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    Dangerous by Design: The American Special Operations Institution and Strategy in Irregular Warfare

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    Creator
    Livieratos, Cole
    Advisor
    Bennett, Andrew
    Abstract
    The United States Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as a struggle among state and nonstate actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. Yet, despite the centrality of influence and legitimacy in this definition and military doctrine, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has almost exclusively relied on force while fighting irregular wars since 9/11. Why have strategies employed by United States special operations forces in irregular warfare converged on the use of force to the exclusion of other forms of power like inducement and persuasion? I argue that SOCOM’s convergence on strategies of force resulted from the path dependent nature of the civil-military institution surrounding special operations. Congress uniquely designed SOCOM to have a dual operational and institutional role, generating strong feedback channels not seen elsewhere in the military. The degree of feedback SOCOM receives from its operations varies according to their salience, while the type of feedback—positive or negative—is determined by the perceived appropriateness of the operations and forces who conduct them. I test my theory by tracing the development of SOCOM, paying particular attention to its treatment of three types of units that proxy for different applications of power: direct action units that apply force, Psychological Operations units that apply persuasion, and Special Forces units that have the capability to apply various forms of power. Using interviews with over 50 elite policymakers and special operations personnel, an original discrete choice experiment and survey instrument, archival research, and analysis of primary source materials from SOCOM, the Pentagon, and Congress, I find that direct action force is considered to be more salient and appropriate than inducement or persuasion. The positive feedback generated by the use of force and negative feedback from the use of persuasion helped SOCOM’s direct action units lock in leadership positions and sustain institutional arrangements that continued to prioritize the use of force. My research contributes to the understanding of how civil-military relations shape the selection of military strategies broadly, and it specifically offers important insights for how states select strategies in irregular warfare.
    Description
    Ph.D.
    Permanent Link
    http://hdl.handle.net/10822/1062655
    Date Published
    2021
    Subject
    civil-military relations; information operations; irregular warfare; military strategy; special operations; International relations; Military art and science; Political Science; International relations; Military studies; Political science;
    Type
    thesis
    Embargo Lift Date
    2023-09-23
    Publisher
    Georgetown University
    Extent
    632 leaves
    Collections
    • Department of Government
    Metadata
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    Georgetown University Seal
    ©2009 - 2022 Georgetown University Library
    37th & O Streets NW
    Washington DC 20057-1174
    202.687.7385
    digitalscholarship@georgetown.edu
    Accessibility