The Pro-Life Argument From Substantial Identity: A Defence
Bioethics 2004 June; 18(3): 249-263
This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms, who, embryology reveals, came to be at conception/fertilisation. I reply to the objection to this argument (as found in Dean Stretton, Judith Thomson, and Jeffrey Reiman), which holds that we came to be at one time, but became valuable as a subject of rights only some time later, in virtue of an acquired characteristic. I argue against this position that the difference between a basic, natural capacity and some degree of development of such a capacity is a mere difference in degree, that this position logically implies the denial of equal personal dignity, and that the selection of the required degree of development of a capacity is necessarily arbitrary.
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The Pro-Life Argument From Substantial Identity and the Pro-Choice Argument From Asymmetric Value: A Reply to Patrick Lee Reiman, Jeffrey (2007-07)Lee claims that foetuses and adult humans are phases of the same identical substance, and thus have the same moral status because: first, foetuses and adults are the same physical organism, and second, the development from ...
Lee, Patrick (2007-02)In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro-life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro-life position is rightly ...
Elliott, Kevin (2007-02)William Hurlbut, a Stanford University bioethicist and member of the President's Council on Bioethics, recently proposed a solution to the current impasse over human embryonic stem cell research in the United States. He ...