Harming, Not Aiding, and Positive Rights
Kamm, Frances Myrna
Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1986 Winter; 15(1): 3-32.
Kamm considers the implications if the following two theses should prove true: killing and letting die are morally equivalent per se (Thesis E), as are harming and not aiding in cases where less than life is at stake (Thesis GE). She argues that each thesis has two versions, with one having broader implications than the other for deriving new rights or duties. These rights and duties are limited, however, by the need to apply the theses uniformly to cases that are equivalent in all respects. Kamm supports her arguments by exploring the notion of moral equivalence, discussing the methodology of testing for it, and broaching the subject of whether Theses E and GE are, in fact, true. (KIE abstract)
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