Structural Estimation of a Principal-Agent Model: Moral Hazard in Medical Insurance

dc.creator	Vera-Hernandez, Marcos	en
dc.date.accessioned	2016-01-09T00:05:59Z	en
dc.date.available	2016-01-09T00:05:59Z	en
dc.date.created	2003-12	en
dc.date.issued	2003-12	en
dc.identifier	doi:10.2307/1593783	en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Rand Journal of Economics 2003 Winter; 34(4): 670-693	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://worldcatlibraries.org/registry/gateway?version=1.0&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&atitle=Structural+estimation+of+a+principal-agent+model:+moral+hazard+in+medical+insurance&title=Rand+Journal+of+Economics+&volume=34&issue=4&spage=670-693&date=2003-12&au=Vera-Hernandez,+Marcos	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1593783	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10822/996111	en
dc.format	Article	en
dc.language	en	en
dc.source	eweb:265560	en
dc.subject	Insurance	en
dc.subject.classification	Philosophical Ethics	en
dc.subject.classification	Right to Health Care	en
dc.subject.classification	Economics of Health Care	en
dc.title	Structural Estimation of a Principal-Agent Model: Moral Hazard in Medical Insurance	en
dc.provenance	Citation prepared by the Library and Information Services group of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University for the ETHXWeb database.	en
dc.provenance	Citation migrated from OpenText LiveLink Discovery Server database named EWEB hosted by the Bioethics Research Library to the DSpace collection EthxWeb hosted by DigitalGeorgetown.	en

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