Substantial Identity and the Right to Life: A Rejoinder to Dean Stretton
Bioethics 2007 February; 21(2): 93-97
In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro-life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro-life position is rightly understood--being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature -- this position does not lead to the difficulties Stretton claims it does.
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Stretton, Dean (2004-06)In 'The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence', Patrick Lee argues that the right to life is an essential property of those that possess it. On his view, the right arises from one's 'basic' or 'natural' ...
Lee, Patrick (2004-06)This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms, who, embryology reveals, came to be at ...