To What Do We Have Moral Obligations and Why? II
BMJ (British Medical Journal). 1985 Jun 8; 290(6483): 1734-1736.
Following up on his 1 June 1985 article on moral obligations to living human beings versus other sentient beings, Gillon focuses on arguments for and against prohuman "speciesism," the claim that "viability" is a justifiable criterion for differentiating between humans that may be killed and those that may not, and claims that "personhood" is a morally relevant differentiating concept. He discusses the positions taken by Peter Singer and Dame Mary Warnock on "speciesism," and the theories of such philosphers as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Michael Tooley regarding the essence of personhood. He sees no solid basis for grounding the scope of moral obligations on simple sentience, membership in the human species, or technical differentia such as viability, and concludes that medical ethics still suffers from the lack of an adequate theory on which to base a right to life. (KIE abstract)
Abortion; Allowing to Die; Beginning of Life; Bioethics; Congenital Disorders; Ethical Theory; Ethics; Fetuses; Human Characteristics; Human Rights; Killing; Life; Medical Ethics; Moral Obligations; Moral Policy; Newborns; Personhood; Philosophy; Rights; Right to Life; Self Concept; Speciesism; Suffering; Value of Life; Viability;
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Gillon, Raanan (1985-06-01)In one of a series of articles on philosophical medical ethics, Gillon examines the nature of moral obligations entailed in the claim that all innocent human beings have a fundamental right to life. He considers four moral ...