Ethics Consultation: A Dangerous, Antidemocratic Charlatanry?
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. 1993 Fall; 2(4): 438-442.
Giles Scofield's argument indicates ethics consultants may need to better clarify what in fact they are and what they are not doing, claiming, and striving for. But we must not step back too far. We must neither engage in putting in envious professional claims for exclusive rights in the area of difficult and momentous decisions in healthcare nor get stuck in discussing normative ethics at the level of metaphysics, ontology, and dogmatics (as has happened in Germany for decades). We must not do so especially in view of the achievements of ethics consultation and the growing demand for it by all parties involved, conceded even by sceptics. Ethics consultation, according to Scofield, appears to be dangerous....Let us look more closely at the logic of the argument by discussing the presumed "antidemocratic" nature. The "new tyranny" of thoughts, and the "proper" role of bioethics consultation. Some considerations about the possibility of ethics expertise shall be left for the end.
Autonomy; Bioethics; Communication; Competence; Consultation; Decision Making; Democracy; Education; Ethicist's Role; Ethicists; Ethics; Ethics Committees; Ethics Consultation; Interdisciplinary Communication; Metaphysics; Nature; Normative Ethics; Professional Competence; Rights; Social Dominance; Technical Expertise;
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Task Force on Standards for Ethics Consultation: Response to "Ethics Consultation: The Least Dangerous Profession? " (CQ Vol 2, No 4) Arnold, Robert; Youngner, Stuart J. (1996-03)
Scofield, Giles R. (1993)[I]nstead of accepting their claims, society must consider how it might otherwise benefit from the knowledge clinical ethicists possess in a way that is consistent with its fundamental values. As it turns out, the one ...
Self, Donnie J. (1993)Scofield's article is an extremely important paper that is well-written, carefully and articulately argued, but fundamentally wrong, i.e., philosophically wrong. His position ultimately leads to pure subjectivism of values ...