Death and Reductionism: A Reply to John F. Catherwood
Journal of Medical Ethics. 1992 Mar; 18(1): 40-42.
This reply to John F. Catherwood's criticism of brain-related criteria for death argues that that brainstem criteria are neither reductionist nor do they presuppose a materialist theory of mind. Furthermore, it is argued that brain-related criteria are compatible with the majority of religious views concerning death.
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Lamb, David (1992-03)In this reply to David J. Cole it is argued that the medical concept of death as an irreversible phenomenon is correct and that it does not conflict with ordinary concepts of death. (KIE abstract)
Lamb, David (1991-06)This reply to Martyn Evans's support for a cardiac-centred concept of death attempts to meet some objections to the brainstem definition of death. Evans's appeal to Wittgenstein's philosophy is also criticised.