Institutional impedance : why the post-war American military fails to adapt irregular war
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2009.; Includes bibliographical references. This paper hypothesizes that the institutional United States military's failure to fight effectively in these environments stems from its difficulty in constructing a flexible theory of victory and its preference for ignoring the integration of non-military factors in campaign planning. A structured, focused comparison of American and British counterinsurgency campaigns before and after World War Two illustrates the increased inflexibility and comparative inability to integrate political initiatives in American counterinsurgency campaigns. This correlates to the growth in political influence on the part of the institutional United States military.
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http://hdl.handle.net/10822/553517Date Published
2009Type
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Georgetown University
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(Georgetown University, 2021)The United States Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as a struggle among state and nonstate actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. Yet, despite the centrality of influence and legitimacy in ...
