dc.description | Thesis (M.P.P.)--Georgetown University, 2011.; Includes bibliographical
references.; Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format. All government agencies are affected by a
broad number of factors that determine how they do their job. It is particularly important for
regulatory agencies in the area of consumer protection, that they complete their tasks in a
way that is both fair and beneficial for consumers. In this paper, I attempt to assess the
effect of a variety of political, economic, and budgetary factors on the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regarding their role in horizontal merger
enforcement. I use three simple regression models with the dependent variable of the number of
mergers challenged by the DOJ, FTC, and combined. The independent variables assessed are the
total number of mergers filed, party of the President, ideological measurements of the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees, S&P 500 growth, the unemployment rate, and the
budgets of the two agencies. I find that the political variables have no significant effect in
any of the three regressions. The number of mergers filed is significantly and positively
correlated in all three regressions. S&P 500 growth and unemployment both have a
significant effect on the number of merger challenges by the DOJ but not the FTC. Both the FTC
and DOJ are significantly affected by the size of their respective budgets. In the overall
regression, I find that unemployment, S&P 500 growth, and budgets have a significant
impact on the total number of mergers challenged. The differential effect of the economic
factors on the DOJ and FTC can help to show policymakers the strengths and weaknesses of the
two agencies as well as show what factors might contribute to an agency's ability to equitably
and effectively complete is job. | en |