2003 Iraq War : intelligence or political failure?

dc.creator	Brunson, Dione.	en
dc.date.accessioned	2012-02-10T16:31:16Z	en
dc.date.available	2012-02-10T16:31:16Z	en
dc.date.created	2011	en
dc.date.issued	2011	en
dc.identifier.other	APT-BAG: georgetown.edu.10822_553294.tar;APT-ETAG: 99c47ca79947b4020ea108c0ff5245ba; APT-DATE: 2017-02-13_10:03:45	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10822/553294	en
dc.description	Thesis (M.A.L.S.)--Georgetown University, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references.; Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format. The bold U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was anchored in intelligence justifications that would later challenge U.S. credibility. Policymakers exhibited unusual bureaucratic and public dependencies on intelligence analysis, so much so that efforts were made to create supporting information. To better understand the amplification of intelligence, the use of data to justify invading Iraq will be explored alongside events leading up to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. This paper will examine the use of intelligence to invade Iraq as well as broader implications for politicization. It will not examine the justness or ethics of going to war with Iraq but, conclude with the implications of abusing intelligence.	en
dc.format	application/pdf	en
dc.language	eng	en
dc.publisher	Georgetown University	en
dc.source	Liberal Studies Program, Masters dissertations, 2011.	en
dc.subject	Political Science	en
dc.title	2003 Iraq War : intelligence or political failure?	en
dc.type	thesis	en

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