dc.creator | Piotrowicz, Edward J. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-10T16:35:36Z | en |
dc.date.available | 2012-02-10T16:35:36Z | en |
dc.date.created | 2011 | en |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | en |
dc.identifier.other | APT-BAG: georgetown.edu.10822_553559.tar;APT-ETAG: 5722a39ac77a8570d7ecf10007a923e3 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10822/553559 | en |
dc.description | Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2011.; Includes bibliographical
references.; Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format. Does intelligence make a difference in
war? Two World War II battles provide testing grounds for answering this question. Allied
intelligence predicted enemy attacks at both Midway and Crete with uncanny accuracy, but the
first battle ended in an Allied victory, while the second finished with crushing defeat. A new
theory of intelligence called "Decision Advantage," illuminates how the
success of intelligence helped facilitate victory at Midway and how its dysfunction
contributed to the defeat at Crete. This view stands in contrast to that of some military and
intelligence scholars who argue that intelligence has little impact on battle. This paper uses
the battles of Midway and Crete to test the power of Sims's theory of intelligence. By the
theory's standards, intelligence in the case of victory outperformed intelligence in the case
of defeat, suggesting these cases uphold the explanatory power of the theory. Further
research, however, could enhance the theory's prescriptive power. | en |
dc.format | application/pdf | en |
dc.language | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Georgetown University | en |
dc.source | Security Studies Program, Masters dissertations, 2011. | en |
dc.subject | Military History; International Relations | en |
dc.title | The battle for intelligence : how a new understanding of intelligence illuminates
victory and defeat in World War II | en |
dc.type | thesis | en |