Subjective Character of Experience in Medical Ethics: A Reply to Atkins
Journal of Applied Philosophy 2004; 21(2): 219-223
In a recent issue of this Journal Kim Atkins argued that Thomas Nagel's argument regarding a bat's phenomenal experience is important for understanding the value placed on patient autonomy in medical ethics. In this reply to her paper, I demonstrate that Atkin's argument (a) is based on her misinterpretations of Nagel's argument, and (b) can be established without appealing to such a controversial assumption as that which she makes.
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Atkins, Kim (2000)
"It's All Too Subjective": Scepticism About the Possibility or Use of Philosophical Medical Ethics Gillon, Raanan (1985-05-25)In one of a series of articles on philosophical medical ethics, Gillon rebuts the argument that moral claims are essentially different from scientific claims because scientific claims are objective and confirmable or refutable, ...
Gillon, Raanan (1985-05-25)