Show simple item record

Files in this item

Cover for Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: An Assessment
dc.contributor.advisorBrown, Johnen
dc.creatoren
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-16T19:31:58Zen
dc.date.available2013-05-16T19:31:58Zen
dc.date.created2011en
dc.date.issueden
dc.date.submitted01/01/2011en
dc.identifier.otherAPT-BAG: georgetown.edu.10822_558087.tar;APT-ETAG: 3572656b0cfa51bd43edc22eb456cdce; APT-DATE: 2017-02-13_17:14:02en
dc.identifier.urien
dc.descriptionM.A.L.S.en
dc.description.abstractSince soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States military has been engaged in Afghanistan. In 2009, the U.S. began pursuing a strategy of counterinsurgency designed to protect the population, win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, and build a legitimate, allied government in Kabul. This effort has been characterized by push-pull operations designed to push the insurgency and the population away from each other and pull the population towards the central government.en
dc.description.abstractThis thesis uses the foundational documents and teachings of counterinsurgency to assess the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. It shows that the American counterinsurgency effort is failing and, as currently practiced, is unlikely to ever succeed.en
dc.formatPDFen
dc.format.extent104 leavesen
dc.languageenen
dc.publisherGeorgetown Universityen
dc.sourceGeorgetown University-Graduate School of Arts & Sciencesen
dc.sourceLiberal Studiesen
dc.subjectAfghanistanen
dc.subjectCounterinsurgencyen
dc.subjectUnited Statesen
dc.subject.lcshInternational relationsen
dc.subject.otherInternational relationsen
dc.titleCounterinsurgency in Afghanistan: An Assessmenten
dc.typethesisen


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record