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Cover for On Reasons to Live Justifiably: In Support of a Humean Contractualist Account of Moral Reasons
dc.contributor.advisorRichardson, Henry Sen
dc.creatoren
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-21T16:30:54Zen
dc.date.available2014-08-21T16:30:54Zen
dc.date.created2014en
dc.date.issueden
dc.date.submitted01/01/2014en
dc.identifier.otherAPT-BAG: georgetown.edu.10822_710038.tar;APT-ETAG: f94cbe5b4cc608cd4660c5c70212ca3den
dc.identifier.urien
dc.descriptionPh.D.en
dc.description.abstractThe goal of this dissertation is to explore a new answer to the very old question, "Why be moral?" Or, as the question is often phrased today, "What reason does one have to be moral?" I begin my investigation into this question (what I call the `WM' question) with the keen analysis of it given by T. M. Scanlon in articulating his contractualist answer in What We Owe to Each Other (1998). Although I take Scanlon's view - what he calls an account of the `motivational basis of morality' - to be quite promising, I lodge two objections against it. First, Scanlon does not avail himself of the most complete answer that he could to the WM question. And second, his account of which reason one has to be moral is imbedded in a grand theory that provides a problematic explanation of the existence of reasons. I then argue that strengthening Scanlon's account in response to the first objection makes attractive an alternative theory of reasons, the adoption of which responds to the second objection. In short, I argue that Scanlon can and should accept an account on which one has reason to act rightly because one has reason to live with others on mutually justifiable terms - a reason that one has because she has the further reason to have intimate relationships with others. This latter reason, then, is explainable in a plausible, naturalistic way by the Humean Theory of Reasons (HTR), on which an agent's particular desires explain her reasons for action.en
dc.description.abstractThe result of modifying Scanlon's account in the direction suggested is a view that I call a Humean Contractualist Account of Moral Reasons, or HCA. After making the initial case for such a view in the first two chapters, I spend chapters 3 and 4 completing a sketch of HCA. I then spend the final three chapters defending it from important criticisms. In the end, I conclude that HCA is promising and deserving of further consideration.en
dc.formatPDFen
dc.format.extent268 leavesen
dc.languageenen
dc.publisherGeorgetown Universityen
dc.sourceGeorgetown University-Graduate School of Arts & Sciencesen
dc.sourcePhilosophyen
dc.subjectcontractualismen
dc.subjectHumeanismen
dc.subjectmoral motivationen
dc.subjectreasonsen
dc.subjectScanlonen
dc.subjectT.M.en
dc.subjectSchroederen
dc.subjectMarken
dc.subject.lcshPhilosophyen
dc.subject.lcshEthicsen
dc.subject.otherPhilosophyen
dc.subject.otherEthicsen
dc.titleOn Reasons to Live Justifiably: In Support of a Humean Contractualist Account of Moral Reasonsen
dc.typethesisen


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