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    As If: The Fiction of Executive Accountability and the Persistence of Corruption Networks in Weakly Institutionalized Presidential Systems. Argentina (1989-2007)

    Cover for As If: The Fiction of Executive Accountability and the Persistence of Corruption Networks in Weakly Institutionalized Presidential Systems. Argentina (1989-2007)
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    Creator
    Guillan-Montero, Aranzazu
    Advisor
    Mujal-Leon, Eusebio
    Abstract
    This dissertation seeks to understand patterns of systemic corruption that undermine the quality of democracy It presents a theoretical framework to explain the limits of executive accountability in weakly institutionalized presidential democracies, and explores the emergence, organization and transmission of corrupt practices under weak institutions.
     
    Building upon a case study of Argentina, but also introducing the comparative dimension, this research examines how weak formal institutions and informal rules and practices may hinder executive accountability. The study also addresses how, under these conditions, actors sharing illicit goals are able to agree on informal mechanisms of corrupt exchange to circumvent formal norms, and aims to explain the institutionalization of political corruption.
     
    The strength of checks on the executive is explained by focusing on legislators' willingness to defend their prerogatives against encroachment--a function of the actual workings of institutions. Legislators with low levels of institutional commitment do not effectively perform their oversight responsibilities nor invest in strengthening the legislature's capabilities. However, they use oversight mechanisms to informally bargain with the executive for particularistic benefits in exchange for not enforcing sanctions. The executive relies on both formal and informal resources to assert its authority and shrink accountability, neutralizing specialized oversight agencies and paying off legislators. While specialized oversight bodies may produce relevant information, this is hardly consequential if the linkages between different accountability agents do not work properly and legislators do not hold the executive accountable.
     
    This research identifies the informal institutions that uphold the development of corrupt elite cartel networks, and the mechanisms that facilitate their reproduction by ensuring the impunity of corrupt officials. Actors that share illicit goals craft informal mechanisms that provide critical resources (such as iteration and reputation) to overcome the credible-commitment problems that weak institutions produce. The root causes of impunity arise from the enforcement of an informal rule that allows corruption, which shapes incentives facing accountability agents in charge of punishing corrupt practices through criminal sanctions. Among other means, corrupt practices are transmitted through episodes of rule-breaking and informal sanction. By punishing those who attempt to enforce the law, while protecting those who act within the informal rule, actors indicate the costs of non-compliance and discourage others from taking these actions. Building on this analysis, the dissertation advances recommendations for anticorruption policy reform in new democracies.
     
    Description
    Ph.D.
    Permanent Link
    http://hdl.handle.net/10822/558062
    Date Published
    2011
    Subject
    Accountability; Argentina; Corruption; Democracy; Political Institutions; Presidentialism; Political Science; Public policy; Latin America; Research; Political Science; Public Policy and Social Welfare; Latin American Studies;
    Type
    thesis
    Publisher
    Georgetown University
    Extent
    620 leaves
    Collections
    • Department of Government
    Metadata
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    Georgetown University Seal
    ©2009 - 2023 Georgetown University Library
    37th & O Streets NW
    Washington DC 20057-1174
    202.687.7385
    digitalscholarship@georgetown.edu
    Accessibility