Sectorial Evolution as a Hindrance to Policy Implementation: The 2008 Argentine Agricultural Conflict

Abstract

This work seeks to explain the 2008 agricultural crisis and subsequent defeat of Resolution 125/2008 in the Argentine Senate. The project develops a model which predicts the creation of a disconnect between economic and political actors should one of the two evolve asymmetrically to the other. A consequence of this disconnect is a decrease in the political capacity to impose on a given set of economic actors thereby hindering governance. The model is tested using the case of the Argentine agricultural sector, which underwent a paradigm change during the late 20th Century.

In the studied case, a notable decrease in political capacity is seen, which corresponds to an earlier shift in the productive structure used by the grain producing sector. This disconnect is argued as being a primary factor in the 2008 Argentine agricultural conflict and subsequent defeat of Resolution 125/2008. The model is demonstrated to be an accurate predictor of behavior in this case.