Subjective Character of Experience in Medical Ethics: A Reply to Atkins
Journal of Applied Philosophy 2004; 21(2): 219-223
In a recent issue of this Journal Kim Atkins argued that Thomas Nagel's argument regarding a bat's phenomenal experience is important for understanding the value placed on patient autonomy in medical ethics. In this reply to her paper, I demonstrate that Atkin's argument (a) is based on her misinterpretations of Nagel's argument, and (b) can be established without appealing to such a controversial assumption as that which she makes.
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"It's All Too Subjective": Scepticism About the Possibility or Use of Philosophical Medical Ethics Gillon, Raanan (1985-05-25)In one of a series of articles on philosophical medical ethics, Gillon rebuts the argument that moral claims are essentially different from scientific claims because scientific claims are objective and confirmable or refutable, ...