Uncertainties About 'Painless' Animals
Bioethics. 1989 Jul; 3(3): 226-235.
Macer explores whether it is possible to genetically alter animals to reduce or eliminate their capacity to feel pain, whether it would be ethical to do so, and how we would regard animals that do not feel pain. A possible use for such animals would be as subjects for laboratory research. Among the scientific, philosophical, and ethical uncertainties of pain that Macer considers are: can we define pain? how do we measure pain and anxiety? is pain always related to suffering? what is the minimum level of pain that a being must be able to feel before we reach the conclusion that it should not be used by other beings? are we justified in using beings that do not feel pain when we would not be if they did feel pain and suffer from it? (KIE abstract)
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