropriate remedies that could solve the law deficiency in regards to minority shareholders.||en_US