Building the golden bridge : does military pressure or incentives best explain increased success in counterinsurgency amnesty programs?
Weinger, Travis Kaiser.
Thesis (M.A.)--Georgetown University, 2010.; Includes bibliographical references.; Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format. This paper investigates the dynamics behind counterinsurgency amnesty programs and instances of mass insurgent defections. Using the two most prominent Western counterinsurgency theories -- coercion theory and hearts and minds theory -- as a foundation, the study seeks to determine whether military pressure or incentives offered better correlates with dramatic increases in insurgent defections. Using historical data from the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War, the paper explores the relationship between insurgent defections and military pressure and incentives offered through amnesty programs. The study finds that in eight of the nine periods of mass defection under investigation, military pressure is a much better correlate than amnesty program incentives. Upon further analysis, novelty emerges as the key factor in explaining why some instances of military pressure encourage mass defections and others do not.
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Civilization and the Modern Military: Does Increased Military Spending Lead to Higher Levels of Innovation in Society Jia, Xixiang (Georgetown University, 2014)This paper used a series of two way fixed effect models to test the hypothesis that higher military expenditure will boost the quantity and quality of innovation. The dataset in this paper is a merged dataset from the World ...